Redefining A Philosophy For World Governance - Tingyang Zhao

Redefining
A Philosophy for
World Governance
Tingyang Zhao
Translated by
Liqing Tao
Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture
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Tingyang Zhao
Redefining A
Philosophy for World
Governance
Translated by Liqing Tao
Tingyang Zhao
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Beijing, China
Translated by
Liqing Tao
College of Staten Island
Staten Island, NY, USA
ISSN 2524-8464 ISSN 2524-8472 (electronic)

Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture
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Preface
I was asked by the Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press to

condense the theory of the Tianxia system into a booklet, so that it can be
published in both Chinese and English for a broader audience. I am very
grateful for this suggestion.
My research on the Tianxia system was first published in two English
essays in 2000, these later being republished respectively in Social Identities
in 2006 and in Diogenes in 2008. A comprehensive exposition of the the-
ory in Chinese appeared in my book Tianxia System in 2005. The concept
of the Tianxia system has since received much attention from scholars and
researchers at home and abroad and has been much critiqued and dis-
cussed. In 2016, I published two more books, The Contemporariness of
Tianxia System and Benefits to this China, in which I made significant theo-
retical advances, modifications and revisions to the concept. These books
benefited from the critiques made by many scholars, to whom I would like
to extend my gratitude once again. This booklet of about 30,000 words
intends to summarize The Contemporariness of Tianxia System and Benefits
to this China and also several ensuing papers. Owing to space limitations,
I have had to leave out a large quantity of material and research detail. In
spite of this, I hope I will outline clearly the fundamental concept of the
Tianxia system and would like to take this opportunity to express my
thanks to my editor Sara Crowley-Vigneau, Yue Li and the translator
Liqing Tao.
ix
x Preface
By way of introduction, I want to make it clear that, though the con-

cept of Tianxia comes from ancient China, the focus here is not on China
but on the extended world.
Beijing, China Tingyang Zhao

November 28, 2017
Praise for Redefining A Philosophy
for World Governance
“One of China’s most original scholars presents here a concept of world order that
commands the attention of all students of global politics.”
—Peter J. Katzenstein, Walter S. Carpenter, Jr. Professor of
International Studies, Cornell University, USA
“In a world torn apart by national, ethnic, and economic conflicts, this revitalization
of ‘All-Under-Heaven’ by renowned Chinese thinker Tingyang Zhao should be a
‘must read’ for all people interested in global politics.”
—Fred Dallmayr, Emeritus Packey J. Dee Professor,
University of Notre Dame, USA
xi
Contents
1 The Concept of Tianxia and Its Story 1

1.1 The Politics that Started with World Order 2
1.2 Tianxia as a Trinity of the Three Worlds 9
2 A World-Pattern State: A Whirlpool Formula of China21

2.1 China as an Epitome of Tianxia22
2.2 Focal Point and Whirlpool25
2.3 One Country, Multiple Systems36
3 The Contemporariness of Tianxia43

3.1 World History Yet to Begin43
3.2 Kantian Peace and Huntington’s Challenge46
3.3 Constructed Externalities49
3.4 The Conditions for a New Tianxia54
3.5 Four Key Concepts for a New Tianxia System58
Index67
xiii
Introduction: The One and the Many
The issue of “the one and the many” is always raised when the natural
world or life itself is contemplated. It is an ontological issue that concerns
the state of existence and the destiny of humanity. In a commonly shared
world, humans have created plural lives. This man-made existence of “the
one and the many” is fraught with conflicts and contradictions. Such is
human destiny; and it is a problem that humans have to resolve
themselves.
The ontological situation of humanity has an explosive origin, analo-
gous to the so-called “Big Bang” that set space and time in motion. The
awakening of human consciousness has opened the door to possibilities,
and hence transformed the single dimension of time into many dimen-
sions. Because of this awakening, humanity has embarked upon a future
that is described by Borges as “the forking paths of time,” which makes a
multitude of histories possible. The point in time when human beings cre-
ate possibilities by transcending inevitability is brought about by their
invention of the magic words of negation.1 When people can say “no” or
1
See Zhao Tingyang: The first philosophical word. In Philosophical Research (Zhexueyanjiu),
Chinese edition, No. 11 of 2016, Beijing. In that paper I argue the word of negation was the
first philosophical word, and that evidence of this comes from logic. Briefly, words of nega-
tion, “no” or “not,” for example, can be found as the basic “gene” of logic, and make all
logical connections meaningful. Logic usually adopts five basic connectives: negation (¬),
conjunction (∨), disjunction (∧), implication (→), bi-implication (↔). If simplified into only
two connectives, none of the acceptable combinations of two connections can dispense with
negation (¬); that is, negation should be one of the two. Furthermore, if we reduce the two
connectives into only one, that is the Sheffer connective, which has two forms: the alternative
xv
xvi INTRODUCTION: THE ONE AND THE MANY
“not,” they rise above inevitability and open up possibilities; that is, they
move beyond the given oneness and usher in the many. This act of cre-
ation marked by words of negation has also given birth to free will, and
subsequently to different minds and souls. These plural possibilities signal
plural futures, imply choices of multiple possible lives and leave behind
plural histories. However, this enriched life has also produced divergent
opinions, opposing beliefs and a choice of conflict or even brutal war. This
is because words of negation bring with them the basic proposition that
“others disagree,” a fundamental issue that underlies all human differ-
ences and conflicts. Although “word of negation” is a linguistic term or a
logic function, it is political in real life. In other words, words of negation
are an ontological invention that have created possibilities of existence and
simultaneously a perpetually unsettled political world.
History has taught us that it has always been hard to resolve the issue
of “the one and the many” in politics. It is almost impossible to have a
perfect system that sets up a common order acceptable to all political par-
ties. For example, the issue of national politics has until now never been
able to evade Plato’s political curse, namely that a national political system
is no more than cyclical alternations between the two extremes of dictator-
ship and democracy. No system that is positioned between these two
extremes can sustain its advantages for long and will eventually decline and
swing to one end or the other. Though Plato did not offer sufficient proof
for this insight, history seems to be on his side as it constantly bears wit-
ness to its validity. Compared with the issue of national politics, world
politics is even more challenging. A country with a long history of unifica-
tion usually carries some collective uniformity, such as in religion, lan-
guage or history, or at least shares some common interests. However, the
world has until now not shown any uniformity or sharability in spirit or
interests. So, today’s world remains a mere geographic space, rather than
being commonly shared, indicating that it is still in an anarchy. In essence,
the world remains in a primitive and natural political state. The introduc-
tion of a world politics that can construct a political world is yet to take
shape. What we have now is only so-called international politics. This is
not the same as world politics, but just a derivative of national politics:
denial (∣, nand, or not-and) or the joint denial (↓, nor, or not-or), it is clear that it is actually
either the unification of the negation (¬) and the conjunction (∨) or the negation (¬) and the
disjunction (∧). The negation is always there.
INTRODUCTION: THE ONE AND THE MANY xvii
strategies for international competition that cater only to national i nterests.

Consequently, international politics still retains its natural primitive nature,
rife with conflicts and hostility. The strategies of international politics,
based on non-cooperative games, are quintessentially hostile to world pol-
itics. Therefore, we need to search for another approach to construct the
political world, a new politics that can transcend hostilities.
The world order has two traditions: imperialism invented by the
Romans and the Tianxia system invented by China. These two are parallel
but different concepts. Although both have “worldness” perspectives,
they are very different in their visions about how to construct a world
order. While both envision a universal world order, the imperial system
seeks to conquer and achieve a dominating rule, while the Tianxia system,
on the other hand, tries to construct a sharable system. We may say that
the Tianxia system aims to create a world system that can become a
benevolent “focal point” for all, to borrow a concept from Thomas
C. Schelling, namely a sharable focal point for all cultures, all peoples and
all religions.
Many historians and political scientists have studied the concept of
empire. In this booklet, I would like to discuss the concept of Tianxia, an
ancient concept that is pregnant with new possibilities that are ready to be
explored. We need to notice that imperialism and hegemonism are failing
rapidly in a globalized and universally technological world. Therefore, we
need another world outlook. In the near future, a technological world
spearheaded by artificial intelligence will come, which may signal an onto-
logical upgrade of the world. This may well be a world remaking, the
beginning of a new epoch for mankind. But clearly this remaking has
enormous risks. I believe that if a new Tianxia system cannot be estab-
lished in order to develop a mechanism to use politics to control techno-
logical risks, then mankind may lose the world while creating a new one.
CHAPTER 1
The Concept of Tianxia and Its Story
Abstract Tianxia is a theory about world politics invented about three

thousand years ago during the Zhou dynasty. It was designed to solve
the issue of a small state governing many large ones, which Zhou found
itself confronted with after a surprise victory. Zhou took the internaliza-
tion approach to solve the issue through the integration of all external
existences into its Tianxia system, a concept that highlights compatibil-
ity and coexistence. Tianxia applied relational, rather than individual,
rationality in solving conflicts between various interests, and thus trans-
formed Zhou politics into a world politics that was all inclusive and
above national calculations. Conceptualized as conflating the three
worlds of geography, socio-psychology and politics, the world of Tianxia
is infinitely expansive, appeals to all people’s expectations and reflects the
“Way of Heaven” in its political institutions. Hence, the Tianxia system,
a system of world politics, enabled Zhou to establish its governance for
about 800 years.
Keywords Tianxia inception • World politics • Trinity world
© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd. 2019 1

T. Zhao, Redefining A Philosophy for World Governance,
Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-5971-2_1
2 T. ZHAO
1.1 The Politics that Started with World Order

Discussing the future involves discussing history, not for the purpose of
learning about historical experiences to learn lessons, as is usually stated,
but in order to understand the genes of civilization so that what has sup-
ported and maximized the evolution of a civilization can be analyzed.
Similar to biological genes and the body, the genes of civilization are its
innate elements. We cannot make a future out of nothing; we need a basis.
In politics, there are at least two starting points for political genes: the
ancient Greek polis that built up the concept of national politics and the
ancient Chinese Tianxia system, the all-under-Heaven system that con-
structed the concept of world politics. Before the advent of politics,
humanity had already had a lengthy history whereby various chiefdoms
ruled. However, ruling is not the same as politics. It is the order of the
mighty, and it falls under natural logic. In other words, it is a natural order
in which a group obeys a mighty leader within but submits to the mightier
without. It does not form a political system that transcends the natural
order, a system that is based on the rational concept of power play and
interest distribution. Confucius says that “to be political is to do the right
things,”1 which means that politics can only be achieved when people
move beyond the irrational rule of might and establish a universal and
effective rational order.
Polis is a miracle. To consider the Greek polis as the beginning of
European politics is not to reject the fact that polis had an earlier origin.
Homer’s epics contain scenes about a political public space, an agora or a
plaza. Relics from early Cretan civilization also bear witness to the agora’s
early existence. But it seems that only the Greek polis ushered in a mature
public sphere in which private and public lives took on their separate and
clearly marked properties and functions. The Tianxia system invented in
ancient China was an even greater miracle in that sense; it created politics
even earlier than the Greek polis. In turn, the Tianxia system invented
during the Zhou dynasty (eleventh century bce–256 bce) had an even
earlier prototype. As legend has it, the system can be traced back to Yao
and Shun (Emperors Yao and Shun) about 4000 years ago or even to
Huang Di (Emperor Huang) about 5000 years ago. But it was probably
just a spiritual view of the ancient sage kings, or an uninstitutionalized
1
Yanyuan chapter in the Analects.
THE CONCEPT OF TIANXIA AND ITS STORY 3
political imagining. According to credible historical records, Tianxia as a

mature political system was invented during the Zhou dynasty more than
3000 years ago. These two political stories, respectively starting in the
polis and the Tianxia system, have developed along their own “forking
paths of time,” as Borges terms it: two different political paths that ran
uncrossed until modern times. With their crossing came the conflict.
Today, the plots of these two stories are intertwined as globalization fuses
the two complementary tales into a possible future.
The Tianxia system in the Zhou dynasty brought forth a political
thinking that began with world issues. But the exact time when this
unusual world view of politics originated is hard to pinpoint. Ancient doc-
uments usually attributed it to the age of sage kings, either the age of Yao,
Shun, Yu and Tang about 4000 years ago, or even further back to the age
of Huang Di about 5000 years ago. Legend has it that in these earlier
times there was already political cooperation among the “ten thousand
states of Tianxia” under the son of Heaven.2 This is an unconfirmed leg-
end, and very likely a projection of the Zhou dynasty’s understanding and
interpretation of preceding dynasties according to its own political ideals.
The age of sage kings was probably still a chiefdom state where tribes pos-
sibly had loosely cooperative relations among themselves, with sage kings
being the most authoritative leaders. Because there was no mature writing
system at that time,3 written laws and official systems could not have
appeared. Wang Guowei’s research shows that even in the Xia and Shang
dynasties, “the relationship between state lords and the son of Heaven was
akin to that between state lords and the covenant leader in later time, not
indicative yet of a superior-subordinate relationship between a king and
his councilors.”4 Evidence of this is that the earliest existing Chinese polit-
ical documents, Shangshu (The Book of History), from about 3000 years
ago, record that in the early Zhou dynasty the lords were still addressing
2
Yiji chapter in Shangshu states: “(The king’s virtue) shines on every place of Tianxia,
reaching all common people in far-away seas and corners, and making masses in ten thousand
states virtuous.” Qi Ce in Zhanguoce (Strategies of the Warring States) states: “In King Yu’s
time of antiquity, there were ten thousand states of Tianxia.”
3
Archeological evidence shows that the earliest mature written language in China that has
been excavated existed about 3500 years ago. So a reasonable estimation of a mature writing
system in China would be no earlier than 4000 years ago.
4
Wang, Guowei (2001), Guan Tang Ji Ling: Yin Zhou Zhi Du Luan [A Collection of Essays
from the Viewing Hall: On Yin Zhou Systems], He Bei Education Press, p. 296.
4 T. ZHAO
each other in equal terms as “Lord of a friendly neighboring state.”5

However, Shangshu also documents that the sage kings appeared to have
acquired some basic ability to coordinate among multiple chiefdoms,
namely “creating compatibility of all states.”6 This included presiding over
consultations on important affairs that called for collaboration among
states, such as flood control, calendar making, season setting and measure-
ment agreements.7 It is probable that communication and cooperation
happened across ethnic groups. Archeological evidence shows that regional
cultures in China at that time carried salient signs of mutual influences.
However, this was still uninstitutionalized cooperation, probably in the
form of ad hoc joint efforts.
Ancient society had a slow and conservative pace of evolution. Hence,
any profound revolution in its system would need extraordinary condi-
tions and opportunities. Therefore, the Tianxia system is a puzzling phe-
nomenon that needs explanation. Ancient tribal societies were limited in
their scope of activity, and their political constructions were usually
restricted. It is hard to imagine what necessitated the construction of such
an all-encompassing world politics.
Let us go back to the historical context to explore the reasons for the
development of the Tianxia system at this time. During the Shang dynasty,
Zhou, semi-agrarian and semi-nomadic,8 was still a small state in the
northwestern region. Yin-Shang had its political center on the Central
Plains and enjoyed advanced agriculture and metallurgy with a population
probably of over a million. So how small was the state of Zhou? According
to historians’ estimates, it had a population above 50,000, and 70,000 at
most.9 The King of Zhou, known for his virtuousness, was appealing as a
leader to some small states. Zhou therefore became a covenant leader.
However, the situation after this victory was quite unstable because of the
massive number of people who were incorporated from the defeated
Shang dynasty, several hostile vassal states closely allied with Shang and
some recalcitrant tribes. The people were restless, and rebellions occurred
5
Mushi and Dahao in Shangshu.
6
Yaodian in Shangshu.
7
Yaodian and Shundian in Shangshu.
8
According to Zhou Benji in Shiji (Records of the Historian) by Sima Qian, the Zhou
started as an agrarian tribe, turned nomadic later and eventually became agrarian again.
9
Xu, Zhuoyun (2001), Xi Zhou Shi [A History of Western Zhou], Sanlian Bookstore Press,
pp. 77–78.
frequently. With various sides needing to be pacified and reassured, the

small state of Zhou that ascended to a leadership position had to grapple
with an unprecedented political situation that occurred against all the
odds: how to allow “the small rules the large” and at the same time “one
rules many.”
Relying on its moral appeal, Zhou was able to form alliances with other
vassal states to conquer Shang. However, though this moral image could
be effective for a short time to allow war mobilization, it was difficult for
this alone to sustain long-term support and loyalty from all vassal states
because morality could not substitute for the power and interests that all
parties desired. Therefore, “the small rules the large” logically eliminated
the possibility of applying a hegemony model. The Zhou regime had only
one choice left; that is, to come up with a governance model that relied on
the appeal of the system rather than military deterrence, replacing military
might with the advantages of the system and hegemonic order with the
benefits of cooperation.
It is clear that from the very beginning the Zhou dynasty was forced to
design a brand-new and complex system. Since Zhou was not able to estab-
lish its rule through hegemony, nor was it able to use its own force to sus-
tain for long its leadership position, Zhou had to come up with a universal
system of long-term cooperation acceptable to all states in order to main-
tain its supreme authority over its myriad vassal states. The key challenge
was overcoming the externalities of those states: thus it should attempt to
turn those external states into internal ones within a shared system, thereby
putting an end to uncontrollable externalities. This meant that Zhou had
to create a world system that would transcend states in order to realize the
internalization of the world, thus utilizing common and cooperative inter-
ests to guarantee its own interests. The success of a world system hinges on
whether it can offer its member states a shared or cooperative interest that
is more attractive than betraying or rejecting the system. In other words,
the benefits of joining the system should be larger than those from not
joining. Otherwise, no one will recognize and support the system. This is
an enormously challenging work of system design, and it calls for great
imagination. It is fair to say that the specifical moment in history that Zhou
encountered actually raised a profound political question. A world order
has become the condition for a state to survive, and the rule of the world
the premise for the rule of a state. In that sense, world politics comes before
the politics of a state. This is in essence an issue of internalizing the world,
namely, an issue of how to make a world of Tianxia.
6 T. ZHAO
At that time, China consisted of many tribal states, allegedly 1000 of

