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Quick Guide to Moral Theories
Central ideas from each of the seven types of moral theory surveyed in chapter 1 are included
here.
A. CONSEQUENTIALISM
BASIC IDEA: Perfectionist consequentialism: a version that con-
strues intrinsic value in terms of human perfec-
C Right action is to be understood entirely in
tions, the most general of which are knowledge and
terms of the overall intrinsic value of the
achievement.
consequences of the action compared to the
overall intrinsic value of the consequences PC An action is right if and only if (and because)
associated with alternative actions an agent it would (if performed) likely bring about a
might perform instead. An action is right if greater net balance of perfectionist goods
and only if (and because) its consequences than would any alternative action one might
would be at least as good as the consequences perform instead.
of any alternative action that the agent might
Rule consequentialism: a version that evaluates com-
perform instead.
peting rules in terms of their acceptance value and
TYPES OF CONSEQUENTIALIST THEORY: then evaluates particular actions by reference to the
acceptance value of associated rules.
Utilitarianism: A version of consequentialism that
construes intrinsic value in terms of happiness or RC An action is right if and only if (and because)
welfare. it is permitted by a rule whose associated
acceptance value is at least as high as the
U An action is right if and only if (and because)
acceptance value of any other rule applying
it would (if performed) likely produce at least
to the situation.
as high a utility (net overall balance of wel-
fare) as would any other alternative action
one might perform instead.
B. NATURAL LAW THEORY

BASIC PRINCIPLE: Intrinsic permissibility. The action in ques-
tion, apart from its effects, is morally per-
NLT An action is right if and only if (and because)
missible;
in performing the action one does not directly
violate any of the basic values (human life, Necessity: It is not possible to bring about the
procreation, knowledge, and sociability). good effect except by performing an action
that will bring about the evil effect in ques-
DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT
tion;
DDE An action that would bring about at least one
Nonintentionality: The evil effect is not
evil effect and at least one good effect is mor-
intended—it is neither one’s end nor a chosen
ally permissible if (and only if) the following
means for bringing about some intended end;
conditions are satisfied:
tim90027_QuickGuide.indd 1 10/06/16 05:22 PM

Proportionality: The evil that will be brought A violation that satisfies all of the provisions of the
about by the action is not out of proportion to DDE counts as an indirect violation and is thus not
the good being aimed at. prohibited by NLT.
C. KANTIAN MORAL THEORY

Humanity formulation of Kant’s fundamental prin- Universal Law formulation
ciple, the categorical imperative: UL An action is right if and only if one can both
H An action is right if and only if (and because) (a) consistently conceive of everyone adopt-
the action treats persons (including oneself) ing and acting on the general policy (that
as ends in themselves and not merely as a is, the maxim) of one’s action, and also (b)
means. consistently will that everyone act on that
maxim.
D. RIGHTS-BASED MORAL THEORY

As the name suggests, a rights-based moral theory
takes the notion of moral rights as basic and defines respect all such rights because they are in
or characterizes the rightness or wrongness of actions conflict, one’s action is among the best ways
in terms of moral rights. to protect the most important rights in the
case at hand.
R An action is right if and only if (and because)
in performing it either (a) one does not vio- Typical moral rights taken as fundamental include
late the fundamental moral rights of others, the Jeffersonian rights to life, various liberties, and
or (b) in cases in which it is not possible to the freedom to pursue one’s own happiness.
E. VIRTUE ETHICS
A type of moral theory that takes considerations of ter) might choose to do in the circumstances
virtue and vice to be the basis for defining or charac- under consideration.
terizing the rightness and wrongness of actions.
Commonly recognized virtues include honesty,
VE An action is right if and only if (and because) courage, justice, temperance, beneficence, humility,
it is what a virtuous agent (acting in charac- loyalty, and gratitude.
F. ETHICS OF PRIMA FACIE DUTY

This sort of moral theory features a plurality of prin- more principles apply and favor conflicting actions,
ciples of prima facie duty. To reach an all-things- one must use moral judgment to figure out which
considered moral verdict in cases in which two or duty is most stringent.
i
Ross’s list of prima facie duties:
Justice: prima facie, one ought to ensure that pleasure is distributed according to merit.
Beneficence: prima facie, one ought to help those in need and, in general, increase the vir-
tue, pleasure, and knowledge of others.
Self-improvement: prima facie, one ought to improve oneself with respect to one’s own virtue and
knowledge.
Nonmaleficence: prima facie, one ought to refrain from harming others.
Fidelity: prima facie, one ought to keep one’s promises.
Reparation: prima facie, one ought to make amends to others for any past wrongs one has
done them.
Gratitude: prima facie, one ought to show gratitude toward one’s benefactors.
Audi’s proposed additions to Ross’s list:
Veracity: prima facie, one ought not to lie.
Enhancement and preserva- prima facie, one ought to contribute to increasing or at least preserving the
tion of freedom: freedom of others with priority given to removing constraints over enhancing
opportunities.
Respectfulness: prima facie, one ought, in the manner of our relations with other people, treat
others respectfully.
G. SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

BASIC IDEA: principles of justice that he argued would be
chosen by agents (under certain specified
SC An action is morally right if and only if (and
conditions) who are deciding on basic prin-
because) it is permitted by a set of moral
ciples for mutual governance.
principles that hypothetical agents would
agree to under conditions that are ideal for
The principle of greatest equal liberty: Each
choosing moral principles (the precise char- person is to have an equal right to the most
acteristics of the hypothetical agents and extensive basic liberty compatible with a
ideal conditions to be spelled out.) similar liberty for others.

