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 ETHICS

Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction introduces the issues and controversies of con-

temporary moral philosophy. It gets students to struggle with the big questions
of morality; it also relates these questions to practical issues, especially racism,
global warming, moral education, and abortion. Providing a practical method for
thinking about moral issues – a method based largely on the golden rule – it is
written simply and clearly throughout. College students who are new to philoso-
phy or who have already taken an introductory course will benefit from its use.

Key Features:
• Serves as either the sole textbook for a lower-level introductory
ethics course or a supplementary text for a more advanced under-
graduate ethics course.
• Provides clear, direct writing throughout, making each chapter easily
accessible for an engaged undergraduate student.
• Offers a philosophically rigorous presentation of the golden rule.
• Includes helpful study aids, including: bolded technical terms; boxes
for key ideas; summaries, study questions, and suggested readings for
each chapter; and a comprehensive glossary/index.

Key Additions to the Third Edition:

• Each chapter now offers additional, optional sections on more
advanced topics for students wishing to dig deeper into the material
(the twenty-five advanced topics include Kohlberg’s moral psychol-
ogy, whether morality is gendered, types of relativism, early Greek
ethics, Hume, and the prisoner’s dilemma).
• Other improvements include better chapter organization, clearer
explanations, improved examples, new names for key arguments, and
a better Kindle version.
• An updated and improved EthiCola instructional program (with a
score-processing program, teacher’s manual, and class slides) can be
downloaded from the web for free (http://www.harrycola.com/ec
or http://www.harryhiker.com/ec).

Harry J. Gensler, S.J., is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago.

Some of his other books include Formal Ethics (1996), Ethics: Contemporary Readings
(2004), Anthology of Catholic Philosophy (2005), Historical Dictionary of Logic (2006),
Historical Dictionary of Ethics (2008), Ethics and the Golden Rule (2013), Ethics and
Religion (2016), and Introduction to Logic, 3rd ed. (2017).
Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy
Series Editor: Paul K Moser, Loyola University of Chicago

This innovative, well-structured series is for students who have already done an
introductory course in philosophy. Each book introduces a core general subject
in contemporary philosophy and offers students an accessible but substantial
transition from introductory to higher-level college work in that subject. The se-
ries is accessible to non-specialists and each book clearly motivates and expounds
the problems and positions introduced. An orientating chapter briefly introduces
its topic and reminds readers of any crucial material they need to have retained
from a typical introductory course. Considerable attention is given to explaining
the central philosophical problems of a subject and the main competing solutions
and arguments for those solutions. The primary aim is to educate students in the
main problems, positions and arguments of contemporary philosophy rather
than to convince students of a single position.

Recently Published Volumes:

Ethics, 3rd ed. Philosophy of Science, 3rd ed.

Harry J. Gensler Alex Rosenberg
Social and Political Philosophy, 2nd ed. Epistemology, 3rd ed.
John Christman Robert Audi
Metaphysics, 4th ed. Philosophy of Perception
Michael J. Loux and Thomas M. Crisp William Fish
Free Will Philosophy of Language, 2nd ed.
Michael McKenna and Derk Pereboom William G. Lycan
Philosophy of Religion, 2nd ed. Philosophy of Mathematics, 2nd ed.
Keith E. Yandell James Robert Brown
Metaethics Philosophy of Biology
Mark van Roojen Alex Rosenberg and Daniel W. McShea
Moral Psychology Classical Modern Philosophy
Valerie Tiberius Jeffrey Tlumak
Philosophy of Social Science Continental Philosophy
Mark Risjord Andrew Cutrofello
Philosophy of Economics Philosophy of Psychology
Julian Reiss José Luis Bermudez
Philosophy of Mind, 3rd ed. Philosophy of Art
John Heil Noël Carroll
Ancient Philosophy
Christopher Shields

For a full list of published series volumes, please visit

https://www.routledge.com/series/SE0111
 ETHICS
A Contemporary Introduction
Third Edition

Harry J. Gensler
ROUTLEDGE

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

NEW YORK AND LONDON

Third edition published 2018
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

and by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2018 Taylor and Francis

The right of Harry J. Gensler to be identified as author of this work has been
asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known
or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the
publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered

trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent
to infringe.

First edition published 1998 by Routledge

Second edition published 2011 by Routledge

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record for this title has been requested

ISBN: 978-0-8153-7865-5 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-8153-7867-9 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-351-23183-1 (ebk)

Publisher’s Note: This book has been prepared from camera-ready copy provided
by the author.
Contents

Preface ix
Introduction 1
Philosophy 1 Study suggestions 4
Logical reasoning 1 Chapter summary 5
Moral philosophy 2 Study questions 6
Why study ethics? 4 For further study 6

PART ONE: POPULAR METAETHICS 7

Chapter 1: Cultural Relativism 8
Ima Relativist 8 CR’s challenge 16
Conformity 10 Kohlberg (optional) 17
Race, climate, children 10 Is morality gendered? (optional) 18
Cultural differences 11 Types of relativism (optional) 19
Products of culture 14 Chapter summary 21
No neutral standpoint 15 Study questions 21
Tolerance 16 For further study 22

Chapter 2: Subjectivism 23
Ima Subjectivist 23 Early Greek ethics (optional) 31
Objections to SB 25 Hume (optional) 34
Ima Idealist 26 The prisoner’s dilemma (optional) 35
Rational feelings 27 Chapter summary 36
IO examples 28 Study questions 37
Problems with IO 30 For further study 37

Chapter 3: Supernaturalism 39
Ima Supernaturalist 39 Modified SN (optional) 46
Knowing God’s will 41 Supernatural virtues (optional) 48
The atheism objection 43 Chapter summary 49
Socrates’s question 44 Study questions 50
SN arguments 45 For further study 51
Ethics and religion 45
vi Ethics

PART TWO: PHILOSOPHICAL METAETHICS 53

Chapter 4: Intuitionism 54
Ima Intuitionist 54 Reforming naturalism (optional) 61
Objective truths 56 Property naturalism (optional) 62
Self-evident truths 57 Chapter summary 66
Objections 60 Study questions 67
Reconstruction 61 For further study 67

Chapter 5: Emotivism 

Logical positivism 69 Moderate emotivism 76
“Good” is emotional 71 The error theory (optional) 77
The simplicity argument 72 Positivism and religion (optional) 79
Moral reasoning 73 Chapter summary 81
Positivism problems 74 Study questions 82
Simplicity problems 75 For further study 83
Emotivism doesn’t work 75

Chapter 6: Prescriptivism 84
Ima Prescriptivist 84 Sartre (optional) 91
Freedom and reason 85 De Beauvoir (optional) 92
Moral reasoning 86 Chapter summary 93
Against Nazis 88 Study questions 94
Objections 89 For further study 95

PART THREE: GOLDEN RULE CONSISTENCY 97

Chapter 7: GR Logic 98
Our strategy 98 Don’t combine these 114
Consistency in beliefs 99 GR variations 118
Consistency in will 101 Kant and GR (optional) 120
Impartiality 104 Chapter summary 121
A GR theorem 107 Study questions 122
In the same situation 109 For further study 123
Willing that if 112

Chapter 8: GR Applications 124

Moral rationality 124 Animal treatment (optional) 141
Racist principles 128 Immigration (optional) 143
Racist arguments 131 Professional responsibilities (optional) 145
Racist actions 134 Chapter summary 148
Global warming 135 Study questions 148
Moral education 137 For further study 149

Chapter 9: GR Frameworks 150
GR justifications 150
GR rights and virtues 152
GR in Christianity 154
GR in other faiths 156
GR and evolution 161
PART FOUR: NORMATIVE ETHICS 173
Chapter 10: Consequentialism 174
Normative ethics 174
Ima Utilitarian 175
Consequentialisms 178
Bizarre implications 180
Ima Rule Utilitarian 183
RU problems 187
Chapter 11: Nonconsequentialism 193
Four prima facie duties 193
Virtues 196
Four commandments 199
Rights and justice 201
Chapter 12: Synthesis Chapter 211
Nonconsequentialism 211
Consequentialism 213
Metaethical views 214
GR consistency 215
Some questions 217
Double effect (optional) 220
Suggested Works 228
Bibliography 229
Glossary/Index 235
Preface vii
GR and natural law 165
GR and Hobbes (optional) 170
Chapter summary 171
Study questions 172
For further study 172
Bentham and Mill (optional) 188
The trolley problem (optional) 189
Chapter summary 190
Study questions 191
For further study 192
Free will and determinism (optional) 205
Chapter summary 208
Study questions 209
For further study 210
Abortion and virtue (optional) 222
Abortion and violinists (optional) 222
Abortion and feminism (optional) 223
Chapter summary 225
Study questions 226
For further study 227
Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com
Preface

This third edition of Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction, while building on the

strengths of earlier editions, has some major improvements.
The basic plan is the same, but enhanced. Get students to struggle with the
big questions about morality. Start with a dreadful view that so many of them
like – that good is relative to culture, that “good” means “socially approved.”
Use a fictional Ima Relativist student to present the view convincingly; then
demolish the view. Push students to think critically instead of just accepting what
sounds good. Get them to ask how, in such a diverse world, we can think out
moral issues together in the wisest and most rational way. Study views that base
ethics on feelings, God’s will, or reason; focus on good points and flaws in the
views. Then move toward a sophisticated version of earth’s most global general
moral perspective – the golden rule, “Treat other as you want to be treated.”
Emphasize the importance of knowing how your action affects others, imagining
yourself on the receiving end of the action, and treating others only as you’re
willing to be treated in the same situation. Apply this to areas like racism and
sexism, global warming, teaching morality to children, animal treatment, immi-
gration, and professional ethics. Explore how the golden rule is global and
connects to world religions and evolution. Then investigate utilitarianism and
nonconsequentialism, and issues about virtue and justice. To wrap up, apply the
various views in the book to the hotly disputed topic of abortion. Along the way,
be clear, concise, and direct – and provide great examples, class slides, and
computer instructional software.
I’m happy with how earlier editions were received. I’ve got much positive
feedback from teachers, students, and general readers. And I’m gratified that the
book was translated into French, Chinese, Thai, and Persian.
I’ve taught this book and the intro ethics course regularly the last few years.
And I’ve written two further books on related topics: Ethics and the Golden Rule
(Routledge 2013) and Ethics and Religion (Cambridge 2016). These experiences
gave me ideas on how to improve this book.
This third edition is better organized and flows more smoothly. Its division
into four main parts is now clearer. I reorganized the golden-rule part into chap-
ters on GR logic, GR applications, and GR frameworks. I cut out the separate
chapters on virtue and on natural law, which interrupted the flow of ideas, and
x Ethics

put these themes into other chapters in a more integrated way.