them. Although those states controlled a limited area of land, which when
combined was less than half of China’s current territory, they nonetheless
covered the entire accessible world known to those people. The territory
was much smaller than the world but was perceived to be the world called
Tianxia. The size of territory was not important here. What mattered was
the sense of the world, a political consciousness that took the whole world
into consideration. Tianxia is a complex concept. Logically speaking, it
refers to the whole world. Yet this world is the natural world as well as the
political world, an overlapping convergence of them both. In actuality,
though, such a convergence has yet to be realized. Thus, Tianxia should
be considered a dynamic concept. It will remain a theoretical concept until
the political world converges with the natural world. Although the politi-
cal world created by Zhou covered only a small portion of Tianxia, it
nevertheless offered a sufficient space for an experiment in world politics.
The Tianxia system as invented by the Zhou dynasty can be viewed as
a system of world politics. It defined the political world as a whole in con-
ceptual terms, thus “making a world of Tianxia.”10 The design of the
Tianxia system is generally attributed to the Duke of Zhou, the dynasty’s
first premier. Yet in all likelihood it was a collective creation of a group of
politicians who were headed by the duke. The creation of the Tianxia
system was the first revolution in China’s political history. It also marked
the inception of world politics, rich with political issues of far-reaching
significance that are becoming increasingly important today. Just as the
Greeks put forth such perpetual issues of justice, public domains and
democracy, the Zhou dynasty asked inevitable questions concerning
Tianxia, compatibility and people’s hearts. Most importantly, the Tianxia
system, for the first time in history, turned the natural earth into a political
Tianxia, thereby establishing the fundamental meanings of world
politics.
Although the original intention of the Duke of Zhou in creating the
system of Tianxia was to solve the specific issues of “the small rules the
large” and “one rules the many,” the solution, nonetheless, yielded a
political model that is of universal significance. The Tianxia system has, in
general, demonstrated basic properties that are essential for a shared world
system: (1) the Tianxia system must guarantee that the benefits of joining
10
Ba Yan chapter in Guan Zi.
will outweigh those of staying outside, thus making all states willing to
recognize it and join; (2) the Tianxia system must ensure that all states are
interdependent in interests and that their relationship is mutually benefi-
cial so as to secure a world order with universal safety and lasting peace;
(3) the Tianxia system must be able to develop public interest, shared
interest and public enterprise beneficial for all states, so as to ensure the
system is universally beneficial. In short, the Tianxia system must achieve
the internalization of the world, so that it has no externality.
Given the specific historical conditions, the Duke of Zhou created a
system that included an enfeoffment system, ritual and music system, and
the concept of governance by virtue.
Enfeoffment is a supervisory system in which separate states govern
themselves within an integrated world (which is different from the feudal-
ism in medieval Europe). The Tianxia system is designed as a network
which includes a myriad of subordinate political members, namely its mul-
titude of vassal states that belong to the political body of the world. Among
them, the sovereign power of the political body, or the suzerain of Tianxia,
is responsible for overseeing common safety and order, and protecting
common and shared interests for the whole system. Every vassal state is
independently governed but belongs to the network system. It is interde-
pendent with the suzerain, subject to its supervision but, at the same time,
allowed to play a supervisory role. The most meaningful design in the
enfeoffment system is that the son of Heaven, the highest lord of Earth,
has the sovereignty of the world politically but not its property rights,
because those belong only to Heaven. The son of Heaven, therefore, is
only mandated by Heaven to be its surrogate to govern the world. Once
the son of Heaven loses his virtues, he will no longer be qualified to gov-
ern the world. In that sense, the sovereign power of the son of Heaven is
only the right to use and the right to manage the world. This requires
clarification. The son of Heaven obtains his sovereign power of the world
through the mandate of Heaven, yet the mandate of Heaven needs tan-
gible evidence to support this claim; otherwise, it is an unauthorized self-
promotion. Therefore, Zhou believed that the son of Heaven must be
virtuous to his people, that is bring happiness and fortunes to his people.
Such virtuous accomplishments will serve as the evidence of the mandate
of Heaven. Later, Confucianists further defined the mandate evidence as
reflecting people’s aspiration, or as making people satisfied. In that con-
ceptualization, the son of Heaven becomes a surrogate of people and in
that capacity indirectly becomes the mandate-holder of Heaven. Such
8 T. ZHAO
people-centered Confucian thinking may easily be associated with the

concept of democracy. But being people-centered is not the same as being
democratic, because the former is not based on people’s opinions but on
their interests. People’s opinions may not always be good for people’s
interests because they can misjudge where their interests lie. Therefore,
the aggregation of people’s opinions can result in an erroneous collective
irrational choice, while the professional analysis of people’s interests is
more likely to yield a rational choice.
Ritual and music system builds up a spiritual order, imbuing forms of
life with a spiritual meaning and giving certain ritual forms to all human
conduct, social events and processes, and to material life, so that they are
distinct from instinct or natural behaviors and acquire solemnity and spiri-
tuality, thereby making people reverent to Heaven and Earth, respectful to
others, kind to natural beings and deferential to daily objects and events.
In a word, ritual and music system gives everything dignity, thus making
them “sacred.” It seems that making everything in life sacred through rites
and music can be understood as a religious spirit, but it is definitely not a
transcendental religion because what has been made sacred is not a divine
entity transcending worldly life but worldly life itself. To dignify ordinary
life with the solemnity of rites and music and in turn transform a religious
sentiment into a passion for life used to be a salient tradition of Chinese
culture. As an aside, that tradition has ceased to exist after the repeated
“collapse of rite and decay of music over time,”11 leaving behind only the
legendary reputation of China as a country of rites. Nevertheless, making
life divine through rites and music seems not to have been an original
intention of the Duke of Zhou when he created these rites and music, but
an unforeseen outcome of his actions, since the issue the duke faced was
not religious but political in nature. The rites and music supported the
order of life in the enfeoffment system. Their purpose was to foster univer-
sal harmony in spirit. Rites imbue everything with spirituality, creating
widely shared spiritual experiences. When things have spiritual properties
that can be shared, they rise above the exclusiveness that is innate in mate-
rial interests, thus making harmony rise above competition. As Confucius
said, “rites matter most in generating harmony.”12
Governing by virtue is very likely to be misinterpreted as a doctrine of
ethics. In essence, it is a concept of political economics. Before virtue
evolved into an ethical concept, it was meant to be a concept of fairness in
11
The phrase is usually used to describe the chaotic political and social situations of late
Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. The wording first appeared in Yang Huo
chapter in the Analects.
12
Xue Er chapter in the Analects.
benefit distribution: “good governance depends on virtue, and is meant to

serve people.”13 Governing by virtue means that benefits must be univer-
sally shared and fairly distributed. The purpose of this is to maximize ben-
efits for everyone, not to promote their maximization for a few. The Duke
of Zhou believed that only governing with virtue could legitimize politics;
or figuratively speaking, force cannot go far or last long, but virtues can.
Virtues can be universally practiced throughout the world, reach all peo-
ples, and pass down to thousands of generations. The Duke of Zhou’s
political consciousness discovered a true political concept: rule by force is
not politics, but just a way of ruling; true politics is an art that creates
universal cooperation and coexistence. In that sense, Zhou’s Tianxia sys-
tem is not merely a political experiment, but also an ideal political
concept.
1.2 Tianxia as a Trinity of the Three Worlds

Ancient China divides nature into Heaven and Earth with humans as the
intermediary connecting the two. Heaven, Earth and humans have the
Way in common: the Way is the best of all possible ways to be. To divide
existence into Heaven, Earth and humans is not epistemological but aes-
thetic. Viewed from this perspective, nature is dichotomized into Heaven
and Earth. Earth is the bearer, carrying everything in real life, providing
people with homes and resources for living. It is also where Tianxia is.
Heaven is the coverer, covering everything possible and serving as the
principle and boundary for all. As a bearer, Earth metaphorically implies
maternal nurturing and selfless giving. As a coverer, Heaven metaphori-
cally implies paternal guidance and supervision. Heaven and Earth are
equally great and symmetrical with each other. Therefore when humans
establish the order of Tianxia on Earth, it must be symmetrical with the
order of Heaven. This belief is called “being in accordance with Heaven.”14
It is not a religion, but an imagination of political theology.
Heaven is the largest “one,” which contains the “many.” The Way of
Heaven is capable of including all things. Since the Way of humans is to be
in accordance with it, it must be able to include all facts. Therefore, the
order of Tianxia must be all inclusive in order to be in accordance with
13
Da Yu Mo chapter in Shangshu.
14
Zhong Yong chapter in Liji (Book of Rites).
10 T. ZHAO
Heaven. Since Heaven gives birth to all things, it protects all lives. So a
Heavenly canon of ontology is to let all beings be. The Yi Jing says: “Let
all beings be is Yi.”15 A straightforward meaning of Yi, or to be in becom-
ing, is constantly regenerating and changing. It also simultaneously implies
a meta-interpretation: constantly regenerating and changing is the perma-
nent and unchanging Way. The complete meaning of this well-known
saying is: “The purpose of regeneration and change is to fill all lives with
vitality, and this is the permanent and unchanging Way.” The concept of
“letting all beings be” in Yi Jing is a politically significant one for ontol-
ogy, implying that Tianxia must be a compatible and coexisting world for
all lives, a world with full compatibility and coexistence that allows all
existences to exist and imbues them with vitality. Here is the mapping and
transition from an ontological concept to a political one. Since Tianxia is
a matching existence of Heaven, the Way of Heaven and that of humans
will therefore be symmetrical, which means the concept of ontology and
that of politics will be too. Since Heaven covers the world, Tianxia must
therefore encompass the world; since the Way of Heaven intends to
achieve the compatibility and coexistence of all, Tianxia must also intend
to achieve compatibility and coexistence for all humans. Therefore, the
ontological order of Tianxia must be based on coexistence as its construc-
tive foundation. To create a system of Tianxia is to construct a compatible
Tianxia out of a conflicted and divided world so as to realize the internal-
ization of the world. As long as the world has not yet become Tianxia,
there will be no lasting peace for anyone or for any state, as the following
states: “When Tianxia is in chaos, there will be no peace for a state; when
a state is in chaos, there will be no peace for a family; when a family is in
chaos, there will be no peace for anyone.”16 According to this political
conceptualization, the purpose of politics is to bring order to Tianxia;
that is, to achieve the maximization of compatibility and coexistence. In
this sense, state politics is just a preliminary form of politics, while world
politics is truly the ultimate form of politics.
Tianxia refers both to the world and to something larger than the
world. It is a concept of a world in a trinity structure; that is, a world that
is perceived as having three different layers. This essentially means the
following:
15
Fifth chapter, Volume 1 of Ji Ci Zhuang in Yi Jing (Book of Changes).
16
Yu Da chapter, Volume 13 of Lu Shi Chun Qiu.
1. In a geographical sense, Tianxia refers to all the lands under Heaven,

or the whole physical world.
The earliest mention of Tianxia comes in Shi Jing or the Book of Odes:
“In all of Tianxia, no land belongs to anyone else but the King.”17 Even
though Tianxia means the whole world, the ancient people did not really
know how big the world really is. The “Nine Regions of China” accessible
in ancient times covered a land that had “the East Sea on the left, the Liu
Sha desert on the right, Jiao Zhi Prefecture in the front, and You Du
Prefecture at the back,”18 which is less than half the size of modern China.
Limited by seas and oceans, high mountains and wild deserts, the ancients
had only heard bits and pieces about the remote world. Before the open-
ing of the path to regions in the west during the Han dynasty, China and
the far-away world only traded goods and there were no political exchanges.
Territories beyond those controlled by China were called “four seas”
(referring not to real seas and oceans but to murky and uncharted places).
Four seas also belonged to Tianxia but had not joined the Tianxia sys-
tem. So how large was Tianxia to the ancient people? The Lord of Qi
state once asked Guan Zi about that. The latter replied, “the land runs
28,000 li from east to west, and 26,000 li from north to south.”19 Shan
Hai Jing, the earliest extant work of geography in China, has a similar
description.20 A li in pre-Qin times equaled about 414 meters.21 Based on
that measurement, Tianxia in Guan Zi’s imagination spanned from east
to west about 11,600 km and about 10,800 km from north to south. It
was not of the same magnitude as Earth, but close to that of Asia. For
ancients living more than 2000 years ago, this imagination was quite
impressive. Of course, some ancients also conjured up some out-of-
proportion ideas of Tianxia. For example, Zhou Yan believed that Tianxia
comprised as many as eighty-one Nine Regions, with China being just one
of them.22 This was obviously excessive and was just a fantasy.
17
Poem Bei Shang in Xiao Ya section of Shi Jing (Book of Odes.)
18
Tai Zu Xun chapter of Huai Nan Zi.
19
Di Shu in Guan Zi.
20
Zhongshang Jing chapter in Shan Hai Jing.
21
Zhai, Guanzhu (1996). Zhongguo Gudai Biaozhunhua (Standardizations in Ancient
China). Shanxi People’s Press, p. 80.
22
Volume 74 in Shiji. Zhonghua Book Company, 1982, p. 2344.
12 T. ZHAO
2. In a socio-psychological sense, Tianxia refers to a world that every-

one acknowledges and joins; that is, a psychological world defined
by all people’s hearts.
In the concept of Tianxia, it is more important to have people than to

possess land. “Acquiring Tianxia” is not simply to unify the land under
Heaven, but to win over the universal support of all people in the world.
The ancients believed that possessing the land without winning the
people’s hearts would end up being unable to use the land, and that you
would lose it sooner or later because of people’s resistance. Therefore
Guan Zi says, “To fight for Tianxia, one has to fight for people first.”23
Xun Zi also states that “Acquiring Tianxia does not mean that people take
their land to join the winner, but means the Way of the winner is convinc-
ing enough to win over people and keep them with him.”24 Winning the
hearts of the people is the decisive factor for truly possessing the land.
Therefore, Tianxia does not merely have a geographic existence; it must
also have a psychological and sociological existence.
3. In the sense of political science, Tianxia refers to a political world

defined by a world system.
A world system defines the political integrity of world and world sover-
eignty. In other words, only a world system can give the world a complete
political existence, that is an institutionalized existence. This is primarily
based on the reason of political theology described above; that since
Heaven has a complete and harmonious system, Tianxia must also have a
complete and harmonious system. This is the so-called principle of being
in accordance with Heaven. In addition, there is also a practical reason. If
there is no world system, then Tianxia will remain a chaotic and disinte-
grated place, and there will be no hope of achieving permanent peace. Mo
Zi says to the same effect that “an integrated Tianxia means to bring
about an orderly governance to Tianxia.”25 Therefore, realizing Tianxia
as a world system is the consummate form of Tianxia, indicating a final
actualization of the trinity world with natural, psychological, and political
23
24
Wang Ba chapter in Xun Zi.
25
First half of Shang Tong chapter in Mo Zi.
worlds completely overlapping with one another. The institutionalization

of the world is what Guan Zi refers to as “making a world of Tianxia.”26
We can see that Tianxia is a more profound and richer concept than
“world” in its usual sense. It is a three-in-one world that includes natural,
psychological and political worlds. This overlapping trinity world forms
Tianxia, which is in essence a world of all-inclusiveness,27 meaning the
whole world becomes internalized without anything external; namely a
world that is characterized only by internality without externality. The con-
cept of all-inclusiveness raises a political issue of how to internalize the
world. It is only when all the places in the world have been internalized into
Tianxia, and all cultures have achieved compatibility and coexistence, that
a world can become Tianxia. In Confucius’s view, what an all-inclusive
world pursues is the ideal of “Tianxia as the common good,”28 that is,
Tianxia becomes the common property for all people. Lu Buwei makes
this point explicitly: “Tianxia is not one person’s Tianxia, but all people’s
Tianxia.”29 This means an all-inclusive Tianxia not only needs to realize
the all-inclusiveness of the world, but also the all-inclusiveness of its owner-
ship. In order to explain the reason for the all-inclusiveness of Tianxia, Lu
Buwei offers a fairly exaggerated example, which should have its fictional
prototype in literature. A person in the State of Jing has lost a bow but
refuses to search for it. He justifies his behavior by saying, “It was lost by a
person in Jing, and must have been recovered by another person in Jing.
Why should I bother to search for it?” Confucius comments that it would
be better if the word “Jing” was removed. Lao Zi further comments that it
would be perfect if the word “person” was also removed.30 That person
from Jing considers all people within his state the same; Confucius consid-
ers all peoples in the world the same; and Lao Zi considers all beings the
same. However, all these views are perhaps too idealistic because no system
can eliminate selfishness in human nature. Therefore, I would rather choose
a realistic goal for Tianxia: establishing a Tianxia system that has common
26
27
Lord Yin section in Gongyang Annotated Chunqiu; Chapter 19 of Han Ji in Volume 27
of Sima Guang’s Zizhi Tongjian (Comprehensive mirror to aid in government) also states that:
“as implied by Chunqiu, a king should be all inclusive in order to unify Tianxia.”
28
Li Yun chapter in Li Ji (Book of Rites).
29
Gui Gong chapter of Volume 1 in Lu Shi Chunqiu.
30
Ibid.
14 T. ZHAO
and shared interests, willing to be embraced by all states and all peoples
along with its game rules, or in other words, all states or all peoples will
benefit more from accepting the Tianxia system than from sabotaging it.
That goal is not very ideal but is achievable and realistic.
The intent of the Tianxia system in the Zhou dynasty was to construct a
network system that could cover the whole world. Even viewed from today’s
perspective, the network nature of the Tianxia system is still contemporary,
or even future-oriented. But its hierarchical structure is not in line with
today’s values, and can easily be viewed as a controlling structure.
Specifically speaking, the Tianxia system of the Zhou dynasty had a
suzerain; that is, the special district under the direct governance of the son
of Heaven called the privileged domain of the king. That suzerain was the
center that supervised and managed the world. The secondary political
units were vassal states, including newly established states and states that
had joined, the new states being those that the Zhou royal court had cre-
ated for its own princes, aristocrats and war heroes, and the joined states
being the existing ones that joined the Tianxia system of their own accord.
The tertiary political units were the high-level subordinates within vassal
states who had their own designated lands, owned by clan or family.
Collectively called a system of Tianxia, states and families, these three lay-
ers of political units formed a political network featuring one entity with
separate governances.
Viewed from today’s perspective, the Tianxia system of the Zhou
dynasty had some network characteristics that resemble today’s internet.
First, every local structure replicates the whole structure; that is, every
region (a state or feoff) is a mini yet complete system, just as subsets are to
a general set. Second, the network system has infinite openness.
Conceptually, the Tianxia system is equal to the world, and the concept
of the world can be extended infinitely (according to today’s imagination,
it can even be extended to outer space). Therefore, the Tianxia system can
likewise reach infinity in openness and compatibility. This is very impor-
tant in practice because it can guarantee that the system can accommodate
all peoples even if they have different religions and cultures. Third, the
Tianxia system is characterized by voluntary cooperation. Every state can
choose to be in or out of its own volition. Fourth, the all-inclusive concept
of the Tianxia system determines that the aim of its politics is to turn
enemies into friends, not to distinguish enemies from friends. This means
that even those states that do not want to join are not treated as hostile
states, but simply outside states that can exist on peaceful terms. Fifth,
every state has the potential to become the new core of Tianxia to replace
the old core, akin to acknowledging the possibility of political revolutions.

