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Lewthwaite EnvironmentalismDeterminismSearch 1966
Lewthwaite EnvironmentalismDeterminismSearch 1966
Lewthwaite EnvironmentalismDeterminismSearch 1966
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GORDON R. LEWTHWAITE
San Fernando Valley State College, Northridge, California
FEW terms have provoked more debate phers to ban the issue, it will continue to
than "environmentalism" and "determin- break surface throughout the whole range
ism." Even before the creation of man a party of the social sciences. Almost despairingly,
of Milton's fallen angels, withdrawing from Carter has warned us that:2
the clamor of a Stygian conference, pondered although geographers have now turned from en-
the nature of determinism' vironmentalism to a more balanced view, allied
fields of knowledge are all too often still follow-
In thoughts more elevate, and reason'd high
ing along in the deterministic paths marked out
Of Providence, Foreknowledge, Will and Fate,
fifty years ago. When history, economics, and po-
Fixt Fate, freewill, foreknowledge absolute,
litical science, even on the college level, refer to
And found no end, in wandring mazes lost.
geographic factors, all too often they take a
It seems too much to hope that we mortals strongly physical environmental determinist view.
In lower-level schools, one seldom meets anything
can bring the matter to a successful con-
but determinism.
clusion, and few among us have failed to
sympathize with the not uncommon plea that This may be an exaggeration: our colleagues
geographers break off this fruitless debate are not all that unsophisticated. Nevertheless,
and move on to fresher themes. Yet the de- historians have long been warned to keep
bate seems irrepressible: even were geogra- their weather eye open, Meggers affirmed
Accepted for publication April 12, 1965. 2 G. F. Carter, Man and the Land: A Cultural
Geography (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1 J. Milton, Paradise Lost, Book II, lines 558-61. 1964), pp. 2, 4.
that "the relationship between environment the Sprouts sought to distinguish as the
and culture has been of increasing interest to milieu, a semantic sidestep designed to
anthropologists in recent years,"3 and sociolo- avoid a verbal tangle.7 But most would agree
gists plead for continuing study of both par- with Griffith Taylor and Sorokin that in
ticular instances and general theories of geo- geography the term environment should de-
graphic determinism.4 Recent geographical note solely the natural, physical, or the-un-
works on the perennial theme of man and the happy term-"geographic" features of the hu-
land leave little doubt that though some have man habitat, and exclude the forces derived
pronounced environmentalism as dead as the from man's activity.8 Admittedly, there is
dodo, it may prove to be, as Spate has averred, room for a measure of demur: some might
an "Immortal bird, not born for death."5 exclude all but the primeval earth unmodi-
If this be the case, it may well be worth fied by man, and others include a man-made
our while to seek not conclusions but clari- savanna as legitimately part of the environ-
fications, and here the intent is to focus at- ment, at least for subsequent generations. Nor
tention upon some variations in the meaning are even purely natural conditions to be di-
of the terms "environmentalism" and "de- vorced from human perception: different
terminism," to analyze some of the resultant culture-groups will see different environmen-
confusion which threatens to bedevil our dis- tal opportunities and limitations in one and
cussion, and to suggest that the "insoluble the same place. But such shades of meaning
dispute" will gain in point if some funda- apart, it seems safe to agree with Barrows
mental concepts are disentangled for separate that it is the combined physical and biological
evaluation.6 setting9 (with the possible addition of loca-
tion) which is generally intended.
THE ENVIRONMENT
the sake of both logical clarity and continuing hatch for man."12 But though the term en-
progress in geographic dialogue. vironmentalism may cover degrees of con-
trol which fall short of the absolute and in-
Environmental Determinism eluctable sovereignty of natural conditions, it
The first and perhaps the most generally does commonly imply a generous measure of
accepted meaning of the term, the one that dominance, a fact neatly exemplified when
leaps directly to the mind, is the concept that Tatham, and Montefiore and Williams,13 dis-
the environment controls the course of human cuss the one and identical theme under the
action. So defined, "environmentalism" is syn- respective titles of "Environmentalism and
onymous with geographic or environmental Possibilism" on the one hand and "Determin-
determinism and antithetical to the possibilist ism and Possibilism" on the other.
thesis that man is free to pick and choose be-
The Environmentalist Definition
tween the vast but varying range of possibil-
ities presented by his environment. Thus But another and quite different meaning
Taylor, Spate, Martin, and Montefiore and has also been attached to the term environ-
Williams used the terms determinism and en- mentalism, namely the definition of geography
vironmentalism interchangeably and in con- as the study of relationships between man
trast to possibilism, Schaeffer and Cumber- and his terrestrial environment. This environ-
land10 alike referred to the environmentalist mentalist concept reflected the search for de-
or determinist concept, and Buchanan de- finable limits and a coherent focus for the
scribed11 discipline. As compared with other fields of
learning, certain approaches to geography
the old environmentalist approach as the belief that
the natural environment firmly moulded man and seemed only to present a loose and encyclo-
his activities, a belief that in its extreme form pedic conglomeration of facts, and this at a
postulated an inevitable, almost fatalistic, relation- time when the sciences in general were in-
ship between man and environment.
tensifying their specialization and formulating
Admittedly the implied distinction between firm and unifying principles. Not only was an
extreme and mild forms of environmentalism aggressive intellectual enclosure movement
suggests that so forceful a word as determin- threatening the existence of the former com-
ism is not always an appropriate synonym, andmon, but many geographers instinctively
this distinction was made explicit when Emrys sought to crystallize their studies around a
Jones equated determinism with the strict theme which was both psychologically satis-
form of environmentalism, and the Sprouts fying and logically unifying. Under these cir-
differentiated between an environmental de- cumstances many responded to the affirmation
terminism characterized by inflexible rigidity that their peculiar task, their raison d'etre, was
and the more flexible "environmentalism the study of relationships between man and
[which] unlike determinism provides an escape his environment. Thus Davis contended that
"it is essentially the factor of relationship of
9 H. H. Barrows, "Geography as Human Ecology," earth and inhabitants that characterizes
Annals, Association of American Geographers, Vol. 13 geography as a subject apart from other
(1923), p. 3. sciences, and that gives an essential unity of
10Taylor, in G. Taylor (Ed.), op. cit., footnote 8,
content and discipline to all its varied parts"
pp. 5, 9, 11; 0. H. K. Spate, "How Determined is
Possibilism?" Geographical Studies, Vol. 4 (1957), and reiterated that this was "the most definite,
pp. 3-12; A. F. Martin, "The Necessity for Determin- if not the only, unifying principle" that he
ism," Transactions and Papers, The Institute of Brit- could find. 4 In similar fashion, Peattie as-
ish Geographers, Publication No. 17 (1951), p. 1;
A. C. Montefiore and W. M. Williams, "Determinism
and Possibilism," Geographical Studies, Vol. 2 (1955),12 E. Jones, "Cause and Effect in Human Geogra-
p. 1; F. K. Schaeffer, "Exceptionalism in Geography:phy," Annals, Association of American Geographers,
A Methodological Examination," Annals, Association Vol. 46 (1956), p. 369; H. and M. Sprout, op. cit.,
of American Geographers, Vol. 43 (1953), p. 247; footnote 7, p. 32.
