PP v Majingcar, GR 249629, 2-15-21 ( Requisites for a plea to a lesser offense)

Facts
Respondents Edgar Majingcar y Yabut (Majingcar) and Christopher Ryan Llaguno y Matos (Llaguno) were
charged with violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165

The respondents both conspired in the selling, dispensing, and delivering to poseur buyer SPO2 Clifford
De Jesus the Methampethamine Hydrochloride popularly known as 'shabu' and the possession of it.

On arraignment, respondents Majingcar and Llaguno pleaded not guilty to both charges. Thereafter, trial
ensued

On separate occasions, respondents submitted their proposals to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
specifically to violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165

The prosecution counter proposed that respondents plead guilty to violation of Section 5, albeit the
penalty would be that as provided under paragraph 3, Section 11 of RA 9165

As for respondents' proposal to plead guilty in on violation of Section 12 of RA 9165, in lieu of Section
11, the prosecution interposed no objection.

The RTC allowed both respondents to plead to a lesser offense, as proposed. Consequently,
respondents were re-arraigned they changed their individual pleas of "not guilty" to "guilty" to the
lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165 in both Criminal Case

On a petition for certiorari initiated by the People, dismissed the petition on two (2) grounds: late filing
and lack of merit.

In the Supreme Court, the People now prays anew that respondents' pleas to a lesser offense of
violations of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165 be set aside, and the case, remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings. It faults the Court of Appeals for ruling that its petition for certiorari was filed out
of time.

On the merits, the People faults the Court of Appeals for upholding respondents' plea bargaining
proposal over the vehement objection of the prosecution. It asserts that it does not dispense with the
required consent of the prosecutor whenever an accused puts on the table a plea bargaining proposal.
Hence, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it allowed respondents to plead to a lesser
offense.

Too, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it declared as unconstitutional DOJ Circular Nos.
027 and 061 and RPO Order No. 027-E-18 when none of the parties themselves even prayed for it.

Since the plea bargaining was improper, respondents cannot claim double jeopardy. They can still be
prosecuted under the original charges filed against them.

The Court ruled that the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding respondents' plea to a lesser offense
of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165 in Criminal Case No. 2016-0775 which carried the
conformity of the prosecutor
In Criminal Case for illegal possession of drugs, the prosecution interposed no objection to respondents'
proposal to plead to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165. Whether to grant
this proposal already rested upon the sound discretion of the court.

However, the Court ruled that The Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it affirmed the
grant of respondents' proposal to plead guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of
RA 9165 in Criminal Case No. 2016-0774, sans the consent of the prosecution which invariably opposed
it

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. – At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may
still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.

Hence, in drug cases where there is no private offended party, the consent of the prosecutor is the
operative act which vests discretion upon the court to allow or reject the accused's proposal to plead
guilty to a lesser offense. Thus, where this consent is withheld, no such discretion gets vested in the
court.

Pp. v. Mira, G.R. No. 175324, October 10, 2007 (Plea of guilty to a capital offense)

Appellant Edison Mira was charged the crime of Rape through sexual intercourse by means of force,
threat, and intimidation with his 11-year old daughter.

On arraignment, appellant entered a guilty plea to the offense charged. Thereafter, the trial court
proceeded with the reception of evidence for the prosecution which presented five witnesses

The defense did not present evidence to counter the charges against appellant, considering his earlier
plea of guilt.

The trial court then rendered a decision finding appellant guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death. The trial court relied heavily on the testimonies of the victim and her younger sister in
establishing the identity of appellant and the act of rape committed against AAA.

Appellant directly appealed his conviction to this Court. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
judgment affirming with modification the trial court’s decision

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in not conducting a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and in failing to inform him if he desires to
present evidence in his behalf.

The controversy centers on the legal consequences of an improvident plea of guilt.

Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.—When the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree to culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.

The searching inquiry conducted by the trial court falls short of these requirements. The inquiry only
consisted of two simple questions, specifically:

 Do you understand the meaning of plea of guilty for the crime charged against you for rape?
 Do you know that when you pleaded [sic] guilty you can be meted out of the supreme penalty;
death or life imprisonment?