Yet a revolution needs to gain political legitimacy from the mandate of
Heaven. If the suzerain state is unfair in its behavior, and thus loses the
people’s support, then it can be toppled and replaced. Otherwise, the
change is a rebellion, not a revolution.
The institutional arrangement with regard to the rights and responsibili-
ties of the suzerain state and its vassal states is generally as follows. First, the
son of Heaven, as surrogate, manages the property of the land in Tianxia,
and carves out a central piece of land for his direct control, namely the
suzerain state. Such public and indivisible resources as mountains and rivers
are also under the direct management of the son of Heaven. The rest of the
land is assigned to lords and princes. Second, these lords and princes have
the right to use the assigned land and people, but do not own them; this
ownership is therefore not transferable. Third, the suzerain is in charge of
keeping public order in the whole system, while vassal states have a highly
autonomous level of self-governance. At the same time, though, they are
responsible for sharing the suzerain’s cost of keeping public order. Vassal
states must pay tributes and services to the son of Heaven, at a much lower
rate than taxes. Such tributes mainly comprise the provision of regional
specialties (such as minerals); while services are largely in the form of labor
(for undertaking public projects such as flood control and road construc-
tion) and military services (to suppress rebellions). In addition, the lords
and princes need to report regularly in person to the suzerain court, while
the son of Heaven often tours the vassal states to vet their governing
records in order to see whether rewards or punishments are necessary.
Fourth, the suzerain state has the largest military force among all states,
while vassal states have armies proportional to their respective rank, popu-
lation and land area. The suzerain state has a military force that is obviously
superior but not overwhelmingly so. According to the rule of the system,
the suzerain state has six armies of about 60,000 to 75,000 soldiers,
whereas the largest vassal state has three armies, a medium-sized state two
armies and a small state one army.31 Such proportional distribution of mili-
tary power serves as checks and balances. If the suzerain state loses its legiti-
macy, a revolutionary alliance of several vassal states will be sufficient to
dethrone it. Therefore, the suzerain state will have to observe the constitu-
tion for virtuous governance of the Tianxia system.
31
Xia Officialdom Sima chapter in Zhou Li (Book of Rites of Zhou); 14th Year of Lord Xiang
in Zuo Zhuan.
16 T. ZHAO
More interestingly, with regard to the geographical layout of the

Tianxia system, the Zhou dynasty designed a semi-political and semi-
theological model that uses the family model to structure its Tianxia net-
work, transforming degrees of kinship within a family into those within a
political network. The son of Heaven, residing at the center of Tianxia,
set up his own privileged domain there, namely the “land of thousand Li”
under his direct management. The capital city where the son of Heaven
resides is “the middle kingdom,” namely the capital right in the center of
Tianxia. The area inside the privileged domain of the king is called the
“inner zone,” as opposed to the “outer zones” that are composed of vassal
states. These latter are fanned out in a circular fashion surrounding the
central privileged domain of the king at intervals of 500 li. However, this
was only the ideal situation. In reality, geographical conditions and tradi-
tional spheres of influence prevented such a perfect execution of planned
regularity. Most probably, the designed structure was only realized in
rough approximation. The total number of inner and outer zones was said
to be five,32 or even nine.33 The degrees of political kinship were, at the
same time, captured as hierarchical relations. Established states usually had
higher titles of nobility than joined states, and also had closer relations
with the suzerain state in military, economic and cultural cooperation.34
32
The first half of Zhou Yu in Guo Yu states: “according to the ancient King’s system, the
land within is called Dian Zone, or King’s Land, the first out circle land Hou Zone, or the
Noble Land, the next out circle land Bing Zone, or Guest Land, the third out circle land Yao
Zone, or Outer Tribe Land, and fourth out circle land Huang Zone, or Wilderness Land.”
33
Xia Officialdom Grand Sima chapter in Zhou Li states: “the land of a thousand li is called
the Guo Ji. The land of five hundred li immediately outside is called Hou Ji, the next outland
Dian Ji, the still next Nan Ji, the still next Cai Ji, the still next Wei Ji, the still next Man Ji,
the still next Yi Ji, the still next Zheng Ji, and last Fan Ji.”
34
Yu Gong chapter in Shang Shu states: “the first five hundred li area is Dian Fu or King’s
farming land. On it, those who live within one hundred li area should pay their tax in the
form of whole grain plant as harvested; those within two hundred li area in the form of grain
spikelets with short stems intact only; those within three hundred li area in the form of grain
spikelets without its short stems; those within four hundred li area in the form of rice with
husks; and those within five hundred li in the form of shelled rice. The next five hundred li
area is Hou Fu or nobles’ area, in which the first hundred li area is designated for high min-
isters of the court; the second hundred li area for Nan nobilities; and the rest hundred li area
for nobles and higher officials who head large vassal states. The next five hundred li area is
Sui Fu or land for appeasement: the first three hundred li area, close to the nobles’ area, usu-
ally has used education to nurture people, and the rest two hundred li uses military training
and forces to safe-guard the country. The five hundred li further out is Yao Fu or area for
Remote vassal states in the most exterior outer zones only had a symbolic
relationship with the suzerain, in the form of accepting noble titles and
making annual tributes.
It is obvious that the Tianxia system designed by the Duke of Zhou
was a mix of idealism and rationalism. The system attempted to include all
states in a system of coexistence, optimize the possibility of mutual inter-
ests in setting up various degrees of cooperation and maintaining a peace-
ful relationship as its minimum standard. This was the idea of creating
compatibility of all states. Its basic spirit was creating a world that allowed
maximization of cooperation and minimization of conflicts.
The Zhou dynasty was the longest lasting dynasty in China’s history,
existing for eight hundred years thanks to its Tianxia system. However,
the second four hundred years saw a gradual descent into the chaos of war
with vassal states fighting for dominance; this eventually led to its down-
fall. The main reason for this was that the suzerain state lost its economic
and military superiority to some well-developed and powerful vassal states,
and as a result gradually lost its credibility. In its final days, the Zhou
dynasty was reduced to a mere nominal existence as a spiritual or cultural
center. In 221 bce, the Qin dynasty unified the country through wars,
discontinued the Tianxia system and created a grand unity system of cen-
tralized governance. The rise and fall of the Zhou dynasty teaches us a
valuable lesson: a highly benevolent political system may not be the most
robust one. This means that for any idealism to be sustainable, it must
simultaneously be realistic. By the same token, any realism must also be
idealistic in order to be meaningful.
Our reflections today on the Zhou dynasty’s experiments with the sys-
tem are aimed not at studying history but at drawing attention to the
political methodology left to us by Tianxia system, which is its real signifi-
cance. First and foremost, the concept of Tianxia gave birth to the largest
possible framework for political analysis, pioneering a political instrument
that is able to analyze world issues. All politics, whether world, interna-
tional or national, can be analyzed within this framework. Meanwhile, the
concept of Tianxia views the world as a political entity instead of a mere
physical entity, and thereby gives the world a political significance. This
outer tribes. In the area, the first three hundred li is for Yi ethnic groups, and the rest two
hundred li for the exiled. Another five hundred li out is the land of wilderness where the first
three hundred li is wide nature and the rest two hundred li is for the exiled criminals.”
18 T. ZHAO
means that the world has its own interests that cannot be reduced to
national interests. These world issues can only be understood from a world
perspective and not from a national perspective. This political methodol-
ogy may be summed up in two classic expressions: Guan Zhong captured
it as “to take family as family, village as village, state as state, and Tianxia
as Tianxia,”35 stating explicitly that world governance should be done
with regard to world issues. Lao Zi said: “to use body to observe body,
family to observe family, village to observe village, state to observe state,
and Tianxia to observe Tianxia,”36 highlighting that world issues must be
understood only within a world-level framework.
The concept of Tianxia implies a political ontology that can be called
the ontology of coexistence. This is the ontological foundation on which
the Tianxia system constructs a political order. If a universally shared
order of coexistence cannot be established for the world, then the world
cannot rise above confrontations, conflicts and wars, much less establish a
common life for the whole of mankind. As long as the world is divided and
confrontational, any society in it will have its negative externalities. This is
where politics fails, and the failure of politics will certainly impact human
life in a comprehensive manner. Politics is not merely a political issue; it is
also an ontological issue that has life or death implications for human
beings. The all-inclusiveness concept of Tianxia must be viewed as a tran-
scendental concept for a political world. It interprets an ideal state of the
world as being an integrated entity that has no externalities and transcen-
dentally acknowledges the world as common interests and common
resources for all mankind. At the same time, it transcendentally excludes
an alienating concept of non-compatibility. This gives sufficient reason to
acknowledge diversity in the world and its cooperative and peaceful rela-
tionship, and to reject any unilateral universalism or cultural imperialism.
It is only in this way that a physical world can be changed into a political
world. In this sense, completing the internalization of the world is indeed
the transcendental mission of world politics.
To realize this, cooperative relational rationality has obvious advantages
over competitive individual rationality. However, relational rationality
does not exclude individual rationality. They are not competing alterna-
tives, but two aspects of universal reason, or rather two approaches to
applying universal reason. Relational rationality gives priority to the mini-
35
Mu Ming chapter in Guan Zi.
36
54th chapter in Dao De Jing.
mization of mutual hostility. It excludes any acts of retaliation and then

engages in the further maximization of mutual interests. Therefore, rela-
tional rationality must be used over individual rationality. If relational
rationality can be used to constrain individual rationality, then vicious
competition can be brought under control and the minimization of con-
flicts can be sought, to ensure the maximization of cooperation and in
turn maximum common interests or sharable interests. The purpose of
relational rationality is to create a social order that can always guarantee
larger benefits from cooperation than from competition, and tries to
achieve Confucian Improvement, namely simultaneous improvement in
the interests of all parties. Confucian Improvement is equal to everyone
simultaneously receiving Pareto Improvement, an individual improve-
ment without harming anyone else’s interest, thus giving it the potential
to be the foundation of a stable and credible system.
As an internalized world system, the Tianxia system is fundamentally
different from the dominating hegemonic world system of imperialism.
The classic Liu Tao summarizes the concept of Tianxia as follows:
King Wen asked Jiang Tai Gong: “How can one govern Tianxia?’ Tai Gong
replied: ‘If one’s mind is broad enough to take in the whole Tianxia, then
he can accommodate Tianxia; if one’s trust is expansive enough to reach the
whole Tianxia, then he can constrain Tianxia; if one’s benevolence is vast
enough to touch the whole Tianxia, then he can hold Tianxia with his kind
heart; if one’s benefit-distribution is magnanimous enough to provide for
the whole Tianxia, then he can protect Tianxia; if one’s authority is virtu-
ous enough to cover the whole Tianxia, then he will not lose Tianxia….
Therefore whoever benefits Tianxia, Tianxia will open its door to welcome
him; whoever puts Tianxia at risk, Tianxia will close its door to reject him;
whoever provides Tianxia with prosperity, Tianxia will sing his virtuous
praise; whoever murders people of Tianxia, Tianxia will kill him; whoever
knows Tianxia thoroughly, Tianxia will understand him; whoever impover-
ishes Tianxia, Tianxia will hate him as its sworn enemy; whoever keeps
Tianxia in peace, Tianxia will depend on him; and whoever endangers
Tianxia, Tianxia will avoid him as a disaster. Tianxia is not one person’s
entitlement. Only he who has virtues can preside over it.”37
Even though this comment borders on exaggeration, it nonetheless

captures, to a great extent, the ancients’ idealistic imagining of Tianxia
politics.
37
Shun Qi of Wu Tao in Liu Tao. This is a forged collection of Lord Jiang’s quotations,
probably written during the Warring States period.
CHAPTER 2
A World-Pattern State: A Whirlpool

Formula of China
Abstract China has managed to retain, in spirit, the concept of Tianxia

in its grand unity system since the Qin dynasty. Wars for conquest among
tribes and nations in ancient China were fought for cultural resources
rather than economic or territorial reasons. The cultural resources of the
Central Plains are unrivaled in the spiritual world they have produced and
encapsulated in unique ideographic writings, which have drawn tribes and
nations into a whirlpool of competition for the throne. The constructs of
compatibility and coexistence in the Tianxia concept inherited from the
Zhou dynasty assure a sharable world for all, conquerors and the con-
quered alike. Furthermore, the succession myth, a political theology cre-
ated by the Tianxia concept, became a traditional narrative repeated by all
rulers. As a result, China has developed into a world-patterned country
with various integrated ethnicities and cultures in an ingenious institu-
tional form, that of one country with multiple systems.
Keywords Cultural advantages • Whirlpool formation • One country

with multiple systems

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-5971-2_2
22 T. ZHAO
2.1 China as an Epitome of Tianxia

The intertwining relationship between China and the concept of Tianxia
has presented a challenge to our defining the nature of China as a state. In
response, we need a historical as well as a philosophical analysis, not merely
to shed light on the characterization of China, but also to further our
understanding of multiple applications of the concept of Tianxia in prac-
tice. As stated before, the Tianxia system of the Zhou dynasty was the first
systemic revolution in China. In 221 bce, the Qin dynasty launched a
second revolution, effectively terminating the Tianxia system by building
a China of grand unity instead. This marked a change of direction from
world construction to state construction. The grand unity model that
began during the Qin dynasty was consolidated during the Han dynasty,1
putting an end to the period of China’s world history and ushering in an
era of state history. However, grand unity China still retains the heritage
of the Tianxia concept, transforming the Tianxia spirit into a state spirit,
changing a world structure into a state structure and consequently turning
China into a “world-structured” country. This Tianxia-embedded China
has inherited the all-inclusive compatibility and internality of the concept
of Tianxia, and therefore cannot be force-fitted into such concepts as
nation-state or empire, because the political connotations of both those
concepts do not capture, or simply misrepresent, that of the Tianxia-
embedded China.
There are three consensuses about China: Chinese civilization has not
been interrupted since its known inception, indicating its strong sustain-
ability; Chinese civilization has always comprised multiethnicities and multi-
cultures, indicating its broad spectrum compatibility; and Chinese civilization
has never produced a universal monotheism or a transcendental religion, a
phenomenon that has been interpreted as indicating the Chinese civilization
1
The concept of grand unity comes from the section of the first year of Lord Yin in
Gongyang Zhuan of Chunqiu, stating: “the first year Spring of the King, the first month.
What is the first year? It is the year the King assumes his throne. What is spring? It is the
beginning of a year. Who was the King? It was King Wen. Why should it mention the King
first and then the first month? Because it is the King who puts in place the first month. Why
mention the king putting in place the first month? It is the Grand Unity.” Grand Unity, in its
original form, refers to this unification. However, the unity of calendars implies political
unity. Dong Zhongshu, being the first one to use the grand unity as a political concept, used
to say that “Grand Unity implied in Chunqiu is a constant principle to be followed through-
out the world, and a universally accepted sense from the antiquity up to now” (Chapter 26
of Dong Zhongshu Zhuan in Han Shu). But history does not bear this out because the sys-
tem of Grand Unity was not invented before the Qin dynasty.
A WORLD-PATTERN STATE: A WHIRLPOOL FORMULA OF CHINA 23
to be highly secular and non-religious. These unique characteristics have not

been fully or effectively explained. Therefore, we need to revisit these
accepted consensuses, since they are not answers provided by history, but
questions about historical issues that are yet to be analyzed and explained.
First of all, the reason for Chinese civilization’s continuity and compat-
ibility lies in the source of its momentum. Why is it able to continue with-
out interruption? Why is it compatible across ethnicities and cultures?
Obviously, all this is impossible without there being an irresistible desire
motive to stay in the game and a game structure that has a sustaining
appeal. A tradition exists not simply because it is a tradition. Instead, it
must have some innate force that functions in a stable manner that keeps it
going. By the same token, compatibility of a civilization cannot simply stem
from a moral concept of benevolent tolerance (if morality cannot benefit
people, then they will lose interest in it). There must therefore exist a uni-
versally compatible system that can guarantee the common interests of all.
I intend to show that in ancient China, activities among peoples all over the
country in which they competed for maximum material interests and maxi-
mum spiritual resources generated a whirlpool of force on the Central
Plains. Once the whirlpool took shape and assumed a stable structure, it
developed into an inevitable centripetal force and a self-reinforcing power
that made it difficult for the majority of people involved to disengage from
it. Eventually, an enormous whirlpool formed that came to define the mag-
nitude and the concept of China. The theoretical advantage of the whirl-
pool formula is its ability to explain effectively why the ancient China could
continuously expand its territory into a super-sized country without being
an expansionary empire. The secret of this lies in the fact that its expansion
was not dividends from outward military expansion, but gifts from outside
competitors who were continuously drawn by the centripetal force into the
China whirlpool. The crucial point is that the formation of the China whirl-
pool was, on the one hand, associated with competition for the core posi-
tion, and on the other, closely associated with the universal appeal of the
concept of Tianxia. The Tianxia system of the Zhou dynasty is already
history, but the all-inclusiveness concept in Tianxia is still being applied
effectively by a political system as it resolves fierce conflicts within the
whirlpool to accommodate all peoples, which is a multicultural and multi-
ethnic mode of coexistence. It is a story of transforming Tianxia into a
country. When the Tianxia system ended, its spiritual heritage was infused
into China’s internal structure, resulting subsequently in a multicultural
and multiethnic country with grand unity. In essence, the so-called grand
unity is at one with the structure of Tianxia.
24 T. ZHAO
Since grand unity China encompasses a world structure, its political

intention is to unify all states under its governance, include all peoples in
one family and put Tianxia’s ideals into practice in one country, thereby
defining a political form in which a country, limited in its territory,
expresses the all-inclusiveness concept of Tianxia. Along with it, the spirit
that treats the country as a physical entity and Tianxia as the guiding Way
is established. This is a complex many-in-one political model. How can
the structure of a country be integrated with that of Tianxia? Or, to put
it differently, how can the concept of a country be overlapped with that of
the world? This is a key question to understanding China. For the sake of
facilitating discussion, we need to clarify China’s historical periods. Pre-
Qin, including the Zhou dynasty, belongs to China’s Tianxia period,
which is both China’s history and the world’s history; the grand unity
country system, initiated by Qin Shi Huang, transformed myriads of states
within its reach into one country, thereby epitomizing the Tianxia ideal in
a China concept, meaning that the period from Qin to Qing is ancient
China; after 1911, China attempted to model itself on the European
nation-state concept to set up a modern sovereign country, but it simulta-
neously inherited the tradition of the grand unity country, thus becoming
a sovereign country with grand unity. No matter how complex modern
China is, its Tianxia spirit remains constant, highlighting that the concept
of Tianxia is a stable gene in the country.
Grand unity China is an important case that illustrates a flexible applica-
tion of the concept of Tianxia. Even though the grand unity system
started in the Qin-Han period ended the Tianxia system, and China no
longer attempts to run world-scale Tianxia, the country is nevertheless
run as a condensed version of Tianxia. This is both reliance on a familiar
path and a creative interpretation of the tradition. The double characteris-
tics of nationality and cosmopolitanism destine ancient China to be a non-
confined concept that is perpetually growing, as well as a physical existence
that is always open and changing. Therefore, China is a way to grow
instead of a fixed territory. Its physical magnitude changes, ranging from
the expansive territories of the Han, Tang, Yuan and Qing dynasties, to
the fragmented lands of the Sixteen States, the Southern and Northern
dynasties, the Five Dynasties and Ten States, and the Song, Liao, Jin and
Western Xia periods. Since Qin-Han times, China has seen more divided
times than grand unity of its land. But grand unity has always remained a
political, or even theological, conviction in China. It is an embodied
Tianxia in a country, which therefore contains the sacred gene of being in
accordance with Heaven from the concept of Tianxia.
2.2 Focal Point and Whirlpool

