Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code

punishes those who shall write, publish or

circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government of the Philippines or any of the
duly constituted authorities thereof or which
suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or
riots or which tend to stir up the people
againts the lawful authorities or to disturb
the peace of the community.
(April 14, 2024) – Davao del Norte Rep. Pantaleon Alvarez on Sunday urged the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) to withdraw its support for Pres. Bongbong Marcos Jr., saying this would help in attaining
peace and stability in the country.
Alvarez, a close ally of former president Rodrigo Duterte, issued the plea during a rally of the die-hard
supporters of the tough-talking leader in Tagum City.
He reminded the AFP of its constitutional duty to protect the citizens and the state in light of the rising tensions
between the Philippines and China in the West Philippine Sea.
“Kapag hinayaan natin na pumutok ‘yung giyera, ‘yan ba ay pagprotekta sa taumbayan? Hindi,” said Alvarez,
who served as speaker of the House of Representatives during Duterte’s term.
He added that the Philippines should not wait for a war to ensue, which could lead to “destruction” and
“famine.”
“Sa mapayapang paraan, please withdraw your support for the chief executive,” said Alvarez. “Kapag nag-
withdraw kayo (AFP) ng suporta sa kanya, wala na siyang ibang magagawa kung hindi bumaba sa puwesto.”
He also hurled a personal attack, calling the president, “Bobo Marcos.”

The rally happened on the heels of the alleged “secret agreement” between Duterte and China regarding the
West Philippine Sea.

DAVAO ORIENTAL, Philippines – Former speaker and Davao del Norte 1st District
Representative Pantaleon Alvarez apologized on Tuesday night, April 16, for his call for the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to withdraw support from President Ferdinand Marcos
Jr., but denied that it was inciting sedition.
“Pasensya na,” Alvarez told fugitive preacher Apollo Quiboloy’s media arm, Sonshine Media
Network International (SMNI), “nadala rin ng bugso ng damdamin. Mahal ko ang Pilipinas,
lalo na ang Mindanao.”
(Sorry, I got carried away by strong emotions. I love the Philippines, especially Mindanao.)

Alvarez said this after drawing flak for his call on the military to withdraw its support from the
Marcos administration during the Hakbang ng Maisug rally in Tagum City, Davao del Norte,
on Sunday, April 14. The rally was led by former president Rodrigo Duterte and organized as
an offshoot of Malacañang’s April 8 suspension order against Davao del Norte Governor
Edwin Jubahib.
The former speaker said his call, which stirred controversy and sparked adverse reactions from
government officials and the military establishment, was not meant to incite sedition because
he did not espouse violence.
Alvarez said his remarks in Tagum were a result of his dismay over Philippine foreign policy,
particularly regarding the contentious issue of the West Philippine Sea.
“At paano ako tatahimik? Tingnan n’yo nangyayari. Kinakaladkad tayo ng Malacañang
papunta sa digmaan kahit na ang China ay nauunahan na ang Amerika pagdating sa
ekonomiya, teknolohiya at lakas ng military. Hindi siya katanggap-tanggap. May nuclear
weapons sila, kaya rin nila magpapaputok at hindi tayo makakapalag. Maraming Pilipino
ang mamamatay. Ubos tayo,” he said.
(And how can I stay quiet? Look at what’s happening. Malacañang is dragging us towards war
even though China is already ahead of America in terms of economy, technology, and military
strength. It’s unacceptable. They have nuclear weapons, so they can use them and we won’t be
able to fight back. Many Filipinos will die. We’ll be wiped out.)
He said he was prepared to answer for his controversial remarks before the House of
Representatives, and was not worried about the prospect of being expelled because he was
about to step down as congressman anyway.
Alvarez is serving his third and last term as a Davao del Norte representative, and is
constitutionally barred from seeking reelection in next year’s elections.
Alvarez’s call for action did not go unnoticed by Justice Secretary Jesus Crispin Remulla, who
ordered an investigation into the former speaker’s pronouncements, citing concerns over
potential legal ramifications.
“I have ordered an investigation on the statements of Congressman Pantaleon Alvarez to
determine whether it has risen to the level of sedition, inciting sedition, or even rebellion,”
Remulla said, urging Alvarez to uphold ethical standards befitting his role as a lawmaker.
The AFP has also rebuffed Alvarez’s plea for military intervention, emphasizing their loyalty
to the government and rejecting any notion of abandoning their allegiance to the duly-elected
leadership. – Rappler.com
Got comments, questions, or insights about this story? Download the Rappler
Communities app for iOS , Android , or web , tap the Community tab, and join any of our
chat rooms. See you there!
1 comment
SORT BY

1. ET
 Eriberto, T.Says:
APRIL 17, 2024 AT 2:34 PM
Davao del Norte 1st District Representative Pantaleon Alvarez showed how brave he
was when he spoke those words, which led to sedition. Finally, he did retreat, but the
harm had been done. I believe that just like in the “Charge of the Light Brigade,” the
cavalry commander received a wrong command, which led to their death. Rep. Alvarez
just followed a faulty command, which damaged his reputation. In the future, that
“Hakbang ng Maisug” name, if its speakers will keep retreating like Rep. Alvarez, may
be renamed “Hakbang ng mga Duwag.”
April 17, 2024, 3:01 pm Updated on April 17, 2024, 6:56 pm
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National Security Adviser Eduardo Año (PNA file photo)

