SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Governed by ordinary rules Governed by special rules,

supplemented by special supplemented by ordinary
rules. rules.
Courts of general jurisdiction. Courts of limited jurisdiction.
Atty. Demetrio Custodio REVIEWER By: Francisco Initiated by pleading, and Initiated by petition, parties
C. Banguis Jr. parties respond through an respond through an
answer. opposition.
Laws on pleadings applicable: Laws on pleading generally
GENERAL PROVISIONS
1.filing
PacificofBanking
an vs.answer,
Court of not applicable.
RULE 72. Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules counterclaim, cross-claim,
Appeals 242 SCRA 493
Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. — Rules of third party complaint.
Doctrine: Action is the act by which one sues another in a court
special proceedings are provided for in the following cases:
of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the
(b) Escheat;
act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party,
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special
(d) Trustees;
proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by
(e) Adoption;
one against another, while the latter is but a petition for a
(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
declaration of a status, right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;
to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action.
(h) Habeas corpus;
Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for
(i) Change of name;
an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the fact
(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.
(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of
minor natural children;
Facts:
(l) Constitution of family home;
(m) Declaration of absence and death;  PB was placed under receivership by CB and was
(n) Cancellation of correction of entries in the subsequently placed under liquidation with an appointed
civil registry. liquidator. CB then filed with RTC assistance for the
liquidation then creditors filed their claims after.
Section 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In the  In 1989, the Union filed a complaint in intervention seeking
absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary payment for their salaries etc. which the court granted.
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special  However, in 1991, President Nanagas of PDIC was appointed
proceedings. by CB as liquidator. In this case, he asked for an MR and
Clarification of the order. The judge modified the order but
in effect denied the MR. He then filed a Notice of Appeal and
a Motion to submit Record on Appeal.
ACTION VS. SPECIAL PROCEEDING
 But the respondent judge disallowed the NOA for being filed
RIANO:
Action Special Proceeding late (after 15 days) and said that it has become final and
A formal demand of one’s An application or proceeding executory. Execution granted in favor of Union.
right in a court of justice in to establish the status or right  Other private respondents likewise claimed payment for the
the manner prescribed by of a party, or a particular fact. shares of stocts amounting $2.5M and that they had
the preference. As a result, judge also directed liquidator to pay
court or by the law. them.
It is the method of applying No formal pleadings are  Liquidator moved for MR but denied then he filed for a
legal remedies according to required unless the statute Notice of Appeal. But the judge ordered the same stricken
definite established rules. expressly so provides. off for having been filed without authority of CB and beyond
Where a party-litigant seeks Where his purpose is to seek 15 days. Ordered execution granting SHs or investors claim.
to recover property from the appointment of a
another, his remedy is to file guardian for an insane, his CA 5th Division= Proceeding is SP for the Union so the period for
an action. remedy is a special appeal was 30 days. Hence, it was within and declared valid.
proceeding to establish the CA 14th Division= For the SH/ investor’s claims, court said that
fact or status of insanity liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action. Hence, 15 days only
NOTE: Not limited to cases calling forin Section
mentioned an 1 but and the appeal was filed only on the 23rd day from the day of his
includes cases the purpose of which is to establish the status receipt of the order appealed from.
or right of a party or a particular fact.
Issue: WON a petition for liquidation under Section 29 of RA No.
UP LAW BOC: 265 or Central Bank Act is an SP or OCA. (SPECIAL
Action Special Proceeding PROCEEDINGS.)
To protect or enforce a right To establish a right, status or Held:
or prevent or redress a wrong. particular fact.  Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an
Generally adversarial in Non-adversarial, may involve insolvent corporation should be classified a special
nature, involves two or more only one party. proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does
parties. not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the
prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not
 pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's
wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can
be enforced against any person.
 What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the
corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be able to
file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts
and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a
declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in
another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the
corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right
of creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the
disposition of the corporation's assets.
 Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division,
liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for
interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves
claims on a subject matter against a person who has no
interest therein. This is not the case in a liquidation
proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of the
corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the
benefit of the creditors. He is thus charged with insuring
that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful
claimants and in the order of payment provided by law.
 Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding
for the settlement of state of deceased persons under Rules
73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common
purpose: the determination of all the assets and the payment
of all the debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or
the estate. The Liquidator and the administrator or executor
are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the
claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation
and the estate is not disputed. The court's concern is with
the declaration of creditors and their rights and the
determination of their order of payment.
SC= Decisions appealed from are AFFIRMED.
2. Heirs of Gabatan vs. CA and L.
Pacana 581 SCRA 70
Doctrine: Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who
are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must
take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court
cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as
the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or
right.
Facts:
 Respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of 1.1 ha of
land inherited from her deceased mother. She said that the
said land has not been returned to her mother despite
demands and petitioners took possession of the same since
then.
 Petitioners denied and answered that respondent is not the
rightful owner since she is not the daughter, and the alleged
mther was survived by the siblings. Also said that they’ve
been in actual, physical, open, continuous possession of
property for more than 50 years. Moreover, the persons
mentioned were merely caretakers and husband hence no
interest over the same.
 Subsequently, they amended their answer and alleged that
the disputed land was already covered by an OCT under
them.
RTC= Favored respondent. Declared owner of property and
reconvey the same to her.
CA= Affirmed the RTC. Respondent’s claim of filiation was
sufficiently established during the trial. Also affirmed the DOS in
which Hermogena, mother of respondent, was identified as an
heir. Also, no prescription since it couldn’t ripen into acquisitive
prescription because Teofilo never held the property in the
concept of an owner.
Issue: WON a special proceeding was proper before the action
for conveyance is granted. (YES.)
Held:
 The respondent’s main cause of action in the court a quo is
the recovery of ownership and possession of property. It is
undisputed that the subject property, Lot 3095 C-5, was
owned by the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his lifetime.
Before us are two contending parties, both insisting to be the
legal heir(s) of the decedent.
 In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled
that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, and not in an independent civil action.
 In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes
Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to
the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the
proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing
the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of
an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a
decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary
civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
property.
 However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v.
Portugal-Beltran, where the Court relaxed its rule and
allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title
to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, to wit:
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only
property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the
Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the
circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which
could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish
the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical;
it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the
civil case – subject of the present case, could and had
already in fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case,
there being no compelling reason to still subject
Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a
determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial
court should proceed to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties during the trial and render a
decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-
trial, x x x. (emphasis supplied)
 Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one
parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as
their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more
practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for
the determination of the status of respondent as the sole
heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the
parties to
 Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to
the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the
issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed
jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered
judgment thereon.
SC= Petition is GRANTED.
3. Montaner vs. Sharia District Court, Liling
576 SCRA 746
Doctrine: The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second
argument, that the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court is
an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an
erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a
quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding
before the Shari’a District Court, where the parties were
designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was
denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the
proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters
of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of
the deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the
Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact."
Facts:
 Petitioners (Luisa Kho and children) are the first family of
the deceased Alejandro Montaner Sr. while respondents
(Liling and daughter) are the second family.
 Respondents filed a complaint for partition of the estate of
the decedent and appointment of administrator. Petitioners
filed an Answer with an MTD because Sharia court has no
jurisdiction (Montaner was Roman Catholic), failed to pay
correct docket fees, and filiation was barred by prescription.
Sharia Court= Dismissed respondents complaint for partition.
Montaner Sr was not a Muslim and jurisdiction extends only to
the settlement and distribution if the estate of deceased.
Muslims.
MR= Denied opposition of petitioners and granted MR of Liling
despite lack of notice of hearing. Was deemed cured when
petitioners were notified of the existence of the pleading hence
took cognizance of the motion.
Issue: WON the Sharia Court has jurisdiction over the settlement
of the estate of the deceased and that this was in the nature of
special proceedings cognizable by such court. (YES.)
Held:
 Although private respondents designated the pleading filed
before the Shari’a District Court as a "Complaint" for judicial
partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the
estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional
facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
Muslim, such as the fact of Alejandro Montañ er, Sr.’s death as
well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition
also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs,
so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable
list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very
properties sought to be settled before a probate court.
Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the
intention of the private respondents to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of the decedent. These include the
following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the
decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an
administrator of the said estate.
 We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that
the district court does not have jurisdiction over the case
because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to
dismiss that Montañ er, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a
court over the nature of the action and its subject matter
does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer or
a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend
almost entirely on the defendant or result in having "a case
either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed
by simple stratagem.28 Indeed, the "defense of lack of
jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact does
not render the court to lose or be deprived of its
jurisdiction."
 The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to
dismiss. In the case at bar, the Shari’a District Court is not
deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as
a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim.
The Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and
receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction,
which requires an a priori determination that the deceased
is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District Court
determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the
district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
 This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on
special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased Muslim. In a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the
applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent
and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s
heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to
participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of
the decedent. Here, the respondents seek to establish the
fact of Alejandro Montañ er, Sr.’s death and, subsequently,
for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañ er to be
recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.
 Petitioners’ argument that the prohibition against a
decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil
action applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement
of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil
action which has definite adverse parties, a special
proceeding has no definite adverse party.
 The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding,
respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil
action, in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong" necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are
either the plaintiff or defendant. On the other hand, a special
proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status,
right, or a particular fact," has one definite party, who
petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or
particular fact, but no definite adverse party.
 In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the
decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a
special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the
estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the
estate, pay its liabilities, and to distribute the residual to
those entitled to the same.
SC= Petition DENIED. SDC Orders AFFIRMED.
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS
RULE 73. Venue and Process
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the
decedents is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had
estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
Section 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage.
— When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or
wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered,
and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses
have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of either.
Section 3. Process. — In the exercise of probate jurisdiction,
Courts of First Instance may issue warrants and process
necessary to compel the attendance of witnesses or to carry into
effect theirs orders and judgments, and all other powers granted
them by law. If a person does not perform an order or judgment
rendered by a court in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction, it
may issue a warrant for the apprehension and imprisonment of
such person until he performs such order or judgment, or is
released.
Section 4. Presumption of death. — For purposes of settlement
of his estate, a person shall be presumed dead if absent and
unheard from for the periods fixed in the Civil Code. But if such
person proves to be alive, he shall be entitled to the balance of his
estate after payment of all his debts. The balance may be
recovered by motion in the same proceeding.
JURISDICTION LIMITED TO ADJUDICATION AND
SETTLEMENT OF PROPERTIES OF DECEASED
4. Ramon Ching vs. Rodriguez, Joseph Cheng et al
G.R. No. 192828, November 28, 2011
Doctrine: An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement
of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of
property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. A special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact. It is distinguished from an
ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong. To initiate a special proceeding, a petition
and not a complaint should be filed.
Facts:
 Respondent filed a complaint for disinheritance and
declaration of nullity of the DOS, etc. against petitioners.
They alleged that petitioner killed their father (Antonio) and
that he misrepresented himself when he declared that he
was the son but in fact was only an adopted.
 They prayed that he be disqualified from inheriting, nullify
the TCTs involving 6 parcels of land issued in favor of him,
declare the agreement and waiver null and void for being
illegal, declare null the transfer of the shares of sticks of Po
Wing for being illegally procured through falsification of
signatures, declare null the affidavit of settlement of estate
executed by petitioner, and declare null the DOS over three
parcels sold to Asia Antlantic and Elena Tiu.
 Petitioners filed with RTC an MTD for FS, LP, RJ and
respondents not being real parties. But this was denied.
 Subsequently, respondents filed an Amended Complaint
impleading Metrobank for a certain certificate worth P4M
and be declared rightful owners over the same. RTC
admitted the amended complaint. Then it issued a pre-trial
order.
 Petitioners filed MTD over their amended complaint for lack
of jurisdiction. This is because the suit partakes that of SP
not as an ordinary civil action.
RTC= Denied petitioners MTD. The question of ownership is at
issue hence ordinary civil action is proper. The relief establishing
status of the plaintiffs was nowhere to be found.
CA= Affirmed RTC. Nothing in the said complaint shows that the
action of the private respondents should be threshed out in a
special proceeding, it appearing that their allegations were
substantially for the enforcement of their rights against the
alleged fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon
Ching. The private respondents also instituted the said amended
complaint in order to protect them from the consequence of the
fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching by seeking to disqualify Ramon
Ching from inheriting from Antonio Ching as well as to enjoin
him from disposing or alienating the subject properties,
including the ₱4 Million deposit with Metrobank. MR= Denied.
Issue: WON the RTC and CA erred in dismissing the MTD of
petitioners on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for allegedly
being a special proceeding rather than an ordinary civil action.
(NO.)
Held:
 Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended
Complaint sought, among others, the disinheritance of
Ramon and the release in favor of the respondents of the
CPPA now under Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02-
105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not a
special proceeding pertaining to a settlement court.
 Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected
only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be
specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that
while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended
Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or
any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of
Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the
prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251
does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and
does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited
jurisdiction.
 The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended
Complaint, seeking the release in favor of the respondents of
the CPPA under Metrobank's custody and the nullification of
the instruments subject of the complaint, necessarily require
the determination of the respondents' status as Antonio's
heirs.
 It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was