Ancient wars were not wars between nations or religions, but attempts by
regimes to grab Tianxia, the so-called deer-hunting (a metaphor of battles
for the throne) in Tianxia. Since nationalistic and religious motives play
no role, what were the driving forces behind unity and division in ancient
China? And how did those forces come into being? The complexity of
China stems from it being a site where “all peoples from all four corners”2
congregated, thus making Chinese history a collective product by all peo-
ples, a story with multiple intertwining plot lines. Every continuous his-
tory witnesses certain fundamental issues or certain kinds of events that
keep on recurring. What causes similar issues and events to repeat them-
selves? Further, we need to ask what the sustained appeal was that drew
various parties from all corners to the political games of deer-hunting on
the Central Plains.
Historical events have contingencies and creativities and, therefore, tak-
ing on multitudes of forms. But contingencies could not explain the lasting
motive that sustains the continuity of a history. Historicity, as an irresistible
momentum, must have been hidden in the structure of the motive for these
myriad historical stories. And the structure of this internal motive both
defines the game nature of the history and determines the undeterred col-
lective actions that take place repeatedly. Because historicity does not directly
materialize in historical stories but remains hidden in their anti-stories, that
is, existing in the repeatability of the non-repeating events, historicity, there-
fore, can effectively explain the continuity of an existence. When an exis-
tence has had a conscious motive structure, the existence then has possessed
historicity; hence the history has possessed the time, or in other words, time
becomes history. Thus we should focus here on the motive and its modus
operandi that have turned temporal China into Chinese history. If history is
understood as having a preset ultimate objective, then historicity is a mission
according to the Christian view of history; if history is understood as an
ever-evolving process, then historicity is a way of growth by which a being
pursues its permanent existence, which is the Chinese view of history.
The direct motive of living is to obtain resources for living. However,
when people begin to seek stable and reliable long-term existences, what
they are attempting to do is to possess the future in advance; this calls for
political resources, and living begins to enter a state of politics. In other
2
It was used to describe the legendary Huang Di’s successful efforts to gather peoples
from all places to fight winning wars against opponents. It first appeared in the biographic
chapter on Five Kings of Shiji by Sima Qian (145 bce–87 bce?).
26 T. ZHAO
words, living is an economic issue to start with, but in the process of pursu-
ing a credible future that is not to be hijacked by others it changes into a
political issue. The simple economic activity for sustaining living involves
only a relationship between humans and nature, a natural process that is not
yet history, characterized by time only but not yet historicity. Once an inter-
est-based relationship gives rise to the issue of power, the significance of
power is to possess the future, and then a competitive game between humans
begins. In this sense, a history always starts with politics. Power needs to
establish order, so as to turn open accessible resources into exclusive
resources, thus ensuring that a continuous existence becomes a credible
expectation. In this sense, politics is an attempt to set up a certain order in
order to possess the future. When an order attempts to regulate the way that
the future must follow, setting up that order is creating history, and creating
history is to possess the capital to create the future. We can thus understand
Voegelin’s claim that “a historical order comes from an orderly history.”3
If a historical order (which is also a political and/or a theological order
at the same time, these three are usually integrated) becomes a political
resource pursued by all, a game of competition participated in by all will
take shape, and a common history will unfold. When a historical order or a
game of competition becomes the common interest of all peoples, it
becomes a historic and political focal point. This is a game concept from
Thomas C. Schelling, where the focal point refers to a selection made by all
without prior consultation.4 For the present discussion, this concept of
focal point can be borrowed to explain the formation of a common history.
In the case of China, then, what historical order and what type of competi-
tive game have made Chinese history a common history of all peoples?
China’s formative process demonstrates two kinds of normal situations
that are naturally occurring: interactive exchange among regional cultures,
and dissemination of a culture from the center outwards. However, both of
these naturally occurring phenomena are not sufficient to explain the
method of growth in the case of China. On the one hand, interactive
exchange cannot necessarily explain the integrated nature of China, because
exchange among cultures in various regions does not necessarily lead to
integration; each party is also likely to take what it needs and remain inde-
3
Voegelin, Eric. (2010). Order and History, Volume I. Israel and Revelation. Translated by
Huo, Wei’an and Ye, Ying. Nanjing: Yilin Press, p. 19.
4
Schelling, Thomas. (2011). The Strategy of Conflict. Translated by Zhao, Hua et al.
Beijing: Huaxia Press, pp. 48–51.
pendent of others or, as often happens, exchanges can result in hostilities

and consequent isolation. On the other hand, dissemination from the center
outwards is mainly a Western historical model that does not match much the
facts in China. Therefore, this may not be the primary reason for China to
have become integrated. More often than not, it is hard to borrow Western
historical modes to explain Chinese history, because the ways in which these
two histories have grown have been too different. Expansion outward seeks
conquests through military power. Yet the ancient Central Plains area was
the earliest to enter into an agrarian life, in antiquity, and was able to live a
self-sufficient and stable life. It had no need for outward conquests, and was
not superior in its military might. But the Central Plains was a precious place
that everyone was competing for; various ethnic groups from all over to
engage in fierce “deer-hunting” on the Central Plains, resulting in large-
scale racial blending and integration. That is the main historical fact. The
Ban Quan battle and the Zhu Lu battle about 5000 years ago were the earli-
est deer-hunting battles on the Central Plains that were documented by the
ancients, and also milestone events that marked the beginning of the mas-
sive integration in China of diverse peoples. Consequently, the primarily
nomadic and hunting tribes, headed by Huang Di,5 established their domi-
nance when they defeated the agriculture-oriented tribes of Yan and the
primarily fishing and hunting tribes of Ci Long, thereupon beginning to
establish, according to the legend, the earliest order of Tianxia, which
allowed a continuous integration of peoples from different ethnic groups
and in the process defined the concept of the Chinese people (that is the
descendants of Yan-Huang). It can be seen that the earliest concept of the
Chinese people in essence concerned the nomadic, agrarian, fishing, and
hunting ethnic groups that met and integrated on the Central Plains. If the
Huang Di period was really about 5000 years ago as legend has it, a typical
distinctive nomadic or agrarian economy did not seem to exist then. In all
likelihood, the economy then was a mixed type.6
5
Sima Qian, in the biographic chapter on Five Kings of Shiji, states: Huang Di “moved
around freely without a permanent residence, using soldiers as guards for his accompanying
army’s camping site.” It is clear that Huang Di was the head of a nomadic tribe. It also shows
that there were, at least, some nomadic tribes residing in the Yellow River Valley. Huang Di’s
tribe roamed in areas bordering Mongol regions in the north, and was connected in the west
with Shangxi and Shang Gan regions. Therefore, Huang Di’s tribe might either be the latter-
day Bei Di (uncivilized people in the north) or Xi Rong (uncivilized people in the west).
6
In early days, China was sparsely populated by people but had an abundance of animals.
Hence, hunting was a common way of life for peoples from the four corners. The earliest
agricultural and nomadic activities were low in efficiency, and therefore it was impossible for
28 T. ZHAO
A fundamental reason behind the emergence and sustained develop-

ment of a large-scale politics and culture must be a certain irresistible core
appeal, which is why I choose “focal point” to explain China’s develop-
ment. In other words, there must have existed a certain irresistible mag-
netic power that made China a common selection by peoples from all
corners of the world. Here we will analyze a focal point for the political
gaming that existed throughout the ancient Chinese history, that is the
gaming of “deer-hunting in Tianxia” centered on the Central Plains. The
structured force that sustained the game was in the form of a whirlpool
with a powerful centripetal force. For several thousand years, multitudes
of tribes from all over, unable to resist the temptation of interests in the
whirlpool center, joined voluntarily and tirelessly in the deer-hunting
games, competing for the throne of China. All this expanded the size of
the gaming whirlpool, strengthened its centripetal power and eventually
stabilized and formed a vast China shaped by the China whirlpool. This
China whirlpool is the core issue that we need to analyze and explain.
Politics generally pursues wealth. However, that argument alone is not
sufficient to characterize China’s special context. Situated in the middle
region of the Yellow River valley, the ancient Central Plains seem to have
enjoyed a comparative overall advantage in material civilization, did not
have an overwhelming superiority and was not the most advanced in every
technology. Archeological evidence shows that early China from northern
areas of Inner Mongolia and Liao Ning to the southern region of the
Yangtze River valley has a high concentration of birthplaces of many civiliza-
tions. They all had their own resources, almost equivalent yet distinctively
specialized technological capacities, apparently comparable standards of
material life and similar population sizes. Why were they not content to stay
divided on their separate territories, wanting instead to compete in deer-
hunting on the Central Plains? If the Central Plains had a relative advantage
in material wealth, then at most this can explain why the area would be
targeted for pillaging, but not sufficient to explain why it became a place
where everyone wanted to settle down permanently, worthy to be competed
this to become a sustainable way of life. High efficiency agricultural life must rely on ox-
plowing, which started in the Spring and Autumn period: we know that Lord Wu Ling of
Zhao only realized the advantage of nomadic riding and archery in the Warring States period.
See Xu, Zhongshu. (2015). Gu Qiwuzhong de Gudai Wenhua Zhidu (Ancient Cultural
Systems in the Ancient Utensils). The Commercial Press, pp. 1–124, 374–380.
for by various powers with unyielding persistence in spite of the dangers

they faced. No matter what, wars are always the greatest risk and gamble
with life and death. From a rational perspective, if the Central Plains did not
offer an irresistible and enormous temptation, it would be impossible to
explain why it became a region that various powers had to compete for.
What, then, are the unique and quality resources that the Central Plains
have that the other regions did not and had to take over as their own?
Material wealth and position as a transportation hub are significant, but they
are not irreplaceable or decisive factors. Therefore, we need to go beyond
material conditions to explore other possible options. It can be found that
temptations stronger than material ones can only come from the spiritual
world, which has a magic power. In contrast to the consumable material
world, the spiritual world increases in value and its gains are infinite. In
other words, the more a spiritual world is used and shared by an increasing
number of people, the more added cultural values and irresistible political
magic it will have; it will consequently attract more souls, resulting in an
infinite cycle of more added value through more use. Therefore, we have
reason to believe that the special attraction of the ancient Central Plains
must have been its having a spiritual world that enjoyed the maximum
added value politically, a spiritual world that was universally open so that all
peoples could utilize it to construct and expand their political power. Thus
it was the largest must-win political resource. The universal appeal and shar-
ability of the spiritual world of the ancient Central Plains are based on the
following factors, and this is not necessarily an exhaustive list:
1. Chinese characters. The Central Plains was the earliest area to

develop a mature writing system. Around 4000 years ago, it began
to develop a data system that could record and store a massive
amount of information, or a written medium that could carry com-
plex thoughts and rich narratives. As a result, the Central Plains was
the first to have the ability to construct a spiritual world.
It is worth noting that Chinese characters are ideographic in
nature, so they are not direct signs indicating language sounds. This
means that the sounds of the Central Plains’ language cannot monop-
olize Chinese characters. Instead, Chinese characters can be a medium
of information that is commonly sharable independent of the sounds
of the Central Plains’ language. Therefore, Chinese writing is quintes-
sentially an open and commonly shared resource, available to other
peoples who use different languages, thus making the spiritual world
30 T. ZHAO
in Chinese writing a common spiritual resource. In history, many

nomadic tribes succeeded in conquering the Central Plains to become
a Chinese dynasty. They had their own languages but not their own
writing. In spite of some tribes’ inventions of their own writing sys-
tems, they were no match for the informational and expressive capa-
bility of the Chinese writing system, and eventually those peoples all
adopted Chinese writing as their main instrument for knowledge pro-
duction. Owing to their ability to exist and be understood indepen-
dently from pronunciation as an ideographic writing, Chinese
characters can be naturally shared far and wide, thus becoming the
common script for many ethnic groups; and the spiritual world in
Chinese writing also becomes a common spiritual world for all.
When Chinese characters turn time into the beginning of history,
they also come into possession of the starting point of Chinese his-
tory and its historical path, creating thereupon a reliance on the path
to the spiritual world. Sharing this spiritual world means to share the
starting point and the path of history, and the continued sharing of
this spiritual world, which is shared by more and more peoples, will
be able to reach further and gain more power politically. Therefore,
sharing the spiritual world of the Central Plains is the most benefi-
cial political option for self-advancement. It is in this sense that the
spiritual world and the knowledge production system in Chinese
writing became an irreplaceable and quality resource for the Central
Plains. This invisible resource is more important than its central
location and material resources, because it is a power with unlimited
potentials instead of being a finite resource. Therefore, the funda-
mental force that drives the Chinese whirlpool comes from the need
for ethnic groups to fight over the right to share the spiritual world
and its knowledge system, which was originally invented on the
Central Plains; or in other words, to fight for the right to interpret
the end products of knowledge and the right to have the authorita-
tive interpretation of history.
2. Although a universal written language is a necessary resource for
establishing large-scale politics, it is not sufficient to guarantee turn-
ing enemies into friends so as to construct a shared world. To turn
enemies into friends is a political ability, which needs to be operation-
alized into universally compatible concepts and systems. This shows
that the Tianxia system created by the Zhou dynasty is another deci-
sive factor in forming the Chinese whirlpool. The concept of Tianxia
implies maximum compatibility, with nobody’s participation being

