Marine Pollution Bulletin, Vol. 35, Nos 7 12, pp.
365 373, 1997
Pergamon
PII: S0025-326X(97)00153-7
Modelling the Release to the Kara Sea
of Radioactive Waste from the
Icebreaker Lenin: Version II
S. J. TIMMS*§, N. M. LYNN*, M. E. M O U N T t , Y. SIVINTSEV$ and J. M. WARDEN*
*Department of Nuclear Science and Technology, Royal Naval College Greenwich, London SEIO 9NN, UK
tLawrence Livermore National Laboratory, PO Box 808, L-634, Livermore, CA 94551, USA
:~Russia Research Centre, Kurchatov Institute, 123182 Moscow, Russian Federation
In progressing its work for the International Arctic
Seas Assessment Project (IASAP), under the auspices
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
the Source Term Working Group has developed a
FORTRAN model to predict a radiation release profile
into the Kara Sea from reactor fuel and activated
components of the nuclear icebreaker Lenin. The
model accounts for the degradation of containment
materials through corrosion and other mechanisms,
and predicts annual release rates to 4500 years into
the future. Version I of the model was developed as a
spreadsheet program from the original data gathered
by the Working Group and the results were published
by Timms et al. (1994); revised information on the
method of disposal necessitated a change to the
program, which is presented in this paper as Version
II. The model is being applied to other marine
reactors dumped in the Kara Sea in a programme of
work for the IASAP aimed at assessing the collective
release profile from all significant dump sites in this
region. © 1997 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All
rights reserved
In the Spring of 1993, an English translation of the
Russian report, Facts and Problems related to Radio-
active Waste Disposal in Seas adjacent to the Territory of
the Russian Federation (Yablokov et al., 1993) was
released. The findings presented in this report were the
result of a scientific study commissioned in October
1992 by the Office of the President of the Russian
Federation. The White Book, as the report was later
called, reported that: (1) between 1965 and 1988, 16
naval reactors from seven former Soviet Union
submarines and the icebreaker Lenin, each of which
had suffered some form of reactor accident, were
dumped at five sites in the Kara Sea; (2) between 1959
and 1991, low level liquid radioactive waste was
§Corresponding author.
© 19t)7 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Printed in Great Britain
I)(125-326X/97 $17,0t)+ I)/I){I
discharged at sites in the Baltic, White, Barents and
Kara Seas; and (3) between 1964 and 1991, low and
intermediate level solid radioactive waste was dumped
at sites in the Barents and Kara Seas.
Of the discarded naval reactors, six of the 16
contained their spent nuclear fuel (SNF). In addition,
approximately 60% of the SNF from one of the three
Lenin marine reactors was disposed of in a concrete
and stainless steel shell container. The vast majority of
the low and intermediate level solid radioactive waste
was disposed of in containers of unknown composition.
The Kara Sea disposal sites for the 16 naval reactors
and low and intermediate level solid radioactive waste
varied in depth from 12 to 38(1 m.
The White Book also reported estimates of total
radioactivity at the time of disposal. These were: (1)
2300 kCi (85.1 PBq) of fission products in the SNF; (2)
100 kCi (3.7 PBq) of 6"Co in the reactor components;
(3) 24 kCi (0.9 PBq) of unspecified origin in the low
level liquid radioactive waste, over 50% of which was
discharged in the Barents Sea; and (4) 15.9kCi
(0.6 PBq) of unspecified origin in the low and inter-
mediate level solid radioactive waste, over 95% of
which was discarded in the Kara Sea. With rare excep-
tion, no radionuclides were identified and no estimate
provided for the current levels of radioactivity.
The hzternational Arctic Seas Assessment Project
International concern over the possible health and
environmental effects from disposal of these aforemen-
tioned radioactive wastes in the shallow waters of the
Arctic seas prompted the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), as part of its responsibilities to the
London Convention of 1972, to initiate the Inter-
national Arctic Seas Assessment Project (IASAP)
(Sjoeblom and Linsley, 1993). The IASAP formally
began on 1 February 1993 in Oslo, Norway, at the
meeting on the Assessment of Actual and Potential
365

