Neypes, et. al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No.
141524,
September 14, 2005;
FACTS: Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino,
Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action
for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance
and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial
Court, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands,
Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo,
namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and
respondents) filed various motions with the trial court.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court resolved the motions as
follows: (1) the petitioners’ motion to declare respondents Bureau of
Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for
their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent
heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them
was improper; (2) the Land Bank’s motion to dismiss for lack of cause of
action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and
matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to
dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription,
was also denied because there were factual matters that could be
determined only after trial.
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could
very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of
the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.
In an order dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed
petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of
dismissal on March 3, 1998, and, on the 15th day thereafter or on
March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the
trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days
later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the
appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding
that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July
31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but this too was
denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice
of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal.
They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to
run only on July 22, 1998, since this was the day, they received the final
order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When
they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had
elapsed, and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.
ISSUE: WON petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal before
the trial court.
What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which
triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal: the
February 12, 1998, order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998,
order dismissing the motion for reconsideration?
RULING: The Supreme Court sustained petitioners’ view that the order
dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the
final order contemplated in the Rules.
The Supreme Court declared that it was the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted
the final order as it was what ended the issues raised therein.
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process.
It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who
seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements
of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to
appeal.10 The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural
rules. BP 129,11 as amended, provides:

Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of
the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed
from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period
for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of
judgment appealed from. x x x
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new
trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15
days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A
final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is
an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented
at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the
parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to
tardy appeals, the SC have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the
extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In
those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, its decisions
were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set
by law. But the SC hasten to add that in those rare cases where
procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a
clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial
system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance
between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee
that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper
disposition of his cause.
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts.26 It
has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules
for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy
disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the
Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for
parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or
more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule
42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for
new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.
Hence, the Supreme Court hold that petitioners seasonably filed their
notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July
22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration).
Yu v. Hon. Samson Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011
FACTS: Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina
Casaclang, an information for estafa against the petitioner was filed with
the RTC.
In a May 26, 2005, decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as
charged.
Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a
motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and
material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she
was convicted.
In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s
motion for new trial for lack of merit.
On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the
RTC, alleging that pursuant to the ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,
she had a "fresh period" of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt
of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18, 2005,
within which to file a notice of appeal.
On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to
submit a copy of Neypes for his guidance.
On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal for being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable
to appeals in criminal cases.
On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the
decision.
On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted
for resolution.
On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the
prosecution’s motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the
decision.
ISSUE: Whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies to
appeals in criminal cases.
RULING: The SC hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of
appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying
her motion for new trial.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new
trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion
for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for
reconsideration that constituted the final order which finally disposed of
the issues involved in the case.
The raison d’être for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal
period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when
the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to
appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves
with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-
day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or
resolution.
In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of
the 15-day period within which to appeal. The Court categorically set a
fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration
within which to appeal, thus:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all
courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even
establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive
process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules
governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly
Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based
 on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their
appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which
to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new
rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the
Court’s pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should
equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the
Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the
periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section
39 of BP 129 categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal
from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of
any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision
appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court)
also ought not to recognize any distinction.17
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly
the same. There is no substantial difference between the two
provisions insofar as legal results are concerned – the appeal
period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order
denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this
situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists
why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly
addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary
appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely
civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of
Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also
apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC
exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal
cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal
from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil
and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should be treated differently.
Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make
it applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall
effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a
civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal
case – a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly
discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double
standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property
interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be
prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and unequal
standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have
recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to
reason is not allowed in law – Quod est inconveniens, aut contra
rationem non permissum est in lege.
Heirs of H. Zayco, et. al. v. Hinlo, Jr., GR No. 170243, April 16,
2008
FACTS: After Enrique Hinlo died intestate on January 31, 1986, his
heirs filed a petition for letters of administration of his estate in the
Regional Trial Court. Ceferina Hinlo, widow of Enrique, was initially
appointed as special administratrix of Enrique's estate. On December
23, 1991, petitioners Nancy H. Zayco and Remo Hinlo were appointed as
co-administrators in lieu of their mother Ceferina who was already sickly
and could no longer effectively perform her duties as special
administratrix.
On March 4, 2003, respondent Atty. Jesus V. Hinlo, Jr., a grandson of
Enrique and heir to his estate by virtue of representation, filed a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration in his favor and an urgent
motion for the removal of petitioners as co-administrators of Enrique's
estate. Petitioners opposed both the petition and the motion.
