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BLURB
He’s half my age, and he’s running away from the biggest
criminal organization in the world. More importantly, he’s
the most gorgeous man I’ve ever had in my bed.
His confidence and the way he begs for my body that first night
get the best of me. I blindly follow him headfirst into a perilous
adventure.
Time is against us. We must save our family and make sure we
don’t end up burning alive in the process.
This is a work of fiction. Names, characters, business, events and incidents are the
products of the author’s imagination. Any resemblance to actual persons, living or
dead, or actual events is purely coincidental.
Product names, logos, brands, and other trademarks referred to herein are the
property of their respective trademark holders. All trademarks remain the property
of their respective holders.
Disclaimer
1. Fiorenzo
2. Derrick
3. Fiorenzo
4. Derrick
5. Fiorenzo
6. Fiorenzo
7. Derrick
8. Fiorenzo
9. Derrick
10. Fiorenzo
11. Fiorenzo
12. Derrick
13. Fiorenzo
14. Fiorenzo
15. Derrick
16. Fiorenzo
17. Derrick
18. Fiorenzo
19. Derrick
20. Fiorenzo
21. Derrick
22. Fiorenzo
Derrick’s Epilogue
Fiorenzo’s Epilogue
This book is a work of fiction. Safe sex practices might not be fully
introduced and/or followed by the characters. The author does not
encourage unprotected sex. Everyone should inform themselves, to
the best of their ability, on the safest sex practices available to
them.
Enjoy!
1
FIORENZO
DERRICK
The Atlas.]
[March 22, 1829.
The Atlas.]
[April 5, 1829.
This celebrated wit and character lived to a great age, and retained
his spirit and faculties to the last. In person he did not at all answer
to Mr. Cobbett’s description of authors, as a lean, starveling, puny
race—‘men made after supper of a cheese-paring’—he was large,
robust, portly, and florid; or in Chaucer’s phrase,
‘A manly man to ben an abbot able.’
In his latter years he was blind, and had his head close shaved; and
as he sat bare-headed, presented the appearance of a fine old monk—
a Luther or a Friar John, with the gravity of the one and the wit and
fiery turbulence of the other. Peter had something clerical in his
aspect: he looked like a venerable father of poetry, or an unworthy
son of the church, equally fitted to indict a homily and preach a
crusade, or to point an epigram, and was evidently one of those
children of Momus in whom the good things of the body had laid the
foundation of and given birth to the good things of the mind. He was
one of the few authors who did not disappoint the expectations
raised of them on a nearer acquaintance; and the reason probably
was what has been above hinted at, namely, that he did not take to
this calling from nervous despondency and constitutional poverty of
spirit, but from the fulness and exuberance of his intellectual
resources and animal spirits. Our satirist was not a mere wit, but a
man of strong sense and observation, critical, argumentative, a good
declaimer, and with a number of acquirements of various kinds. His
poetry, instead of having absorbed all the little wit he had (which is
so often the case), was but ‘the sweepings of his mind.’ He said just
as good things every hour in the day. He was the life and soul of the
company where he was—told a story admirably, gave his opinion
freely, spoke equally well, and with thorough knowledge of poetry,
painting, or music, could ‘haloo an anthem’ with stentorian lungs in
imitation of the whole chorus of children at St. Paul’s, or bring the
black population of the West Indies before you like a swarm of flies
in a sugar-basin, by his manner of describing their antics and odd
noises. Dr. Wolcot’s conversation was rich and powerful (not to say
overpowering)—there was an extreme unction about it, but a certain
tincture of grossness. His criticism was his best. We remember in
particular his making an excellent analysis of Dryden’s Alexander’s
Feast in a controversy on its merits with Mr. Curran; and as a
specimen of his parallelisms between the sister-arts, he used to say
of Viotti (the celebrated violin-player), that ‘he was the Michael
Angelo of the fiddle.’ He had a heresy in painting, which was, that
Claude Lorraine was inferior to Wilson; but the orthodox believers
were obliged to be silent before him. A short time before his death he
had a private lodging at Somers’ Town, where he received a few
friends. He sat and talked familiarly and cheerfully, asking you
whether you thought his head would not make a fine bust? He had a
decanter of rum placed on the table before him, from which he
poured out a glass-full as he wanted it and drank it pure, taking no
other beverage, but not exceeding in this. His infirmities had made
no alteration in his conversation, except perhaps a little more
timidity and hesitation; for blindness is the lameness of the mind. He
could not see the effect of what he said lighting up the countenances
of others; and in this case, the tongue may run on the faster, but
hardly so well. After coffee, which he accompanied with the due
quantity of merum sal, he would ask to be led down into a little
parlour below, which was hung round with some early efforts of his
own in landscape-painting, and with some of Wilson’s unfinished
sketches. Though he could see them no longer, otherwise than in his
mind’s eye, he was evidently pleased to be in the room with them, as
they brought back former associations. Youth and age seem glad to
meet as it were on the last hill-top of life, to shake hands once more
and part for ever! He spoke slightingly of his own performances
(though they were by no means contemptible), but launched out with
great fervour in praise of his favourite Wilson, and in disparagement
of Claude, enlarging on the fine broad manner and bold effects of the
one, and on the finical littleness of the other, and ‘making the worse
appear the better reason.’ It was here we last parted with this fine old
man, and it is with mixed pleasure and regret we turn to the subject.