The difference principle: Social and eco-
RAWLS’S TWO PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE:
nomic inequalities are to be arranged so that
In the context of developing a theory of they are both (a) reasonably expected to be
social justice governing social and political to everyone’s advantage and (b) attached to
institutions, John Rawls proposed two basic positions and offices open to all.
ii
D isp ut e d M o r a l I s s u es
A R eader
Fourth Edition
Mark Timmons
University of Arizona
New York Oxford
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Timmons, Mark, 1951- editor.
Title: Disputed moral issues : a reader / [edited by] Mark Timmons,
University of Arizona.
Description: Fourth Edition. | New York : Oxford University Press USA, 2016.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016038175| ISBN 9780190490027 (student edition) | ISBN
9780190490034 (instructor edition) | ISBN 9780190650308 (loose leaf)
Subjects: LCSH: Ethics–Textbooks. | Ethical problems–Textbooks.
Classification: LCC BJ1012 .D57 2016 | DDC 170–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016038175
Printing number: 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Printed by LSC Communications, United States of America

Contents
Quick Guide to Moral Theories inside front cover

Preface xi
User’s Guide xv
1 A Moral Theory Primer 1

1. What Is a Moral Theory? 2
2. Seven Essential Moral Theories 6
A. Consequentialism 6
B. Natural Law Theory 11
C. Kantian Moral Theory 15
D. Rights-Based Moral Theory 20
E. Virtue Ethics 25
F. Ethics of Prima Facie Duty 26
G. Social Contract Theory 29
3. Coping with Many Moral Theories 31
2 Moral Theory Selections 38

J. S. Mill / Utilitarianism 38
St. Thomas Aquinas / Treatise on Law 44
Immanuel Kant / The Moral Law 48
John Locke / Natural Rights 55
Aristotle / Virtue and Character 59
W. D. Ross / What Makes Right Actions Right? 67
John Rawls / A Theory of Justice 71
Additional Resources 82
v
vi CONTENTS
3 Sexual Morality 84
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, approved by Pope
Paul VI / Vatican Declaration on Some Questions of Sexual Ethics 88
John Corvino / What’s Wrong with Homosexuality? 94
Thomas A. Mappes / A Liberal View of Sexual Morality and the
Concept of Using Another Person 103
Raja Halwani / Virtue Ethics and Adultery 113
4 Pornography, Hate Speech, and Censorship 121

The Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography /
Pornography and Harm 130
Nadine Strossen / W
hy Censoring Pornography Would Not Reduce
Discrimination or Violence against Women 136
Susan Dwyer /Enter Here—At Your Own Risk:
The Moral Dangers of Cyberporn 146
John Arthur / Sticks and Stones 157
Andrew Altman / Speech Codes and Expressive Harm 165
5 Drugs and Addiction 176

David Boaz / Drug-Free America or Free America? 182
Peter de Marneffe / Decriminalize, Don’t Legalize 188
Robert E. Goodin / Permissible Paternalism: Saving Smokers from
Themselves 198
Daniel Shapiro / Addiction and Drug Policy 204
Contents vii
6 Sexism, Racism, and Reparation 212

Ann E. Cudd and Leslie E. Jones / Sexism 217
J. L. A. Garcia / The Heart of Racism 227
Tommie Shelby / Is Racism in the “Heart”? 240
Louis J. Pojman / Why Affirmative Action Is Immoral 248
Thomas E. Hill Jr. / The Message of Affirmative Action 257
7 The Ethics of Immigration 268

Stephen Macedo / The Moral Dilemma of U.S. Immigration Policy: Open
Borders versus Social Justice 273
Joseph H. Carens / M igration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian
Perspective 285
Christopher Heath Wellman / Immigration and Freedom of Association 299
Sarah Fine / Freedom of Association Is Not the Answer 318
8 Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide 330

James Rachels / Active and Passive Euthanasia 336
Philippa Foot / Killing and Letting Die 340
Daniel Callahan / A Case against Euthanasia 346
Michael B. Gill / A Moral Defense of Oregon’s Physician-Assisted
Suicide Law 355
David Velleman/ Against the Right to Die 369
9 The Ethical Treatment of Animals 377

Peter Singer / All Animals Are Equal 380
Carl Cohen / Do Animals Have Rights? 389
Peter Carruthers / A gainst the Moral Standing of Animals 397
Alastair Norcross / P uppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal
Cases 407
viii CONTENTS
10 Abortion 420
Mary Anne Warren / On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion 428
Judith Jarvis Thomson / A Defense of Abortion 435
Patrick Lee and Robert P. George / The Wrong of Abortion 444
Rosalind Hursthouse / Virtue Theory and Abortion 455
Don Marquis / Why Abortion Is Immoral 465
L. W. Sumner / A Moderate View 470
11 Cloning and Genetic Enhancement 478

Leon R. Kass / Preventing Brave New World 485
Gregory E. Pence / Will Cloning Harm People? 493
Michael J. Sandel / The Case against Perfection 502
Frances M. Kamm / Is There a Problem with Enhancement? 510
Peter Singer / Parental Choice and Human Improvement 522
12 The Death Penalty 532

Stephen Nathanson / An Eye for an Eye? 538
Ernest van den Haag / A Defense of the Death Penalty 544
Jeffrey H. Reiman / Civilization, Safety, and Deterrence 549
James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West, and
Jonathan Lloyd / C apital Attrition: Error Rates in
Capital Cases, 1973–1995 552
13 War, Terrorism, and Torture 561

David Rodin / The Problem with Prevention 570
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong / Preventive War—What Is It Good For? 582
Michael Walzer / Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses 595
Contents ix
Andrew Valls / Can Terrorism Be Justified? 603

Alan M. Dershowitz / Should the Ticking Bomb Terrorist Be Tortured? 614
Marcia Baron / The Ticking Bomb Hypothetical 625
14 World Hunger and Poverty 639

Garrett Hardin / Lifeboat Ethics 642
Peter Singer / The Life You Can Save 648
John Arthur / World Hunger and Moral Obligation 662
Amartya Sen / Property and Hunger 671
Onora O’Neill / A Kantian Approach to World Hunger 677
15 The Environment, Consumption, and Climate Change 684