This third edition adds optional sections on advanced topics; teachers can
choose to cover these in class, ignore them (the book makes sense without them),
or just encourage interested students to read them. These sections extend the
range of the book, now making it suitable for introductory to intermediate ethics courses.
To see what these are about, look for “(optional)” in the Contents; the first six
sections deal with Kohlberg’s moral psychology, whether morality is gendered,
types of relativism, early Greek ethics, Hume, and the prisoner’s dilemma.
There are many other improvements. These include clearer explanations,
better examples, names for key arguments, a better Kindle version, and a greater
emphasis on consistency, global warming, multiculturalism, ethical universals,
evolution and biology, and groupism.
I improved the companion EthiCola software, which runs on Windows,
Macintosh, and Linux. I adapted the program to Windows touchscreens and
tablets, made it easier to set up on Macs, and updated chapter exercises. EthiCola
(with a score-processing program, teacher manual, and class slides) can be
downloaded for free from either of these Web addresses (harrycola.com and
harryhiker.com are clones of each other – so if one fails then try the other):

http://www.harrycola.com/ec
http://www.harryhiker.com/ec
http://www.routledge.com/cw/gensler

The teacher manual and class slides are conveniently accessible from EthiCola’s
HELP menu; so I suggest that you just install EthiCola (teachers should check
the option to install the score processor too).
I wish to thank all who somehow contributed to this third edition. I thank
Andy Beck at Routledge and his staff and reviewers, who made good suggestions.
I thank my ethics students, especially those whose puzzled looks pushed me to
make things clearer. And I thank the many teachers, students, and self-learners
who have e-mailed me over the years.
I hope you enjoy the book. I hope it deepens your appreciation of the golden
rule. And I hope it helps you think more clearly about one of life’s central ques-
tions: “How can we form our moral beliefs in the wisest and most rational way?”

Harry J. Gensler
Philosophy Department
Loyola University Chicago
Chicago, IL 60660, USA

http://www.harrycola.com
http://www.harryhiker.com
Introduction

This book is an introduction to moral philosophy. So what is moral philosophy? But

first, what is philosophy?

A. Philosophy
Philosophy is reasoning about the big questions of life. Is there a God? Are our actions
free or determined? Are we completely explainable in material terms? How ought
we to live? … Such questions are difficult and controversial. Our answers, good
or bad, give us a perspective for thinking and acting – a “world view.” But our
first attempts at answering may be confused and poorly thought out.
Philosophy reasons about such big questions. We first try to get clear on what
the question is answering. Then we consider possible views – and problems that
these may lead to; we eliminate views that lead to absurdities. We look for the
most adequate of the remaining views. If we can’t completely resolve the issue,
at least we can arrive at a well thought-out answer.
Other disciplines deal in their own way with the big questions. So we can
study the history of belief in God, its psychological causes or stages, or its treatment
in literature or religious traditions. While valuable, these studies don’t replace philoso-
phy – which rationally debates the big questions (like whether God exists).

B. Logical reasoning
Reasoning in philosophy resembles reasoning in other areas. We reason about
things like who committed the murder, what car to buy, whether there’s a great-
est prime number, or how to cure cancer. As we approach these issues, we clarify
the question and gather background information. We review what others have
said. We consider alternative views and objections to them. We make distinctions
and weigh pros and cons. We sometimes do experiments. The climax comes
when we take a stand and try to justify it. We explain that the answer must be
such and such, and we point to other facts to justify our answer; this is logical
reasoning, where we go from premises to a conclusion.
Logical reasoning concludes something from something else. We might con-
clude that the butler committed the murder from the beliefs that (1) either the
butler or the maid did it, and (2) the maid didn’t do it. If we put such reasoning
2 Introduction

into words, we get an argument – a set of statements consisting of premises and

a conclusion (here “‫ ”׵‬is short for “therefore”):

Either the butler or the maid did it. B or M

The maid didn’t do it. Not-M
‫ ׵‬The butler did it. ‫ ׵‬B

This argument is valid, which means that the conclusion follows logically from
the premises: if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. To prove
something, we need a valid argument with true premises; if we have both, then our
conclusion has to be true. If we give clearly true premises from which our con-
clusion logically follows, then we’ve proved our conclusion. And to attack an
argument, we need to dispute its validity or the truth of its premises.
Doing philosophy involves much logical reasoning. We often attack a view P
by showing that it leads to an absurdity Q:

If P is true, then Q would be true.

Q is false.
‫ ׵‬P is false.

It’s important to examine a view’s implications and look for flaws. We can show
a view to be false by showing that it has false implications; and we at least cast
doubt on the view by showing that it has doubtful implications.
In developing our philosophical views, reasoning and personal commitment
are both important. Reasoning alone won’t resolve all the disputes. After consid-
ering arguments on both sides, we have to make up our own minds. But if we
pick a view with strong objections, then we need to respond to these.
Philosophy doesn’t argue from religious revelation or tradition. If you argue
from these, then you’re doing theology, not philosophy.

C. Moral philosophy

Metaethics: What is the nature and methodology of moral judgments?

Normative Ethics: What principles ought we to live by?

Moral philosophy (ethics) is reasoning about the big questions of morality. Its two
main branches deal with two central questions.
Metaethics studies the nature and methodology of moral judgments. It asks
questions like: What do “good” and “ought” mean? Are there moral truths? Is
there moral knowledge? How can we justify or rationally defend moral beliefs?
Metaethical views often have two parts: one is about the nature of moral judg-
ments (perhaps a definition of “good”) and the other is about method (how to
 Introduction 3

pick our moral principles). For example, cultural relativism says (1) “good” means
“socially approved” and (2) we should pick our moral principles by following
what our society approves of. While cultural relativism bases morality on social
conventions, other views may base it on personal feelings, God’s will, self-
evident truths, or something else.
Normative ethics, moral philosophy’s other branch, studies what principles
we ought we to live by. It defends or attacks claims about four main areas:

• what actions we ought to do,

• what ends are intrinsically good,
• what character traits are virtuous, and
• what moral rights we have.

Normative ethics has two levels. Normative ethical theory looks for very gen-
eral moral principles – about actions, intrinsic goodness, virtues, or rights. An
example of a normative ethical theory is classical utilitarianism, which makes these
claims (here happiness = pleasure and the avoidance of pain):

• “We ought to do whatever maximizes the total happiness (counting

everyone’s happiness).”
• “Only happiness is intrinsically good; so the good life, for ourselves or
another, is a happy life.”
• “Virtues (like kindness and patience) are character traits that tend to
promote happiness; we’re morally good persons if our actions are habit-
ually motivated to maximize the total happiness.”
• “Our basic moral right is to have our happiness count equally with that
of everyone else; social arrangements that violate this are unjust.”

In contrast, applied ethics studies specific moral issues like abortion or lying,
or moral issues in areas like business or medicine. Both levels endorse moral
principles. They say things like “We ought to do such and such …”
We’ll start with metaethics, since it’s about method and thus more basic. Later
we’ll use our method to arrive at moral principles. Chapters 1 to 12 divide up
into four groups of three chapters each:

• Popular Metaethics (Chapters 1–3): basing morality on social conven-

tions, personal feelings, or God’s will.
• Philosophical Metaethics (Chapters 4–6): basing morality on self-evident
truths, emotional exclamations, or impartial imperatives.
• Golden Rule Consistency (Chapters 7–9): a powerful approach to moral
rationality, built on “Treat others as you want to be treated.”
• Normative Ethics (Chapters 10–2): two types of normative theory and
then a final synthesis chapter that applies the views that we’ve studied
to the hotly disputed topic of abortion.
4 Introduction

When you finish the book, you should have a good basic understanding of moral
philosophy and some of its main approaches.

D. Why study ethics?

I can think of four reasons to study moral philosophy – besides the fact that, for
many of us, it’s very interesting.
(1) Moral philosophy can deepen our reflection on life’s big questions. As we
live, we assume some answer to these questions, or perhaps a confused mixture
of answers. Philosophy helps us to think these things out better.
(2) Moral philosophy can improve our moral thinking. It can give us useful
tools and help us to see the big picture. As we grow up, we’re continually told
what’s good or bad, or what we ought or ought not to do; our parents tell us this
– as do our teachers, our friends, and the wider society. Eventually, we have to
sort through these values and form our own moral beliefs. But how can we do
this in the wisest way? That’s the central issue of moral philosophy.
(3) Moral philosophy can enrich our professional and parental lives. Most pro-
fessions (like politics, business, medicine, religion, and education) raise ethical
issues; moral philosophy can help with these – as it can also help with parental
issues, like how to teach morality to our children.
(4) Moral philosophy can sharpen our general thinking skills. Philosophy
majors do awesomely well on standardized exams for getting into graduate
programs in law, business, and medicine. Philosophy teaches us to think rigor-
ously, understand and evaluate conflicting points of view, express ideas clearly,
and reason carefully. These skills are valuable in life, and philosophy can develop
them like nothing else can.