K. B. Cumberland, The Geographer's Point of View 13 G. Tatham, "Environmentalism and Possibilism,"
(Auckland: Auckland University College, 1950), p. in G. Taylor (Ed.), op. cit., footnote 8, pp. 128-62;
10. Montefiore and Williams, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 1.
1 K. Buchanan, Geography and Human Affairs 14 W. M. Davis, Geographical Essays (Boston: Ginn
(Wellington: Victoria University College, 1954), p. 8.
and Co., 1909), pp. 8, 36.
serted that neither a map of wheat nor a man has relations,"21 Barrows contended that
map of rainfall could be; considered geo- geographers were turning away from physical
graphic: a geographic fact emerged only when studies and increasingly defining "their sub-
the maps were combined to show the rela- ject as dealing solely with the mutual relations
tionship.15 And both Vidal de la Blache and between man and his natural environment ...
Brunhes affirmed that this idea of relation- the science of human ecology,"22 and White
ship "must dominate every complete study of and Renner underscored this anthropocentric
geographical facts."' character when they defined the subject as
This synthesizing principle did not exclude "the study of human society in relation to the
variations round the theme. Some tended to earth background."23 Such varying priorities
include natural features per se, whereas cul- in the consideration of earth and man were
tural features were deemed admissible only reflected in differing sequences in the ap-
insofar as they were related to the physical proach to geographical analysis: some pro-
earth. Thus Vallaux described physical geogra- ceeded from the earth to man, seeking to
phy as "the synthetic study of the earth's trace natural influences into human life,
surface" and human geography as "the syn- whereas others progressed from man to the
thetic study of the relationship between hu- earth, a principle not infrequently invoked as
man societies and that surface,"'7 and Mill de- more favorable to objectivity in the evaluation
fined geography as the study of "the distribu- of the environmental factor, and to due recog-
tion of physical features culminating in the nition of the role of human initiative.
explanation of the interaction of man with But whether it was man or the earth that
his terrestrial environment."'8 Some, such as was thrust to the fore, a single theme ran
Davis, affirmed that consistent application of like a thread through variant formulations of
the organism-to-earth relationship principle the field: the primary and distinctive function
swept the whole spectrum of plant and animal of geography was the elucidation of environ-
mental relationships. It is this environmentalist
ecology into the purview of geography, for
position which Sauer once found to prevail
"a science cannot be cut off arbitrarily in the
among English-speaking geographers, driving
midst of a series of relations that characterize
a wedge of mutual indifference between them
it."'19 Others, by contrast, sought to exclude
and their continental European colleagues.24
such far-ranging concepts and focus upon the Stamp was probably expressing the prevailing
human response, logically relinquishing plant British viewpoint when he asserted that the
and animal ecology as well as all but inci- essence of geography was the study of en-
dental concern with the physical earth, and vironmental influences upon man and man's
reducing the subject, as Hartshorne insisted, adaptation to that environment, but despite
to a purely social science.20 Thus Dickinson Sauer's impression, such "environmentalism"
and Howarth roundly affirmed that plants was scarcely checked by the Channel: the
and animals were "of no consequence to the Belgian Michotte found it characteristic of
geographer except in so far as they constituted French geographers such as Brunhes, and
part of the physical environment with which Hettner challenged it in Germany where it
was influential for at least a brief period.26
To Hartshorne in the United States, as to Sauer alike objected that the environmentalist
Cumberland in New Zealand, this approach concept of geography was a peril to objectivity
remained inherently environmentalistic even since it placed a particular premium on "the
when the reciprocal character of earth-man demonstration of an environmental adjust-
relationships was fully recognized and the ment."30 Schliter in Germany and Michotte in
starkness of terrestrial influences was modified Belgium also joined in insisting that such
and mollified by emphasis on the wide range determinism is fostered if not fathered by a
of possibilities left open to man.27 Thus en- definition which instructs the geographer to
vironmental determinism and possibilism were find relationships.31 In Britain, Clark affirmed
both included in the category, a fact which that the essential postulate of environmental-
Hartshorne recently made explicit when he ism, namely the assumption that human phe-
referred to the "vigorous debate among those nomena are best comprehended by correlation
who adhere to the 'environmentalist' concept, with their natural setting, is all too readily
between 'determinists' and 'possibilists.'"28 reduced to a crudely deterministic form espe-
cially when simplified for teaching purposes,
ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS AND
thoughts both anticipated and echoed in New
ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINISM
Zealand where Miss Gorrie affirmed that the
Here is the nub of the matter and the quest easily degenerated into crude determin-
source of recurrent confusion. Environmental- ism, and Cumberland alleged that the search
ism is obviously one of Lewis Carroll's port- for environmental correlations precluded
manteau words into which at least two dif- scientific objectivity.32
ferent meanings are packed, concepts which This is where the writer begs to differ, or
may now be curtly summarized (for brevity's at least to insist that the anti-environmental-
sake) as belief in environmental determinism ists have overstated their case. There may
on the one hand and, on the other, the accept- well have been an environmentalist syndrome,
ance of environmental relationships as the a cluster of concepts frequently associated but
unifying lynch-pin of geography. not necessarily in causal fashion. For neither
Wishful Thinking? strict logic nor a balanced view of the history
of the discipline warrants the charge that the
But, it may be objected, are not these two search for relationships was loaded with the
concepts one and the same thing? Or, if original sin of inherent bias. It need not for a
they are not exactly identical, are they not moment be denied that the environmental
at least closely related manifestations of the wish may be the father of deterministic
same root-principle? Some would think so, thought, and that those all-important relation-
and tend either to place both under the same ships may have been exaggerated or even in-
generalizing title of "environmentalism," or to
vented by the overeager. But such a psycho-
indicate that the environmental-relationship logical bent is far from being a logical neces-
principle is the guilty father of environmental
sity and constitutes an unavoidable danger in
determinism. This is one of the most common
any case. No matter what our concept of the
contentions of the worldwide fraternity of geographer's role, the comprehension of a
geographers. In the United States, Platt de-
variety of relationships, including environ-
fined environmentalism as "that approach...