that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA
which was in Mercedes' possession prior to the execution of
the Agreement and Waiver. The respondents also prayed for
the alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of a
hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's
deposits with Metrobank during the pendency of the case. It
can thus be said that the respondents' prayer relative to the
CPPA was premised on Mercedes' prior possession of and
their alleged collective ownership of the same, and not on
the declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it
also has to be emphasized that the respondents were parties
to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver prayed to be
nullified. Hence, even without the necessity of being
declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the
standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in
the light of their claims that
 there was no consideration for their execution, and that
Ramon exercised undue influence and committed fraud
against them. Consequently, the respondents then claimed
that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonio’s
estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the
authority of the said affidavit, are null and void as well.
Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall
first require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs
is a mere defense which is not determinative of which court
shall properly exercise jurisdiction.
 In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of
the documents subject of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be
achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific
case was instituted to protect the respondents from the
supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon. In the event that the
RTC will find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the
respondents, the only consequence will be the reversion of
the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio.
Civil Case No. 02-105251 was not instituted to conclusively
resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation
and distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper
subject of a special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules
of Court.
 The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the
RTC may not be strategically sound, because a settlement
proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to
recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been
illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC,
in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be
restrained from taking cognizance of respondents'
Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and
the prayers indicated therein are matters which need not be
threshed out in a special proceeding.
SC= Petition DENIED.
5. Natcher vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001
Doctrine: Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance
and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person
such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake
of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the
Rules of Court. Clearly, matters which involve settlement and
distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive
province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction.
Facts:
 Sps. Esguerra owned a 9K sq. meters land. When wife
(Graciana) died, children and husband entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of her esrare in which they divided
the properties. Husband got 8/14 while children, 1/14
shares.
 Subsequently, heirs subdivided among themselves the lands
into several lots. Husband donated the same to children
amounting to 4.8K square meters. He was left with only 447
sq. meteres property.
 Morever, husbands property were further divided into two.
First lot was sold to a third person while the second, he
sought ownership over the same.
 In 1980, husband married petitioner Natcher. During such
marriage, Graciano sold the second lot to his wife and a new
TCT was issued in her favor. Graciano died and left Natcher
and children as heirs.
 Children filed a complaint against Natcher alleging that she
emplied fraud, misrepresentation and forgery when she
acquired the second lot. As such, their legitimes were
impaired.
 Natcher answered that she was legally married and that was
a compulsory heir entitled as well. Also, Graciano has
distributed to respondents their share and that they cannot
anymore claim to his estate.
RTC= Favored petitioners. DOS invalid since no evidence of
separation of property and that under NCC it was an invalid
donation. However, may be an advanced inheritance for being a
compulsory heir.
CA= Reversed and Set Aside RTC Decision. RTC had no
jurisdiction because it is within the Probate Court to decide the
settlement of estate which is seen under special proceedings.
Court should have just ruled the validity of the sale and leave the
resolution in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose.
Issue: WON it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to
decide the settlement of the estate through special proceedings.
(YES.)
Held:
 Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case,
acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to
render an adjudication and resolve the issue of
advancement of the real property in favor of herein
petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to
our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question.
Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of
Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate
court so as to validly pass upon the question of
advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to
his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
 In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of
our pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo13 and Mendoza
vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be
resolved by the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First
Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its
limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a
mere question of procedure. In essence, it is procedural
question involving a mode of practice "which may be
waived".
 Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of
herein private respondents inasmuch as the six children of
the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court,
acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue
of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
 A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and
proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial court
failed to observe established rules of procedure governing
the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This
Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance
of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under
the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum
to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as
other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano
Del Rosario's estate.
SC= Petition Denied. CA AFFIRMED.
6. In Re: In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of
Ruperta Palaganas
G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011
Doctrine: But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills
executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet
been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article
816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is
abroad
produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides,
or according to the formalities observed in his country.
Facts:
 Ruperta, naturalized US citizen died but had a last will and
testament executed in California designating her brother
Sergio as executor for properties left in PH and US.
Respondent Ernesto, another brother, filed with RTC a
petition to probate the said will and for his appointment as
administrator of her estate.
 However, this was opposed by the nephews of Ruperta,
Manuel and Benjamin contenting that it should be probated
in the US where she executed it. Assuming it can, still invalid
for being made under duress and without the testator’s full
understanding. Ernesto is unqualified as well.
 Other siblings visited PH, so Ernesto filed a motion with the
RTC for leave to take their deposition which it granted. RTC
directed parties to submit memorandum on the issue of
whether the will may be probated in PH.
RTC= Admitted Ruperta’s will. Appointed Ernesto and issued
Letters of Special Administration. Appealed with the argument
that unprobated will executed by AM in the US cannot be
probated for the first time in PH.
CA= Affirmed the RTC. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court
does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the
country of its execution, before it can be probated in the
Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from
reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed
abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures.
Issue: WON a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be
probated in PH although it has not been previously probated and
allowed in the country where it was executed. (YES.)
Held:
 In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province
where he has an estate may take cognizance of the
settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further
state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will,
or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any
time after the death of the testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in
his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
 Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance
of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a)
the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences
of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or
decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the
property of the estate;
(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and
(e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of
the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to
the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of
his death in the province where the probate court is sitting,
or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he
left in such province.7The rules do not require proof that
the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in
the country of its execution.
 In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first
probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners
Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure
for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But,
reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated
and allowed in a foreign country is different from that
probate
where the will is presented for the first time before a
competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule
77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance,
since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it
cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate,
the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the
foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the
matter can be established.
 Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically. If
the instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for
the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them
outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no
will shall pass either real or personal property unless the
will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.
 Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing
more than an initial ruling that the court can take cognizance
of the petition for probate of Ruperta’s will and that, in the
meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special
administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present
evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the testator’s
state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance
with the formalities required of wills by the laws of
California. This explains the trial court’s directive for
Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Ruperta’s
will and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and
Probate of Will of California.
SC= Petition DENIED. CA AFFIRMED.
7. Isabel and Douglas Jr. Portugal vs. Leonila Portugal-
Beltran
G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005
Doctrine: The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in
which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a
decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement
is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no
special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of
the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among
other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special
proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but
had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative
heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special
proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-
opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his
declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the
partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or
properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
Facts:
 Jose (father) married Paz in 1942 and Isabel in 1948. Both of
them had children, the former named Dougls Jr and the latter
Leonila Aleli.
 In 1968, the siblings of Portugal executed a Deed of Extra
Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the estate of
their father over a 155 sq. m parcel of land in his favor.
 ROD issued TCT in his favor married to Paz Lazo. Paz died, in
1984 and Portugal in 1985 intestate.
 Issue arose when respondent executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased person the
said parcel of land. New TCT issued in her favor.
 Hence, petitioners filed a complaint alleging that respondent
is not related to the deceased, as such, not entitled to inherit.
She also perjured herself when she made false
representations in her affidavit of adjudication.
RTC= Dismissed the case not based on the issues presented
during pre-trial but for lack of cause of action on the
ground that
petitioner’s status and right as putative heirs had not been
established before a probate court and lack of jurisdiction over
the case citing Yaptinchay case. The case is proper before special
proceedings not in ordinary civil actions like this case. Hence, not
being a probate court, no jurisdiction.
CA= Affirmed RTC. Carino case not applicable in this case because
main issue in that case was validity of marriage while here is the
annulment of title to property. Status in this case have not been
properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceedings.
Issue: WON petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case
for annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of
the TCT issued in her name. (NO.)
Held:
 In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly
that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on
February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication
under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the
general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it
should be judicially administered and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no
will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
 Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of
Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
 It appearing, however, that in the present case the only
property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan
parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of
the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence,
not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as
heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate
with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.
And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the
civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already
in fact presented evidence before the trial court which
assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined
during pre-trial.
 In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there
being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate
to administration proceedings since a determination of
petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case
filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to
evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the
trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant
Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose
Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due
course and can still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim
under the complaint.
SC= Petition GRANTED. CA SET ASIDE.
8. Eduardo Agtarap vs. Sebastian Agtarap et al
G.R. No. 177099, June 8, 2011
Doctrine: The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial
court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend
to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the
proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court
merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. However, this
general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency
and convenience.
Facts:
 Petitioner Eduardo filed with RTC a verified petition for the
judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father
Joaquin.
 He alleged that his father contracted two marriages (Lucia:
Jesus, Milagros and Jose (Joseph grandson) and Caridad:
Eduardo, Sebastian and Mercedes) during his lifetime. At the
time of his death, he left two parcels of land with
improvements in Pasay city.
 Joseph, grandson, had been leasing and improving the same.
He also appropriated the P26K income per month since
1994.
 Petitioner alleged that he should be appointed as special
administrator, take possession and charge of the assets of
the estate and declare him compulsory heir so that he is
entitled of his share.
 Sebastian, petitioner’s brother, admitted the allegations and
conceded but the grandchildren of Joaquin from the first
family opposed the same. They said that said properties
belonged to the conjugal partnership of their deceased mom
Lucia and father Joaquin. Also, the money used for the
extensions and improvements was exclusively from them.
They opposed the appointment because Eduardo not
physically fit, minimal interest and does not possess the
desire to earn. Joseph has the best interest in the properties.
RTC= Appointed Eduardo and issued letters of administration.
Subsequently, after opportunity to be heard, court ordered the
partition of the properties in favor Eduardo. He was able to prove
that the bulk of the estate property were acquired during the
second marriage. He was able to render a true and just
accounting of his administration from his date of assumption.
MR= Favored respondents. Denied Eduardo and Sebastian and
granted Joseph and Teresa. Declared that properties belonged to
conjugal partnership of first family. Directed the modification of
order of partition to reflect correct sharing of the heirs.
CA= Dismissed the appeal. Sebastian and Eduardo had smaller
shares as ordered by the court. MR= Denied.
Issue: WON the determination of ownership of the subject real
properties were within the jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate
court. (YES.)
Held:
 We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant
case considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and
that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the
resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the
determination of whether the subject properties are
conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s jurisdiction
to settle the estate of Joaquin.
 It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his
verified petition for judicial settlement of Joaquin’s estate,
he alleged that the subject properties were owned by
Joaquin and Caridad since the TCTs state that the lots were
registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to
Caridad Garcia. He also admitted in his petition that Joaquin,
prior to contracting marriage with Caridad, contracted a
first marriage with Lucia. Oppositors to the petition, Joseph
and Teresa, however, were able to present proof before the
RTC that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 were derived from a
mother title, TCT No. 5239, dated March 17, 1920, in the
name of FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES Y JOAQUIN AGTARAP,
el primero casado con Emilia Muscat, y
 el Segundo con Lucia Garcia Mendietta (FRANCISCO VICTOR
BARNES y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the first married to Emilia
Muscat, and the second married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta).
When TCT No. 5239 was divided between Francisco Barnes
and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in the name of Joaquin
Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta, was issued for a
parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 745 of the Cadastral
Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral
Record No. 1368, consisting of 8,872 square meters. This
same lot was covered by TCT No. 5577 (32184)22 issued on
April 23, 1937, also in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married
to Lucia Garcia Mendietta.
SC-= Remanded to RTC for further proceedings insofar as the
settlement of the estate of Joaquin is concerned.
TESTATE VS. INTESTATE
9. Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, Lourdes Cuenco
53 SCRA 360
Doctrine: It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not
state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is
first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. The Rule precisely and
deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts." A fair reading of the Rule —
since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and
co- ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom
the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to
the exclusion of all other courts. Conversely, such court, may
upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last
will has been presented in another court where the decedent
obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his
surviving widow and their minor children, and that the
allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the
decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take
cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in
abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before
it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
Facts:
 Senator Cuenco died and was survived by widow petitioner
and children of the first marriage.
 Respondent Lourdes Cuenco, one of the children of the first
marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with
CFI Cebu and alleged that Sen. Cuenco died intestate in
Manila but resided in Cebu at time of his death, that he left
