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Risk, Systems and Decisions
Myriam Merad
Benjamin D. Trump
Expertise
Under
Scrutiny
21st Century Decision Making for
Environmental Health and Safety
Series Editors
Igor Linkov
U.S. Army ERDC, Vicksburg, MS, USA
Jeffrey Keisler
College of Management, University of Massachusetts
Boston, MA, USA
James H. Lambert
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA
Jose Figueira
University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/13439

Myriam Merad • Benjamin D. Trump
Expertise Under Scrutiny

21st Century Decision Making
for Environmental Health and Safety
Myriam Merad Benjamin D. Trump
Centre National de la Recherche US Army Corps of Engineers
Scientifique Engineer Research and Development Center
UMR ESPACE Concord, MA, USA
Paris, France
ISSN 2626-6717 ISSN 2626-6725 (electronic)

ISBN 978-3-030-20530-0 ISBN 978-3-030-20532-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20532-4
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of
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From Myriam,
You used to say to me: “Why do you
challenge me so much in every
conversation?”
The tables have turned – now you have the
edge in all of our discussion.
To an exceptional man who has and will
always hold a unique enduring place in my
heart.
To Adel
From Benjamin,
For my mother, who taught me the value of
making good decisions, even when the path
down that road is a difficult one.
Foreword
It is easy to think that decision-making is a relatively simple task. After all, humans
by default make hundreds of decisions a day – what to wear, what to eat, and many
other daily tasks. However, organizations are often faced with situations where
making good decisions is a task wrought with uncertainty and the potential for loss.
Unlike repetitive decisions we are making daily, policy decision-makers often find
themselves in uncharted waters where new problems emerge without well-
understood precedents. In these situations, the approach taken to triage one’s
decision-making needs can make all the difference between mission success and
organizational disaster.
This work by Drs. Myriam Merad and Benjamin Trump tackles a critical compo-
nent of the decision-making challenge facing many actors in the government and
industry – the role of expertise in informing the decision-making process and
addressing risk inherent within organizational activities. Far from being a simple
task, the process of decision-making in areas such as environmental health and
safety or technology governance is one that requires deliberative thought regarding
the type of expertise needed to craft legitimate, accurate, and institutionally accept-
able solutions. Merad and Trump address this emerging need by meticulously
reviewing the drivers of risk-informed decision-making, as well as the various strat-
egies to onboard expertise and judgment to craft and implement good policies.
As a civil servant in government, I see Merad and Trump’s work as immediately
relevant to a variety of risky, contentious, and high-visibility decisions that we face
which have the potential to incur widespread benefits or harms to the public. They
go into specific detail regarding areas of increasing contestation and risk to govern-
ments and organizations in Europe, the United States, and many other areas around
the globe. Later, they demonstrate how decision support tools, such as multi-criteria
decision analysis, can serve as an additional crutch to structure and comparatively
evaluate value trade-offs within complex decision environments – something neces-
sary in situations where a scientific defense of one’s decision-making process is a
political and institutional necessity.
vii
viii Foreword
Far from being a simple process, organizational decision-making is a task with

high stakes and the potential for significant losses if undertaken improperly.
Merad and Trump outline how organizations might better deal with these situations
and bolster their perceived legitimacy and competency among the public in the
process of doing so. This book will be of great value for academics and practitioners
in the field.
Igor Linkov, PhD.

Team Lead, Risk and Decision Science Team
US Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center
AAAS Fellow
Acknowledgments
The topics on which we choose to write are never neutral. We were both fortunate
to grow up in a family of senior civil servants, professionals, and researchers (uni-
versity hospital) in which the notions or values, such as “professional integrity,”
“awareness of the common and public interest,” as well as “concern for alterity,”
were the core guiding principles. We are honored and grateful for exposure to those
ideas at an early age – they are certainly difficult to learn, but pay dividends in our
own professional careers.
Beyond their personal ethics, many practitioners and specialists abide by respec-
tive professional oaths (e.g., the Hippocratic oath, the Galien oath, the magistrates’
oath).
In our profession of risk analysis, we were surprised to discover that no such
oaths or creeds exist – at least as a universally agreed-upon code of conduct.
Certainly, there was the Archimedes’ oath, yet few people in our professional orbits
are aware of it, let alone swear by it. The idea of ethics and validity within the exper-
tise processes is nonetheless essential for the hundreds of agencies and thousands of
professionals and policymakers that make use of risk science – we hope that this
book highlights these needs and demonstrates how valid and just decision-making
might be grounded in ethics, transparency, and clear professionalism.
In framing these ideas, we are indebted to our friends and colleagues that have
inspired and motivated us.
The first is Nicolas Dechy. Once Myriam had the book project in mind, Nicolas
was the one who challenged her the most on the subject.
We are grateful to Michel Llory for our long discussions and for his recommen-
dations all along. His experience and his famous statement “what should we think
about all this?” is a question that any writer must face and address.
Dominique Guionnet, Mohamed Boudalaa, and André Cicolella were valuable
colleagues and friends. They have in common, in addition to a high scientific qual-
ity, a professional and moral integrity that are commendable and admirable.
Claude Hansen, Guy Planchette, and Paul Carriot provided a valuable advice and
guidance. We are also grateful to André Lannoy and Yves Merian, who read early
editions of our text – we are grateful for their time and support.
ix
x Acknowledgments
We are grateful for George Siharulidze and Joshua Trump’s patience and tenacity
in editing and reviewing this work.
Many thanks to Igor Linkov. He is a precious friend who knows the value of the
long game and is an irreplaceable mentor and guide. We are also thankful for José
Palma-Oliveira, who is the ultimate sounding board and Renaissance man of our
times.
We also give thanks to the US Army Corps of Engineers, which supports Dr.
Trump and his research. We are both also grateful for the support of our friends at
the Society for Risk Analysis, which inspired not only out ideas but our very col-
laboration as coauthors.
This book, however, would not have been possible without the support and fund-
ing of the French Ministry of Environment and the French National Scientific
Research Center, CNRS.
Our deep gratitude is due to all of our friends and institutions for making this
possible.
Contents
Part I Unpacking the Decision Making Process