In an order dated July 23, 2002, the RTC revoked the appointment of
petitioners as co-administrators of the estate of Enrique and directed
the issuance of letters of administration in favor of respondent on a
P50,000 bond. Respondent posted the required bond, took his oath as
administrator and was issued letters of administration.
Petitioners received a copy of the July 23, 2002, order on August 2,
2002, and moved for its reconsideration on August 9, 2002. The RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated July 23, 2003.
Petitioners received a copy of the July 23, 2003, order on July 31, 2003,
and filed a notice of appeal the same day. They submitted a record on
appeal on August 29, 2003.
In an order dated January 5, 2004, the RTC denied the notice of appeal
and record on appeal. It ruled that petitioners resorted to a wrong
remedy as the July 23, 2002, and July 23, 2003 orders were
interlocutory and not subject to appeal. Even assuming that appeal was
the proper remedy, it was filed late.
Petitioners challenged the January 5, 2004 RTC order in the CA by way
of a petition for certiorari and mandamus. In a decision dated June 27,
2005, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC as the notice of appeal and
record on appeal were in fact filed beyond the prescribed period.
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the CA denied it.
Petitioners contend that the RTC erred when it ruled that the July 23,
2002 and July 23, 2003 orders were not appealable. They also claim
that their notice of appeal and record on appeal were filed on time.
ISSUE: WON the assailed orders are appealable.
RULING: An order appointing an administrator of a deceased person's
estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties in connection
with the administration, management and settlement of the decedent's
estate. It is a final order and, hence, appealable.
In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. The
notice of appeal and the record on appeal should both be filed within 30
days from receipt of the notice of judgment or final order. Pursuant to
Neypes v. CA, the 30-day period to file the notice of appeal and record
on appeal should be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
From the time petitioners received the July 23, 2003 order (denying
their motion for reconsideration of the July 23, 2002 order) on July 31,
2003, they had 30 days or until August 30, 2003 to file their notice of
appeal and record on appeal. They did so on August 29, 2003. Thus, the
appeal was made on time.
MODES OF APPEAL:
(1) San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders, et. al. v. Bayang, G.R. No. 194702,
April 20, 2015;
FACTS: On April 15, 2000, petitioner SLR Builders (then known as
Violago Builders, Inc), as seller, and respondent Ma. Cristina F. Bayang
(Cristina), as buyer, entered into a "contract to sell" of a sixty (60)-
square meter lot in Barangay Payatas, Quezon City.
Upon full payment of the monthly amortizations on the purchased lot,
Cristina demanded from SLR Builders the execution of the deed of
absolute sale and the lot's certificate of title, but the latter failed to
deliver, prompting Cristina to file a complaint for specific performance
and damages against SLR Builders and its President, Oscar Violago
(petitioners) before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB).
In a decision dated February 16, 2004, Housing and Land Use Arbiter
Atty. Joselito F. Melchor ruled in Cristina's favor.
The petitioners appealed Arbiter Melchor's decision to the HLURB Board
of Commissioners. The Board dismissed and denied, respectively, the
petitioners' appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration. The
petitioners then brought their case to the Office of the President.
In a resolution dated November 17, 2006, the OP dismissed the
petitioners' appeal for having been filed out of time. The OP's resolution
stated:
A review of the records shows that the HLURB Decision affirming
the Arbiter's decision was received by the respondents/appellants
(referring to the petitioners) on July 27, 2005. On that date, the
15-day prescriptive period within which to file an appeal began to
run. Instead of preparing an appeal, respondents-appellants
opted to file a Motion for Reconsideration on August 10, 2005.
Their filing of the said motion interrupted the period of appeal by
that time, however, fourteen (14) days had already elapsed.
On April 17, 2006, respondents-appellants received the
Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration. Following
the above rules, respondents-appellants have only one (1) day
left, or until April 18, 2006, within which to file their notice of
appeal to this Office. Unfortunately, they were able to do so only
on April 27, 2006, or nine (9) days late.
The petitioners moved to reconsider and argued that the "fresh period
rule" enunciated in the case of Domingo Neypes, et at. v. Court of
Appeals, et al. should be applied to their case.
The OP, in a resolution dated July 26, 2007, denied the petitioners'
motion with finality, stating that the "fresh period rule" applies only to
judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals, such as in petitioners'
case. The petitioners then appealed to the CA via petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
In its assailed decision, the CA denied the petitioners' petition for
review. The CA, likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration; hence, the filing of the present petition for review on
certiorari with this Court.
ISSUE: Whether the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies to
administrative appeals, such as an appeal filed from a decision of the
HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office to the President.
RULING: It is settled that the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies
only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals. In this case,
the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners to the OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature;
thus, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes does not apply.