real and personal properties in Cebu and QC. Court ordered
the hearing and that due notice be given to all heirs and
requisite publication be made.
 This order was subjected to three modifications until the
court issued an order stating that it is has not yet acquired
jurisdiction because of the noncompliance of the requisite
publication of the notice and hearing.
 A week after, petitioner Rosa, wife from second marriage,
filed with CFI QC for the probate of the will made by
deceased Sen. Cuenco and issuance of letters of
testamentary being the widow and executrix.
 When she learned of the intestate proceeding in Cebu, she
filed in Cebu an opposition and MTD as well as opposition
for the appointment of administrator. Cebu court issued an
order holding MTD until QC acts on the petition for probate.
 Respondents filed in QC an Opposition and MTD opposing
the probate and assailing jurisdiction in view that Cebu
Court had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over such
proceeding. Hence, this was an improper venue and there
was lack of jurisdiction.
 QC court denied respondents’ MTD on the ground that
testate proceedings precedes intestate. And that his
residence at time of death was at QC. MR denied.
QC Court= Admitted the probate and appointed petitioner
widow as executrix without bond as desired by testator.
CA= Favored respondents and against petitioner. First
proceeding was instituted in Cebu, follows that it excluded QC
where Rosa filed the probation of the will. As such, petitioner
Rosa should assert the same in Cebu. QC is enjoined. MR=
Denied.
Issue: WON CA erred in prohibiting QC from proceeding with the
testate proceedings. (YES.)
Held:
 Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction
in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and
deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could
the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate
petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must
first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and
must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which
the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is
undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the
Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and
coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
 Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the
probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the
estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the
Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of
venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.
 Under the facts of the case and where respondents
submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to
probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be
declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without
jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in
accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition. In
the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take
cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and
deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon
City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to
determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did
leave a last will and testament upon which would depend
the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon
City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect
for both courts — at the behest and with the deference and
consent of the Cebu court
— that Quezon City was the actual residence of the decedent
who died testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja
ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not
serve the practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu
court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as
indicated in the decision under review, to determine for
itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon
City court had already so determined Quezon City as the
actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents
have not seriously questioned this factual finding based on
documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should
likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or
its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow
petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to
institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City. It
would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-
widow, who under all the applicable rules of venue, and
despite the fact that the Cebu
 court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an
intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time
on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where
petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after
the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the
decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary
and is admittedly entitled to preference in the
administration of her husband's estate, 20 would be
compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the
way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for
probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the
intestate proceedings be convertedinto a testate proceeding
— when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate
proceedings, as per the facts of record and as already
affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the
decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile.
 It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one
named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will
and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a
disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law
on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time,
money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu
court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to
take up with the probate court.
 Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the
Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will
to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof,
and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said
order, the said order of probate has long since become final
and cannot be overturned in a special civic action of
prohibition.
SC= CA reversed and prohibition dismissed.
10. Angela Rodriguez vs. Borja, Apolonia et al
17 SCRA 418
Doctrine: The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is
delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed"
plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit
therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its
allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made
after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back
to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of
Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of
Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March
12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Bulacan court is incontestable.
Facts:
 Fr. Rodriguez died in Manila. He purportedly left a will and
this was delivered before clerk of court of Bulacan by
respondents Apolonia and Adelaida.
 Petitioners Angela and Maria filed a petition for leave of
court to allow them to examine the alleged will. Before the
court could act, the same was withdrawn by them.
 Instead petitioners then filed before CFI Rizal a petition for
the settlement of intestate estate of Fr. Rodriquez alleging
that he resides in Paranaque, Rizal and they also prayed that
Maria be appointed as Special Administratix.
 Respondents Apolonia filed a petition for the probate of the
will delivered by them.
 Petitioners contends that since the intestate proceedings
filed before CFI Rizal was filed 8AM while that of the
respondents in CFI Bulacan at 11AM, latter has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.
 Respondents averred that CFI Bulacan acquired jurisidiction
upon delivery of the will and that such takes precedence
over their claims.
CFI= Denied the MTD on the ground that a difference in few
hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the
other. In fact, petitioners already knew about the will and that
this case before the court is just to prevent from exercising its
jurisdiction. MR= Denied.
Issue: WON CFI Bulacan acquired jurisdiction and MTD filed by
petitioners be dismissed. (YES.)
Held:
 We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the
delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on
March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed
until later, because upon the will being deposited the court
could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and
place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding
notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule
76, of the Revised Rules of Court.
 The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is
delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed"
plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere
deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition
for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for
probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is
deemed to relate back to the time when the will was
delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was
submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4,
while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later,
the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan
court is incontestable.
 But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule
77) speaks of a will being delivered to "the Court having
jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not
have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal
province. We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of
residence as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-
1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he retained
throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth
in Parañ aque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the
Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous
decisions, the power to settle decedents' estates is conferred
by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of
the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of
the. Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is
deceased, or that he left personal property in Hagonoy,
province of Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of June 11, 1963,
Annex "H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case
before us.
 The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan
Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that court is
entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express
provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court,
since the same enjoins that:
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1)
 This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have
been asked to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate.
Of them only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule
grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first
invoked, without taking venue into account.
 There are two other reasons that militate against the success
of petitioners. One is that their commencing intestate
proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the
decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith,
patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the
 precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of
priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not
designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into
a race between applicants, with the administration of the
properties as the price for the fleetest.
 The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate
succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate,
since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid
operative will.
SC= Certiorari is DENIED. Petition dismissed.
11. Roberts vs. Leonidas
129 SCRA 33
Doctrine: The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous
that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an
intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned
to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases
Facts:
 Edward Grimm had two families. When he died, he was
survived by the first family (Juanita and Ethel) and second
family, Maxine as surviving wife, and Pete and Linda Grimm,
children.
 He executed two wills in San Francisco California. One
disposed the PH estate which was described as conjugal
properties while the other disposed estate outside PH.
 In both, he favored second wife and children. Children of the
first were given legitimes in the will disposing of the estate
in PH.
 However, the will disposing the estate outside PH, testator
said that he did not make any provision for the children of
the first family for the same has been given in the will with
the estate found in PH.
 Two wills and codicil were presented for probate in 3 rd
District of Utah and Mrs. Roberts were notified.
 Maxine admitted that she received the notice of the intestate
petition filed by Ethel. Months after, 3rd District of Utah
admitted to probate the will and codicil.
 Two weeks later, both parties (Maxine and Ethel) with
knowledge of the intestate proceedings in Manila, entered
into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate.
o Stated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be
designated as personal representatives of OH estate;
Maxine retains ½ share of estate not less than
$1.5M in Utah and Manila; children shall share
equally the Net Distributable Estate
 In the intestate proceeding, it was found out that when the
parties sold the Palawan Project, it turned out that the buyer
was incorporated by Ethel.
 Acting on the project partition, without signature of Maxine,
adjudicated Maxine 4/8 share of PH estate and 1/8 for the
children.
 Maxine filed a petition to annul partition approved by the
intestate court and letters of administration revoked. That
she be appointed as executrix and Ethel ordered to account
for the properties received by them.
 Maxine alleged that they were defrauded by Ethel and that
the compromise in Utah was illegal. Intestate proceeding
was invalid because he died testate.
 Ethel filed MTD but this was denied by Judge Leonidas for
lack of merit. She then filed certiorari before this Court that
the testate proceedings be dismissed.
Issue: WON a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a
partition, approved in an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of
the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its
Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district court). (YES.)
Held:
 We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in
denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.
 A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm
died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838,
Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
 The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara,
74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088,
May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of
a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate
proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge
assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing
the two cases.
 Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality
of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition
unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other
pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who
appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies
of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.
SC= Petition DISMISSED. TRO dissolved.
WHERE ESTATE SETTLED IF RESIDENT OR NON RESIDENT
12. Cayetano vs. Leonides
129 SCRA 522
Doctrine: If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall
be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in
a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.
Facts:
 Adoracion Campos died and left her father petitioner
Hermogenes and respondent sisters as surviving heirs. Since
father was the only compulsory heir, he executed an
Affidavit of Adjudication the entire estate of the deceased
daughter.
 One of the sisters, Nenita Paguia filed a reprobate of the will
of the deceased which was allegedly executed in US and for
appointment as administratix of the estate. She alleged that
deceased probated the will in US and that the original
administrator Dr. Bargaza waived his appointment and that
there is an urgent need to replace him.
 An opposition of the will was filed by petitioner and declared
that it was forgery. Even if it were true, it can’t apply because
it would work injustice and injury to him.
 But nevertheless, father confirmed the veracity of the will
and filed MTD Opposition. An ex parte presentation of
evidence was made.
 Respondent judge probated the will and declared the same
to be valid. The withdrawal was allegedly acknowledged by
petitioner.
 However, in 1979, petitioner filed a petition for relief and
prayed that the order be set aside because the dismissal of
the opposition was secured through fraudulent means. Such
was inserted among the papers which he signed in
connection
 with 2 Deeds of Conditional Sale. The lawyer was not even
his counsel of record in the SP case.
 The judge dismissed his petition for failure to adduce
evidence. Meanwhile, father died and left a will which was
questioned by children and forced heirs. Because such
appointed Polly Cayetano as the executrix of the will. As
such, Cayetano filed a motion to substitute herself in the
instant case which was granted.
 The respondent judge ruled that he had no jurisdiction
because it should be Cavite Court.
Issue: WON the court had jurisdiction. (YES.)
Held: Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion
Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven
that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and
permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America
and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner.
Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a
settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court
to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing
to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et
al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).
SC= Certiorari and prohibition DISMISSED.
13. Garcia Fule vs. Court of
Appeals 74 SCRA 189
Doctrine: In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence,
that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary.
Facts:
 Virgina Fule filed with CFI Laguna a petition for letters of
administration for the property of Amado Garcia who died
intestate. She also moved for her appointment as special
administratix. Judge Malvar granted this.
 An MR was filed by Preciosa Garcia for appointment was
made without jurisdiction since no notice of the petition was
made. As surviving spouse, she had preference in the
appointment.
 Subsequently, Preciosa filed a motion to remove Virginia
because such appointment was obtained through
misrepresentations, had adverse interest and unsuitable.
 Notice of hearing was made then a supplemental petition for
appointment of regular administrator was filed by Virginia
which was opposed by Preciosa since CFI Laguna never was
conferred jurisdiction.
 Judge Malvar issued an order appointing Virginia despite MR
of Preciosa. Then Preciosa moved to dismiss the petition and
that she filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia.
RTC Judge Malvar= Favored petitioner. CA= Reversed. MR=
Denied.
Issue: WON last residence was at QC not Calamba. (YES.)
Held:
 Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and
Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G.
Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for
letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on
April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of
Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving
real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and
in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying
of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or
residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as
"property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in
Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the
contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his
death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before
the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended
petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G.
Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
 On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna.
 A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the
decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in
evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B.
Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11
Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside
from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973
obtained three months before his death; the Marketing
Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12,
1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of
sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated
January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain
parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia;
and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last
place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the
conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia
C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection
to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of
the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is
not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived."
In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to
hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive
her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a
mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her
rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the
enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the
proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
SC= Petition of Virginia Fule denied.
JURISDICTION LIMITED TO ADJUDICATION AND
SETTLEMENT OF PROPERTIES OF DECEASED
14. Uy vs. Dizon-Capulong
221 SCRA 87
Doctrine: Every judge should be cognizant of the basic principle
that when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to
be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some the titles of complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina Cortes,
other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of who
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in
the courts of administration proceedings. The trial court, acting
as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such
contentions, which must be submitted to the trial court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction. The failure of respondent
judge to apply this basic principle indicates a manifest disregard
of well-known legal rules.

