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Citizenship,
Territoriality, and
Post-Soviet Nationhood
The Politics of Birthright
Citizenship in Azerbaijan,
Georgia, and Moldova
Maxim Tabachnik
 Citizenship, Territoriality, and Post-Soviet
Nationhood

“This fine book captures a moment in the identity negotiations of three lesser
known communities of the former Soviet space: Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Moldova. Among other things, it shows the resilience of identity in the old
developed cultures vis-a-vis its mutability in the recent artificially-created ones. It
also underscores the error of regarding the development of identities in post-So-
viet nations as a function of a natural inclination for liberal democracy. Full of
fascinating data, the book should be of interest to every student of PSS.”
—Liah Greenfeld, Professor, Sociology, Political Science, and Anthropology,
Boston University, USA

“This book represents an invaluable contribution to present-day scholarship in a

number of respects. It provides extensive information on the contemporary sit-
uation in three ex-Soviet border states, where Western governments have thus
far not been able to compete effectively with Russia for influence because of the
Russians’ far greater knowledge of the area. As an expression of the pre-mod-
ernist school of nationalism studies, this book also explains clearly and in detail
the historical background which led to and still influences the situation in these
countries, as a corrective to modernist studies which have left their readers bewil-
dered when history reared its head. From a theoretical perspective, this study
draws a crucial distinction between civil nationalism, based on liberal-demo-
cratic values, and territorial nationalism, based on birth in the territory which
a state occupies, showing that conflation of civic and territorial nationalism has
been the product of a naive assumption, based upon a particular interpretation
of the Euro-American experience and resulting in systemic misunderstanding of
the political situations in other areas of the world, that they are both manifesta-
tions of the same political impulse, when in fact, territorial nationalism can be
motivated by factors which are not liberal-democratic at all. The book also gives
comparative insight into the motivations which governments have for adopting
one or another policy regarding dual citizenship, a topic which will inevitably
be addressed in broader circles as more and more people around the world avail
themselves of this option.”
—John Myhill, Full Professor, English Department, University of Haifa, Israel
“Maxim Tabachnik has revolutionized the study of citizenship and nationalism
in general by reformulating the ‘ethnic’ (bad) ‘civic’ (good) distinction into one
between ‘ethnic’ and ‘territorial.’ He has demonstrated convincingly, using the
example of the post-Soviet states, that an ethnic/territorial distinction is much
better able to account for differences in the outlooks and policies of these and
other states than the traditional paradigm. The book also provides a fascinating
study of the development of citizenship thinking throughout the ages. In short,
this is a book from which both regional specialists of the post-Soviet space and
students of nationalism in general have much to learn.”
—André Liebich, Honorary Professor of International History and Politics,
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Switzerland

“This book makes important advances in the study of citizenship, nationalism,

and national identity politics. Drawing on extensive primary research in and on
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, the book offers rich empirical account of how
and why elites in the post-Soviet region craft more or less inclusive citizenship
rules. The author’s central argument that territorial and civic nationalism, while
often used interchangeably, are in fact distinct concepts of collective identity both
in their historical origin and in their impact on citizenship policy making in mod-
ern states will engage scholars of nationalism far beyond the post-Soviet region.”
—Oxana Shevel, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science,
Tufts University, USA

“This book makes an important contribution to the scholarship of citizenship

in post-Soviet states by exploring the origins of citizenship laws in Azerbaijan,
Moldova and Georgia. This is an interesting book that highlights how ethnic
identity, territorial nationalism, concerns of territorial integrity and geopoli-
tics collide to define boundaries of citizenship in these countries. The book is
rich with detail and relevant to contemporary events in the post-Soviet region.
Sociologists, political scientists, historians studying nation-state-building in the
contemporary era should read it.”
—Shushanik Makaryan, Ph.D., Researcher, Population Research Institute,
Pennsylvania State University, USA
 Maxim Tabachnik

Citizenship,
Territoriality,
and Post-Soviet
Nationhood
The Politics of Birthright Citizenship
in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova
Maxim Tabachnik
Department of Politics
University of California, Santa Cruz
Santa Cruz, CA, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-12881-4 ISBN 978-3-030-12882-1 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12882-1

Library of Congress Control Number: 2019935512

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction
on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
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To my grandparents and all victims of the Second World War
and ethnic genocide
 Preface

This book, based on the findings of my Ph.D. research, was born out
of my fascination with ethnicity and ethnic belonging. I grew up in the
Soviet Union, in the city of Ufa, the capital of what is currently known
as the Republic of Bashkortostan, a subject of the Russian Federation.
Bashkirs, the titular ethnicity, constitute less than a third of the region’s
population, the rest shared almost equally between Russians and Tatars.
Street signs and much of the local media, however, was in Bashkir, even
if most of Bashkir speakers lived in rural areas. Bashkirs also dominated
leadership positions in the region. This situation seemed strange to me
growing up.
While I haven’t examine my home region’s history specifically, now,
of course, I know that the borders cutting across ethnic populations are
the result of the infamous Soviet nationalities policy, masterminded by
the Commissar for Nationalities Joseph Stalin in the early 1920s. The
overrepresentation of the titular ethnic group in leadership position is
the likely effect of korenizatsiya, the 1920s policy of “rooting” ethnici-
ty-based administrative regions in titular cultures to increase support for
the newly established Bolshevik regime.
One of Stalin’s policy goals was to avoid pan-Turkism, or the nation-
alist idea of unifying all Turkic-speaking people into one political state.
From that point of view, it was important to break them down into as
many ethnic groups as possible (those were meticulously established by
Soviet social scientists) and, just as it was done with other ethnic groups,
to mismatch administrative and ethnic borders. I assume that the clearly

