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Climate Justice in a Non-Ideal World
Climate Justice in
a Non-Ideal World
Edited by
Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser
1
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
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Acknowledgements
Many people have shared their time and talents in order for this volume to be
a success. We wish to extend a heartfelt thanks to all of them. The first vote of
thanks goes to our authors who all contributed their original research and
who painstakingly and patiently responded to comments from their peers
and also to editorial requests. The second goes to Dominic Byatt, Olivia Wells,
and Sarah Parker from OUP. The third goes to colleagues who have given
encouragement and advice: Robyn Eckersley, Edward Page, Henry Shue, Adam
Swift, Alexa Zellentin, and the participants at the two workshops organized to
discuss the book’s chapters. We would particularly like to thank Simon Caney
for being both a contributing author and a willing source of excellent and
friendly advice at many stages of the project. The fourth goes to Elizabeth
Finneron-Burns and to Zoe Davis-Heaney for their administrative and research
support. The fifth goes to the University of Warwick, the Leverhulme Trust
(grant number ECF-2013-352), the Oxford Martin School’s Geoengineering
Programme, the University of Zurich’s Research Priority Programme for Ethics,
and the Oxford Martin Programme on Human Rights for Future Generations
for the funding, and the research environments they provide. We are aware
that this volume is not, to use Amartya Sen’s expression, transcendentally
perfect. However, comparatively speaking, the contributions of all these
people have made it far less non-ideal than it would otherwise have been.
For this, we are grateful to you all.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/4/2016, SPi
Table of Contents
List of Figures ix
List of Abbreviations xi
Notes on Contributors xiii
Introduction 1
Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser
Table of Contents
Index 319
viii
List of Figures
xii
Notes on Contributors
xiv
Notes on Contributors
Princeton Climate Futures Initiative, and has been an invited contributor to the Archi-
tectural League of NY, the Commission on Human Security, and a consultation of the UN
Secretary General’s Special Representative on Business and Human Rights. Her work on
climate change draws both on her expertise in ancient Greek political thought (on which
she has published four books and many articles) and on broad interests in the relationship
between democratic politics and scientific knowledge, uncertainty, and communication.
Her publications relevant to climate change include Eco-Republic (2012) and articles in
the journal Episteme (2013); the journal Politics, Philosophy and Economics (2014); and a
chapter in Political Thought and the Environment (ed. Forrester and Smith, forthcoming).
She was a 2012 Fellow of the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation.
Holly Lawford-Smith is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sheffield. She is
currently working on a three-year Marie Curie project, focused on cooperation between
states in addressing climate change. She previously held postdoctoral positions at the
Australian National University (ANU) and Charles Stuart University, working on
the obligations held by beneficiaries of injustice, and on climate ethics. Her PhD is
from the ANU and her MA and undergraduate degree from the University of Otago in
Dunedin, New Zealand. She has worked in the past on political feasibility and non-ideal
theory, and now works mainly on collective action.
Peter Lawrence is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Tasmania Law School where he
teaches international law and international environmental law and is currently the
faculty advisor of the University of Tasmania Law Review (UTLR). His key area of
research concerns the interface between ethics, justice, climate change, and inter-
national law. His publications include Justice for Future Generations, Climate Change
and International Law (2014). Previously Lawrence worked for the Australian Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1989–2004). This included eight years negotiating
UN and South Pacific environmental treaties and extensive involvement in developing
Australian government policy positions.
Andrew Light is University Professor and Director of the Institute for Philosophy and
Public Policy at George Mason University and Distinguished Senior Fellow at the World
Resources Institute. From 2013 to 2016 he served as Senior Adviser and India Counselor
to the Special Envoy on Climate Change, and Staff Member in the Secretary’s Office of
Policy Planning, in the US Department of State. In this capacity he was Co-Chair of the
U.S.-India Joint Working Group on Combating Climate Change and Chair of the
Interagency Climate Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals, among
other duties. Before joining the US government he was Senior Fellow and Director of
International Climate Policy at the Center for American Progress. In his academic work
he is the author of over 100 articles and book chapters, primarily on climate change,
restoration ecology, and urban sustainability, and has authored, co-authored, and
edited nineteen books, including Environmental Values (2008), Controlling Technology
(2005), Moral and Political Reasoning in Environmental Practice (2003), Technology and the
Good Life? (2000), and Environmental Pragmatism (1996).