MANILA – Davao del Norte Rep. Pantaleon Alvarez underestimated the
professionalism and integrity of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and
the Philippine National Police (PNP) when he urged them to withdraw their
support from President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr., National Security Adviser
(NSA) Eduardo Año said Wednesday.
"Both institutions are loyal to the Constitution, the rule of law, the chain of
command, and the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
Insinuations to the contrary are baseless and unfounded," Año said in a
statement.
Año, a retired military chief, said such a move when done by a public official,
more so a high-ranking military reservist, is not only irresponsible but also
illegal and unconstitutional.
"It erodes the very foundation of our democratic institutions and undermines
the supremacy of civilian authority over the military. Such utterances and
actions can be construed as seditious or rebellious and they have no place in
our society," he added.
He said the armed forces in a democratic country such as the Philippines are
neutral and apolitical and are focused on serving the nation's interests.
"Rep. Alvarez, and others who may be similarly inclined, should not drag such
respected institutions to serve their partisan agenda or self-interest, even if
such calls are made, as he claimed, in a fit of emotion," the NSA pointed out.
Año also called on the Department of Justice (DOJ) to thoroughly review this
matter and consider appropriate legal actions against Alvarez and other
similar individuals.
"His words and deeds are a disservice to our men and women in uniform who
risk their lives daily to safeguard our nation's security, defend us from all
manner of threats, and uphold the Constitution," he stressed.
The Philippine Navy has already asked Alvarez, a Marine reservist with the rank
of colonel, to explain his statements.
Excuse to avoid prosecution
Camiguin Rep. Jurdin Jesus Romualdo said Alvarez's claim that his "seditious"
remarks are protected by free speech is simply an excuse to avoid prosecution.
Romualdo said Alvarez should face the consequences for urging the military
and the police to withdraw their support for President Marcos.
“Huwag na po tayong magpalusot (Let's stop making excuses). The former
speaker very well knows that free speech is not absolute. One cannot make a
seditious call or a libelous statement without facing the consequences,”
Romualdo said.
Romualdo welcomed the decision of DOJ Secretary Jesus Crispin Remulla to
investigate whether Alvarez’s statements could be interpreted as seditious or
rebellious, noting that it would not be difficult for the agency to evaluate them
given the available evidence.
Davao del Norte Representative Pantaleon Alvarez on Tuesday denied committing
sedition when he appealed to the military to withdraw their support from President
Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. to avoid the escalation of tension in the West
Philippine Sea.

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In a press statement, Alvarez questioned how his call for the military, which he made
during a rally in Tagum City on Sunday night, could be considered seditious when he
was not talking about force or armed uprising.

"Paano naging seditious o disorderly conduct 'yung sinabi ko eh peaceful nga at

orderly. Meron dissatisfaction sa AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines)," he said.

(How is my statement considered seditious or disorderly when it was peaceful and

orderly? There's dissatisfaction in the AFP.)

Alvarez clarified that he did not call for an armed conflict or public uprising, and that
his call did not involve force or intimidation.

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"At kung sasabihin man 'outside of legal' yung 'means,' bakit bawal ba mag-resign ang
mga sundalo bilang withdrawal of support kung hindi na sila naniniwala sa direksyon
ng liderato? Karapatan din nila 'yan, constitutionally protected rights 'yan," Alvarez
said.

(When they say that the means is illegal, why, can't soldiers resign as a show of
withdrawal of support if they no longer believe in the direction of the leaders? That's
their right and it is constitutionally protected.)

Alvarez stressed that under the Constitution, the AFP "is the protector of the people
and the State."

During Sunday's rally in Tagum City, Alvarez appealed to the military organization to
withdraw support from Marcos.

"Nakikiusap ako sa inyo. We don't have to hurt each other. We don't have to fire a
single shot. Simple lang, sa mapayapang paraan. Please withdraw your support to the
Chief Executive," he said.

(I am appealing to you. We don't have to hurt each other. We don't have to fire a
single shot. It’s simple, in a peaceful way. Please withdraw your support to the Chief
Executive.)

'Tantamount to sedition'

Alvarez's call did not sit well with some of his colleagues at the House of
Representatives, with one calling it seditious.

"That's tantamount to sedition. We cannot countenance that," said Cagayan de Oro

City Representative Rufus Rodriguez in an interview with reporters.

"We have regularly elected officials of our country and the President was elected with
a big majority. He has the support of our people. Calling for a putschist or rebellion by
the soldiers is uncalled for, to say the least," he added.
Despite Alvarez's claim that his statement was not seditious, Rodriguez said such call
could result in a conflict.

"When you ask for a withdrawal of support, then there will be a conflict because those

"When you ask for a withdrawal of support, then there will be a conflict because those
who will heed his advise and withdraw support, the others who are supporting the
president will have to come in also and enforce the law," he said, adding that
Alvarez's statement was "uncalled for."

"[It's] uncalled for especially from an elected official in the House of Representatives
to be calling for a withdrawal of support. That is really rebellion. That is really
seditious that they will withdraw support to our incumbent President who has the
mandate of

Alvarez, meanwhile, asked for understanding for his remarks, saying he just got
carried away by his emotions.