vii
viii    Preface

reduced borders of the potentially insurgent Tatar Republic are the result
of the same preoccupation. Tatars had been the most politically and cul-
turally active Turkic ethnic group in the Russian Empire. Bashkortostan
ended up with more than double territory of Tatarstan. Many, if not
most, of Bashkortostan’s Tatars live in the districts that border Tatarstan.
The fall of the Kazan Khanate (a prominent descendant of the
Mongol empire) to Ivan the Terrible in 1552 (commemorated by the
construction of the postcard-famous St. Basil’s Cathedral in Red Square)
is a key milestone in the political consolidation of the Russian state
and the catalyst of its spectacular territorial expansion into Siberia and
beyond that has made Russia by far the largest territorial state in the
world, even today, after the loss of many of its possessions during the
rise and fall of the Soviet Union. Russian Federation is an inheritor of
the empire with an uneasy relationship between ethnic Russian collective
identity and that of over 160 other ethnolinguistic groups.
To explain my interest in ethnicity fully, I have to come back to
my family history. My mother Irina, an ethnic Russian (or so she was
convinced before I discovered her Ukrainian roots) married my father
Mark, an ethnic Jew. The ethnic tension within the family was ever-­present
during my childhood, which went along with the overall anti-Semitic
general sentiment I encountered among my peers, despite of the Soviet
ideological values of ethnic equality and brotherhood we were taught in
school. When I started secondary school, I had to choose my “nationality”
from the two options available to me (nationality was an infamous “fifth
graph” entry in the Soviet passport). My teacher told me to put down
“Russian” because it is better. My family thought so, too. My patronymic
(derived from my father’s first name) and my last name (Jewish-Ukrainian)
remained “Jewish,” however, which led to frequent questions.
The more I dug into my family history, the more I realized how drasti-
cally ethnic identity affected it. My paternal grandmother Lyuba grew up
in a Jewish-Ukrainian village on the border with Poland. She spoke many
languages fluently, including Yiddish and Ukrainian. One day she went for
a brief visit to her aunt in Kiev. Turned out, it was destiny’s way to save
her from an imminent death. All her numerous immediate family perished
during the first day of the War as the Nazi troops crossed from Poland
into Western Ukraine, leaving her the sole survivor. She never recovered
from that trauma fully. I also found out that maternal great-grandmother
Katya, the key person during my childhood, was an ethnic Ukrainian. Her
“kulak,” or rich peasant, family was stripped of possessions in Chernigov,
 Preface    ix

Ukraine, and sent on a wheel cart to Siberia. Throughout her life, she
always traveled to the West, spending long periods of time in Lvov and in
Riga as she lost all her three husbands to the War and the Stalinist repres-
sions. The two family branches met in Ufa, a safe place just West of the
Ural Mountains away from the Nazis for one, and a half-way escape from
the Siberian exile for the other (of course, Ufa is also famous for being the
exile destination of Vladimir Lenin during the tsarist regime).
One of Katya’s daughters Lyusya moved westward, first to Kazan
and then to Riga, Latvia, together with many other Russian-speakers
recruited by the Soviet state to man newly built factories there. Thanks
to Lyusya, I was able to spend summers in Riga, which retained its
Germanic and Western European feel despite decades of Sovietization in
the aftermath of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states as the result of
the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi
Germany. I was able to witness the surge of the nationalist movement in
Latvia, and even the entry of Soviet tanks into Riga during the August
Coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, which led to
the dissolution of the country that I grew up in. Upon Latvia’s inde-
pendence, Lyusya, like most of the Russian “invaders,” became stateless
and received the “passport of non-citizen” of Latvia, which served as her
identification document. As all government and business communication
was switched into Latvian, her daughter Galina‘s Latvian skills became
crucial for survival. Later, during my years spent in Barcelona, I was
shocked about how similar the Catalan nationalist movement was to the
Latvian one, but also to the Bashkir one, to the Tatar one, to the Russian
one. Ethnic nationalism clearly had very defined ideological qualities.
The logical continuation for my curiosity about the nature of ethnic
consciousness was to delve into the existing scholarship on nationalism
during my graduate studies at Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and
the University of California, Santa Cruz. The first thing I discovered, to
my surprise, was that the term “nationalism” meant different things in
the West and in the East. By nationalism in Russia (and probably the rest
of Central and Eastern Europe), we mean to say “ethnic nationalism.”
In the West, the term refers to the principle of organizing the world into
territorial nation-states, a type of political organization that has become
standard practice since the French Revolution (with the important prece-
dents of English and American Revolutions).
This difference gave me great insight and threw me into the midst of
the biggest conceptual debate of the nationalism field over the ethnic/civic
x    Preface