Aaron Maltais is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science at Stockholm
University specializing in contemporary political theory. His work on climate change
addresses questions that arise at the intersection between normative theories of climate
xv
Notes on Contributors
justice and empirical research on climate governance and it has been published in
Environmental Politics, Environmental Values, and Political Studies. With Professor Catri-
ona McKinnon, Maltais has co-edited The Ethics of Climate Governance (2015). He also
works on the problem of political obligations and its relation to theories of immigra-
tion, global justice, global governance, and state sovereignty and has recently pub-
lished a theory of political obligations in Legal Theory.
Darrel Moellendorf is Professor of International Political Theory and Professor of
Philosophy at Johann Wolfgang Universität Frankfurt am Main. He is the author of
Cosmopolitan Justice (2002), Global Inequality Matters (2009), and The Moral Challenge
of Dangerous Climate Change: Values, Poverty, and Policy (2014). He co-edited (with
Christopher J. Roederer) Jurisprudence (2004), (with Gillian Brock) Current Debates in
Global Justice (2005), (with Thomas Pogge) Global Justice: Seminal Essays (2008), and
(with Heather Widdows) The Routledge Handbook of Global Ethics (2014). He has been a
Member of the School of Social Sciences at the Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton)
and a Senior Fellow at Justitia Amplificata at Goethe Universität, Frankfurt, and the
Forschungskolleg Humanwissenschaften.
Jörgen Ödalen is Senior Lecturer in Political Theory at the Department of Management
and Engineering, Linköping University, Sweden. His main area of research is contem-
porary political theory, with a particular focus on issues of global justice, climate-
induced migration, sovereignty, and national and local self-determination. He is also
doing empirical research on the effects of pedagogical training on teaching in higher
education. He has published papers in journals such as Local Government Studies, Ethics,
Policy & Environment, Scandinavian Journal of Public Administration, and Scandinavian
Journal of History.
Jonathan Pickering is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Deliberative Democracy
and Global Governance, based at the University of Canberra, Australia. Before joining
the University of Canberra he taught climate and environmental policy at the Austra-
lian National University. Pickering’s research interests include the ethical and political
dimensions of global climate change policy, global environmental governance, devel-
opment policy and ethics, and global justice. His published research includes articles
in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Ethics & International
Affairs, World Development, and Global Environmental Politics. Previously he worked as a
policy and programme manager with the Australian Government’s international devel-
opment assistance programme (AusAID; 2003–2009).
Dominic Roser is a Research Fellow at the Oxford Martin Programme on Human Rights
for Future Generations at the University of Oxford and at the Nanjing University of
Information Science and Technology. With a background in philosophy and econom-
ics, his research is located in contemporary political philosophy. The focus of his work
lies on various aspects of the debate on climate ethics such as intergenerational justice,
global justice, non-ideal theory, risk, human rights, and the normative foundations of
climate economics. He has collaborated in various interdisciplinary and policy-relevant
projects. Together with Christian Seidel, he has co-authored a German language intro-
duction to climate ethics (English translation Climate Justice: An Introduction (2016)). His
publications have appeared in journals such as Critical Review of International Social and
xvi
Notes on Contributors
Political Philosophy, Environmental Values, and Climatic Change as well as books published
by Oxford University Press and Cambridge University Press.
Christian Seidel is Lecturer (‘Akademischer Rat’) at the Friedrich-Alexander University
Erlangen-Nürnberg. His research interests cover various issues in contemporary moral
and political philosophy (such as personal autonomy, consequentialism, egalitarian-
ism, climate ethics, and the ethics of risk) as well as the moral and political philosophy
of John Stuart Mill. Seidel was formerly a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of
Zurich’s Centre for Ethics, where he worked on the ethics of global public goods and
questions of intergenerational and global justice. Together with Dominic Roser, he has
written a German language introduction to climate ethics (English translation Climate
Justice: An Introduction (2016)). Other work on climate change has been published in
Climate Policy and Climatic Change. He also worked as a public policy consultant on
issues of globalization, climate change, and energy policy.