"Pasensiya na, nadala rin ng bugso ng damdamin. Mahal ko ang Pilipinas, lalo na ang
Mindanao. At paano ako tatahimik? Tingnan niyo nangyayari. Kinakaladkad tayo ng
Malacañang papunta sa digmaan kahit na ang China ay mauunahan na ang Amerika
pagdating sa ekonomiya, teknolohiya, at lakas militar. Hindi 'yan katanggap-tanggap.
May nuclear weapons sila, kaya nila magpaputok at hindi tayo makakapalag.
Maraming Pilipino ang mamamatay. Ubos tayo," he explained.

(Forgive me, I was carried away by my emotions. I love the Philippines, especially
Mindanao. How can I stay silent? Look at what's happening. Malacañang is dragging
us

to war with China, which is about to overtake America when it comes to economy,
technology and military might. That's unacceptable. They have nuclear weapons that
they can use against us. Many Filipinos will die.)

Amid Alvarez's call, the AFP on Monday said its loyalty remains with the 1987
Constitution.
In a statement, AFP spokesperson Colonel Francel Margareth Padilla said the military
"reiterates its unwavering commitment to professionalism, loyalty to the Constitution,
and strict adherence to the Chain of Command

The latter is a scurrilous libel against the

Government. 1 It calls our government one
of crooks and dishonest persons (dirty)
infested with Nazis and a Fascistis i.e.
dictators.
And the communication reveals a
tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a
feeling incompatible with the disposition
to remain loyal to the government. 2