dichotomy. This concept is a renamed version of the contradiction between

Eastern and Western nationalisms described by Hans Kohn at the end of
the Second World War. He suggested that nationalism is the East is based
on blood and in the West on liberal-democratic values. While most schol-
ars agree that there are two types of nationalism, their definitions, nature,
and origin are still widely debatable, not unlike the very concept of eth-
nicity itself. As such, I discovered that the central idea of ethnic identity
and ethnic nationalism, a community of blood and descent, was somehow
deemphasized and even completely lost, possibly due to political correct-
ness, especially when looking through the prism of US-based academia.
Moreover, empirical cases didn’t always seem to fit theory and definitions
either, which led to many scholars giving up on applying the ethnic/civic
dichotomy to real-life cases of nationalism.
This book is a response to these observations. It comes up with its
own interpretation of the history of nationalism. While constructing a
history of nationalism is a gargantuan task, my attempt at it has allowed
me to argue that Western/civic nationalism has two components, one—
inherently related to the rise of the West (read, individualism and liberal
democracy), but the other one based on a community of territory. The
latter has been in continuous tension with ethnic collective identity since
times immemorial. Not only the subdivision of ethnic nationalism into
liberal-democratic and ethnic components recasts the way we see the his-
tory of civilization but it makes the ethnic/civic dichotomy applicable in
empirical research, not only for Western cases but also for those of the
rest of the world, including the former Soviet Union.
Last but not least, behind it all stands my belief in the intrinsic seduc-
tive danger and unfairness of ethnicity and blood descent as a political
ideology. I hold this belief because of my family history as well as the his-
torical examples from the Second World War and the wave of inter-eth-
nic atrocities committed as the Communist bloc collapsed (let alone
endless others in the history of humankind). This book is homage to all
victims of ethnically induced violence and, ultimately, to the importance
of remembering our history and the realization that it deeply shapes
of who we are today, in ways often unforeseen. Through my study of
nationalism in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, I invite you to make
your own conclusion about ethnic nationalism and its place in history
and current political life.

Santa Cruz, USA Maxim Tabachnik

 Acknowledgements

I express deep gratitude to the Department of Politics, University of

California, Santa Cruz, for continuous academic, financial, and moral
support; my dissertation committee: Professors Ben Read, Eleonora
Pasotti, Matt O’Hara and especially my advisor, Prof. Roger Schoenman,
for their guidance, as well as:

• Prof. Rainer Bauböck, Chair in Social and Political Theory, Department

of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute;
• Prof. John Etherington, Department of Political Science and Sociology,
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona;
• Prof. Jerry Hough, Department of Political Science, Duke University;
• Shushanik Makaryan, Social Science Research Institute, Penn State
University, for practical advice with field research;
• Field contacts Asima Nasirli, Prof. Lala Aliyeva (Baku State University),
Mehman Namazov, Ali Huseynli, Konul Bayramova in Azerbaijan;
Daria Jitaru (Paliamentary Archive of Moldova), Victoria Doncila
(National Library of Moldova), Prof. Aliona Cara (Moldova State
University), Lydia Galus in Moldova; Demna Janelidze and Prof.
Thomas Weir in Georgia;
• Delta Air Lines, its empathetic employees and the Delta Scholarship
Fund for financial and other support;
• Santa Cruz Women’s Club for continuous financial support;

xi
xii    Acknowledgements

• The governments of Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia as repre-

sented by the officials that agreed to interviews, in their goodwill
support of this research effort;
• All the interviewees who agreed to be part of this project and with-
out whom, it would have been impossible;
• On a personal note, my parents Irina and Mark Tabachnik, grand-
parents Lyubov and Izrail Tabachnik, aunt Galina Zhubritskaya, my
friends Kyla Czerwinsky, Mark Formanek, Dmitry Razumovskyi,
Mike Melamed, Gilbert Murillo, Nicole Lordy, Ryan Watt, and
Valerie Herbunot; my mentor Prof. Nelly Furman, for their support
prior and during this work; the dedicated staff of the Divinitree
yoga studio in Santa Cruz, CA for keeping me grounded and
healthy throughout graduate school;
• Last but not least, to all the devoted teachers at Ufa Secondary School
No. 50, later known as Political Science Gymansium No. 1, such as
my first teacher Zoya Dmitriyevna, Zilya Ishkaleyevna Kazikova, Nina
Borisovna Maksimova, Lidiya Lerovna Smorigo, Galina Gadiyevna
Arslanova, Yelena Yuryevna Alekseeva, Zuhra Zakiyevna Rahimova,
just to name a few, and all others who contributed to the pedagogical
success of Soviet secondary education, which gave me the solid intel-
lectual foundation that serves me to this day.
 Contents

1 Introduction: Territorial National Identity in Russia’s

“Buffer Zone” 1

Part I The Battle Between Blood and Territory:

Academic, Historical and Institutional Setting

2 The Academic Setting 11

3 The Historical and Institutional Settings 33

Part II The Politics of Unconditional Jus Soli in the

Post-Soviet States with Frozen Conflicts

4 Citizenship Policy Highlights 71

5 Frozen Conflicts and Politics of Territorial Citizenship 99

6 Historical Collective Identity 119

7 The “Fifth Column”: Jus Soli and Geopolitics of Dual

Citizenship 193

xiii
xiv    Contents

8 Georgian Azeris: Victims and Beneficiaries

of Territorial Nationalism 221

9 Abkhazia: A View from a de Facto State 243

Part III Making Sense of the Findings

10 Theoretical Analysis 261

11 Conclusion: Toward Territorial Nationalism? 281

Index 283
 List of Figures

Chapter 4
Fig. 1 Evolution of unconditional jus soli and dual citizenship
legislation in post-Soviet states with frozen territorial conflicts 72

Chapter 5
Fig. 1 Ethnic composition of post-Soviet countries with frozen
conflicts (Source CIA Worldbook, except for Transnistria
[Encyclopædia Britannica.com], Abkhazia [UNPO.org]
and S. Ossetia [Gutenberg.org]) 100

Chapter 6
Fig. 1 “Bessarabia is Romania” on the walls of Bucharest, 2014 132
Fig. 2 “Moldovans are Romanians” on the walls of Chisinau, 2015 133
Fig. 3 “Bessarabia is Romania”, a political poster from Romania, 2012 134
Fig. 4 Rate of approval of Women’s marriage by nationality
(Source The Caucasus Barometer) 154