Gwynne Taraska is Associate Director of Energy Policy at the Center for American
Progress, where she works on international and US climate and energy policy. Taraska
has expertise in international climate negotiations and has focused on the content and
structure of the Paris agreement, including the legal form of the agreement, the path-
way for executive ratification in the US, and the topic of loss and damage. She also has
expertise in climate finance and has focused on the landscape of multilateral climate
funds and market-based mechanisms for mitigation and adaptation. Taraska was pre-
viously Research Director of the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at George
Mason University.
xvii
Introduction
Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser
In 2004 Stephen Gardiner observed that ‘very few moral philosophers have
written on climate change’ (Gardiner 2004: 555). A decade hence, the situ-
ation is quite different—the literature on the ethics of climate change has
burgeoned.1 Moreover, it is now widely recognized beyond the confines of
philosophy departments that the question of how to respond to climate
change has an inescapable moral element. For example, in its Fifth Assessment
Report the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stated that
‘[E]thical judgements of value underlie almost every decision that is connected
with climate change’ (IPCC 2014: 215), and acknowledged the scholarly
research that has taken place.
The substantial inclusion of the subject of ethics was something of a depart-
ure for the IPCC, which has performed five authoritative reviews of the
scientific literature on climate change.2 Since the IPCC’s First Assessment
Report in 1990, it has become increasingly certain that climate change is
anthropogenic and will have many significant impacts on the environment.
Climate change will affect precipitation, temperatures and weather patterns,
sea-levels and acidity, and biodiversity. The type and degree of change is
expected to vary widely across regions. Concern about these impacts led the
international community to establish the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), whose stated aim is to ‘prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the earth’s climate system’. This
is widely interpreted, including in the outcome documents of international
1
In this volume, we, and many of the contributors, use terms such as ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’
interchangeably. In the context of some academic philosophy, these terms might be used in a more
specific way.
2
The IPCC’s Second Assessment Report contained a chapter discussing intertemporal equity
(Arrow et al. 1996), but from the perspective of economists.
Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser
For an overview of how the 2 C target was developed and adopted, see Randalls (2010).
3
4
The IPCC author John Broome is one prominent exception. Broome has a narrower
understanding of what ‘justice’ means than most who write about climate change, including
most of the authors in this volume. However, in his most recent book, he acknowledges that on
his understanding of the concept, climate change does raise problems of justice (Broome 2012:
chapter 4).
5
Stephen Gardiner (2011) argues that the combination of the global and intergenerational
dimensions of climate justice makes the problem especially challenging: a ‘perfect moral storm’.
2
Introduction
6
For a typology of responses to climate change see e.g. Heyward (2013). Of immediate policy
relevance is the discourse of ‘Loss and Damage’, which is already the subject of international
negotiations. For one overview, see Verheyen (2012).
7
The term carbon egalitarianism is taken from Bell (2008). Most discussions do focus on carbon
dioxide reductions, but a more accurate term might be ‘greenhouse gas egalitarianism’ as other
gases contribute to climate change. For an argument that climate forcers more generally should be
considered, see Light and Taraska, Chapter 8, this volume.
3
Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser
costs of doing so, we can enquire about the latter question separately from the
former. In one of the earliest pieces on climate change, three separate prin-
ciples were identified (Shue 1999) which can be labelled as the ‘contributor to
problem principle’ (CPP), the ‘beneficiary pays principle’ (BPP), and the ‘abil-
ity to pay principle’ (APP).8 Various arrangements of these principles have
been proposed (Caney 2005, 2010; Page 2008, 2012; Vanderheiden 2008; Bell
2011b; Moellendorf 2014).
More generally, there has been some thought given to how climate justice
should relate to other issues in global justice. Some (e.g. The Global Commons
Institute 2005; Gosseries 2005) appear to regard climate justice almost as akin
to a separate ‘sphere of justice’.9 Others take the opposite view, holding, for
example, that both access to energy from the burning of fossil fuels and
successful adaptation should be treated as part of the total package of benefits
and burdens governed by a set of general principles of justice (Caney 2012).
There has therefore been progress in thinking about justice and climate
change. However, it should be of no surprise that the international response
so far to the challenges of climate change does not even begin to approximate
the principles of justice that are discussed in the literature. As many, including
some in this volume, have noted, the goal of limiting global temperature rise
to 2 C—the globally agreed target—seems remote (IPCC 2014). Neither are
the prospects for a just global distribution of climate policy’s burdens and
benefits any better (see, for example, Abeysinghe and Huq, Chapter 9, this
volume).
