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 Contemporary Security Studies

DEFENDING NATO’S
NORTHERN FLANK
POWER PROJECTION AND MILITARY OPERATIONS
Edited by
Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge
Defending NATO’s Northern
Flank

This book investigates several aspects of military power and security in the
North Atlantic and Arctic regions.
NATO’s northern flank is a large maritime and littoral theater, where
NATO directly borders Russia’s Northern Fleet Military Administrative
Territory, which is the location of some of Russia’s most potent air, sea,
and land power capabilities. While military tensions on the northern flank had
been relatively low for years, the Ukraine war and increased great-power
rivalry have altered that dynamic, with heightened geopolitical tensions. This
has increased the focus on military-strategic competition in this northernmost
region of the alliance. This book presents new assessments of several aspects of
military power and security in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions. With an
analysis of the security and political climate in the High North and of
developments in Western military strategies, capabilities, doctrines, and
operational concepts, the volume seeks to bring together an holistic
understanding of the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the
North Atlantic states and NATO in this dynamic area of responsibility for
the alliance. In doing this, the book provides key insights into the role of
branch-specific and joint approaches to power projection and operations in
the High North, which also include selected country case studies.
This book will be of much interest to students of NATO, military studies,
security studies, and International Relations.

Lon Strauss is an associate professor of Military History at the US Marine

Corps Command and Staff College.

Njord Wegge is a professor of Political Science at the Norwegian Defence

University College/Norwegian Military Academy.
Contemporary Security Studies
Series Editors: James Gow and Rachel Kerr
King’s College London

This series focuses on new research across the spectrum of international peace
and security, in an era where each year throws up multiple examples of con­
flicts that present new security challenges in the world around them.

Drones and Global Order

Implications of Remote Warfare for International Society
Edited by Paul Lushenko, Srinjoy Bose, and William Maley
Understanding Russian Strategic Behavior Imperial Strategic Culture and
Putin’s Operational Code
Graeme P. Herd
International Legitimacy and the Domestic Use of Force
A New Theoretical Framework
Megan Price
Security Cooperation between Western States
Openness, Security and Autonomy
Olivier Lewis
Serbian Paramilitaries and the Breakup of Yugoslavia
State Connections and Patterns of Violence
Iva Vukušić
Contesting Torture
Interdisciplinary Perspectives
Edited by Rory Cox, Faye Donnelly and Anthony F. Lang Jr.
Defending NATO’s Northern Flank
Power Projection and Military Operations
Edited by Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.

com/Contemporary-Security-Studies/book-series/CSS
Defending NATO’s
Northern Flank
Power Projection and Military
Operations

Edited by Lon Strauss and

Njord Wegge
First published 2024
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2024 selection and editorial matter, Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge;
individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge to be identified as the authors
of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters,
has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Strauss, Lon, editor. | Wegge, Njord, 1976- editor.
Title: Defending NATO’s northern flank : power projection and military
operations / edited by Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge.
Description: London ; New York, NY : Routledge, Taylor & Francis
Group, 2024. | Series: Contemporary security studies |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2023026085 (print) | LCCN 2023026086 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781032381930 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032381947 (paperback) |
ISBN 9781003343905 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: North Atlantic Treaty Organization‐‐Scandinavia. |
Scandinavia‐‐Military relations‐‐United States | United States‐‐Military
relations‐‐Scandinavia. | National security‐‐Scandinavia. |
Scandinavia‐‐Strategic aspects. | Scandinavia‐‐Foreign relations.
Classification: LCC UA646.3 .D418 2024 (print) | LCC UA646.3
(ebook) | DDC 355/.0310948‐‐dc23/eng/20230911
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023026085
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023026086

ISBN: 978-1-032-38193-0 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-032-38194-7 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-34390-5 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905
Typeset in Galliard
by MPS Limited, Dehradun
Contents

Acknowledgments viii
List of Contributors ix

1 Security and defense of NATO’s northern flank:

An introduction 1
LON STRAUSS AND NJORD WEGGE

SECTION I
Security, power projection, and operations on NATO’s
northern flank 13

2 The strategic challenge of expeditionary warfare and the

defense of NATO’s northern flank 15
LON STRAUSS AND NJORD WEGGE

3 A defense dilemma and a possible security dilemma:

Norway, the United States, and the defense of Northern
Norway, 1960–1980 32
STIAN BONES

4 The Russian way of regular warfare and the Arctic 50

AMUND OSFLATEN

5 National security interests of Russia’s Northern Sea

Route: Additional elements of domestic and interna­
tional importance 67
TROY J. BOUFFARD
vi Contents

6 NATO, doctrines, and the Arctic 84

PALLE YDSTEBØ

7 Norwegian problems of confidence building:

Geopolitical exposure and military vulnerabilities in the
High North 103
TORMOD HEIER

SECTION II
Strategic interests and the Arctic 121

8 US national strategy in the Arctic 123

DAVID AUERSWALD

9 Integrated naval deterrence in the Arctic: Deterring

Russian aggression through US-Norwegian cooperation 142
WALTER BERBRICK AND LARS SAUNES

10 Operationalizing joint force capabilities and priorities for

growing problem sets in the Arctic region 167
RYAN BURKE AND JAHARA MATISEK

11 Special operations forces in the Arctic: From heroes to

zeroes? 183
MARIUS KRISTIANSEN, NJÅL HOEM, AND LEO BLANKEN

SECTION III
Nato’s northern flank states 203

12 Norway’s strategic role and interests at NATO’s

northern flank: Finding a new balance? 205
JOACHIM BENTZEN

13 Finnish and Swedish NATO membership: What does it

hold for the Arctic? 225
HANNA OJANEN AND ARTO VÄISÄNEN

14 A kingdom divided against itself: The Kingdom of

Denmark and the rise of Arctic security dynamics 250
LISELOTTE ODGAARD
 Contents vii

15 The UK as a near-Arctic state and essential regional

security ally 266
DANITA CATHERINE BURKE

Index 289
Acknowledgments

This project had not been possible without various sources of support. We
would especially like to thank the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, the
Norwegian Defence University College, the Marine Corps University, and
the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare. We would also like
to thank our chapter contributors as well as our patient and supporting
families!
Contributors