Consequences of Dumping Radioactive Waste into
Arctic Seas.
The stated objectives of the IASAP are to: (1) assess
the risks to human health and to the environment
associated with the radioactive waste dumped in the
Kara and Barents Seas; and (2) examine possible
remedial actions related to the dumped wastes and
advise on whether they are necessary and justified. To
meet these objectives, four working groups were estab-
lished: (1) Source Term, (2) Existing Environmental
Concentrations, (3) Transfer Mechanisms and Models,
and (4) Impact Assessment and Remedial Measures.
The IASAP Source Term Working Group
The first consultants' meeting of the Source Term
Working Group, hereafter identified as the Group, was
held at the IAEA, in Vienna, Austria, on 10-14
January 1994. The purposes of this meeting were to:
(1) review progress and needs on the source term
evaluation for the assessment of risks to human health
and the environment associated with nuclear reactors
dumped in the Kara Sea; and (2) prepare a preliminary
source term description to be used by the Transfer
Mechanisms and Models Working Group.
During the meeting, the Group reviewed and
discussed source term reports prepared by consulting
members, one from the United States and one from
Russia. The estimate prepared by the consulting
member from the United States was for the inventory
of selected actinides and fission products in the SNF
and activation products in the reactor components and
primary system corrosion products of the 16 naval
reactors (Mount et al., 1993). Estimates for the Lenin
radionuclide inventory were based upon core history
information obtained from translations of Russian
articles available in the open literature, whereas the
estimates of the nuclear submarine radionuclide inven-
tories were based upon core history information
developed from open literature Western estimates of
their operating characteristics. The estimate prepared
by the consulting member from Russia was for the
inventory of selected actinides and fission products in
the SNF and activation products in the reactor compo-
nents of the Lenin (Sivintsev, 1993). In addition to the
inventory estimate, this report provided detailed infor-
mation on the operating history of the Lenin; condition
of the reactor compartment, reactor pressure vessels
(RPVs) and the SNF prior to disposal, and the disposal
operations. From the standpoint of the Group, the
later of these two source term estimates was definitive
for the Lenin.
The Group was also provided with preliminary infor-
mation from the September-October 1993 joint
Norwegian/Russian expedition to the Tsivolka Fjord,
Stepovoy Fjord and Novaya Zemlya Depression
disposal sites in the Kara Sea (Foyn and Nikitin, 1994).
Included among this information were preliminary
results from underwater camera investigations of
366
Marine PollutionBulletin
specific objects and in situ gamma spectroscopy of
bottom sediments.
As the information from the joint Norwegian/
Russian expedition was preliminary at best, and
because Russian estimates for the radionuclide inven-
tories in the nuclear submarine naval reactors would
not be available for evaluation before the Autumn of
1994, the Group initially focused its efforts on the
Lenin, and developed the first release rate model
(Timms et al., 1994).
The second meeting of the Group was held in
Vienna during September 1994 and a third meeting
was held in Greenwich, London, on 20-24 March 1994.
At this latter meeting, further information on the
disposal of the Lenin reactor compartment and the
SNF was presented (Sivintsev, 1995a); follow up