There are many possible reasons for this lack of global action on climate
change. Many countries are hesitant to act without assurance of others joining
the effort. When it comes to reducing fossil fuel consumption, the primary
source of GHG emissions, international negotiators have all too often insisted:
‘after you!’ (Shue 1994).10 This is not to be censorious. Human societies have
not experienced a problem as complex as climate change and it is even
possible that human cognitive development results in the use of heuristics
unsuited for understanding climate change (e.g. Chen 2011). Moreover, many
people find that they have considerable inner resistance to embracing the
lifestyle changes that are sometimes demanded. Democratic governments
respond primarily to the short-term preferences of their own citizens whereas
8
The CPP is sometimes referred to as the polluter pays principle (PPP) but we prefer the former,
as the PPP has a distinctive meaning in European environmental policy.
9
The term ‘spheres of justice’ is taken from Walzer (1983).
10
For some illustrations of countries’ emphasis on the actions of others, consider the Byrd-Hagel
Resolution (see Light and Taraska, Chapter 8, this volume), the EU’s explicit linkage between its
quantitative reduction goal and an international agreement being in place (Da Graça Carvalho
2012), or Yu-Quingtai, the Chinese Special Representative for Climate Negotiations, who referred
to Western two-car households and said: ‘[m]any Chinese households have only just purchased
their first car and they tell us we should ride bikes?’ (quoted by Revkin 2010).
4
Introduction
the effects of climate change extend far into the future and across the globe.
Current global institutions are not particularly effective at engendering action
on climate change. For example, the UNFCCC’s strong focus on consensus
has been criticized for effectively allowing each one of the 196 states a veto on
action. Moreover, the international institutions and the debates that take
place within them are situated in a context of previous injustices, such as
colonialism and later indifference to humanitarian crises caused by conflicts
or famine. This has made it challenging to engage less-developed countries in
a global action plan to fade out reliance on fossil fuels. Thus, the current
response to global climate change falls short of a just solution on several
counts.
Much of the literature on climate justice examines considerations that have
little overlap with the arguments that keep negotiators and activists awake at
night. This should not at all make us dismiss this body of work, but it should
make us engage more carefully with how the prevailing approaches to climate
justice can be brought to bear on the questions we face in the imperfect world
we live in. The literature on non-ideal theory is well placed for this task.
At the same time as the growth of interest in the moral problems of climate
change, there has also been an explosion of interest in non-ideal theory and
also in the issue of political feasibility (see e.g. Farrelly 2007; Sen 2006, 2009;
Gilabert and Lawford Smith 2012; Gheaus 2013; Simmons 2010; Stemplowksa
and Swift 2012). As we shall explain in the next section, non-ideal theory
with its focus upon questions of human unwillingness to act justly, and upon
unfavourable circumstances, complements ideal theory. It also seems particu-
larly pertinent to the case of climate change.
The term ‘non-ideal theory’ is used in various ways.11 Its historical roots lie in
Rawls’s distinction between two different tasks of political philosophy.
According to Rawls, the task of ideal theory is to outline a conception of
distributive justice, circumscribed by two assumptions: full compliance and
favourable circumstances (Rawls 1973: 245). Full compliance means that all
individuals and institutions act according to the principles of justice. The
assumption of favourable circumstances refers to conditions other than the
11
For an overview see Stemplowksa and Swift (2012) and Valentini (2012). It is helpful to note
that Hamlin and Stemplowksa (2012) distinguish between the theory of ideals and ideal theory. It
is one thing to examine certain values or ideals (such as liberty, equality, etc.) and to evaluate
various states of affairs in which these ideals are realized to different extents. This is the theory of
ideals. By contrast, ideal versus non-ideal theory can be seen as being about practical reasoning: it is
about prescribing actions, but under different constraints.
5
Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser
6
Introduction
12
In a paper entitled ‘It’s Not My Fault . . . ’ Walter Sinnott Armstrong (2005) defends the claim
that an individual’s GHG emissions do no harm, but nevertheless argues that individuals should
campaign for government action on climate change.
