QUESTION NO.

1:
Differences between Moellendorf and Brock’s cosmopolitan accounts of global justice.
As per Della Porta, D. (2015), an individual's rights are more important than the interests of the
state or community, therefore this notion of global justice falls within cosmopolitanism. To the
cosmopolitan, the individual is the beginning point of moral analysis since they believe that all
humans have equal moral worth.
So, even though cosmopolitans disagree about how to ensure that all individuals are treated
equally in terms of moral concern, the value of each individual remains a central priority for all
of these different approaches. Some cosmopolitan scholars have begun to critically confront
theories of justice that have historically been restricted to the state and contained within the
sphere of political theory (rather than international theory) because of this emphasis on the moral
value of the individual. To this goal, the theory of global justice was developed, which aims to
determine the best way to guarantee a fair existence for everyone on our planet, regardless of
their nationality or social scale (DeMartino, G., 2002).
Hayward, T. (2006) mentioned that in Theory of Justice, Rawls expresses his ideas on justice in
the state, but his views on global justice are quite different. In contrast, people rather than
individuals are the emphasis of John Moellendorf, who claims that Rawls has trouble capturing
respect for individuals. An alternative normative thought experiment that replicates optimal
deliberation conditions. Additionally, it provides a framework for considering global justice
issues. Distributive justice can be improved by applying a needs-based minimum floor principle.
Moellendorf's logic is important. According to Brock, G. (2009), legislators who don't know
what their constituents are capable of will want the aggregate set of talents and abilities to benefit
everyone, not just those they represent (Pogge, T., 2001).
However, according to Brock, the world is made up of diverse communities that are structured in
different ways. All people are not part of the same group, and Brock does not believe that all
communities are homogeneous. In fact, she states that our moral imagination can be expanded if
we can feel the force of having to assume the perspective of someone else.
As per Sangiovanni, A. (2007), Brock argues that you shouldn't have easy access to data that
could help you estimate your chances of being in certain situations. Delegates will have to
consider carefully what 'the strains of commitment' truly entail and what she will be willing to
tolerate in an open and honest way. No one knows where they live, how large or populous it is or
what kind of economic development is most prevalent in the territory they represent.
Moral cosmopolitanism is a position Brock shares with many others involved in the debate on
global justice. Despite this, she rejects the idea of a global government. The typical extreme
definition of "institutional cosmopolitanism" is not one she endorses (Sangiovanni, A., (2007).
To truly embrace moral cosmopolitanism, she argues, we need to be open to new international
institutions and reforms to current ones, as well as a willingness to create new ones from the
ground up. Assuming that a world state is impossible or would bring more harm than benefit in
the near future, we should pursue a variety of cosmopolitan reforms in order to achieve our
cosmopolitan objectives.
Young, I. M. (2006) claimed that people who are rational will care at least a little about having
some independence. Delegates would like assurances as to what treatment is acceptable. Dissent,
conscience, free expression, unionization and freedom of movement are all legitimate additions.
Delegates to the United Nations General Assembly should keep an eye out for opportunities to
address their needs. Being unable to meet our basic requirements must be one of the most
devastating consequences that we can experience.
Most aspects of human activity, including economic and political structure, will be affected by
the minimum package. What kind of governance system would we implement? We want to keep
as much control as possible over the things that immediately affect our lives, such as our ability
to eat and sustain life, so that our critical interests are not jeopardized.
Delegates may have additional compelling reasons to reject a world government in favor of
retaining nations. One of the most critical considerations is which option is the most prudent in
light of the current situation's uncertainties. Brock, G. (2009) that this issue is based on the
combination of two factors. A cautious approach would be sensible in light of the seriousness of
the situation, and therefore ensures a risk-averse decision-making process. It's understandable to
worry about what might happen if the world government turns out to be disastrous.
In conclusion, I've made the case so far for a minimum package that would allow us to all have a
decent life, including the ability to meet our own and our dependents' basic needs, in an ideal
scenario. This package would also include provisions for those who are permanently or
temporarily disabled, as well as some form of safety net (Brock, G., 2009).
QUESTION 2:
Brock’s Arguments
Young, I. M. (2006) stated that Cosmopolitanism is a belief that holds that all people have equal
moral value, regardless of whether they happen to be co-nationals. This translates quite
powerfully into obligations to all people, regardless of their nationality.
According to Yael Tamir and David Miller, our obligations to our fellow citizens are more
important and immediate than our obligations to the rest of the world. Neither author is
consistent, according to Brock, in their acceptance of the normative background and restraint
provided by universal and impartial concerns on the degree to which we may favor members of
our own groups.
Brock argues that securing global justice should come before caring for the needs of one's own
citizens. As per Brock, G. (2009). normal thought experiment is used to show that delegates in an
original position would only accept helping their fellow co-nationals if their basic necessities and
rights were ensured and equitable terms of cooperation across borders had been established.
A preference for co-nationals is often cited by liberal nationalists. In Chapter 10, Brock discusses
Yael Tamir's and David Miller's arguments for this, as well as five more arguments. Tamir feels
there are reasons to prefer nationality because of the shared identity it provides. Similarly, Miller
sees national identity as vital, but prefers to prioritize the interests of our own country and its
residents over those of other nations, on the basis that nations have the right to self-determination
(Della Porta, D., 2015).
"Gratitude," "reciprocity," "common history," "common affiliation," and "the necessity for such
preferences to make our political lives work correctly" are the five arguments that Brock