rejected, and promises by default a political game open to everyone.
That is why it becomes a political resource that is equally attractive to
and equally usable for everyone. Although the concept of Tianxia is
a unique innovation created by the culture of the Central Plains, its
non-exclusiveness has a universal significance, and it can therefore be
accepted as a commonly shared political and theological resource. As
a reflection of Heaven, Tianxia must replicate symbolically the order
of Heaven. As Heaven is shared by all, so should Tianxia have
boundless inclusiveness and compatibility. The potential capacity of
Tianxia is almost infinite, capable of accommodating all outside cul-
tures, or at least capable of living in peace with any culture. That may
explain why subsequent dynasties continued to use the concept with-
out abandoning it. That may also explain why those ethnic groups
that successively reigned over the Central Plains (Xianbei, Qidan,
Nüzhen, Mongolia, Manchu minority) all willingly accepted the
concept of Tianxia and used it to justify their political legitimacy.
3. The snowball effect of political theology. Almost all the victors in
the deer-hunting competition, in an attempt to maintain lawful use
and stable possession of superior spiritual and material resources,
have rationally selected the succession myth of Tianxia created by
the Zhou dynasty to explain their own triumphant stories, adding
their own dynasties as another chapter in the long political succes-
sion narratives that began with Huang Di. They use this myth to
justify their politics, and also to make their rules universally accept-
able. This is a most cost-effective strategy for achieving political
legitimacy and yielding the highest returns at the same time. It is
hard to imagine the winners of the deer-hunting game rejecting
such a political theology. After being constantly enriched by subse-
quent stories, this historical line turns into a commonly trusted
political myth, becoming not only an irresistible spiritual resource,
but also simultaneously preventing the restarting of any brand-new
historical narratives, because rejecting a deeply rooted historical the-
ology to create another historical myth is just too costly, too diffi-
cult, too hard to be accepted universally and almost certainly
doomed to fail for lack of plausibility. Therefore, to side with the
existing and authentic historical line is undoubtedly the optimal
political choice.
32 T. ZHAO
There may be other reasons, but these decisive factors are sufficient to
give rise to the Chinese whirlpool formula. The effect of a whirlpool lies in
its constant centripetal force. History shows that at the beginning some
political forces, in their fight for quality resources, participated willingly in
the deer-hunting competitions on the Central Plains, which produced the
initial whirlpool. As more political forces became involved, the whirlpool
grew in volume and size, spiritual resources and political theological sig-
nificance accruing continuously, thus further strengthening its centripetal
effect. It is this whirlpool effect from the constant deer-hunting games in
Tianxia that created China and its whirlpool method of growth. The
openness of the whirlpool gaming—thanks to the concept of Tianxia—
determined that China is a concept that is continuously and even endlessly
growing; a concept that continuously approaches the magnitude of
Tianxia. It also means that Tianxia belongs more and more to the world,
not merely to early China.
It can be said that China is a methodology, not a limited concept. This
is because China has been a practitioner of the concept of Tianxia, and
Tianxia is a limitless and open concept. According to the imagination of
ancient China, China was at the center of Tianxia. The earliest “China”
was on the Luoyang Plain, and later expanded to cover areas from Xi’an,
the southern Shaanxi, to Luoyang, or the place called the Central Plains.
This location is so centrally positioned and connected with its neighboring
regions on all sides that it gives the impression of being a geographical
center. When the Zhou dynasty established the Tianxia system that
included all other states, China resided in the center and became the suzer-
ain state. This spatial change simultaneously led to the evolution of the
concept of China. The original meaning of the character “Guo” (state)
refers to a capital city, its ideographic components indicating that it is a
city’s walled-in land guarded by weapons. A state’s land does not merely
cover the capital city, but also its suburbs and bordering wilderness. The
suburbs refer to the neighboring areas around the capital city, including
various small cities and country townships; while the wilderness covers all
the expansive agricultural land beyond the suburbs. China is the capital city
of the suzerain of Tianxia, namely the capital of the dynasty. King Chen of
Zhou proclaimed the construction of a new capital: “I set up my home at
China (the center of the state).” That “China” was in Luoyang. Thereafter,
the concept of China evolved from the suzerain capital to the whole suzer-
ain state (the privileged domain of the king), and then in about the Spring
and Autumn period, China was used to refer to the Central Plains area,
encompassing myriad vassal states that shared the culture of music and rites
of the Tianxia system. The vassal states included those in the current
Henan, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Shandong and Hebei in the Yellow River Valley,
to be distinguished from the culturally primitive areas in the south and in
the far north of the Gobi desert. This indicates that China, in addition to
its geographic sense, acquired a cultural connotation. When the primitive
states in the Yangtze River Valley (such as the states of Jin, Chu, Wu and
Yue) evolved into cultures similar to that of the Central Plains, and their
military became powerful enough to compete for dominance on the
Central Plains, the concept of China further expanded to the Yangtze River
Valley. By the same token, when the ethnic groups in the far north, north-
west and southwest became increasingly involved in the deer-hunting
games on the Central Plains, the concept of China expanded accordingly,
and once even expanded to areas much vaster than contemporary China:
moving west over Cong Mountain Ridge, going east bordering Japanese
Sea, advancing north to include Siberia and spreading south to the South
China Sea. The concept of China, with Tianxia as its ideal, has an unlim-
ited ability to extend, in theory, and its magnitude is decided by that of the
whirlpool.
The pull-in effect of the whirlpool has also made Chinese culture diverse
and integrated. The way in which China’s integrated culture takes its shape
is called recomposition, similar to genetic recombination. Yet recomposi-
tion is not a one-sided change but an interactive process involving multiple
parties. It is, therefore, different from a one way religious conversion, but
is a collective reconstruction of a common order of existence by many cul-
tures. The flexibility of the recomposition has made the concept of China
take on certain “biological” characteristics. Borrowing Taleb’s term, it is
“antifragile” by being responsive to changes and adaptable to new circum-
stances.7 The outcome of recomposition is an enriched and commonly
shared culture, among which various cultures are so infused that they are
no longer traceable individually. For example, the standard sounds of
China’s common language have undergone constant mixing with those of
many other ethnic groups, and subsequently none of the regional lan-
guages today can claim to be the standard voice of the ancient China; even
today’s Putonghua sounds have many phonological elements from the
Manchu nationality’s language. Other aspects of culture follow a similar
7
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. (2012). Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder. Hong
Kong: Random House, p. 3.
34 T. ZHAO
trend.8 Obviously, compatibility and flexibility of recomposition should be

attributed to the concept of Tianxia. Only this all-inclusive theory can
reasonably explain the open and interactive recomposition of the culture.
In addition, recomposition also has an innovative function that infuses new
life into foreign cultures. For example, Buddhism came from ancient India,
and has all but disappeared in India today, whereas China has become the
largest Buddhist region; and Marxism has suffered defeat in many countries
but still dominates as the main school of thought in China. More interest-
ingly, Western philosophy has become a staple of the curriculum in depart-
ments of philosophy at Chinese universities, being much more extensively
offered than even Chinese philosophy. Obviously, the continuous applica-
tion of recomposition has made China more and more a “world.”
In the interactive recomposition process by various ethnic groups and
various cultures in ancient China, the culture of the Central Plains remains
a main resource. That is a fact. As discussed before, the culture of the
Central Plains has a more mature and comprehensive institutional struc-
ture as well as a knowledge production system. Therefore, in terms of poli-
tics and social management, it is an existing cultural resource with
maximum efficiency, and as such becomes a primary and rational choice
for any tribal group that rules the Central Plains. Although the nomadic
ethnic groups entering the Central Plains usually kept their own original
cultures, owing to their lack of highly mature systems of knowledge pro-
duction and social management as found in the Central Plains (sizable
collections of comprehensive documents and books, an equally impressive
educational system, academic system and bureaucratic management sys-
tem), they all chose rationally to embrace the highly advanced existing
cultural resources of the Central Plains, and quickly became the sharer,
promoter and creator of Central Plains culture. In other words, peoples
from all ethnic groups are coinventors, rather than mere receivers, of the
culture of the Central Plains. For example, the Imperial Civil Examination
System, considered an important invention by the Chinese culture, was
actually created by Emperor Wen of the Sui Dynasty, a descent of Xianbei
8
For example, today’s so-called “traditional costumes” are in fact those of the Manchu
nationality’s style, and “traditional music instruments” are actually imported from the west-
ern regions. The representative songs of every nationality have also become the classical
songs shared by all ethnic groups. So goes every other aspect of a culture.
nationality; and the same system was brought to its mature form by Taizong
of the Tang dynasty, also of Xianbei extraction. The nomadic dynasties that
ruled the Central Plains were by no means less enthusiastic than the Han
peoples’ dynasties in promoting Confucianism: the official titles bestowed
on Confucius by them are, at least, parallel in number to those bestowed by
the Han dynasties. For example, the Tang dynasty (Xianbei) titled Confucius
posthumously as king; Xi Xia (Dangxiang, a branch of Tibetans) posthu-
mously crowned Confucius as emperor; the Yuan dynasty (Mongolia) con-
ferred the posthumous title of king on Confucius; and the Qing dynasty
(Manchu) posthumously accorded Confucius Teacher of Ancestors. A
more significant example comes from the Yuan dynasty’s authorization of
the Neo-Confucianism of the Song dynasty as standard answers in the
Imperial Civil Examinations, whereas no such high status was ever given to
it in the Song dynasty when it came into being.9 The Yuan’s Grand Capital
constructed by Kublai Khan (designed by Bingzhong Liu) is, among the
capital cities of all China’s dynasties, the closest to the ideal capital city
stipulated in Zhou Li. That is to say, it follows the construction principle
that the capital city should have “nine latitudinal roads and nine longitudi-
nal roads, the front section for official congregations and the back section
for markets, the left side for the ancestral temple, and the right side for the
temple of the Earth gods.” Even the capital cities of Han and Tang are far
less stringent than Yuan Grand Capital in following these construction
regulations.10 It is clear that the original land of a culture cannot monopo-
lize the rights regarding its interpretation and creation, and a culture once
shared becomes a common resource.
In short, China has always been the result of interactive recomposition
and co-construction by multiple ethnic groups and multiple cultures. It is
not complete assimilation to Han, nor rejection and alienation among dif-
ferent cultures. It is a recreation through gene reconfiguration. In infused
Chinese culture, the spiritual world expressed in the medium of Chinese
writing has further enhanced its richness and profundity, and has always
played a major role. Even when the northern ethnic groups (particularly
Mongolia and Manchu) ruled the Central Plains, the culture of the Central
Plains was still the chief cultural resource. The fundamental reason for this
is, as we discussed before, that the embedded Chinese historical line is where
9
Yao, Dali. (2011). Meng Yuan Zhidu Yu Zhengzhi Wenhua (Meng Yuan Systems and
Political Culture). Beijing: Beijing University Press, p. 270.
10
Xu, Pingfang. (2015). Zhongguo Chengshi Gaoguxue Lunji (A Collection of Essays on the
Archeological Studies of Chinese Cities). Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Press, p. 81.
36 T. ZHAO
the northern ethnic groups find their maximum interests. Therefore their
choices are necessitated by their interests. Whether the Yuan dynasty or the
Qing dynasty, their political legitimacy can always find justifications in
Chinese thought, at least in the tradition of Tianxia. As a Tianxia-patterned
country, a multicultural and multiethnic China is neither a theoretical chal-
lenge nor a practical problem.
2.3 One Country, Multiple Systems

Since the China whirlpool continues to draw in many ethnic groups, it is
certain to lead to the coexistence of multiethnicities and multicultures.
Coexistence is a result of rational choice by all involved. Otherwise, there
will be no peace for all, which of course is not in the best interest of any-
one. Yet how to let multiple ethnicities and multiple cultures coexist, and
how to make them integrated yet still distinctive, is a problem every
dynasty has to resolve. Its solution requires political imagination. This
problem did not exist in the Tianxia period of pre-Qin times, because the
Tianxia system itself is a model that fuses distinctiveness within integra-
tion. However, in the context of a grand unity system, how to achieve this
becomes a new problem. An ingenious solution to the problem is one
country with multiple systems.
Who, then, invented one country with multiple systems? The concept
of Tianxia must have been the inspiration for it. The Qin dynasty started
the grand unity system. But the short-lived dynasty did not have the time
to face the problem of one country with multiple systems before its own
demise. The ensuing Han dynasty, militarily stalemated with Xiongnu
(Huns), and later opening up roads westward to regions beyond, began to
face the issue of coexistence of multiple ethnic groups. Taking after the
Qin system, Han likewise used the grand unity system to replace the “cre-
ating compatibility of all states” of the Zhou dynasty. However, the grand
unity system only provided a solution to the uniformity issue in regions
directly under its control, but was unable to solve the problem of compat-
ibility among different ethnic groups. To deal with Xiongnu, which was a
slightly weaker military rival but was hard to overcome, the Han dynasty
in the beginning tried to bring it into its tributaries through political mar-
riage. However, Xiongnu proved to be Han’s competitor, not its ally.
Political marriages and tributary status could not solve the conflicts. The
concept of Tianxia was still used in China in Qin and Han and thereafter.
In that sense, the Han dynasty did not treat Xiongnu as an equal foreign
state but as a challenger to its order. Northern regions as far as the Gobi
Desert were still within the mandate area of the son of Heaven and were
reachable by carriages or boats. Thus the Xiongnu were still the subjects
of the son of Heaven, not foreigners. When dealing with Xiongnu, the
Han dynasty was short of new ideas and imagination.
Han’s new political experiences came from its westward opening up to
outside regions. The western regions had many small ethnic groups who
remained non-unified and for a long time were under threat from mighty
Xiongnu. Since these ethnic groups also resided around the Silk Road and
had trade interests with the Han dynasty, they had the motivation to join
the political alliance with Han and seek protection from the powerful
dynasty, as captured in the description: “The west regions are looking up
to the reverential virtues of Han, and are all too happy to be part of us.”11
When the political force of the Han dynasty reached the western regions,
the dynasty began to truly face the issue of cultural differences. The
administrative system with prefectures and counties was not suitable for
the allied ethnic groups in the western region. Thus the Han dynasty con-
tinued to use the practice of “not requiring a change of one’s customs” of
the Zhou’s Tianxia system,12 and came up with a system extension called
“Duhu” (military guardian),13 a supervisory system. The Han dynasty set
up the Xiyu Duhufu (Western Region Protectorate), which had no office
of Taishou (Satrap) but only Duwei or Xiaowei (the military general). This
meant that the Duhufu was just a military supervisory, not a social admin-
istrative, institution. The main function of the Duhufu was to supervise
military posts and garrisons, military and agricultural activities, and safe-
guard the western region, which, at its peak, contained as many as fifty
small states under supervision.14 Since it did not have administrative and
managerial functions, the Duhufu had no right to interfere with the self-
governing order of the ethnic groups in the western region. Its single
focus was to maintain the alliance between the western region and the
central royal court. The Duhufu might be the earliest example in China of
one country with multiple systems. Its flexible control idea was taken up
11
Ban Gu, Part A of Chapter 96 on western regions in Han Shu.
12
Qu Li chapter in Li Ji.
13
Ban, Gu. Chapter 70, Zhengji Biography in Han Shu.
14
Meng, Xiangcai. (1996). Zhongguo Zhengzhi Zhidu Tongshi (A Complete History of
Chinese Political Systems), Volume III (Ed. by Bai Gang). Beijing: People’s Publishing House,
pp. 257–258.
38 T. ZHAO
later in the Sui and Tang dynasties, and became the cornerstone for a more
mature system of flexible control.15
Before the Sui and Tang times, the Sixteen States period saw the
entrance of northern nomadic ethnic groups into the Central Plains to
establish many separatist regimes. Owing to the massive number of Han
people under their rules, these regimes adopted the system of having sepa-
rate governance for Han and Hu (non-Han minorities in the west and
north regions). The system was first implemented by the Han state under
Liu Yuan, in which the emperor was the common ruler for these two
peoples, and there were two sets of officials governing respectively Hu and
Han. As a general rule, Hu people went into military occupations and
Han people into agriculture; Hu officials led armies, and Han officials
managed the economy and society. Therefore, the separate governing of
Hu and Han was at the same time also separate governance for soldiers
and civilians.16 Thus the country was divided into two spaces of military
and society. In spite of the two systems, this was not one country with two
political systems, but rather a division of governance according to social
functions.
The flexible control system in the Tang dynasty was a true mature sys-
tem of one country with multiple systems. The Tang dynasty ruled over a
vast territory with many ethnic groups, so it set up controlled provinces as
administrative institutions beyond the ruled provinces on the Central
Plains. Its governing principle was to have divisions of peoples but unity of
the country, a very mature and flexible system of one country with multiple
systems. While the Tang dynasty’s flexible control system centered around
the Central Plains as its political core, it was nevertheless void of any sense
of a cultural center. It was a political system based on cultural equality, and
Tang’s Emperor Taizong, thanks to his profound virtues and command of
15
Flexible control was a locally adaptable system by the dynasty to control border regions.
Its specific policy was different for different locales and times. Its basic concept was to realize
regional autonomy under the control of the central government. Key fortresses were usually
garrisoned by armies dispatched by the central government, but they were not to interfere
with local traditional life and its way of management. Du You said: “when virtues reach wild
and faraway places, all uncivilized peoples are consequently transformed. People are then
governed according to who they are, and their normal expectations are also met in life. This
way of governing is called flexible control.” [Du, You. (1988). Chapter 171, Preface to
Prefecture Systems in Tong Dian. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.]
16
Huang, Huixian. (1996). Zhongguo Zhengzhi Zhidu Tongshi, Volume IV (Ed. by Bai
Gang). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 72–80.
high respect, assumed a double identity as both the son of Heaven and the
great Khan, becoming the common ruler of agricultural regions and
nomadic regions. The system in the controlled provinces was adapted to
the customary practices of the locals, who enjoyed a high degree of autono-
mous governance. The greatest autonomy came in the form of the com-
plete retention of an ethnic group’s traditional system, in which offices
ranging from chief executives to all low ranks were taken by people of that
group’s national descent. The Dudu (governor of p rovince), Cishi (the
provincial-level governor), Duhu (military guardian) and the like were all
from the hereditary heads of these ethnic groups. A less autonomous gov-
ernance form had supervisory officials appointed and sent by the central
royal court. Still less autonomous governance had a system whereby the
officials dispatched by the central royal court and the local officials formed
a combined management.17
The Liao dynasty (Qidan) had a system in which the Fan and Han
peoples were governed separately, with the North Shumiyuan (Privy
Council) using traditional Qidan rules and regulations to govern Qidan
people while the South Shumiyuan (Privy Council) used Han rules and
regulations to govern Han people.18 The Yuan dynasty’s system was the
most complicated, with the Mongolian system as the pillar being attached
to Han practices, resulting in several systems operating in parallel to one
another. For example, the law was a combination of Mongolian law, Han
law and Islamic law.19 The Ming dynasty basically followed the practice of
one country with multiple systems used in the Tang dynasty, allowing its
border regions to maintain the traditional systems of local ethnic groups.
Among these traditional systems, the chieftain system created specifically
by the Yuan dynasty for the southwest ethnic groups evolved into a mature
system during the Ming dynasty. The one country with multiple systems
in the Qing dynasty was an epitome of such a system: the emperor of Qing
was both an emperor and a great Khan; the dynasty used a highly Han-
based system to rule the Central Plains, and implemented a mixed system
in border regions that combined both autonomy and central supervision.
17
Yu, Lunian. (1996). Zhongguo Zhengzhi Zhidu Tongshi, Volume III (Ed. by Bai Gang).
Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 256–260.
18
Li, Xihou & Bai, Bing. (1996). Zhongguo Zhengzhi Zhidu Tongshi, Volume III (Ed. by
Bai Gang). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 74–87.
19
Yao, Dali. (2011). Meng Yuan Zhidu Yu Zhengzhi Wenhua. Beijing: Beijing University
Press, p. 280.
40 T. ZHAO
In sum, China, in the Tianxia age of the pre-Qin period, established a