mental relationships, will remain an essential
which gives primary consideration to the nat-
part of the field: all that may legitimately
ural environment as a causal factor, advocates
its importance, and looks particularly for evi-
30 Hartshorne, op. cit., footnote 20, p. 126; Sauer,
dence of its influence," creating, indeed, "a op. cit., footnote 24, p. 622.
prejudice in [its] favor."29 Hartshorne and 31 For Schliiter see Hartshorne, op. cit., footnote 20,
p. 126; Michotte, op. cit., footnote 26, pp. 11-15.
27 Hartshorne, op. cit., footnote 20, p. 126; Cum- 32 K. G. T. Clark, "Certain Underpinnings of Our
berland, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 10. Arguments in Human Geography," Transactions and
28 R. Hartshorne, Perspective on the Nature of Papers, The Institute of British Geographers, Publica-
Geography (Chicago: Association of American Geog- tion No. 16 (1950), p. 16; A. M. Gorrie, The History
raphers, Rand McNally and Company, 1959) p. 57. of Geography in New Zealand (unpublished M.A.
29 R. S. Platt, "Environmentalism versus Geogra- Thesis, Auckland, Auckland University College,
phy," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 53 (1948), 1955), p. 290; Cumberland, op. cit., footnote 10, p.
pp. 351, 355. 11.
be required is that the scholar be guided by ical science forbid cancer research to isolate
the desire for truth rather than by special and follow the scent of tobacco, even with
pleading, and that the selective abstraction deliberate disregard for other potential causes?
of one single thread from the complex fabric Is an economist or historian forbidden to con-
of geographical reality should not involve the centrate his attention on the economic factor
denial of other and perhaps more significant because this may tempt him toward economic
strands. Even Martin, who avowed both the determinism? Why then need any geographer
environmentalist concept and "the necessity be embarrassed by our time-honored concern
of [ultimate general] determinism" insisted with "the geographic factor"? And is human
that "geographers do not assert that the ecology, for all its willful vagaries, inherently
geographical environment is the only or even less worthy of dispassionate study than plant
the most important determinant of human ac- or animal ecology? Legitimate objections arise
tivity, they merely state that their particular only if such selected themes be erected into
business is to examine this group of deter- exclusive principles which govern and define
minants rather than the others."33 We do not our field, or if the role of environment is
have to agree with this inadequate summary exaggerated to the detriment of other fac-
of our task to see that the only presupposition tors.
necessarily involved in the search for environ-
mental connections is the belief that some Environmentalists Denounce
relationship may in fact prove to be present, Environmentalism!
surely an innocuous assumption if it be sub- In point of historic fact, most of those who
ject to the confirming or cancelling effect of defined geography according to the environ-
subsequent investigation. mentalist concept were careful to repudiate
environmental determinism, at least in prin-
The Unavoidable Presupposition
ciple. It was Vidal de la Blache who stated
Of course, much more positive preconcep- that his aim was "to bring into relief the
tions may well be involved, but it still re- geographical factor"37 and Brunhes who urged
mains true, as the Sprouts have emphasized,34 that geographical studies must be dominated
that an open mind is not one which is empty by the theme of relationship,38 but these were
of presuppositions but one which is open to the very founding fathers of possibilism. In
the modifying impact of fresh evidence, and America, Whitbeck and Thomas, in their study
that no conceivable hypothesis or framework of "the geographic factor," similarly affirmed
of reference can free us from potential bias in "the core of the Possibilist philosophy ... that
one form or another. Even the principle of nature is 'not Mandatory but Permissive.'"39
areal differentiation, though strictly neutral in And Buchanan, asserting the centralizing
regard to environmental causation, has been theme to be human ecology, stressed the
accused by Pye of fostering "a selective hunt "importance of the cultural factor [which]
for some indices of regional differentiation,"35 pervades the whole field of human geography
and twitted by Kimble with promoting the and in certain areas completely overshadows
game of "hunt-the-region."86 This is not, of all others."40 But such affirmations have been
course, to condemn definition in terms of areal legion: suffice to quote Barrows who meshed
variation or to advocate return to the en- his very plea for the definition of geography
vironmentalist concept of geography: far from as human ecology with the warning that
it! But it is to assert that no principle should geographers must seek "especially to minimize
be rejected just because it is trailed by its the danger of assigning to the environmental
exaggerated and distorted shadow. Does med- factors a determinative influence which they
33 Martin, op. cit., footnote 10, P. 9. 37Quoted in R. G. H. Church, "The French School
34 4H. and M. Sprout, op. cit., footnote 7, pp. 33-34. of Geography," in G. Taylor (Ed.), op. cit., footnote
35 N. Pye, Object and Method in Geographical 8, p. 72.
Studies (Leicester: 1955), p. 7. 38 Brunhes, op. cit., footnote 16, p. 14.
-3 G. H. T. Kimble, "The Inadequacy of the 39 R. H. Whitbeck and 0. J. Thomas, The Geo-
Regional Concept," London Essays in Geography graphic Factor (New York: Appleton-Century, 1932),
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1951), pp. 151- p. 12.