examines in Chapter 11(Brock, G., 2009).
The two arguments that I favor out of the five are the first and the fourth argument.
The first argument sheds light on gratitude. It discusses that when people are growing up, they
owe a debt of gratitude to the nation for all that it has done to shape who they become.
Nationalism may provide numerous benefits, including the ability to realize one's deepest needs
and goals, the development of one's own qualities, and a host of other possibilities.
Humans, according to some, have underlying wants that can only be met by residing among
members of the same ethnic group. Some of the recognized demands include: belonging, self-
esteem through belonging, creating something coherent of ourselves and our life, and achieving
self-identity or self-definition through cultural membership and group affiliation.
However, Collste, G. (2010) argued that there are many who believe that feeling secure and
building one's self-esteem are intertwined and that only by being a part of a nation can an
individual grow into a mature, self-sufficient agent.
Individuals are obligated to the nation because the nation has helped them achieve their deepest
needs or desires, they have developed specific attributes, or they have benefited their fellow
citizens in a variety of other ways, according to these kinds of reasoning. To fulfill these duties,
it is believed that one should prioritize aiding one's fellow citizens in order to preserve,
perpetuate, or strengthen their nation and culture.
According to Armitage, D. (2020), belonging to a national community is the correct kind of
membership, we might have commitments to our fellow countrymen that are stronger than any
other obligations we may owe to anybody else. All of Brock's objections to these arguments are
legitimate. As a result of this, she concedes that national preferences are necessary. In the actual
world, most people are deeply attached to their countries, and a realistic utopia must take this
into consideration.
Brock’s critique is successful as it is grounded in logic. For the ‘gratitude argument’ for
example, Brock elaborates how people who grow up in communities owe a debt of appreciation
to the nation for the role it plays in helping them become who they are, allowing them to acquire
specific characteristics, and so forth. However, she also presents the valid point that if one is
bound by gratitude, it's puzzling why the list of persons to whom one owes thanks includes all of
one's fellow citizens (Barry, C., & Pogge, 2006).
In addition, the 'gratitude argument' relies on various assumptions that may be called into doubt.
The assumption that everyone has a deep human yearning to be a part of a nation is false.
Psychologically as well as morally, some people question the existence of such requirements.
It isn't just that they don't need them, but that possessing them is harmful, childish, or undesirable
in some other sense. If people do need to join groups, it is not clear that they need to join national
ones. Brock, G. (2009), proceeds to argue that even if she doesn't have close personal ties to
everyone in my country, she needs some kind of connection to the things that unite us or matter
to them in some way. Compatriots are unlikely to be bonded by any glue that extends beyond the
outskirts of their group.
QUESTION 3:
ETHICAL PRESENTISM AND GLOBAL JUSTICE
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As discussed in the paper by Collste, G. (2010), although global rectification is not feasible and
practical due to various reasons as mentioned below;
 It is not possible to measure the loss faced by any country or community in past on the
measuring scales of present
 Previous losses can never be judged and compensated in present because the victims who
have faced the loss or injustice are no more alive today
 Also, the culprits who were responsible for the injustice are not alive in present to
compensate those losses
 The decedents can never be obligated to pay for the injustices made by their ancestors in
the past because they are not responsible for the deeds of their ancestors (Collste, G.
(2010).
But the theory of global justice says that previous injustices should be compensated in the
present if possible and at any means.
According to Armitage, D. (2020), the principles of ethical presentism presented by Jon Elster, is
in contrast to the theory of global justice. Ethical presentism states that only living individuals
matter when it comes to justice. Elster theory further explains that past doesn’t matter and justice
is just to be concerned with the living individuals. Injustice done in the past cannot be
compensated in the present by taking revenge from the descendants of the ancestors. However,
Elster further discusses that the injustice done in past on individuals may constrain present
distribution under the circumstances that if they have left any moral trace in the present.
Research by Della Porta, D. (2015) has explained that ethical presentism principles have
formulated a criterion on the basis of which we can judge which injustices of the past need to be
compensated in the present.
As per Sangiovanni, A. (2007), Global justice principles demand the governments across the
world to avoid the ethical presentism and to improve the level of justice under their jurisdiction.
The ethical presentism has been introduced as the emerging concepts and ideas that belong to the
perceptions and the perspectives of the individuals.
To elaborate the connection of global justice with ethical presentism, we will take the example of
Scandinavian countries. There is an argue that should Scandinavian compensate England and
France for the brutalities of Vikings on them? The ninth and tenth centuries were the clear
examples of brutalities of Vikings on Scandinavians. According to Barry, C., & Pogge, T. W.
(2006), the ethical presentism, the answer is no because none of the moral traces of Vikings can
be found in the present. Ethical presentism states if the historical wrong is not visible in the
present, it can be of importance for history but never for the ethics.
The implications of the ethical presentism for the global justice have been evident from the
perspective of the provision of justice and equal rights. Global justice demands that the whole
world should act as a community where responsibilities should be distributed among the
countries on individual and collective manner (Hayward, T. (2006). Nations should be held
responsible for any kind of injustice taking place in any part of the earth and countries should
make collective efforts to bring tranquility and remedying injustice. The theory of global justice
negates the concepts of ethical presentism and states that for all the injustices done in the past,
responsible and developed countries should rectify those injustices. They can do so by rebuilding
the victims that are still going through tough times due to previous brutalities done on them.