1 The Challenge of Making Good Decisions�� 3
2 About Expertise Problems: Decision Making Challenges
in a Contentious Environment�� 11
Risks and Uncertainties�� 13
Different Categories of Risks: About Negatives and Positives�� 15
Different Management, Governance, and Regulatory Principles�� 19
Resilience and the Unknown�� 23
About Foresight in Risk-Based Approaches�� 26
Learning from Risks and Resilience-Based Approaches �� 28
3 Actors and Experts in the Decision Making Process�� 33
The Decision-Maker and the Concept of a “Contract”�� 33
The Analyst, the Expert, and Expertise�� 37
Actors, Stakeholders, and Democratic Frameworks�� 43
Knowing: About Knowledge, Beliefs, and Perceptions�� 46
The Expertise Problems Formulation: Four
Preliminary Questions�� 46
The Taxonomy of Knowledge and Information�� 49
The Interactions as a Learning Process�� 50
4 Critical Challenges and Difficulties in Safety, Security,
Environment and Health: Why Are We So Bad at Managing
SSEH Problems?�� 55
Some Theoretical and Political Contextual Indications About
Risk in the Field of Safety, Security, Environment- Health (SSEH) �� 60
Safety and Reliability�� 61
Complex Systems�� 61
The Environment and Stakeholder Participation: Rio’s
Turning Point �� 62
xi
xii Contents
Corporate Social Responsibility: From the Earth Summit

to the Climate Summit �� 63
Expertise and Decision: Two Interrelated Processes �� 64
Key Failures and Deficits in Expertise Process and Some
Practical Illustration �� 66
About Problem Framing�� 66
About Problem Structuring�� 69
About Formal Problem Solving �� 72
About Conclusions Framing�� 76
Stories of Expert Folly, Failure, and Misadventure �� 79
Consistency Versus Institutional Allegiance�� 79
Some Summarizing Elements of Safety Report (SR)�� 79
5 Ethics and Analytics as Key Drivers of Good Decisions�� 89
About the Validity and Legitimacy of Expertise in SSEH �� 91
Why Is It a Matter of Ethics?�� 91
How Can We Contribute to Assessing the Quality of the
Expertise Process? �� 93
A Generic Integrated Framework for Analytics and Ethics
of Expertise�� 97
Some Insights About Validity and Legitimacy Conditions�� 99
Context and the Expertise Process�� 102
About the Cognitive, Collective and Organizational Biases
and Factors that Influence Risk Perception, Problem Framing
and Conclusions Structuring�� 107
What Can We Conclude? �� 108
Part II Formalized Decision Support for Safety, Security,
Environment and Health
6 Solving Problems in SSEH: The Use of Decision
Support Tools�� 111
Multi-criteria Decision Making: Why? For Whom? How? �� 111
Actors and Decision Makers�� 112
The Objects of Study: The Concept of Potential Actions�� 113
From the Optimal Solution to the Satisfactory Solution�� 114
Structure of Preferences and Function Criterion:
How to Develop an Indicator �� 115
Multicriteria Decision Aiding Methods: The Main Principles�� 118
Four Reference Problems�� 119
From Partial to Global Assessment: The Aggregation�� 120
How Can We Choose a Multicriteria Method According
to the Different Categories of Risk Studies (SR)? �� 121
7 Decision Making, ELECTRE, and SSEH�� 127
General Concepts and Principles of ELECTRE III
and ELECTRE TRI Methods�� 128
The Outranking Concept for Studies of Risk�� 129
Contents xiii
The Credibility Index in ELECTRE III and ELECTRE TRI�� 130

The ELECTRE III Method�� 132
The ELECTRE TRI Method�� 134
The Concept of Categories�� 134
The Determination of Boundary Profiles to Categories
in the Method ELECTRE TRI �� 134
Regarding the Allocation Procedures and the Impact
of the Ranking of Categories on the Ranking of Risk �� 135
The Meaning and the Details of Weights�� 140
The Meaning of Weight in Studies of Risks�� 140
How to Define a Set of Weights �� 141
Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Analysis �� 142
On the Incomparability Relation “R”�� 143
The Cutting Threshold λ in ELECTRE TRI�� 143
Key Takeaways�� 144
8 Navigating a River of Doubt: Making Decisions
in a 21st Century World�� 147
The Way Forward: Striving Towards Ethical, Scientific,
and Effective Decision Making�� 149
Bibliography �� 153
Index�� 165
About the Authors
Myriam Merad is a French National Scientific Research Center (CNRS)’

Research Director (Professor) at Paris Dauphine University and Nice Sophia
Antipolis University. She leads research in risk, sustainability, and resilience gover-
nance and decisions in safety, security, and health environment.
Professor Merad is primarily interested in expertise framing, policy analytics,
and participative/deliberative decision analysis.
She is the author of six books in French on decision aiding, expertise, and risk
assessment and management; concertation and mediation in environment; and man-
aging the organizational change of sustainable development, as well as three upcom-
ing books in English and French. She has contributed to the different national
guidelines and legislations in the field of safety and sustainability, has written more
than 50 papers for scientific journals and conferences, has participated in 80 confer-
ences and seminars, and has co-organized more than 30 technical and scientific
seminars, conferences, and meetings.
She is a councilor of the Society for Risk Analysis (SRA) and French Society for
the Prevention of Natural Disasters (AFPCN) and a fellow of the French Institute
for Risk Management (IMdR) and French Society of Environment Engineers
(AFITE).
Benjamin D. Trump is a Research Social Scientist for the US Army Corps of

Engineers. His work focuses on decision-making and governance of activities under
significant uncertainty, such as emerging and enabling technologies (synthetic biol-
ogy, nanotechnology) and developing organizational, infrastructural, social, and
informational resilience against systemic threats to complex interconnected sys-
tems. He served as a delegate to assist US presence in OECD’s Global Science
Forum in 2017 and is the President of the Society for Risk Analysis’ Decision
Analysis and Risk Specialty Group in 2018–2019. He was selected as a Fellow of
the Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity Initiative, Class of 2019.
Dr. Trump was also a contributing author of the International Risk Governance
Council’s Guidelines for the Governance of Systemic Risks, as well as their 2nd
Volume of the Resource Guide on Resilience. He is also frequently active with
xv
xvi About the Authors
several Advanced Research Workshops for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s
Science for Peace Programme, including his role as Overall Coordinator of a work-
shop titled Cybersecurity and Resilience for the Arctic. Coauthored with Dr. Igor
Linkov, his book The Science and Practice of Resilience (2019) includes a detailed
discussion of the methodological, philosophical, and governance-related work
behind the concept of resilience. He received his Ph.D. from the University of
Michigan’s School of Public Health, Department of Health Management and Policy,
in 2016, his M.S. (2012) in Public Policy and Management, and his B.S. in Political
Science (2011) from Carnegie Mellon University.
Part I
Unpacking the Decision Making Process
Chapter 1
The Challenge of Making Good Decisions
How do we make good decisions?