David Auerswald is a professor of Security Studies at the US National War

College as well as a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He
has published extensively on a variety of national security and foreign policy
topics, most recently on the geopolitics of the Arctic, as well as on civilian
oversight of the military in democracies. Dr. Auerswald has worked as a
congressional staff member on three separate occasions. He received his
PhD and MA degrees in political science from the University of California,
San Diego, and undergraduate degrees in political science and English
literature from Brown University.
Joachim Bentzen works as a senior advisor on security policy with the
Norwegian Armed Forces. At the time of writing, he was a guest researcher
at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies (IFS) working under the
Norwegian security policy in strategic perspective research program.
Walter Berbrick is an associate professor in the War Gaming Department,
founding director of the Arctic Studies Group, and co-lead scholar of the
Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative. He served as the senior arctic policy
advisor to the secretary of the Navy and special representative for the
Arctic Region at the US State Department. Berbrick is an International
Affairs Fellow and member of the Council on Foreign Relations, holds a
doctorate degree from Northeastern University, and served 10 years in
the US Navy.
Leo Blanken is an associate professor in the Defense Analysis Department at
the Naval Postgraduate School, where he is the academic lead for the
“Applied Design for Innovation” graduate curriculum. He has authored
work on military innovation, great power competition, defense economics,
and metrics/assessment. He is the author of Rational Empires:
Institutional Incentives and Imperial Expansion (University of Chicago
Press) and is co-editor of Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success
and Failure (Georgetown University Press). Leo collects and DJs rare soul
and funk records from the 1960s.
x Contributors

Stian Bones (b. 1972) is a professor of Modern History at UiT—The Arctic

University of Norway. He has written extensively on political, security, and
diplomatic topics related to Norway and the European Far North during
the Second World War and the Cold War. Among his latest publications is
The Struggle for Freedom. He is the editor of The Second World War in the
High North published in 2022. The subject of his doctoral thesis (2007)
was North Norway during the Cold War. Bones has also worked on the
history of Norway’s relations to the United States, Norwegian-Russian
relations, and the history of Norway’s polar politics.
Troy J. Bouffard is the director of the Center for Arctic Security and
Resilience (CASR) at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, where he has been
full-time faculty member since 2014. He retired from the US Army in 2010
after 22 years of service worldwide. He continues to conduct research and
work with USNORTHCOM, NATO StratCom CoE, the North American
and Arctic Security and Defence Network, 11th Airborne Division (Arctic),
various national labs, the Arctic Council EPPR Working Group, Geneva
Center for Security Policy, and many others. Additionally, he co-leads the
Arctic eTalks with USNORTHCOM. His current research involves Russian
NSR nexus of defense and international law.
Dr. Danita Catherine Burke is a research fellow at the Center for War
Studies, University of Southern Denmark, and a Northern Scholars Visiting
Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities,
University of Edinburgh. Dr. Burke’s research addresses topics including
Arctic diplomacy and security, environmental and animal rights activism
legacies, stigma, and cultural violence. She is the author of International
Disputes and Cultural Ideas in the Canadian Arctic (Palgrave Macmillian),
Diplomacy and the Arctic Council (McGill-Queens University Press), WWF
and Arctic Environmentalism (Manchester University Press), and Cultural
Violence, Stigma and the Legacy of the Anti-Sealing Movement (Routledge).
Dr. Ryan Burke is a professor in the Department of Military and Strategic
Studies (MSS) at the US Air Force Academy (USAFA), research director of
USAFA and USNORTHCOM’s Homeland Defense Institute, co-director
of Project 6633 at the Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point, and an
affiliate professor with the University of Alaska—Fairbanks (UAF) Center
for Arctic Security and Resilience. Ryan holds graduate degrees from
Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, the
University of Delaware’s Joseph R. Biden School of Public Policy and
Administration, and Saint Joseph’s University. He is also a veteran Marine
Corps officer.
Tormod Heier is a professor of military strategy and operations at the
Norwegian Defence University College/Command Staff College, Oslo.
He has served 32 years as an army officer with tenure in the Ministry of
Defence, Norwegian Intelligence Service, Afghanistan, and Brigade North.
 Contributors xi

Heier has published extensively on security- and defense-related issues

related to Norwegian and allied strategies in out-of-area operations and in
the Arctic. He received the Army’s Medal of Merit in 2023 and Norwegian
PEN’s Ossietzky Price in 2017.
Njål Hoem is an active-duty Norwegian army officer. He currently serves at
the Norwegian Special Operations Command. He holds a BA degree in
Military Leadership and Land Warfare from the Norwegian Military
Academy, has studied Leadership and Organizational Psychology at BI
Norwegian Business School, and holds an M.Litt. degree in War Studies
from the University of Glasgow. He is one of the founding members of the
editorial staff of the Norwegian electronic journal Stratagem.
Marius Kristiansen is an active-duty Norwegian army officer whose military
service began in the Norwegian Navy. He currently serves as the
Norwegian exchange officer of USSOCOM J3-International Division.
Kristiansen holds a PhD degree in Political Science and Strategy, an MSc
degree in Defence Analysis—Irregular Warfare, a BA degree in Land
Warfare and Military Leadership, and an Advanced Certificate in Terrorism
Studies. He was a 2022 non-resident fellow with the Irregular Warfare
Initiative, is a 2023 non-resident fellow at the Joint Special Operations
University, and is one of the founding members of the editorial staff of the
Norwegian electronic journal Stratagem.
US Air Force Lt. Col. Jahara Matisek PhD, is a military professor in the
National Security Affairs Department at the US Naval War College and is a
command pilot with over 3,700 hours in the C-17, E-11 BACN, T-6, and
T-53. He most recently served at the US Air Force Academy as an associate
professor in the Military and Strategic Studies Department, the research
director for the Strategy and Warfare Center, and a senior fellow for the
Homeland Defense Institute. He has published over 90 articles on strategy
and warfare in peer-reviewed journals and policy-relevant outlets.
Liselotte Odgaard is a professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence
Studies in Oslo and a non-resident senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.
Her work focuses on US-China-Europe relations, including NATO-China
relations; Chinese foreign, security, and defense policy; Indo-Pacific
security; and the geopolitics of the Arctic region. Dr. Odgaard has been
a visiting scholar at institutions such as Harvard University, Woodrow
Wilson Center, and the Norwegian Nobel Institute. She is the author of
numerous monographs, books, peer-reviewed articles, and research papers
on Chinese and Asia-Pacific security, and is a frequent commentator on
these issues in the media.
Dr. Hanna Ojanen is the research director at Tampere University, where she
leads the STRAX research consortium on the change of strategic culture, and
an adjunct professor at the Department of Warfare, Finnish National Defence
xii Contributors