13
There is also a temporal dimension to partial compliance. Any particular agent might factor in
problems posed by past non-compliance, current non-compliance, or expected non-compliance.
This dimension is easier to think about in the case of others’ non-compliance, but it is also true that
an individual might have to factor her own akrasia into her practical reasoning.
7
Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser
However, humanity does not yet have the means and knowledge to harvest
this energy efficiently.14
There are therefore many features that a non-ideal account of climate justice
might choose to focus upon. Once one or more non-ideal features have been
identified and analysed, the task of comparing various possible responses to
these features comes into view. How ought we to act in a world characterized
by these non-ideal circumstances? Generally speaking, the available types of
responses to non-ideal circumstances are either to maintain the standards
applicable in ideal circumstances, or to revise them. If the latter is chosen,
there is the question of whether the standards should be revised upwards or
downwards, in terms of demandingness and whether the content of agents’
duties should be changed. This is what general accounts of non-ideal theory in
the Rawlsian sense can offer. Let us now consider other understandings of
‘non-ideal theory’.
As Laura Valentini notes, the appeals in support of non-ideal theorizing
seem to stem from frustration with ideal theory’s insufficient action-guidance
in the ‘here and now’ and with its ‘perceived inability to have an impact in the
political sphere’ (Valentini 2012: 655). Some commentators have associated
the call for non-ideal theory with the call for action-guidance in more specific
circumstances. If the task of theorizing is indeed shifted from knowing the
standards that apply—whether in ideal or non-ideal theory—to action-
guidance in the ‘here and now’, then something further is needed. It means
bringing in the actual empirical, political, and motivational context and
comparing various steps forward that could potentially be taken. This requires
bringing into focus certain facts that are much more specific than general
appeals to partial compliance and unfavourable circumstance. As Zofia Stem-
plowska and Adam Swift point out, this is to require ‘political philosophers to
do more than just philosophy’ (2012: 385). On this understanding, the project
of non-ideal theory involves recommendations for embarking on the transi-
tion towards a more (or, ultimately, fully) just world. This involves, among
other things, making comparisons of particular situations and prescribing
institutional reforms. The call is not just for non-ideal theory, but for action-
guiding non-ideal theory. One example is Amartya Sen, who distinguishes
between what he calls a ‘transcendental’ approach to justice (associated with
ideal theory) and a ‘comparative approach’ (associated with non-ideal theory).
Non-ideal theory, or the comparative approach, requires us to look at different
14
The potential use of CDRs combines elements of empirical uncertainty and technological
constraints (real and postulated). According to the IPCC, meeting the 2 C target would require not
only a sharp drop in GHG emissions, but also the use of some CDR technology, for example bio-
energy with carbon-capture and storage (BECCS) technology (see the IPCC’s scenario RCP 2.6).
BECCS is not yet a proven technology and it is not guaranteed that it will be developed and
implemented successfully.
8
Introduction
concrete situations and context-specific options, set priorities, and rank alter-
native social arrangements as ‘more or less just’ (2006: 216). Sen goes on to
claim that if people are concerned with making the world more just, they
should abandon the project of ideal theorizing (or in Sen’s terms, the tran-
scendental approach) in favour of the comparative approach, on the grounds
that the former is neither necessary nor sufficient for the latter.
It is worth mentioning here that ideal theory’s ‘perceived inability to have
an impact in the political sphere’ is also taken up by political realism. Political
realists castigate mainstream political philosophy for being ‘idealistic’ and
producing overly ambitious ‘utopian’ theories.15 They charge it with not
representing ‘an ideal of political life achievable even under the most
favourable circumstances’ (Galston 2010: 387). In support of this, political
realists emphasize the darker elements of human psychology: emotions and
passions and the difficulties of cooperation (Galston 2010: 398). Producing
normative guidance for politics should not be conceived of as ‘applied moral-
ity’ (Williams 2005: 77). Rather, politics has its own internal standards and
distinctive norms. These distinctive norms are appropriate, because the pri-
mary focus for politics should lie on achieving order and stability rather than
realizing high-flying visions of justice.