research by the consulting member for Russia had
revealed that the details of the dumping arrangements
of the SNF given in the White Book had been incor-
rect, necessitating a revision of the data already
presented at Vladivostok. The following section
summarizes the most up-to-date information pertinent
to development of the Lenin source term.
Lenin Source Term
Background
Launched in Leningrad in 1959, the icebreaker Lenin
was the first nuclear merchant ship in the world.
During her 31 years in commission, the Lenin had two
separate steam generating installations (SGIs). The
first SGI contained three pressurized water reactors
(PWRs) of 90 MW maximum thermal power each and
operated from 1959 to February 1965 when, during
routine repair of the SGI, an operator error allowed
the core of the N2 PWR to be left without water for
some period of time. As a consequence, a part of the
reactor core was damaged due to residual heat. It is
the characteristics of this first SGI that form the basis
for the Lenin source term.
Characteristics of the First SGI
The entire SGI, including the steam generators and
pumps, was located in the centre of the ship in an
isolated reactor compartment. The three PWRs were
aligned vertically in a plane perpendicular to the keel
and were surrounded by a large iron-water tank shield.
The biological shield located above the three PWRs
was made of limonite concrete and a heat-resistant
composition of graphite and boron.
Each cylindrical RPV was made from low alloy steel,
with approximate dimensions of 2 m diameter, 5 m
height, and 40 mm thick walls with a 5 mm internal
stainless steel (SS) layer of cladding. The height and
diameter of each PWR core were approximately 1.6 m
and 1 m, respectively, with each core containing 219
cylindrical technical fuel channels (TFCs) with 36
pin-type fuel elements. The fuel elements contained
Volume 35/Numbers 7-12/July-December 1997
fuel pellets made from sintered UO2 enriched to 5.0%
235U and clad with a Z r - N b alloy or stainless steel.
To reduce heat and radiation effects on each RPV
and subsequently extend their operating lives, thermal
shields consisting of five concentric SS cylinders of
15-25 mm thickness each (105 mm total) were
positioned around each reactor core. Two of these five
concentric cylinders were welded to the upper and
lower rings, which connected with the upper and lower
plates used for fixation of the TFCs.
Reactor Operating Histories
The first fuel load lasted from 1959 to 1962 and
consisted of 80 kg of 235U in each reactor core. The
integrated power productions with this first fuel load
were equal to 17.8GWd for the N1 PWR and
18.0 GWd for the N2 and N3 PWRs. Refuelling was
carried out in 1963. The second fuel load lasted from
1963 to 1965 and consisted of 129 kg 23-~U clad in SS in
the NI PWR and 75 kg 235U clad in Z r - N b in the N2
and N3 PWRs. The N2 PWR operated from 19 July
1963 to 17 November 1963 and from 22 June 1964 to
13 November 1964 for a total period of 267 days. The
mean power of the N2 PWR during the second fuel
load was 53 MW. At the time of the reactor accident,
the integrated power production for the N2 PWR was
approximately 14.2 GWd thermal and the burnup was
equal to 18.9MWd per tonne initial heavy metal.
Integrated power productions for the second fuel load
were equal to 22.5GWd for the N1 PWR and
17.5 GWd for the N3 PWR.
Reactor Compartment Disposal
Initially, all undamaged and damaged SNF was
removed from the three RPVs. However, as a conse-
quence of the accident, only 94 of the 219 TFCs from
the N2 RPV could be removed for normal disposal.
The N2 core barrel, containing the remaining 125