William F. Baxter / People or Penguins: The Case for Optimal Pollution 692
Aldo Leopold / The Land Ethic 697
Thomas E. Hill Jr. / I deals of Human Excellence and Preserving the Natural
Environment 702
Stephen M. Gardiner / A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change,
Intergenerational Ethics, and the Problem of Moral
Corruption 709
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong / I t’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and
Individual Moral Obligations 717
Bjørn Lomborg / Let’s Keep Our Cool about Global Warming 732
Glossary 740
Preface
The guiding aim of this anthology is to connect various disputed moral issues with moral
theory in order to help students better understand the nature of these disputes. The issues
featured in this book include questions about the morality of various forms of sexual behav-
ior; pornography, hate speech, and censorship; drugs and addiction; sexism, racism, and
reparations; immigration; euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide; the ethical treatment of
animals; abortion; cloning and genetic enhancement; the death penalty; war, terrorism, and
torture; world hunger and poverty; and ethical questions that relate to consumption, climate
change, and the environment in general.
The connection between moral disputes over such issues and moral theory is that oppos-
ing moral viewpoints on some topics are very often grounded in one or another moral theory.
Thus, to understand an author’s arguments for her or his favored position, one must be able
to recognize the author’s deepest moral assumptions, which are reflected in the moral theory
from which the author proceeds in reasoning about particular moral issues.
In editing this anthology, I have attempted to help readers connect moral issues with
theory in the following ways:
•
A moral theory primer. One way to connect issues and theory is to have students read
compact summaries of the various moral theories—summaries that convey just enough
detail about a moral theory to aid understanding without overwhelming the reader. This
is what I have tried to do in the first chapter, “A Moral Theory Primer,” in which I first
explain what a moral theory is all about—its main concepts and guiding aims—and
then proceed to present seven types of moral theory that are essential for understanding
moral disputes over the sorts of issues featured in this book. In the brief introduction
and “User’s Guide” immediately following this preface, I explain how one might inte-
grate the moral theory primer into a moral problems course.
•
Chapter introductions. In addition to the primer, I have also written introductions to
each chapter that go over certain conceptual, historical, and theoretical issues that stu-
dents must have in beginning their study of moral issues. These introductions include
remarks about how the moral theories presented in the primer relate to the arguments
of the authors whose writings are featured in the chapter.
•
Selection summaries. Again, in order to aid one’s understanding of the articles, each
selection is preceded by a short summary of the article. Immediately after the summary
I have, where relevant, included a cue to readers that indicates the relevant part of the
moral theory primer that will aid in understanding the article in question.
xi
xii PREFACE
•
Reading and discussion questions. Following each selection, I have included a set
of reading and discussion questions. The reading questions are meant to prompt stu-
dents’ understanding of each selection’s content, whereas the discussion questions
are meant to help stimulate critical thought about the issues and arguments in the
selections.
•
Quick guide to moral theories. I have also included a “Quick Guide to Moral Theories,”
which lists the various principles featured in each of the seven theories featured in the
primer. This is for readers who need a brief reminder of the key elements of one or more
of the featured moral theories.
In addition, this anthology includes the following features that many will find useful:
•
Glossary. For ease of reference, I have included a glossary of important terms that are
defined in the moral theory primer and in the chapter introductions. Each term in the
glossary appears in boldface type when it is first introduced in the text. The glossary
entry for each term specifies the chapter and section in which the term is first intro-
duced.
•
Additional resources. Finally, at the end of each chapter, I have included a short list of
resources, broken down into Web resources, authored books and articles, and edited
collections. These resources are recommended to those who wish to explore a topic in
more detail.
As mentioned earlier, the following “User’s Guide” makes a few suggestions about integrat-
ing the study of moral theory and moral issues.
New to the Fourth Edition