What do you do when you must take action on an important and risky issue, yet lack
the necessary information to make an informed decision? Even more challenging, how
do you make decisions about an uncertain subject, when delay is a costly or unaccept-
able option?
These types of questions are not just an academic exercise, but are difficulties
facing government policymakers, high-risk industry leaders, and a wide multitude
of other organizations. Fundamentally, these questions shape an all-important char-
acteristic of the governing process – whether or not decisions are viewed as valid
and legitimate in the eyes of pertinent stakeholders.
Some of us believe in their personal good fortune. Some prefer to roll the dice
and leave decisions up to chance. Others will elect to rest on their laurels and refuse
to act altogether – at least until they are given greater clarity for future actions and
are no longer dogged by uncertainty. Each of these courses of action is broadly
framed by their tolerance for risk. Some will balance potential negatives and posi-
tive outcomes, while others will be more risk-averse (focusing primarily on nega-
tives or losses) or gain seeking (focusing primarily on the positives or potential
growth form an activity).
Others will ask for advice from those they trust (such as their relatives). This is a
commonly held approach in a wide array of topic areas, from military strategy to
personal finance, where the advisor’s character, background, or general credibility
is the determining factor behind their perceived legitimacy. In Ancient Rome, such
was the fate of Pompey the Great, who went against better judgment and listened to
trusted allies and colleagues regarding proper military action against Julius Caesar
at the Battle of Pharsalus in 48 BC – advice that turned out to be catastrophically
incorrect and doomed the Roman Republic. Despite a decades-long career as a mili-
tary commander, Pompey acceded to poor advice by impatient colleagues and
rashly attacked a desperate enemy – giving rival commander Caesar a singular
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 3

M. Merad, B. D. Trump, Expertise Under Scrutiny, Risk, Systems and
Decisions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20532-4_1
4 1 The Challenge of Making Good Decisions
opportunity to defeat his Senatorial enemies in a desperate yet well-planned pitched