University. She holds a doctorate degree in Political and Social Sciences from
the European University Institute. Her research focuses on European
security and defense, EU-NATO relations, and Nordic countries’ security
policies. Her publications include “The EU’s engagement with international
organisations. NATO’s impact on the making of EU security policy,” in
Roberta N. Haar et al. (eds.) The Making of European Security Policy. Between
Institutional Dynamics and Global Challenges (Routledge 2021).
Amund Osflaten is an officer in the Norwegian Army and a tutor/researcher
at the Norwegian Military Academy/Norwegian Defence University
College. His fields of expertise are strategic culture, war studies, and, in
particular, Russian military theory and conventional warfare. Previous
education includes a BA degree in Military Studies, a BA degree in
International Studies, and an MA degree in Peace and Conflict Studies.
Currently, he is conducting a PhD at King’s College London in which he
looks at “The Russian Way of Regular Land Warfare after the Cold War.”
RADM(R) Lars Saunes is a professor and a Distinguished International
Fellow at the US Naval War College. As Chief of the Royal Norwegian
Navy from 2014, he changed the Navy’s course toward high readiness,
renewed its aim on warfighting skills, and strengthened the allied team on
the northern flank of NATO. During his 37 years of military career, he has
held the highest positions in submarine service, naval operations, and coast
guard operations. He has held flag positions as Commandant of the
Norwegian Coast Guard and Chief of Royal Norwegian Navy. His role as
professor includes co-leading The Newport Arctic Scholar Initiative,
teaching and lecturing on strategy and leadership, mentoring students,
and facilitating international cooperation and friendship.
Dr. Lon Strauss is an associate professor of Military History at the Marine
Corps Command and Staff College. His work focuses on US Arctic security,
the First World War, and military intelligence’s homefront surveillance in the
early 20th century. He co-authored War: Contemporary Perspectives on
Armed Conflicts Around the World, was an editor for 1914–1918 Online, and
has published several articles and book chapters.
Arto Väisänen is a PhD fellow at the ARENA Centre for European Studies at
the University of Oslo and a former researcher at Tampere University and
the ENGAGE project. He has previous work experience at the European
Institute of Peace and the European Parliament and received degrees from
the College of Europe, Bruges, and Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies in Geneva. His research focuses on European foreign,
security, and defense policy as well as small states, EU climate policy,
climate security, and the Arctic region.
Njord Wegge is a professor in Political Science at the Norwegian Defence
University College/Norwegian Military Academy, where he leads several
 Contributors xiii

research projects related to security and military power in the Arctic. Wegge
has earlier been “Chair of Arctic Security” at the Marine Corps University,
he has been a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley, and he has worked as a Senior
Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
as well as at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI). Wegge finished his PhD
on International Relations in the Arctic in 2013 at the University of
Tromsø, the Arctic University of Norway.
Palle Ydstebø is a retired Lieutenant Colonel from the Norwegian Army and
holds a PhD degree in War Studies from the University of Glasgow. His
main field of interest is the emergence and development of military strategy
and operational art, and Soviet and Russian military operations. Ydstebø
has served in the Norwegian Corps of Engineers, Army Headquarters,
Norwegian Intelligence Service, and the Norwegian Defence Command
and Staff College before his current position at the Military Academy. He
has had field and staff assignments in Afghanistan, Germany, and South
Sudan, and he edited the two recent editions of the Norwegian Joint
Operational Doctrine.
1 Security and defense of NATO’s
northern flank
An introduction
Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge

NATO’s northern flank is a large maritime theater, often understood as the

region stretching from Greenland in the west to Norway and the Barents
Sea in the east, confined by the Arctic Ocean in the north, and with the
Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap making a natural borderline in the south.
At this northern flank, NATO directly borders Russia and its “Northern Fleet
Military Administrative Territory,” which hosts some of Russia’s most potent
air, sea, and land power capabilities, including the main bulk of that great
power’s strategic submarines (Kjellén, 2022, p. 43; Wall and Wegge, 2023).
Thus, it is easy to imagine a threat to this part of NATO’s territory coming
from the northeast.
During the Cold War, NATO’s command for its northernmost flank area
was the “Allied Forces Northern Europe” (AFNORTH), which was located at
Kolsås outside Oslo. It was responsible for allied operations in Denmark and
Norway (with the exception of Svalbard, Jan Mayen, Greenland, and the
Faroe Islands) and the northern parts of West Germany and their adjacent seas
and oceans (Berdal, 1994, pp. 39, 79; Solvang and Wegge, 2023, p. 17).
However, with the end of the Cold War, AFNORTH and the other regional
commands were disbanded (Solvang and Wegge, 2023, p. 17). Yet, with the
increased tension in Europe after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014,
NATO decided to open Joint Force Command Norfolk (JFC Norfolk). As
JFC Norfolk is designated to focus on the protection of the North Atlantic sea
area and the “trans-Atlantic link,” as well as “the Arctic,” JFC Norfolk today
stands out as a key NATO operational command, responsible for protecting
this part of the alliance, including what can be labeled its northern flank (see
Figure 1.1) (JFC Norfolk, 2023).
NATO’s northern flank has several unique features, both with respect to its
rather remote northern location, where climatic and logistical challenges tend
to complicate military operations, and also in its strategic location close to one
of Russia’s most important (if not the most important) military-strategic
complexes, located on the Kola Peninsula (Wegge and Halsne, 2022, p. 32).
In a political context, the Arctic is usually defined as all areas north of the
Arctic Circle, that is, north of the 66°33′ latitude. NATO’s northern flank

DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905-1
2 Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge

Ca n a d

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Figure 1.1 NATO’s northern flank.

Source: Created for the Editors by Julie Nord.

overlaps substantially with the European parts of the Arctic region (Andrysiak
and Newton, 2022, p. 24).

NATO’s border with Russia in the north

The Russian defense concept for its Northern Fleet and its joint forces’ stra-
tegic assets in the Kola Peninsula is often referred to as the “bastion defense.”
The bastion defense (see Figure 1.2) is a multilayered anti-access/area denial
(A2/AD) defense system covering the Kola Peninsula with its surrounding
seas, coastal areas, and islands, including access to the North Atlantic, the
Barents Sea, parts of the Arctic Ocean, and the Norwegian Sea as far south as
the GIUK gap (Nordenman, 2019, pp. 128–155; Kjellén, 2022, p. 40). In
this area, Russia is assumed to have an ambition of sea denial or sea control in
the area closest to its home bases (Expert Commission, 2015).
For NATO, the northern flank stands out as a remote, cold, littoral area
where, for substantial parts of the year, it is difficult to operate due to harsh
climatic conditions and other challenges, such as limited daylight during the
winter season. Hence, the flank represents a unique challenge to NATO with
respect to the need for cold-weather tactical and operational skills, including
cold-weather-adapted gear, in order to project power and operate successfully
in this region over time. In addition, the proximity to some of the most
capable Russian forces and their A2/AD capabilities, in combination with
long logistical lines back to the population centers and industrial hubs in
Western Europe and the United States of America, make sustaining forces
 Security and defense of NATO’s northern flank 3