In Panolino v. Tajala, the Court was confronted with a similar issue of
whether the "fresh period rule" applies to an appeal filed from the
decision or order of the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary, an
appeal which is administrative in nature. We held in Panolino that the
"fresh period rule" only covers judicial proceedings under the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure:
The "fresh period rule" in Neypes declares:
 To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which
to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals; and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new
rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution.
As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision in Neypes, the
"fresh period rule" shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals
from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court).
Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) Fortune Life Insurance Company v. Commission on Audit, et.
al., G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015;
FACTS: Respondent Provincial Government of Antique and the
petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement concerning the life
insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and
tanod, the former obligating ₱4,393,593.60 for the premium payment,
and subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher
to COA Antique for pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the payment
for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government
Code). Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied.
Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the
COA. On November 15, 2012, the COA issued its decision denying the
petition, holding that under Section 447 and Section 458 of the Local
Government Code only municipal or city governments are expressly
vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for barangay
workers; and noting the LGU’s failure to comply with the requirement of
publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government
Procurement Reform Act).
The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14,
2012, and filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013.
However, the COA denied the motion, the denial being received by the
petitioner on July 14, 2014.10
Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014,
but the petition for certiorari was dismissed as earlier stated through the
resolution promulgated on August 19,2014 for (a) the late filing of the
petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified
declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondents.
The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule
64 petition is akin to a petition for review brought under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court.
The petitioner submits that it filed the petition for certiorari within the
reglementary period following the fresh period rule enunciated in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: WON the fresh period applies to Rule 64.
RULING: Fresh Period Rule under Neypes did not apply to the petition
for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
days from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file
the petition. Considering that it received the notice of the denial
on July 14, 2014, it had only until July 19, 2014 to file the
petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which
was 25 days too late.

There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections that the belated filing of
petition for certiorari under Rule 64. the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the
fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As such,
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having
judgment or final order rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of applied. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of
fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due an injustice that is not commensurate with the degree of his
course only upon a prima facie showing that the Regional Trial Court thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. Absent
committed an error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper.
of the challenged judgment or final order. In contrast, the petition for
certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for certiorari under Rule
65, and assails a judgment or final order of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not
designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the
COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are

different. In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days
to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed
decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion
for new trial or reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed
within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial
or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the
Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion
be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the
remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event,
reckoned from the notice of denial.

The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013,
which was 31 days after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on
December 14, 2012. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five
(3) Belo Medical Group v. Santos, G.R. No. 185894. August 30, except for the most compelling reasons and in no case to exceed
2017 (Rule 45 v. Rule 43; appeal based on pure questions of law fifteen (15) days.
in an intra-corporate dispute);
On the other hand, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court allows for
appeals to the Court of Appeals to raise questions of fact, of law,
FACTS: In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
or a mix of both. Hence, a party assailing a decision or a final order of
Rules of Court, Belo Medical Group, Inc. (Belo Medical Group) assails the
the trial court acting as a special commercial court, purely on questions
Regional Trial Court December 8, 2008 Joint Resolution in Civil Case No.
of law, must raise these issues before the Court of Appeals through a
08-397. This Joint Resolution granted respondent Jose L. Santos'
petition for review. A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC mandates it. Rule 43 allows it.
(Santos) Motion to Dismiss and Belo Medical Group's Complaint for
interpleader and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Relief against
Belo Medical Group argues that since it raises only questions of law, the
Santos and Victoria G. Belo (Belo), and declared all other pending
proper mode of appeal is Rule 45 filed directly to this Court. This is
incidents as moot.
correct assuming there were no rules specific to intra-corporate
disputes. Considering that the controversy was still classified as
The case involves the 25 shares allegedly owned by Santos. Santos was
intra-corporate upon filing of appeal, special rules, over general
denied inspecting the corporate books of the corporation.
ones, must apply.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition filed by Belo Medical Group, Inc.
Based on the policy of judicial economy and for practical considerations,
with the Supreme Court uses the correct mode of appeal.
this Court will not dismiss the case despite the wrong mode of appeal
utilized. For one, it would be taxing in time and resources not just for
RULING: Rule 45 is the wrong mode of appeal.
Belo Medical Group but also for Santos and Belo to dismiss this case and
have them refile their petitions for review before the Court of Appeals.
A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC promulgated by this Court En Banc on
There would be no benefit to any of the parties to dismiss the case
September 14, 2004 laid down the rules on modes of appeal in cases
especially since the issues can already be resolved based n the records
formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission:
before this Court. Also, the Court of Appeals already referred the matter
to this Court when it dismissed Belo's Petition for Review. Remanding
1. All decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim
this case to the Court of Appeals would not only be unprecedented, it
Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of
would further delay its resolution.