Here is a summary of the changes I’ve made in this edition:
• In the chapter featuring classic selections on moral theory, I have replaced the selection
from Bentham with one from J. S. Mill’s Utilitarianism.
• In the chapter on sexual morality, I have replaced “Why Shouldn’t Tommy and Jim
Have Sex” by John Corvino with an excerpt from his recent 2013 book, What’s Wrong
with Homosexuality? The third edition of this book included two articles debating gay
marriage. On the advice of some users, and the fact that many students report to me that
for them gay marriage is no longer an issue, I have dropped the two articles in question
and have not replaced them.
• I have added two new selections to the chapter on pornography, hate speech, and cen-
sorship. Susan Dwyer in “Enter Here—At Your Own Risk: The Moral Dangers of
Cyberporn” tackles the question of internet pornography from the perspective of virtue
ethics. Andrew Altman defends the justification of hate speech codes in his “Speech
Codes and Expressive Harm.”
• The chapter on sexism, racism, and reparation now includes “Sexism” by Ann E.
Cudd and Leslie E. Jones.
• For the chapter on euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, I have added David Vel-
leman’s “Against the Right to Die,” which presents a unique perspective on the dangers
of a legal right to die.
• I have made a few changes in the chapter on the ethical treatment of animals. I have
replaced three of the articles from the third edition, adding Peter Singer’s classic, “All
Preface xiii
Animals Are Equal,” Peter Carruthers’s “Against the Moral Standing of Animals,” in
which he addresses the issue from a contractualist perspective, and finally, Alastair
Norcross’s spirited critique of the practice of meat-eating in his “Puppies, Pigs, and
People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases.”
• On the good advice of one of the reviewers for this edition of the book, I have added a
selection by Stephen M. Gardiner, “A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergen-
erational Ethics, and the Problem of Moral Corruption,” to the chapter on the environ-
ment, consumption, and climate change.
Finally, this third edition features an updated Instructor’s Manual and Testbank on CD
and a companion website for both students and instructors that I describe in more detail in
the “User’s Guide” following this preface.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Robert Miller, my editor at Oxford University Press, for encouraging me to do a
new edition of this anthology, and to the folks at OUP involved in the production of this vol-
ume. I am especially grateful to the following philosophers for their extremely helpful advice
for this edition: Jacob Affolter (Arizona State University), Adam Cureton (University of
Tennessee, Knoxville), Bob Fischer (Texas State University), Matthew Fitzsimmons (Uni-
versity of North Alabama), Frank Schalow (University of New Orleans), Barbara Tucker
(Trident Technical College), and four anonymous reviewers for Oxford University Press.
xiv PREFACE
Dedication
Finally, I wish to dedicate this fourth edition of Disputed Moral Issues to Betsy Timmons
for her generous research assistance in helping to update many of the chapter introductions
and for her cheerful encouragement during my work on this edition.
Mark Timmons
Tucson, AZ
User’s Guide
In what follows, I suggest how instructors might approach teaching a course that is primar-
ily focused on particular moral disputes but also integrates moral theory into the teaching of
those disputes. Following this discussion is a description of the various resources for both
students and instructors that come with this book.
As mentioned in the preface, a central aim of this anthology is to connect a range of con-
temporary disputed moral issues to moral theory. Much of the philosophical literature on the
morality of abortion, homosexuality, pornography, cloning, and the death penalty approaches
these and other issues from the perspective of some moral theory. As I will explain more
fully in the next chapter, a moral theory purports to answer general moral questions about
the nature of the right and the good. So one way in which philosophers tackle disputed moral
issues is by appealing to a moral theory—appealing, that is, to a general conception of the
right and the good in examining some particular moral issue.
But this presents a challenge for students who are trying to understand and think about the
moral controversies featured in this book and presents an associated challenge for instruc-
tors. Because of the important role that moral theory plays in the writings of both profes-
sional philosophers and nonphilosophers who write about contemporary moral issues, a full
understanding of most of the readings in this book requires that one have a basic grasp of the
various moral theories to which authors appeal in their writings. Some authors take the time
to briefly explain whatever moral theory they are using in approaching some moral issue,
but many do not—they assume a basic acquaintance with moral theory. And this means that
a student not previously acquainted with moral theory is often at a disadvantage in trying to
understand the position and arguments of an author. The associated challenge for an instruc-
tor is to teach just enough moral theory to aid students’ understanding in a course devoted
primarily to disputed moral issues.
In this anthology, I try to address this challenge in a number of related ways. First, I have
written an introductory overview of moral theory, “A Moral Theory Primer,” in which I first
explain what a moral theory is all about and then present the basic elements of seven types
of moral theory that are featured throughout the readings in this book. These theories include
the following:
• Consequentialism (including utilitarianism)
• Natural law theory (including the doctrine of double effect)
•
Kantian moral theory (including Kant’s Humanity and Universal Law formulations of
the categorical imperative—Kant’s fundamental moral principle)
xv
xvi USER’S GUIDE
•
Rights-based theory (including an explanation of “rights-focused” approaches to moral
problems that are very common but importantly distinct from a genuinely rights-based
theory)
• Virtue ethics (including an explanation of the concepts of virtue and vice)
•
Ethics of prima facie duty (including W. D. Ross’s classic version and the more recent
version defended by Robert Audi)
•
Social contract theory (featuring John Rawls’s influential contract theory of justice)
The moral theory primer, then, is meant to get readers up to basic speed on seven essential
moral theories, with an eye on their application to disputed moral issues.
The moral theory primer can be read straight through. But let me make a suggestion
about how it might be used in a course devoted mainly to contemporary moral problems—a
suggestion that incorporates additional ways in which I have tried to address the previously
mentioned challenge. (What I am about to say reflects my own approach to teaching a con-
temporary moral problems course.)
The basic idea is to incorporate select readings from the moral theory primer as one
proceeds to work through the readings in the chapters that follow. The motto here is: Teach
moral theory as needed in working through the readings. I have written the primer so that the
segments on each of the seven types of moral theory are largely self-standing; they can be
consulted as needed in learning about and teaching moral issues. I find that teaching moral
theory as needed helps students to better digest and understand the somewhat abstract nature
of a moral theory by immediately relating it to some concrete moral issue. And, of course,
their coming to understand moral theory helps them more fully understand the readings.
Let me further suggest a way of implementing the teaching of theory on an as-needed
approach.
•
Getting started. Read the introduction and section 1 of the moral theory primer in which
I provide a brief overview of what a moral theory is all about. That will be enough to
get readers started.
•
Moving ahead to the moral issues. Then I recommend proceeding to one of the chapters
on a disputed moral issue—they can be taught in any order.1
•
Chapter introductions. Read the chapter introduction on the selected topic; it will
explain basic concepts relevant to the chapter topic. Each of these chapters ends with a
subsection entitled “Theory Meets Practice,” in which I briefly relate the moral theories
that are used in that chapter’s readings to the topic of the chapter.
•
Cues for the integrated use of the moral theory primer. Then proceed to work through
the readings in the selected chapter. Each reading begins with a brief summary of the
article and, in those cases in which an author is appealing to, or relying on, some moral
theory, the summaries are followed by a recommended reading, which cues readers to
go back (if needed) to the relevant sections of the moral theory primer where the theory
in question is presented. This is how I incorporate the teaching of various moral theories
into the course as needed.
Let me add that not every reading appeals to one or another moral theory. Some articles
are mainly concerned with conveying an understanding of some disputed concept like
“sexism” or “racism.” One of the articles in the chapter on the death penalty is concerned
entirely with statistical evidence about error rates in capital cases, an issue that, of course,
User’s Guide xvii
bears importantly on the morality of the death penalty. And in a few other cases, the read-
ings do not clearly proceed from some moral theory. So, not every article summary includes
a recommendation to consult the moral theory primer. But most of the reading selections
do connect directly with one or more of the moral theories explained in the primer.
•
Quick reference guide to moral theories. In order to make it easy to review the funda-
mental principles of each of the theories, I have placed a “Quick Guide to Moral Theo-
ries” at the front of the book. Once one has read the relevant sections of the moral theory
primer, this guide may be consulted to refresh one’s memory of the basics.
Again, the preceding steps reflect how I like to proceed. Users are invited to find ways that
best fit their own style of teaching.
Resources for Students and Instructors

This fourth edition includes an “Instructor’s Manual” and “Computerized Testbank” on CD
and a Companion Website (www.oup.com/us/timmons) that offers resources for both stu-
dents and instructors.
Instructor Resources both in the Instructor’s Manual and in the Companion Website include the
following:
• Sample syllabi
• Lecture notes in PowerPoint format
• Chapter goals and summaries
• A Testbank that includes essay, multiple-choice, true/false, and fill-in-the-blank questions
Student Resources on the Companion Website include the following:
• Self-quizzes, which include multiple-choice, true/false, and fill-in-the-blank questions