As per Young, I. M. (2006), the ethical presentism principles deny the existence of whatever has
happened in the past and believes that only present things exist. It also believes that justice is
only applicable to the present happenings. Whatever wrong or injustice is done in the past is just
gone and do not require any compensation in the present Armitage, D. (2020). While the theory
of global justice believes that for the countries, communities and people who have become a
victim of injustice during any time in past should be given a compensation in the present world.
Global justice demands justice for the entire world. It says that justice is not only concerned with
the living individuals rather all moral and ethical injustices done in the past should also be
addressed by those who are responsible for those injustices (Collste, G., 2010).

Global justice associates a moral and ethical obligation on every individual across the globe to
answer for all the injustices that has been committed by them in the past. According to my
opinion, the ethical presentism principle is a hard approach towards humanity and supports
selfishness.
REFERENCES:

Armitage, D. (2020). In defense of presentism. History and Human Flourishing.

Barry, C., & Pogge, T. W. (2006). Global institutions and responsibilities: Achieving global
justice.
Brock, G. (2009). Global justice: A cosmopolitan account. Oxford University Press.
Collste, G. (2010). ‘… restoring the dignity of the victims’. Is global certificatory justice
feasible?. Ethics & Global Politics, 3(2), 85-99.
Della Porta, D. (2015). The global justice movement: An introduction. In Global justice
movement (pp. 11-38). Routledge.
DeMartino, G. (2002). Global economy, global justice: Theoretical and policy alternatives to
neoliberalism. Routledge.
Hayward, T. (2006). Global justice and the distribution of natural resources. Political studies,
54(2), 349-369
Nagel, T. (2005). The problem of global justice. Philosophy & public affairs, 33(2), 113- 147.
Noel, A., & Therien, J. P. (2002). Public opinion and global justice. Comparative political
studies, 35(6), 631-656.
Pogge, T. (2001). Priorities of global justice. Metaphilosophy, 32(1‐2), 6-24.
Pogge, T. W. (2001). Eradicating Systemic Poverty: brief for a global resources dividend.
Journal of Human Development, 2(1), 59-77.
Sangiovanni, A. (2007). Global justice, reciprocity, and the state. Philosophy and public affairs,
3-39.
Young, I. M. (2006). Responsibility and global justice: A social connection model. Social
philosophy and policy, 23(1), 102-130.