TFCs and all five thermal shields, was removed and
placed into a cylindrical screening container. This
container consisted of two concentric steel cylinders
with a 550 mm layer of concrete between them. The
inner space of the N2 reactor, now in the container,
was filled with Furfurol. The container, hereafter called
Container B, of wall thickness 50ram, was then
hermetically sealcd by welding a 100 mm thick steel
cover on top, and stored on land for two years
(Sivintsev, 1995a).
Before disposal, the RPVs and their primary circuit
loops and equipment were washed, dried and hermet-
ically scaled, and the ceiling of the reactor compart-
ment was equipped with special pressure relief valves.
Container B, with the SNF, was transferred from its
land storage location to a specially prepared caisson on
a floating pontoon. The caisson, hereafter called
Container C, consisted of cylindrical SS walls 12 mm
thick; oncc Container B had been placed in Container
C, it was surrounded by Furfurol and Container C was
sealed with an 18 mm SS cover.
In September 1967, the Lenin and the pontoon
carrying Container C and the SNF were towed to
Tsivolka Fjord on the coast of Novaya Zemlya. During
transit, a storm occurred in the region of the Kara
Gate and the pontoon was temporarily lost due to
rupture of the towing cable. The pontoon was subse-
quently found, secured to the towing vessel Lepse, and
towed to Tsivolka Fjord, where it was sunk on 18
September. The reactor compartment with the three
RPVs was sunk on 19 September directly from the
Lenin through the bottom of her hull. The two dump
sites were approximately 1 km apart, and at a depth of
about 60 m.
Radionuclide Inventories
Fission Products" and Actinides
Calculations of core cell burnup in the N2 PWR
were performed by the spectral code G E T E R A
(Belousov et al., 1991). The fission product and
actinide activities were estimated using the R E C O L
library data base (Kevrolev, 1987), which was gener-
ated on the bases of the latest versions of the evaluated
nuclear data files, ENDF/B-V, with corrections based
on the results of critical experiments (Williams, 1985).
The criticality problem was solved for a realistic 3-D
geometry model of a TFC by Monte-Carlo with
R E C O L and checked with MCNP (Briesmeister, 1987)
for fresh fuel load. One-group cross-sections were
prepared for burnup calculation of critical loads of
both fresh and spent fuel and input to ORIGEN-2
(Groff, 1983) for detailed radionuclide content
calculations.
Activation Products
All internal reactor constructions were made from
SS; the RPVs were made from low alloy steel. Almost
all activation products associated with the Lenin PWRs
originated in the internal constructions made from SS.
Analysis of neutron activation shows that only four
radionuclides are of consequence at 10 or more years
after reactor shutdown. These are 63Ni, 6CJCo, 59Ni and
~4C. Activities of 63Ni and 6°C0 were estimated from
the following equation:
A = 3.1 x 1016(p m.... )[Pm+Pa+AK(]~.,lY~,~+w)]T)~qj,
where 3.1 x 10 J" is the number of fissions (s M W ) - ~;
P .... , is the mean thermal power of the reactor, MW;
Pm is the fraction of the neutron flux captured in the
main reactivity compensating lattices per unit fission;
p~t is the fraction of the neutron flux captured in the
additional reactivity compensating lattices per unit
fission; AK is the fraction of the neutron flux captured
in the shielding assemblage and lower plate per unit
fission; g~ is the macroscopic capture cross-section for
thermal and intermediate neutrons in the steel of the
367
 Marine Pollution Bulletin