Chapter 8
Fig. 1 Rate of approval of women’s marriage to Georgian Azeris
(Source The Caucasus Barometer) 231

xv
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Territorial
National Identity in Russia’s “Buffer Zone”

The presumption that ethnic identification would disappear with con-

tinuous modernization and globalization explains the relative loss of
academic interest in ethnicity and identity politics before the fall of the
USSR in 1991 (Freni 2011:6; Suny 1989:504). This event shocked
political scientists as did the brutal inter-ethnic warfare in Yugoslavia that
claimed thousands of lives right in the heart of Europe. There is little
doubt that a collective search for identity and belonging is now at the
forefront of global politics and is even behind such pressing develop-
ments as jihadism and terrorism (Attwood 2015). Ethnic nationalism has
firmly entrenched itself in the West but is also threatening the Islamic
world as well as post-colonial states of North Africa and Southwest Asia
(Murphy 2010:770). Ethnic identification and ethnic prejudice reinforce
each other (Meeus et al. 2010:319) and are behind the rise of the far-
right movement in the West and even, as some claim, the election of
Donald Trump in the USA (Chait 2016).
The disintegration of the Soviet bloc unleashed an immense wave of
ethnic nationalism. While all 15 Soviet Union republics progressed to
become independent nation-states, some inter-ethnic conflicts in that
process “froze”: unresolved, they linger on, de facto separatist states exe-
cuting full control of their territories with outside (read, Russian) sup-
port but no international recognition. Such are the separatist conflicts
in Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia. Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria,
Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, respectively, have existed as de facto states
for almost 30 years. Their very existence prevents Azerbaijan, Moldova,

© The Author(s) 2019 1

M. Tabachnik, Citizenship, Territoriality, and Post-Soviet Nationhood,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12882-1_1
2 M. TABACHNIK

and Georgia from forging stronger ties to the West, be it closer asso-
ciation with the EU or NATO. While these three countries have been
recognized as a “new and surprisingly enduring geopolitical space”
due to the frozen conflicts (Toal 2017:4), I call these states a “buffer
zone” between Russia and the West. Located, as a foreign service offi-
cial from Abkhazia labeled it, on the imaginary “border between the US
and Russia” (Tania 2016), the three buffer states continuously vacillate
between a pro-Russian and a pro-Western political orientation. This is
happening at the time of the lowest point of the US-Russian relations
since the Cold War, when any small trigger can lead to escalated confron-
tation. The geopolitical importance of the buffer zone, therefore, is diffi-
cult to overstate. An escalation of the frozen conflicts has the potential to
disrupt the entire international system (Berg 2018:4).
Upon this backdrop, a peculiar collective identity development has
taken place. Despite the dominance of ethnic nationalism (and defining
the nation by blood relations) in the post-Soviet space (PSS), Azerbaijan
and Moldova have opted for a strikingly territorial definition of the
nation (I assume that, broadly, citizenship rules stand for a national
membership policy designed by the nation-state). Both of these coun-
tries have bestowed citizenship on anyone born on their territories, a
policy known as unconditional jus soli. It is typically contrasted to jus
sanguinis (citizenship by blood). Today’s national membership is decided
mostly by one of the two legal principles, together known as birthright
citizenship (Ehrkamp and Jacobsen 2015:157). Jus sanguinis is ubiqui-
tous but few states use jus soli, and especially its unconditional version,
associated with liberal democracies and the American continent. In the
USA, President Trump made unconditional jus soli a campaign slogan
and recently threatened to eliminate it by an executive order leading to
a wave of protests (Davis 2018). No such policy exists in the rest of the
PSS, Europe or Eurasia, except for the two states mentioned.
While Moldova’s democracy is somewhat tangible, Azerbaijan has
been continuously criticized for its authoritarianism and a progres-
sively worsening human rights record. Did these countries turn away
from ethnic nationalism to reconnect to the residents of frozen con-
flicts? This seems plausible. However, Georgia, the third buffer zone
country, practices not only no unconditional jus soli but no jus soli ele-
ments whatsoever. Uncovering the reasons behind the persistence of
citizenship policies of territorial nationalism (by territorial nationalism
I mean, in this case, defining the nation by the territory v. by ethnicity)
 1 INTRODUCTION: TERRITORIAL NATIONAL IDENTITY … 3