• Helpful Web links
• Suggested readings and media (articles, films, etc.)
Learning Management System (LMS) cartridges are available in formats compatible with
any LMS in use at your college or university and include the Instructor’s Manual and Com-
puterized Testbank and student resources from the companion website.
NOTE
1. Of course, some topics naturally go well together because the moral issues they raise are deeply
connected. For instance, chapter 4 on pornography, hate speech, and censorship raises issues about
the morality of government interference in the lives of its citizens. The same sort of issue comes up in
chapter 5 on drugs and addiction. Chapters 9 and 10 on animals and abortion, respectively, go together
because they raise important questions about the scope of moral standing, that is, about the boundaries
of what should count in our moral deliberations.
1 A Moral Theory Primer
In 1998, Dr. Jack Kevorkian helped Thomas Youk end his life by giving him a lethal injection
of drugs—an incident that was videotaped and later broadcast on CBS’s 60 Minutes.1 Youk
had been suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (often called Lou Gehrig’s disease), a
progressive neurodegenerative disease that attacks nerve cells in the brain and spinal cord,
eventually leading to death. In the later stages of the disease, its victims are completely para-
lyzed, as was Youk at the time of his death.
Kevorkian’s killing Youk was a case of euthanasia, which is defined as the act of killing
(or allowing to die) on grounds of mercy for the victim. In this case, because Youk consented
to his own death and because Kevorkian brought about Youk’s death by an act of lethal
injection, Kevorkian’s action was an instance of voluntary active euthanasia. Kevorkian was
eventually tried and convicted of second degree murder for his active role in bringing about
Youk’s death. But even if Kevorkian did violate the law, was his action morally wrong?
Youk’s immediate family and many others saw nothing morally wrong with Youk’s decision
or with Kevorkian’s act. They argued, for example, that proper respect for an individual’s
freedom of choice means that people in Youk’s situation have a moral right to choose to
die and that, therefore, Kevorkian was not acting immorally in helping Youk end his life.
Of course, many others disagreed, arguing, for example, that euthanasia is morally wrong
because of its possible bad effects over time on society, including the possibility that the
practice of euthanasia could be abused, and vulnerable persons might be put to death without
their consent. Which side of this moral dispute is correct? Is euthanasia at least sometimes
morally right, or is this practice morally wrong?
Disputes over moral issues are a fact of our social lives. Most people, through television,
the Internet, magazines, and conversing with others, are familiar with some of the general
contours of such disputes—disputes, for example, over the death penalty, the ethical treat-
ment of animals, human cloning, abortion. The same sort of moral question raised about the
actions of Kevorkian can be raised about these and other moral issues. Thinking critically
about such moral issues is where philosophy becomes especially important.
A philosophical approach to moral issues has as its guiding aim arriving at correct or
justified answers to questions about the morality of the death penalty, the ethical treatment
of animals, human cloning, abortion, and other issues of moral concern. Given the contested
nature of such practices as cloning and abortion, one needs to be able to defend one’s position
with reasons. Just as those who dispute questions about, say, science or history are expected
to give reasons for the scientific and historical beliefs they hold, those who seriously dis-
pute moral questions are expected to give reasons for whatever moral position they take on
1
2 CHAPTER 1 • A MORAL THEORY PRIMER
a certain issue. If we examine how philosophers go about providing reasons for the moral
positions they take on certain issues, we find that very often they appeal to a moral theory.
That is, in arguing for a particular position on the topic of, say, euthanasia, philosophers
often make their case by applying a moral theory to the practice of euthanasia. Applying
moral theory to issues of practical concern—practical issues—is one dominant way in which
reasoning in ethics proceeds. This way of tackling moral issues by applying theory to cases
is featured in this book of readings.
But what is a moral theory? What are its guiding aims? What moral theories are there?
How is a moral theory used in reasoning about disputed moral issues? These are the main
questions of concern in this moral theory primer.
1. WHAT IS A MORAL THEORY?
According to philosopher John Rawls, “The two main concepts of ethics are those of the
right and the good. . . . The structure of an ethical theory is, then, largely determined by how
it defines and connects these two basic notions.”2
In explaining what a moral theory is, then, the place to begin is by clarifying the two main
concepts featured in such a theory.
The Main Concepts: The Right and the Good

In ethics, the terms “right” and “wrong” are used primarily to evaluate the morality of actions,
and in this chapter we are mainly concerned with moral theories that address the nature of
right and wrong action (or right action, for short). Here, talk of right action in contrast to
wrong action involves using the term “right” broadly to refer to actions that aren’t wrong.
Used in this broad sense, to say of an action that it is right is to say that it is “all right” (not
wrong) to perform, and we leave open the question of whether the act, in addition to being
all right, is an action that we morally ought to perform—an obligation or duty. But we
sometimes find “right” being used narrowly to refer to actions that are “the” morally right
action for one to perform, and when so used, it refers to actions that are morally required or
obligatory (one’s obligation or duty). Actions that are all right to perform (right in the sense
of merely being not wrong) and that are also not one’s moral obligation to perform—actions
that are all right to perform and all right not to perform—are morally optional. So, we have
three basic categories of moral evaluation into which an action may fall: an action may be
morally obligatory (something one morally ought to do, is morally required to do, is one’s
duty), or morally optional, or morally wrong. To help keep this terminology straight, I have
summarized what I have been saying in Figure 1.1.
Again, in ethics, the terms “good” and “bad” are used primarily in assessing the value of
persons (their character) as well as experiences, things, and states of affairs. Philosophers
distinguish between something’s having intrinsic value (that is, being intrinsically good
or bad) and something’s having extrinsic value (that is, being extrinsically good or bad).
Something has intrinsic value when its value depends on features that are inherent to it,
Obligatory actions Optional actions Wrong actions