The appellant was not fully apprised of the consequences of his guilt plea. In fact, as argued by
appellant, he was led to believe that the penalty for his crime could still be reduced upon his plea of
guilty, especially when the trial court informed him that he could be meted the supreme penalty of
death or life imprisonment.25 Moreover, the trial court judge failed to inform appellant of his right to
adduce evidence despite the guilty plea. Verily, appellant was deprived of the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.

Notwithstanding the incautiousness that attended appellant’s guilty plea, we are not inclined to remand
the case to the trial court as suggested by appellant. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt
are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and
credible evidence in finding the accused guilty, the judgment must be sustained, because then it is
predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but also on evidence proving his commission of
the offense charged.26

The RTC and the Court of Appeals are unanimous in sustaining the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. The trial court made the following observations:

All the [p]rosecution witnesses are one in pin-pointing Edison Mira as the one who raped [AAA]. The
testimonies of his two (2) children, [BBB], an 8-year old, younger sister of [AAA] and [AAA] herself
categorically declared without hesistation regarding the [c]ertainty of the rape committed by Edison
Mira against [AAA]. This two (2) children [are] [very] credible and convincing and defense were not able
to destroy the testimonies.

These testimonies, taken together with the medical findings that AAA sustained abrasions on the vulva
and that her hymen was no longer intact, lead to no other conclusion that she had been raped and that
appellant, her father, was the perpetrator.

PP v Comendador, GR No. L-38000, 9-19-80PP V talusan, GR 179187, 7-14-09 (Improvident plea of

guilty)

Facts
The case of People v. Comendador involves the conviction of Diosdado Comendador for the crime of
robbery with homicide.

The trial court based its ruling on Comendador's plea of guilty, which it found to have been freely and
voluntarily given, despite the court's warning of the possibility of the death penalty.

The court also considered Comendador's extrajudicial confession, marked as Exhibit "J", as well as the
testimonies of several witnesses.

Testimonies of Witnesses

Edilberto Zaragoza, the father of the deceased, testified that his son had money of his own but still gave
him P200.00 for his vacation. He later learned that his son had been robbed and killed in Toledo City.

Dolores Reponte testified that she saw Comendador with the deceased a few hours before the body was
found.

Angelo Obenque, a neighbor of Comendador, testified that Comendador visited his house on the day of
the crime with items belonging to the victim.

Dioscoro Panda-an, a police corporal, testified that he found the fatal weapon and a pair of shoes near
the body at the crime scene.

Edilberto Evangelista, a police lieutenant, testified that Comendador admitted to the robbery and killing
and turned over the stolen items.

The prosecution presented its evidence and rested its case.

The defense did not present any evidence.

Appeal and Rejection of Arguments

In his appeal, Comendador raised several errors, including the argument that his plea of guilty should
have been considered as a plea of not guilty.

The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Plea of Guilty and Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession

The Supreme Court held that a plea of guilty is a judicial confession of guilt and an admission of all the
material facts alleged in the information.

While it is true that accused-appellant requested for a lesser penalty, such does not make his plea of
guilty conditional. It remains to be an admission of the facts alleged in the information charging robbery
with homicide. At most, said plea for a lesser penalty is an appeal to emotion as it does not assail,
restrict or qualify the information. It does not even specify the penalty desired to be imposed.

That the accused-appellant intended his plea of guilty to be unconditional is further 'bolstered by the
fact that he did not adduce any evidence in his favor and merely submitted the case for decision.
Although he had an opportunity to do so after the prosecution rested its case, he did not avail of the
same. He remained resolute in his decision to own the crime. His claim, therefore, that his plea of guilty
is conditional is inconsistent with his candor, spontaneity and insistent admission of guilt in the trial
court.

Comendador's plea of guilty was considered unconditional, despite his request for a lesser penalty.

The court also held that Comendador's extrajudicial confession was admissible, even though it was
obtained without the presence of counsel, as it was given before the effectivity of the New Constitution.

Sufficient Evidence and Identification of Corpus Delicti

The court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution, including the testimonies of witnesses
and the stolen items recovered from Comendador, proved his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The court rejected the argument that the corpus delicti (the fact of the crime) was not properly
identified, as there was sufficient testimonial evidence to establish the death of the victim.

Modification of Penalty

The court modified the trial court's judgment by imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of
death, as there were no aggravating circumstances present.