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under
Republic Act No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code) shall be
Applying the nature of the controversy test, this is still an intra
appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for
corporate dispute. The Complaint for interpleader seeks a determination
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
of the true owner of the shares of stock registered in Santos' name.
Ultimately, however, the goal is to stop Santos from inspecting
2. The petition for review shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
corporate books. This goal is so apparent that, even if Santos is
from notice of the decision or final order of the Regional Trial
declared the true owner of the shares of stock upon completion of the
Court. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount
interpleader case, Belo Medical Group still seeks his disqualification from
of the legal fee prescribed in Rule 141 as amended before the
inspecting the corporate books based on bad faith. Therefore, the
expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may
controversy shifts from a mere question of ownership over movable
grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days within which to file
property to the exercise of a registered stockholder's proprietary right
the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted
to inspect corporate books.
(4) Global Medical Center of Laguna v. Ross Systems
International Incorporated, G.R. No. 230112. May 11, 2021 RULING: Procedural Departures:
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and
Rule 43 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
FACTS: GMCLI engaged the services of RSII for the construction of its
hospital in Cabuyao, Laguna, in accordance with a Construction
The first procedural law which effectively expanded the reach of judicial
Contract.
review vis-à-vis CIAC arbitral awards is Revised Administrative Circular
No. 1-95,53 issued for the Court by then Chief Justice Andres R.
RSII sent two demand letters to GMCLI, claiming that it still had a
Narvasa on May 16, 1995, which amended Circular No. 1-91 and
balance of P4,884,778.92 to collect from the latter.
prescribed the rules governing appeals to the CA from final orders or
decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies. For
RSII filed a complaint and request for arbitration before the CIAC on
the first time, the CIAC was included in the enumeration of quasi-
August 6, 2015.
judicial agencies, the decisions of which may be appealed to the CA.54
This inclusion is the first clear departure from E.O. 1008's original
On May 10, 2016, the CIAC promulgated its Final Award,29 which ruled
provision that a CIAC arbitral award may only be appealed to this Court.
that:
Further, Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 also substantially
extended judicial review powers in its categorical inclusion of questions
1. The CIAC has jurisdiction over the instant case as it involves a
of fact as those that may be appealed, to wit:
construction dispute.
3. WHERE TO APPEAL. — An appear under these rules may be taken to
2. [GMCLI] is not authorized to withhold and remit the CWT of 2% on
the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein
the cumulative amount based on Progress Billings Nos. 1 to 15.
provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and law. (Emphasis supplied)
3. [RSII] is not entitled to the release of the amount of [P]4,884,778,92
as the balance for Progress Billing No. 15.
This procedural expansion was affirmed by the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, particularly Rule 43 thereof,55 which once
4. [GMCLI] is not entitled to moral damages.
more included the CIAC as among the quasi-judicial agencies the
decisions of which may be appealed to the CA with respect to either
5. No attorney's fees shall be paid by either party to the other.
points of fact, or law, or both.

6. The cost of arbitration shall be shouldered by the Parties in proportion

In retrospect, what may be gleaned is that the enabling of the CA to
to their respective claims.
review questions of fact pertaining to the CIAC awards departed from
E.O. 1008's original design of the relationship between the courts and
the CIAC, when it created the latter. In effect, the authoritative
ISSUE: (1) a revisit and untangling of the relevant laws and case
expertise of the CIAC was undone with these two new procedural
pronouncements on the extent of judicial review of CIAC arbitral
changes because with the CA's power to review the arbitral tribunal's
awards;
factual determinations, the CA then acts as a trial court, before which
factual assertions already threshed out in the CIAC are litigated anew.
(2) a decisive harmonization of the standing laws on CIAC review vis-à-
Needless to say, one may be reasonably hard-pressed to find sound
vis perceptible Constitutional limitations; and finally
basis for a court's exercise of reviewing a specialized tribunal's findings
of fact that are well within its specialized competence and well-outside
the court's.
More so, such a factual review easily runs the peril of being speculative,
as it overly extends the review powers that may invite ridicule upon the
courts, which are forced to venture into industry-specific technical
findings that they are not designed to do.
To be sure, the Court dispels with utmost import any conclusion to the
effect that upholding the CIAC's authoritative expertise on questions of
facts before it necessarily translates to even the slightest implication of
inadequacy of intelligence or inferiority of competence on the part of
appellate judges. This inference is as unintended as it is unsupported by
the succeeding exhaustive discussion of the history and the
constitutional schema within which this particular mode of review is
found.
