POLICE POWER

Definition and Scope

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED due to lack of merit. The temporary

restraining order issued by this Court on December 1, 2015 is consequently DISSOLVED.

1. Kabataan Party List v. COMELEC

CHARACTERISTICS

1. Ermita-Malate v. City Mayor of Manila

 FERNANDO, J.:

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted
forthwith. With costs.

FACTS:

On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved by
then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them
into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at ). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the
demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide
open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the
validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower
court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by
Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity,
the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot
prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is
no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only
discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue
of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due process
contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a
standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down
prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of
the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.
2. Ichong v. Hernandez

SC Decision: The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

[Petitioner: Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by RA 1180 Respondents: Jamie Hernandez, Secretary of
Finance and Marcelino Sarmiento, City Treasurer of Manila]

Facts: Petitioner Lao H. Ichong brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that Republic
Act 1180 is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting
under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner
attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law; (2)
the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates
international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines. In answer, the Solicitor-
General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that the Act was passed in the valid exercise
of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest
of national economic survival.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act 1180 violates the equal protection of laws.

Held/Ruling: No. According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also
then provided that police power cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a
contract. The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State. The law
does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist
for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the
due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The
petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
3.City of Manila v. Laguio

TINGA, J.:
4 WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION V. CITY OF MANILA
TINGA, J.:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774
is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

FACTS:

The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7774 which prohibits short time admission, or
checking in for less than twelve hours, in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the city, and provided that violators shall punished by imprisonment
and fine. The Petitioners questioned the ordinance before the Regional Trial Court arguing that it
is unconstitutional for violating right to privacy, and infringing their property right thus affecting
their business interests as operators of drive-in hotels and motels in the city.

The RTC ruled in their favor and strike down the ordinance as unconstitutional for infringing
personal liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution such as the right to operate economic
enterprises. Further, the illicit relationships the ordinance sought to dissuade could be
performed still by paying the 12-hour stay. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the RTC stating that (1) it did not violate right to privacy and freedom of movement as it only
penalizes owners or operators of establishments that admit individual for short time says, and
(2) it is a valid exercise of police power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare
clause.

HELD:

The Court ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The Court ruled that in order for an ordinance to be
valid, it must also conform to the substantive requirements: (1) it must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. In using this test, the Court is constrained
to struck down the Ordinance for arbitrarily intruding into private rights. It must appear that the
interests of the public generally require an interference with private rights and the means must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of
private rights.

In the present case, the Ordinance could have been valid if it employed less intrusive measures
of curtailing immorality in the city such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug
dealers through active police work, or the strict enforcement of existing laws penalizing
prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of
the petitioners who may offer short time rates for families who pass by only for a few hours
while there is a black out, or a traveler who washes up for a few hours before continuing his
travel. Further, the ordinance can be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without
any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
5. Lutz v. Araneta

FACTS:

This case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental to test the legality of
the taxes imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment
Act.

Promulgated in 1940, the law in question opens (section 1) with a declaration of emergency,
due to the threat to our industry by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as
provided in the Tydings-McDuffe Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential position in the
United States market"; wherefore, the national policy was expressed "to obtain a
readjustment of the benefits derived from the sugar industry by the component elements
thereof" and "to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss
of its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition of the export taxes."

Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of
P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of the Act, for the crop years 1948-
1949 and 1949-1950; alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the
aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public
purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action having been dismissed by
the Court of First Instance, the plaintiff appealed the case directly to the SC.

ISSUE:

WON the tax provided for in CA No. 567 a valid exercise of police power.

RULING:

YES. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that sugar production is one of the great
industries of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export products. It gives
employment to thousands of laborers in fields and factories. It is a great source of the state's
wealth, is one of the important sources of foreign exchange needed by our government, and is
thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion,
protection and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was
competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar
industry should be stabilized in turn; and in the wide field of its police power, the lawmaking
body could provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its
components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to
sustain.
6. Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.

Facts:

1. Petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators
adversely affected assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram
industry. The Decree promulgated on October 5, 1985, took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen
(15) days after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.

2. PD 1994 issued a month thereafter reinforced PD 1987 and in effect amended the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Petitioner contended among others that the tax provision of
the decree is a rider.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PD 1987 is unconstitutional due to the tax provision included

RULING: PD 1987 is constitutional.

1. The title of the decree, which calls for the creation of the VRB is comprehensive enough to
include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covered in all its provisions. It
is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the
body of the decree.

2. The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the general object of the decree, which is the regulation of the video
industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with
nor foreign to the general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the
regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.

3. The express purpose of PD 1987 to include taxation of the video industry in order to
regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videos is evident from
Preambles 2 and 5. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the
measure.
Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A.
No. 3844).

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a
call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law,
undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case
of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in
1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of
private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits
for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still
unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P.
No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O.
No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted.
Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988.
This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives
them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.

[Two of the four consolidated cases are discussed below]

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of
ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since
their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land
to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own
land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to
belong to a different class.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229)
on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program
and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that
only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for
under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land
in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been
in the form of money and not in bonds.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of
cash.

HELD:

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt
from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not
shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to
share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will
not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a
wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of
the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small
landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining
just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the
landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both parties
agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner
agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that,
the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the
landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body,
then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination.
This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional
exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of
eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have
to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient
money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just
compensation.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION VS. ARLENE DE GUZMAN, ET AL., June 21, 2004

POLICE POWER/Public Health; THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE A PROFESSION

Facts:

After the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) released the names of successful
examinees in the Medical Licensure Examination, the Board of Medicines observed that the
grades of the 79 Fatima College of Medicine successful examinees were unusually and
exceptionally high in the two (2) most difficult subjects of the exam, i.e., Biochemistry and
Obstetrics and Gynecology.

The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding the registration as physicians of all the
examinees from Fatima College of Medicine. Compared with other examines from other
schools, the results of those from Fatima were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered
close to each other. The NBI Investigation found that the “Fatima examinees gained early
access to the test questions.”

On July 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC of
Manila to compel the PRC to give them their licenses to practice medicine. Meanwhile on July
21, 1993, the Board of medicine issued Resolution No. 21 charging the respondents of
immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud and deceit and recommended that the test results of the
Fatima Examinees be nullified.

On December 19, 1994, the RTC of Manila promulgated its decision ordering the PRC to allow
the respondents to take the physician’s oath and to register them as physicians. The same was
appealed by the PRC to the Court of Appeals which sustained the RTC decision.

Hence, this petition.

Held:

It must be stressed that the power to regulate the practice of a profession or pursuit of an
occupation cannot be exercised by the State in an arbitrary, despotic or oppressive manner.
However, the regulating body has the right to grant or forbid such privilege in accordance with
certain conditions.

But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, their exercise may be
regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. As such, mandamus will not lie to
compel the Board of Medicine to issue licenses for the respondents to practice medicine.

RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the
qualifications of the candidates for the board examination, the scope and conduct of the
examinations, the grounds for the denying of the issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking
a license that has been issued. It is therefore clear that the examinee must prove that he has
fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by law and the licensing
authority to be granted the privilege to practice medicine. In short, he shall have all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The petition is therefore granted.