In its broadest sense, non-ideal theory asks how to respond to an imperfect
world. Some advocates of non-ideal theory emphasize a different approach to
theorizing, others call for more practical action-guidance. The challenges of
responding to climate change are further evidence, if any were needed, that
we do not live in an ideal world. Moreover, climate change is a good test-case
for the philosophical debates about non-ideal theory. Therefore, the aim of
this book is to merge two trends: the growing interest in climate justice, and
the growing calls for non-ideal theory.
The chapters of this volume all highlight non-ideal features that characterize
the climate change context. They discuss a range of responses to these fea-
tures, in terms of individual action, policymaking, institutional reform, and
engaging in deliberation in public, political, and scientific fora.
The volume is divided into three parts. Part I ‘Facing Reality: Responding to
an Unjust World’ focuses on general analysis of the proper response to partial
compliance and unfavourable circumstances in the case of climate change. In
Chapter 1 Simon Caney clearly sets out a non-ideal feature: our fellow humans
15
For two influential statements of political realism, see Bernard Williams (2005) and Raymond
Geuss (2008). For an overview of the main tenets of political realism see William Galston (2010).
9
Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser
10
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Mit klugen Augen schaute das Kind neugierig umher. Die beiden
sprachen jetzt kein Wort mehr miteinander. Bis die Schwester Oberin
kam in Begleitung der Schwester Salesia. Die Pförtnerin hielt nun
statt der Kerze eine große Stehlampe in der Hand, die sie auf den
ovalen Tisch in der Mitte des Zimmers stellte.
Die Oberin war eine hohe, schlank gewachsene Frau. Nicht mehr
ganz jung. Aber mit einem gesunden, runden Bauerngesicht,
eckigen Bewegungen und mit Augen, die nicht recht zu ihrer
sonstigen Erscheinung paßten. Es waren helle, scharfe Augen.
Augen, die einen klaren, wissenden Blick hatten, energisch und
selbstbewußt schauten, und dann wieder demütig und
unentschlossen. Die Schwester Oberin hielt ihre Augen meistens
gesenkt und hatte die Hände wie zum Gebet fromm ineinander
gefaltet, als befände sie sich im steten Zwiegespräch mit ihrem Gott.
Die Ennemoserin erhob sich, als die Oberin eintrat, und hieß
auch das Kind aufstehen.
„Gelobt sei Jesus Christus!“ grüßte die Oberin mit leiser, sanfter
Stimme, die in einem seltsamen Gegensatz zu ihrer derben
Erscheinung war. Dann gab sie der Ennemoserin die Hand und bat
sie, Platz zu nehmen. Die Sophie setzte sich ungebeten. Baumelte
mit den Füßen und besah sich jetzt im hellen Lampenschein ihre
Umgebung.
Freundlich und sauber schaute es in dem Wartezimmer aus. Für
Sophies Geschmack zu sauber. Denn hier drinnen war alles hell und
weiß. Weiß die Vorhänge an den beiden Fenstern und weiß die
Überzüge der Polsterstühle. Weiß die gehäkelte Decke, die auf dem
ovalen Tisch lag. Und weiß die kleinen Schutzdeckchen, die an die
Lehnen des grünen Sofas geheftet waren. Auch die Hauben der
beiden Klosterfrauen waren weiß.
Es war das erstemal in ihrem Leben, daß die Sophie eine
Klosterfrau in unmittelbarer Nähe betrachten konnte. Ab und zu hatte
sie ja auf ihren Streifwegen eine solche begegnet. Sie war ihr aber
immer in weitem Bogen ausgewichen. Die großen weißen Hauben
mit den dreieckigen Flügeln kamen ihr so unsagbar häßlich vor, daß
sie dieselben gar nicht näher anschauen mochte. Noch eine Art
Nonnen kannte das Kind. Das waren solche mit langen schwarzen
Tüchern, die ihnen nach rückwärts vom Kopfe hingen, während das
Gesicht nur durch ein weißes Stirnband abgeschlossen wurde.
Diese gefielen ihr schon weit besser. Allerdings hatte sie auch vor
ihnen eine eigene Scheu und wich ihnen aus, wo sie nur konnte.
Mit einer Nonne gesprochen hatte die Sophie noch nie im Leben.
Und jetzt hatte sie mit einem Male sogar zwei Klosterschwestern in
ihrer nächsten Nähe. Und noch dazu solche mit garstigen weißen
Hauben, die sie gar nicht leiden mochte.