in Azerbaijan and Moldova and their absence in Georgia is the grand task
of this book.
I argue that citizenship policies of territorial nationalism (or their
absence) in the three countries with frozen conflicts have been condi-
tioned not by liberal-democratic development associated with civic
nationalism but three factors: territorial integrity concerns, historical
collective identity, and geopolitics of dual citizenship. These findings
are based on archival and secondary sources and, more importantly, on
almost 100 in-depth interviews with politicians, academics, constitutional
lawyers, policy analysts, and journalists during my fieldwork stays in the
region.
Why do I insist on the term “territorial” nationalism and avoid the
term “civic” nationalism? In an attempt to clarify the continuous con-
fusion surrounding the concept of civic nationalism, I have argued for
a conceptual separation between “civic” and “territorial” nationalisms
(Tabachnik 2019). Civic nationalism is territorial (it defines the nation by
the territory of the state and not by blood), but it is also based on liber-
al-democratic values and is a product of modernity. Pre-modernist school
of nationalism thought, on the contrary, testifies to the long history of
the tension between blood and territory that goes back to pre-modern
times (Hastings 1997; Myhill 2006). This tension may be an intrin-
sic attribute of land-based societies that had left the nomadic lifestyle
behind. I, therefore, agree with scholars who, while recognizing nation-
alism and citizenship as products of modernity, see the political nation
as a modification of pre-modern collective identity (Coleman 1995:49–
50; Hastings 1997:29–30). The tension between ethnic and territorial
collective identities has been going on continuously since pre-modern
times and is parallel to the better-recognized one by the public debate,
between ethnic nationalism and liberal democracy.
The ethnic/territorial tension is extremely impactful in Russia whose
relationship with the West is at its worst due to, among other issues,
Russia’s takeover of Crimea, its alleged role in the military conflict in
Eastern Ukraine and its apparent efforts to meddle into Western political
processes, all too reminiscent of Cold War tactics. To fully understand
Russia’s motivations, it may be helpful to see Russia as “torn state” (in
the words of Russian nationalist writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn) caught
between its remaining imperial ambitions (and thus, a territorial under-
standing of the nation) and the desire to reconnect to the 25 million eth-
nic Russians cut off in 1991 by the dissolution of the USSR (the ethnic
4 M. TABACHNIK

understanding of the nation) (Zevelev 2001:52–53). Affinity with eth-

nic Russians and Russian speakers in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine largely
conditions Russian public opinion. Russian culture and language have
been used as the basis for the expansion of citizenship to residents of
post-Soviet states. This perspective is usually absent from Western analy-
ses of the ongoing conflict between Russia and the West, as well as from
their view of many other political developments in the globalized world,
where an ages-old but little-noticed struggle to define collective identity
by blood or territory, continues. The separatist conflicts in the buffer
zone may be frozen, but they are ready to explode at any moment.
Clashes between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh forces, for example,
are almost ongoing.
A re-ignition of just one of these conflicts is likely to result in a clash
between Russian and Western interests, and as such, to threaten the sta-
bility of the whole international order. Residents of the frozen conflicts
have been linked to Russia by its expansionist citizenship policies. The
majority of the populations of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria
have Russian citizenship, and of Nagorno-Karabakh—Armenian one. As
Armenia depends on Russian military support, such situation effectively
puts the key to the control of the destiny of the frozen conflicts into
Russian hands.
As a new frozen conflict is born in Eastern Ukraine (and the country,
thus, may eventually drift into the “buffer zone” by default despite its
connection to the West), this work also contributes to the scholarship
on frozen conflicts and unrecognized states in the PSS (King 2001:525).
Understanding the politics of identity in the states with frozen conflicts
(which are at the core of the conflicts themselves) may open new ave-
nues for their resolution and the eventual pacification of these pockets
of regional and global geopolitical instability in an international order
already challenged by new state creation as in the cases of East Timor,
South Soudan, Kosovo as well as Britain’s referendum to exit the
European Union. Scholars had lamented the “critical gap in our under-
standing of the security developments in the former Soviet Union”—the
resolution of the frozen conflicts is necessary, urgent and possible but has
stalled due to the lack of comparative research (Dov 2002:832).
The book’s findings are rich with theoretical implications to existing
nationalism scholarship. Territorial integrity concerns, including pacify-
ing separatist and inter-ethnic conflicts, have not been previously linked
to jus soli citizenship explicitly. Yet, as we will see, citizenship by birth
 1 INTRODUCTION: TERRITORIAL NATIONAL IDENTITY … 5

on the territory can be a powerful indicator of a larger, territorial, con-

cept of national identity in place due to a combination of structural and
instrumental factors. In Azerbaijan, unconditional jus soli became part of
the state policy of de-ethnicization of national identity implemented with
the goal of preventing further separatism and the country’s disintegra-
tion. In Moldova, unconditional jus soli lacked the deliberate character
of the Azerbaijani policy but, nevertheless, helped reconnect to the resi-
dents of the separatist territory and became an intrinsic feature of the ter-
ritorial concept of the Moldovan nation. In Georgia, however, the power
of ethnic nationalism did not allow it to link to residents of frozen con-
flicts through jus soli.
Theoretical implications of the second driver of citizenship policy, his-
torical collective identity, are even more impactful. First, they suggest
that citizenship policy and, by extension, the concept of national iden-
tity are inherently historical, in support of Roger Brubaker’s theory that
contrasted German and French citizenship policies (1990). I argue that
this is valid even in cases of newly created nation-states with little to no
history of independent statehood during modern times, as is the case of
the three countries under study. Second, in an important adjustment to
Brubaker’s theory, I suggest that such historical collective identity may
be not only ethnic and civic, as he claimed, but also territorial. Third,
I suggest that such identity can be even pre-modern joining the voices
of pre-modernist scholars who have criticized the modernist approach
to nationalism. Modernists see nations as modern and both nation and
ethnicity as largely mythological, constructed and, therefore, less and less
relevant in the modern world.
Both in Azerbaijan, where the language changed names to Turkish
and then back to Azeri (the script changing four times in the twentieth
century) and many still lament not being called Turks, and in Moldova,
where the Supreme Court consisting of dual citizens of Romania
renamed the language from Moldovan to Romanian, historical circum-
stances thwarted the development of ethnic identity and largely contrib-
uted to the continuing confusion about whether Azeris are really Turks
and Moldovans are really Romanians. In Georgia, an ethnic understand-
ing of the nation is conditioned by centuries worth of sacred mythol-
ogy but, more importantly, the historical role of language and religion in
the consolidation of ethnic collective identity in pre-modern times. In all
three cases, the weight of history on both the concepts of national iden-
tity and citizenship policies is simply too heavy to discard.
6 M. TABACHNIK