74. 40 Buchanan, op. cit., footnote 11, p. 12.
do not exert."4' It was precisely this admoni- necessity is bound to affect our thinking on
tion coupling the environmentalist concept "the restricted question of geographical de-
with the repudiation of geographic determin- terminism versus possibilism,"45 and that "en-
ism which led Wagner to think Hartshorne in vironmentalism can legitimately be recognized
error in regarding Barrows as an environmen- as one component in a general determinism,"46
talist.42 But surely the point need not be la- whereas Huntington divided the field be-
bored further: given the dual meaning of tween "believers in determinism" on the one
the term, there was many an environmentalist hand and believers in "possibilism or free will"
who denounced environmentalism. on the other.47
But these presumed connections cannot be
A Fight for Freedom! accepted without demur. What are the meta-
But why should environmental determinism physical concepts of general determinism and
be denounced? The mere mention of the term free will? And how do they differ from the
is likely to invoke a chorus of condemnation, concepts of environmental determinism and
and if the theme of the chorus may be sum- possibilism in geography? And how do these
marized without too much distortion, it would geographical approaches differ from each
run as follows: determinism made man a mere other?
creature of his environment, predestined to
DETERMINISM... AND DETERMINISM
civilization or savagery, wealth or poverty, by
the sovereignty of the geographic factor. The Perhaps it will serve to clarify the issue if
effectiveness of tradition and culture and the a clear distinction is first drawn between the
free will of man was thus denied or minimized metaphysical concept of general determinism
by a concept which allegedly dominated on the one hand and geographical determin-
geographic thought in the late nineteenth cen- ism on the other. The former proposes that
tury, bringing the discipline into ill repute neither man's will nor anything else has a
as the supposed advocate of a "single-factor ghost of a chance of escaping the iron grooves
heresy,"43 a naively monocausal approach fixed from eternity or making one whit of
which was bound to crumble before a touch difference to the future. "It professes," wrote
of intellectual sophistication and a multiplicity
William James in oft-quoted words, "that
of incompatible facts. As many a fledgling those parts of the universe already laid down
geographer, therefore, learns at his academic absolutely appoint and decree what the other
peril, determinism is now presumed to be as parts shall be. . . . The whole is in each and
dead as the dodo, deservedly replaced by every part and welds it with the rest into an
possibilism which puts the environment back absolute unity, an iron block, in which there
in its place and gives due recognition to the can be no equivocation or shadow of turn-
free will of man. ing."48 The will itself is not free but deter-
Indeed, it seems to be quite commonly as- mined, and a single instance of chance or un-
sumed that environmental determinism was constrained decision would introduce the lib-
largely an extension into geography of the ertarian principle and disrupt the monolithic
metaphysical concept of universal or general unity of the necessitarian creed which, as Platt
determinism, whereas possibilism was; an anal-protested, denies the possibility of an open
ogous projection of belief in free will. As the future.49
Sprouts affirmed, "one of the attractions of
possibilism seems to have been its explicit 45 0. H. K. Spate, "Toynbee and Huntington: A
assumption of freedom of choice."44 Spate, Study in Determinism," Geographical Journal, Vol.
118 (1952), p. 408.
though not necessarily assuming the identity
46 Spate, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 387.
of the concepts, affirmed that our attitude to47 E. Huntington, Mainsprings of Civilization (New
the fundamental problem of free will and York: John Wiley and Sons, 1945), p. 292.
48W. James, "The Dilemma of Determinism," in
41Barrows, op. cit., footnote 9, p. 3. P. Edwards and A. Pap (Eds.), A Modern Introduc-
42 P. Wagner, The Human Use of the Earth (Glen-tion to Philosophy (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press,
coe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), p. 245, reference 2. 1957), p. 330.
43 R. Murphey, An Introduction to Geography (Chi- 49 R. S. Platt, "Determinism in Geography," Annals,
cago: Rand McNally and Company, 1961), p. 8. Association of American Geographers, Vol. 38 (1948),
44 H. and M. Sprout, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 48. p. 129.
Quite obviously this all-inclusive determin- leaves the question unsolved: was the choice
ism bears a family resemblance to geograph- free or was it necessitated by some other fac-
ical determinism, but whereas the former tor, psychological, political, or economic, per-
may postulate any factor or any combination chance? In point of fact the only form of
of factors, the latter presumes, in Platt's words, determinism with which possibilism is in-
that it is "the natural environment" which compatible is geographic determinism: the
causes "everything in human life."50 The field is left wide open for every other par-
metaphysical concept leaves the human will ticular determinism as well as the overarching
and the course of history open to determina- necessitarian principle. It was realization of
tion by any imaginable control or complex of this fact which led Platt, involved in a plea
controls, pituitary glands and politics, hunger for the reality of human choice, to complain
and habitat, the urge for power or the urge that complex "determinism may persist as a
of the libido, and among these the physical false guide in geography even after environ-
setting may conceivably be dismissed as in- mentalism has been banished from the field."54
consequential. Geographical determinism, by Conversely, it is doubtful whether many
contrast, is what Schaeffer termed one of "the deterministic philosophers have been sym-
various determinisms with an adjective, such pathetic with their presumed allies working
as economic determinism,"'51 for it attributes in geography. Freud was a determinist in
sovereign control to one factor and one fac- general and in particular, but he was certainly
tor only. not a geographical one, whereas Communists,
committed both to economic determinism and
The Neutrality of Possibilism the transforming power of social revolution,
Certain implications logically follow from repudiate any theory that the Marxist vision
this distinction. In the first place, it seems may be frustrated by an environmental veto:
clear that (psychological affinities apart), it is possibilism which such determinists favor.
possibilism has virtually no connection with
Conflicting Determinisms
the philosophical problem of determinism and
free will. If the environment alone be con- This latter fact highlights another conclu-
sidered, it may well be true, as Brunhes in- sion: geographic determinism is competitive
sisted, that there are "no necessities but every- with every other monocausal determinism. Ad-
where possibilities,"52 but this leaves unsolved mittedly it could, in theory, coincide and
the further question of why one possibility coalesce with general determinism, but only
should be selected rather than another. Unless if the environment were presumed to control
the geographer then follows the chain of cau- absolutely everything in an infallible and in-
sation back and back through space and time exorable grip. But such an all-embracing
and plumbs its very psychological or meta- geographic determinism is irreconcilable not
physical depths (and how many geographers only with possibilism but with every other
do that?), the problem of freedom and neces- form of determinism. Casserley clinched the
sity remains unresolved. Nor are other par- point when he affirmed that55
ticular determinisms banished: in fact, all that
determinism is a general name for a whole class
possibilism does or can do is to assert that
of deterministic philosophies, physical or biological
whether or not human action is free or deter- determinism, geographical or climatic determinism,
mined, it is not determined solely by geographic psychological determinism, sociological determinism,
conditions, a denial that leaves the door wide even theological determinism. The extent to which
open to the forceful entry of other controls. any one of these systems can be shown to possess
even a measure of truth . . . is a refutation of the
Geographers may agree with Tatham that the
absolute and universalistic claims of any of the
Danish decision to turn from wheat-growing others.