shielding assemblage, cm-~; Z.~+w is the macroscopic summary of the estimated radioactivity for activation
capture cross-section for thermal and intermediate products in the three reactor pressure vessels that are
neutrons in the steel and water of the shielding assem- sealed within the Lenin reactor compartment, for 1993.
blage, cm-~; T is the irradiation time, days; k is the
radioactive decay constant for 63Ni or 6°Co, days 1;
and qJ is the ratio of the activation cross-section of Ni
Lenin Release Model
or Co to the total activation cross-section of the steel
under irradiation. A F O R T R A N model was developed to provide a
Activities for 59Ni and HC were initially estimated workable estimate of the rate of release of activity into
from a British calculation of activation products in the the environment. With so many unknowns, especially
reactor components of a generic nuclear powered with respect to the behaviour of oxide fuel in seawater,
submarine one year after shutdown (House of corrosion rates, and the effectiveness of the various
Commons Defence Committee, 1990). This was later containment barriers, a number of simplifying assump-
replaced by a result from the Russian Federation tions were necessary, as described below. In all cases,
(Sivintsev, 1995b). such assumptions are pessimistic so as to over- rather
Table 1 presents a summary of the estimated radio- than underestimate the rate of release of activity. The
activity in Container C for 1993. Table 2 presents a model has the ability to vary most of the operating
parameters, for instance, corrosion rates, material
TA BLE 1 thicknesses and barrier effectiveness or containment
E s t i m a t e d radioactivity in C o n t a i n e r C, 1993. lifetimes.
Activity All the fission products and actinides are in
Container B within Container C. Container B also
Radionuclide C u r i e s (Ci) B e c q u e r e l s (Bq) Percent ( % ) contains the core barrel from the N2 RPV, repre-
Fission p r o d u c t s senting an estimated 27% of the total inventory of
137Cs 1.3 x 104 4.9 x 1014 26.14
activation products. The remaining 73% of activation
137tuBa 1.3 x 104 4.7 x 1014 24.73
~°Sr 1.2 x 104 4.5 x 1014 23.73 products are in the RPVs. It is further assumed that
9ily 1.2 × 104 4.5 X 1014 23.73 the activation products in the three RPVs are distri-
~SKr 4.8 x 1(12 1.8 X 1013 0.937
buted in the ratio 80% thermal shields, 10% RPV
151Sm 3.0 x 102 1.1 x 1013 0.583
I47pm 4.8 x 101 1.8 × 1012 0.095 cladding, 10% RPV walls.
3H 2.4 x 101 8.8 x 1011 0.047 The process of release of radionuclides from the
99Tc 3.6 x 10 ° 1.3 x 10 II 0.0117 activated RPV walls and SS thermal shields is deemed
125Sb 2.0 x 10° 7.5 x 10 lq' 0.004
12~'~1 5.7 x 10 3 2.1 X 10 ~ 1.1 X 10 5 to be by corrosion. For fission products and actinides
Subtotal 5.1 x 104 1.9 x 1015 100.00 in the oxide fuel, once seawater penetrates to the fuel
the release process is assumed to be immediate from
Activation products
63Ni 1.4 x 103 5.0 x 1013 77.23 fuel grain boundaries, followed by a very slow dissolu-
6°Co 3.5 x 102 1.3 x 1013 20.08 tion of fuel grains. Reasonably accurate rates of radio-
5'~Ni 1.8 x 101 6.7 x 1011 1.05
active release into the sea are clearly crucial for
14C 1.6 x 10 5 5.9 x 105 9.3 x 10 7
Subtotal 1.7 × 103 6.4 × 1013 100.00 realistic modelling and have been predicted from a
detailed survey of current literature. Values are based
Actinides on corrosion rates in cold, well oxygenated seawater.
241pu 1.9 x 103 7.1 x 1013 82.13
241Am 1.9 × 102 7.0 x 1012 8.14 The result of this work by the Department of Nuclear
239pu 1.4 x 102 5.0 x 1012 5.87 Science and Technology, Royal Naval College,
24°pu 6.1 x 101 2.3 × 1012 2.63
Greenwich, has been reported by Carter (1994) and is
23Xpu 2.9 x 101 1.1 x 10 ~z 1.23
Subtotal 2.3 x 103 8.6 x 10 ~3 100.00 the source document for the majority of rates of
material decomposition used in this paper.
The base values for corrosion rates are then multi-
plied by factors in the range zero to unity to model the
TABLE 2
retardation of corrosion by the various levels of
E s t i m a t e d radioactivity in the t h r e e r e a c t o r pressure vessels within
the r e a c t o r c o m p a r t m e n t of the i c e b r e a k e r Lenin, 1993. containment. These factors, known as k factors, are
discussed in the next sections and represent the
Activity Working Group's best estimate of the effectiveness of
Curies Becquerels Percent
Radionuclide (Ci) (Bq) (%) the containments.