Finally, the connection between jus soli politics, dual citizenship, and
geopolitics is another important contribution to nationalism and citi-
zenship studies. Dual citizenship has been rapidly expanding globally
(Brøndsted Sejersen 2008) as it had firmly entered the human rights
agenda (Spiro 2010) greatly aided by the recommendation in the 1997
European Nationality Convention of the Council of Europe (Checkel
2001; Joppke 2008:4).
The connection between the politics of jus soli, geopolitics of dual cit-
izenship, however, came as a surprise in my research. It became apparent
only when Azerbaijan canceled its unconditional jus soli in 2014 due to
fears of foreign interference and further tightened its ban on dual citi-
zenship. On a closer look, the other two cases had a similar connection,
if not with the same empirical outcome. In Moldova, complete dual cit-
izenship liberalization under the passportization assault by Romania and
Russia contributed to the seamless acceptance of unconditional jus soli,
which appeared as a result of a legal oversight. In Georgia, jus soli was
rejected on the grounds of it being conducive to dual citizenship, from
the beginning seen as beneficial to Russia and threatening the country
with further separatism through its “fifth column.”
The Azerbaijani state has been the most decisive in its use of jus soli
policy in the overall attempt to manage collective identity in order to
retain territorial integrity and prevent ethnic conflict. While historical
collective identity may be on its side, geopolitical pressures are not. It is
yet to be seen whether the cancelation of unconditional jus soli in 2014
will result in the re-ethnicization of national identity in Azerbaijan and
with it, a re-ignition of inter-ethnic conflicts on its borders with Russia
and Iran. Moldova has recognized the value of jus soli for its efforts
to reconnect with the residents of Transnistria as well as for retaining
inter-ethnic peace in the country. In Georgia, however, the government
has not responded to NGO calls to introduce jus soli in its citizenship
law, which complicates the life of its ethnic minorities and the integration
of migrants. I devote a separate chapter to the plight of Georgian Azeris,
both in Georgia and Azerbaijan, as well as another chapter on the per-
spective on the Georgian national identity politics from inside the frozen
conflict, Abkhazia.
From a normative perspective, the book demonstrates the political
attractiveness of the territorial definition of the nation. Such definition
allows for a continuous separation between the modern state and histori-
cal ethnicity, which may counterbalance the tendency by historical ethnic
 1 INTRODUCTION: TERRITORIAL NATIONAL IDENTITY … 7

groups to demand their own state as posited by theories of nationalism

(Gellner 1983) and thus avoid border revisions and disgruntled ethnic
minorities. The separation between the state and ethnicity, as the expe-
rience of Azerbaijan (and, to the lesser extent, of Moldova) suggests,
may offer an alternative by constructing an ethnically blind territorial
nation independently of the liberal-democratic development. Defining
its national membership by territory rather than ethnicity will force the
nation-state to reinvent itself in order to meet the intrinsic human need
for collective and historical belonging without discrimination but would
arm it well for current global political, economic, and environmental
challenges in an interdependent world.

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 PART I

The Battle Between Blood

and Territory: Academic, Historical
and Institutional Setting

Part I describes the book’s academic context demonstrating the contin-

uous scholarly disagreement on the nature, typology and history of the
nation and nationalism. As it introduces the concept of territorial nation-
alism, it also offers the reader the historical context of the institution of
citizenship from the perspective of the ethnic/territorial tension both in
the West and in the post-Soviet space.
 CHAPTER 2

The Academic Setting

Since its beginnings in the works of Hans Kohn in the middle of the
twentieth century, academic literature on nationalism has been character-
ized by an intense conceptual debate and ambiguity (Brubaker 1999:55).
The lack of conceptual consensus may be, in fact, the main hurdle in this
subfield of political science (Hutchinson and Smith 1994:3–4) at the
intersection of comparative politics and international relations. Some
scholars have even suggested that no definition of the central concept
of nationalism studies, the nation, may be devised whatsoever (Seton-
Watson 1977:5). This debate has been the most divisive in the case of
“ethnic/civic nationalism,” where the differences between the dominant
modernist school of nationalism thought collide with its critics the most.
I suggest that a deeper reflection on ethnic/civic nationalism and dis-
tinguishing territorial nationalism from civic one may hold the key to a
rapprochement between modernists and their critics.

1  The Origins of the Nation:

Modern or Pre-modern?
While nationalism as a way of organizing political space is taken for
granted today (Calhoun 2005:520), its origins and nature are still widely
debated. Some believe the nation satisfies a natural need for collec-
tive identity historically built upon blood relations but also religion and
language. The nation has, therefore, been present throughout human