E. Study suggestions
This book has lots of study helps. There are boxes or bullets with key points,
chapter summaries, study questions, computer exercises, and suggestions for
further readings. Key terms are introduced in bold; learn each such term and its
definition; the Glossary/Index has a collection of definitions. Sections marked
“(optional)” discuss advanced topics; unless your teacher tells you otherwise, you
might skip these (and footnotes) if you want to keep things simpler.
Many chapters feature presentations by fictional students. In the next chapter,
the fictional Ima Relativist will explain and defend cultural relativism. Take her
view seriously and try to understand it. Try to explain it accurately, without
slanted language. A good motto for doing philosophy is “Understand before you
criticize.” After you understand a view, reflect on how plausible you find it and
how well it accords with your own thinking. Then look for objections.
Read the fictional presentation several times. First read to get the general idea.
Read it again to get the details; be sympathetic, as if you were listening to a friend
explain her views. Read it again critically, trying to uncover weak points and
problems. Finally, after you’ve discussed the view in class, read it again to see
 Introduction 5

where you stand.

After each fictional presentation, I’ll raise objections. Consider these carefully,
and try to express them in your own words. Ask whether they’re good objections,
or whether they misunderstand the view or can be answered. You may have
further objections yourself.
Every view, even false ones, can teach us something. If you reject a view, you
might still incorporate some of its ideas into your own thinking. Or you might
use the rejected view to help you develop a sharply opposed approach.
Relate the views to practical issues. Ask yourself how a view would apply to
racism, global warming, or teaching morality to your children. Concrete applica-
tions can help us to understand philosophical views and see their relevance.
This book is an introduction to moral philosophy and isn’t meant to be the
last word on the subject. There’s much more to say about all this. The end of
each chapter mentions further readings that you might want to pursue.
Moral philosophy is difficult and controversial. As you study it, you may at
times feel perplexed and overwhelmed; this reaction is common. Radically
opposed views can seem equally plausible, and a view that seems convincing at
first can sometimes be demolished by a few well-placed objections. Don’t be
discouraged; instead, try to make progress. You may not arrive at the final
answers, but you can hope to improve your understanding of morality and arrive
at answers that are more adequate and better thought out.

F. Chapter summary
To do philosophy is to reason about the big questions of life – questions like “Is
there a God?” and “Are our actions free or determined?”
Philosophy reasons about such questions. We first try to get clear on what the
question is asking. Then we consider the range of possible answers. We criticize
each answer as brutally as we can; and we eliminate views that lead to absurdities.
We look for the most adequate of the remaining views. If we can’t completely
resolve the issue, at least we can hope to arrive at a well thought-out belief.
Logical reasoning about philosophical questions involves constructing argu-
ments (premises and a conclusion). We aim for clearly true premises from which
our conclusion logically follows. The most common way to reason attacks a view
by showing that it logically implies things that are false or doubtful.
Moral philosophy (ethics) reasons about the big questions of morality; it has
two parts. Metaethics studies the nature and methodology of moral judgments; it
deals with what “good” means, whether there are moral truths, and how to justify
moral beliefs. Normative ethics studies which principles we ought we to live by; it
defends or attacks claims about what actions we ought to do, what ends are intrin-
sically good, what character traits are virtuous, and what moral rights we have.
Metaethics is more basic, since it studies how to pick moral principles.
In this book we’ll first consider views about the nature and methodology of
ethics. Then we’ll consider a practical approach to moral rationality that stresses
6 Introduction

consistency and the golden rule. Then we’ll do some normative ethics. In study-
ing moral philosophy, we’ll be wrestling with some big questions of life, refining
our moral thinking, preparing to deal with ethical issues in our professional and
parental lives, and sharpening our general thinking skills.

G. Study questions
I suggest that you write out the answers to these study questions; this will help
to solidify the ideas in your mind and give you a good source for review. Or, if
you prefer, create an chapter outline that also has the answers to these questions.
If you don’t know an answer, go back to the section that deals with it.

1. What is philosophy? Give two examples of questions that it deals with. (A)
2. If you had a previous philosophy course, what definition of “philosophy”
did you learn? Was the definition radically different from the one given
here, or was it just phrased differently? Give two issues that you dealt with.
3. What other subjects deal with the big questions? How does their approach
differ from that of philosophy?
4. Philosophy reasons about the big questions. Explain what this “reasoning”
in a general sense involves. (B)
5. What is logical reasoning? What is an argument? What two things do we
need to prove something?
6. What is the most common way to argue against a philosophical view?
7. What is moral philosophy? Explain its two main questions and the differ-
ence between metaethics and normative ethics. (C)
8. What four areas does normative ethics investigate?
9. Why study moral philosophy? (D)
10. Who is Ima Relativist and how should we approach her view? (E)
11. Explain this motto: “Understand before you criticize.” How might some-
one violate this idea?

H. For further study

Do the EthiCola exercise for “Ethics 00 – Introduction.” The end of the Preface
(page x) explains how to download the EthiCola program.
For a longer introduction to philosophy, see Audi’s “Philosophy.” For a
longer introduction to logic, see Chapter 1 of Gensler’s Introduction to Logic.
You may at times want to consult other works and see what they say about
the various views; the “Suggested Works” page at the back of the book has
general suggestions. You may also want to consult my Historical Dictionary of Ethics
(Gensler and Spurgin). My Ethics: Contemporary Readings (Gensler, Spurgin, and
Swindal) is a good companion for this present book and has primary-source read-
ings to go with specific chapters. The Bibliography at the end of the book has
information on these works.
Part One

Popular Metaethics
1 Cultural Relativism

Cultural Relativism (CR): “Good” means

“socially approved.” Pick your moral principles
by following what your society approves of.

Cultural relativism (CR) says that good and bad are relative to culture. What is
“good” is what is “socially approved” in a given culture.
We’ll begin by listening to the fictional Ima Relativist explain her belief in
cultural relativism. As you read this, reflect on how plausible you find her view
and how it fits your own thinking. We’ll later consider objections.

1.1 Ima Relativist

My name is Ima Relativist. I’ve embraced cultural relativism as I’ve come to
appreciate the deeply cultural basis for morality.
I was brought up to believe that morality is about objective facts. Just as snow
is white, so also infanticide is wrong. But attitudes vary with time and place. The
norms I was taught are those of my own society; other societies have different
ones. Morality is a cultural construct. Just as societies create different styles of
food and clothing, so too they create different moral codes. I learned this in
anthropology class and experienced it as an exchange student in Mexico.
Consider my belief that infanticide is wrong. I was taught this as an objective
truth. But it isn’t; it’s just what my society holds. When I say “Infanticide is
wrong,” this just means that my society disapproves of it. For ancient Romans,
infanticide was all right. There’s no sense in asking which side is “correct.” Their
view is true relative to their culture, and our view is true relative to ours. There
are no objective truths about right or wrong. When we claim otherwise, we’re
just imposing our culturally taught attitudes as the “objective truth.”
“Good” is a relative term, and thus needs a further reference to complete its
sense. Something isn’t “to the left” absolutely, but only “to the left ofx” this or
that; the door might be to the left of me but to the right of you. Similarly, something
isn’t “good” absolutely, but only “good in” this or that society; infanticide might
be good in my society but bad in your society.
We can express CR most clearly as a definition: “X is good” means “The
 Cultural Relativism 9

majority (of the society in question) approves of X.” Unless otherwise specified,
the society is that of the person making the judgment. When I say “Hitler acted
wrongly,” I mean “according to the standards of my society.”
While I’ve emphasized good and bad actions, the same analysis applies to what
goals are intrinsically good, what character traits are virtuous, and what moral rights we
have. Society decides such questions for its members, and different societies may
decide them in very different ways.
The myth of objectivity says that things can be good or bad “absolutely” –
not relative to this or that culture. I have three arguments for rejecting this and
moving to cultural relativism.
(1) My cultural differences argument points out that cultures can differ radically
on moral issues, like infanticide, polygamy, and women’s rights. When we speak
of good or bad absolutely, we’re just absolutizing the norms of our society and
taking them to be objective facts; so, in dealing with conflicting norms from
another culture, we think that we’re right and they’re wrong. Believing in objective
values is provincial and narrow minded; those who accept this myth of objectiv-
ity need to study anthropology or live for a time in another culture.
(2) My product of culture argument begins by seeing that societies create value
systems and teach them to their members. We shudder at the idea of infanticide,
because we were taught to shudder; if we were brought up in ancient Rome, we’d
think of infanticide as perfectly fine. Societies create different styles of clothing,
different types of food, different ways of speaking, and different values. The
clothing styles and the values of another culture aren’t objectively right or wrong;
they’re just different.
(3) My no neutral standpoint argument points out that there’s no neutral stand-
point for arguing against another culture’s values. Scientific issues can be decided
by experiments; if someone thinks heavy objects fall faster than light ones, we
can drop objects of different weights and see which ones hit the ground first.
Moral issues aren’t like this. When we argue about ethics, we just assume the
values of our own culture. There’s nothing objective here.
As I’ve come to believe in cultural relativism, I’ve grown in my acceptance of
other cultures. Like many exchange students, I used to have this “we’re right and
they’re wrong” attitude. I struggled against this. I’ve come to realize that the other
side isn’t “wrong” but just “different.” We have to see others from their point
of view; if we criticize them, we’re just imposing the standards of our society. We
cultural relativists are more tolerant.
Through cultural relativism I’ve also come to be more accepting of the norms
of my own society. CR gives a basis for a common morality within a culture – a
democratic basis that pools everyone’s ideas and ensures that the norms have
wide support. So I can feel solidarity with my own people, even though other
groups have different values.

Before going on, reflect on your reaction to cultural relativism.

What do you like or dislike about it? Do you have objections?
10 Part 1: Popular Metaethics

1.2 Conformity
Ima has given us a clear formulation of an approach that many find attractive.
She’s beginning to think about morality and to grow in her moral thinking. Yet
I’m convinced that her basic perspective on morality is wrong. Ima will likely
agree as she gets clearer on her thinking.
CR’s big problem is that it forces us to conform to society’s norms – or else
we contradict ourselves. If “good” and “socially approved” mean the same thing,
then whatever is one has to be the other. So this reasoning would be valid, and
we could prove that something is good from the premise that it’s socially approved:

X is socially approved.
‫ ׵‬X is good.

And this statement would be self-contradictory:

X is socially approved but it isn’t good.