The complaint appears to be framed upon the theory that a

writing, in order to be punishable as a libel under this
section, must be of a scurrilous nature and directed against
the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, and must, in addition,
tend to some one of the results enumerated in the section.
The article in question is described in the complaint as "a
scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States
and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, which
tends to obstruct the lawful officers of the United States and
the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands in the
execution of their offices, and which tends to instigate others
to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and which
suggests and incites rebellious conspiracies, and which
tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, and
which disturbs the safety and order of the Government of the
United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands." But it is "a well-settled rule in considering
indictments that where an offense may be committed in any
of several different modes, and the offense, in any particular
instance, is alleged to have been committed in two or more
modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense
committed in any one of them, provided that it be such as to
constitute the substantive offense" (Com. vs. Kneeland, 20
Pick., Mass., 206, 215), and the defendants may, therefore, be
convicted if any one of the substantive charges into which
the complaint may be separated has been made out.
We are all, however, agreed upon the proposition that the article
in question has no appreciable tendency to "disturb or obstruct
any lawful officer in executing his office," or to "instigate" any
person or class of persons "to cabal or meet together for unlawful
purposes," or to "suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or
riots," or to "stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to
disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government." All these various tendencies, which are described
in section 8 of Act No. 292, each one of which is made an
element of a certain form of libel, may be characterized in general
terms as seditious tendencies. This is recognized in the
description of the offenses punished by this section, which is
found in the title of the act, where they are defined as the crimes
of the "seditious utterances, whether written or spoken."
Excluding from consideration the offense of publishing "scurrilous
libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands," which may conceivably
stand on a somewhat different footing, the offenses punished by
this section all consist in inciting, orally or in writing, to acts of
disloyalty or disobedience to the lawfully constituted authorities in
these Islands. And while the article in question, which is, in the
main, a virulent attack against the policy of the Civil Commission
in appointing natives to office, may have had the effect of exciting
among certain classes dissatisfaction with the Commission and its
measures, we are unable to discover anything in it which can be
regarded as having a tendency to produce anything like what may
be called disaffection, or, in other words, a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government
and obedient to the laws. There can be no conviction, therefore,
for any of the offenses described in the section on which the
complaint is based, unless it is for the offense of publishing a
scurrilous libel against the Government of the of the United States
or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.
Can the article be regarded as embraced within the description of
"scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or
the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands?" In the
determination of this question we have encountered great
difficulty, by reason of the almost entire lack of American
precedents which might serve as a guide in the construction of
the law. There are, indeed, numerous English decisions, most of
them of the eighteenth century, on the subject of libelous attacks
upon the "Government, the constitution, or the law generally,"
attacks upon the Houses of Parliament, the Cabinet, the
Established Church, and other governmental organisms, but
these decisions are not now accessible to us, and, if they were,
they were made under such different conditions from those which
prevail at the present day, and are founded upon theories of
government so foreign to those which have inspired the legislation
of which the enactment in question forms a part, that they would
probably afford but little light in the present inquiry. In England, in
the latter part of the eighteenth century, any "written censure
upon public men for their conduct as such," as well as any written
censure "upon the laws or upon the institutions of the country,"
would probably have been regarded as a libel upon the
Government. (2 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England,
348.) This has ceased to be the law in England, and it is doubtful
whether it was ever the common law of any American State. "It is
true that there are ancient dicta to the effect that any publication
tending to "possess the people with an ill opinion of the
Government" is a seditious libel ( per Holt, C. J., in R. vs. Tuchin,
1704, 5 St. Tr., 532, and Ellenborough, C. J., in R. vs. Cobbett,
1804, 29 How. St. Tr., 49), but no one would accept that doctrine
now. Unless the words used directly tend to foment riot or
rebellion or otherwise to disturb the peace and tranquility of the
Kingdom, the utmost latitude is allowed in the discussion of all
public affairs." (11 Enc. of the Laws of England, 450.) Judge
Cooley says (Const. Lim., 528): "The English common law rule
which made libels on the constitution or the government
indictable, as it was administered by the courts, seems to us
unsuited to the condition and circumstances of the people of
America, and therefore never to have been adopted in the several
States."
We find no decisions construing the Tennessee statute (Code,
sec. 6663), which is apparently the only existing American statute
of a similar character to that in question, and from which much of
the phraseology of then latter appears to have been taken, though
with some essential modifications.
The important question is to determine what is meant in section 8
of Act No. 292 by the expression "the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands." Does it mean in a general and abstract sense
the existing laws and institutions of the Islands, or does it mean
the aggregate of the individuals by whom the government of the
Islands is, for the time being, administered? Either sense would
doubtless be admissible.
We understand, in modern political science, . . . by the
term government, that institution or aggregate of institutions by
which an independent society makes and carries out those rules
of action which are unnecessary to enable men to live in a social
state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society
by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them.
Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society.
By "dministration, again, we understand in modern times, and
especially in more or less free countries, the aggregate of those
persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time
being (the chief ministers or heads of departments)." (Bouvier,
Law Dictionary, 891.) But the writer adds that the terms
"government" and "administration" are not always used in their
strictness, and that "government" is often used for
"administration."
In the act of Congress of July 14, 1798, commonly known as the
"Sedition Act," it is made an offense to "write, print, utter, or
published," or to "knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing,
printing, uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous, and
malicious writing or writings against the Government of the United
States, or either House of the Congress of the United States, or
the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said
Government, or either House of the said Congress, or the said
President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or
disrepute, or to excite against them or either or any of them the
hatred of the good people of the United States," etc. The term
"government" would appear to be used here in the abstract sense
of the existing political system, as distinguished from the concrete
organisms of the Government — the Houses of Congress and the
Executive — which are also specially mentioned.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that this is the sense in
which the term is used in the enactment under consideration.
It may be said that there can be no such thing as a scurrilous
libel, or any sort of a libel, upon an abstraction like the
Government in the sense of the laws and institutions of a country,
but we think an answer to this suggestion is that the expression
"scurrilous libel" is not used in section 8 of Act No. 292 in the
sense in which it is used in the general libel law (Act No. 277) —
that is, in the sense of written defamation of individuals — but in
the wider sense, in which it is applied in the common law to
blasphemous, obscene, or seditious publications in which there
may be no element of defamation whatever. "The word 'libel' as
popularly used, seems to mean only defamatory words; but words
written, if obscene, blasphemous, or seditious, are technically
called libels, and the publication of them is, by the law of England,
an indictable offense." (Bradlaugh vs. The Queen, 3 Q. B. D.,
607, 627, per Bramwell L. J. See Com. vs. Kneeland, 20 Pick.,
206, 211.)
While libels upon forms of government, unconnected with
defamation of individuals, must in the nature of things be of
uncommon occurrence, the offense is by no means an imaginary
one. An instance of a prosecution for an offense essentially of this
nature is Republica vs. Dennie, 4 Yeates (Pa.), 267, where the
defendant was indicted "as a factious and seditious person of a
wicked mind and unquiet and turbulent disposition and
conversation, seditiously, maliciously, and willfully intending, as
much as in him lay, to bring into contempt and hatred the
independence of the United States, the constitution of this
Commonwealth and of the United States, to excite popular
discontent and dissatisfaction against the scheme of polity
instituted, and upon trial in the said United States and in the said
Commonwealth, to molest, disturb, and destroy the peace and
tranquility of the said United States and of the said
Commonwealth, to condemn the principles of the Revolution, and
revile, depreciate, and scandalize the characters of the
Revolutionary patriots and statesmen, to endanger, subvert, and
totally destroy the republican constitutions and free governments
of the said United States and this Commonwealth, to involve the
said United States and this Commonwealth in civil war,
desolation, and anarchy, and to procure by art and force a radical
change and alteration in the principles and forms of the said
constitutions and governments, without the free will, wish, and
concurrence of the people of the said United States and this
Commonwealth, respectively," the charge being that "to fulfill,
perfect, and bring to effect his wicked, seditious, and detestable
intentions aforesaid he . . . falsely, maliciously, factiously, and
seditiously did make, compose, write, and publish the following
libel, to wit; 'A democracy is scarcely tolerable at any period of
national history. Its omens are always sinister and its powers are
unpropitious. With all the lights or experience blazing before our
eyes, it is impossible not to discover the futility of this form of
government. It was weak and wicked at Athens, it was bad in
Sparta, and worse in Rome. It has been tried in France and
terminated in despotism. it was tried in England and rejected with
the utmost loathing and abhorrence. It is on its trial here and its
issue will be civil war, desolation, and anarchy. No wise man but
discerns its imperfections; no good man but shudders at its
miseries; no honest man but proclaims its fraud, and no brave
man but draws his sword against its force. The institution of a
scheme of polity so radically contemptible and vicious is a
memorable example of what the villainy of some men can devise,
the folly of others receive, and both establish, in despite of
reason, reflection, and sensation.'"
An attack upon the lawfully established system of civil
government in the Philippine Islands, like that which Dennie was
accused of making upon the republican form of government
lawfully established in the United States and in the State of
Pennsylvania would, we think, if couched in scandalous language,
constitute the precise offense described in section 8 of Act No.
292 as a scurrilous libel against the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands.
Defamation of individuals, whether holding official positions or not,
and whether directed to their public conduct or to their private life,
may always be adequately punished under the general libel law.
Defamation of the Civil Commission as an aggregation, it being "a
body of persons definite and small enough for its individual
members to be recognized as such" (Stephen, Digest of the
Criminal Law, art. 277), as well as defamation of any of the
individual members of the Commission or of the Civil Governor,
either in his public capacity or as a private individual, may be so
punished. The general libel law enacted by the Commission was
in force when Act No. 292, was passed. There was no occasion
for any further legislation on the subject of libels against the
individuals by whom the Insular Government is administered —
against the Insular Government in the sense of the aggregate of
such individuals. There was occasion for stringent legislation
against seditious words or libels, and that is the main if not the
sole purpose of the section under consideration. It is not
unreasonable to suppose that the Commission, in enacting this
section, may have conceived of attacks of a malignant or
scurrilous nature upon the existing political system of the United
States, or the political system established in these Islands by the
authority of the United States, as necessarily of a seditious
tendency, but it is not so reasonable to suppose that they
conceived of attacks upon the personnel of the government as
necessarily tending to sedition. Had this been their view it seems
probable that they would, like the framers of the Sedition Act of
1798, have expressly and specifically mentioned the various
public officials and collegiate governmental bodies defamation of
which they meant to punish as sedition.