battle. Pompey’s example demonstrates that, unfortunately, not all advice is well-
conceived or helpful.
Keeping with this military theme, a more successful example from Ancient China
includes a willingness of rivals Sun Quan and Liu Bei to combine forces against a
daunting and confident foe. The leaders adopted a cunning military strategy created
by General Huang Gai, who in-turn defeated the far stronger and better-organized
armies of Cao Cao at the Battle of Red Cliffs in 208 AD. Despite being numerically
and organizationally inferior to Cao Cao’s northern armies, Sun Quan and Lieu Bei
recognized that Huang Gai’s military strategy provided perhaps the only realistic
opportunity to prevent their collective destruction. Huang Gai’s eventual success
ensured the continued sovereignty of Sun Quan and Liu Bei’s regimes, and pre-
vented Cao Cao’s consolidation of China through military force.
Such a reliance and trust within a close confidante can be inherently risky as
well, where one places the safekeeping of their resources within a single person’s
best judgment. Though history is littered with examples of how such trust (often in
the form of nepotism) can go wrong, a trusted colleague can help guide an individ-
ual or an organization through challenging times and through seemingly insur-
mountable odds.
Still others seek the council of ‘experts,’ where the onus is given to those who are
perceived to have training, knowledge, or wisdom in a topic area that would allow
them to derive the best course of action. Among other reasons, such a reliance upon
expert panels, and the panels’ own tendency towards groupthink and lack of col-
laboration, contributed to the Challenger space shuttle disaster on January 28, 1986.
In this tragic event, critical information related to engineering concerns of the
Challenger were not communicated through NASA’s chain of command in a sup-
portive nor expeditious manner.
On a lighter and more positive note, the success of such panels may be demon-
strated by the 1975 Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA, which generated
some of the earliest guidance on the good governance of emerging biotechnologies.
In these and other examples, trust is spread across third-party experts who are
trained to address a given problem using their experience and problem-solving
capabilities. Such a strategy may appear inherently less risky than relying upon a
trusted friend, relative, or colleague, yet such approaches can also be limited by the
degree of an individual’s expertise, and whether such expertise is applicable and
helpful to a given situation. Regardless of the strategy chosen, decision makers must
ultimately aggregate as much advice and guidance as possible given the constraints
of time, money, and manpower, and take risks in hopes of achieving some desired
end.
Uncertainty is a fact of life, and nothing will ever make us one hundred percent
certain what the future holds. Throughout history and the present day, many indi-
viduals and organizations use various heuristics, stratagies, and tools to cope with
such uncertainty, ranging from psychological, social, economic, cultural, anthropo-
logical, and even religious support and guidance (IRGC 2018; Trump et al. 2018a,
b, c). We use these highly diverse mentalities and backgrounds to influence our
decision making, whether it be to balance costs and benefits, consider ethical dilem-
1 The Challenge of Making Good Decisions 5
mas, or to simply survive the daily chore of selecting what to wear to work in the
morning. Whether their impact is significant or trivial, our heuristics, biases, other
behavioral characteristics determine how we, as individuals, address uncertainty
from one day to the next (Palma-Oliveira et al. 2018).
However, such uncertainty is magnified when the consequences of a given risk
are borne not just by ourselves, but also by others we are responsible for or care
about. For example, the decision to borrow a large sum of money to finance a busi-
ness venture can have dramatic consequences for family members, who may rely
upon the business’ ability to generate profits to provide for their daily livelihood and
wellbeing. These challenges can become much more worrisome, where potential
losses can permanently harm others who otherwise may not have had a say in the
decision at hand. These dilemnas can appear paralyzing without the proper help and
support.
In these cases, a great many of us will seek the aid of others to make better sense
of the uncertainty facing us. Whatever role or expertise they hold, he or she should
know about a specific issue of the given problem and be trustworthy in their judg-
ment (hopefully, by being unbiased as well). However, as you will likely assume,
this is no simple task. Your course of action must exist within a world of conflicting
information and often an equally spirited and insistent opposing point of view. This
becomes especially difficult when your desired course of action goes against socially
acceptable norms or ‘common knowledge,’ and can have a substantial effect upon
how you frame risk tradeoffs and conduct value judgments. Ultimately, the way you
frame, organize, manage, or govern the expertise process influences how expert
validity and legitimacy is perceived and understood, and can have a dramatic impact
upon the types of decisions that can be made given these and other political and
institutional limitations.
Even more troublesome is the fact that generally, individuals and organizations
are required to conduct multiple decision making tasks simultaneously and with
limited time and money.
This is particularly true for government policymakers and business leaders.
Government officials and related public authorities are forced to deal with a multi-
tude of uncertain, highly contentious, and occasionally contradictory issues that
are skewed by political debate or inflexible budget limitations. A notable example
of this includes environmental health and safety, such as recurring concern over the
safety, reliability, and sustainability of critical infrastructure (e.g., nuclear power,
chemical and petrochemical plants, waste storages, road networks, information
systems, etc.).
Institutional cultures and policy histories limit the type and scope of decisions
that may be made for such infrastructure, which can help simplify day-to-day opera-
tions yet also fosters significant difficulty regarding the management of unforeseen
or low probability events that threaten to disrupt or destroy infrastructure function-
ality and performance (Trump et al. 2019). When operational algorithms and pre-
determined technical advice is limited in its effectiveness or ability to rectify acrisis,
even government stakeholders are forced to gain expert insight from non-traditional
sources – making it all the more important that such experts (a) clearly understand
the threat in question and the general goals that must be met to ameliorate the threat,
and (b) acknowledge and work within the bounds of longstanding political and
institutional realities that shape agency culture regarding the perception, assess-
ment, management, and communication of risk. This is quite a tall order, yet as we
have seen from examples ranging from severe hurricanes in the American Gulf
Coast to international cybersecurity against increasingly refined and complex cyber-
attacks, these events happen frequently and require a willingness of public officials
to adapt to the situation at hand with available, and hopefully valid and legitimate,
expert insight (Slovic et al. 1980; Linkov and Trump 2019).
At this point, you might be of the impression that we are arguing for an “expert-
only approach” to guiding decision making. While experts can certainly help
address complex challenges under significant uncertainty, even they operate under
certain assumptions that can be grossly incorrect. Sometimes so-called experts in a
given domain operate with as much bias and error as any other person – which can
lead to disastrous consequences.
Scientific experts are under the influence of unconscious factors that can contrib-
ute to their blindness. A core example of this includes the period leading up to the
Financial Crisis and Great Recession of 2007–2009, where top-level experts and
policy leaders were unable to diagnose warning signs in international finance that
nearly contributed to a collapse of the global financial system. Another example
includes the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, where many internal company experts
dismissed structural and engineering concerns associated with the offshore oil rig
that infamously contributed to a massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. In both
cases, trusted experts ignored or failed to interpret signals of impending disaster that
generated widespread misery.
It is impossible to be an expert on all subjects. Even if you could be, the likeli-
hood of you making unbiased, fully informed, and well-scoped decisions are pro-
hibitively unlikely. In complex industries, experts and decision-makers must
maintain a degree of humility and modesty in the knowledge that it is impossible to
be omnipresent, and be fully cognizant of all threats and risks at all times. They
must then rely on collective expertise and organizational processes. At some point,
we all rely upon something to reassure, guide, and instruct us on how to behave or
act in a given situation. There is no shame in this – on the contrary, acknowledging
one’s limitations to reliably execute informed decisions without help is what good
leaders are made of. However, even in this state of reliance upon the guidance and
expertise of others, it is essential to understand how the advice of even these indi-
viduals or groups can be swayed by bias, uncertainty, and the need to utilize heuris-
tics to make sense of a chaotic world.
We hone in on four such factors: procedural, cognitive, perceptional, and organi-
zational. While interrelated, these four factors can each subconsciously bias or sway
judgment in even the most cut and dry situations, and complicate what should be a
simple decision into one wrought with confusion, uncertainty, and inefficiency.
You are likely less familiar with procedural biases. To better describe what these
are and how they can influence how decisions are made, let’s make use of an exam-
ple. Let’s imagine that you were able to select a group of four experts (E1, E2, E3,
and E4) that you trust.
These experts are supposed to give you conclusions about the level of risk (high
risk, medium risk, and low risk) induced by a decision that you are eventually
required to make. Based on their relative expertise, each expert provides different
conclusions: E1 considers that the decision is of high risk (level 1), E2 considers it
as being low risk (level 3) as E4 and E3 considers the decision as a medium risk
(level 2). Obviously, the lack of consistency across experts is disconcerting.
As a responsible decision-maker, you likely favor transparency, consistency, and
predictability in your decision making processes. Such transparency can arise from
various procedures, from rule-by-majority to clear and scientifically defensible
decision making algorithms. For example, if two or three of the abovementioned
experts voice strong agreement for a given strategy, a valid and consistent decision
making strategy would be to follow their advice of the least risky option forward.
Many modern corporations are structured behind such decision making processes,
where a Board of Directors is charged with the overall governance and strategic
operations of the corporate venture. Related bodies include many regulatory author-
ities, which rely upon transparent, consistent, and majority-driven decisions regard-
ing safe use and best practices of emerging material production and commodification.
The advantage of this approach is that it considers a broad base of expertise and
opinion, yet it possesses an inherent disadvantage of being less efficient due to the
need to debate and aggregate information from various sources. Nevertheless, such
states which vest power and decision making across a broad body often have the
capacity to overcome many unforeseen disruptions and organizational challenges,
ranging from historical examples such as the Byzantine Empire to Napoleonic
France to much of the modern United States and European Union. Even accounting
for the unique institutional and political drivers within these and other examples,
distributed and majority-driven governing processes often require a period of delib-
eration to operate effectively.
Likewise, some operations require bold action from a single empowered decision
maker. The stakes are often high with such governing procedures, where a ‘go-it-
alone’ approach is often taken with minimal deliberation and may go against con-
ventional best practices or expert opinion. Wrong decisions here can mean
significantly greater losses than would be undertaken by a majority-rule governing
approach, yet wise (and hopefully lucky) leaders can also leverage significantly
greater benefits than traditionally available. Historically, many military operations
were governed by such an approach. One example includes the military career of
Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, who famously disregarded the advice of
much older and experienced Macedonian generals in his battles against Greek City
States, Achaemenid Persia, Scythia, and India. Many of Alexander’s great successes
came from these bold moves where, if he had been less skilled or lucky, a negative
result could have resulted in the destruction of his army and country. Alexander’s
luck and skill were not shared by Tsar Nicholas Romanov II of the Russian Empire,
who took personal command of Russia’s forces in World War I against the advice of
more experienced and capable commanders and fostered the collapse not only of the
Tsarist Russian Army, but also of the Imperial Romanov dynasty. The question of
whether to reserve decision making onto oneself, to abide by majority rule, or invest
greater support behind a small but respected minority (i.e. if E3 is perceived as a
more trusted and legitimate authority, when E1 and E2 may disagree with E3’s
assessment) is one that can only be determined based upon context, institutional
requirements, and overall levels of risk and loss aversion held by key stakeholders.
Notice that these procedures are nor absolute nor neutral: they all can lead to dif-
ferent conclusions, and even if they happen to generate the same conclusions, it can
be for different reasons. That means that there is a gap between what can be consid-
ered to be “consistent” or “robust” or “legitimate” and the way “procedurally” this
decision making process becomes operational.
We use ‘frames’ and ‘framing devices’ to structure differing courses of action as
being normatively positive or negative relative to some predetermined baseline.
Frequently, such frames are construed as bias. In fact, this is wrong.
These framing factors are not intrinsically biased, but erroneous. Let’s go back to
our example. A large part of us could be tempted, based on the equity principle, to
split the difference across all experts. Since the four experts have not given the same
conclusions, you might be tempted by this formula: two experts have given a level
3, one expert a level 1, and one expert a level 2, then (2∗3 + 1∗1 + 1∗2)/4 = 2.23 so
the conclusion is that the decision is of some moderate level of risk.
Do you see where the error is?
No?
Well, let us imagine that rather than using a quantitative convention (high risk:
level 1, medium risk: level 2 and low risk: level 3), we instead use a more qualitative
one (high risk: level A, medium risk: level B and low risk: level C), will you con-
sider that the conclusion is (2∗C + 1∗A + 1∗B)/4?
No. Why?
Because you know that even there is some normative order which defines A, B,
and C, such variables cannot initially be objectively calculated and or measured.
Where the weighted average may have been sufficient for a more quantitative mea-
surement approach, it does not work well with qualitative metrics (at least, not with-
out some transformation of data – we will discuss this in later chapters).
Causes of error and biasing factors are numerous. A low need for cognition
(Cacioppo and Petty 1982), low procedural knowledge, time pressure, or organiza-
tional incentives to conformity are examples of these factors.
Bias and error are terms that are frequently used in everyday language, but are
rarely defined and unpacked as scientific concepts. Well, what is the problem with
those biases and errors, especially when it comes to the science of decision
making?
Are they simply an academic concern to achieve purity in mathematical mea-
surement? Absolutely not.
When bias and error enter into the decision making process, they influence the
capacity of individuals or organizations to make transparent, logical, and scientifi-
cally informed decisions. For large and powerful organizations, bias and error can
lead to significant losses in life, money, and prestige.
Since you are accountable and responsible for your decisions, you have to con-
sider how information and advice are framed and inform strategy. It is not only a
matter of deontology, but of ethics, such as considering the impacts (short, medium
and long terms) that your choices have upon your dependents and the greater
society.
Let us try to summarize what we discussed until now:
• When decisions are crucial dealing with high risks and under uncertainty, we can
ask for advice.
• Advice is given by those who we trust in their legitimacy and so on their advice/
conclusions.
• In some context, we do not have the ability and opportunity to choose those advi-
sors/experts. They are imposed or are all that is presently available. At that point,
we still have a need for a demonstration of their legitimacy and the validity of
their conclusions.
• This is even the case if we can choose our experts even though these experts are
initially accredited by a large and excessive capital of trust.
• There is a large range of biasing factors that could affect our final decision. This
is equally true when it comes to experts.
• Expertiese in one area does not mean expertise in all.
• Being conscious of these biasing and potential sources of errors could contribute
to more ethical and responsible decisions and expertise.
A large part of the question of informed, valid, and legitimate decision making
centers upon how experts and decision makers account for uncertainties and risks.
When a conclusion is well-famed, and risks are visibly avoided or prevented, deci-
sion makers are often praised. When something goes wrong, and disaster strikes,
such decision makers are placed under extensive scrutiny – regardless of whether
their actions directly contributed to such losses. This way of considering autonomy
in decisions, distorted by an over personalization and sacralization of expertise and
the decision-making processes, leads us to the common argument of “human error.”
Actors, analysts, and decision-makers are rarely autonomous: they are influ-
enced by a number of endogenous and exogenous factors. These might include
membership or participation within an organization, a group, or a geospatial terri-
tory, as well as any pertinent institutional laws, explicit and tacit rules and proce-
dures, and specific cultures that constrain the expertise and decision processes. The
way these organizations are managed and governed affect and influence experts’
conclusions, as well as how these conclusions are filtered and implemented into
government policy or private sector practice. More significantly, the difficulty in
assessing and analyzing the public policies and strategies in the field of safety, secu-
rity, and environment-health erode the perceived validity and legitimacy of exper-
tise and decision processes (Linkov et al. 2018a, b).
The duality between the design and the conduct of expertise and the management
and governance of expertise is rarely discussed in literature or practice (Merad and
Trump 2018). The challenge in this book is to deconstruct the decision making pro-
cess and identify the practices which facillitate effective, valid, and just leadership.
Based on these suggestions, we will propose an integrated framework for analyt-
ics and ethics of expertise in the field of safety, security, and environment-heath.
The chapters herein describe the various drivers and components behind decision
making, in hopes that readers may arrive at decision processes that are more robust,1
valid, and reflexive than those taken in an unstructured or ad hoc manner.
This book tackles the problem of valid, just, and ethical decision making in envi-
ronmental health and safety by reviewing each component of the decision making
problem in turn. Chapter 2 provides a detailed description of expertise problems,
their increasing commonality, and general strategies to address such challenges.
Chapter 3 focuses more explicitly on the various stakeholders involved in the deci-
sion making process – from publics, to actors, to decision makers, to experts. Chapter
4 describes the longstanding challenges and limitations associated with decision
making within environmental health and safety, while Chapter 5 reviews analytical
and methodological strategies to overcome these limitations in cases where transpar-
ency, scientific reproducibility, and validity are of the utmost importance. Chapters 6
and 7 unpack methodological options to scientifically validate and communicate
risk-based information through decision support. Finally, Chapter 8 reflects upon the
modern challenge of expertise and legitimacy in a twenty-first Century world.
1
The notion of robustness used in this book goes beyond the stability of the conclusions to the
sensitivity analysis. The reader will discover the extent to which the concept of robustness has been
applied throughout the book.
Chapter 2
About Expertise Problems: Decision
Making Challenges in a Contentious
Environment
Right action is better than knowledge; but in order to do what is