world order as an integrated entity of many states; and from the Han
Dynasty this turned into one country with multiple systems. Although
Tianxia is condensed into the internal structure of a country, the decisive
gene does not change: it is always the concept of Tianxia with its all-
inclusiveness and compatibility. What changes is its way of application,
that is, the development of an external application and an internal applica-
tion of the concept of Tianxia, or in other words a world-level application
and a country-level application. Therefore, it can be seen that the concept
of Tianxia is a universal methodology, applicable both to the construction
of a world (the Tianxia system in the Zhou dynasty), and to the construc-
tion of a country (Tianxia-patterned China since Qin and Han). These
two levels of applications are methodologically the same; that is, they use
a method analogous to a topological approach to produce different mod-
els in practice that are similar in structure but different in form. In differ-
ent discursive contexts and conditions, the concept of Tianxia has different
manifestations and ways of application, but remains consistent in its fun-
damental spirit.
In ancient China, the external application of the Tianxia methodology
has two models: one is the Tianxia system and the other is the tributary
tradition from the Han dynasty to the Qing dynasty. As we have discussed
before, the politics defined by the Tianxia system of the Zhou dynasty is a
politics intended to construct a world order. Different from the general
sequence of political occurrences, the political principle of Zhou’s Tianxia
system is to establish a world order (Tianxia) first, then to build states (vas-
sal states). This system of politics with world first and states second means
that the Tianxia methodology is to first apply Tianxia politics externally
and then internally. When the Tianxia system of Zhou ended, the grand
unity system turned the tributary tradition into a foreign-relational policy of
Chinese dynasties, which is the second model of external application of the
Tianxia methodology. The tributary policy from the Han dynasty onwards
(particularly in the Ming and Qing times) has often been misinterpreted as
a tributary system as defined by Fairbank.20 To take a tributary policy as a
tributary system may be, in my opinion, an over-interpretation. Even though
tributary practice since the Han time retained the label of tributary of the
Zhou dynasty, it was more nominal than substantive. It did not have, as
20
Fairbank, John King (ed.). (2010). Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign
Relations. Beijing: CASS Press, p. 1.
required by a system, the actual power to control and manage tributaries’

politics, military and economy; instead it served merely as a cultural model
and fulfilled the function of appeasing those in remote regions. Elevating
this policy to a system without the essential functions of a system is an over-
characterization. The tributary system in the Zhou dynasty is substantive
because the vassal states have to fulfill their political and economic duties to
keep the Tianxia system running. However, the tributary practice since the
Han dynasty has been, in essence, a mere foreign relational tradition with-
out actual power to control. Therefore, it does not qualify as a system.
Strictly speaking, components with some substantive significance in the
tributary tradition since the Han dynasty are the practices of conferring
noble titles and pledging to the dynastic calendar. Conferring of noble titles
means that a remote state has a relatively close relationship with China,
which can entitle it to ask China for help when a state emergency occurs;
pledging to the dynastic calendar is to use the Chinese calendar and chro-
nology in one’s state, indicating the acceptance of a temporal sovereignty
that is different from spatial sovereignty.21 If a tributary state follows a
Chinese chronology, it means that it accepts the Chinese historical narrative
as a common history. But on the whole, the tributary relationship has prom-
ised very limited substantive power.
Different from the idealized external applications of the Tianxia meth-
odology, the internal applications of it by the grand unity dynasties have
had more realistic effects. When Tianxia’s world scale shrank to that of a
state, it became an internal spatial structure within the space of a state.
Although it has a similar structure to the concept of Tianxia, it no longer
has externality toward the world. Instead, it has contracted into a model
of internality, namely constructing a miniature Tianxia in a limited space.
It is exactly the innovative internal application of the Tianxia methodol-
ogy that has made it possible for ancient dynasties to create a world-pattern
state that is neither an empire nor a nation-state. It is also the internal
application of the Tianxia concept that has facilitated the formation of the
China whirlpool, resulting in a grand unity China that is multifaceted yet
integrated. Among them, the most imaginative internal application of the
concept of Tianxia is the invention of one country with multiple systems,
21
Shao, Yiping. (2014). China in Japanese Documents. In Fudan Daxue Guji Zhenli
Yanjiushuo (ed.), Yuwai Wenxiu li de Zhongguo (China in Foreign Documents). Shanghai:
Shanghai Literature and Arts Press, p. 130.
42 T. ZHAO
allowing the internal structure of China to take on “worldness.” The tra-

dition of “one country with multiple systems” continues in modern China
as well. The “one country, two systems” of Deng Xiaoping means that a
country can have not only different systems internally, but also different
ideologies, which is a modern innovation of one country with multiple
systems.
For the future world, what kinds of new application can the concept of
Tianxia have? This is a question worth considering.
CHAPTER 3
The Contemporariness of Tianxia
Abstract World history has not yet begun because the world is still not
integrated into an all-inclusive Tianxia that is characterized by shared inter-
ests and mutual compatibility. Although at present the world is attempting
multilateral internationalism in the hope of resolving or eliminating conflicts
or wars, internationalism falls short of Tianxia, which envisages the inter-
nalization of all externalities. In the current era of rapid globalization and
technological advancements that connect the world more than ever, the
ancient concept of Tianxia and its experiments in Chinese history are highly
relevant and worthy of study, given their potential to inform the tireless
pursuit of mankind for the common good and peaceful coexistence.
Keywords All-inclusiveness • Internalization • Compatibility
3.1 World History Yet to Begin

World history is a dubious concept because mankind has not yet been able
to embrace the world as world (analogous to Guanzi’s “take Tianxia as
Tianxia”). As a result, the world we live in today is still a physical world
instead of one defined by common interests and shared by everybody. In
other words, we are living in a physical world that does not have a global
political sovereignty or a universal constitution. In that sense, the world
today is still a non-world.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-5971-2_3
44 T. ZHAO
This non-world has not yet had a shared history. Before the modern era,
respective localized histories existed in parallel to each other. In the modern
era, however, with the colonization movement, overseas markets expansion
and imperialist outreach, places in different parts of the world came to be
connected with one another. Local histories were integrated with the his-
tory of Europe and the network that was created became a complex history
of histories. Nevertheless, that is not world history, only a history of
European expansion. Passing off that history as a history of the world is a
basic template that is found in the so-called world history prevalent today.
A real history of the world must begin with a world order that narrates
a shared life of mankind. World order is not one in which a hegemony or
allied major powers rule the world, but one that is based on universal com-
mon interests of sovereign nations; not one in which a certain country
establishes the game rules for the entire world, but one in which a global
constitution establishes the game rules for all nations. The system of
Tianxia during the Zhou dynasty was an experiment that tested the con-
cept of world politics as well as holding out a promise for true world his-
tory. So far, the world has not become Tianxia. For that reason, the real
history of the world has yet to begin.
The world has been in a state of anarchy until now. It has even lapsed
into the state of the jungle from time to time, as Hobbs said. The anarchic
situation indicates that politics still remains in its natural state, with all the
primitive and savage characteristics of pre-civilization. As there is no uni-
versally accepted global system, not even a universally accepted world out-
look, it is simply not possible to form a world that can function as a political
body. People belong to the world only geographically, whereas politically
they belong to their own nations. Being a world citizen is a premature
illusion, because there are neither world sovereignty nor a world constitu-
tion. With the current state of anarchy, the world is only a living place that
is fiercely fought over and is being much damaged in the process. The real
problem is not the so-called failed states, but the failed world. If the world
continues to exist as it does for much longer, then it will be hard for any
country, even a large one, to overcome its negative externalities and secure
its safety and interests in a dangerous world. Ironically, though all coun-
tries know well that their existence and development depend on a safe and
cooperative world, none has ever taken the political problems of the world
into serious account, the reason being that the common interests of the
world are not as urgent as national interests, and hegemonic states are
always trying to maintain their exploitative international systems in total
THE CONTEMPORARINESS OF TIANXIA 45
disregard of the world’s common interests. With a wide range of dangers

ever increasing (financial crises, artificial intelligence, cyber crime, ecologi-
cal crisis, environmental pollution, nuclear weapons, biological weapons,
smart weapons, terrorism, even war), we must deal with the world as seri-
ously as we deal with our national interests, individual rights and govern-
ment revenue.
We cannot expect to develop world politics out of international politics,
because international politics is derived from national politics and is conse-
quently subject to the logic of the latter. National politics is an internal
politics with the distribution of power and interests, rights and obligations
as its core issue. International politics, on the other hand, is a nation’s
external politics, namely its rivalry with other nations for power and inter-
ests, including through competition, struggles or even war. Although
international politics deals with political issues around the world, it is, how-
ever, not world politics per se because it is not based on world interests but
on national interests; not aimed at achieving world peace and cooperation
(although peace and cooperation is a trendy slogan for international poli-
tics) but at maximizing self-interests by overwhelming opponents. It can
even be said that international politics has not solved conflicts of interests
among states, but instead has deepened tensions among them and made
their conflicts even more complicated. While national politics can generally
establish an effective system or rules, international politics does not have
any systems or fair rules other than seeking so-called strategies that benefit
the self at the expense of others. Evidently, international politics is not sepa-
rate from national politics but is affiliated to national politics as its strategy
for external affairs. That is why the world is always in a state of anarchy and
is never able to advance toward real world politics. Since international poli-
tics is in essence hostilities in the guise of politics, it turns the world into a
commons of total anarchy and plunges it into the greatest tragedy.
International politics is actually the root cause of conflicts in the world.
What is needed to truly solve this problem is the realization that we
have reached a critical juncture in history. We may recall the specific factors
that enabled the Zhou dynasty to establish the Tianxia system. Zhou
became the covenant leader among states after a lucky victory. Being a
small state, Zhou was to solve the political problems raised by “one rules
many” and “the small rules the large.” Currently there are virtually no
reasonable choices other than establishing a world order that benefits all.
Historical opportunities like this are not repeated. Nevertheless, it is very
likely that globalization and advances in science and technology may cre-
46 T. ZHAO
ate further critical junctures in history. On the one hand, highly developed
technology will probably sufficiently empower a small group to destroy
the order of any nation. This means that an oppressed or ambitious small
group might become extremely dangerous because of its advanced tech-
nology or find itself capable of creating challenges that will be fatal for
major powers. On the other hand, highly developed technological systems
might become vulnerable to sabotage by all kinds of irrational resistance
forces. These are all crises that we might have to face. They may be so
tremendous that they become Doomsday problems. Strictly speaking, the
destructive power inherent in highly developed technology is not a threat
that targets hegemony specifically, but actually threatens the entire world,
consequently making conflicts of interests or ideological conflicts extremely
dangerous. Therefore, such a danger not only dooms hegemony, but
mankind as well. The only way out is to establish a world system that can
guarantee universal benefits to all people and to all nations; a world struc-
ture that is compatible and coexistential.
This is the relevance of the Tianxia system in the contemporary and
future world.
3.2 Kantian Peace and Huntington’s Challenge

The perpetual peace proposed by Kant in 1795 is a very forward-looking
theory for its age. At that time, the European powers were deep in their
greedy rivalry to divide up the world. The lure of war was stronger than the
desire for peace. It was not until after the two world wars that the aspira-
tions for peace prevailed. Kant’s theory contains at once an idealistic fantasy
and a realistic vision. The idealistic fantasy is to establish a universal republic
for world citizens. This means turning the world into a super-sized nation,
an idea that even Kant himself dismisses as unrealistic because a universal
country will never become the common aspiration of all countries. Perhaps
none of them will agree to be annexed into a big country. Moreover, if the
world does become one country, then that country is even more likely to
evolve into an authoritarian one. Therefore, Kant proposes a safer peace
solution, a peaceful alliance of “free states.”1 Such an alliance would be
1
See Kant. (1997). “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View” and
“Perpetual Peace” in Lishi Lixing Pipan Wenji (A Collection of Essays on Critique of Historical
Reason). Beijing: The Commercial Press.
deemed peaceful because the free states would be similar in system, political
culture and values. The European Union is Kant’s theory in current
practice.
Kant’s theory is certainly all-encompassing, yet the conditions for peace
it requires have their limitations; thus it cannot solve the world’s peace
problem. First, Kantian peace requires all countries to have homogeneous
systems and common values, a condition that it is not possible to satisfy.
Different countries have different cultures, values and political systems. It
is hard to imagine them all turning into politically homogeneous countries
and even harder to imagine a uniform culture and religion. Therefore,
Kant’s solution may find its widest application in a culturally homoge-
neous region, such as Europe, but cannot be applied to solve the problem
of world peace. Secondly, countries with political and cultural similarities
are not free from conflicts of interests. Kant’s peace solution is merely an
international agreement among countries, not a system for common inter-
ests that transcends all nations. Therefore, it cannot guarantee that coun-
tries will stop having serious conflicts of interests or will refrain from
harming each other over those interests. Kant believes that free nations
will resolve their differences in a rational way. That belief is now rephrased
into a dubious myth that democratic countries will have no wars among
themselves. However, even though there may not be military wars, there
may still be other forms of wars, such as financial wars, malicious competi-
tion or actions that seriously harm the interests of other countries.
Therefore it is obvious that national interests will not disappear because of
political or cultural similarities.
Obviously, Kant’s solution can promote regional cooperation, but it
cannot solve international conflicts, let alone conflicts among civilizations,
as noted by Huntington. His discussion concerning this issue is question-
able here and there, but he raises a profound problem. Similar political
systems are clearly not sufficient to overcome conflicts among civilizations,
because these are more profound than conflicts in political ideologies.
Therefore, the end of the cold war does not mark the end of history, but
a new stage in history. Huntington is visionary in this respect, given that
ongoing world conflicts have already proved that the so-called “end of
history” is illusory. As a matter of fact, conflicts of various kinds, whether
over ideology or civilization, national interests or class confrontation,
power or interests of any type, have never ceased to exist; they have only
varied in focus at different times. We need to realize that similarities in
civilization are not sufficient to overcome conflicts, just as similarities in
48 T. ZHAO
political systems are not sufficient. When power and interests are at stake,
countries with similar civilizations do not reach agreements just because
they are similar. The real problem is whether there is a form of world order
that can prevent tensions from escalating into war or fatal conflict.
People in the modern age hope to solve disputes through rational dia-
logue. The least costly way of competing is by substituting military might
with negotiations. However, the effectiveness of language over action in
striving for an upper hand is apparently exaggerated. The reality is that
dialogue can only settle certain inconsequential disputes. This is because
there is alleged to be a general lack of rationality in dialogue. If this is the
case, will dialogue effectively solve conflict if it is sufficiently rational?
Reference can be made in this regard to correct dialogue under the “ideal
speech situation” that is envisaged by Habermas, which is sufficiently
rational, equal, sincere and open. Such an ideal dialogue borders on uto-
pia, because Habermas overlooks a key point: no matter how rational a
dialogue is, no party will make concessions over fundamental interests of
survival. Similarly, mutual agreement about beliefs concerning the mean-
ing of life, such as religion, spirituality and values, is also hard to reach
through dialogue. What a fully rational dialogue can do at best is to achieve
mutual understanding or empathy. Yet people will never give up their own
fundamental interests or their way of life for the sake of mutual under-
standing or empathy. This can be summed up by saying that mutual
understanding cannot guarantee mutual acceptance.2
The updated law of peoples put forward by Rawls touches upon a larger
political problem that is not considered by Kant in his peace theory; but
Rawls’s theory of international politics is far less attractive than his theory
of justice, disappointingly so in fact.3 According to Rawls, the domestic
principle of social justice does not apply to the international community. In
the latter, a “difference principle” that helps the vulnerable must be elimi-
nated. However, eliminating this difference principle that protects the poor
amounts to rejecting international justice. In an anarchical world where the
strong preys on the weak, the desperate weak will most likely choose to
resist by whatever means, thus resulting in a dangerous world. Rawls’s solu-
tion to that situation is, of all things, intervention. He says that, when
2
See my article “Understanding and Acceptance” (in Les de la Connaissance Reciproque,
ed. Alain Le Pichon, Le Robert, 2003).
3
Rawls, John. (1999). Law of Peoples. Harvard University Press.
necessary, democratic countries may subject the non-cooperative countries

to “forceful sanctions and even to intervention.”4 A stale proposition such
as this is nothing but modern neo-imperialism, which is absolutely not
acceptable to Kant as an international principle. In fact, Kant rejects Rawls’s
theory in advance when he argues that when states are in dispute, “neither
party can be declared an unjust enemy, for this would already presuppose a
judge’s decision.”5 Obviously, no one has the unilateral privilege to presup-
pose a fair judgment.
The United Nations is a great achievement in attempting to resolve
international conflicts. However, it is only an international consultation
body subordinate to the system of sovereign nations. It has no power to
manage the world and is not even qualified as a global political system.
The United Nations is still limited by its internationalism in reaching
“worldness.” For that reason, the rules of the United Nations are not the
rules of a world system but international rules. The organization tries to
provide a space for public consultation where deals can be made to resolve
violence. However, solutions reached through the United Nations that
satisfy all parties only concern less serious disputes. For those involving
consequential interests, the United Nations has had a hard time in reach-
ing resolutions satisfactory to all parties. There is no doubt that dialogue
and mediation have reduced wars, but they have never reduced conflicts
and tensions. Even when all parties have reached some equilibrium, it is
usually the Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game, rarely the win-
win solution that people dream of. After all, the United Nations is an
organization with no real power, being a consultative instead of an author-
itative institution. In particular, it does not have any political power over
sovereign nations. No wonder it cannot prevent any imperialist group
from dominating the world. For that reason, the United Nations is not a
world concept above sovereign nations.
3.3 Constructed Externalities