BASTION

BASTION DEFENCE

RUSSIA
ICELAND

the bastion indicates

the patrolling area of
the Russian strategic
FINLAND submarines
SWEDEN
inner defence -
NORWAY
ambition of control
outer defence -
UNITED ambition of denial
ESTONIA
KINGDOM

Figure 1.2 The Russian bastion and the reach of the bastion defense.
Source: Expert Commission, 2015, p. 21.

there extremely challenging, particularly during conflict. These factors explain

why NATO has historically considered its northern flank one of the most
difficult to defend against Russian attacks (Berdal, 1994; Nordenman, 2019).
As Russia in recent years has conducted significant rearmament programs in
its Arctic region, including introducing brand-new high-tech weapons such as
the Kinzhal and Zircon hypersonic missiles, the region also houses new,
complicated defensive problems for NATO (Boulègue, 2019; Lavikainen,
2021; Arctic Today, 2022). Russia has refurbished many of the Soviet era’s
old Cold War bases in the Russian Arctic. According to a CSIS report from
2020, the number of reopened bases or facilities is assumed to be around 50:
“Russia’s military posture in the Arctic emphasizes air and maritime early
warning and defense […]. This includes the refurbishment of 13 air bases, 10
radar stations, 20 border outposts, and 10 integrated emergency rescue sta-
tions” (Conley et al., 2020, p. 6).
However, Russia’s war in Ukraine has substantially affected its force posture
and priorities in the Arctic, specifically with respect to its land power com-
ponents, which today are being depleted in the Northern Fleet Military
Administrative Territory. As the majority of the Northern Fleet’s naval
4 Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge

infantry and land forces appear to have been transferred south to the battle-
fields in Ukraine, where they are incurring significant casualties, Russia’s
ability to make a surprise intrusion over land into NATO’s northern flank has
been weakened (Norwegian Intelligence Service, 2023; Wall and Wegge,
2023). Yet, while the war has changed Russia’s land power military disposi-
tions, the Northern Fleet appears to retain operational control of their main
strategic weapon systems, which are typically bound to naval and airborne
platforms.

The future of NATO in the north

In the western part of the Arctic as well, there is a renewed focus on
military security and the ability to operate and project power. Increased
interest in NATO’s northern flank is not least exemplified by Finland and
Sweden gaining NATO membership, an expansion of NATO that has
dramatically increased the alliance’s border with Russia. Particularly, with
Finland, the expansion opened up new Arctic territories in near proximity
to the Kola Peninsula. Inclusion of the two Nordic states also creates
significant new logistical opportunities for the defense of NATO’s
northern flank (Wegge, 2022). However, this expansion also raises new
questions on how NATO should plan to defend this enlarged northern
area of responsibility.
While the dominant perception has been that military tensions on the
northern flank have been relatively low for quite some time, e.g. when
compared to the Baltic Sea region or NATO’s eastern flank, heightened
geopolitical tensions and the war in Ukraine have changed the political and
strategic situation in this part of the world in recent years (Wegge and Halsne,
2022, p. 32). When assessing to what degree there is still a cooperative
political climate in the Arctic, the Arctic Council—the region’s premier
intergovernmental forum, which is comprised of the eight Arctic states, several
indigenous peoples organizations, as well as state and non-state observers—is
of particular interest. While the Arctic Council has been a success story in
inter-state cooperation in the Arctic since the end of the Cold War, and even
to some extent was able to remain an open forum for discussion and collab-
oration after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, this is not the case
anymore. The manner in which the work of the Council was put on hold, with
the seven democratic states (A7) deciding to “resume work together on some
of the forum’s projects, but without Russia,” is also illustrative of the general
political situation in the Arctic (US Department of State, 2022; Barents
Observer, 2022). This unusual circumstance is particularly telling given the
fact that Russia represents about 50% of the Arctic region, measured in both
landmass and oceanic area. Russia has similarly denounced any plans for future
cooperation with the west in the Arctic Council, prioritizing her own national
interest and removing references to cooperation within the Arctic Council
from its newest Arctic strategy (High North News, 2023).
 Security and defense of NATO’s northern flank 5

Thus, the idea of an “Arctic exceptionalism” with respect to lower geo-

political tension, which sometimes persisted in academic forums, is no longer
fitting (Pezard et al., 2017, pp. 7–25; Henninen, 2019, p. 231; Käpylä and
Mikkola, 2019). In general, there is uncertainty over where international rela-
tions in this strategically important part of the world are heading. For example,
General Wayne Eyre, the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, characterizes the
Arctic as being “at an inflection point” after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine
(High North News, 2022). Also, in the 2023 threat assessment from the US
intelligence community, one finds concerns over what might follow after the
split between Russia and the A7: “Contested economic and military activities in
the Arctic have the potential to increase the risk of miscalculation, particularly
while there are military tensions between Russia and the other seven Arctic
countries following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022” (Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, 2023, p. 22).
In this uncertainty, one finds Arctic scholars like Professor Timo Koivurova
at the University of Lapland warning against an unnecessary securitization of
“everything” in the Arctic, pointing to the likelihood of a new version of the
Cold War in the region (Koivurova, 2022). While Koivurova makes a timely
remark, one could also argue that the situation in the Arctic region simply
reflects the overall geostrategic landscape in Europe following the Kremlin’s
aggressive and unprovoked war against Ukraine.

Strategic challenges and opportunities facing the North Atlantic

states and NATO
In a statement to the US House Armed Services Committee on 8 March
2023, General Glen D. VanHerck, Commander of US Northern Command
(NORTHCOM), stated the following on key concerns and priorities per-
taining to the Arctic:

The ability of the joint force to operate and campaign in the Arctic remains
a pressing concern for USNORTHCOM and NORAD. The PRC and
Russia continue to invest in Arctic capabilities as both seek to increase
presence and influence in the region while shifting the rules-based
international order to their advantage. More than 50 percent of USNO-
RTHCOM’s area of operations is in the Arctic, and USNORTHCOM and
NORAD’s priorities in the region continue to focus on increased presence,
campaigning through joint training and exercises, and close collaboration
with allies and partners.
(VanHerck, 2023)