right, we must know what is right.
—Charlemagne (724–814 A.D.)
Humans do not like dealing with problems. Though some may revel in times of
chaos and doubt, the average person is plenty satisfied when their problems seem far
away, and daily life remains ordinary and predictable. Problems are the embodiment
of unpredictability, and such unpredictability threatens trouble that could generate
an untold array of harmful consequences. Such consequences could be minor (i.e.,
taking an alternate route to work that happens to experience significant traffic on
that day) to life-altering (i.e., critically inaccurate medical diagnoses). Thankfully,
the human mind is tailored to be a problem-solving machine and uses various tricks
and shortcuts to demystify uncertainty, identify patterns, and derive the optimal
solution for the given problem at hand. This ‘brain-as-problem-solving-device’ con-
cept is honed throughout one’s educational experience, where schools use ‘prob-
lems’ as teaching moments for students to derive a solution via a mixture of
deductive and inductive reasoning and fact retention.
By the end of secondary school, modern educational practices tend to prepare
most students to expect problems to be a priori framed and fixed by others – those
with more theoretical knowledge, more resources, or more delegated responsibility.
Further, modern education tends to frame problems as normatively negative, where
uncertainty presents potential losses to health, wealth, and happiness. Few empha-
size problems and uncertainty as an opportunity, yet some like investor and busi-
nessman Warren Buffet have capitalized on uncertainty and decision making crises
by fashioning his fortune at Berkshire Hathaway. In this arena, Buffet famously
stated that investors should be “fearful when others are greedy and greedy when
others are fearful” – this logic goes against natural human tendencies towards safety
and loss aversion (more famously described by Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky in their Prospect Theory) yet demonstrates that problems can generate
opportunities in the same way they raise the potential for losses.
Regardless of the mindset of how one approaches a problem, a further assump-
tion related to problems in human activity is that, regardless of situational context
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 11