Facts:
 A certain Herminia Alvos filed with RTC Valenzuela a
petition for the settlement of the estate of Ambrocio Pingco.
Respondent judge appointed her as special administratix.
 Counsel for Herminia requested to direct ROD of Valenzuela
to freeze any transaction without the signature of Herminia
since there was an alleged sale with late Ambrocio and Jose
and Rizalina Uy which the court granted.
 Counsel filed an urgent motion to cancel the titles under Jose
P. Uy stating that the same was only reguistred in his name
through fraud and signatures forged. Respondent judge
granted the same and reinstatement of titles in the names of
Sps Pingco and Paz Ramirez were issued.
 Jose Uy filed with CA to annul the same and judge be
restrained from proceeding. Meanwhile, titles reverted back
to Sps. ambrocio and Paz Ramirez.
 CA granted motion of Uy and set aside respondent judge’s
order. Also enjoined from further proceedings. A probate
court has no authority to y decide questions of the
ownership of property, real or personal. The only purpose of
the examination . . . is to elicit information or to secure
evidence from the persons suspected of having possession
or knowledge of the property of the deceased, or of having
concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the property
of the deceased. If after such examination there is good
reason for believing that the person so examined has
property in possession belonging to the estate, it is the duty
of the administrator, by ordinary action, to recover the
same. MR= Denied.
 Meanwhile, respondent judge approved project partition
submitted by Herminia. On motion of counsel, judge ordered
that the titles in the name of Ambrocio be adjudicated to
those mentioned in the approved partition.
 The ex parte petition for the approval of the DOS was
granted.
 Meanwhile, SC affirmed CA that annulled and set aside order
of respondent judge.
 Judge disregarded this and still granted the ex parte petition
for approval of the deed of absolute sale of properties.
Despite such, judge again approved another deed.
 Hence this petition by Sps. Jose and Rizalina Uy.