If CR is true, then we have to conform completely to our society’s values – we

can’t consistently disagree with them – we aren’t free to think for ourselves on
moral issues. This is an absurd result. We surely can consistently disagree with
our society’s values. We can consistently affirm that something is socially approved
but deny that it’s good. This would be impossible if CR were true.
Ima could bite the bullet (accept the implausible result), and hold that it is
self-contradictory to disagree morally with the majority. But this is a difficult
bullet to bite. Ima would have to hold that civil rights leaders contradicted them-
selves when they disagreed with accepted views on segregation. She’d have to
conform to the majority view on all moral issues – even if the majority is igno-
rant. And if majority opinions change, then she’d have to change her moral
beliefs too. With CR, the central virtue of the moral life is conformity (being a
follower instead of an independent thinker); good actions are ones that are socially
approved. By outlawing disagreements, CR would stagnate society and violate the
critical spirit that characterizes philosophy.

1.3 Race, climate, children

As you consider a view about morality, don’t be too abstract. Apply the view to
concrete issues, to see how it works. Look for areas where the view gives
implausible results. Here we’ll consider how CR applies to racism, global warm-
ing, and teaching morality to our children.
(1) Racism. Imagine that you live in a society that practices and approves of
extreme racism – perhaps America before the Civil War (with black slavery) or
Nazi Germany (with the killing of Jews). A satisfying view of morality should
show how to attack racist actions; CR fails at this, since it holds that racist actions
are good in a society if they’re socially approved. Even worse, CR logically entails
 Cultural Relativism 11

that protesters who say “Racist actions are socially approved but not good” contradict
themselves. These CR implications are difficult to accept.
(2) Global warming. Roughly speaking, there are two main views. Climate-change
affirmers say the earth is rapidly warming, this is mostly caused by human activity,
and humanity ought to make radical changes, especially in its use of fossil fuels,
to prevent catastrophic harm for future generations. Climate-change deniers, in
contrast, claim that human activity isn’t a major cause for recent temperature
increases (which take place for other random causes) and humanity needn’t
change its use of fossil fuels. If we followed CR consistently, we’d go with which-
ever view was socially accepted by the majority; this is the “good” view, even if
people accept it out of ignorance of the scientific evidence. Applying CR to
global warming could bring disastrous consequences to humanity.
(3) Teaching morality to our children. If we accepted CR, how would we bring up
our children to think about morality? We’d teach them to think and live by
current social norms – whatever these were. We’d teach the virtue of conformity
instead of critical thinking. We’d teach that these are correct reasoning: “My
society approves of A, so A is good,” “My peer-group approves of driving while
drunk, so this is good,” and “My Nazi society approves of racism, so racism is
good.” Our children will grow up to be conformist professionals who think the
“socially accepted” way is always the “good” way. Applying CR to moral educa-
tion would have unhappy consequences.
CR may sound good when viewed abstractly; but it applies poorly to issues
like racism, global warming, and teaching morality to children.1

1.4 Cultural differences

Moral realism claims that some things are objectively right or wrong, indepen-
dently of what anyone may think or feel. Dr Martin Luther King (1963), for
example, claimed that racist actions were objectively wrong. Racism’s wrongness
was a fact; any person or culture that approved of racism was mistaken. In saying
this, King wasn’t absolutizing accepted norms; instead, he rejected accepted norms.
He appealed to a higher truth about right and wrong, one that didn’t depend on
human thinking or feeling. He appealed to objective values.
Ima rejects this belief in objective values and calls it “the myth of objectivity.”
On her view, actions are good or bad only relative to this or that culture; against
1
The anthropologist Ruth Benedict was a major defender of CR (1934): “We recognize that
morality differs in every society and is a convenient term for socially approved habits. Mankind
has always preferred to say, ‘It is morally good,’ rather than ‘It is habitual’ …. But historically
the two phrases are synonymous.” However, in writing about American racism later, she
ignored her CR and saw racism as both socially approved and bad (like a sickness). She used
anthropology to counter ideas about racial inferiority, claiming that the top third of the human
race – physically, intellectually, or morally – includes people of all races. She urged America to
“treat people on their merits, without reference to any label of race or religion or country of
origin” and “ensure human dignity to all Americans” – even though these ideas clashed with
her view that good = socially approved. While CR may seem sophisticated when we study
other cultures, CR is a very unsophisticated way to actually reason about moral issues.
12 Part 1: Popular Metaethics

King, actions can never be good or bad objectively. But are objective values really
a “myth”? Against objective values, Ima gave the cultural differences, product of culture,
and no neutral standpoint arguments. This is her first argument:

My cultural differences argument points out that cultures can differ

radically on moral issues, like infanticide, polygamy, and women’s
rights. When we speak of good or bad absolutely, we’re just absolutiz-
ing the norms of our society and taking them to be objective facts;
so, in dealing with conflicting norms from another culture, we think
that we’re right and they’re wrong. Believing in objective values is provin-
cial and narrow minded; those who accept this myth of objectivity
need to study anthropology or live for a time in another culture.

Let’s express this reasoning more clearly. The desired conclusion is “No moral
beliefs are objectively true.” Here’s a strict premise-conclusion formulation:

No idea on which there is wide disagreement is objectively true.

All moral beliefs are ideas on which there is wide disagreement.
‫ ׵‬No moral beliefs are objectively true.

While the conclusion follows validly from the premises,1 both premises are
doubtful. Against premise 1, a wide disagreement doesn’t show that there’s no
truth of the matter, that neither side is right or wrong. There’s much disagree-
ment about cholesterol, religion, and the causes of global warming; yet there may
still be a truth of the matter about these areas.
Premise 2 is also doubtful. While some moral beliefs have wide disagreement,
others have wide global agreement.2 Most cultures have similar norms against
stealing, lying, adultery, and killing. Many moral differences come from applying
similar basic values to different situations. The golden rule, “Treat others as you
want to be treated,” is widely accepted across cultures. And the United Nations
and the world religions have consensus statements about ethics.
Ima and CR distort ethical differences in at least six other ways. (1) CR sees
the world as neatly divided into morally uniform societies. While there are big moral
differences between societies, there’s little moral difference within each society, since
the majority decides the norms. But the world isn’t like that. Instead, the world
is a confusing mixture of overlapping societies and groups; and individuals in a
given society, far from simply following the majority view, may differ widely
among themselves on moral issues. Consider speed limits. We pretty much agree
on what the “official speed limit” for a given place is (since the government
decides this), but we disagree on whether it’s morally proper to go much over the
speed limit (since this expresses our individual beliefs).
CR leads us to see other societies in oversimplified stereotypes. Someone

1
This syllogistic reasoning (“No A is B, all C is A ‫ ׵‬no C is B”) is clearly valid (Gensler 2017).
2
Kinnier (2000) summarizes recent scientific research about ethical universals.
 Cultural Relativism 13

might say, “We Americans respect human rights and oppose terrorism; but soci-
ety X believes in terrorism and opposes human rights.” But both societies likely
have many people on both sides of the civil-rights issue. In America, the news
often has a story about a white supremacy group or an individual who acts vio-
lently against gays or Muslims. And society X likely has some individuals who push
for civil rights and fair treatment for all. CR encourages a WE versus THEY
mentality, where both groups are looked upon in an oversimplified way.
(2) CR ignores the subgroup problem. We all belong to overlapping groups. I’m
part of a specific nation, state, city, and neighborhood; and I’m also part of
family, professional, religious, and peer groups. These groups often have
conflicting values. According to CR, when I say “Racism is wrong” I mean “My
society disapproves of racism.” But which society does this refer to? Maybe most
in my national and religious societies disapprove of racism, while most in my
professional and family societies approve of it. CR could give us clear guidance
only if we belonged to just one society. But the world is more complicated than
that. We’re all multicultural to some extent.
Excessive partisanship is a problem in the United States. Citizens and politi-
cians often identify strongly with their political subgroup, whether Republican or
Democrat: “good” becomes what their party accepts and “bad” what the other
party accepts. Conformity with party replaces a concern for truth, the common
good, and a fair appraisal of arguments.
(3) CR says that those who believe in objective values are just absolutizing the
values they learned from their society. This needn’t be the case, as we see from
Martin Luther King. In asserting racism’s objective wrongness, King didn’t
absolutize accepted norms; instead, he disagreed with accepted norms.
(4) Moral realists needn’t say “We’re right and they’re wrong.” Perhaps there’s
a truth to be found in moral matters, but no culture has a monopoly on this truth.
Different cultures may need to learn from each other. To see the errors and blind
spots in our own values, we may need to see how other cultures do things, and
how they react to what we do. Learning about other cultures can help to correct
our cultural biases and move closer to the truth about how we ought to live.
Ima rejects the dogmatic “We’re right and they’re wrong” attitude. And she
stresses the need to understand the other side from their point of view. These
are positive ideas. But her view that neither side can be wrong limits our ability
to learn from how other cultures do things. A culture that can’t be wrong thereby
can’t correct its mistakes.
(5) Moral realism can respect most cultural differences, even though it insists
that some things are objectively right or wrong. Different societies often have dif-
ferent ways to promote common objective values. Traffic laws everywhere ought
to promote traffic safety; but societies can legitimately differ in which laws they
set up to do this (for example, whether we should all drive on the left or all drive
on the right). And all societies ought to have rules and customs that promote the
goods of family life (loving relationships and raising children); but societies can
differ on how to do this most effectively for their people (with perhaps arranged
marriages in some places). Many cultural differences are experiments in living that
14 Part 1: Popular Metaethics

test different ways to promote common objective values (like healthcare for all
at an affordable price). Often cultures can learn from each other; so if we have a
problem with weak family life or expensive healthcare, we might study other cul-
tures who handle these issues better.
Moral realism can accept strong principles about human rights. It can hold
that hurting people because of their race is objectively wrong – and that any society
that approves of this needs to change. CR cannot accept such things. Respecting
a range of cultural differences doesn’t make you a cultural relativist. What makes
you a cultural relativist is the claim that anything that’s socially approved must
thereby be good (including hurting people because of their race).
(6) CR does little to establish common norms between societies. As technology
shrinks the planet, moral disputes between societies become more important.
Nation A approves of equal rights for women (or for other races or religions),
but nation B disapproves. What is a multinational corporation that works in both
societies to do? Or societies A and B have value conflicts that lead to war. Since
CR helps very little with such problems, it gives a poor basis for life in the twenty-
first century. Maybe moral realism can do better.