to dairying involved deliberate choice rather
Sorokin pressed a not dissimilar point: any
than environmental constraint, 5 but this still
particular determinism is automatically re-
50 Platt, op. cit., footnote 49, p. 126, note 1.
51 Schaeffer, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 247. 54Platt, op. cit., footnote 49, p. 126.
52 Brunhes, op. cit., footnote 16, p. 607. 55 L. J. V. Casserley, Morals and Man in the Social
53Tatham, in G. Taylor (Ed.), op. cit., footnote 8, Sciences (London: Longmans, Green and Company,
p. 149. 1951), p. 169.
were "the most potent factor of all in influenc- environmental determinism come into its
ing human evolution, whether biological or own.76
social," but this was accompanied by an ac-
knowledgment of "the great influence" of other Environment Matters Most
factors such as "military power, religions, be-
Thus there is equivocation enough and
liefs, and sagacious rulers."73 Furthermore, he
many a shadow of turning in environmental
opened the door, however reluctantly, to hu-
determinism, if indeed the term may legiti-
man choice. The very function of the geog-
mately be used to describe a thesis which
rapher was to focus attention on natural con-
admits a plurality of causes and allows sup-
ditions with the object of guiding develop-
posedly rigid controls to be relaxed into flexi-
ment into fruitful rather than barren chan-
bility. But presumably the meaning of the
nels, and to recognize that "nature has laid
term will be governed by usage and context
down a Master Plan for the world" which is
rather than by devotion to semantic purity,
ignored at man's peril.74 His philosophy of
and for present purposes it is more significant
"Stop-and-Go Determinism" rested on the to isolate the core-meaning of this generally
assumption that75
accepted concept. At times, admittedly, the
the best economic programme for a country to fol- context indicates that the environmental de-
low has in large part been determined by nature, terminant is nothing more than some minor
and it is the geographer's duty to interpret this
factor which acquires temporary but critical
programme. Man is able to accelerate, slow, or stop
the progress of a country's development. But he value and tilts an otherwise indecisive bal-
should not, if he is wise, depart from the direc- ance, like the insignificant nail for want of
tions as indicated by the natural environment. which a battle was lost, or the storm that
But this is clearly an assertion that it is what took the Pilgrim Fathers to Massachusetts
man ought to do rather than what he does rather than Virginia. But more commonly
in fact do which is determined, a point made such determinative power is attributed to a
still more apparent when man is conceded permanent or crucial element which may
"the choice between wise and foolish actions" shape basic policy or govern the long-term
and the ability to force nature's hand, at least progress of a nation: as Spykman phrased it,
temporarily, if he is willing to pay the price. "ministers come and ministers go . . . but
Taylor's concessions, in fact, go even further: mountain ranges stand unperturbed,"77 and
possibilism is admitted to have some validity Zimmermann confessed that the localizing ef-
in "unusually endowed" regions such as east- fect of coal on industrial power seemed so
erm America and western Europe, nor is de- significant that it was "difficult to escape the
terminism deemed a concept appropriate to lure of one-sided determinism."78 But the ac-
the meticulous details of "micro-geography": cepted connotation of geographic determinism
as a general concept involves more than this:
only when "macro-geography" surveys the
it involves the presumption that the natural
worldwide panorama of human occupance and
environment is the most important factor in
perceives the broader pattern of control does
human life. Sometimes it is assumed to have
an originating and governing power analogous
C3G. Taylor, Environment, Race and Migration
to that which Marx attributed to the ma-
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), p. 4.
terial forces of production, reducing the forms
14Taylor sought to differentiate his "scientific de-
terminism" from the "teleological determinism" ac- of social and political life, art and religion,
cepted by Ritter and Guyot, in G. Taylor (Ed.), op. to secondary and derivative status. Thus
cit., footnote 8, p. 5. But as Hartshorne, op. cit., foot- Ridgeway affirmed that "social institutions
note 28, pp. 62-63, and Spate, op. cit., footnote 45,
and religious ideas are no less (than physical
p. 419, indicated, an unconscious teleology lurked in
the assumption that "Nature" had a plan. Moreover,
teleological determinism (which presumed a spiritual 7W Taylor, in G. Taylor (Ed.), op. cit., footnote 8,
purpose in the laws which geographers might dis- pp. 3-19, 159-62.
cover in man's relationship with the earth) was 77 N. J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World
scarcely competitive with scientific determinism: it Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power
merely assumed a different dimension in interpreta- (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942),
tion. p. 41.
" Taylor, in G. Taylor (Ed.), op. cit., footnote 8, 7S E. WV. Zimmermann, World Resources and In-
p. 160. dustries (New York: Harper and Bros., 1951), p. 455.
79 Quoted in Sorokin, op. cit., footnote 8, p. 173. 83 The writer owes some valuable suggestions on
'I H. H. McCarty, "An Approach to a Theory of this point to Dr. Jerome Richfield, Chairman of the
Economic Geography," Economic Geography, Vol. 30 Department of Philosophy, San Fernando Valley State
(1954), pp. 96-97. College.
si J. W. Alexander, Economic Geography (Engle- 84 B. Ginzburg, "Science," Encyclopedia of the
wood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. Social Sciences (London: Macmillan and Co., 1954
13-14; S. W. Wooldridge, The Geographer as Scientist ed.), Vol. 13, pp. 601-02.
(London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1956), p. 85 S. M. Thompson, The Nature of Philosophy
23. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp.