By analyzing the security-political situation in the High North, combined

with assessments of developments in western military strategy, capabilities,
and operational concepts fitted for NATO’s northern flank, this book will seek
to bring together a holistic understanding of the strategic challenges and
6 Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge

opportunities facing the alliance in this northern part of its area of responsi-
bility. In this respect, questions on how the alliance and its member states
should train and develop capabilities and concepts, enabling them to operate
and effectively project power in this dynamic area of responsibility for the
alliance, will be scrutinized. This context will inform an investigation of
identified problems related to a lack of domain awareness and resilience in
infrastructure affecting NATO and the joint force’s ability to project power,
which also includes the role of bilateral defense relationships.
With Finland’s NATO membership and Sweden’s, the consequences of
this expansion will be addressed. One element of this likely future evolution
of NATO potential is changes to the role and status of allied presence in the
northern parts of Fennoscandia. While today there are no traditional allied
bases on NATO’s northern flank to ensure permanent American or other
non-local allied stand-in forces operating within the “Weapon Engagement
Zone” of Russia’s military complex in the Kola Peninsula, change is likely to
be underway (Behrmann et al., 2022). One such development is found
through the recently signed ten-year contract ensuring a training camp for
Royal Marines Commandos in Inner Troms (Joint-forces.com, 2023).
However, the future Finnish and Swedish policies on the issue of foreign
bases remain to be seen.
This book will contribute to the discussion with an updated and uniquely
composed research-based investigation of the strategic situation on NATO’s
northern flank. It will focus on both the political-strategic as well as the
military-operational levels, investigating to what degree national forces and
NATO are prepared to project power and operate in this region. In this
context, the book will assess to what degree current security strategies, as
well as changes in operational concepts, are developed to fit both the
technological and military-strategic challenges, hence ensuring that the
North Atlantic states and NATO have the ability to operate and project
power throughout the competition spectrum, from peace to crises and war
on its northern flank.

The structure and research tasks of this book

This book will be divided into three sections. In the first section—I: Security,
power projection, and operations on NATO’s northern flank—scholars address
some important topics related to overall security and defense on this north-
ernmost flank of the alliance, also including insight into Russian strategic
thinking. The section starts out with Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge analyzing
the security environment in the Arctic, giving an overall assessment of
NATO’s ability to defend its northern flank. In this assessment, challenges to
expeditionary warfare in a multi-domain operational setting will be discussed.
Following this, Stian Bones presents important aspects of the historical
background of the United States and its Arctic operational and strategic
planning, including defense cooperation with Norway. In this chapter, security
 Security and defense of NATO’s northern flank 7

dilemmas from the height of the Cold War, particularly from the time period
1960–1980, will be addressed.
Amund Osflaten comes next with a chapter discussing Russian defense
thinking and how this relates to the Arctic region. In a situation with soaring
tensions between Russia and NATO, the Russian way of regular warfare,
combined with the strategic realities of the Russian Arctic, indicates a strong
Russian inclination to strike preemptively if war is seen as imminent or highly
likely. As the Northern Strategic Bastion on the Kola Peninsula is central to
the Russian second-strike capability and thus is perceived as central to state
survival, an assessment of the likelihood of pre-emptive attack in order to
thwart a NATO buildup is discussed. The Norwegian strategic predicament
lies in avoiding inadvertently triggering a pre-emptive strike, while still being
able to mount an adequate defense of Norwegian territory. This strategic
dilemma is important to understand for Norwegian and NATO decision-
makers before a crisis develops. Then, Troy J. Bouffard examines additional
components that help define the overall national security priority that is
Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR). The chapter provides insights into how
the Kremlin has developed powerful justification regarding the NSR’s stra-
tegic importance through four exploratory themes, including a brief history of
the NSR and its importance in international law, the role of Article 234 of
UNCLOS, efforts and tensions involving maritime tonnage goals, and impacts
concerning freedom of navigation. As the NSR remains a top national priority
for Moscow—in general and especially in the Arctic—an increased under-
standing of all relevant factors will help analysts, decision-makers, and en-
thusiasts consider the complex circumstances more effectively as NSR-related
geopolitical and maritime competition inevitably increases.
In Palle Ydstebø’s chapter, a discussion on NATO’s doctrinal development
pertaining to the Arctic is conducted. The chapter focuses on the different
roles and function of doctrine in light of joint operational experiences in the
European Arctic. Finally, for this section, Tormod Heier points out challenges
to East-West relationships and confidence building, particularly after Russia’s
annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
In the years before the Ukraine War, Norway’s geostrategic exposure and its
military vulnerability reinforced each other. This was because US-Russian
rivalry intensified and thus coincided with grave operative deficiencies inside
Norway’s force structure. As Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and invaded
Ukraine in 2022, Norwegian confidence-building efforts have therefore been
exposed to a dual pressure: externally, from two assertive powers character-
izing each other as strategic rivals outside the coast of Norway; and internally,
from military vulnerabilities originating from a feeble force unable to sustain a
credible national presence in its own areas of operations.
In the second section of the book—II: Strategic interests and the
Arctic—focus will be put on some key dimensions of the strategic role of the
Arctic for the US and its key allied partners of relevance to the northern flank,
also including investigation of specific services. In this section, David Auerswald
8 Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge

starts out by exploring the evolution of US policy toward the Arctic. By

structuring the investigation into three periods: the early Cold War, the post-
Cold War era, and the recent rise of great power competition, the chapter
investigates the evolution of US policy regarding Arctic cooperation and col-
laboration, resource extraction, power-projection capabilities, and preparation
for Arctic combat. In Chapter 9, Walter Berbrick and Lars Saunes analyze the
contribution of United States and Norwegian naval power to deterring Russian
military aggression and malign influence in the Arctic. While there is broad
agreement that Norway and the United States should form the foundation of
allied efforts to deter Russian high-end military threats in the Arctic, it is unclear
what this looks like operationally. The chapter also discusses how the United
States and Norway can strengthen cooperation through denial, resilience, and
cost-imposition actions.
In Chapter 10, Ryan Burke and Jahara Matisek outline the time and processes
to achieve US policy coherence in the Arctic and the steps taken for each military
branch in outlining strategies and objectives in the region. While they identify the
role of the US Air and Space Force in the Arctic, the lack of dedicated resources
and the perceived threat have translated into a joint force solution in the Arctic.
Most notably, they describe how Joint All-Domain Operations and Joint-All
Domain Command and Control (JADC2) are being developed to fit the realities
of the Arctic, because the future of US and allied space power is dependent on
access to the region and the support of multi-domain awareness through JADC2.
This chapter is followed by an investigation by Marius Kristiansen, Njål Hoem,
and Leo Blanken suggesting that special operation forces (SOF) have a key role in
the utilization of military means in the Arctic. However, mentally bound by a
generation of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, the authors discuss how
new cognitive models are necessary to understand their role in the Arctic, giving
SOF a potential as strategic enablers in the Arctic.
In the book’s third and final section—III: NATO’s northern flank
states—chapters from key states on NATO’s northern flank are presented. The
section starts out with a Norwegian perspective by Joachim Bentzen. This
chapter highlights elements of both continuity and change in Norway’s
strategic position on NATO’s northern flank after the Cold War. Three ex-
ternal drivers of change make Norway’s strategic position now different from
that of the latter half of the past century: shifting great power dynamics, a
transformed theater of operations, and a forthcoming geostrategic shift due to
an expanding NATO. Importantly, the chapter also demonstrates how
Norway finds itself having a different strategic role and interests due to
changes within the country itself. Norway’s small but potent military capa-
bilities, its economic muscle, and, not least, its energy supplies give the
country an ability to “punch above its weight.” Combined, these develop-
ments call for novel strategic thinking for the small state on the alliance’s
northern flank.
In the following chapter, Hanna Ojanen and Arto Väisänen investigate
Finland and Sweden. Their chapter both discusses how these northern states
 Security and defense of NATO’s northern flank 9