In the final analysis, politics is determined by power unit, which in essence
is a unit used in settling interests. From the beginning of the modern era
to the present time, political ideology has been shaped by individuals and
4
Ibid., p. 81.
5
Kant. Political Writings, p. 96 (page number of the English version).
50 T. ZHAO
states, which are two political units with a pivotal role. In the absence of
the political dimension called Tianxia, political logic is contained within
the boundary of a nation as its largest space of valid application.
Cosmopolitanism is abandoned. As discussed above, international politics
is nothing but national politics reaching out in service of a nation not the
entire world. Therefore, it is not possible for modern politics to develop
into world politics against its own logic. If politics defined by power inter-
est has natural reasons for survival, then conflicts among civilizations are
entirely based on artificial reasons. That is to say, the externality of a civi-
lization is constructed based on spiritual reasons. Because of this, conflicts
among civilizations are an issue worth pondering.
Every culture is a spiritual world, a system that provides explanations
for everything. Differences among spiritual worlds reflect different per-
spectives and have nothing to do with right and wrong. Every culture
treasures what it treasures and has no need to hate other cultures.
Therefore, hostility toward other cultures has no natural reasons. Such
hostilities need at least two exclusive elements. These are dogmatism
(believing one’s own culture to be the only correct or legitimate spiritual
world and all other spiritual worlds to be incorrect or illegitimate) and
exclusive power (believing one’s own culture to be the spiritual world that
has the power to make value judgments, to replace other spiritual worlds
and with a mission to convert other spiritual worlds). Both these elements
are indispensable.
Only monotheism has the desire for dogmatism and exclusive power.
Christianity has transformed Judaism, a particular monotheism, into a
common monotheism, which thus has both dogmatism and exclusivity.
Building on the four inventions in spiritual politics, Christianity has cre-
ated four inventions in ideology, namely advocacy (coming from mission-
ary work), institutionalization of minds (from preaching and repenting),
congregation (from collective believers with a common mind) and spiri-
tual enemy (pagans).6 In so doing, other cultures are branded as pagan-
ism, a sworn spiritual enemy that cannot be tolerated to exist. However,
Christianity has failed in its attempt to unify the spiritual world, resulting
in spiritual wars throughout the world or conflicts among civilizations as
defined by Huntington, as well as creating a political model summed up
6
For details, please see my book: Zhao. (2009). Study on a Bad World. Beijing: People’s
Publishing House in China, pp. 200–210.
by Carl Smith as “recognition of enemy.” Ever since the world was viewed
by Christianity as confrontational in spiritual terms, the universal and a
priori nature of the concept world has been rejected by this particular
belief. Subsequently, the theological logic of Christianity has been applied
extensively in various secular scenarios. For instance, before being enlight-
ened by modern universal civilization from the West, all other places were
deemed uncultivated; before being liberated by communism, all other
places were deemed to be in a dark age; before achieving democracy, a
society is destined to suffer, and so on and so forth.
If the world has only one faith, then it will lose the worldness of a
world, which depends on a richness of spiritual life. If that richness is lost,
then the world is lost. If the world is unified into one religion, one value
system, one spiritual world, then it will cease to be a world, since in spirit
it is reduced to a single thing in spite of its vast physical space. Metaphysically
speaking, “one” is meaningful only when it implies a contrast with “many.”
Otherwise, it is merely a boring tautology of “1 = 1.” It is also worth not-
ing that contemporary monotheism has come up with a subtle strategy in
which the pluralities of various cultures are downplayed by explaining
them as diversities, in an attempt to consider other cultural phenomena as
diverse aesthetic landscapes within the framework of Western culture but
outside the sphere of power. Given this unequal standing, the value of the
many is not duly recognized in discourse; only equally valued multivari-
ants can constitute the shared one system, just as each natural number
belongs equally to the natural number set. Using monotheism as a politi-
cal logic to construct artificial externalities of a culture and pit one culture
against others only betrays political immaturity. Truly artful politics is built
on compatibility. If built on uniformity, politics is nothing but control, a
type of control that is void of governance, commanding no hearts and
minds. Politics means more than control. If it cannot bring about an order
that lets all beings be, then it is not true politics. The goal for power is not
power itself, but to create a common order based on compatibility in order
to enrich the world.
Politics must be in accordance with Heaven, not with God. The spiri-
tual world of every culture is sacred in its own right. And what is sacred in
every culture does not explain the benefits of survival but the meaning of
life. Deified mountains, rivers, land, plants, traditional legends and histori-
cal figures in each spiritual world embody notions that cannot be destroyed.
They not only constitute the soul of a nation, but also embody the capac-
ity of a culture to mobilize the community. Each spiritual world has an
52 T. ZHAO
invincible ability to be transcendent, but that does not mean spiritual

worlds are antagonistic with each other. Only universal monotheism has
created spiritual antagonism in its attempt to unify spiritual worlds. But
contrary to monotheism, Tianxia is a concept that is capable of accom-
modating multiple spiritual worlds and providing every one of them with
a space for existence to prevent them from harming each other. Therefore,
the Tianxia system is an inclusive world of all possible worlds, namely the
one system composed of the many.
The political model based on monotheism has brought forth conflicts
among civilizations. As Huntington acknowledges, challenges imposed by
the West against cultures from other regions are “unilateral,” and “the
West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion
(to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather
by its superiority in applying organized violence.”7 Even though the physi-
cal world can be conquered, the spiritual one cannot, which makes it inevi-
table that the logic of conquest will reach its turning point. “Where there
is oppression, there will be resistance” (Mao Zedong). Especially at times
when competition strategies, technology, organization and social mobili-
zation have become sharable common knowledge, the oppressed will be
able to obtain the abilities that allow them to retaliate effectively, thus
dooming the political logic of imperialism. All this suggests that imperial-
ism is an unsustainable politics. In spite of its ambition to rule the world,
imperialism lacks the vision for a world politics that centers on the interests
of the world. Instead, it upholds country as a supreme body and regards
the world as an object to rule. As a result, no matter how far and wide an
empire extends its domination, its interests and values are much smaller
than the world’s scope. This is the limitation of the imperialist logic.
Without adopting the worldview of a non-exclusive world, there is no
hope that an effective universal order will be established. Imperialism, for
its lack of vision of Tianxia, has confused the right sequence in which the
conditions for a universal order will be established. Thinking wrongly that
universality comes from universalization, it always attempts to universalize
its own values unilaterally. This is a fatal misunderstanding. Whether in
logic or in practice, universality is a precondition for universalization, not
the other way round. That is to say, only inherently universal things can be
7
Huntington, Samuel, P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order. Touchstone Books, p. 51.
universalized, whereas universal expansion will never lead to universality.

That is exactly where the fundamental difference lies between unilateral
universality and compatible universality, as well as between imperialism
and Tianxia.
As mentioned above, the significance of Tianxia lies in its vision for an
inclusive world, a world that has internalities but not externalities. This is
exactly the ontological condition for a universal order. It means that a
world order must acknowledge the internalization of the world as a tran-
scendental principle before it can achieve universality. That world, there-
fore, must attain internalization. Only by realizing its internalization can a
universal order be established. Conversely, with political exclusion and
externality, the world cannot become world and a universal world order
will never be achieved. In other words, to construct the universal world
order has to begin with recognizing the transcendental concept of an all-
inclusive world, and then has to use the political logic of this all-inclusive
world to set up the order. Any political logic that rejects the concept of
Tianxia will invariably divide the world into us versus them, exploiters
versus the exploited and the ruling versus the ruled. The purpose of this
logic is to establish negative externalities in an arbitrary and deliberate
way. Such political logic, the logic of imperialism, has no hope of success
because it is bound to encounter the paradox it creates yet goes beyond its
power to overcome. This creates several dilemmas.
1. Xunzi’s paradox or the paradox of cooperation. Cooperation can

yield more aggregated interests, therefore everybody needs coopera-
tion. However, if people are presumed to seek their own maximized
interests, then cooperation will fall apart owing to the resultant
unequal distribution. Xunzi believes that the only way to resolve this
plight is to establish commonly accepted rites (equivalent to univer-
sally acknowledged rules). The problem is that before the internal-
ization of the world is achieved there can be no conditions under
which a commonly acknowledged system of the world can be set up
to distribute benefits. Therefore, the hegemonic rules of the game
under international conditions will be certain to disintegrate in the
face of persistent resistance, rebellion or non-cooperation.
2. Imitator paradox. In today’s world of competition, no one can
monopolize knowledge and technology because any competitive
strategy will become common knowledge over time. Every player is
sure to imitate any selfish strategy and ends up inevitably in a lose-
54 T. ZHAO
lose equilibrium, or the prisoner’s dilemma. The problem lies in the

fact that no strategy that seeks exclusive benefits can survive the test
of universal imitation, namely in-kind retaliation. Therefore, it is not
possible to set up a widely recognized or generally effective rule of
the game or system. It also means that any act that tries to use a
hegemonic logic to establish a universal order is inherently paradoxi-
cal, because in the very process of establishing a hegemonic order, a
resister against that order is born at the same time.
3. Paradox of exclusive explanation. Hegemonic media can monopo-
lize explanations about spirituality, values and truth, but it will be
hard to ensure the credibility of these exclusive explanations because
an exclusively explained hegemonic strategy contains a self-defeating
logic. If everything that hegemony does can be explained as legiti-
mate, then nothing is illegitimate, which follows that all evils can be
explained as legitimate, thus making explanation invalid: for instance,
waging wars in the name of peace, human rights and liberation;
destroying freedom and democracy in the name of freedom and
democracy; denying other people their human rights in the name of
human rights. Such a practice contaminates the notion of legitimacy
by making it cover all evils, creating an explanation paradox in so
doing. If the concept of good implies legitimacy of all actions, then
that concept will automatically dissolve because “good” must have
“bad” in its connotation. When the concept of legitimacy implies
the reason for every action, then it begins to cover evil by implica-
tion, leading to the disintegration of the concept.
In conclusion, any hegemony or unilateralism will inevitably create its

own destroyer.
3.4 The Conditions for a New Tianxia

What is going to end is the modern era, not history.
If there can ever be such a thing as the end of history, it will probably
be a suicidal end of the human race brought about by itself, namely the
last judgment by mankind on itself. Mankind’s suicidal path began with
self-deification by modern humans, their refusal to acknowledge the exis-
tence of any divine being above themselves, their definition of the greedy
pursuit of self-interest as an individual’s rights, and their pretense that they
are the lords of everything under the sun. The modern era first granted
legitimacy to selfishness, then to the rational pursuit for maximization of

self-interests. This carries a tremendous inherent danger. The selfish nature
of mankind is already a possible breeding ground for evil. With the legiti-
mation of selfishness, that possibility becomes inevitability. Another dan-
gerous pursuit in the modern era is the conquering of Nature and the
search for endless development. Such an ideology has significantly
increased the risks pertaining to human behavior, not only by strengthen-
ing the human race’s capability to engage in mutual destruction (nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons, gene weapons, smart weapons), but also
by increasing the likelihood of human destruction (gene engineering, arti-
ficial intelligence) as a result of breaking through natural limitations.
The modern game is based on competition and at its beginning is full
of vitality. However, asymmetric technological advantage enables a few
countries to divide and exploit the world. Once the entire world has
achieved modernization, especially in information accessibility, monopo-
lized knowledge will become shared knowledge, diminishing gradually
any asymmetric advantage so that the game of competition is rendered
increasingly non-profitable. We have already entered a global game, but,
in the absence of a global system we continue to use the old rules for this
modern game. Such an incongruity has already brought constant failures
to our thinking and actions. Therefore, world governance has become an
urgent problem. Nowadays, human beings are engaged in some very risky
activities that have unpredictable consequences, especially the new tech-
nological revolution that shows enormous capability and potentials, com-
bining biology, artificial intelligence and the internet. What is particularly
dangerous is that this technological advance is usually viewed as indisput-
able progress. However, will unbridled technological advances lead to
spectacular catastrophe and even human extinction?
In addition to the possible Doomsday catastrophe caused by technol-
ogy (assuming there is still time before this happens), political problems
caused by technological development have already become a real threat.
Will new technology evolve into a new kind of dictatorship that nobody
can counter? Very likely. For instance, human beings love to have technol-
ogy that provides them with a “complete” service, but that is bound to
come with complete control. A complete service seems to offer maximized
free choices and equal rights, yet at the same time it has taken a firm con-
trol of people’s lives and thoughts. This will be a new dictatorship unprec-
edented in history, a dictatorship realized by offering freedom and equality.
This sounds like a paradox. Everybody seems to be free and equal, yet all
56 T. ZHAO
“free choices” are defined and preset by technocracy, so that freedom loses
all its potential for creativity and significance to human life. Here is the
irony: the new technocracy will achieve its success through freedom and
democracy.
When service becomes a systematic supply that shapes all kinds of needs,
it positions itself as a supreme power that nobody is able to resist. However,
that power is not an authoritarian power, but a manipulative power. People
are willing to be controlled because everybody needs the service that is
provided by the technological system. “Service is power” will probably
become a formula for the future. More convenient, integrated and compre-
hensive global service will provide the foundation for the new power in the
era of globalization. Mao Zedong once said that power must “serve the
people.” At the time that slogan was nothing but a political Utopia, but
today it seems, unintentionally, to be very forward-looking: serving the
largest number of people will gain the greatest possible power. That is to
say, the broadest service can be exchanged for the greatest power. It should
be pointed out, however, that the ultimate objective for this power is not
providing a service but obtaining authoritarian power through that service.
Mesmerized by the systematic full service, mankind in future may be vol-
untarily institutionalized. This new type of dictatorship is not what modern
freedom and democracy can overcome, because it is through freedom and
democracy that the new dictatorship that is anti-freedom and anti-democ-
racy achieves its success. It is a paradoxical product of freedom and democ-
racy. Democracy and market can effectively prevent monopolies by
traditional power, but this new type of power has adopted a new strategy to
use democracy and market in achieving new dictatorship. Its potency lies in
its inherent parasitism, using market and democracy as its host.
What is even more dangerous is that once the new technocracy acquires
systematic power, it will have no difficulty at all in committing systematic
violence. This kind of violence is everywhere in a systematized way of life.
It is a violence that has no recourse, is hard to indict and has no respon-
sible actor because the oppressor is the very system that people depend on
for their entire life. Compared with the low level of tyranny in which an
old-fashioned authoritarian government makes people rage in silence, sys-
tematic violence is of a higher level. It makes people lose their ability to
think by feeding them with ideological concepts from a given database. As
a result, people can only think by searching a vocabulary verified by the
system as politically correct. Enslaving hearts and minds is indeed the most
profound violence.
When people are engaging themselves in defending and enjoying mod-

ern democracy, new technocracy has already modified the concept of
democracy in secret by degrading democracy to publicracy. I use pub-
licracy to indicate the regression from democracy that is based on personal
choice to politics that is based on public opinions. Those public opinions
that dictate people’s choice are no more than opinions expressed by the
mass media and the mainstream, created by a systematic power. There is a
process involved in which human minds become institutionalized first by
steering and then by volition. More alarmingly, publicracy is not the oppo-
nent of democracy, but the result of democracy. Power will never miss an
opportunity to control others. Now that a public space has been created
by democracy, power is offered an opportunity to steal control of that
space by using publicracy to erode democracy and turn it into a cloak for
dictatorship. The real power behind this is the technological system that
makes game rules and issues awards (improvements in life).
The primary beneficiary of globalization is not any state, but a new
power in the form of a network encompassing the whole world. It is the
global system of financial capital and the system of high technology that
have benefited most from globalization and are well positioned to become
the greatest powers in the world.
The global game defined by that global technological system will
change the essence of the ontological condition of politics. That techno-
logical system is built on relations. Physical entities (countries and indi-
viduals) will retreat to a secondary position. Under the globalized system,
the nature of relations will determine the nature of entities as well as the
valid moves and rules of the new game. Existence will no longer have its
self-sufficient completeness and independence but will instead become a
function of coexistence. This scenario seems to verify a metaphysical con-
struct of the concept of Tianxia: existence presupposes coexistence. Once
people develop stronger and stronger interdependency, the biggest oppor-
tunity for survival or the most successful survival method is no longer to
seek strategies to maximize exclusive interests, but a coexistent strategy
that is compatible with the system. In an interdependent environment,
seeking maximized exclusive interests will lead to inevitable defeat. When
common interests outweigh exclusive interests, a confrontational strategy
will cease to be beneficial, or even become counter-productive.
The global technological system, though it contains the danger of new
technocracy, provides, however, the physical conditions for the new sys-
tem of Tianxia. Only by establishing a universal world order above and
58 T. ZHAO
beyond the national system can the outdated imperialist hegemony be

eliminated, the emerging new technological powers be contained and the
world be saved from insanity and destruction. That is the relevance of the
new system of Tianxia.
3.5 Four Key Concepts for a New Tianxia System

If what the future world needs is a new Tianxia system, then owing to
changed political, economic, technological and cultural conditions, that
system must be different in many ways from the ancient one. The new
system needs to update or improve several key concepts, and at least four
of them are crucial.
1. Internalization of the world
Internalization of the world is a fundamental goal of the new Tianxia

system. It is based on the concept of non-exclusiveness in the old Tianxia
system. Non-exclusiveness is established as a transcendental concept of the
worldness of the world. Heaven is all-inclusive, so Tianxia should match
up to Heaven. That traditional reason is still valid today in that it is able to
preclude the hostile nature of politics from redefining the concept of poli-
tics by considering it as the art of turning enemies into friends. In a highly
globalized world, the first essential condition for universal security and
enduring peace is to achieve the internalization of the world to eliminate
its negative exclusiveness. Only in this way can wars and hostile competi-
tions be eradicated. Therefore, internalization of the world is a condition
for the collective peace and shared interests for every nation. The new
system of Tianxia will become a supervisory system so that a universal
world order can be maintained. The system is anti-imperialist in nature
because it belongs to the entire world, not to any country. It means to
“take the Tianxia as Tianxia” and “Tianxia as the common good.”
Simply put, only by achieving internalization of the world can a non-
exclusive and safe world be created.
2. Relational rationality
We trust that reason in human beings can lead to reasonable behavior.