8\2Wooldridge, op. cit., footnote 81. 264-65.
tion which may defy proof or disproof till the ministic systems. Any number of lawful proc-
end of time, but tactical determinism is a esses may be recognized, each may be the
methodological approach which retains its focus of a separate pattern, and each may
hold in the sphere of science, and indeed is impinge upon or interlock with others in an
aggressively invading the whole realm of so- orderly manner or in sheerly contingent
cial analysis. fashion. Indeed, purely random and unpre-
dictable factors may intrude to disrupt or
Deterministic Systems mask the basic principle, and it would surely
be the absence rather than the presence of
Tactical determinism finds its characteristic
such complications which would prove sur-
expression in the form of deterministic sys-
prising in the social sciences. As the philoso-
tems. These do not postulate that the whole
pher Urmson wrote, the real question to be
universe is irrevocably involved in an inter-
raised is not whether such determinism is
locking system of cause and effect, but they
true or false but whether it is useful.88 And
are based on the assumption that there are
so long as the methodological construct re-
processes which are normally law-abiding and
tains its inherent lawfulness and the con-
thus allow prediction and retrodiction. In
comitant potential for extrapolation, it re-
Bertrand Russell's definition, any system is
mains in principle deterministic.
deterministic if there is "the possibility of in-
ferring . . . events at any time from events
Scientific Law and Human Choice
at certain assigned times."86 Even causality is
not necessarily presumed: indeed this is a Nor need such a system necessarily be con-
vexed question. A number of events may fol- strued as deterministic in the sense of ordain-
low in regular sequence or coexist side by ing the course of events, locking cause to
side, but this may imply not a logical deter- effect, or constraining the human will. Sharp
mination but only an existential connection. distinctions can be drawn between different
Nevertheless, the system remains: the only types of laws, especially between those which
presumption which is absolutely essential is are prescriptive and those which are descrip-
that there be a process or pattern of sufficient tive. As Schlick elucidated the principle, the
regularity to enable the analyst to read back- laws which a state prescribes may possibly
wards and forwards in time or space. As Sid- be obeyed under compulsion or not at all,
ney Hook viewed it, it need not (indeed it but natural laws only describe what actually
cannot) be assumed that such relationships does take place. The planets are not forced
will invariably recur or endure forever: even by the "burdensome laws of Kepler to move
the longest continued of associations, strictly in orderly paths; no, these laws . . . express
speaking, warrants no more than "a probable only what in fact planets actually do."89 This
judgement," though in practice the invariance does not of course imply that human actions
of law may legitimately be erected into "a may be described with the regularity of the
postulate of scientific enquiry."87 stars in their courses. Hartshorne may well
Nor is such a deterministic system exclusive be right in affirming that "there will always
in character. Each may be conceived as an remain a hidden area in social science which
abstraction, an intellectual construct, or a cannot be explained by scientific laws,"90 and
model deliberately isolated from the almost Spate may be asserting a necessary truth in
inevitable involvements and complications of insisting that there are "enclaves of individ-
actuality. It will, therefore, be valid only uality not accessible to punch cards,"91 and
within its proper and restricted frame of ref- warning that the application of deterministic
erence: a multiplicity of data will fall out- principles by the quantifiers has reached if
side this frame. Moreover, no one system need
be extended to the exclusion of other deter- 88 J. 0. Urmson, The Concise Encyclopedia of
Western Philosophy and Philosophers (New York:
86 B. Russell, "On the Notion of Cause," Mysticism Hawthorne Books, 1960), p. 97.
and Logic (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 89 M. Schlick, "When Is a Man Responsible?," in
1957), p. 192. P. Edwards and A. Pap (Eds.), op. cit., footnote 48,
8- S. Hook, "Determinism," Encyclopedia of the p. 350.
Social Sciences (London: Macmillan and Co., 1954 90 Hartshorne, op. cit., footnote 28, p. 156.
ed.), Vol. 6, pp. 110-12. 91 Spate, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 392.
not exceeded its proper limits. But there may laws may thus be operative at one level of
also be broad areas of human conduct where analysis, but with never a hint of compulsion
lawful or rational processes can be observed at another.
and from which deterministic systems can be
abstracted. Scientific Determinism: A Matter of Method
As a matter of fact, and rightly or wrongly, Whether geographers should follow those
rumblings of dissent from social scientists and who go on to dismiss the time-honored con-
philosophers warn us that the attempt to frontation of determinism and free will as a
repel determinism by claiming pockets of mere pseudo-problem seems scarcely relevant
immunity from the long arm of scientific law here, nor is it necessary to assume the validity
may prove both misguided and unnecessary. of logical positivism, or of any other philo-
It has long been doubted whether the cause sophical position for that matter. As Spate
of spiritual liberty had anything to gain from pointed out,94 positivism may be undermined
reliance on the allegedly random behavior of and ultimately abandoned, and Blaut may be
subatomic particles and, as the philosopher right in hinting that geography has been too
Thompson warned, the past practice of basing much involved with passing phases of philo-
opposition to determinism on resistance to sophical thought.95 Nor will all necessarily
"the unlimited extension of scientific explana- agree with these redefinitions of determinism.
tion . . . particularly [to] the human per-
Some, indeed, charge that such rephrasing
sonality" was proving to be a dubious strategy. empties the word of its precise and time-
Indeed such "attempts to build a protective honored meanings: economic determinism
wall . . . have never succeeded for long";92 and geographic determinism were concepts
libertarians now look to deeper principles that
with positive substance, and linguistic analysis
lie beyond the patterns. In similar vein the
should not degenerate into a verbal sleight of
Cambridge philosopher Ryle condemned the hand to cover a change of position. But the
futility of efforts to exorcise "the bogey of pros and cons of such debate need not delay
mechanism" by resisting the extension of pre-
us here; the fact is that useful and relevant
cise laws. Human freedom could not be sal-
concepts have been elucidated, and geogra-
vaged by clutching at the irrelevant straw of
phers must take cognizance of their implica-
Heisenberg's "uncertainty principle" or by
tions. It is significant to us that the mono-
betting on the "very, very long odds" offered
by hypothetical holes in the network of law- lithic block-universe of total determinism has
fulness; what was needed, it was argued, was been at least partially replaced by separate
a different level of interpretation. The social deterministic blocks which may or may not
scientists might continue to elucidate law after be cemented into a unified structure, and laws
law till every facet of human behavior was once presented as rigid proclamations of ne-
covered, but any impression of remorseless and cessity are softened into statements of prob-
mechanical control would be sheer optical ability and description. As the sociologist
illusion. In Ryle's telling illustration, an un- Sorokin insists, "scientific determinism states
initiated observer of a chess game might well only that, on the basis of the theory of prob-
deduce that every move was governed by ability, the appearance, connection, or dis-
some rule, and leap to the conclusion that appearance of such and such phenomena is
"heartless necessity dictates the play." But probable or improbable with such and such
this would miss the vital point: every move
a degree of probability, and that is all. All
could at one and the same time be free and
terms like 'inevitable,' 'necessary,' and so on,
purposeful. Thus, Ryle concluded, "the laws
are not a part of science, or of the scientific
that [we] have found and will find may, in
conception of determinism."96 Some, including
one sense of the metaphorical verb, govern
Allix and Hartshorne, have even gone so far
everything, but they do not ordain every-
thing. . . . Indeed, they do not ordain any- as to affirm that now "the only true deter-