Activation products Activation Release.from the RPV Walls and Thermal

63Ni 3.6 x 103 1.4 x 10 TM 78.84
6°Co 9.5 × 102 3.5 X 1013 20.50 Shields
59Ni 3.1 x 102 1.1 x 101-" 0.66 The reactor compartment walls are assumed to form
14C 2.7 x 10 -~ 1.0 x l06 5.8 x 10- 7
a boundary around the RPVs and to modify the release
Subtotal 4.6 x 103 1.7 x 1014 100.00
into the surrounding sea by the containment effective-

368
Volume 35/Numbers 7-12/July-December 1997
ness factor kc; thus the effective corrosion rate
Xcn= kcX, where X is the base corrosion rate.
Pressure release valves allowed seawater into the
reactor compartment on sinking. Corrosion is therefore
assumed to occur on either side of the hull, but at a
very reduced rate internally because of low oxygen
levels. The weakest area of containment is in the
vicinity of the weld securing the mild steel cover plate.
At a mean corrosion rate of 0 . 1 6 6 m m y r -~ the
estimated life of an assumed 10 mm thick weld is about
60 years. Up to this point, the effectiveness of the
containment boundary is considered to be 100%
(kc = 0); thereafter, it is assumed to be 90% effective
(kc = 0.1). General corrosion of the 10 mm thick mild
steel hull/reactor compartment acts at a rate of
0.075 m m y r ~ on both sides of the plating, until
complete failure eliminates the effectiveness of this
boundary (k~ = 1), 67 years from first immersion in
seawater in 1967. These values of kc are input into the
model as step changes, modifying the appropriate steel
corrosion rates for the RPV materials.
Based on the given data (Sivintsev, 1993), vessel
geometry is assumed to be as shown in Fig. 1. The low
alloy steel RPV walls corrode immediately from the
outside at a rate of 0.075 m m y r 1 multiplied by a
biological acceleration factor of 2 (Sivintsev, 1995b)
and by the relevant k factor of the hull, kc, releasing
activation products into the surrounding water. The
inner components of the RPV corrode away at much
reduced rates based on a further factor, ktotal, which is
derived from analysis of the diameter of pipes and
other penetrations into the RPVs, all of which were
initially capped with 10 mm stainless steel plates. The
RPVs are also assumed to have flooded at the instant
of sinking, with a small gap in the bolted flanges
allowing some water exchange.
From this, the inner side of the stainless steel
cladding and both sides of the SS thermal shields
corrode into the sea, at a rate of 0 . 0 2 m m y r 1,
reduced by the multiplication factor ktotal.
Activation Release .from the N2 PWR Fuel Rods and
Thermal Shields
Although the geometry of the structure containing
the SNF and the core barrel from the N2 reactor is
100ram
RPV
Fig. 1 D i m e n s i o n s o f R P V a n d t h e r m a l shields.
complicated, modelling the release rates is relatively
simple. It has been assumed that no activity is released
from the whole unit until the lid of Container C has
corroded off, followed by the lid of Container B, using
pitting corrosion rates applicable to the material of
each container, acting on the lid welds.
Once seawater penetrates Container B, the five SS
thermal shields from the N2 RPV are assumed to
corrode away on both sides at a rate of 0.02 mm yr
The damaged fuel from the N2 PWR is assumed to
comprise UO2 pellets, 5% enriched, 4.5 mm diameter,
10 g c m - 3 density, carried in Z r - N b alloy cladding. In
the absence of details of the extent of damage to the
125 technical fuel channels, a conservative assumption
is made that the cladding material has been fully
breached and does not constitute a barrier to fission
product release from the fuel.
As soon as the fuel is in contact with seawater, an
immediate release of 20% of the fission product and
actinide inventory is assumed from the fuel grain
boundaries. The remaining fission products and the
actinides are released through dissolution of fuel grains
at a pessimistic rate of 30 x 10 7gcm 2 day ~, as
estimated by Sivintsev (1993). For fuel pins with a
4.5 mm diameter and 10 g cm ~ density, this equates to
a constant dissolution rate of 1.1 mm per 1000 yr. For
ease of modelling, the model assumes a linear surface
for the circular fuel pin and an evenly spread rate of
dissolution. Allowing for the geometry of the pins,
activity release from dissolution will commence at its
maximum rate, reducing until the pins finally
disappear.
Information is lacking on the precise composition of
the hardening mixture Furfurol in which the radio-
active material is encased. It is known that it is based
on a chemical obtained from the acid hydrolysis of the
polysaccharides of oat husks, corn cobs or straw, and
that it can be polymerized with compounds such as
acetone or urea to form a hard resin. An effective
lifetime of 500 years is quoted (Yablokov el al., 1993)
for this material. However, in the absence of reliable
data on the performance of Furfurol in such environ-
mental conditions, a conservative lifespan of 100 years
in the radiation environment is assumed in the model,
and the breakdown of the material is assumed to be
5 mm 25 mm 25 mm 21 mm 15 nun 19 mm
Clad SS thermal shields
369
 Marine Pollution Bulletin