The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental

system of the United States, and it is quite apparent that, though
grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a body and
some of its individual members, it contains no attack upon the
governmental system by which the authority of the United States
is enforced in these Islands. The form of government by a Civil
Commission and a Civil Governor is not assailed. It is the
character of the men who are intrusted with the administration of
the government that the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute by
impugning the purity of their motives, their public integrity, and
their private morals, and the wisdom of their policy. The
publication of the article, therefore, no seditious tendency being
apparent, constitutes no offense under Act No. 292, section 8.

"The idea of violence prevades the whole letter" says Justice Paredes
of the Court of Appeals. "The mere fact that a person was so
disgusted with his "dirty government" to the point of taking his own
life, is not merely a sign of disillusionment; it is a clear act to arouse
its readers a sense of dissatisfaction against its duly constituted
authorities. The mention made in said letter of the situation in Central
Luzon, the Hukbalahaps, Julio Guillen and the banditry in Leyte,
which are instances of flagrant and armed attacks against the law and
the duly constituted authorities cannot but be interpreted by the
reading public as an indirect justification of the open defiance by the
Hukbalahaps against the constituted government, the attempt against
the life of President Roxas and the ruthless depredations committed
by the bandits of Leyte, thus insinuating that a state on lawlessness,
rebellion and anarchy would be very much better than the
maladministration of said President and his men

, it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or assassination

of all Roxas officials (at least members of the Cabinet and a majority
of Legislators including the Chief Executive himself). And such
suggestion clinches the case against appellant.
In 1922 Isaac Perez of Sorsogon while discussing political matter with
several persons in a public place uttered theses words: "Filipinos
must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head" — referring to the them
Governor-General, Leonard Wood. Perez was found guilty of inciting
to sedition in a judgment of this court published in Volume 45 of the
Philippine Reports. That precedent is undeniably opposite. Note that
the opinion was penned by Mr. Justice Malcolm probably of speech.
Adopting his own words we could say, "Here the person maligned by
the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His
official position, like the President of the United States and other high
office, under form of government, instead of affording immunity from
promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in
this instance, the attack on the President passes the furthest bounds
of free speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech
was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which
could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of
feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the
Government and obedient to the laws."
The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there
being no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him,
the decision will be affirmed with costs.

[G.R. No. 21049. December 22, 1923. ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ISAAC PEREZ, Defendant-

Appellant.

Mario Guarina for Appellant.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1.

On ________, during the rally held by the

Maisug , P A in his speech uttered the
following words
”

“
P A in his interview with the media did not
deny that, he had urged the AFP to withdraw
their support from their commander-in-chief .
But he denied that his speech was seditious
as his utterances were done in a peaceful
manner and that there was no tumultuous
and rising publicly. He asserts that the
elements of sedition are absent . He is dead
wrong . His acts fall within the purview of art
143 of RPC which defines and penalizes the
crime of sedition. virtua1aw library

In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses

which are not directed primarily against
individuals, but rather against the existence
of the State, the authority of the
Government, or the general public peace.
Among them is sedition, which is the
raising of commotions or disturbances in
the State. It is a revolt against legitimate
authority. Though the ultimate object of
sedition is a violation of the public peace
or at least such a course of measures as
evidently engenders it, yet does not aim
at direct and open violence against the
laws, or the subversion of the
Constitution. (2 Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary, 974; U. S. v. Abad [1902], 1
Phil., 437; People v. Cabrera [1922], 43
Phil., 64.)

It is our course fundamentally true that the

provisions of ART 143 RPC must not be
interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of
speech and the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and petition the Government for
redress of grievances.In a democratic state ,
criticism , no matter how severe,
on the Executive, the Legislature,
and the Judiciary, is within the
range of liberty of speech. But
when the intention and effect of
the act is seditious, the
constitutional guaranties of
freedom of speech and press and
of assembly and petition must
yield to punitive measures
designed to maintain the prestige
of constituted authority, the
supremacy of the constitution and
the laws, and the existence of the
State. (III Wharton’s Criminal
Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U. S. v.
Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422;
People v. Perfecto, supra.)

In the instant case , the attack on the

President goes beyond bounds of free speech
and common decency. More than a figure of
speech was intended. There is a seditious
tendency in the words used by P A ,
which could easily produce disaffection
among the AFP and PNP and a state of
feeling incompatible with a disposition to
remain loyal to the Government and
obedient to the laws.