increase NATO’s Arctic territory and bring a longer land border with Russia,
and how they also bring strong new contributions to NATO’s defense. The
link between the Baltic Sea and the Arctic also becomes clearer. The chapter
argues that inclusion of all five Nordic countries in NATO increases contri-
butions to NATO’s thinking around Arctic strategy and wider resilience.
In Chapter 14, Liselotte Odgaard shows that although minor differences
exist between Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands on issues such as
trade relations due to different export dependencies, disagreements on Arctic
security mainly arise from differences on decision-making influence rather
than substantial differences on the role of NATO, China, and Russia in
security and defense policies. In the final chapter, Danita Catherine Burke
provides an overview of the UK approach to Arctic/northern security, arguing
that there are two fundamental reasons why the UK is interested in and willing
to be a regional security leader: (1) the position affords it status in global
politics as a major power player; and (2) as a self-described nearest Arctic
neighbor, the UK government views security issues in the Arctic as national
security issues with a risk of impact on the UK. The chapter presents the UK’s
two-pronged approach to structuring its Arctic/northern defense engage-
ment: (1) participation in NATO-focused Arctic defense and other multi-
lateral northern-focused security arrangements such as the UK-led Northern
European Joint Expeditionary Force; and (2) forging bilateral Arctic-specific
military/security alliances with Arctic states such as Finland, Norway, Sweden,
and Iceland. Furthermore, this chapter introduces the leading role that the
Royal Navy plays in the UK’s ability to be a global security leader in the
Arctic/north and the challenges that the Scottish independence movement
poses to the UK’s capacity and position in Arctic defense.

References
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Arctic.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs September–October, pp. 24–29.
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off-zircon-hypersonic-cruise-missile-in-arctic-test-launch/ [Accessed 27 March 2023].
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Conley, H., M. Melino and J. B. Alterman (2020) “The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic
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and Heninen, Lassi (eds.), The Global Arctic Handbook. Cham: Springer.
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Arctic.” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 13(2022): pp. 34–52.
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Section I