© The Author(s) 2019 11

M. Tabachnik, Citizenship, Territoriality, and Post-Soviet Nationhood,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12882-1_2
12 M. TABACHNIK

history and its, even if often mythical, symbols are passed through gener-
ations (Smith 1988; Smith 1999). The persistent and prominent modern-
ist school of nationalism thought, however, believes that the nation is not
a historical reality since the dawn of times but an invention of modernity
and pre-modern history is all but irrelevant (Cărăuş 2001:18, 21, 46).
Modernity is understood as a complex sociopolitical, economic and
ontological change that originated in Europe sometime in the middle of
the second millennium A.D. when “something happened” in collective
consciousness of such proportions that we still do not fully understand,
it despite the attempts by such bright minds of sociological thought as
Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim (Lachmann 2000:1). This
“something” has since spread, bringing with it the demise of monarchy
(politically); industrialization and globalized capitalism (economically);
secularism, rationalism, and individualism (ontologically). The impact of
this social change is not fully clear until now. In the words of Karl Marx,
“All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable
prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become
antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that
is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses
his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind” (1848).
Nationalism, in modernist view, is part of the overall transition to
the age of modernity. It is propelled by the change of economic rela-
tions from feudal agricultural economies to industrial capitalism on the
one hand and an ontological onset of the sociopolitical ideology of lib-
eralism based on individual rights, on the other. Nationalist ideology,
therefore, prioritized education, social mobility, egalitarianism, anonym-
ity, and communication to satisfy the needs of this social transformation
(Cărăuş 2001:18–19, 21, 61). The nations are constructed and recon-
structed using mostly mythological discourses and narratives, in order
to provide a functional collective identity for individuals plucked out of
collective living.
The role of history is central to the debate between modernists and
its critics. On the one hand, it is hard to dispute that history is crucial
for understanding nationalism since each concept of national identity is
rooted in a particular historical setting (Hechter 2000:4). On the other
hand, modernists see the historical setting as less relevant since they
believe all nationalisms to have been “constructed” in the course of
the eighteenth–nineteenth centuries and only made “feel” old with lit-
tle actual history behind (Gellner 1983:6). Modernists (such as Ernest
 2 THE ACADEMIC SETTING 13

Gellner, Elie Kedourie, John Breuilly, Benedict Anderson, Tom Nairn,

Eric Hobsbawm, Eugen Weber, and, to a lesser extent, Liah Greenfeld)
have dominated nationalism studies and social sciences overall (Calhoun
2005:523). They see the American (1776) and French (1789) revo-
lutions as well as the parliamentary republic in Britain in the seven-
teenth century as the catalysts for the era of nationalism that followed
(Hutchinson and Smith 1994:5).
The history of nationalism is commonly seen as the history of what
we call today “nation-states”—admittedly geographic territories ruled by
a single government over the people or “the nation” who have a certain
culture and a collective identity. Their existence is commonly traced back
to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia that ended the “long sixteenth cen-
tury” of wars in Europe and with it the prevalent model of city-states as
a pattern of political organization (Taylor 1994:153). Gellner famously
argued that the very idea of nationalism is joining culture and the polit-
ically centralized territorial state (1983:4). Modernists believe that par-
ticular borders are more or less haphazard and do not respect historical
ethnic composition. They are results of either colonial administrative
division or the demands of capitalist development such as the need for
economies of scale in printing books (Anderson 1983). Charles Tilly,
for example, demonstrated how feudal war-making produced territorial
states in early medieval Europe with haphazard borders drawn by mili-
tary abilities of particular leaders (1985).
Critics pointed out that modernists may be victims of the modernist
worldview themselves, failing to recognize the power of irrational attach-
ment and emotion that provides the foundation for nationalism because
of their “excessive” modern rationality (Cărăuş 2001:42–43). Ethnic
nationalism, for example, widely appeals to the power of emotions.
In the 1970s and 1980s, modernists were challenged by pre-mod-
ernists led by Anthony Smith. While pre-modernists vary in their
approach to the origins of nationalism, they agree that nationalism is
not a modern but pre-modern social phenomenon. Liberal political
developments, such as the French Revolution, thus invented the politi-
cal concept of the nation but not the nation per se (Coleman 1995:49–
50). In modern times, the nation just adjusted to capitalism (Hastings
1997:29–30). It is a modern version of older cultural communities
that abounded in pre-modern times (Smith 1988:11–12). Historical
continuity to pre-modern and ancient history is, therefore, crucial for
nationalism.
14 M. TABACHNIK

Similarly, political theorist Charles Taylor suggested that the

Reformation and its emphasis on individualism merely put to prac-
tice major Christian beliefs, which before were more theoretical. In
pre-Christian societies, individuals in a “modern” sense did not exist,
one could simply not imagine oneself as not part of society (2007:150).
Religion was codified as laws and defined group identity while in mod-
ern times laws organize individual wills as opposed to defining people
as a group (2007:163–165). Despite being associated with modernism,
Kohn also saw nationalism as a particular stage in the evolution of terri-
torial state units, a stage linked to the rise of Western civilization based
on Christianity and rational thinking (1994:163).
The debate between modernists and pre-modernists is still ongo-
ing (Gat 2013:2, 17; Gorski 2006:143) but somehow the distinction
between ethnic and civic nationalisms has not been central to it despite,
possibly, holding the key to the debate’s very resolution.

2  The Embattled Ethnic/Civic Dichotomy

Most scholars accept that there are two ideal types of nationalism (Brown
1999:281) even if they disagree about their precise definitions. “Civic”
nationalism, a term coined by Anthony Smith (1991:9–12), usually describes
nationalism based on the territory of the state and liberal-democratic values.
It is routinely contrasted to “ethnic” nationalism, which is based on a com-
munity of common descent, real, or perceived (Brown 2007:17).
This scholarship goes back at least to the literature on the origins of
modernity. Karl Marx saw the root of this duality in the inherent con-
flict between individual and collective interests (Brown 1999:284).
Max Weber explained both the modernity and the consequent Anglo-
American (and also Dutch) “destruction of the spontaneity” by a col-
lective identity created by the Protestant ideology prone to asceticism
(Weber 2003:126–127). Emile Durkheim elaborated further by argu-
ing that individualism reached its apogee in the USA populated by the
Puritans, the most individualistic Protestants (Durkheim 1951:163). The
Reformation produced a loss of faith in the habitual system of beliefs,
leaving each individual to prioritize one’s goals and identity over the col-
lective resulting in a new type of collective identity contrasted with the
old Catholic version (Durkheim 1951:209, 374–375). In the twentieth
century, Friedrich Meinecke labeled these two types of national identity
as Staatsnation and Kulturnation (Larin 2012:34).
 2 THE ACADEMIC SETTING 15