M. Merad, B. D. Trump, Expertise Under Scrutiny, Risk, Systems and
Decisions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20532-4_2
12 2 About Expertise Problems: Decision Making Challenges in a Contentious…
or challenges, a solution is possible. Among potential solutions, there are optimal,

beneficial, and harmful ones – all derived normatively and based upon the goals and
needs of the given stakeholders (Collier et al. 2016). We have to find the optimal one
concerning normative and procedural constraints.
Many differing schools of thought have emerged regarding the interpretation of
knowledge and our capacity to address problems. Depending on scientific commu-
nities (e.g., social science, engineering), some argue that problems are framed and
solutions are identified using the most situationally correct procedure. Likewise,
others consider that problems are constructs and that solutions can be explicitly or
implicitly found within the framing of the problem with or without formal
procedures.
One such community includes positivists. There is a kind of intellectual comfort
in the positivist approaches: all problems can be addressed, there is a clear separa-
tion between analysts that solve problems and decision-makers that provide prob-
lems, and there is also an optimal solution to discover and implement based on best
knowledge.
This approach to decision aiding could be considered as satisfactory for some
categories of problems, such as those where the stubborn myth of that problem
framing is a normatively neutral exercise.
However, these approaches are hardly maintainable in cases where the framing
of problems and solutions impact a large diversity of actors by producing disparities
in negative and positive outcomes partition. It is also the case when knowledge is
incomplete, and systems are hardly reachable. Constructivist approaches are then
more appropriate.
Within such an approach, knowledge is ‘constructed’ and framed in a manner
that builds from the empirical and cultural background (Linkov et al. 2012). They
can be differently framed according to the decision-maker, analysts and more
largely to other categories of actors. This finding has corollaries:
1. there is a need for problems framing;
2. there is a variety of procedural issues to deal with problems;
3. the set of solutions is potentially broad and comprehensive;
4. both the solutions and the process going from problem framing to solution fram-
ing should be valid and legitimate by the decision-maker, the analyst itself and
the actors;
5. the claim and pretention to validity and legitimacy are not only reducible to sci-
entific or regulatory norms;
6. problems and so solutions are nor absolute nor perennial: they are time, knowl-
edge, and territorially dependent.
As we have seen before, problems are framed dealing with expected, unexpected,
perceived, or potential negatives. When dealing with safety, security and
environment-health issues, these negatives are often called “risks.”
Risks and Uncertainties 13
Risks and Uncertainties
What is risk? What is uncertainty?