1.5 Product of culture

Here’s Ima Relativist’s second argument – and a stricter formulation:

My product of culture argument begins by seeing that societies create

value systems and teach them to their members. We shudder at the
idea of infanticide, because we were taught to shudder; if we had
been brought up in ancient Rome, we’d think of infanticide as
perfectly fine. Societies create different styles of clothing, different
types of food, different ways of speaking, and different values. The
clothing styles and the values of another culture aren’t objectively
right or wrong; they’re just different.

No products of culture express objective truths.

All moral beliefs are products of culture.
‫ ׵‬No moral beliefs express objective truths.

Again, both premises are doubtful. Against premise 1, some products of culture
express objective truths. Every book is a product of culture; and yet many books
express some objective truths. Every statement (since it’s expressed in a human
language) is a product of culture; and yet many statements express objective
truths. So too, a moral code could be a product of culture and yet still express
some objective truths about how people ought to live.
Against premise 2, it’s too simple just to say “All moral beliefs are products of
culture.” Yes, our culture greatly influences our moral beliefs, even though we may
reject some cultural norms. But other factors contribute much to our moral
thinking, such as:
 Cultural Relativism 15

• Individual differences. Individuals, based on their own thoughts, feel-

ings, and experiences, may form moral beliefs that diverge from
those of the larger group.
• Logic. When society teaches us a pair of logically incompatible norms,
rationality may push us to reconsider both norms and reject one.
• Biology. To promote our survival, evolution built into us certain social
instincts (like the golden rule and concern for the group), as it did for
other social animals (like wolves and honey bees).
• Religion. Genuine religion can call us to a higher standard than does
society, for example to love everyone instead of just our group.
• Developmental psychology. The psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg (§1.9)
claims that people of every culture develop moral thinking through
set stages. CR is an immature conformism typical of teenagers; as we
grow out of this, we begin to think for ourselves about morality more
rationally. So not all social scientists accept CR; many oppose it.

CR is one-sided in considering only culture and ignoring other factors (like indi-
vidual differences, logic, biology, religion, and developmental psychology).

1.6 No neutral standpoint

Here’s Ima Relativist’s third argument – and a stricter formulation:

My no neutral standpoint argument points out that there’s no neutral

standpoint for arguing against another culture’s values. Scientific
issues can be decided by experiments; if someone thinks heavy
objects fall faster than light ones, we can drop objects of different
weights and see which ones hit the ground first. Moral issues aren’t
like this. When we argue about ethics, we just assume the values of
our own culture. There’s nothing objective here.

No belief that can’t be strongly defended on

culturally neutral grounds is objectively true.
All moral beliefs are beliefs that can’t be strongly
defended on culturally neutral grounds.
‫ ׵‬No moral beliefs are objectively true.

Again, both premises are doubtful. Against premise 1, there may be truths that
we have no solid way of knowing about. Did it rain on this spot exactly 500 years
ago today? There’s some truth about this, but we’ll never know it. Only a small
percentage of all truths are knowable. So there could be objective moral truths,
even if we had no solid way to know them. In addition, premise 1 is self-refuting,
assuming that it itself can’t be strongly defended on culturally neutral grounds.
Against premise 2, there may be strong, transcultural ways to argue ethical
16 Part 1: Popular Metaethics

beliefs. Chapters 7 to 9 try to give a way to reason about ethics that would appeal
to intelligent and open-minded people of practically every culture – thus doing
for ethics what scientific method does for science.
So Ima’s attack on objective values fails. But this isn’t the end of the matter;
the dispute over objective values is important and will keep reappearing.

1.7 Tolerance
CR seems to promote tolerance; but CR, in an intolerant society, supports intoler-
ance. Suppose that most people in our society approved of extreme intolerance
toward other cultures (so foreigners are continually ridiculed). If we followed
CR, we’d have to conclude that this intolerance is good (since it’s socially approved).
In addition, CR is intolerant toward minority views of our own culture, since
such views are automatically wrong. Rebels who say “X is socially approved but bad”
are always wrong (since social approval decides what’s good). CR blocks social
change, since it outlaws disagreeing with socially accepted norms.
Moral realism can provide a firmer foundation for tolerance. It can claim that,
in general, we ought to respect and allow actions, beliefs, and attitudes of other
individuals and cultures, and dissenting views in our own culture, even when
these differ from our own views.1

1.8 CR’s challenge

Cultural relativism challenges ethics: How can we reason together about ethics in a
multicultural world with conflicting value systems? We can’t just assume that our values
are correct and argue from this. But then what can we appeal to?
In criticizing CR, we appealed to consistency. CR has implications (about con-
formity, racism, global warming, and moral education) that are difficult to accept.
And its defense (using the cultural differences, product of culture, and no neutral stand-
point arguments) is based on faulty ideas. Those who find CR appealing will likely
find CR impossible to hold consistently once they understand it. Appealing to consistency
can be powerful in moral matters; instead of using our premises against an oppo-
nent’s view, consistency uses the opponent’s premises against the opponent’s view.
CR in some situations leads to self-contradictions:

• Our society may have inconsistent norms. Early America insisted that
(1) all people have a right to liberty and (2) black people who are slaves have
no right to liberty. Then CR makes us accept self-contradictions.
• Our society may disapprove of automatically following what’s socially
approved – while CR requires us to do this. Suppose you’re in Congress
and your society disapproves of flip-flopping (changing your beliefs to

1
“In general” permits exceptions. We shouldn’t respect or allow hateful Nazi racist actions.
And we should correct our children when they say “I hate people of such and such a group –
because they’re all …” (giving a false stereotype). Still, in general, tolerance should rule.
 Cultural Relativism 17

fit what most approve of); then by CR you shouldn’t flip-flop. But CR
also requires you to flip-flop (you must follow the majority view).

Views that lead to self-contradictions are flawed, in an objective way.

We can take away some positive ideas from CR: how society influences our
moral beliefs (for better or worse), our need to understand other cultures on their
own terms, our need to generally be tolerant toward other cultures and their
values (with some exceptions for cultures like Nazi Germany), and the error of
the general “We’re right and you’re wrong” approach toward other cultures.
This book sketches a series of views, where criticism of one view leads us
naturally into the next view. Ima Relativist is making progress by moving from
“We’re right and you’re wrong” to CR; but problems with CR would push her
to move further. While I see my sequence of views as pedagogically useful, I
make no claims about its psychological necessity.

1.9 Kohlberg (optional)

Many social scientists reject CR. Lawrence Kohlberg (1927–87), perhaps the
most important moral psychologist of recent years, saw CR as an immature stage
of moral thinking, typical of teenagers and young adults. So the common idea
that all social scientists support CR is wrong.
Kohlberg began by asking a group of 72 young boys about moral dilemmas;
the Heinz dilemma, for example, asks whether it would be right to steal over-
priced medicine that your wife desperately needs. The reasons the boys gave for
their answers were scored as fitting one stage or another. The same subjects were
interviewed again every few years to see how their ethical thinking had changed.
Similar studies were done across the globe. The same stage-sequence was seen in
every culture, although some groups made less progress. Those at higher stages
tended to be stronger in logical thinking and in empathetic role-playing.
On the basis of much research, Kohlberg claimed that we all, regardless of
our culture, develop in our moral thinking through a series of six stages:

1. Punishment/obedience: “bad” is what brings punishment.

2. Rewards: “good” is what brings what you want.
3. Parental approval: “good” is what pleases Mommy and Daddy.
4. Social approval: “good” is what is socially approved.
5. Utilitarian: “good” is what promotes society’s welfare.
6. Impartial principles: “good” is what expresses consistency, justice, and
equal dignity; act only as you’re willing that anyone act in the same
situation, regardless of where you imagine yourself in that situation.

Later stages on the list are higher in that they appear later in time, are preferred by
those who understand both stages, and are philosophically more adequate. While
we do most of our moral thinking at one stage, we sometimes go higher or lower.
Children aren’t just passive sponges who internalize what they’re taught.
18 Part 1: Popular Metaethics

While children do absorb values, they’re also little philosophers who struggle for
better ways to think about values. We all begin by thinking in terms of punish-
ment and obedience: bad actions are ones that are punished. Society doesn’t teach us
this, but it may teach us which particular actions bring punishment. Later, chil-
dren think more of rewards and become more manipulative.
At age six, my nephew Will nicely fit stage 3: “good” is what makes Mommy and
Daddy (and Uncle Harry) proud of you. Personal approval drove his moral thinking;
if we appealed to punishment or reward, Will complained that we were treating
him as a baby. Stage 3 was age-appropriate for Will; but if he were still at this
stage twenty years later (going to med school to make Mommy and Daddy proud
of him), we’d be disappointed.
An older child, often as a teenager, normally comes to CR stage 4. Here
“good” is what’s socially approved, first by the peer group, and later by the larger
society. We need to fit in, wear the right kind of clothes, and listen to the right
kind of music – where the “right kind” is what’s socially approved. Many begin-
ning college students struggle with these issues; this may be why they take CR so
seriously, even though the view is implausible when we study it carefully.
What comes after cultural relativism, according to Kohlberg? Sometimes con-
fusion and skepticism follow (stage 4½); indeed, an ethics course may promote
these. Then we may move into stage 5 (which resembles the rule utilitarianism
of Chapter 10) or stage 6 (which resembles the golden-rule consistency view of
Chapters 7 to 9). Both stages try to evaluate conventional norms rationally.
I don’t bring up Kohlberg to argue that, since his theory is correct, hence CR
is wrong. His theory is controversial. And we’ve already demolished CR; we don’t
need help from psychology. I mention Kohlberg, rather, because many people
are pressured into accepting CR by the myth that all social scientists are cultural
relativists. But there’s no such consensus. Kohlberg and many other social
scientists emphatically reject CR; they see it as an immature stage of moral think-
ing in which we just conform to society.
Kohlberg’s approach raises a problem about the meaning of “good.” People
may mean different things at different stages; a young child by “good” may mean
“what pleases Mommy and Daddy.” So we should see our quest in terms of what
morally mature people mean by “good.” If our objections to CR are correct, then
morally mature people by “good” don’t mean “socially approved.”