Kohn reconceptualized this distinction into the theory of

Western/Eastern nationalisms influential till today (Kohn 1965:165;
Larin 2010:452). Similarly connecting Western nationalism with the
Reformation, he formulated the foundation of modernism by suggesting
that the origins of Western civilization and nationalisms were not Judeo-
Christian or Greco-Roman but in the individualism of the seventeenth–
eighteenth-century England and the Netherlands, which erased ethnic
and class distinctions (Kohn 1944:331; Kohn 1962:31).
Later scholarship did away with the “Western/Eastern” labels and
instead based the typology on the tension between blood relations on
the one side and common values and simply territory on the other. The
first type of nationalism has been called American-French, political, ter-
ritorial, or individualistic, the second—romantic, tribal, cultural, or col-
lectivist (Franck 1997; Brown 1999; Greenfeld 1993; Guibernau 1996).
The typology, usually known as the “ethnic/civic dichotomy” (Calhoun
1997:88), was rediscovered in the aftermath of the collapse of the
USSR and the subsequent resurgence of ethnic nationalism (Janmaat
2006:50).
Ethnic nationalism is commonly defined by a genetic link through
common ancestry (Breton 1988:86–87; Meeus et al. 2010:307). One
has to be born into the ethnic nation but may voluntarily join a civic one
(Keating 1996:3). But what precisely is civic nationalism?
Definitions abound and center on a wide variety of liberal-­democratic
values such as respect for individual rights, equality, and tolerance of eth-
nic and religious diversity. On the other hand, collective identity based
on the state’s territory has been central to civic national membership
(Brown 1999:283). Civic nationalism, therefore, is seen as anything,
which is not ethnic nationalism, but necessarily encompassing territorial-
ity and liberal-democratic values (Brown 2007:17).
Such conflation of territoriality and liberal democracy in one term may
be a major reason behind the conceptual confusion that surrounds the
ethnic/civic dichotomy, to the point that is has been even called an ulti-
mate “epistemological obstacle” (Máiz 2004:29) to advances in national-
ism studies.
After the rejection of Kohn’s “Eastern/Western” labels (Shulman
2002; Bjorklund 2006), the conceptual debate sought to prove the
whole ethnic/civic typology as baseless by arguing that all nationalisms
have ethnic origins (Máiz 2004:16) as well as other ethnic components
such as a language (Kymlicka 2001:244).
Another random document with
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 “The best thing in the world for you, mamma,” said Dick, “and jolly for
us, once in a way, to have you all to ourselves.”
What could mortal woman, being the boys’ mother, say more? I am
afraid she would have considered favourably the idea of going to Nova
Zembla, wherever that may be, under such conditions. And Winks, though
he yawned as he listened, thought well of it too; he liked driving, on the
whole, though too much of it bored him, and he had not at all approved
when his mistress “put down” her carriage. They set off next morning in the
brightness of noon, through the country which had not yet lost any of its
beauty, though here and there the trees had yellow patches on them, and the
parks were all burnt brown with the heat of summer. They were a very
merry party, notwithstanding that the final examination was hanging over
Dick’s head, and the parting which must follow. Winks, for his part, after
two or three hours of it, got bored with the levity of the conversation, and
rustled about so, that he was put out of the carriage to run for the good of
his health. He went along for a mile or two, pleased enough, gathering dust
in clouds about him. But when he intimated a desire to be taken in, the
boys, hard-hearted beings, laughed in the face of Winks.
“A run will do you good, old fellow,” said Dick, with cruel satisfaction.
A short time afterwards, I am sorry to say, a dreadful accident, nature
unknown, happened to Winks. He uttered a heart-rending shriek, and
appeared immediately after making his way towards the carriage, holding
up one feathery paw in demonstrative suffering. The anxious party stopped
immediately, and Winks made his way to them, laboriously limping and
uttering plaintive cries. But when, all a-dust as he was, this hypocrite was
lifted into the carriage, holding up the injured member—and was softly laid
upon the softest cushion to have it examined, words fail me to express the
sardonic grin with which he showed his milk-white teeth. There was no
more the matter with the little villain’s paw, my gentle reader, than with
yours or mine.
Never was there a pleasanter two days’ journey than this which Mrs.
Eastwood made with her boys through the sunshiny autumn country, along
the road, where gold-coloured leaves dropped in her lap as they drove her
along, now one on the box, now another, in their turn; till the High Lodge at
last appeared in sight all covered with white downy clusters of clematis
done flowering, with late roses, and matted network of interlacing leaves.
Innocent rushed to the door, slim and pale in her black dress, her eyes
shining with sudden delight, her soft face inspired.
“You have come to take me home. I am Nelly now!” she cried, throwing
her arms about the common mother. Jenny, whom she had not noticed, leant
back upon the carriage, looking at her with eyes that glowed under his dark
brows. He had always stood by Innocent since the day when he had read
Greek to her in the Lady’s Walk; he had always been sure that “something
would come of her.” “We don’t know half what Innocent will come to!” he
repeated now to himself.

GILBERT AND RIVINGTON, PRINTERS, ST. JOHN’S SQUARE, LONDON.

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