Actions that one morally ought to do; Actions that are not obligatory and are Actions that one ought not to do.
that it would be wrong to fail to do. not wrong. Morally speaking they are
“Right” in the narrow sense. all right to do and all right not to do.
Right actions
Broad sense of right action that
covers both obligatory and optional actions
FIGURE 1.1 Basic Categories of Right Conduct
whereas something is extrinsically good when its goodness is a matter of how it is related to
something else that is intrinsically good. For instance, some philosophers maintain that hap-
piness is intrinsically good—its goodness depends on the inherent nature of happiness—and
that things like money and power, while not intrinsically good, are nevertheless extrinsically
good because they can be used to bring about or contribute to happiness. Thus, the notion of
intrinsic value is the more basic of the two notions, and so philosophical accounts of value
are concerned with the nature of intrinsic value. And here we can recognize three basic value
categories: the intrinsically good, the intrinsically bad (also referred to as the intrinsically
evil), and what we may call the intrinsically value-neutral—that is, the category of all those
things that are neither intrinsically good nor bad (though they may have extrinsic value).3
A moral theory, then, is a theory about the nature of the right and the good and about the
proper method for making correct or justified moral decisions. Accordingly, here are some
of the main questions that a moral theory attempts to answer:
1. What makes an action right or wrong—what best explains why right acts are right and
wrong acts are wrong?
2. What makes something good or bad—what best explains why intrinsically good things
are intrinsically good (and similarly for things that are intrinsically bad or evil)?
3. What is the proper method for reasoning our way to correct or justified moral conclu-
sions about the rightness and wrongness of actions and the goodness and badness of
persons, and other items of moral evaluation?
In order to understand more fully what a moral theory is and how it attempts to answer these
questions, let us relate what has just been said to the two guiding aims of moral theory.
Two Main Aims of a Moral Theory

Corresponding to the first two questions about the nature of the right and the good is what
we may call the theoretical aim of a moral theory:
The theoretical aim of a moral theory is to discover those underlying features of
actions, persons, and other items of moral evaluation that make them right or wrong,
good or bad and thus explain why such items have the moral properties they have.
Features of this sort serve as moral criteria of the right and the good.
Our third main question about proper methodology in ethics is the basis for the practical aim
of a moral theory:
The practical aim of a moral theory is to offer practical guidance for how we might
arrive at correct or justified moral verdicts about matters of moral concern—verdicts
which we can then use to help guide choice.
Given these aims, we can evaluate a moral theory by seeing how well it satisfies them. We
will return to the issue of evaluating moral theories in section 3. For the time being, we can
gain a clearer understanding of these aims by considering the role that principles typically
play in moral theories.
The Role of Moral Principles

In attempting to satisfy these two aims, philosophers typically propose moral principles—
very general moral statements that specify conditions under which an action is right (or
wrong) and something is intrinsically good (or bad). Principles that state conditions for an
action’s being right (or wrong) are principles of right conduct, and those that specify condi-
tions under which something has intrinsic value are principles of value. Here is an example
of a principle of right conduct (where “right” is being used in its broad sense to mean “not
wrong”):
P An action is right if and only if (and because) it would, if performed, likely
bring about at least as much overall happiness as would any available alternative
action.4
This principle, understood as a moral criterion of right action, purports to reveal the under-
lying nature of right action—what makes a right action right. According to P, facts about
how much overall happiness an action would bring about were it to be performed are what
determine whether it is morally right. Although P addresses the rightness of actions, it has
implications for wrongness as well. From P, together with the definitional claim that if an
action is not morally right (in the broad sense of the term) then it is morally wrong, we may
infer the following:
P* An action is wrong if and only if (and because) it would, if performed, likely not
bring about at least as much overall happiness as would some available alterna-
tive action.
Since, as we have just seen, principles about moral wrongness can be derived from principles
of rightness, I shall, in explaining a moral theory’s account of right and wrong, simply for-
mulate a theory’s principles (there may be more than one) for right action.
In addition to serving as moral criteria, principles like P are typically intended to provide
some practical guidance for coming to correct or justified moral verdicts about particular
issues, thus addressing the practical aim of moral theory. The idea is that if P is a correct
moral principle, then we should be able to use it to guide our moral deliberations in coming to
correct conclusions about the rightness of actions, thus serving as a basis for moral decision
making. In reasoning our way to moral conclusions about what to do, P has us focus on the
consequences of actions and instructs us to consider in particular how much overall happi-
ness actions would likely bring about.
To sum up, a moral theory can be understood as setting forth moral principles of right
conduct and value that are supposed to explain what makes an action or other object of evalu-
ation right or wrong, good or bad (thus satisfying the theoretical aim), as well as principles
that can be used to guide moral thought in arriving at correct or justified decisions about what
to do (thus satisfying the practical aim).
The Structure of a Moral Theory

Finally, what Rawls calls the “structure” of a moral theory is a matter of how a theory con-
nects the right and the good. As we shall see, some theories take the concept of the good
to be more basic than the concept of the right and thus define or characterize the right-
ness of actions in terms of considerations of intrinsic goodness. Call such theories value-
based moral theories. Value-based moral theories include versions of consequentialism,
natural law theory, and virtue ethics. However, some moral theories do not define right-
ness in terms of goodness. Some theories are duty-based moral theories—theories that
take the concept of duty to be basic and so define or characterize the rightness of actions
independently of considerations of goodness. These theories are often called “deontologi-
cal” moral theories (from deon, the Greek term for duty). The moral theory of Immanuel
Kant (see later in this chapter) and theories inspired by Kant (Kantian moral theories) are
arguably deontological.5 And what is called the ethics of prima facie duty, if not a pure
deontological theory, contains deontological elements, as we shall see when we discuss
this theory later in section 2.
Brief Summary
Now that we have reviewed a few basic elements of moral theory, let us briefly sum up.
•
Main concepts of moral theory. The two main concepts featured in moral theory are the
concepts of the right (and wrong) and the good (and bad).
•
Two aims of moral theory. A moral theory can be understood as having two central
aims. The theoretical aim is to explain the underlying nature of the right and the
good—specifying those features of actions or other items of evaluation that make an
action or whatever right or wrong, good or bad. We call such features “moral criteria.”
The practical aim is to offer practical guidance for how we might arrive at correct or
justified moral verdicts about matters of moral concern.
• The role of moral principles. A moral theory is typically composed of moral principles
(sometimes a single, fundamental principle) that are intended to serve as criteria of
the right and the good (thus satisfying the theoretical aim) and are also intended to be
useful in guiding moral thinking toward correct, or at least justified conclusions about
some moral issue.
• The structure of a moral theory. Considerations of structure concern how a moral theory
connects the concepts of the right and the good. Value-based theories make the good
(intrinsic value) more basic than the right and define or characterize the right in terms
of the good. Duty-based theories characterize the right independently of considerations
of value.
In the next section, we briefly examine seven moral theories that play a large role in
philosophical discussions of disputed moral issues. After presenting these theories, I devote
the remaining section and an appendix to questions that are likely to occur to readers. First,
there is the question of why studying moral theories is helpful in thinking about disputed
moral issues when there is no one moral theory that is accepted by all those who study moral
theory. Rather, we find a variety of apparently competing moral theories that sometimes yield
conflicting moral verdicts about the same issue. So, how can appealing to moral theory really
help in trying to think productively about moral issues? This is a fair question that I address
in section 3. However, before going on, let me say something about how one might use this
chapter in studying the moral issues featured in this book.
User’s Guide Interlude