1.10 Is morality gendered? (optional)

Carol Gilligan (1936–), a colleague of Kohlberg, thought that males and females
have distinctively different ways to think about morality. So are right and wrong
relative, not to culture, but to gender?
After Kohlberg developed his moral stages, based on interviews with boys,
he found that girls tended to score lower than boys. Gilligan objected that his
methods had a gender bias and that his stages applied mainly to males; she
thought females tend to think differently. She posited two mature forms of moral
thinking: justice and caring. Men tend to think of morality in terms of justice,
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personages in the entourage of the Sultan. … The Porte,
however, protested, with the support of Germany, against the
appointment of Colonel Schaeffer, who appears to have been
suspected of English sympathies. Russia, too, it was said,
objected, insisting that the appointee must be of the Orthodox
Greek faith. Thus, on the question of selecting a
governor-general for Crete, the concert of the powers broke
down as it did at other points during the long crisis. At the
end of November the name of Prince Francis Joseph of
Battenberg was prominently mentioned as a prospective
candidate of favor. The Cretan assembly proposed, unless a
suitable governor were speedily chosen by the powers, to offer
the post to a candidate of its own selection."

Current History, 1897,

pages 865-866.

Months went on, while the Powers still discussed the Cretan
situation and no agreement was reached. In January, 1898, the
Turkish government appointed Edhem Pasha governor of Candia;
but, in the face of the admirals of the blockading squadrons,
who exercised an undefined authority, he seems to have had
practically little power. Presently, a new attempt was made to
select a Christian Governor-general. France and Russia
proposed Prince George of Greece, but Austria and Turkey
opposed. In April, Austria and Germany withdrew from the
blockade and from the "Concert," leaving Great Britain,
Russia, France and Italy to deal with Cretan affairs alone.
The admirals of these Powers, acting under instructions, then
divided the Cretan coast among themselves, each directing the
administration of such government as could be conducted in his
own part. The British admiral had Candia, the capital town,
and there trouble arose which brought the whole Cretan
business to a crisis. He attempted to take possession of the
customs house (September 6), and landed for that purpose a
small force of 60 men. They were attacked by a Turkish mob,
with which they fought desperately for four hours, losing 12
 killed and some 40 wounded, before they could make their
retreat to the shore and regain their ship. At the same time a
general massacre of Christians in the town was begun and some
800 perished before it was stopped. Edhem Pasha, with about
4,000 Turkish troops at his command, was said to have waited
long for the mob to do its work before he interfered.

This outbreak brought the four Powers to a decisive agreement.

They joined in imperatively demanding the withdrawal of
Turkish troops and officials from the island, and enforced the
demand. Guarantees for the safety of the Mohammedan population in
life and property were given; it was conceded that the
Sultan's suzerainty over Crete should be maintained, and he
was allowed to hold one military post in the island for a sign
of the fact. On those terms the Turkish evacuation of Crete
was carried out in November, and Prince George of Greece was
appointed, not Governor-general, but High Commissioner of the
four Powers, to organize an autonomous government in the
island and administer it for a period of three years. The
appointment was accepted, and Prince George was received with
rejoicing in Crete on the 21st of December. The blockade had
been raised on the 5th, and on the 26th the admirals departed.

During the following two years (1899-1900) there seems to have

been a generally good condition of order restored and
preserved. A constitution was framed by a national assembly,
which conferred the executive authority on Prince George, as
High Commissioner, with responsible councillors, and created a
Chamber of Deputies, elected for the most part by the people,
but containing ten members appointed by the High Commissioner.
Equal rights for all religious beliefs was made a principle of
the constitution.

TURKEY: A. D. 1899 (May-July).

Representation in the Peace Conference at The Hague.
 See (in this volume)
PEACE CONFERENCE.

{550}

TURKEY: A. D. 1899 (October).

Concessions to the Armenians.

In October an irade was published by the Sultan which withdrew

restrictions on the movements of Armenians in the provinces,
except in the case of suspects; granted pardon or commutation
of sentence to a number of Armenian prisoners; ordered payment
of sums due to Armenian government officials who had been
killed or expelled at the time of the massacres; directed
assistance to be given in the repairing and rebuilding of
churches, schools, and monasteries which had been injured or
destroyed, and also gave direction for the building of an
orphanage near Constantinople.

TURKEY: A. D. 1899 (November).

Railway to the Persian Gulf.

A German Bank Syndicate obtained from the Sultan, in November,

1899, a concession for the extension of the Anatolian Railway
from Konieh in Asia Minor, to Basra, or Bassorah, on the
Persian Gulf. The line, which will pass through Bagdad, and
along the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, is to be
completed within eight years from the date of the grant. "The
concession is regarded as a startling proof of German
influence in Constantinople, and a defeat both for Russian and
British diplomacy. It is certainly a defeat for the former,
and will greatly increase suspicion at St. Petersburg as to
the ultimate ends of Germany in Turkey; but we suspect that
Indian statesmen will perceive considerable compensations in
the arrangement. Not to mention that all railways which
approach India develop Indian trade, the railway may secure us
a strong ally in Asia. It is not of much use for Russia to be
running a line from the Caspian to Bushire if when she gets
there she finds Britain and Germany allied in the Persian
Gulf, and able by a railway through Gedrosia to Sind to throw
themselves right across her path."

Spectator (London),
December 2, 1899.

"The opposition of the French company owning the

Smyrna-Kassaba road, which extends east as far as Afion
Karahissar, was removed by granting this company 40 per cent
of the shares in the extension, and the local objection was
obviated by a provision in the concession giving the Turkish
Government the right to purchase the line at any time. Few
railroad lines can be of greater prospective importance than
this 2,000 miles of railroad uniting the Persian Gulf with
Europe, forming a rapid transit to and from the East, opening
up large tracts of agricultural country, and paving the way
for German commercial supremacy in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia.
It is not difficult to see how Germany, with preferential
rates for goods on German lines, will be able to control the
chief markets of Asia Minor and invade the East. … Germans
purchased the Constantinople-Ismid Railroad from an English
company and extended it to Angora. They also checkmated the
French and English by extending their line from Eski-Sher to
Konieh, thus preventing extension of both the Smyrna-Afion
Karahissar and the Smyrna-Aidin-Dinair roads. The two great
distributing points—Constantinople and Smyrna—are thus
controlled by Germans, and German goods may enter the interior
of Asia Minor and the great valley of the Tigris and Euphrates
on German-controlled roads at a decided advantage. Germans
have obtained the right to build docks and warehouses at Haida
Pasha, the terminus of the Anatolian railroads; and with
through rates for German goods on German lines, German freight
cars may be sent across the Bosphorus and travel to Mesopotamia
and the confines of India and Persia without change."
 United States Consular Reports,
April, 1900, page 497.

Professor Hilprecht has remarked, in the "Sunday School Times"

that "a new era for Babylonian archeology will begin when the
railroad from Koniah to Baghdad and Bassorah has been
constructed. It will then take about a week from London to the
ruins of Babylon, where, doubtless, a railway station (Hillah)
will be established. At present the traveler needs at the best
six weeks to cover this route. This railroad," says the
Professor, "has now become a certainty."

TURKEY: A. D. 1899-1901.
Impending outbreak in Macedonia.

The state of things in Macedonia, where the people have long

been on the brink of revolt against Turkish rule, excited to
it from Bulgaria and encouraged from Greece, but warned
otherwise by Russia and Austria, is thus described by the
"Economist," in an article quoted in "Littell's Living Age,"
March, 1899: "It is improbable, for reasons stated below, that
Macedonia will rise in insurrection this year [1899], but,
nevertheless, there is great danger in that quarter, which is
evidently disturbing both Vienna and St. Petersburg, and
exciting apprehensions in Constantinople. The Austrian and
Russian Foreign Offices are both issuing intimations that if a
revolt occurs Turkey will be allowed to put it down by Turkish
methods, and the Sultan is raising more troops, sending
Asiatic levies to Macedonia, and despatching some of his
ablest officers to control the hill districts. Severe warnings
have also been sent both to Belgrade and Sofia, and the Greeks
are warned that if their active party moves the Government of
Athens will not again be saved by Europe from the worst
consequences. All these symptoms imply that there is grave
fear, among those who watch Macedonia, that the patience of
her sorely oppressed people has given way, and that they have
resolved to risk everything rather than remain longer under
 the rule of Pashas from whom no man's life and no woman's
honor is safe for twelve hours together. It is known,
moreover, that the course of events in Crete and the
appearance of the Tsar's Rescript have greatly stirred the
population. The former is held by them to show that if a
Christian population in Turkey will risk massacre, Europe will
not allow them to be exterminated, while the latter has made
submission more difficult by putting an end to hope for the
next five years. …

"Turkish subjects must be driven to despair before they will

rise against the Turks, and if they can even hope to be left
alone, the Macedonians will wait, rather than encounter so
dreadful a risk. They have, it is true, the example of the
Cretans to encourage them, but their country is not an island,
and they have the fate both of the Armenians and the
Thessalians to warn them that on the mainland the Turks cannot
be resisted by half-drilled forces.