Issue: WON respondent judge erred. (YES.)

Held:
 We are far from persuaded by respondent Judge. The
charges against her are clearly meritorious and supported
by the records. Hence, there is no need in fact for Us to
conduct a formal investigation if only to determine her
culpability as it is well documented. Her orders and those of
the appellate courts display her open defiance of higher
judicial authority.
 In Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88 pending before her sala,
respondent Judge committed the following highly irregular
and questionable acts indicative of gross ignorance of the
law and grave misconduct prejudicial to the public interest,
to wit:
(a) respondent Judge cancelled on mere motion of a party
 were not parties to the case, to the great prejudice of the  However, grandchild of Lino from first family, Leonardo Jr.
latter; (b) respondent Judge issued two (2) orders which filed a motion for the exclusion of the other siblings of his
disregarded the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling
her disputed Order of 7 June 1989; 3 (c) respondent Judge
issued another order authorizing the sale of the other
properties previously titled in the complainant Jose P. Uy;
(d) respondent Judge issued still two (2) more orders
approving deeds of sale even after this Court had already
affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her
Order of 7 June 1989.
 These actuations of respondent Judge clearly stress her
blatant disobedience to the lawful orders of superior courts
and belie any claim that she rendered the erroneous orders
in good faith as would excuse her from administrative
liability.
 The foregoing transgressions of respondent Judge are
further aggravated by her refusal to abide by the Decision
of the Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989
which directed the cancellation of the titles of
complainants. She was in fact specifically enjoined from
proceeding against them, yet, despite this Decision,
respondent Judge skill authorized the subsequent transfer
or alienation to other persons of properties titled in the
name of complainants to the detriment of the latter. This
utter disrespect for the judgment of a higher court
constitutes grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of
the public, the bench and the bar. The absence of a
temporary restraining order or an order from the Court of
Appeals to revert the titles to complainants is not sufficient
justification for respondent Judge to issue subsequent
orders contrary to the appellate court’s proscription.
Certainly, respondent Judge is fully aware that the
necessary consequence of the appellate court’s decision is
to put back the complainants to their former status prior to
the issuance of the annulled order. Consequently, the Order
of 7 June 1989 being void and of no effect, the ownership of
the properties subject of the settlement proceedings
remains vested in complainants and will continue to be so
until declared void in an appropriate proceeding, not in the
intestate proceedings before respondent Judge. Thus, an
order from the appellate court that will revert the titles to
complainants is not necessary as it is already implied from
its decision annulling the questioned cancellation.

SC= Judge Dizon Capulong guilty of gross ignorance and grave

misconduct. Dismissed from the service with forfeiture.

15. Jimenez vs. Court of

Appeals 184 SCRA 367
Doctrine: The provisional character of the inclusion in the
inventory of a contested property was again reiterated in the
following cases: Pio Barreto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals, Junquera vs. Borromeo, Borromeo vs. Canonoy,
Recto vs. de la Rosa. It has also been held that in a special
proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership
is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve
with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal
force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar.