Peter Pindar, besides his vein of comic humour, excelled when he
chose in the serious and pathetic; and his ‘Lines to a Fly drowned in
Treacle,’ and ‘To an Expiring Taper,’ are among his best pieces.
LOGIC
The Atlas.]
[April 12, 1829.
Much has been said and written of the importance of logic to the
advancement of truth and learning, but not altogether convincingly.
Its use is chiefly confined by some to being a guide to the mind when
first feeling its way out of the night of ignorance and barbarism, or a
curb to the wilful and restive spirit that is a rebel to reason and
common sense. But the extent of the benefit in either case may be
doubted; since the rude and uninstructed will not submit to artificial
trammels, or get up into this go-cart of the understanding, and the
perverse and obstinate will jump out of it whenever their prejudices
or passions are wound up to a height to make its restraints necessary.
The wilful man will have his way in spite of the dictates of his reason
or the evidence of his senses either. The study of logic has been
compared to the getting ready and sharpening the tools with which
the mind works out the truth; but all that is of value in it is more like
the natural use of our hands, or resembles the mould in which truth
must be cast, and which is born with us, rather than an external
instrument with which it must be fashioned; for all syllogisms reduce
themselves either to identical propositions, or to certain forms and
relations of ideas in the understanding, which are antecedent to, and
absolutely govern, our conclusions with the rules for drawing them.
The mind cannot make an instrument to make truth, as it contrives
an instrument to make a certain object; for in the latter case, the
object depends upon the act and will of the mind; but in the former,
the mind is passive to the impression of given objects upon it, and
this depends on certain laws over which it has itself no control. Logic
at best only lays down the rules and laws by which our reason
operates; but it must operate according to those rules and laws
equally whether they are adverted to or not, or they could not be laid
down as infallible. Truth is, in a word, the shape which our ideas take
in the moulds of the understanding, just as the potter’s clay derives
its figure (whether round or square) from the mould in which it is
cast. Thus, if we are told that one wine-glass is less than another, and
that the larger wine-glass is less than a third, we know that the third
wine-glass is larger than the first, without either comparing them or
having any general rule to prove it by. We can no more conceive it
otherwise, or do away that regular gradation and proportion between
the objects so defined and characterised, than we can imagine the
same thing to grow bigger and become less at the same time.
Reasoning is allowed (at least by the schoolmen and the Universities
of Oxford and Cambridge, though not by our wise sceptical moderns)
to be the linking of one judgment on to two others: this and that
being given, why then something else follows. Thus, suppose two
roads to take a diverging direction, you are sure, without measuring,
that the farther you go in the one, the farther you get from the other.
You know that you advance: you infer that you recede. Now the
difficulty lies here—if the premises are the same with the conclusion,
it amounts only to an identical proposition: if they are different, what
is the connection between them? But in the example just given, there
are two circumstances, or properties, stated at the outset of the
question, viz.—not merely the existence, but the direction, of the
road; and to sustain the inference, all that seems necessary is, that
both these circumstances should be borne in mind. For if the road do
not continue to diverge, the conclusion will not hold good; and if it
still continue to diverge, what is this but saying, not only that it
advances, but that it advances in a direction which, by the
supposition, carries it farther at every step from the former road?