The President is the Chief Executive official of

the land . He is vested with supreme
executive power in accordance with the
Philippine Constitution
. A seditious attack on the Governor-
General is an attack on the rights of the
Filipino people and on American
sovereignty. (Concepcion v. Paredes [1921],
42 Phil., 599; U. S. v. Dorr [1903], 2 Phil.,
332.)

:chanrobles.com.ph

P A undoudtedly uttered seditious words or

speeches, which tend to instigate, and stir
up the AFP and PNP to withdraw their
support from their commander-in-chief with
the end view of bringing down this
government , stir up rebellious conspiracies
and tends to disturb the the safety or order of
the Government,

In the words of the law, P A had

uttered seditious words. He has
made a statement and done an act
which tended to instigate others
to cabal or meet together for
unlawful purposes of withdrawing
their support from thei
commander-in-chief . He has
made a statement and done an act
which suggested and incited
rebellious conspiracies. He has
made a statement and done an act
which tended to stir up the AFP
nad the PNP against the lawful
authorities. He has made a
statement and done an act which
tended to disturb the safety or
order of the Government. All of
these various tendencies can be
ascribed to the action of P A and
may be characterized as penalized
by ART 143 of rpc .
They go far beyond the ’exuberant
expressions of meridional speech,’ to use the
expression of this court in a similar case in
Gandia v. Pettingill (222 U. S., 452, 456).
Indeed they are so excessive and outrageous
in their character that they suggest the query
whether their superlative vilification has not
overleapt itself and become unconsciously
humorous." (Balzac v. Porto Rico [1922], U.
S., 298.)
 . The fugitive flame of disloyalty, lighted by
an irresponsible individual, must be dealt with
firmly before it endangers the general public
peace.

when P A uttered the words

during his speech in
______________, he had the
intention of inciting the AFP and
the PNP to gather for an illicit
purpose, or to incite any
conspiracy or rebellion, or to
disturb the safety and order of the
Government, which are the acts
penalizedArt 143 of the RPC.

Amendment to Article 139: Definition of Sedition

Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code is amended to provide a new definition of sedition.
Sedition is now defined as the act of rising publicly and tumultuously to attain, through force,
intimidation, or other illegal means, any of the following objectives:

 Preventing the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding of any popular election
 Preventing the National Government, provincial or municipal governments, or any public officer
from freely exercising their functions or executing administrative orders
 Inflicting acts of hate or revenge upon public officers or employees


 Committing acts of hate or revenge against private individuals or social classes for political or
social ends
 Despoiling any person, municipality, province, or the National Government or the Government
of the United States of their property for political or social ends

Amendment to Article 142: Inciting to Sedition

Article 142 is also amended to address inciting to sedition. The penalty for inciting to sedition is
now prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos. This
penalty applies to individuals who:

 Incite others to commit acts of sedition through speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems,
cartoons, banners, or other representations
 Utter seditious words or speeches
 Write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the
Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or any duly constituted authorities
 Disturb or obstruct lawful officers in executing their functions
 Instigate others to cabal or meet for unlawful purposes
 Suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots
 Stir up the people of the community, endangering the safety and order of the Government