"It seems almost a truism to say that Europe is foolish to

allow such a source of danger as Macedonia presents to
continue without a cure; but there is something to be said on
the other side. The Powers sincerely desire peace, and the
Macedonian magazine cannot be flooded without a war, if it be
only a war between Russia and the Sultan.
{551}
Nobody knows to what such a war would lead, or in what
condition Eastern Europe might emerge from it. Moreover,
however much the Macedonians may excite the sympathies of
philanthropists, they have done a good deal to alienate those
of politicians. They decline to be either Austrian or Russian.
They asked for years to be aided by Greece, and when Greece
declared war on Turkey they refused to rise behind Edhem
Pasha, whom they could have cut away from his supports. They
now ask aid from Bulgaria, but they are most unwilling to
submit to Sofia, and so make of Bulgaria a fairly strong
State. They wish, they say, to make of Macedonia a
Principality, but if it were so made the Slavo-Macedonians
would begin fighting the Græco-Macedonians, until both had
been nearly ruined. They must join one party or the other if
they wish to be free, and stick to the one they join, and
fight for it with a coherence which they have never yet
displayed."

On the 7th of January, 1901, a correspondent of the "London

Times" wrote on the same subject from Vienna, as follows:

"The situation in Macedonia, as described in trustworthy

accounts coming from different directions, testifies to the
increasing danger of trouble. Things have gone so far that an
outbreak may occur this year. In diplomatic circles it is
considered impossible that in any case it can be delayed for
longer than a twelvemonth. In Constantinople, Athens, and all
the capitals of the Balkan States the eventuality of a
Macedonian rising has been expected for several years past,
and in more than one instance preparations have been made
accordingly. To what extent the Macedonia committees have
received official patronage in Bulgaria is now of secondary
interest. The mischief has been done, and the agitation in
Macedonia is at present beyond the control of the Bulgarian
authorities, even if they wished to keep it in check, which is
not certain. All that can be said with confidence is that last
summer Austria and Russia made a vigorous and successful effort
to put an end to the almost open encouragement extended to the
Macedonian committees at Sofia, which was within an ace of
involving the Principality in a war with Rumania. The
Austro-Russian 'entente' [an understanding or agreement
between Russia and Austria, in 1897, to act together in
keeping peace in the Balkan peninsula] has, in fact, done
excellent service wherever diplomatic pressure can be brought
to bear. But, unfortunately, that does not include Macedonia.
If the revolutionary element in that province of the Ottoman
Empire sets at defiance the imposing Turkish forces
concentrated on the spot, it is not likely that it will be
 influenced by what is probably regarded as the remote
contingency of the direct armed intervention of Austria and
Russia. All the warnings and scoldings in the world will not
suffice to preserve peace in Macedonia.

"It is difficult to say what foundation there may be for the

statement that the Sultan himself seeks to take advantage of
the disturbed condition of Macedonia for purposes of his own.
It is alleged that he wishes to prevent any change in the
existing regime in Crete by exciting the apprehension in
Athens and elsewhere that an attempt to modify the status quo
in that island would cause a massacre of the Hellenic
population in Macedonia. This view of the case finds
expression in the following extracts from a letter addressed
to the 'Roumanie,' one of the leading organs of
Bukharest:—'The thoroughly bad policy pursued by the Sublime
Porte in Macedonia, which consists in allowing that unhappy
province to remain a prey to Bulgarian agitators so as in case
of need to terrify diplomacy by the spectre of a revolution,
has contributed to open the eyes of the Powers. On the other
hand, the irresistible attraction exercised by the Kingdom of
Greece, not only on the Cretans themselves, but also on all
the rayahs of the Ottoman Empire, is an indisputable fact.'"

See, also (in this volume),

BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES.

TURKEY: A. D. 1900.
The Zionist movement of the Jews to colonize Palestine.

See (in this volume)

JEWS: A. D. 1897-1901.

TURKEY: A. D. 1901.
The Cretan question.

The provisional arrangement of government for Crete,

administered by Prince George, of Greece, as High Commissioner
for the Powers, expires by limitation in December, 1901. What
shall then be done with the island is a question that was
referred, by the several Powers of the Concert, in the early
part of the year, to their ambassadors at Rome, in conference
with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The
administration of Prince George appears to have been quite
remarkably satisfactory to all concerned, and its continuation
was evidently desired, as much by the Cretans as by the
protecting Powers; but the former sought to have it placed on
a basis of permanency, in some form that would be practically
tantamount to the long craved annexation to Greece. Prince
George naturally looks in the same direction, and he is said
to have made it known that he would decline to hold his post
provisionally beyond the term of three years for which he
accepted it in 1898. The ambassadorial conference at Rome
decided, however, that the time has not come for a permanent
settlement of the Cretan question, and that the provisional
arrangement for its government must be renewed. A Press
despatch from Athens, on the 22d of March, 1901, announced the
decision and indicated the circumstances of the situation, as
follows:

"The Cretan Assembly meets at the end of next month, and its
probable attitude towards the question of union with Greece is
already the subject of speculation here. The decision of the
conference of Ambassadors at Rome is embodied in a memorandum
which has been handed to Prince George by the Consuls at
Canea, while a copy of the document has been unofficially
presented to King George 'à titre d'information.' The
Ambassadors express their opinion that any manifestation on
the part of the Cretans in favour of union with Greece would
be inopportune at the present moment, and they propose a
prolongation of the present provisional system of government
without assigning any definite term to the High Commissioner's
mandate.
 "Whether Prince George, who is an enthusiastic advocate of
union with Greece, will accept the new arrangement
unconditionally remains to be seen. Meanwhile the islanders
are occupied with preparations for the elections.

{552}

"It appears that at a recent sitting of the Prince's Council

one of the most prominent of Cretan politicians advocated the
institution of an autonomous Principality on the lines already
laid down by the existing Constitution. The proposal provoked
a violent outburst on the part of the Athenian Press, which
denounces its author as a traitor to the cause of Hellenism.
The opinion apparently prevails here that the establishment of
a Principality would finally preclude the union of the island
with Greece."

TURKEY: A. D. 1901.
Order regulating the visit of Jews to Palestine.

See (in this volume)

JEWS: A. D. 1901.

----------TURKEY: End--------

TWAIN, Mark:
Description of scenes in the Austrian Reichsrath.

See (in this volume)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1897 (OCTOBER-DECEMBER).

U.

UCHALI, Treaty of.

See (in this volume)

ITALY: A. D. 1895-1896.
UGANDA: A. D. 1894.
Creation of the Protectorate.

See (in this volume)

BRITISH EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE: A. D. 1895-1897.

UGANDA: A. D. 1897-1898.
Native insurrection and mutiny of Sudanese troops.

A train of serious troubles in the Uganda Protectorate began

in May, 1897, with an insurrection of some of the chiefs,
instigated by the king, Mwanga, who was restive under British
control. The revolt was suppressed after some sharp fighting,
especially at Kiango, on the 24th of July, and King Mwanga
escaped into German territory. In August he was formally
deposed by a council of chiefs, and his infant son, Chua, was
elected king in his place, under a regency of three of the
chiefs. But a more serious trouble followed, from the mutiny
of a part of the Sudanese troops which had been serving in
Uganda. These troops were being sent to join an expedition,
under Major Macdonald, for the exploration of the districts
adjacent to the Italian sphere of influence, and were not
permitted to take their women with them. This seems to have
been their chief grievance. They also complained of being
overworked, underpaid, insufficiently fed, and commanded by
young officers who would not listen to their complaints. They
seized Fort Lubas, on the frontier between Uganda and Usoga,
made prisoners of several of their officers, whom they finally
murdered, and held the fort against repeated attacks until early
in January, 1898, when they made their escape. They were
pursued and attacked (February 24) at Kabagambe, on Lake
Kioja, where they had built a fort. Many were killed, the
remainder much scattered. A considerable party got away to the
eastern side of the Nile and continued to give trouble there
throughout the year.
Meantime, the deposed king, Mwanga, had escaped from the
Germans and effected a new rising among his late subjects; and
another deposed king, Kabarega, of Unyoro, had also
reappeared, to make trouble in that region. After the
suppression of the Sudanese mutiny these risings were
overcome, with the help of some 1,100 troops brought from
India for the emergency. In March, there was news of
Kabarega's death, and the British Acting Commissioner and
Consul General issued the following proclamation:

"Whereas Kabarega, the deposed King of Unyoro, is reported to

have deceased, and whereas the present disordered state of
affairs in that country has proved that, for the maintenance
of good government and good-will, it is expedient to provide
for the succession to the kingdom of a member of the Royal
House, it is hereby publicly proclaimed that Karukala, son of
Kabarega, is now appointed King of Unyoro, under the
protection of Her Britannic Majesty. The Kingdom of Unyoro
comprises the provinces of—Busindi, Shifalu, Magungu, Kibero,
Bugoma, Bugahiaobeire. This appointment is in accordance with
the general conditions by which countries in British African
Protectorates are guided and regulated, and it secures to the
Kingdom of Unyoro all the advantages which accrue from its
being an integral part of such a Protectorate. The local
government of the country will be administered, under the
guidance of Her Majesty's Representative, by a Council of
Regency of either two or three Chiefs, to be appointed by Her
Majesty's Commissioner. This Council of Regency will, subject
to the approval of Her Majesty's Commissioner, select and
appoint the Katikiro and the other Chiefs of the first rank
required in accordance with local custom. These Chiefs, on
their appointment being confirmed, will select and appoint in
full Council the lesser grade Chiefs, until the system of
local administration is complete."

Great Britain, Parliamentary Publications

(Papers by Command: Africa, Number 7, 1898, page 42).
UGANDA RAILWAY, The.

On the 30th of April, 1900, the British Parliament voted

£1,930,000 for the completion of the railway under
construction from Mombasa, on the Indian Ocean, to Lake
Victoria-Nyanza, officially known as the Mombasa-Victoria
Railway. Previous expenditure had been about £3,000,000. On
the 30th of October it was reported that rails were laid down
to the 452d mile from Mombasa, and that advance gangs were
working about 40 miles beyond that point.

UITLANDERS.

See (in this volume)

SOUTH AFRICA (THE TRANSVAAL): A. D. 1885-1890, and after.

UNGAVA, The district of.

See (in this volume)

CANADA: A. D. 1895.

UNITED CHRISTIAN PARTY.