Das Kind lehnte sich bequem in dem Sessel zurück, legte das
dunkle Köpfchen mit den beiden nassen Zöpfen auf die linke Seite,
hielt sich mit den Händen an ihrem Sitz fest, als wäre sie zu Pferd,
und baumelte unruhig mit den Füßen hin und her.
Die Schwester Salesia machte sich an der großen Ölampel zu
tun. Goß aus einer Kanne, die in einem Winkel des Zimmers
verborgen stand, Öl nach und putzte das Licht zurecht.
Das Kind besah sich die Schwester ganz genau, und sie gefiel ihr
immer besser. Trotz der garstigen Haube und dem häßlichen
Gewand. Denn das Kleid der Schwester mißfiel dem Kind gleichfalls.
Es war dunkel und unförmig. Ein faltiger, weiter Rock und eine
dunkle, ebenso weite Schürze. Eine Bluse von derselben Farbe, von
der man jedoch mit Ausnahme der weiten Ärmel gar nichts sehen
konnte, da ein breiter, steif gestärkter Kragen sie zur größeren Hälfte
verdeckte. Um die Mitte hatten die Klosterschwestern einen weißen,
dünnen Strick geschlungen, der seitwärts in einem Knoten neben
einem großen Rosenkranz mit Kreuz herunterhing.
Die Oberin unterhielt sich mit der Ennemoserin im gedämpften
Ton so leise, als fürchteten die Frauen, durch den Laut ihrer
Stimmen die heilige Ruhe des Klosters zu stören.
Die Ampel, an der die Schwester Salesia sich zu schaffen
machte, hing vor einer lebensgroßen Christusstatue, die das heilige
Herz Jesu purpurrot leuchtend und mit einem goldenen
Strahlenkranz umgeben als Sinnbild der unendlichen Liebe des
Heilands auf der Brust trug.
Das Kind hatte noch wenig von Gott gehört und wußte auch
nicht, was die fromme Statue darstellen sollte. Aber sie ahnte, daß
es Gott sein sollte, und war so vertieft in ihre Betrachtung, daß sie
gar nicht darauf merkte, was die beiden Frauen an ihrer Seite
verhandelten.
Es war ihr jetzt auch gleichgiltig; denn je mehr sie sich hier
umsah, desto besser gefiel es ihr. Und als die Schwester Oberin sich
erhob, sie bei der Hand nahm und ihr erklärte, sie dürfe von jetzt an
hier bleiben und das Kloster solle nun ihre Heimat sein, war sie ganz
damit einverstanden.
Das beklemmende Gefühl, das sie anfangs beim Betreten des
Klosters ergriffen hatte, war geschwunden, und willig folgte sie den
beiden Klosterfrauen in das Innere des Hauses, nachdem sie sich
von der Ennemoserin mit kurzem Gruß verabschiedet hatte.
Es war jetzt schon spät an der Zeit. Die Zöglinge des Klosters
gingen gerade von einer Schwester geführt durch den gedeckten
Gang zur Kirche hinüber. Alle in gleichen, einförmigen, grauen
Kleidern, mit runden, schwarzen Kragen und ohne Hüte. Sie
verbeugten sich tief vor der Oberin und warfen neugierige Blicke auf
das Kind. Dann gingen sie schweigend in Reih’ und Glied der Kirche
zu. — — —
Es war ein eigentümliches Gefühl, mit dem die kleine Sophie
abends in ihrem sauberen, weiß bezogenen Bette lag. In einem
großen, langen Saal war es. Bett an Bett, nur durch kleine
Zwischenräume voneinander getrennt, standen die Lagerstätten der
Kinder in zwei Reihen nebeneinander. Ungefähr zwölf Betten
mochten es sein. Und am Ende des Saales hatte ein Bett Platz
gefunden, das zu beiden Seiten mit Vorhängen verhüllt war. Dort
schlief eine der Schwestern, der die Aufsicht über die Zöglinge
anvertraut war.
Lange konnte die Sophie kein Auge schließen. Es war ihr alles so
ungewohnt und fremd. Bisher hatte sie ihr Lager auf einem elenden
Lumpenhaufen gehabt in dem fahrenden Haus des Karrners. Hatte
sich mit den Geschwistern Tag für Tag gerauft und gebalgt um eine
Decke oder ein Kissen.