The court found that the aggravating circumstances of craft, uninhabited place, and abuse of confidence
or obvious ungratefulness were not supported by the evidence.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Diosdado Comendador for robbery with homicide and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, based on his plea of guilty, extrajudicial confession, and sufficient
evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

People v. Espinosa, G.R. Nos. 153714-20, 15 August 2003

Facts:

Separate cases of estafa and attempted corruption of public officials were filed before the
Sandiganbayan(SBN for brevity) by the Office of the Ombudsman against respondent Espinosa.
(provincial administrator of Masbate and several other individuals. )

Before his arraignment, Espinosa filed a motion for reinvestigation of the cases before the
Sandiganbayan. The same court granted the said motion of the accused, hence directed the Office of
the Special Prosecutor to evaluate the evidence against him.

While the cases were being reevaluated, Espinosa filed a motion for Leave to travel abroad.

On the date set for the hearing of the motion, SBN issued an order resetting the hearing to April
22,1999.

Furthermore it required the respondent to be conditionally arraigned on that date before the SBN would
act on his motion to travel. As such, Espinosa was arraigned and his motion to travel was granted. He
entered the plea of not guilty to both informations filed against him.

The Office of the Ombudsman through the Office of the Special Prosecutor then moved to withdraw ex
parte the cases filed against the Espinosa. The said motion was granted by the SBN.

Thereafter, the Office of the Ombudsman filed in the same court seven informations for Malversation of
Public funds against Espinosa and several others.

In response, Espinosa filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. He argued that double
jeopardy had already attached because he had been arraigned in the previous estafa cases and the
motion to withdraw had been granted without his express consent.

On other hand, the Ombudsman argued that the arraignment with respect to the two previous cases
was conditional. It was made solely for the purpose of accommodating private respondents request to
travel abroad while the matters were pending reinvestigation. The SBN ruled in favour of Espinosa.

ISSUE/S: W/N there is double jeopardy – YES

Likewise, the Court ruled in favor of Espinosa.The Court ruled that the petitioner failed to follow the
proper procedure. First, the petitioner should have first filed a motion for reconsideration before
the SBN. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari will lie only when there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy

For the issue that the arraignment of the accused was made conditionally in order for the SB to act on
his motion to travel. The Supreme Court ruled that such practice is not mentioned or provided for in
the regular rules of procedure. The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan promulgated by
the Supreme Court, does not mention any conditional arraignment, neither the regular rules of court.
The Supreme Court further stated that Espinosa pleaded simply and unconditionally on

Furthermore, the argument of the petitioner that Espinosa knew at that time that his arraignment
is being made conditionally in order for his motion to travel be granted, amounts to a waiver of his right
against double jeopardy failed to persuade the Court. The right against double jeopardy is enriched in
the 1987 Constitution. Such waiver must be clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent. The alleged
waiver falls short of the above requirement.

All requisites of double jeopardy are present in this case, to wit: 1.) first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second, 2.) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, 3.) the second jeopardy
must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. And
legal jeopardy attaches only if: a) upon a valid indictment, b) before a competent court, c) after
arraignment, d) a valid plea has been entered and e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.

However Espinosa did not participate nor consent with the withdrawal of the cases against him. The
accused learned of the motion only after the cases against him had been dismissed.
The petitioner does not even dispute the fact that Espinosa was not notified of this motion neither was a
hearing held thereon.

In a nutshell, the alleged conditions attached to an arraignment must be unmistakable, express,

informed and enlightened. They must be expressly stated in the Order disposing of the arraignment.
Otherwise, the plea should be deemed to be simple and unconditional.

Daan v Sandiganbayan, GR 163972-77, 3-29-08

Facts:
 Daan and Kuizon were charged of 3 counts of malversation of public funds and falsification of
public document by a public officer or employee and entered a plea of not guilty to the cases
filed against them.
 Thereafter, they offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty and offered to substitute the same
with a plea of guilt provided that the mitigating circumstances of confession of plea of guilt and
voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not
acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of not guilty to the crime of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of guilty, but to the
lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. On the other hand, the
accused offered to substitute their plea of not guilty to the malversation cases with a plea of
guilty to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
 The Sandiganbayan denied their Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation of
the Prosecution on the ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval. The
Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this case filed by
Daan.

Issue: WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition for Plea
Bargain?

Held: Yes, the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the accused’s request to Plea Bargain.