Amendment to Article 154: Unlawful Use of Means of Pu... continue reading

Referring to case (2) — scurrilous libels against the

Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippines Islands which the
Court said may stand on a somewhat different
footing from the rest-the Court went on to say:
In the determination of the question we have
encountered great difficulty, be reason of the
almost entire lack of American precedents
which might serve as a guide in the
construction of the law. There are, indeed,
numerous English decisions, most of them
of the "Government, the constitution, or the
law generally," attacks upon the Houses of
Parliament, the Cabinet, the Established
Church, and other governmental organisms,
but these decisions are not now accessible
to us, and, if they were, they were made
under such different conditions from which
prevail at the present day, and are founded
upon the theories of government so foreign
to those which have inspired the legislation
of which the enactment in question forms a
part, that they would probably afford but little
light in the present inquiry. In England, in the
latter part of the eighteenth century, any
"written ensure upon public men for their
conduct as such", as well as any written
censure "upon the laws or upon the
institutions of the country," would probably
have been regarded as a libel upon the
Government. (2 Stephen, History of the
Criminal Law of England, 348.) This has
ceased to be the law in England, and it is
doubtful whether it was ever the common
law of any American State. "It is true that
 there are ancient dicta to the effect that any
publication tending to 'posses the people
with an ill opinion of the Government' is a
seditious libel (per Holt, C.J., in R. vs.
Tuchin, 1704 St. Tr., 532, and Elenborough,
C.J., in R. vs. Cobbet, 1804, 29 How. St. Tr.,
49), but no one would accept that doctrine
now. Unless the words used directly tend to
foment riot or rebellion or otherwise to
disturb the peace and tranquility of the
Kingdom, the utmost lattitude is allowed in
the discussion of all public affairs." (11 Enc.
of the Laws of England 450.) Judge Cooley
says (Const. Lim., 901): "The English
common law rule which made labels on the
constitution or the government indictable, as
it was administered by the courts, seems to
us unsuited to the condition and
circumstances of the people of America, and
therefore never to have been adopted to the
States."
After citing the Act of Congress of July 14, 1798,
commonly and historically known as the "Sedition
Act," and after nothing that "the term 'government'
would appear to be used here in the abstract sense
of the existing political system, as distinguished from
the concrete organisms of the Government — the
House of Congress and the Executive — which are
also specially mentioned," the Court reached the
opinion that "this is the (abstract) sense in which the
term is used in the enactment under consideration."
The Court pointed out that, "while libels upon forms
government, unconnected with defamation of
individuals, must in the nature of things be of
uncommon concurrence, the offenses is by no
means imaginary one," and cited a case
(Republic vs. Dennie, 4 Yeates [Pa.], 267) in which
the defendant was indicted for bringing into
contempt and hatred the independence of the
United States, the constitution of this
Commonwealth and of the United States; for exciting
popular discontent and dissatisfaction against
the scheme of polity instituted; for condemning the
principles of the Revolution, and revailing the
characters of the patriots and statesmen; for
endangering, subverting, and totally destroying
the republican constitutions and free
governments of the said United States and the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
In consonance with the principles laid down, the
Court held that the article published by Dorr, in
which he virulently attacked the policy of the Civil
Commission in appointing Filipinos to office, did not
come within the purview of the law, although it "may
have had the effect of exciting among certain
classes dissatisfaction with the Commission and its
measures." It found that there was nothing in the
article which could "be regarded as having a
tendency to produce anything like what mat be
called disaffection, or, other words, a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the
Government and obedient to the laws."
The message which the accused herein caused to
be published with his picture contained no libel or
criticism against the instituted system of government
as distinct from the administration. On the contrary,
the gist of the message was that the author was
desperate and was going to kill himself because
many men in the government were following the
practices of absolute and despotic rulers in other
parts of the world. He wanted President Truman and
Mr. Churchill, leading exponents of such democratic
institutions as are consecrated in the Philippine
Constitution, to be informed that President Roxas
and others in his administration were unfaithful to
the tenets of constitutional government. He pointed
to the turbulent situation in Central Luzon, the
rampant banditry in Leyte, the attempted
assassination of President Roxas by Guillen, etc.,
not as examples to be emulated to be emulated but
as the direct outcome of what he claimed
widespread graft and corruption in the Government.
He pretended to have decided to take his life
because he was impotent to remedy or suppress
this deplorable state of affairs, and he ashamed of
the way the Government was being conducted. He
likened some men in the Government, whom he did
not specify, to Hitler and Mussolini, not that he
idolized those notorious characters but because, he
felt, evil forces that undermined the ideas and ideals
of the Constitution were at work in our republic. In
short, far from advocation the overthrow or change
of the present scheme of polity, the article evinced
intense feeling of devotion to the welfare of the
country and its institutions.
President Roxas was the only official named in the
article. But the defendant did not counsel violence in
his reference to the President and the unnamed
officials. In his statement to the effect that he was
going to kill himself because he could not kill
President Roxas and the men who surrounded the
Executive, it is not a necessary deduction that he
wished others to do it. Let it be remembered that the
message was addressed to the writer's "wife" and
"children" who, it turned out, were imaginary.
At best, the meaning of the sentence is doubtful and
the norm is that, where the defendant's intention is
ambiguous he should be given the benefit of the
doubt. The courts may not subject an act or
utterance to a microscopic examination in an
endeavor to find in it germs of seditious utmost
caution is called for lest the freedom of expression
be impaired. Although statutes against sedition have
been held not to violate the constitutional guaranty
to the freedom of expression, the courts are warned
to so construe or interpret them as not to abridge
that freedom. (33 C.J., 164, citing U.S. vs. Apurado
et al., 7 Phil., 422.) It is axiomatic that the
Constitution is the paramount law and that
legislation has to be adjusted thereto. Accordingly in
the solution of clashes, which frequently occur,
between liberty or free speech and prosecution for
sedition, the criterion, it is submitted, should be the
presence or absence of real, not imaginary, danger
of the utterance materializing or inciting others
to disloyalty to the Government and its
laws.
There is no inciting to sedition unless,
according to Mr. Justice Holmes' theory
expressed in connection with a similar
topic, "the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." In the
very law punishing inciting to sedition there
is the requirement that the words alleged to
be seditious or libelous lead or tend to the
consummation of the evils sought to be
prevented. Even in the ordinary offenses of
threat and defamation, words are not taken