due to radiation damage and cracking. Furfurol has the
effect of inhibiting the activity released from the SNF
encased in Furfurol by the factor kr. The multiplying
factor kr is zero until the caisson is dumped, and then
ramps to unity over the ensuing 100 years. However,
using this lifetime, it will have degraded completely
long before the year 2300, which is the calculated date
for the complete opening of the fuel containment
structure.
Deterioration of the Concrete in Seawater
Version I of the model assumed a layer of concrete
completely surrounding the fuel container• The new
information shows that the concrete is only around the
sides for radiation shielding purposes and thus will not
inhibit the release of fission products from the fuel into
the sea once the container lids have corroded away.
Therefore concrete was not included in Version II as a
containment barrier.
Results
Results of the Working Group's model for total
release rates of fission products, activation products
and actinides into Tsivolka Fjord are shown in Fig2-5
• As the two dumped components are resting close to
each other in the Fjord, the rates shown come from
both units together. Events are rounded to the five-
year date.

Tsivolka LENIN)
CASE A: ActivityFiord/loth
Release sectonsl
100C

,~ 100
D"
10

\
m
_o
0.1

'~-- 0.01 - . ,,
O
'~ 0.001

i i i i i i
0.000~ 500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Date (year)
Fission Products
Ver: 3.1(F)
12/12/95: Revised inventory

Fig. 2 Output from L E N I N (V.II) release rate model, fission

products.

Tsivolka Fjord (LENIN)

CASE A: Activity ~elease (Both Sections)
"f0000

1000

100

10
ca

O
1 - k
IZ
0.1
o
< 0.01

1 i _ i i i i i . . . . .
0"00 :i 500 2000 2500 _3000 3500 4000 4500 500(
Date (year)
Actinides
Ver: 3. I ( F )
12/12/95: Revised inventory

Fig. 3 Output from L E N I N (V.Ii) release rate model, actinides.

370
Volume 35/Numbers 7-12/July-December 1997

Tsivolka Fiord (LENIN)

CASE A: Activity Release (Both Sections)
10000

1000
O
1o

.~ 100

i . I i
10
1500 2000 2500 000 00 4000 4500 500(
I~ate (year~s
Activation Products
Ver: 3 . 1 ( F )
12/12/95: Revised Inventory

Fig. 4 Output from LENIN (V.II) release rate model, activation

products.

Fission Product and Actinide Release
Fig. 2Fig. 3 show the release profiles for the fission
products and the actinides released from the caisson.
In the year 2300, containment is finally breached,
producing the initial pulse release of 530 MBq y r - l for
fission products and 1620 MBqyr -~ of actinides. The
release rates immediately drop in the following year, as
corrosion is assumed to be the only mechanism acting
for the remainder of the time. Release rates become
18 MBq yr-~ of fission products and 57 MBq y r - I of
actinides.
Release rates then slowly decrease as the fuel pins
corrode away and the activity of the fuel itself
decreases. At year 2700, for instance, the release rates
are 0.1 MBq y r - ] for fission products and
0.4 MBq y r - i for actinides. By 4500, they are down to
0.003MBqyr -I fission products and 0 . 1 M B q y r -~
actinides. The fuel has completely corroded away by
the year 4570.
Activation Product Release
The graph of release rates for the activation
products is more complicated, as various k factors
come into play on the two dumped units. Fig. 4 shows
the release rate from all the activated components.