Section 2, Rule 116 authorizes Plea bargaining which provides that: “At arraignment, the accused, with
the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead
guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged . After arraignment but
before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his
plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.”

Here, the Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea bargain. Moreover, the lesser offense of
Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Accounts by an Accountable Officer are
necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public
Funds. Specifically, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the
lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took
advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of
the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds, while the informations contain allegations which make out a case for Malversation against
petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held
liable for Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to render
account was in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to render such an accounting within the
prescribed period.

Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise constitute
the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO [GR No. 130026 | May 31, 2000 |

FACTS

Two informations filed, charging accused-appellant with rape

 On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty Thereafter, TC
issued an Order finding accused Magat guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to a
jail term of 10 years per case (January 10, 1997)
 After 3 months – cases were revived on instance of complainant on the grounds that the penalty
imposed was “too light” o Accused-appellant was re-arraigned on both informations, to which he
pleaded NOT GUILTY o
 July 3, 1997 – about a month after, the accused-appellant entered again a plea of GUILTY o The
informations were read to him in both English and Tagalog and he was repeatedly asked as to whether
he understood his change of plea and the consequences of said plea
 TC – found Magat guilty of crime of rape and was sentenced to death by lethal injection

 Sent to SC on automatic review

 Accused-Appelant contends that the TC erred in re-arraigning and proceeding into trial despite the
fact that he had already been convicted based on his plea of guilt o the original order had attained
finality since the prosecution didn’t appeal or move for reconsideration or moved to set aside the order
o therefore, the order should no longer be set aside or modified even if the penalty imposed in the said
order was too light
 he also posits that the re-arraignment and trial on the same information violated his right against
double jeopardy

The Court ruled that order of TC convicting Magat on his own plea of guilt is VOID AB INITIO  because
the Magats plea is not the plea bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and rules of procedure

 When is plea bargaining allowed? o Sec 2, Rule 116 – when an accused pleads guilty to a lesser
offense o “Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. – The accused, with the consent of the offended party and
the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or
not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than
the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. o A conviction under this
plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy

.” In instant case: the A/A did NOT plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to rape charges and only
bargained for a lesser penalty.
 he did not plea bargain but made conditions on the penalty to be imposed
 ERRONEOUS because by pleading guilty to the offense charged, A/A should be sentenced to the
penalty which he pleaded Essence of a plea of guilty  that accused admits ABSOLUTELY and
UNCONDITIONALLY his guilt and responsibility for the offense imputed to him.
 an accused MAY NOT admit guilt provided that a certain penalty will be given to him  this is a
conditional plea of guilty (NOT ALLOWED) In instant case: this was undoubtedly a conditional plea
 TC should have vacated such a plea and entered a plea of not guilty Also in effect, judgment rendered
by TC based on a void plea bargaining is also VOID AB INITIO, thus cannot be considered to have
attained finality
 since judgment of conviction rendered against A/A is void, double jeopardy will not lie HOWEVER,
whatever were the errors in the arraignment of A/A are considered waived because of the re-
arraignment, since he did not question the procedural errors in his first arraignment

PEOPLE V BALISACAN
FACTS:

Aurelio Balisacan stabbed Leonicio Bulaoat, which resulted in the latter's death. Aurelio was
subsequently charged with homicide before the trial court of Ilocos Norte.

During the arraignment, Aurelio pleaded guilty. He was then allowed to present evidence to prove
mitigating circumstances. During his testimony, Aurelio said he stabbed Leonicio in self-defense because
the latter was strangling him.

On the basis of the above testimony, the trial court acquitted Aurelio.

An appeal was filed before the Court of Appeals, but the CA forwarded the same to the Supreme Court,
noting that said appeal involved questions purely of law.

ISSUE:

Whether an appeal challenging the acquittal of Aurelio constitutes double jeopardy. -- NO.

HELD:

The Supreme Court said that double jeopardy did not apply in this case because:

1. While it is true that Aurelio had first entered a plea of guilty, his subsequent testimony that he
acted in complete self-defense had the effect of vacating said plea. Therefore, the trial court
should have required him to plead anew on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not
guilty be entered for him.The fact that this was not done meant there was no standing plea at
the time Aurelio was acquitted by the trial court, and as such, there could be no double jeopardy
with respect to the appeal filed.
 2. The trial court also decided the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any
opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of Aurelio. In doing so, the
trial court clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental
prerequisite, the trial court's action was null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity
for want of due process, was no acquittal at all, and thus can not constitute a proper basis for a
claim of double jeopardy.