That is, two things are affirmed of a given object; the mind sets out
with a complex proposition, and what it has to do is not to forget one
half of it by the way. It would be long enough before the abstract idea
of a road would imply its distance from another; but it would also be
hard if a diverging road—that is, a road that recedes while it
advances—did not recede. A mathematical line and its direction are
not two things, like the feet of a pair of compasses—that while the
line is moving one way, the direction may be going astray in another
—but mutually implied and inseparably connected together in nature
or the understanding—let the realists or idealists determine which
they please. Or, as the wise man said to the daughter of King
Cophetua, ‘That which is, is; for what is that but that, and is but
is?’[58] The worst of the matter is, that the most important
conclusions are not to be so easily enclosed in pews and forms of
words and definitions; and that to catch the truth as it flies, is as nice
a point as hedging the cuckoo: though they say that its wings have
been lately clipped and a pound built for it somewhere in
Westminster. Not to proceed farther in this subject, and get ‘over
shoes, over boots’ in the mire of metaphysics, we shall conclude this
article with what we meant to state at the commencement of it, to wit
—that the commonest form of the syllogism is the worst of all, being
a downright fallacy and petitio principii. It consists in including the
individual in the species, and runs thus: ‘All men are mortal; John is
a man; therefore John is mortal.’ Let any one deny this at his peril;
but what is, or can be gained by such parroting? The first branch of
the premises takes for granted and supposes that you already know
all that you want to prove in the conclusion. For before you are
entitled to assert roundly that all men are mortal, you must know
this of John in particular, who is a man, which is the point you are
labouring to establish; or, if you do not know this of every individual
man, and of John among the rest, then you have no right to make
such a sweeping general assertion, which falls to the ground of itself.
Either the premises are hasty or false, and the conclusion rotten that
way; or if they be sound, and proved as matter-of-fact to the extent
which is pretended, then you have anticipated your conclusion, and
your syllogism is pedantic and superfluous. In fact, this form of the
syllogism is an unmeaning play upon words, or resolves itself into
the merely probable or analogical argument, that because all other
men have died, John, who is one of of them, will die also. The
inference relating to historical truth, and founded on the customary
connection between cause and effect, is very different from logical
proof, or the impossibility of conceiving of certain things otherwise
than as inseparable. Suppose I see a row of pillars before me, and
that I chuse to affirm—‘Those hundred pillars are all of white marble;
the pillar directly facing me is one of the hundred; therefore that
pillar is also of white marble’—would not this be arrant trifling both
with my own understanding and with that of any one who had
patience to hear me? But if I were to see a number of pillars
resembling each other in outward appearance, and on examining all
of them but one, found them of white marble and concluded that that
one was of white marble too, there would be some common sense in
this, but no logic. The mind, however, has a natural bias to wrap up
its conclusions (of whatever kind or degree) in regular forms of
words, and to deposit them in an imposing framework of
demonstration; it prefers the shadow of certainty to the substance of
truth and candour; and will not, if it can help it, leave a single loop-
hole for doubt to creep in at. Hence the tribe of logicians, dogmatists,
and verbal pretenders of all sorts.
THE LATE MR. CURRAN
The Atlas.]
[April 26, 1829.
This celebrated wit and orator in his latter days was a little in the
back-ground. He had lodgings at Brompton; and riding into town
one day, and hearing two gentlemen in the Park disputing about
Mathews’s Curran, he said—‘In faith, it’s the only Mr. Curran, that is
ever talked of now-a-days.’ He had some qualms about certain
peccadillos of his past life, and wanted to make confessors of his
friends. Certainly, a monastery is no unfit retreat for those who have
been led away by the thoughtless vivacity of youth, and wish to keep
up the excitement by turning the tables on themselves in age. The
crime and the remorse are merely the alternations of the same
passionate temperament. Mr. Curran had a flash of the eye, a
musical intonation of voice, such as we have never known excelled.
Mr. Mathews’s imitation of him, though it had been much admired,
does not come up to the original. Some of his bursts of forensic
eloquence deserve to be immortal, such as that appalling expression
applied to a hired spy and informer, that he ‘had been buried as a
man, and was dug up a witness.’ A person like this might find
language to describe the late shots at Edinburgh. Mr. Curran did not
shine so much in Parliament; but he sometimes succeeded admirably
in turning the laugh against his opponents. He compared the
situation of government after they had brought over a member of
Opposition to their side, and found the renegado of no use to them,
to the story of the country-gentleman who bought Punch and
complained of his turning out dull company. Some of Mr. Curran’s
bon-mots and sallies of humour were first-rate. He sometimes
indulged in poetry, in which he did not excel. His taste in it was but
indifferent. He neither liked Paradise Lost nor Romeo and Juliet. He
had an ear for music, and both played and sung his native ballads
delightfully. He contended that the English had no national music.
He was an enthusiastic admirer of Mrs. Siddons. He said of John
Kemble, that, ‘he had an eye rather to look at than to look with.’ His
great passion was a love of English literature and the society of
literary men. He occasionally found his account in it. Being one day
in a group of philosophers, and the invention of fire being spoken of,
one of the party suggested that it was from seeing a horse’s shoe
strike fire; ‘and I suppose,’ said Curran triumphantly, ‘the horse-shoe
was afterwards made with that fire.’
THE COURT JOURNAL—A DIALOGUE
The Atlas.]
[June 7, 1829.