Facts:
 Lino had two families in which for the first (with
Consolacion), he had four children and with the second
(with Genoveva), seven children. In the first marriage, he
acquired 5 parcels of land.
 Lino died and consequently, Genoveva died. One of the
children, Virginia, from the second family filed a petition
before CFI Pangasinan praying to be appointed as
administratrix for the properties of Lino and Genoveva.
This included the children from the first family and the
first wife.
 father for the reason that they have already received their
inheritance and that they are not the children of Genoveva
and Lino.
 Virginia was appointed as administratix of the intestate
estate if Lino and Genoveva, then had inventory in which
she included the five parcels of land in issue. But this was
opposed by the grandchild from the first family since this
was already under his father’s siblings from the first family.
Evidence was presented such as testimonial and
documentary.
 Probate court excluded 5 parcels of land and MR was denied.
CA dismissed the petition of Virginia to include the 5 parcels
of land and the decision became final and executory.
 2 years after, Virginia filed an amended complaint with RTC
to recover the possession or ownership of the land and that
respondents be ordered to render an accounting.
Respondents moved for the dismissal on grounds of
prescription and barred by prior judgment.
 RTC dismissed the case on the ground of res judicata. MR
was denied as well. CA affirmed RTC.
Issue: WON in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the
lower court has jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership and
whether res judicata exists as to bar petitioners’ present action
for recovery of the lands at issue. (NO.)
Held:
 We reverse. Petitioners' present action for recovery of
possession and ownership is appropriately filed because as a
general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of
title provisionally. Since the probate, court's findings are not
conclusive being prima facie, 10 a separate proceeding is
necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels
of land.
 The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction
and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which
result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, can only be settled in a separate action.
 All that the said court could do as regards said properties is
determine whether they should or should not be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then
the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to
an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
 The provisional character of the inclusion in the inventory of
a contested property was again reiterated in the following
cases: Pio Barreto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, Junquera vs. Borromeo, Borromeo vs. Canonoy,
Recto vs. de la Rosa. It has also been held that in a special
proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of
ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court
cannot resolve with finality. 18 This pronouncement no
doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as
in the case at bar.
 Res judicata does not exist because of the difference in the
causes of actions. Specifically in S.P. No. 5346, the action was
for the settlement of the intestate estate of Lino Jimenez and
Genoveva Caolboy while Civil Case No. 16111 was an action
for the recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5)
parcels of land. Moreover, while admittedly, the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V in S.P. No. 5346 had
jurisdiction, the same was merely limited jurisdiction. Any
pronouncement by said court as to title is not conclusive and
could still be attacked in a separate proceeding. Civil Case
No. 16111, on the other hand. was lodged before the
Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII in the
exercise of the court's general jurisdiction. It was, in fact,
such "separate or
ordinary proceedings" contemplated by the rules for a final
determination of the issue of ownership of the disputed
properties. To repeat, since the determination of the
question of title to the subject properties in S.P. 5346 was
merely provisional, petitioners are not barred from
instituting the appropriate action in Civil Case No. 16111.
 Indeed, the grounds relied upon by private respondents in
their motion to dismiss do not appear to be
indubitable.1â wphi1Res judicata has been shown here to be
unavailable and the other grounds of prescription and laches
pleaded by private respondents are seriously disputed. The
allegation in the complaint is that the heirs of Leonardo
Jimenez, Sr. (referring to private respondents,) forcibly
intruded into and took possession of the disputed properties
only in 1978, after the death of Genoveva Caolboy. Since the
action for reconveyance was instituted in 1984, it would
appear that the same has not yet prescribed or otherwise
barred by laches.
 There are a number of factual issues raised by petitioners
before the lower court which cannot be resolved without the
presentation of evidence at a full-blown trial and which
make the grounds for dismissal dubitable. Among others,
the alleged admission made by petitioners' mother in the
deed of sale is vehemently denied, as well as the fact itself of
adjudication, there being no showing that the conjugal
partnership of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson had
been liquidated nor that a judicial or extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of Lino Jimenez was undertaken
whereby such adjudication could have been effected.
 The grounds stated in the motion to dismiss not being
indubitable, the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No.
16111.
SC= CA REVERSED and RTC is directed to proceed case in
dispatch.
16. Pio Barreto vs. Court of Appeals
131 SCRA 606
Doctrine: Final and executory decisions, more so with those
already executed, may no longer be amended except only to
correct errors which are clerical in nature. They become the law
of the case and are immutable and unalterable regardless of any
claim of error or incorrectness. Amendments or alterations which
substantially affect such judgments as well as the entire
proceedings held for that purpose are null and void for lack of
jurisdiction. The reason lies in the fact that public policy dictates
that litigations must be terminated at some definite time and that
the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory
by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.
Facts:
 Respondent Honor Moslares instituted an action for
annulment of sale with damages before RTC of Manila
against the Testate Estate of Nicolai Drepin and petition Pio
Barreto Realty Development Corporation.
 She alleged that the Deed of Sale over 4 parcels executed in
favor of Barreto Realty was null and void for the same was
already sold to him by deceased.
 Both agreed to have a Compromise agreement and this was
approved by the Trial Court. Howver, subsequent
disagreements arose on the question of who bought the
properties first.
 The agreement actually gave the parties options and priority
in acquiring the lot by buying the same ahead of the other.
Moslares claimed that he bough first because he delivered 2
checks in favor of Baretto for 3M and Drepin Estate for
1.35M.
 But petitionder denied receiving the check. Instead it Agreement it was provided that in the event respondent
claimed that it bought the properties ahead by tendering
TRB manager’s check for 1M. But this was also refused by
respondents.
 Baretto filed a motion before the trial court that it complied
with its obligations under the agreement but that the offer
was refused and prayed for execution to compel Moslares.
 Judge Laguio ordered for a writ of execution. The lawyer of
the estate reacted and filed an urgent motion to hold the
execution in abeyance for there was a pending court decision
re ownership of the land in RTC Antipolo. Moslares filed an
MR and Barreto moved to amend the order.
 Judge Laguio ruled on three motions. Denied the two
motions of the Estate and affirmed ex parte motion of
Barreto. Sheriff personally delivered the checks to Moslares
as per order.
 Three years later, Moslares filed a Motion for Execution
alleging that it bought the lots subject of the agreement. He
asked Barreto to execute a deed of conveyance. The previous
tender did not produce the effect since it was not legal
tender.
 Respondent judge granted the motion and ordered Barreto
to execute a deed of conveyance over the subject lots in
favor of Moslares. MR by Barreto was granted and also
declared that the issue of absolute owner has already been
settled and now a closed matter.
 MR for Moslares was again granted so it favored Moslares
invoking interest of justice and equity. Check was not valid
and there was no payment in return. But judge ordered
Moslares certain conditions. These conditions were not met.
 Barreto instead consigned their payment to clerk of court
but judge failed to act on the motion as he was on vacation
leave. Executive judge dela Rosa granted the prayer of
Barreto realty and judge Laguio inhibited.
 But in the end, Judge Laguio favored Moslares and Barreto
filed a petition for certiorari before CA assailing such order.
CA dismissed the petition. MR also denied.

Issue: WON the CA erred in dimissing the certiorari when it

concluded that petitioner did not pursue the fruitful and effective
implementation of the writ. (YES.)

Held:
 It is not disputed, and in fact borne by the records, that
petitioner bought the disputed lots of the Drepin Estate
subject matter of the Compromise Agreement ahead of
Moslares and that the checks issued in payment thereof were
even personally delivered by the Deputy Sheriff of the RTC-
Br. 18, Manila, upon Order of respondent Judge dated 14
June 1990 after tender was refused by Moslares and the
Drepin Estate. Respondent Moslares never raised the
invalidity of the payment through checks either through a
motion for reconsideration or a timely appeal. Hence, with
the complete execution and satisfaction of the Decision
dated 24 July 1986 which approved the Compromise
Agreement, Civil Case No. 84-27008 became closed and
terminated leaving nothing else to be done by the trial court
with respect thereto. As petitioner correctly contended, the
Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that petitioner did
not pursue the fruitful and effective implementation of the
writ of execution in its favor. As already stated petitioner
paid for the lots through the court-sanctioned procedure
outlined above. There was no more need for the Drepin
Estate, owner of the lots, to execute a deed of conveyance in
petitioner's favor because it had already done so on 10
October 1980. In fact the disputed lots were already
registered in petitioner's name under TCT Nos. 50539,
50540 and 50541 as a consequence thereof. That was also
why in the penultimate paragraph of the Compromise
 Moslares bought the lots ahead of petitioner Barretto
Realty the latter, not the Drepin Estate, was to execute the
corresponding deed of conveyance and deliver all the titles
and pertinent papers to respondent Moslares. There was
therefore nothing more to be done by way of fruitful and
effective implementation.
 Clearly then respondent Judge Laguio no longer had any
jurisdiction whatsoever to act on, much less grant, the
motion for execution and supplement thereto filed by
Moslares on 17 September 1993 or more than three (3)
years later, claiming that he had already bought the lots.
The fact that the check paid to him by Barretto Realty was
never encashed should not be invoked against the latter. As
already stated, Moslares never questioned the tender done
three (3) years earlier. Besides, while delivery of a check
produces the effect of payment only when it is encashed,
the rule is otherwise if the debtor was prejudiced by the
creditor's unreasonable delay in presentment. Acceptance
of a check implies an undertaking of due diligence in
presenting it for payment. If no such presentment was
made, the drawer cannot be held liable irrespective of loss
or injury sustained by the payee. Payment will be deemed
effected and the obligation for which the check was given
as conditional payment will be discharged.18
 Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Laguio's Order
dated 8 November 1993 which granted private
respondent's motion for execution thus nullifying the 1990
sale in favor of petitioner after he had in effect approved
such sale in his Order of 14 June 1990 and after such order
had already become final and executory, amounted to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority, a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, for which
reason, all further orders stemming therefrom are also null
and void and without effect.
 The principle of laches does not attach when the judgment
is null and void for want of jurisdiction. The fact that
petitioner invoked par. 3 of the Order of 11 February 1994
praying that its P1,000,000.00 check still in Moslares'
possession be considered sufficient payment of the
disputed lots, could not be cited against it. For one thing,
petitioner from the very start had always consistently
questioned and assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court to
entertain respondent's motion for execution filed three (3)
years after the case had in fact been executed. Secondly
estoppel being an equitable doctrine cannot be invoked to
perpetuate an injustice.