Classically, when it comes to risk, there are a variety of conventional definitions
used by practitioners, analysts, and regulators such as:
1. risk is the probability of occurrence of a dreaded event with certain consequences;
2. risk is a combination of a hazard and vulnerability of assets and stakes;
3. risk is the effect of uncertainty that one will accomplish their objectives.
The underlying aspect within these definitions is that risk is focused upon under-
standing the negative outcomes of an action or activity. Likewise, risk assessors and
managers seek to understand how, according to different scientific communities and
cultures, these “negatives” are regulated, managed, and governed. Let us consider,
for example, definition number 2 within the French context for chemical and petro-
chemical industries. Issues and steps in risk analysis and risk regulation linked with
industrial hazard are under the monitoring and control of the Regional Directorate
for Environment, Development, and Housing (DREAL); while issues linked with
the vulnerability of assets and stakes are under the responsibility of the Departmental
Directorate in charge of Territories (DDT).
Secondly, these definitions deal with probable, possible, known, or unknown
negative outcomes and externalities. In this view, risk is about how scientists, regu-
lators, practitioners, and analysts deal with their level of knowledge, of information,
and their consensus and disagreements on what is known and what is not.
Thirdly, these definitions lack precision regarding who is defining the set and
range of negatives that should be considered and who will endorse the responsibility
and the consequences of these negatives. This omission is significant. That supposes
that:
(i) there is somewhere a kind of absolute truth on what risk is that the Analyst can
find,
(ii) all Analysts will define risk similarly if they are qualified,
(iii) accordingly, it is not necessary to explicit who is the Analyst and what his role
and competencies are,
(iv) whatever are the aims of the risk analysis, it is possible to model risk as a
physical phenomenon,
(v) exposed or vulnerable stakes are within the direct scope of impact of the physi-
cal phenomenon where “vulnerability” is an inner characteristic of the stake.
The fourth aspect is that risk seems to include only “negatives.” But how about
those outcomes from risky actions and activities that might be normatively positive
to one or more actors? What happens when a single outcome is normatively nega-
tive for some segments of society and positive for others?
The first definition is inspired by the economic theory of risk (see Knight 1921),
but excludes considerations about the positives. In the economic theory, risk
represents a measurable uncertainty, with objective probability and a known
distribution of outcomes, where “true uncertainty” is an unquantifiable and immea-

surable, with subjective probability and a non-known distribution of outcomes.
Depending on one's school of thought, economic theory of risk considers that:
(i) risk is about losses or gains: negatives and positives;
(ii) risk is about losses (negatives), and uncertainty is about gains (positives).
The third definition of risk that is issued from ISO 31000:2018 is also based on the
economic theory of risk where the objectives are known, and the uncertainty is
measurable but both based on objective and subjective probabilities. But since the
risk is “the effect of uncertainty on […]” the risk is inherently framed as a measure
of loss.
The same observations could be applied to the second definition of risk.
Within modern economic theory, risk and uncertainty center upon the actions
and decisions that are taken such as investigating a new marketplace or investing in
a new product. Risk in the first two definitions is not taken, but is suffered. As an
externality, this influences the Analyst’ relations to knowledge, outcomes, and con-
trol. So, if it is clear within economic theory that risk is taken by the Decision
Maker (DM), the DM is the actor who possesses a large part of the knowledge that
he will partly share with the Analyst, and that the DM is responsible and account-
able for this risk, these issues are not that clear when it comes to risks that are suf-
fered. Indeed, if the DM is responsible and accountable for the decisions that will
be taken following the risk analysis, he is not necessarily the one who will endorse
the losses.
The other definitions of risk focus upon “negatives”. Safety, Security,
Environment, and Health (SSEH) analysts use mainly the economic definition of
risk in an inadequate way. In the EHS field, risks are about “negatives” and reveal
the way central and local administrations, or the way different departments and
services within a company are structured and organized to deal with these
negatives.
It could be tempting for a risk analyst, a regulator or a DM to homogenize the
risk definitions as ISO 31000 constructs it. We do think that the definition and fram-
ing of risk are an emergence of the way a sector, a community of practice, a State,
and more largely various sociotechnical systems and their ecosystems are organized
to deal with negatives and common and public goods (Palma-Oliveira et al. 2018).
If risk is considered as a technical problem, then it could be possible to harmonize
definitions across institutions, actors, and stakeholders in a methodologically and
philosophically transparent manner. But, if we accept that risk is a sociotechnical
problem, harmonization can lead to a loss of significant information and knowledge
about the sociotechnical system (Trump et al. 2018; Linkov et al. 2016).
So, what can be put in common to deal with the heterogeneous way of defining
and then dealing with risk?
Different Categories of Risks: About Negatives and Positives 15
Different Categories of Risks: About Negatives and Positives
Let us consider that each DM and actor maintains their definition of risk that we will
not constrain. Considering that risk is about:
(i) actors and stakeholders,
(ii) their arguments,
(iii) their objectives,
(iv) knowledge,
(v) information,
(vi) consequences,
(vii) foresight,
(viii) responsibilities,
(ix) constraints, and
(x) measures that have to be done.
These ten issues are time-dependent: they can vary within the time.
Each actor has his perception of risk and what the problem of risk is. Each actor
also has his own experience with this respect. The knowledge and contextual infor-
mation mobilized by each actor is fundamentally different, incomplete, and func-
tionally bounded – consistent with principles of bounded rationally expounded by
Simon (1957, 1966, 1982) and Kahneman, & Tversky (1986). Accordingly, we can
split problems dealing with what risk is about in four categories (Fig. 2.1):
• The known-knowns, or “Proven risks and Materialized risks”: based both on
their experience and their perception of “negatives,” actors can give pieces of
Fig. 2.1 Subdividing risk through the twin variables of risk perception and knowledge of risk
consequences
information, facts, and arguments that contribute to proving that negatives have
and then can occur.
• For unknown-knowns, or “Denied risks”: actors have experimented directly or
indirectly the negatives and have the information of the occurrence of negatives
somewhere, but they do not wish to consciously or unconsciously perceive it as
a risk.
• For known-unknowns, or “Suspected risks”: actors give arguments and pieces of
evidence and doubts are mobilized, but facts are difficult to find and demonstrate;
knowledge is not stabilized on the topic.
• For unknown-unknowns, or “Unknowable risks”: the actors have neither the
direct and indirect pieces of evidence about negatives nor the perception of the
risk due to a lack of information, a lack of knowledge sharing and stabilization.
Since knowledge and information vary over time, specific threats can be reclas-
sified as they arise or enter into the domain of public concern (IRGC 2018; Trump
et al. 2017).
Sorting and classifying a risk requires considerations of time, knowledge, and
information dependent based upon our historical experience with such events as
well as our construction of an action or outcome as normatively negative. Figure 2.2
shows how these categories vary within time.
Accordingly, we will name a risk as being:
• “emergent” when a risk will move from “unknowable,” “suspected” or “denied”
categories to a “proven risk” due to new information, new knowledge and a will-
ingness of a group of actors to pay attention to the category of problems raised
by this risk;
• “resurgent” when he used to be considered, at a certain period, as being “proven”
and “denied” after a certain period and then being reconsidered as “proven”;
Level of uncertinity
(Knowledge and epistemic)
Suspected risks (known-Unknown)