Tsivolka Fiord ('LENIN)

CASE A: Activity Release (Both Sections)
10000 [

.ID"• 1000

m
loo
@
tO 10
m

@ 1
n,'

--'~ 0.1
0
'~ o.oi
i i i } i i
0"001500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 fi00(
Date (year)
Total
Ver: 3.1(F)
12/12/95: Revised inventory

Fig. 5 Output from LENIN (V.II) release rate model, sum of all
radioactive isotopes.

371

T h e hull is first breached by the year 2030,
c o m m e n c i n g with outer wall R P V corrosion release,
with a small contribution from material inside the
R P V s through the bolted flange gaps. The release rate
starts at 224 M B q yr-~ but, five years later, the hull
fails completely and the rate jumps to 2150 M B q y r -
Main coolant pipes, control rod tube caps and other
penetrations fail in 2055, increasing the release rates to
2 1 7 0 M B q y r -~. Until 2300, the release rate falls,
largely due to decay of the 6°Co c o m p o n e n t of the total
activity.
At year 2300, the caisson c o n t a i n m e n t is breached
and the thermal shields of reactor N2 are exposed to
corrosion; this increases the overall release rate to
624 M B q y r 1. These shields are c o r r o d e d away by
2660; Fig. 2 shows this decrease down to 62 MBq y r -
when the only material left is in the R P V assemblies.
T h e R P V s themselves disappear at 2700, and their
cladding by 2795. This exposes what is left of the
thermal shields to corrosion on both sides as ktotal
b e c o m e s equal to 1; the release rate jumps to
58 M B q yr J, then falls away gradually for the final 250
years until all the activated material is gone by 3050.
Total Release R a t e s
Figure 5 shows the summation of the three previous
graphs, the total activity release per year from the
Lenin c o m p o n e n t units. T h e initial release is
d o m i n a t e d by activation product material between 2035
and 2055. Release rates decrease until 2300, when the
caisson c o n t a i n m e n t is breached and the fission
product/actinide spike dominates with a total release in
that year of 2570 MBq yr
Release rates decline as the fuel and activated
materials disappear, with a marked decrease at 3050
when the last of the thermal shield material corrodes
away, leaving only the fuel to last on to 4570 when, in
the last year, the release rate has decreased to
0.008 M B q y r 1
Conclusions and Further Work
Version II of the Source T e r m Working G r o u p s
assessment shows release rates of the icebreaker's
radioactive material into the waters of Tsivolka Fjord
extending from the year 2030 to the year 4570. T h e
magnitude of the release rates has two maxima. The
first, at 2055 (2170 M B q yr ~), is c o m p o s e d of activa-
tion products from the R P V assemblies; the second
maximum, at 2300 (2570 MBq y r - 1), is largely m a d e up
of fission products and actinides from the sunken
caisson. After that date, release rates fall and, at 3050,
all activated material is gone, leaving only fuel material
to slowly disintegrate until 4570, when all traces of
radioactivity from the debris will have c o r r o d e d away.
The model depends largely on estimates of corrosion
rates, the effectiveness of the containment and the
penetration caps. T h e lifetime of the Furfurol material
372
Marine Pollution Bulletin
is put at 100 years, which may be an underestimate
according to the Whitc Book, but seawater is still
prevented from reaching the fuel material for 335 years
by the Containers B and C.
If underwater surveys of the site can identify weak
links in the containment boundaries, effort should be
m a d e to establish the integrity of the reactor compart-
ment surrounding the RPVs, and the state of welded
lids on Containers B and C.
The authors wish to thank Ms K.L. Sjoeblom, Division of Nuclear
Fuel Cycle and Waste Management, IAEA Vienna, for her work in
organizing the Source Term Working Group, and for permission to
publish the study as part of the IAEA's International Arctic Seas
Assessment Project; and Dr J.H. Carter, Department of Nuclear
Science and Technology, Royal Naval College Greenwich, for
researching and sifting corrosion data in support of the modelling
work for this paper.
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Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas adjacent to the Territory of the Russian Federation, Moscow.

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