Security, power
projection, and
operations on NATO’s
northern flank
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 —Eh! bien, Christophe? fit Babette.
—Vous parlez sans la reine, répondit le jeune avocat.
Quelques jours après cette déception assez amère, un apprenti
remit à Christophe ce petit billet laconique.
«Chaudieu veut voir son enfant!»
—Qu’il entre! s’écria Christophe.
—O mon saint martyr! dit le ministre en venant embrasser
l’avocat, es-tu remis de tes douleurs?
—Oui, grâce à Paré!
—Grâce à Dieu qui t’a donné la force de supporter la torture!
Mais qu’ai-je appris? tu t’es fait recevoir avocat, tu as prêté le
serment de fidélité, tu as reconnu la prostituée, l’Église catholique,
apostolique et romaine!...
—Mon père l’a voulu.
—Mais ne devons-nous pas quitter nos pères, nos enfants, nos
femmes, tout pour la sainte cause du calvinisme, tout souffrir!... Ah!
Christophe, Calvin, le grand Calvin, tout le parti, le monde, l’avenir
comptent sur ton courage et sur ta grandeur d’âme! Il nous faut ta
vie.
Il y a ceci de remarquable dans l’esprit de l’homme, que le plus
dévoué, tout en se dévouant, se bâtit toujours un roman
d’espérances dans les crises les plus dangereuses. Ainsi, quand,
sur l’eau, sous le Pont-au-Change, le prince, le soldat et le ministre
avaient demandé à Christophe d’aller porter à Catherine ce traité
qui, surpris, devait lui coûter la vie, l’enfant comptait sur son esprit,
sur le hasard, sur son intelligence, et il s’était audacieusement
avancé entre ces deux terribles partis, les Guise et Catherine, où il
avait failli être broyé. Pendant la question, il se disait encore:—Je
m’en tirerai! ce n’est que de la douleur! Mais à cette demande
brutale: Meurs! faite à un garçon qui se trouvait encore impotent, à
peine remis de la torture et qui tenait d’autant plus à la vie qu’il avait
vu la mort de plus près, il était impossible de s’abandonner à des
illusions.
 Christophe répondit tranquillement:—De quoi s’agit-il?
—De tirer bravement un coup de pistolet comme Stuart sur
Minard.
—Sur qui?
—Sur le duc de Guise.
—Un assassinat?
—Une vengeance! Oublies-tu les cent gentilshommes massacrés
sur le même échafaud, à Amboise? Un enfant, le petit d’Aubigné, a
dit en voyant cette boucherie: Ils ont haché la France!
—Vous devez recevoir tous les coups et n’en pas porter, telle est
la religion de l’Évangile, répondit Christophe. Mais, pour imiter les
Catholiques, à quoi bon réformer l’Église?
—Oh! Christophe, ils t’ont fait avocat, et tu raisonnes! dit
Chaudieu.
—Non, mon ami, répondit l’avocat. Mais les princes sont trop
ingrats, et vous serez, vous et les vôtres, les jouets de la maison de
Bourbon...
—Oh! Christophe, si tu avais entendu Calvin, tu saurais que nous
les manions comme des gants!... Les Bourbons sont les gants, nous
sommes la main.
—Lisez! dit Christophe en présentant au ministre la réponse de
Pibrac.
—Oh! mon enfant, tu es ambitieux, tu ne peux plus te dévouer!...
je te plains!
Chaudieu sortit sur cette belle parole.
Quelques jours après cette scène, Christophe, la famille Lallier et
la famille Lecamus étaient réunis, en l’honneur des accordailles de
Babette et de Christophe, dans la vieille salle brune où Christophe
ne couchait plus; car il pouvait alors monter les escaliers et
commençait à se traîner sans béquilles. Il était neuf heures du soir,
on attendait Ambroise Paré. Le notaire de la famille se trouvait
devant une table chargée de contrats. Le pelletier vendait sa maison
et son fonds de commerce à son premier commis, qui payait
immédiatement la maison quarante mille livres, et qui engageait la
maison pour répondre du paiement des marchandises sur lesquelles
il donnait déjà vingt mille livres en à-compte.
Lecamus acquérait pour son fils une magnifique maison en pierre
bâtie par Philibert de l’Orme, rue Saint-Pierre-aux-Bœufs, et la lui
donnait en dot. Le syndic prenait en outre deux cent cinquante mille
livres sur sa fortune, et Lallier en donnait autant pour l’acquisition
d’une belle terre seigneuriale sise en Picardie, de laquelle on avait
demandé cinq cent mille livres. Cette terre étant dans la mouvance
de la couronne, il fallait des lettres-patentes, dites de rescription,
accordées par le roi, outre le paiement de lods et ventes
considérables. Aussi la conclusion du mariage était-elle ajournée
jusqu’à l’obtention de cette faveur royale. Si les bourgeois de Paris
s’étaient fait octroyer le droit d’acheter des seigneuries, la sagesse
du conseil privé y avait mis certaines restrictions relativement aux
terres qui relevaient de la couronne, et la terre que Lecamus guignait
depuis une dizaine d’années se trouvait dans l’exception. Ambroise
s’était fait fort d’apporter l’ordonnance le soir même. Le vieux
Lecamus allait de sa salle à sa porte dans une impatience qui
montrait combien grande avait été son ambition. Enfin, Ambroise
arriva.
—Mon vieil ami, dit le chirurgien assez effaré et regardant le
souper, voyons tes nappes? Bien. Oh! mettez des chandelles de
cire. Dépêchez, dépêchez! cherchez tout ce que vous aurez de plus
beau.
—Qu’y a-t-il donc? demanda le curé de Saint-Pierre-aux-Bœufs.
—La reine-mère et le jeune roi viennent souper avec vous,
répliqua le premier chirurgien. La reine et le roi attendent un vieux
conseiller dont la charge sera vendue à Christophe, et M. de Thou
qui a conclu le marché. N’ayez pas l’air d’avoir été prévenus, je me
suis échappé du Louvre.
En un moment, les deux familles furent sur pied. La mère de
Christophe et la tante de Babette allèrent et vinrent avec une célérité
de ménagères surprises. Malgré la confusion que cet avis jeta dans
l’assemblée de famille, les préparatifs se firent avec une activité qui
tint du prodige. Christophe, ébahi, surpris, confondu d’une pareille
faveur, était sans parole et regardait tout faire machinalement.
—La reine et le roi chez nous! disait la vieille mère.
—La reine! répétait Babette, que dire et que faire!
Au bout d’une heure tout fut changé: la vieille salle était parée, et
la table étincelait. On entendit alors un bruit de chevaux dans la rue.
La lueur des torches portées par les cavaliers de l’escorte fit mettre
le nez à la fenêtre aux bourgeois du quartier. Ce tumulte fut rapide. Il
ne resta sous les piliers que la reine-mère et son fils, le roi Charles
IX, Charles de Gondi nommé grand-maître de la garde-robe et
gouverneur du roi, M. de Thou, le vieux conseiller, le secrétaire
d’État Pinard et deux pages.
—Braves gens, dit la reine en entrant, nous venons, le roi mon
fils et moi, signer le contrat de mariage du fils à notre pelletier; mais
c’est à la condition qu’il restera catholique. Il faut être catholique
pour entrer au parlement, il faut être catholique pour posséder une
terre qui relève de la couronne, il faut être catholique pour s’asseoir
à la table du roi! N’est-ce pas, Pinard?
Le secrétaire d’État parut en montrant des lettres-patentes.
—Si nous ne sommes pas ici tous catholiques, dit le petit roi,
Pinard jettera tout au feu; mais nous sommes tous catholiques ici?
reprit-il en jetant des yeux assez fiers sur toute l’assemblée.
—Oui, sire, dit Christophe Lecamus en fléchissant quoique avec
peine le genou et baisant la main que le jeune roi lui tendit.
La reine Catherine, qui tendit aussi sa main à Christophe, le
releva brusquement et, l’emmenant à quelques pas dans un coin, lui
dit:—Ah! çà, mon garçon, pas de finauderies? Nous jouons franc jeu!
—Oui, madame, reprit-il saisi par l’éclatante récompense et par
l’honneur que lui faisait cette reine reconnaissante.
—Hé! bien, mons Lecamus, le roi mon fils et moi nous vous
permettons de traiter de la charge du bonhomme Groslay, conseiller
au Parlement, que voici, dit la reine. Vous y suivrez, j’espère, jeune
homme, les errements de monsieur le Premier.
De Thou s’avança et dit:—Je réponds de lui, madame.
—Eh! bien, instrumentez, garde-notes, dit Pinard.
—Puisque le roi notre maître nous fait la faveur de signer le
contrat de ma fille, s’écria Lallier, je paie tout le prix de la seigneurie.
—Les dames peuvent s’asseoir, dit le jeune roi d’une façon
gracieuse. Pour présent de noces à l’accordée, je fais, avec
l’agrément de ma mère, remise de mes droits.
Le vieux Lecamus et Lallier tombèrent à genoux et baisèrent la
main du jeune roi.
—Mordieu! sire, combien ces bourgeois ont d’argent! lui dit Gondi
à l’oreille.
Le jeune roi se prit à rire.
—Leurs seigneuries étant dans leurs bonnes, dit le vieux
Lecamus, veulent-elles me permettre de leur présenter mon
successeur et lui continuer la patente royale de la fourniture de leurs
maisons?
—Voyons, dit le roi.
Lecamus fit avancer son successeur qui devint blême.
—Si ma chère mère le permet, nous nous mettrons tous à table,
dit le jeune roi.
Le vieux Lecamus eut l’attention de donner au roi un gobelet
d’argent qu’il avait obtenu de Benvenuto Cellini, lors de son séjour
en France à l’hôtel de Nesle, et qui n’avait pas coûté moins de deux
mille écus.
—Oh! ma mère, le beau travail! s’écria le jeune roi en levant le
gobelet par le pied.
—C’est de Florence, répondit Catherine.
—Pardonnez-moi, madame, dit Lecamus, c’est fait en France par
un Florentin. Ce qui est de Florence serait à la reine, mais ce qui est
fait en France est au roi.
—J’accepte, bonhomme, s’écria Charles IX, et désormais ce sera
mon gobelet.
—Il est assez bien, dit la reine en examinant ce chef-d’œuvre,
pour le comprendre dans les joyaux de la couronne.—Eh! bien,
maître Ambroise, dit la reine à l’oreille de son chirurgien en
désignant Christophe, l’avez-vous bien soigné? marchera-t-il?
—Il volera, dit en souriant le chirurgien. Ah! vous nous l’avez bien
finement débauché.
—Faute d’un moine, l’abbaye ne chôme pas, répondit la reine
avec cette légèreté qu’on lui a reprochée et qui n’était qu’à la
surface.
Le souper fut gai, la reine trouva Babette jolie, et, en grande
reine qu’elle fut toujours, elle lui passa au doigt un de ses diamants
afin de compenser la perte que le gobelet faisait chez les Lecamus.
Le roi Charles IX, qui depuis prit peut-être trop de goût à ces sortes
d’invasions chez ses bourgeois, soupa de bon appétit; puis, sur un
mot de son nouveau gouverneur, qui, dit-on, avait charge de lui faire
oublier les vertueuses instructions de Cypierre, il entraîna le premier
président, le vieux conseiller démissionnaire, le secrétaire d’État, le
curé, le notaire et les bourgeois à boire si druement, que la reine
Catherine sortit au moment où elle vit la gaieté sur le point de
devenir bruyante. Au moment où la reine se leva, Christophe, son
père et les deux femmes prirent des flambeaux et l’accompagnèrent
jusque sur le seuil de la boutique. Là, Christophe osa tirer la reine
par sa grande manche et lui fit un signe d’intelligence. Catherine
s’arrêta, renvoya le vieux Lecamus et les deux femmes par un geste,
et dit à Christophe:—Quoi?
—Si vous pouvez, madame, tirer parti de ceci, dit-il en parlant à
l’oreille de la reine, sachez que le duc de Guise est visé par des
assassins...
—Tu es un loyal sujet, dit Catherine en souriant, et je ne
t’oublierai jamais.
 Elle lui tendit sa main, si célèbre par sa beauté, mais en la
dégantant, ce qui pouvait passer pour une marque de faveur; aussi
Christophe devint-il tout à fait royaliste en baisant cette adorable
main.
—Ils m’en débarrasseront donc, de ce soudard, sans que j’y sois
pour quelque chose! pensa-t-elle en mettant son gant.
Elle monta sur sa mule et regagna le Louvre avec ses deux
pages.
Christophe resta sombre tout en buvant, la figure austère
d’Ambroise lui reprochait son apostasie; mais les événements
postérieurs donnèrent gain de cause au vieux syndic. Christophe
n’aurait certes pas échappé aux massacres de la Saint-Barthélemi,
ses richesses et sa terre l’eussent désigné aux meurtriers. L’histoire
a enregistré le sort cruel de la femme du successeur de Lallier, belle
créature dont le corps resta nu, accroché par les cheveux à l’un des
étais du Pont-au-Change pendant trois jours. Babette frémit alors, en
pensant qu’elle aurait pu subir un pareil traitement, si Christophe fût
demeuré Calviniste, car tel fut bientôt le nom des Réformés.
L’ambition de Calvin fut satisfaite, mais après sa mort.
Telle fut l’origine de la célèbre maison parlementaire des
Lecamus. Tallemant des Réaux a commis une erreur en les faisant
venir de Picardie. Les Lecamus eurent intérêt plus tard à dater de
l’acquisition de leur principale terre, située en ce pays. Le fils de
Christophe, qui lui succéda sous Louis XIII, fut le père de ce riche
président Lecamus qui, sous Louis XIV, édifia le magnifique hôtel qui
disputait à l’hôtel Lambert l’admiration des Parisiens et des
étrangers; mais qui, certes, est l’un des plus beaux monuments de
Paris. L’hôtel Lecamus existe encore rue de Thorigny, quoiqu’au
commencement de la Révolution, il ait été pillé comme appartenant
à M. de Juigné, l’archevêque de Paris. Toutes les peintures y ont
alors été effacées; et, depuis, les pensionnats qui s’y sont logés l’ont
fortement endommagé. Ce palais, gagné dans le vieux logis de la
rue de la Pelleterie, montre encore les beaux résultats qu’obtenait
jadis l’Esprit de Famille. Il est permis de douter que l’individualisme
moderne, engendré par le partage égal des successions, élève de
pareils monuments.