But the individual rationality advocated in the modern era is merely an
inadequate application of reason. As a matter of fact, individual rationality
seeks to maximize self-interests and in so doing only aggravates conflicts

and confrontation. Therefore, we need relational rationality to balance
individual rationality. If individual existence is a priority concern for indi-
vidual rationality, then coexistence is a priority concern for relational ratio-
nality. In other words, individual rationality is the correct type of reason
for economics, as it gives priority to exclusive interests; whereas relational
rationality is a humane rationality, giving priority to mutual safety and
security. Relational rationality makes eradicating wars and hostility a basic
requirement and limits competitions permitted by the minimization of
mutual hostility. The institutional rationality of the new system of Tianxia
must be based on relational rationality in order to ensure its non-exclusive
model of coexistence. Specifically speaking, relational rationality has at
least two essential components:
(a) Coexistence prior to existence, or existence presupposing coexis-

tence. This is the ontological foundation of relational rationality. It
means that we must acknowledge the following fact: coexistence is
the condition of sustainable existence for every being. In other
words, nothing can exist beyond coexistence. Therefore, coexis-
tence is the necessary condition for ensuring the security and inter-
ests of an existence;
(b) Minimization of mutual hostility. This is a direct application of the
principle “let all beings be” from Yi Jing. Minimization of mutual
hostility is the optimal strategy to construct a good relationship of co-
existence. It means that in people’s daily life practices minimization of
mutual hostility must always take precedence over maximization of
self-interests. Here, relational rationality can satisfy the rational require-
ment of risk aversion to the greatest extent possible, and its safety coef-
ficient clearly surpasses that of individual rationality. For that reason,
relational rationality is the most reasonable principle.
3. Confucian Improvement.
If relational rationality can be further operationalized into something

positive or idealistic, it will take the form of a strategy aimed at maximiza-
tion of reciprocal interests, which means that for any society improvement
in overall interests must bring about simultaneous improvement in every-
body’s interests, rather than a unilateral improvement only. In short, it
means improved iff let improved. This idea is derived from the Confucian
60 T. ZHAO
belief “established iff let established; improved iff let improved.”8 That
Confucius’s belief is a basic humanitarian concept with multiple signifi-
cance in its political, economic and ethical dimensions. We can sum it up
as Confucian Improvement from the perspective of political economics.
Viewed from this angle, it means that if and only if a system is universally
legitimate, then it will be able to guarantee Pareto’s Improvement in
everybody’s interests so long as the overall interests of a society are
improved. That is to say, Pareto’s Improvement in the overall interests of
a society should not benefit only certain individuals or part of the popula-
tion but must lead to Pareto’s Improvement for every individual. Evidently,
Confucian Improvement is far better than Pareto’s Improvement. What it
embodies is the idealistic objective of the new system of Tianxia.
4. Compatible universalism.
Cultures in the world used to coexist peacefully side by side, taking

pride in their own beauty, until mono-theological ideology brought about
conflicts among civilizations. Mono-theology not only believes its values
to be universal, but also demands that they are adopted as the only value
system, thus making conflicts among civilizations inevitable. Universal val-
ues are generally understood as values applied to every individual, an
inherent error bound to result in the following paradox: if a certain culture
can believe its values to be applicable to everybody, then every culture can
believe the same, thus resulting in conflicts among civilizations. So it can
be seen that unilateral universalism is invalid logically. Compatible univer-
salism, on the other hand, considers universal values as those applied to
every interrelation; namely it anchors universal values on symmetrical rela-
tions rather than on unilateral individuals, thus avoiding the paradox in
values. The basic principle for compatible universalism can be stated as
follows: any value that can be defined by symmetrical relations is a univer-
sal value. Obviously, only a rational symmetrical relationship can prove to
be universal and inevitable, and can gain general consent. Any value that
cannot be defined by symmetrical relations only represents personal pref-
erences or the specific values of a particular group.
8
Yong Ye chapter in The Analects.
In order to support the above four key concepts, I will consider politics
as an art to construct an order for coexistence, with peace instead of con-
flict as its ultimate objective. As such, theories about fighting are merely
technical whereas theories about peace are truly artistic. The ontological
telos of any being is to seek permanent existence. That is the a priori theo-
rem of existence itself. At the same time, any individual existence will pre-
suppose coexistence. That is a fact. Acknowledging those two points will
help us understand why peace is the ultimate goal of politics. Of course,
fighting is also undertaken for the purpose of survival, but it cannot guar-
antee permanent existence. As a matter of fact, fighting is just a high-stake
gambling embarked upon out of perceived necessity, not the original pur-
pose of existence. Socrates believes that no one errs knowingly. That the-
ory can be understood in this context as being that no one will deliberately
take the risk of fighting if there is a better choice. In that sense, modern
political philosophy only studies erroneous human behavior. Such research
is necessary, but it fails to explore the fundamental problems in politics.
Politics that identifies the enemy (from Hobbs to Carl Schmitt and
Huntington) is actually a negative politics, whereas to turn enemies into
friends is truly meaningful politics. If wars are considered to be hostile
actions aiming at destroying the survival conditions of an opponent, then
all wars, except defensive ones, are irrational. Their temporary victories
seem to have achieved their rational and intended results, but from the
perspective of a sufficiently distant future, any destructive hostilities will
invariably trigger retaliation, and therefore are irrational errors after all.
We need a kind of philosophy that takes into account future effects. Such
a philosophy should at least demonstrate in theory that even when an
action is rational as far as its goal of seeking direct interests is concerned,
it still should be regarded as irrational when it subsequently results in a
destructive interaction of mutual retaliations in future.
We can design a test called “universal imitation” to verify this argu-
ment. Given that in Hobbs’s context (which has the most explanatory
power), every gamer has his or her individual rationality, seeks to maxi-
mize personal interests and has adequate learning ability, then everybody
will learn among themselves other people’s smarter strategies to make
gains, and will imitate in subsequent games those acquired successful strat-
egies or apply more effective countermeasures. As a result, during a mul-
tiround long-term competition, more capable gamers will continue to
come up with better strategies in an attempt to ensure an upper hand, yet
any strategy can only maintain a temporary advantage, because smart
62 T. ZHAO
strategies will soon become common knowledge for everybody to imitate.

By and by, strategic advantage will fade away owing to the symmetry in
strategy. Suppose the strategies are finite in number, and mutual imitation
will eventually drain the collective pool of strategies. Suppose that the
strategies are infinite in number, then their innovation will not be able to
keep up with the speed of imitation (because the cost of imitation is lower
than that of innovation), resulting also in a collective depletion of strate-
gies. Either way, innovative strategies will lose their leading edge when all
kinds of advantageous strategies have emerged and are being copied by
everybody everywhere, and when everybody has the same saturated com-
mon knowledge or symmetric knowledge (equal knowledge about each
other). The collective depletion of strategies will inevitably ensue. By then,
the game will have reached the equilibrium of stable strategies.
The problem is that a stable strategy universally adopted can be a good
one that benefits all or a bad one that hurts everybody’s interests. The
only way to test this is to see whether the strategy universally adopted will
generate a cycle of retaliations or not. If not, then it is a good strategy able
to withstand imitations and benefit all. Conversely, if a strategy universally
imitated will lead to in-kind retaliations and bring troubles in consequence
to its creator, then it is a bad strategy that will surely result in the tragedy
of imitations. The two conclusions that can be drawn from the above are
as follows. First, if a strategy is bound to trigger retaliations, then it cannot
pass the test of imitation. Such a strategy is therefore identified as irratio-
nal. Secondly, a strategy that triggers retaliations will generate an endless
cycle of retaliations. Such a vicious cycle created by universal imitation
will, in aggregation, result in collective irrationality, regardless of whether
a retaliatory action is effective for its short-term objective, thus leading to
long-term ineffectiveness owing to collective irrationality. That is to say,
an action that satisfies only individual rationality cannot guarantee itself to
be a stable and effective rational action: future retaliations may eventually
prove it to be irrational. In other words, an action cannot prove itself to
be rational solely based on its own rational calculation. Its rationality must
be proven by other people’s rational responses. That is to say, it is up to
relational rationality to prove whether an individual rational action is suf-
ficiently rational. Therefore, individual rationality is truly rational only
when it can lead to collective rationality.
The result of this test challenges the modern concept of individual
rationality. The latter is generally believed to mean that each individual
will aim to maximize personal interests, is able to calculate gains or losses
logically and will have consistent rather than cyclical or conflicting ranking
of his or her preferred options. However, individual rationality has its
deficiencies in that it can only reflect unilateral rational thinking, but can-
not consider the rationality of the interactive relationship between self and
others, nor its possibility to develop into collective rationality thereafter.
Actually, each action, in choosing its objective, also automatically chooses
a certain way of interaction, which ends up deciding everybody’s future.
This means that the future is jointly decided by multiple actors, a function
of collective actions instead of individual ones. Clearly, individual rational-
ity is not fully sufficient to ensure unilaterally a future compatible with
one’s own interests. A sufficient rationality must be able to remain univer-
sally valid through the process of interactions. As individual rationality
focuses on its own exclusive interests, it is very likely to miss greater and
longer-term interests because of short-sightedness, such as prisoner’s
dilemma, the tragedy of the commons or free-rider, all of which manifest
short-sighted choices, the phenomenon of occasional smartness but per-
petual dumbness. Therefore, we need to look for a rational concept that
remains universally valid in an interactive relationship, so as to solve the
challenging issue of cooperation. For that reason, it is necessary to intro-
duce relational rationality, which highlights the priority of coexistence
awareness as follows. First, it is able to foresee the issue of retaliation
against imitation and act pre-emptively for the sake of retaliation aversion.
This is an enhanced risk aversion that takes future interaction into consid-
eration, and as such will always give priority to minimization of mutual
hostility over maximization of self-interests. Secondly, it is able to seek
further an optimal condition for coexistence in which cooperation is maxi-
mized and conflicts are minimized once the minimization of mutual hos-
tility is ensured, so as to develop shared interests to a maximum degree.
Nevertheless, we are not rejecting individual rationality, but it needs to be
redefined. Individual rationality focuses on negative defensive action, namely
defending one’s maximum interests when faced with external challenges. It
differs somewhat from the concept of individual rationality as is understood
in the modern age. The latter aims at maximizing personal interests. That
goal, being too positive, is in tension and incompatible with the rational
principle of risk aversion. If individual rationality can be limited to negatively
defending one’s own interests, then it can be compatible with the principle
of risk aversion. At the same time, relational rationality can contribute to
constructing stable and credible coexistence aiming at the minimization of
mutual hostility as its realistic goal and achieving Confucian Improvement as
64 T. ZHAO
its idealistic goal, namely the simultaneous improvement of all parties when
one kind of interest is improved. It can be defined as follows: if Party x gets
interest gains x+, then and only then will Party y get simultaneous interest
gain y+ and vice versa. Hence, promoting x+ becomes a beneficial strategy
for y because y must recognize and promote x+ in order to get y+ and vice
versa. Confucian Improvement requires a simultaneous Pareto Improvement
for everybody concerned as a result of any improvement in overall interests,
thereby eliminating the unilateral benefits allowed by Pareto Improvement.
Pareto Improvement does not require the improvement of everybody’s
interests. Instead, it only requires that nobody’s interests are impaired. In
that regard, Pareto Improvement is not adequate for guaranteeing a univer-
sally satisfied improvement in spite of its capacity to capture the overall
improvement of a society. Simply put, Pareto Improvement can bring about
progress, but cannot get rid of conflicts. Confucian Improvement, on the
other hand, is able to achieve universal improvement in interests to the satis-
faction of all. It therefore holds the promise of eliminating conflicts, and
therefore serves as the foundation of a stable and credible system. Confucian
Improvement is effectively Pareto Improvement for everybody; that is, an
inclusive Pareto Improvement. For that reason, Confucian Improvement is
the optimal improvement among all possible ones.
The above test of universal imitation tells us that relational rationality
free of retaliation is not only the reason behind universally valid behavior,
but also the reason behind any universally valid rules of game. Therefore,
no retaliation is the constitutionality of any constitution. It can explain
whether any constitution, law or system has universal validity. Before the
birth of politics, as in Hobbs’s natural state for instance, people naturally
used individual rationality. Therefore, individual rationality is not an
invention of civilization, but human beings’ natural instinct. Only rela-
tional rationality marks the maturity of human civilization. In order for the
new system of Tianxia to become a universal one, it must build on rela-
tional rationality and use relational rationality to define universal values
and compose a global constitution. In that new system of Tianxia, the
achievement most aspired for is to eliminate the zero sum game.
Lastly, I would like to address the concerns and challenges by Western
scholars with regard to the system of Tianxia. William A. Callahan exem-
plifies the concern. He suspects that the system of Tianxia is a new kind
of hegemony called Sinocentrism and will establish “Pax Sinica” under the
rule of China.9 Such concerns are caused by misunderstandings stemming

from the limitations of a theoretical framework. In a European theoretical
framework, the largest concept available for discussing the world order is
empire. Hence, it is very easy to associate Tianxia with an empire.
However, Tianxia is fundamentally different in nature, because it is a sys-
tem that has nothing to do with the conquest, hegemony and hostility
characteristic of an empire. Instead, it is a voluntary, shared and hospitable
system. The concept of Tianxia refers to a compatible system that includes
multiple set-ups in one system. Its compatibility is based on coexistent
relationships formed with relational rationality rather than on a unified
religion or ideology. Therefore, Tianxia is a shared world order, not rul-
ing by a certain country. Its intended result is that no member in the sys-
tem will gain maximized personal interests but can hope for maximized
common security and shared interests. In addition, Salvatore Babones has
proposed a very imaginative challenge. Believing that the world is moving
toward a post-imperialist era, he agrees that a system of Tianxia should be
established in the world. In his opinion, the United States is transforming
itself into a system of Tianxia called “American Tianxia.”10 Moreover, in
future competition, “American Tianxia” will defeat “Chinese Tianxia”.
He states that Tianxia is a “right concept,” but China is a “wrong coun-
try.” Therefore, it is up to the United States to realize the system of
Tianxia. This way of thinking also misunderstands the concept of Tianxia.
Tianxia aims at the internalization of the world by eliminating externali-
ties that trigger conflicts. Therefore, the system does not mean competi-
tion between one country and another, but transition from a non-world to
the world. That is to say, Tianxia envisages a shared right world instead of
a wrong country that practices hegemony. I would like to reiterate a
hypothesis raised in the introduction. If a new system of Tianxia cannot
be established to bring global risks under control, then human beings are
very likely to lose their world.
9
Callahan, William A. (2011). Tianxia, Empire and the World. In W. A. Callahan and
E. Barabantseve (eds.), China Orders the World. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center
Press, p. 105.
10
Babones, Salvatore. (2017). American Tianxia: Chinese Money, American Power and the
End of History. UK: Policy Press.
Index1
A D
All peoples, xvii, 9, 12–14, 23–26, Deer-hunting (a metaphor of battles
29, 46 for the throne), 25, 27
Appeasing those in remote regions, 41 Designated lands, 14
Dudu (governor of province), 39
Duhu (military guardian), 39
C
Cishi (the provincial-level
governor), 39 E
Collective depletion of strategies, 62 Enfeoffment system, 7, 8
Compatibility, 6, 10, 13, 14, Established states, 14, 16
22, 23, 30, 31, 34, 36,
40, 46, 51, 53, 57,
60, 63, 65 F
Concept of governance by virtue, 7 Flexible control, 37, 38, 38n15
Confucian Improvement, 19, 59, 60,
63, 64
Controlled provinces, 38, 39 G
Creating compatibility of all states, 4, Grand unity, 17, 22–24, 22n1, 36, 40, 41
17, 36 Great Khan, 39
1
Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refers to notes.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-5971-2
68 INDEX
I S
Imperial Civil Examination System, Shumiyuan (Privy Council), 39
34, 35 Son of Heaven, 3, 7, 14–16,
In accordance with Heaven, 9, 12, 37, 39
24, 51 Standard voice, 33
J T
Joined states, 14, 16 Taishou (Satrap), 37
Tianxia (all-under-heaven), xvii,
2–19, 22–25, 27, 28, 30–34,
L 36, 37, 40–65
Let all beings be, 10, 59 To be in becoming, 10
Tributary policy, 40
N
Neo-Confucianism of the Song U
dynasty, 35 Uniformity, xvi, 36, 47, 51
Nine Regions of China, 11
W
P Way of Heaven, 9, 10
Political marriages, 36
The privileged domain of the king,
14, 16, 32 X
Xianbei, 31, 34, 35
Xiaowei (the military general), 37
R Xiongnu (Huns), 36, 37
Ritual and music system, 7, 8 Xiyu Duhufu (Western Region
Ruled provinces, 38 Protectorate), 37

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Redefining

More information about this series at

ISSN 2524-8464 ISSN 2524-8472 (electronic)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018968488

Cover illustration: © Melisa Hasan

Throughout the course of human history, Chinese civilization has always

non-­Chinese readers to gain a more systematic understanding of the phi-

August 2018 Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press

I was asked by the Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press to

By way of introduction, I want to make it clear that, though the con-

Beijing, China Tingyang Zhao

1 The Concept of Tianxia and Its Story 1

2 A World-Pattern State: A Whirlpool Formula of China21

3 The Contemporariness of Tianxia43

strategies for international competition that cater only to national i­ nterests.

The Concept of Tianxia and Its Story

Abstract Tianxia is a theory about world politics invented about three

Keywords Tianxia inception • World politics • Trinity world

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd. 2019 1

1.1 The Politics that Started with World Order

political imagining. According to credible historical records, Tianxia as a

each other in equal terms as “Lord of a friendly neighboring state.”5

frequently. With various sides needing to be pacified and reassured, the

At that time, China consisted of many tribal states, allegedly 1000 of

people-centered Confucian thinking may easily be associated with the

benefit distribution: “good governance depends on virtue, and is meant to

1.2 Tianxia as a Trinity of the Three Worlds

1. In a geographical sense, Tianxia refers to all the lands under Heaven,

2. In a socio-psychological sense, Tianxia refers to a world that every-

In the concept of Tianxia, it is more important to have people than to

3. In the sense of political science, Tianxia refers to a political world

worlds completely overlapping with one another. The institutionalization

the old core, akin to acknowledging the possibility of political revolutions.

More interestingly, with regard to the geographical layout of the

mization of mutual hostility. It excludes any acts of retaliation and then

Even though this comment borders on exaggeration, it nonetheless

A World-Pattern State: A Whirlpool

Abstract China has managed to retain, in spirit, the concept of Tianxia

Keywords Cultural advantages • Whirlpool formation • One country

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd. 2019 21

2.1 China as an Epitome of Tianxia

to be highly secular and non-religious. These unique characteristics have not

Since grand unity China encompasses a world structure, its political

2.2 Focal Point and Whirlpool

pendent of others or, as often happens, exchanges can result in hostilities

A fundamental reason behind the emergence and sustained develop-

for by various powers with unyielding persistence in spite of the dangers

1. Chinese characters. The Central Plains was the earliest area to

in Chinese writing a common spiritual resource. In history, many

implies maximum compatibility, with nobody’s participation being

trend.8 Obviously, compatibility and flexibility of recomposition should be

2.3 One Country, Multiple Systems

In sum, China, in the Tianxia age of the pre-Qin period, established a

required by a system, the actual power to control and manage tributaries’

allowing the internal structure of China to take on “worldness.” The tra-

The Contemporariness of Tianxia

Keywords All-inclusiveness • Internalization • Compatibility

3.1 World History Yet to Begin

non-Chinese readers to gain a more systematic understanding of the phi-

August 2018 Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press

Beijing, China Tingyang Zhao

1 The Concept of Tianxia and Its Story 1

2 A World-Pattern State: A Whirlpool Formula of China21

3 The Contemporariness of Tianxia43

strategies for international competition that cater only to national i nterests.

necessary, democratic countries may subject the non-cooperative countries