SC= CA REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Conveyance to Moslares

void and Barreto declared absolute owner.

17. Ramos vs. Court of

Appeals 180 SCRA 635
Doctrine: Approval of the probate court of the conditional sale
is not a conclusive determination of the intrinsic or extrinsic
validity of the contract but a mere recognition of the rights of
private respondent as an heir to dispose of her rights and
interests over her inheritance even before partition. Probate
jurisdiction of the former court of first instance or the present
regional trial court relates only to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and probate of wills of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions
of ownership that arise during the proceeding; A separate
action may be the appropriate remedy; Approval of the
conditional sale by the probate court was without prejudice to
the filing of the proper action for consolidation of ownership
and / or reformation of instrument in the proper court within
the prescriptive period. probate court acting as a cadastral
court acts with limited competence and has no jurisdiction
over actions for consolidation of ownership, and
such action must have been filed in the former CFI, now in the
regional trial court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
Facts:
 Respondent Adelaida Ramos borrowed from her brother
Oscar 5K and 9K in conection with her business transaction
involving a recovery of a parcel of land. It was used to
finance the trip to Hawaii. As security, she executed in favor
of her brother 2 deeds of conditional sale of her rights for
the lots registered under the name of their parents.
 She failed to repurchase hence petitioner filed for
consolidation and approval of the conditional sale before CFI
Tarlac acting as cadastral court.
 Probate Court ordered the approval as well as the cadastral
court.
 Respondents remained in possession until petitioner took
possession thereof. Respondent filed with CFI for declaration
of nullity the orders. Ground was that such were mere
mortgages and were vitiated by fraud. This was opposed by
petitioners and said that these were voluntarily executed.
 Court rendered that these were REM and that plaintiffs
ordered to solidarily pay defendants.
 CA affirmed in all respects and MR was denied.
Issue: WON the petition has merit.
(NO.) Held:
 With respect to the orders dated January 22, 1960 and April
18, 1960, issued by the Court below acting as a probate court
and cadastral court, respectively, the same could not
preclude the institution of the case now under review.
 A reading of the order of the probate court will show that it
is merely an approval of the deed of conditional sale dated
May 27, 1959 executed by petitioner Adelaida Ramos in
favor of petitioners. There is nothing in said order providing
for the consolidation of ownership over the lots allegedly
sold to petitioners nor was the issue of the validity of said
contract discussed or resolved therein. "To give approval"
means in its essential and most obvious meaning, to
confirm, ratify, sanction or consent to some act or thing
done by another. The approval of the probate court of the
conditional sale is not a conclusive determination of the
intrinsic or extrinsic validity of the contract but a mere
recognition of the right of private respondent Adelaida
Ramos as an heir, to dispose of her rights and interests over
her inheritance even before partition. As held in Duran, et
al., vs. Duran the approval by the settlement court of the
assignment pendente lite, made by one heir in favor of the
other during the course of the settlement proceedings, is not
deemed final until the estate is closed and said order can
still be vacated, hence the assigning heir remains an
interested person in the proceeding even after said
approval.
 Moreover, the probate jurisdiction of the former court of
first instance or the present regional trial court relates only
to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and
probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment
and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and
trustees. Subject to settled exceptions not present in this
case, the law does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate
court to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceeding. The parties concerned may
choose to bring a separate action as a matter of convenience
in the preparation or presentation of evidence. Obviously,
the approval by the probate court of the conditional sale
was without prejudice to the filing of the proper action for
consolidation of ownership and/or reformation of
instrument in the proper court within the statutory period
of prescription.
 The same jurisdictional flaw obtains in the order of
consolidation issued by the cadastral court. The court of first
instance or the regional trial court, acting as cadastral court,
acts with limited competence. It has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of an action for consolidation of ownership, much
less to issue an order to that effect, such action must have
been filed in the former court of first instance, now in the
regional trial court, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
That remedy, and the procedure therefor, is now governed
by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court as a special civil action
cognizable by the regional trial court in the exercise of
original general jurisdiction.
 Antecedent thereto, Article 1607 of the Civil Code provided
for consolidation as follows:
 In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in
the vendee by virtue of the failure of the vendor to comply
with the provisions of article 1616 shall not be recorded in
the Registry of Property without a judicial order, after the
vendor has been duly heard.
 Hence in Crisologo, et al. vs. Centeno, et al., we ruled that
said Article 1607 contemplates a contentious proceeding
wherein the vendor a retro must be named respondent in
the caption and title of the petition for consolidation of
ownership and duly summoned and heard. An order
granting the vendee's petition for consolidation of
ownership, without the vendor a retro being named as
respondent, summoned and heard, is a patent nullity for
want of jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
latter.
 The questioned order of consolidation issued by the
cadastral court, being void for lack of jurisdiction, is in
contemplation of law non-existent and may be wholly
disregarded. Such judgment may be assailed any time, either
directly or collaterally, by means of a separate action or by
resisting such judgment in any action or proceeding
whenever it is invoked. It is not necessary to take any step
to vacate or avoid a void judgment; it may simply be
ignored.
SC=Petition Denied. CA Affirmed.
18. Pastor vs. Court of Appeals
122 SCRA 885
Doctrine: In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the
issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will.
As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter
which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for
the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the
Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
Facts:
 Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by
their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.)
and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn
Quemada.
 Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an
alleged holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the CFI which
contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in
favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.’s 42%
share in the operation by ATLAS.
 Thereafter, the probate court appointed Quemada as special
administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr. whether or
not covered or affected by the holographic will.
 Consequently, Quemada instituted against Pastor Jr., and his
wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of
estate which included the properties subject of the legacy
which
 were in the names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who
claimed to be the owners in their own rights, and not by
inheritance.
 The probate court issued an order allowing the will to
probate. The order was affirmed by CA and on petition for
review, the SC dismissed the petition and remanded the
same to the probate court after denying reconsideration.
 For two years after remand of the case to the probate court,
all pleadings of both parties remained unacted upon. Not
long after, the probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic
validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia
on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no
hearing was held. Instead, the probate court required the
parties to submit their respective position papers.
 While the reconveyance suit was still pending in another
court, the probate court issued Order of Execution and
Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the
royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the
legacy to Quemada was not inofficious.
 Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was directed to remit directly
to Quemada the 42% royalties due to decedent’s estate, of
which Quemada was authorized to retain 75% for himself as
legatee. Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr. and/or his
assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the
accumulated legacy of Quemada. Being “immediately
executory”, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of
Execution and Garnishment.
 The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof but in the
meantime, the probate court ordered suspension of payment
of all royalties due Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until after
resolution of oppositor’s motion for reconsideration.
Pending motion, Pastor Jr. and his wife filed with the CA a
petition for certiorariand prohibition with a prayer for writ
of preliminary injunction assailing the writ of execution and
garnishment issued by the probate court.
 However, said petition was denied as well as their motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review by
certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue: WON the Probate Order resolved with finality the
questions of ownership and intrinsic validity. (NO.)
Held:
 The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of
execution is the Probate Order allegedly resolved the
question of ownership of the disputed mining properties.
However, nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a
declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the
contrary, it is manifested therein that ownership was not
resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic
validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of
appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and
approved the holographic will “with respect to its extrinsic
validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant
to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.” It
declared that the intestate estate administration aspect
must proceed subject to the outcome of the suit for
reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and
personal properties.
 The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership
of the properties listed in the estate inventory, considering
that the issue of ownership was the very subject of
controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending.
It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders
to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality
the question of ownership of the mining properties and
royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the
dispositive portion
of the said Probate Order directed special administrator to
pay the legacy in dispute.
EXCEPTIONS
19. Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals
202 SCRA 106
Doctrine: We however find that the fifth or last issue to be
meritorious and the same deserves Our careful consideration. In
said issue, herein petitioner maintains that to proceed to execute
the deed of absolute sale without the go-signal of the Probate
Court is to be recreant to his sworn duty as administrator, as well
as to render void his actuations done without the permission of
the Probate Court. This contention is correct and is impressed
with merit. Inasmuch as the owner-seller of the property was
already deceased and there were proceedings in the Probate
Court, it was incumbent for the Probate Court to first give
authorization to the administrator of the estate to deliver titles of
lots which had previously been sold. The decedent after all,
might be considered the alter ego of the Mother Earth Realty
Development Corporation. The private complainant had been
duly instructed by the accused herein to file the proper petition
or motion with the Probate Court for delivery of said title but
said complainant for one reason or another, disregarded said
instructions. If at all anybody should be blamed, it should be
private complainant herself for her failure to obtain the needed
authorization from the court. Indeed, questions of title to any
property apparently still belonging to estate of the deceased may
be passed upon in the Probate Court, with consent of all the
parties, without prejudice to third persons such as the herein
private complainant.
Facts:
 Petitioner Trinidad filed with CFI an action for partition of 4
parcels of land claiming that he was the son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad, whose dad was Patricio, original owner
of the land. Patricion died and left 4 parcels.
 As the son of Inocentes, he claimed partition in equal shares
with the siblings of his father, but they refused. The
defendants alleged that he was not the son of their brother
and that their brother was also single before his birth.
Respondents said that they had not lived with him and that
they’ve been in possession of since the death and never gave
a share in the produce of the land.
CA= Plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that he
was the son of the late Inocentes. Respondents acquired
ownership by acquisitive prescription.
Issue: WON CA committed reversible error.
(YES.) Held:
 Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive
prescription sets in when one of the interested parties
openly and adversely occupies the property without
recognizing the co-ownership, and because private
respondents had been in possession — in the concept of
owners — of the parcels of land in issue since Patricio died
in 1940, they acquired ownership of these parcels.
 The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired
ownership of the property in question by acquisitive
prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the
other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-
ownership.43 Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-
owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so
long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
 In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the
action for partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-
owner, was
 receiving from private respondents his share of the produce  The administrators of the spouses Rafael Valera and
of the land in dispute. Until such time, recognition of the co- Consolacion Sarrosa claim that the fishpond should be
ownership by private respondents was beyond question. returned to the spouses’ estates.
There is no evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of
 The Probate Court presided by Judge Adil held that there has
the co-ownership of petitioner's father Inocentes over the
been an implied trust created, therefore the fishpond should
land. Further, the titles of these pieces of land were still in
be restored to the estate of the spouses pursuant to Arts.
their father's name. Although private respondents had
1453 and 1455 of the Civil Code.
possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not
 Pursuant thereto, he directed the sheriff to enforce
shared with petitioner the produce of the land during the
reconveyance of the fishpond to the estate.
pendency of this case, still, they manifested no repudiation
 The fishpond was leased by the Garin Heirs to Fabiana, who
of the co- ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, the
although willingly surrendered it to the sheriff, later filed a
Court held:
complaint-in-intervention. This was dismissed so he
. . . Corollarily, prescription does not run again private
instituted a separate action for injunction and damages.
respondents with respect to the filing of the action for
 Court of Appeals reversed (fishpond to be returned to Garin
partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription
Heirs and their lessee Fabiana) saying that:
is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the
(1) Probate Court had no jurisdiction;
co- ownership. In the other words, prescription of an action
(2) that the Title of the Garin Heirs is a stronger claim
for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is
that rebuts the presumption that the estate owns the
properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs.
fishpond; and
Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing
(3) that assuming the Probate Court had competence to
Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
resolve ownership, a separate action has to be filed.
 Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription
the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation
Issue: WON Probate Court had authority to order reconveyance of
of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners
the fishpond. (NO.)
(Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore,
an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot
Held:
be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987).
 The CFI (now RTC), acting as Probate Court, exercises but
On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be
limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take
at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless
property involved (Rogue vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
the claimant and all the Other parties having legal interest in
 Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed
the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the
reversible error in holding that petitioner's claim over the
submission of the question to the Probate Court for
land in dispute was time-barred.
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby
prejudiced. This is issue is not a jurisdictional, but
SC= Petition GRANTED. Decision and Resolution RESERVED
procedural, involving a mode of practice which may be
and SET ASIDE. RTC Reinstated.
waived.
 The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the
20. Valera vs. Inserto
application of the exception to the rule. It was at all times
202 SCRA 106
clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance
Doctrine: The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call
was being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it
for the application of the exception to the rule. As already earlier
was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and
stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the
permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being
parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of title
explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary civil action,"
over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue
but merely to determine whether it should or should not be
definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the
included in the inventory. This function of resolving whether
question being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary
or not property should be included in the estate inventory is,
civil action/' but merely to determine whether it should or should
to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's
not be included in the inventory. This function of resolving
competence, although the Court's determination is only
whether or not property should be included in the estate inventory
provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the
is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence,
final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by
although the Court's determination is only provisional in
the parties.
character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action that may be instituted by the parties.  Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question
of title to the fishpond was merely provisional, the fishpond
Facts: cannot be the subject of execution, as against its possessor
who has set up title in himself (or in another) adversely to
 Rafael Valera was granted leasehold rights over an 18
the decedent, and whose right to possess has not been
hectare fishpond in Iloilo by the government to last during
ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These
his lifetime.
considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the
 He transferred it by “fictitious sale” to his daughter Teresa to
Torrens title to the property is not in the decedents' names
support her children with the agreement that when the
but in others.
children finishes schooling, the fishpond will be returned to
 A separate action must be instituted by the administrator to
him.
recover the property.
 Valera and his spouse Consolacion Sarosa and their child
Teresa died.
SC= Decision of the CA AFFIRMED.
 The heirs of Teresa – her husband Jose Garin and their
children bought the fishpond from the government,
acquiring title thereto.
 DEATH (FACT OR PRESUMED) IS JURISDICTIONAL