The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings under another
judge for plea by the defendant, trial with presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the defense,
and judgment thereafter.

PP v Pailano, GR L-43602, 1-31-89

Facts:

The case involves the accused-appellant, Antonio Pailano, who was charged with rape. The alleged rape
occurred in October of 1971 in Barrio Sampinit-Baybay in the City of Bago. The complainant, Anita
Ibañez, was fifteen years old at the time of the incident. She claimed that the accused-appellant dragged
her to a bushy place on the seashore and raped her at scythe-point. She did not report the incident to
her mother because the accused-appellant threatened to kill her if she did. The accused-appellant
admitted to having sexual intercourse with Anita but claimed it was consensual, stating that Anita had
enticed him into the bushes and initiated the act. The criminal complaint alleged the commission of the
crime through the first method of rape (by using force or intimidation). However, the prosecution
sought to establish at the trial that Anita was a mental retardate.

Issue:

The main issue in the case is whether the accused-appellant is guilty of rape.

Ruling:

The court reversed the conviction of the accused-appellant and acquitted him on reasonable doubt.

Ratio:

The court found that the conviction of the accused-appellant on the ground that he raped Anita while
she was unconscious or otherwise deprived of reason, instead of through force and intimidation as
alleged in the criminal complaint, would violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The court emphasized that this right is safeguarded by the Constitution to
ensure that the accused can prepare an adequate defense. Convicting the accused-appellant of a ground
not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would be unfair and
underhanded.

Furthermore, the court found that the charge of rape has not been adequately established. The medical
examination of Anita did not show any evidence of insanity, and the prosecution failed to prove that
Anita's mental condition was so weakened during the encounter that she could not resist the accused-
appellant's advances. The court also considered the age of the accused-appellant, who was already
sixty-nine years old at the time, and doubted his ability to accomplish the rape as easily as Anita
described it. The court concluded that the evidence presented did not prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused-appellant committed rape.

PP v Araneta, GR 250980, 3-15-22

Facts:
The case involves the appeal of accused-appellant Rogelio Caloring in a Kidnapping for Ransom case.

The accused individuals, including Caloring, were charged with Kidnapping for Ransom in relation to the
kidnapping of four victims in Quezon City in 2005.

At the arraignment, the accused, with the assistance of their respective counsel, entered pleas of "not
guilty" to the offense charged. However, there is nothing in the records to show that Alada was indeed
arraigned.

The RTC found all of the accused, except for Navanes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged in the Information. The RTC ruled that the criminal and civil liability of Navanes had been
extinguished by his death after arraignment and prior to the promulgation of the Judgment.

The accused-apellant Rogelio Carolling apealled on the case. However, during the pendency of the
appeal, Caroling passed away.

The Court ruled that his death extinguished his criminal liability as well as his civil liability arising from
the offense.

The case against Caloring was dismissed, and his civil liability was also extinguished.

However, other than the extinguishment of criminal and civil liability of the accused due to death, the
Information filed against them a charged them with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom, which is
considered a defect.

The accused waived their right to question the defect by failing to file a motion to quash the
Information. Therefore, the accused, except for one who remained at large, could be convicted of the
offense. The Court emphasized that the conviction of the accused who had not been arraigned,
including the one who remained at large, was void.

Arraignment is essential in informing the accused of the charges against them and giving them the
opportunity to prepare their defense.

Estipona v. Lobrigo (Plea-bargaining)

Facts:

Petitioner Salvador Estipona, Jr. was accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, for having illegally have in his possession 0.084 gram of shabu. Under Section
23 of R.A. No. 9165, plea-bargaining is prohibited in all drug cases.

On June 15, 2016, he filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,
praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and be allowed to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of
violation of Section 12 of R.A. No. 9165 (for Possession of Drug Paraphernalia).

The trial court denied his Motion holding that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 expressly prohibits plea-
bargaining in drugs cases. Estipona filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial
court.

Arguing that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165 is unconstitutional for it encroaches upon the Supreme Court's rule-
making power and therefore violative of the equal protection clause, he filed a Petition before the SC to
declare Sec. 23 unconstitutional.