Ein Höllenspektakel war das an jedem Abend gewesen. Ein
Geschrei und Geheul und Gezeter, bis der Vater mit dem Stock und
mit wilden Flüchen zwischen die kleinen Raufbolde dreinfuhr. Dann
duckten sie sich und gaben Ruhe. Dumpf war es in dem kleinen
Schlafabteil des Wagens. Eng und dumpf. Aber die Sophie schlief
vortrefflich und vollständig traumlos bis zum Morgen, wo neuer
Höllenlärm sie weckte.
Wie ganz anders war es heute in dem freundlichen und sauberen
Schlafsaal des Klosters. Tiefer Friede und heilige Ruhe. Nichts regte
sich.
Etwas wie abergläubische Furcht überkam das Kind. Sie setzte
sich in ihrem Bette auf und sah hinüber zu dem großen
Madonnenbild, vor dem ein schwaches rotes Licht brannte. Und
wieder schaute sie auf die schlafenden Mädchen an ihrer Seite, die
ruhig und gleichmäßig atmend dalagen und auf ihren weißen Kissen
aussahen wie Engelsköpfe auf kleinen weißen Wolken.
Langsam und in dumpfen Schlägen schlug die Uhr von dem
Turme zu Mariathal die zehnte Stunde.
Mit leisen, unhörbaren Schritten kam eine junge
Klosterschwester, ging von Bett zu Bett und blieb dann vor der
kleinen Sophie stehen.
„Kannst nit schlafen, Kind?“ frug sie flüsternd.
„Naa!“
„Fehlt dir was?“
„Naa!“
„Hast Heimweh?“ frug die Schwester weich und beugte sich über
das Kind.
„Ja!“ sagte die Sophie heiser, und ihre Augen füllten sich mit
Tränen.
„Heimweh ... und bist ein Karrnerkind?“ frug die Schwester
verwundert. Dann aber erinnerte sie sich daran, einmal gehört zu
haben, daß gerade diese Menschen eine brennende Sehnsucht
nach der weiten Welt hätten, die ihnen Glück und Heimat war.
„Armes Kind!“ sagte die Schwester voll inniger Teilnahme, setzte
sich an den Bettrand und ergriff die kleinen braunen Hände der
Sophie. „Armes Kind! ’s wird schon wieder besser!“ tröstete sie.
„Mußt halt beten. Kannst beten?“
„Naa!“
„Nit?“ Die Schwester ließ ganz erschrocken die Hände des
Kindes fahren. „Nit beten, nit einmal das Vaterunser?“
„Naa!“
„Und das Ave Maria?“
„Naa!“ Das Kind sagte es zögernd. Es hatte ein unbestimmtes
Gefühl, daß sie etwas nicht kannte, was sie wissen sollte. Und sie
fühlte, daß dieser Mangel ein großer sein mußte, weil die Schwester
so erschreckt tat.
„Soll ich’s dich lehren, das Vaterunser?“ frug die Schwester.
„Ja!“
Da erhob sich die junge Klosterschwester, faltete die Hände des
Karrnerkindes und machte ihm das Zeichen des Kreuzes auf die
Stirne.
Und dann betete sie mit ihm, jedes Wort betonend, halblaut das
Vaterunser im Schweigen der Nacht, in dem stillen Saale, während
die andern Kinder ringsumher ruhig unter ihrer Obhut schliefen.
Betete mit dem halbwilden braunen Mädel, das in dem Frieden des
Klosters seine Zuflucht gefunden hatte, das Vaterunser von der
ersten bis zur letzten Bitte.
Und die Sophie sprach Wort für Wort nach, bis im gedämpften
Flüsterton die letzten Bitten des heiligsten Gebetes der Christenheit
von ihren jungen Lippen durch den nachtstillen Saal gingen. Neben
dem ruhigen Atmen der schlafenden Kinder und gemeinsam mit der
leisen, weichen Stimme der jungen Klosterschwester ... „Und vergib
uns unsere Schuld, als auch wir vergeben unsern Schuldigern.
Führe uns nicht in Versuchung, sondern erlöse uns von dem Übel.
Amen.“
Drittes Kapitel.