21. Lorenzo vs. Posadas

G.R. No. L-43082, June 18, 1937
Doctrine: Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, we hold
that a transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the
predecessor's death, notwithstanding the postponement of the
actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary,
and the tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at
that time regardless of its appreciation or depreciation.

Facts:
 Thomas Hanley died, leaving a will and a considerable amount
of real and personal properties. Proceedings for the probate
of his will and the settlement and distribution of his estate
were begun in the CFI of Zamboanga. The will was admitted
to probate.
 The CFI considered it proper for the best interests of the
estate to appoint a trustee to administer the real properties
which, under the will, were to pass to nephew Matthew ten
years after the two executors named in the will was
appointed trustee. Moore acted as trustee until he resigned
and the plaintiff Lorenzo herein was appointed in his stead.
 During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the
defendant Collector of Internal Revenue (Posadas) assessed
against the estate an inheritance tax, together with the
penalties for deliquency in payment. Lorenzo paid said
amount under protest, notifying Posadas at the same time
that unless the amount was promptly refunded suit would be
brought for its recovery. Posadas overruled Lorenzo’s
protest and refused to refund the said amount. Plaintiff went
to court. The CFI dismissed Lorenzo’s complaint and
Posadas’ counterclaim. Both parties appealed to this court.

Issue: When does the inheritance accrue? Should the inheritance

be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the time of
the testator’s death or on its value 10 years later?

Held:
 The tax is upon transmission or the transfer or devolution of
property of a decedent, made effective by his death. It is in
reality an excise or privilege tax imposed on the right to
succeed to, receive, or take property by or under a will or the
intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift to become operative at
or after death. Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, 1922,
the inheritance tax accrued as of the date.
 Based of the value of the estate at the time of the testator’s
death - If death is the generating source from which the
power of the estate to impose inheritance taxes takes its
being and if, upon the death of the decedent, succession
takes place and the right of the estate to tax vests instantly,
the tax should be measured by the value of the estate as it
stood at the time of the decedent's death, regardless of any
subsequent contingency value of any subsequent increase or
decrease in value.
 A transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the
predecessor's death, notwithstanding the postponement of
the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the
beneficiary, and the tax measured by the value of the
property transmitted at that time regardless of its
appreciation or depreciation.