In the “User’s Guide,” I suggested that although this chapter can be read straight through,
readers may want to stop here and go on to one of the following chapters and begin their
study of disputed moral issues. In the chapter introductions and the brief article summaries
that precede each reading selection, I prompt readers to read (or reread) my presentations of
one or more of the moral theories described in the next section. For those who wish to consult
primary sources corresponding to the moral theories in question, there are the selections in
the next chapter.
As I explained in the user’s guide, I like to teach moral theory along with the readings.
Seeing how a moral theory applies to a particular moral issue is helpful for understanding
an author’s position on the issue, which in turn helps readers gain a deeper understanding of
and appreciation for moral theory. As for integrating section 3, I recommend consulting this
part of the chapter when the questions it addresses are prompted by one’s thinking about and
discussing the book’s readings.
2. SEVEN ESSENTIAL MORAL THEORIES
Seven types of moral theory are prominently represented in our readings: consequentialism,
natural law theory, Kantian moral theory, rights-based moral theory, virtue ethics, the ethics
of prima facie duty, and social contract theory. Here, then, is an overview of these various
theories that will provide useful background for understanding our readings.
A. Consequentialism
In thinking about moral issues, one obvious thing to do is to consider the consequences or
effects of various actions—the consequences or effects on matters that are of concern to us.
Consequentialism is a type of moral theory according to which consequences of actions are
all that matter in determining the rightness and wrongness of actions. Its guiding idea is this:
C
Right action is to be understood entirely in terms of the overall intrinsic value
of the consequences of the action compared to the overall intrinsic value of the
consequences associated with alternative actions an agent might perform instead.

An action is right if and only if (and because) its consequences would be at least
as good as the consequences of any alternative action that the agent might instead
perform.
A number of important ideas are packed into C that we need to unpack—ideas that are pres-
ent in the varieties of consequentialist moral theory presented next. Let us sort them out.
• First, consequentialist moral theory is a value-based moral theory: it characterizes or
defines right action in terms of intrinsic value.
• Second, this sort of theory involves the fairly intuitive idea of alternative actions open
to an agent: in circumstances calling for a moral choice, an agent is confronted by a
range of alternative actions, any one of which she might choose to perform.
• Third (and relatedly), consequentialism is a comparative theory of right action: the
rightness (or wrongness) of an action depends on how much intrinsic value it would
likely produce (if performed) compared to how much intrinsic value alternative actions
would likely produce (if performed).
• Fourth, the consequentialist account of right action is a maximizing conception: we are
to perform that action, from among the alternatives, whose consequences will have at
least as much overall value as any other.
• Fifth, and finally, consequentialism is a strongly impartialist moral theory in the sense
that the rightness or wrongness of an action is made to depend on the values of the con-
sequences for everyone who is affected by the action, where everyone affected counts
equally. (This fifth point will become clearer when we consider particular versions of
consequentialism.)
Consequentialism, we have noted, is a general type of moral theory that has a variety
of species. For instance, consequentialists may differ over the issue of what has intrinsic
value. Those versions that take happiness or welfare alone to have intrinsic value are ver-
sions of utilitarianism, whereas those that take human perfection to have intrinsic value
are versions of perfectionism. Again, consequentialists may differ over the primary focus
of consequentialist evaluation. Some versions focus on individual actions, other versions
focus on rules. So, we can distinguish four main species of consequentialism. Let us
explore further.
Utilitarianism has been perhaps the most prominent form of consequentialism, so let us
begin with it.
Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism was originally developed and defended by Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832)
and later refined by John Stuart Mill (1806–1873).6 Their basic idea is that it is human
welfare or happiness that alone is intrinsically valuable and that the rightness or wrongness
of actions depends entirely on how they affect human welfare or happiness. As a conse-
quentialist theory, utilitarianism requires that one maximize welfare where the welfare of all
individuals who will be affected by some action counts. We can sharpen our characteriza-
tion of this theory by introducing the technical term “utility,” which refers to the net value
of the consequences of actions. The net value of an act’s consequences refers to how much
overall welfare or happiness would likely result from an action, taking into account both
the short-term and long-term effects of the action on the welfare of all who will be affected.
The basic idea is that an action’s rightness or wrongness depends both on how much hap-
piness (if any) it would likely produce for each individual affected were it to be performed,
as well as how much unhappiness (if any) it would likely produce for each affected person
were it to be performed. For each alternative action, then, we can consider the net balance of
overall happiness versus unhappiness associated with that action. Call this overall net value
the utility of an action. We can now formulate a generic statement of the basic utilitarian
principle—the principle of utility:
U An action is right if and only if (and because) it would (if performed) likely pro-
duce at least as high a utility (net overall balance of happiness versus unhappiness)
as would any other alternative action one might perform instead.7
Notice that the utility of an action might be negative. That is, all things considered, an action
may produce a net balance of unhappiness over happiness were it to be performed. Moreover,
since U (like all versions of C) is comparative, it may turn out that the right action in some
unfortunate circumstance is the one that would likely bring about the least amount of overall
negative utility. This would be where all of one’s options have a negative utility.
As formulated, U leaves open questions about the nature of happiness and unhappiness
about which there are different philosophical theories.8 Bentham and (apparently) Mill held
that happiness is entirely constituted by experiences of pleasure and unhappiness by experi-
ences of displeasure or pain. And so their theory of intrinsic value is called value hedonism:
only states of pleasure have positive intrinsic value and only states of pain have intrinsic
negative value; anything else of value is of mere extrinsic value. So, for instance, for the
value hedonist, any positive value that knowledge may have is extrinsic: it is only of positive
value when it contributes to bringing about what has intrinsic value, namely pleasure (or the
alleviation of pain). It should be noted that a value hedonist need not (and should not) take
an excessively narrow view of pleasure and pain; the hedonist can follow Bentham and Mill
in holding that in addition to such bodily pleasures of the sort one gets from eating delicious
food or having a massage, there are aesthetic and intellectual pleasures such as appreciating
a beautifully written poem. Moreover, the value hedonist will recognize not only passive
pleasures of the sort just mentioned, but also active pleasures as when one plays a game
or is involved in some creative activity. So value hedonism can recognize a broad range of
pleasurable experiences that have positive intrinsic value and a broad range of painful experi-
ences that have negative intrinsic value.
If we now combine the principle of utility (U) with value hedonism, we obtain hedonistic
utilitarianism:
HU An action is right if and only if (and because) it would likely produce (if per-
formed) at least as high a net balance of pleasure (or less pain) as would any
other alternative action one might do instead.
But as I hope my presentation has made clear, one need not accept hedonism as a theory of
value in order to be a utilitarian. In fact, many contemporary utilitarians reject value hedo-
nism and accept some other conception of happiness or welfare. But, again, what makes a
theory a version of utilitarianism is that the theory accepts the basic consequentialist claim,
C, together with the idea that it is human happiness or human well-being that has intrinsic
value and is to be promoted in what we do.
Perfectionist Consequentialism
But a consequentialist need not be a utilitarian. She might hold that there are items having
intrinsic value other than happiness that are important in determining the rightness or wrong-
ness of action. To illustrate, I have chosen what is called perfectionist consequentialism—a
species of the generic view that accepts a perfectionist theory of value.9 According to a
value perfectionist, it is states of human perfection, including knowledge and achievement
that have intrinsic value.10 One might come to have a great deal of knowledge and achieve-
ment in one’s life, yet not be happy. So a perfectionist theory of the good is not the same
as a happiness theory of the good. We might formulate the basic principle of perfectionist
consequentialism as follows:
PC An action is right if and only if (and because) it would (if performed) likely bring
about a greater net balance of perfectionist goods than would any alternative
action one might perform instead.
The distinction between utilitarianism and perfectionist consequentialism has to do with
differences over what has intrinsic value for purposes of morally evaluating actions. And
notice that the consequentialist principles presented thus far refer to particular concrete
actions and their consequences, so the views (expressed in principles U, HU, and PC) are
versions of act consequentialism. However, as mentioned at the outset, another important
division within the ranks of consequentialists is between act and rule versions of the view.
So let us turn from act versions to rule versions.
Rule Consequentialism
Moral rules—rules, for example, against lying, theft, and killing—are generally thought to
be significant in thinking about particular moral issues. The importance of moral rules is
emphasized by rule consequentialists. Act consequentialism is the view that the rightness of
a particular, concrete action—an actual or possible doing by a person at a time—depends
on the value of its consequences. Rule consequentialism is the view that the rightness or
wrongness of an action depends on whether it is required, permitted, or prohibited by a rule
whose consequences are best.11 So rule consequentialism involves two levels of evaluation:
first, rules that require, permit, or prohibit various courses of action are evaluated by refer-
ence to the values of their consequences, and second, a particular action is evaluated by
determining whether it is required, permitted, or prohibited by a rule whose consequences
are best. Let us explore this view a bit further.
The sense in which a rule can have consequences has to do with the fact that were people
to accept the rule in question, this would influence what they do. So, we can evaluate a rule
by asking what consequences would likely be brought about were it to be generally accepted
in society. Call the value associated with rules their acceptance value. This idea is familiar.
Think of debates in the sporting world about changing the rules of some sport. The focus in
such debates is on the likely effects the proposed rule change would have on the game, were
it to be accepted.
According to rule consequentialism, then, the morality of a particular action in some
situation depends upon the acceptance values of various competing rules that are relevant to
the situation in question. We can thus formulate this theory with the following principle of
right conduct:
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Disputed Moral Issues: A Reader (4th