The Court's iteration of the original limits set upon judicial review of the
CIAC arbitral awards must not be considered impertinence against
appellate judges, lest all rulings that delineate limits be seen as a put-
down of the competence of the jurisdiction they confine. The Court here
simply upholds the persuasive weight of factual findings of the CIAC,
and consequently rules against a factual judicial review that effectively
undermines the CIAC's conclusive and authoritative findings, consistent
with the prevailing laws as outlined.
It further goes without saying that appellate judges are fully equipped
to conduct factual review by evaluating whether or not factual findings
of lower courts or tribunals are supported by evidence. This fact is
affirmed not in the least by the fact that in the event that a factual
review of the CIAC arbitral awards is merited in the narrowest of sense,
the same may be brought before the CA through the appropriate
petition. Demonstratively, therefore, the CA is ultimately not divested of
any review powers that it was not intended to wield, to begin with, but
merely donned with the authority of review of the CIAC arbitral awards
that falls within the original extent of E.O. 1008.
Finally, this factual review of the courts also weighs heavily in costs for
the parties, in that instead of having an abridged resolution of their
disputes, the same is, in fact, lengthened, with resort to the CIAC
becoming no more than an additional layer in the process, and its
resolution of construction disputes no longer the alternative to litigation,
but only the beginning.
It is settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which
have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but
also finality, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In particular, factual findings of construction arbitrators are final
and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal.
Far from being absolute, however, the general rule proscribing against
judicial review of factual matters admits of exceptions, with the standing
litmus test that which pertain to either a challenge on the integrity of
the arbitral tribunal, or otherwise an allegation of a violation of the
Constitution or positive law. The 2019 case of Tondo Medical Center v.
Rante77 illustrates:
Thus, questions on whether the CIAC arbitral tribunals conducted
their affairs in a haphazard and immodest manner that the most
basic integrity of the arbitral process was imperiled are not
insulated from judicial review.
In other words, the scenarios that will trigger a factual review of the
CIAC's arbitral award must fall within either of the following sets of
grounds:
(1) Challenge on the integrity of the arbitral tribunal (i.e., (i) the award
was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (ii) there was
evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or of any of them; (iii)
the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; (iv) one or more of the
arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under Section 9 of R.A.
87679 or "The Arbitration Law", and willfully refrained from disclosing
such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been materially prejudiced; or (v) the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual,
final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was
not made) and;
(2) Allegation of the arbitral tribunal's violation of the Constitution or
positive law.
In addition to the prototypical examples that exceptionally trigger a
factual review of the CIAC's arbitral awards, the Court here discerns the
merit in adding the otherwise forgotten presumption that factual
findings of the CIAC arbitral tribunal may also be revisited by the Court
upon an allegation that the arbitral tribunal committed an act that is
violative of the Constitution or other positive laws. To abate fears, the
delimitation discerned in the Court's power to review factual findings of
the CIAC shall in no way plausibly allow for a situation wherein the
Court's hand is stayed from correcting a blatant constitutional or legal
violation because the autonomy of the arbitral process is paramount.
Contrarily, the Court underscores that the contracted or very limited
grounds for alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CIAC
arbitral tribunal, however narrow, are still principally tethered to the
courts' primary duty of upholding the Constitution and positive laws.
The addition of the second ground makes plain that no amount of
contracting or expanding grounds for grave abuse will ever be permitted
to lay waste to the original purpose of the courts and their mandate to
uphold the rule of law.
ISSUE: Whether the direct appeal of the CIAC awards to this Court was
an effective increase of the Court's appellate jurisdiction which therefore
required the Court's blessing through its advice and concurrence.
Based on the prior discussions, appeal from the CIAC awards may no
longer be filed under Rule 43. This leaves only appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45, which provides:
RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (1a, 2a)
As it stands, Rule 45 contemplates only appeals from final
judgments and orders of lower courts, and does not include
quasi-judicial bodies or agencies. This differs from the former Rule
45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the CA, and
had to be adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from
certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies whenever the purpose
was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law.
In furtherance of the animating basis for the direct appeal of the CIAC
awards to this Court, CIAC awards may reasonably be considered as an
exemption to Rule 45's exclusive contemplation of lower courts. An
interpretation otherwise would create a scenario where a procedural
limitation, which may be hurdled, i.e., jurisdiction may be increased
provided it complies with Section 30, Article VI, operatively prevails over
a substantive intendment to the contrary provided by no less than the
CIAC's very own charter. Given the unique import of the CIAC's design
as a specialized and expedient mode of resolving construction disputes
with persuasive finality, its substantive design must be granted primacy
over procedural rules that, as will be discussed further, place no
insurmountable obstacle before it.