FIN DU MARTYR CALVINISTE.

 NOTE.

Voici cette chanson publiée par l’abbé de La Place dans son

Recueil de pièces intéressantes, où se trouve la dissertation dont
nous avons parlé.
LE CONVOI DU DUC DE GUISE.

Qui veut ouïr chanson? (bis)

C’est du grand duc de Guise;
Et bon, bon, bon, bon,
Di, dan, di, dan, bon,
C’est du grand duc de Guise!
(Ce dernier vers se parlait et se disait sans doute comiquement.)
Qui est mort et enterré.

Qui est mort et enterré. (bis)

Aux quatre coins du poële,
Et bon, etc.,
Quatre gentilshomm’s y avoit.

Quatre gentilshomm’s y avait, (bis)

L’un portoit son grand casque,
Et bon, etc.,
Et l’autre ses pistolets.

Et l’autre ses pistolets, (bis)

Et l’autre son épée,
Et bon, etc.,
Qui tant d’hugu’nots a tués.

Qui tant d’hugu’nots a tués. (bis)

Venoit le quatrième,
Et bon, etc.,
Qui étoit le plus dolent.

Qui étoit le plus dolent; (bis)

Après venoient les pages,
Et b t
 Et bon, etc.,
Et les valets de pied.

Et les valets de pied, (bis)

Avecque de grands crêpes,
Et bon, etc.,
Et des souliers cirés.

Et des souliers cirés, (bis)

Et des beaux bas d’estame,
Et bon, etc.,
Et des culottes de piau.

Et des culottes de piau. (bis)

La cérémonie faite,
Et bon, etc.,
Chacun s’alla coucher.

Chacun s’alla coucher, (bis)

Les uns avec leurs femmes,
Et bon, etc.,
Et les autres tout seul.

Cette découverte curieuse prouverait jusqu’à un certain point la

culpabilité de Théodore de Bèze, qui voulut alors diminuer par le
ridicule l’horreur que causait cet assassinat. Il paraît que l’air faisait
le principal mérite de cette ronde.
 TABLE DES MATIÈRES.

ÉTUDES PHILOSOPHIQUES.

Massimilla Doni 1
Gambara 74
L’Enfant maudit 129
Les Marana 220
Adieu 275
Le Réquisitionnaire 315
El Verdugo 330
Un Drame au bord de la mer 340
L’Auberge rouge 359
L’Élixir de longue vie 391
Maître Cornélius 413
Sur Catherine de Médicis 468
Introduction 469
Première partie.—Le Martyr calviniste 503

FIN DE LA TABLE.
 Au lecteur.
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le curseur sur le mot souligné pour voir le texte original.
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