thing."93 Deterministic laws and systems of
94 Spate, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 380.
92 Thompson, op. cit., footnote 85, p. 266. " J. M. Blaut, "Object and Relationship," The
93 G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Professional Geographer, Vol. 14 N.S. (1962), p. 1.
Barnes and Noble Inc., 1949), pp. 76-82. 96 Sorokin, op. cit., footnote 8, p. 540.
minism is statistical determinism."97 But even that is unprejudiced and truly modern."'02
if determinism as an overarching principle of The acknowledgment of such mathematical
causality has gone by the board, deterministic rules naturally suggests their expression in
principles remain as analytical tools invaluable mathematical formulae, and it is no accident
in their appropriate areas of enquiry, as in- that deterministic systems and quantification
tellectual constructs with the oft-praised vir- have advanced together in the field of geog-
raphy.
tue of extensibility. Indeed, many would join
It is perhaps superfluous to underscore the
with Hettner in holding that at least in this
fact that such deterministic complexes, wheth-
sense of the term "science as such must be
er or not they are recognized as such, have
deterministic."98
been aggressively promoted in recent years,
but there are notable distinctions in the de-
DETERMINISTIC SYSTEMS IN GEOGRAPHY
gree of precision with which they have been
formulated, and in the particular data to
The plain fact is that neither in science in
which they have been applied. At least in
general nor in geography in particular has
principle the dangers of rigidity have usually
determinism been retreating from the field.
been recognized, and the data selected for
Laws, lawful processes, patterns, and models
systematization are more often than not pre-
are recurrent topics or even catchwords that
sumed to be initiated and patterned by cul-
loom large in recent geographical literature. tural rather than environmental forces.
Of course, as Chorley inferred, not even all
mathematical models are deterministic in the Determinism Minus Environmentalism
strictly causal sense of that term,99 but as
This softening of rigidity and highlighting
Spate has pointed out, the formulation of laws of cultural and economic forces is evident
and patterns inevitably implies at least a enough. Although Spate found ample occasion
measure of determinism.'00 Never has the for his warning that much in recent social
reign of law been challenged in physical physics and quantification appears "determi-
geography, surely the very realm where the nist in an unsubtle and unrefined manner,"103
physical principle of indeterminacy should, if the fault would seem to lie in the practice
anywhere, have proved applicable! What is rather than in the principle. Thus Murphey re-
at least partially new is the projection of the pudiated the term law as "too extreme"'"04
reign of law into the cultural realm. "The un- and postulated only concepts and principles,
relenting power of natural agents reigns in the and Robinson, Lindberg, and Brinkman un-
physical world alone," wrote Brunhes. "Human doubtedly reflected a widespread opinion
geography is a field of compromise."'0'1 But when they asserted that the core of much
current geographical study lay not so much in
half a century later Stewart (though without
the search for environmental controls as in the
implying that the laws were environmental
search for general patterns of areal covariation
ones) confidently asserted that "there is no
and for local departures from those overall
longer any excuse for anyone to ignore the
patterns.'05 Admittedly, Renner was seemingly
fact that human beings, on the average and
rigid when he wrote that interegional eco-
at least in certain circumstances, obey mathe- nomic competition is so overriding a factor that
matical rules resembling in a general way Cman must perforce follow different patterns
some of the primitive laws of physics. 'Social in adjusting his living to the natural environ-
physics' lies within the grasp of scholarship
102 J. Q. Stewart, "Empirical Mathematical Rules
Concerning the Distribution and Equilibrium of Pop-
97 Hartshorne, quoting Allix, op. cit., footnote 28, ulation," Geographical Review, Vol. 37 (1947), p.
p. 157. 485.
98 Quoted in Hartshorne, op. cit., footnote 20, p. 103 Spate, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 391.
309. 104 Murphey, op. cit., footnote 43, p. 6.
99 R. J. Chorley, "Geography and Analogue Theory," 105A. H. Robinson, J. B. Lindberg, and L. W.
Annals, Association of American Geographers, Vol. Brinkman, "A Correlation and Regression Analysis
54 (1964), pp. 132-33. Applied to Rural Farm Population Densities in the
00 Spate, op. cit., footnote 45, pp. 407-08. Great Plains," Annals, Association of American Geogra-
101 Brunhes, op. cit., footnote 16, p. 607.phers, Vol. 51 (1961), p. 211.
may be assumed for analytical purposes, and ferent group views its milieu through a
in point of fact Taylor selected an almost distinctive and selective prism of cultural
purely environmentalist system when rather values and historical experience, so cognitive
boldly predicting parallel developments in environmentalism or behaviorism is invoked:
climatically analogous regions in Australia and rice growers and pastoral nomads may ap-
North Africa,112 and Carter selected a cultural perceive objectively identical environments
system when elucidating the role of invention through very different eyes. But emphasis on
and diffusion on a hypothetically uniform such subjective environments should not ob-
earth.113 In essence, at least, these are scarcely
scure the brute fact that the external or ob-
as contradictory as their exponents seem to jective environment is every whit as real and
have thought, and each may yet be invoked often frustrating: if the oil is not there, an
as contributing some valuable insights to the oil-hungry nation may dry-hole till the very
overall interpretation of man-land relation- end of time.
ships.