Denied risks (Unknown-known) Occourred /materialized
Proven risks (known-known) risks (known-known)
Denied risks (Unknown-known) Denied risks (Unknown-known)
Reasonable doubt
Unknowable risk
(Unknown-Unknown)
Time
Adverse fragmented past Events Major Adverse Events
Fig. 2.2 How time and knowledge on negatives influence the attribution of a risk to a category
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Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both
as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be
by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said
Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within
any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress
may by Law have directed.
Section. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving
them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason
unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or
on Confession in open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of
Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood,
or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.
Article. IV.
Section. 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof.
Section. 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State,
shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which
he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the Crime.
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but
shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or
Labour may be due.
Section. 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the
Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the
Congress.
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this
Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the
United States, or of any particular State.
Section. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of
them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of
the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against
domestic Violence.
Article. V.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it

necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States,
shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress;
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year
One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the
first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and
that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of it’s equal
Suffrage in the Senate.
Article. VI.
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the

Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United
States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States,
shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution;
but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office or public Trust under the United States.
Article. VII.
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be

sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the
States so ratifying the Same.
The Word, “the,” being interlined between the seventh and
eighth Lines of the first Page, The Word “Thirty” being partly
written on an Erazure in the fifteenth Line of the first Page,
The Words “is tried” being interlined between the thirty
second and thirty third Lines of the first Page and the Word
“the” being interlined between the forty third and forty fourth
Lines of the second Page.
Attest William Jackson Secretary
done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States
present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord
one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the
Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth. In
witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names,
Go Washington—Presidt and deputy from Virginia
John Langdon
New Hampshire
Nicholas Gilman
Nathaniel Gorham
Massachusetts
Rufus King
Wm. Saml. Johnson
Connecticut
Roger Sherman
New York Alexander Hamilton
Wil: Livingston
David Brearley.
New Jersey
Wm Paterson.
Jona: Dayton
B Franklin
Thomas Mifflin
Robt Morris
Geo. Clymer
Pennsylvania
Thos FitzSimons
Jared Ingersoll
James Wilson
Gouv Morris
Geo: Read
Gunning Bedford jun
Delaware John Dickinson
Richard Bassett
Jaco: Broom
James McHenry
Maryland Dan of St Thos Jenifer
Dan. Carroll
John Blair
Virginia
James Madison Jr.
Wm Blount
North Carolina Richd Dobbs Spaight.
Hu Williamson
South Carolina J. Rutledge
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
Charles Pinckney
Pierce Butler.
William Few
Georgia
Abr Baldwin
APPENDIX II
THE RESOLUTION WHICH PROPOSED THE CONSTITUTION TO THE
CONVENTIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF AMERICA
In Convention Monday September 17th 1787.
Present
The States of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. Hamilton from
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.
Resolved,
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the United States in
Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion of this Convention,
that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates,
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent and Ratification;
and that each Convention assenting to, and ratifying the Same,
should give Notice thereof to the United States in Congress
assembled.
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that as soon as
the Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this Constitution,
the United States in Congress assembled should fix a Day on which
Electors should be appointed by the States which shall have ratified
the same, and a Day on which the Electors should assemble to vote
for the President, and the Time and Place for commencing
Proceedings under this Constitution. That after such Publication the
Electors should be appointed, and the Senators and Representatives
elected: That the Electors should meet on the Day fixed for the
Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes certified,
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the
Secretary of the United States in Congress assembled, that the
Senators and Representatives should convene at the Time and
Place assigned; that the Senators should appoint a President of the
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and counting the
Votes for President; and, that after he shall be chosen, the
Congress, together with the President, should, without Delay,
proceed to execute this Constitution.
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention
Go Washington Presidt
W. Jackson Secretary.
APPENDIX III
THE FIRST SEVENTEEN AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION
1. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.
2. A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.
3. No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner
to be prescribed by law.
4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
5. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, nor to be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
6. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
7. In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.
8. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
9. The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
10. The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.
11. The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
12. The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by
ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall
not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall
name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall
make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all
persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for
each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to
the seat of the government of the United States directed to the
President of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The person having
the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if
such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors
appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the
persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list
of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall
choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the
President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist
of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a
majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the
House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever
the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of
March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President,
as in the case of death or other constitutional disability of the
President.—The person having the greatest number of votes as
Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a
majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person
have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose
shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a
majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be
eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.
13. Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.
14. Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors
for President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of
the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-
one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or
as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to
the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of
each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion,
shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State
shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for
the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations
and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
15. Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude—
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation—
16. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration.
17. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each
State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most
numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the
Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of
election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any
State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary
appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the
legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election
or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the
Constitution.
APPENDIX IV
THE ALLEGED EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the
importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United
States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage
purposes is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 2. The Congress and the several States shall have
concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Sec. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of
the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven
years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the
Congress.
APPENDIX V
THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be

denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of sex.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
Transcriber’s Notes
Minor punctuation errors have been fixed.
Page xvii: “state legislalatures” changed to “state legislatures”
Page 34: “independent governernments” changed to “independent governments”
Page 76: “This govermnent” changed to “This government”
Page 290: “entire subesquent” changed to “entire subsequent”
Page 432: “the semblence of” changed to “the semblance of”
Page 448: “he appointed” changed to “be appointed”
Page 456: “of the Independance” changed to “of the Independence”
Page 457: “Pensylvania” changed to “Pennsylvania”
Page 458: “the preceeding Constitution” changed to “the preceding Constitution”

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