See (in this volume)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER).

UNITED IRISH LEAGUE, The.

See (in this volume)

IRELAND: A. D. 1900-1901.

UNITED STATES OF BRAZIL.

See (in this volume)

BRAZIL.
{553}

----------UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Start--------

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1868-1885.

Cuban questions in controversy with Spain.

See (in this volume)

CUBA: A. D. 1868-1885.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1894.

Legislation to promote the reclamation of arid lands.

The following measure of legislation to promote the

reclamation of arid lands was carried through Congress as an
amendment to the appropriation bill for Sundry Civil
Expenditures, and became law August 18, 1894:

"Section 4.
That to aid the public land States in the reclamation of the
desert lands therein, and the settlement, cultivation, and
sale thereof in small tracts to actual settlers, the Secretary
of the Interior with the approval of the President, be, and
hereby is, authorized and empowered, upon proper application
of the State to contract and agree, from time to time, with
each of the States in which there may be situated desert lands
as defined by the Act entitled 'An Act to provide for the sale
of desert land in certain States and Territories,' approved
March 3d, 1877, and the Act amendatory thereof, approved March
3d, 1891, binding the United States to donate, grant and
patent to the State free of cost for surveyor price such
desert lands, not exceeding one million acres in each State,
as the State may cause to be irrigated, reclaimed, occupied,
and not less than twenty acres of each one hundred and
sixty-acre tract cultivated by actual settlers, within ten
years next after the passage of this Act, as thoroughly as is
required of citizens who may enter under the said desert land
law.

"Before the application of any State is allowed or any

contract or agreement is executed or any segregation of any of
the land from the public domain is ordered by the Secretary of
the Interior, the State shall file a map of the said land
proposed to be irrigated which shall exhibit a plan showing
the mode of the contemplated irrigation and which plan shall
be sufficient to thoroughly irrigate and reclaim said land and
prepare it to raise ordinary agricultural crops and shall also
show the source of the water to be used for irrigation and
reclamation, and the Secretary of the Interior may make
necessary regulations for the reservation of the lands applied
for by the States to date from the date of the filing of the map
and plan of irrigation, but such reservation shall be of no
force whatever if such map and plan of irrigation shall not be
approved. That any State contracting under this section is
hereby authorized to make all necessary contracts to cause the
said lands to be reclaimed, and to induce their settlement and
cultivation in accordance with and subject to the provisions
of this section; but the State shall not be authorized to
lease any of said lands or to use or dispose of the same in
any way whatever, except to secure their reclamation,
cultivation and settlement.

"As fast as any State may furnish satisfactory proof according

to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the
Secretary of the Interior, that any of said lands are
irrigated, reclaimed and occupied by actual settlers, patents
shall be issued to the State or its assigns for said land so
reclaimed and settled: Provided, That said States shall not
sell or dispose of more than one hundred and sixty acres of
said land to any one person, and any surplus of money derived
by any State from the sale of said lands in excess of the cost
of their reclamation, shall be held as a trust fund for and be
applied to the reclamation of other desert lands in such
State. That to enable the Secretary of the Interior to examine
 any of the lands that may be selected under the provisions of
this section, there is hereby appropriated out of any moneys
in the Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, one thousand
dollars."

Acts, 53d Congress, 2d Session, chapter 301.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895.

Re-survey of Mexican boundary.

See (in this volume)

MEXICO: A. D. 1892-1895.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895 (January-February).

The monetary situation.
Contract for replenishing the gold reserve in the Treasury.

The alarming situation of the Treasury of the United States at

the beginning of the year 1895 was clearly described by the
President in his special Message to Congress, January 28.

See in volume 5, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895).

By the operation of what had been aptly called "the endless

chain" of the greenback currency issues of the government
(paid out with one hand, to be redeemed with the other in
gold, which the declining value of silver brought more and
more into demand) the gold reserve in the Treasury was fast
being exhausted, and the hour was approaching when, without
some effective relief, the obligations of the nation would
have to be paid in depreciated silver coin, and its credit
lost. The appeal of the President to Congress had no effect.
The Senate was controlled by a majority of men who desired
precisely the result which he wished to avert. The state of
things in that body was described by Senator Sherman, of the
Committee on Finance, in the following words:
 "The Committee on Finance is utterly helpless to deal with
this vast question. We are quite divided upon it. We are not
allowed to propose a measure to this Senate which all can
approve of, unless there is attached to it a provision for
free coinage of silver."

The attitude of the House was different, but almost equally

hostile to the President's views. Its Republican majority was
not favorable to the aims of the free silver parties, but held
that the relief needed for the Treasury was to be sought in a
return to higher import duties, as a means of obtaining
increased revenue. Hence, a bill to carry out the
recommendations of the President was rejected in the House, on
the 7th of February, by a vote of 162 against 135.

On the following day, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr.

Carlisle, exercising authority which he possessed to sell
certain four per cent. thirty year bonds, contracted with
August Belmont &; Co., who represented the Rothschilds of
London, and with the house of J. P. Morgan & Co., of New York,
on behalf of J. S. Morgan & Co., London, and themselves, for
supplying 3,500,000 ounces of standard gold coin of the United
States, at the rate of 817.80441 per ounce, in exchange for
such bonds. It was a condition of the contract that one half
of the coin supplied should be brought from Europe: also that
the contracting syndicate should use its influence to protect
the Treasury against withdrawals of gold.
{554}
At the same time, the Secretary of the Treasury reserved the
right to substitute three per cent. gold bonds, if Congress
would authorize such an issue, to be taken by the syndicate at
par, in place of the four per cents to which his existing
authority was restricted. It was shown that the consequent
saving in interest would be $539,000 per annum, amounting to
$16,174,770 in thirty years; but the proposal was rejected in
the House of Representatives by 167 votes against 120. The
contract was accordingly carried out in its original form,
 with success so far that the withdrawals of gold from the
Treasury dropped for a considerable period to a low point. It
appeared that when this emergency break was put upon the
working of the "endless chain," the sub-treasury in New York
was believed to be within twenty-four hours of a suspension of
gold payments. But the contract was loudly condemned.
nevertheless, by the opponents of the administration.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895 (February).

Renewed insurrection in Cuba.

See (in this volume)

CUBA: A. D. 1895.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895 (April-May).

Decision of the Supreme Court against the constitutionality
of the Income Tax.

Cases testing the constitutionality of the income tax which

Congress had attached to the Tariff Act of 1894, were brought
to a partial decision in the Supreme Court in April, and
finally in May, 1895.

See, in volume 4 of original edition,

or in volume 5 of revised edition,
TARIFF LEGISLATION, UNITED STATES: A. D. 1894.

[Transcriber's note: For this set see, Volume 4,

"TARIFF: (United States): A. D. 1894."]

The cases in question were "Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and

Trust Company," and "Hyde v. Continental Trust Company." On
the first hearing, the illness and absence of one of the
justices, Mr. Jackson, of Tennessee, left but eight members
in attendance, and they divided equally on several points
which were vital to the decision of the question of
constitutionality in the tax. The appellants accordingly
filed a petition for a re-hearing, submitting, among other
reasons, the following: "The question involved in these cases
was as to the constitutionality of the provisions of the
tariff act of August 15, 1894 (sections 27 to 37), purporting
to impose a tax on incomes. The Court has held that the same
are unconstitutional, so far as they purport to impose a tax
upon the rent or income of real estate and income derived
from municipal bonds. It has, however, announced that it was
equally divided in opinion as to the following questions, and
has expressed no opinion in regard to them: (1) Whether the
void provisions invalidate the whole act. (2) Whether, as to
the income from personal property as such, the act is
unconstitutional as laying direct taxes. (3) Whether any part
of the tax, if not considered as a direct tax, is invalid for
want of uniformity.

"The court has reversed the decree of the Circuit Court and
remanded the case, with directions to enter a decree in favor
of complainant in respect only of the voluntary payment of the
tax on the rents and income of defendant's real estate and
that which it holds in trust, and on the income from the
municipal bonds owned or so held by it. While, therefore, the
two points above stated have been decided, there has been no
decision of the remaining questions regarding the
constitutionality of the act, and no judgment has been
announced authoritatively establishing any principle for
interpretation of the statute in those respects."

The re-hearing asked for was granted by the Court on the 6th
of May, when Justice Jackson was able to take his seat on the
bench, after which, on the 20th of May, by the opinion of five
members of the Court against four, the law was pronounced null,
so far as concerned the imposition of a tax on incomes. The
opinion of the majority was delivered by Chief Justice Fuller,
who said, in part:

"The Constitution divided Federal taxation into two great

classes, the class of direct taxes, and the class of duties,
imposts and excises; and prescribed two rules which qualified
the grant of power as to each class. The power to lay direct
taxes apportioned among the several States in proportion to
their representation in the popular branch of Congress, a
representation based on population as ascertained by the
census, was plenary and absolute; but to lay direct taxes
without apportionment was forbidden. The power to lay duties,
imposts, and excises was subject to the qualification that the
imposition must be uniform throughout the United States.

"Our previous decision was confined to the consideration of

the validity of the tax on the income from real estate and on
the income from municipal bonds. … We are now permitted to
broaden the field of inquiry, and to determine to which of the
two great classes a tax upon a person's entire income, whether
derived from rents, or products, or otherwise, of real estate,
or from bonds, stocks, or other forms of personal property,
belongs; and we are unable to conclude that the enforced
subtraction from the yield of all the owner's real or personal
property, in the manner prescribed, is so different from a tax
upon the property itself, that it is not a direct, but an
indirect tax in the meaning of the Constitution.

"The words of the Constitution are to be taken in their

obvious sense, and to have a reasonable construction. In
Gibbons v. Ogden, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, with his usual
felicity, said: 'As men, whose intentions require no
concealment, generally employ the words which most directly
and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the
enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and the
people who adopted it must be understood to have employed
words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they
have said.' 9 Wheat. 1, 188. And in Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, where the question was whether a controversy
between two States over the boundary between them was within
the grant of judicial power, Mr. Justice Baldwin, speaking for