Edition) Mark Timmons

College Ethics: A Reader on Moral Issues That Affect

Moral Issues in Business William H. Shaw

Writing the Body Politic: A John O’Neill Reader 1st

Issues in 21st Century World Politics Mark Beeson

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B. NATURAL LAW THEORY

tim90027_QuickGuide.indd 1 10/06/16 05:22 PM

C. KANTIAN MORAL THEORY

D. RIGHTS-BASED MORAL THEORY

F. ETHICS OF PRIMA FACIE DUTY

G. SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

Copyright © 2017, 2014, 2011, 2007 by Oxford University Press

For titles covered by Section 112 of the US Higher Education Opportunity

Published by Oxford University Press

Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Printed by LSC Communications, United States of America

Quick Guide to Moral Theories inside front cover

1 A Moral Theory Primer 1

2 Moral Theory Selections 38

4 Pornography, Hate Speech, and Censorship 121

5 Drugs and Addiction 176

6 Sexism, Racism, and Reparation 212

7 The Ethics of Immigration 268

8 Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide 330

9 The Ethical Treatment of Animals 377

11 Cloning and Genetic Enhancement 478

12 The Death Penalty 532

13 War, Terrorism, and Torture 561

Andrew Valls / Can Terrorism Be Justified? 603

14 World Hunger and Poverty 639

15 The Environment, Consumption, and Climate Change 684

New to the Fourth Edition

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Student Resources on the Companion Website include the following:

• Self-quizzes, which include multiple-choice, true/false, and fill-in-the-blank questions

1. WHAT IS A MORAL THEORY?

The Main Concepts: The Right and the Good

Obligatory actions Optional actions Wrong actions

FIGURE 1.1 Basic Categories of Right Conduct

Two Main Aims of a Moral Theory

The Role of Moral Principles

The Structure of a Moral Theory

User’s Guide Interlude

2. SEVEN ESSENTIAL MORAL THEORIES

consequences associated with alternative actions an agent might perform instead.

Story Books for the Young.

BOOKS AT ONE SHILLING.—continued.

Beeton’s Good-Aim Series.

The Hans Andersen Story Books for the Young:—

1. The Christmas Tree.

Child’s First Book of Natural History. Illustrated. Crown 8vo,

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