at face value, but their import or gravity is
gauged by the circumstances surrounding
each particular case.
The term "lead" and "tend" are used in
Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code in
their ordinary signification. Thus
understood, lead as a verb means "to draw
or direct by influence" or "to prevail on," and
tend means "to conduce to an end."
(Webster's International Dictionary.)
Judge by these tests, and granting for the
present purposes that the defendant did
intend to incite others to sedition, the article
was harmless as far as the safety of the
Government and its officers was
concerned, and should have been ignored,
as many others more serious than this one
have been. The message, like an evil
imagining from which no harm proceeds
except to the individual himself, was not
conducive to the attainment of the
prisoner's aims. If words are "the keys of
persuasion" and "the triggers of action," the
article under consideration was far from
possessing either of these qualities, taking
into consideration the personality do the
man who wrote it and what he "did." that the
while thing was comical if it were not
"tragic." The general reaction, it is fairly safe
to say, was one of regret for a man of
eccentric and unbalanced mind or ridicule
and curiosity for a grosteque stunt. The
witnesses for the Government themselves,
some of whom were constabulary officers
stationed at Tagbilaran, stated that upon
reading the article and seeing the author's
picture they just laughed it off, "thinking that
this fellow must be crazy." That was akin to
our own reaction, and there is little or no
doubt that it exemplified the general effect
upon the minds of other readers of the
article. It is certain that none would commit
a rash act upon a vague suggestion of a
man who hanged himself and whom they
had never heard of before, while those who
had known him, like the constabulary
officers above mentioned, were that the
picture was a fake and though the subject
was a crank.
Attack more serious, virulent and inflamatory
than the one at bar, by persons well known in
politics and public life and having influence and
large following, have frequently appeared in the
press or been launched on the platforms. What
the defendant did or said was very tame and
mild by comparison. Nevertheless, those critics
have not been brought to court; and it is to the
everlasting credit of the administration and, in
the long run, for the good of the Government,
that the parties reviled and the prosecutors
have adopted a tolerant attitude. A well-known
author on criminal law quoting classical writers
on the same subject has truly said:
Yet while such is no doubt the law,
prosecutions of this class have recently
fallen, in England as well as in the
United States, for several reasons, into
disuse. In the first place, it is now
generally felt that unless criticism be
permitted to penetrate even to the
foundations of government, revolution
rather than reform may result. Time,
says Bacon, is the greatest of
destructives; and truth is to be
constantly employed in repairing
the breaches which time makes. The
wise conservative, therefore, is often
apparently the most destructive radical;
as he is the most prudent repairer who,
when the piers of a bridge are weakend
by a storm, advices that the work of
reconstruction should begin at the
foundation. To prevent the application of
revolutionary criticism to government is
of all modes of government the most
revolutionary. And closely allied with this
position is another, that among
countries used to freedom libels only
begin to bring the state into contempt
when they are prosecuted by the state
as contemptuos. The sedition laws, for
instance, were among the Chief causes
of the overthrow of the administration of
John Adams; and their repeal one of the
chief causes of the popularity of that of
Jefferson. If, however, seditious libels
are to be prosecuted, it is well to keep in
mind the noble words of princes from
whose edicts the English common law,
imbued as it is in so many other
respects with the spirit of freedom, has
much, in reference to the law of libel, to
learn: "Imppp. Theodosius, Arcarius et
Honorius, A.A.A. Rufino P.P. Si quis
modetiae nescius et pudoris ignarus
improbo petulantique maledicto nomina
nostra crediderit lacessenda, ac
temulentia trubulentus obtrectator
temporum nostrorum fuerit, eum poenae
nolumus subiugari neque durum aliquid
nec asperum sustinere, quoniam, si ex
levitate processerit, contemnedum est,
si ex insania, miseratione dignissium, si
ab injuria, remittendum." (2 Wharton's
Criminal Law Section 1947.)
In somewhat parallel vein is the dissent of Mr.
Justice Holmes, joined in by Mr. Justice
Brandeis, in U.S. vs. Abrams, 250 U.S., 621,
629. Said Justice Holmes:
Persecution for the expression of
opinions seems to me perfectly logical.
If you have no doubt of your premises or
your power and want a certain result
with all your naturally express your
wishes in law and sweep away all
opposition. To allow opposition by
speech seems to indicate that you think
the speech impotent, as when a man
says that he has squared the circle, or
that you do not care whole heartedly for
the result, or that you doubt either your
power or your premises. But when men
have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may some to believe
even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas — that
the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth
is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at
any rate is the theory of our
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all
life is an experiment. Every year if not
every day we have to wager our
salvation upon some prophecy based
upon imperfect knowledge. While that
experiment is part of our system I think
that we should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loathe
and believe to be fraught with death,
unless they so imminently threaten
immediate interference with the lawful
and pressing purposes of the law that
an immediate check is required to save
the country. I regret that I cannot put
into more impressive words my belief
that in their conviction upon this
indictment the
defendants were deprived of their rights
under the Constitution of the United
States.
Moreover, the subject of this prosecution does
not reveal personal malice or hatred. Except for
the "Juez de Cuchillo" item which, like words
coming from a babe's mouth, did not have the
weight or chance to sway the listeners, the
article was but a statement of grievances
against officials abuses and misgovernment
that already were of common knowledge and
which more influential and responsible
speakers and writers had denounced in terms
and ways more dangerous and revolutionary.
Paras, C.J., and Feria, J., concur.

Footnotes
1 "Scurrilous" means low, vulgar, mean, foul (U.S. vs. Strong, 263 Fed., 789;
U.S. vs. Ault, 263 Fed., 800).
2 U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 392.
3 Liberty of the Press 2nd Ed. p. 371.
4 People vs. Nabong, 57 Phil., 455.
5 U.S. vs. Apurado, 7 Phil., 422.
6 But we will not rest conviction on this, aware as we are that the prohibition could be
pushed to the point where it will silence all criticism against public officials, and
thereby infringe the constitutional freedom. Too much danger that men will be
prosecuted, simply because they criticize the powers that be.
7 Terminiello vs. Chicago 337 U.S. Rep. p. 1.
8 Paterson, Liberty of the Press, Speech and Public Worship, p. 81; note Hale and
Benson Law of the Press, p. 359.
9 People vs. Most, 64 N.E. 175, 58 L.R.A. 509. The question whether the words had
the effect of inciting or counseling disturbance of the peace is often a question of
degree, which in the U.S. is largely for the jury. This means it is a question of fact.
(Cf. Schenk vs. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52.)

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 1. March 16, not reported.

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