A Place for a Spectrum
Already, of course, the Sprouts had sug-
gested this fact when they chided geogra- Thus environmental determinism and pos-
phers for throwing away a very healthy baby sibilism may both be viewed as valid if given
when emptying out the dirty water in the their proper place within a necessarily broader
framework
deterministic bath.'14 They favored, rather, a and used with discernment and
series of models which would assign the en- discretion as constructs which cover some but
vironment a varying role ranging from directlynot all of the facts. Viewed from this angle,
active to purely passive. At one extreme lies determinism and possibilism represent the op-
environmental determinism which postulates posite poles of a total spectrum which in-
man as passive and his milieu as active, a cludes every possible position. As the Sprouts
construct which approaches reality when an concluded, 115
earthquake strikes or the temperature plunges random guessing is neither a fruitful nor a neces-
below zero: man responds, willy-nilly. But sary alternative to determinism. Between the ex-
tremes of predictable certainty and total unpredict-
such nonvolitional response is rare and grades
ability . . . lie the concepts of possibility and
into environmentalism, a gentler term em- probability, the latter in many gradations of un-
ployed by the Sprouts to describe the position certainty. . . . These concepts, and the man-milieu
of such as Semple who gave geographic in- relationship hypotheses into which they are in-
fluences an initiating but not irresistible role: corporated, constitute useful and widely used gen-
eral premises for calculating within some range of
those bananas can, if necessary, be grown in uncertainty the boundaries and patterns of things
Greenland. Possibilism, by contrast, shifts the to come.
initiative to man and emphasizes both the
Sometimes it is the deterministic pole which
enlarged opportunities which come with social
will be approached and at other times it is
and technological development and the fact
possibilism which will be approximated, but
that the environment remains inert until hu- to oppose these as mutually contradictory
man action intervenes. Then latent factors be- positions is not only unrealistic but obscures
come operational and man develops the en- the elements of value in each. It is better to
vironmental pattern as a photographer de- view them as abstractions, conserve the truths
velops his film. But since some developments idealized in each system, and apply these
are more likely than others, probabilism is also principles to the real situations which are
a necessary position; in any one culture men bound to vary with culture, time, and place.
tend to respond to similar motivations and There is no need to assume that any one of
thus produce a rational and predictable pat- these constructs or even all of them together
tern. There are pronounced analogies between will cover all of the facts and exclude the
the economies of Australia and the western random play of contingent factors. But each
United States, for instance. But each dif- may perhaps qualify as a deterministic sys-
tem covering enough of the facts to be a use
112 Taylor, in G. Taylor (Ed.), op. cit., footnote 8, ful analytical tool permitting a measure of
pp. 14-16.
extrapolation, retrodiction, and prediction.
113 Carter, op. cit., footnote 2, pp. 28-29.
114 H. and M. Sprout, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 31. 115 H. and M. Sprout, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 99.
is, it seems, a not uncommon impression that including Kant and Ritter, and even Hett-
definition in terms of areal differentiation ner,126 did in fact sometimes exaggerate the
excludes the study of man-land relationships, potency of the environment. But, if this writer
and even dissolves the distinction between reads his Hartshorne aright, the crux of the
man and nature. But this is far from the matter is the displacement of definition in
truth. All that the chorological concept log- terms of relationships with definition in terms
ically implies is that such relationships do not of areal differentiation. This issue remains un-
define the field, that they are included only touched by any multiplication of instances of
insofar as they contribute to the understand- environmental influence or control, and is in
ing of areal differentiation, and that the com- its own turn logically neutral towards pos-
mon distinction between features of natural sibilism and determinism. The student of
and human origin may be less useful for areal differentiation is left free to conclude
geographical purposes than some other and either that physical conditions left wide lati-
equally valid distinctions. But these affirma- tude for human choice or that they deter-
tions carry with them their inevitable corol- mined the patterns of human occupance.
lary: all those relationships which are in fact
expressed in the areal differentiation of the LibertyJ for Laws
earth's surface must inevitably be included, The same principles apply to the connec-
whether they be relationships of man to land, tions between other determinisins and geog-
or man to nature, or of man to nonhuman ele- raphy. Again, there seems to be an under-
ments. Adhesion to the chorological principle current of assumption that recognition of
does not preclude the study of environmental lawful processes and patterns and the exten-
relationships: it merely rejects the thought sion of quantification is somehow incompat-
that these define and circumscribe geography. ible with definition in terms of areal differ-
The study of human ecology and the analysis entiation. But again this misses the point:
of areal differentiation are thus conceived as whatever the goal of the geographer, he should
circles that overlap but do not coincide, and not be limited to or prejudiced against any
definition in terms of the environmentalist particular technique or method. Literary de-
concept is rejected as putting the cart of ecol- scription and levels of humane insight are
ogy before the horse of chorology. undoubtedly required, but in Hartshorne's
But if the study of environmental relation- words the geographer must analyze the rela-
ships be admitted, as it must, to even a sec- tionships of earthly features, "regardless of
ondary role in geography, it is impossible to whether these interrelations can be described
exclude the time-honored debate concerning in terms of 'natural laws' or 'social laws.' "127
the degree of environmental control: thrown The door thus stands wide open for proper
out the door, it will climb back through the recognition of lawful processes and the ap-
window. And no definition in terms of rela- propriate extension of determ-ninistic systems.
tionships, of traditions, or of the chorological
principle presupposes or excludes either pos- SOME PIOUS CONCLUSIONS
sibilism or environmental determinism. Again, What, then, is the conclusion of the whole
it seems, the principle of areal differentiation matter? The terms "environmentalism" and
has sometimes been thought to exclude en- "determinism" have been used and doubtless
vironmental determinism, and the writer has will continue to be used in varying fashion,
heard even mild instances of human response and no harm will come of this if only context
cited as refutation of Hartshorne's basic prin- and connotation stand clear. The environ-
ciple. But this is to miss not only one of the mentalist controversy entangled one argument
issues under present consideration but the about the nature of geography with another
essential thrust of Hartshorne's thesis. Ad- debate about the nature of man and his rela-
nittedly repudiation of environmental deter-
minism has been linked, both historically and 126) For Kant and Ritter in this connection, see
Tatham, in G. Taylor (Ed.), op. cit., footnote 8,
psychologically, with concurrent repudiation
pp. 130-31; for Hettner, see Hartshorne, op. cit., foot-
of the environmentalist concept of geography,note 20, pp. 308-11.
though adherents of the chorological principle, 127 Hartshorne, op. cit., footnote 28, p. 80.
in theoretical discussion they talk the same 131 Montefiore and Williams, op. cit., footnote 10,
p. 1.
132 Spate, "Lord Kelvin Rides Again," op. cit., foot-
12& Platt, op. cit., footnote 29, pp. 355-56. note 119.