II.

The Constitution

A. Illustrative Cases

G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, is in oked by
1

petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic
Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing
legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and
patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to
sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning
bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
2

Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state —

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC —

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and
GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other
type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila
Hotel. . . .

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with
GSIS . . . .

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER —

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following
conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23,
1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on

Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained. 3

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of
P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
4

manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match
the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . . which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
5

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On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid
and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First
Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects
the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed
in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino
people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that
6

since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a
part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of
the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.7

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also
unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. 8

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a
statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under
which business may be done." 9

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony
which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and
exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to
respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired
therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What
is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a
personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.

Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still
inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building
nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of
the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution,
petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason,
the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of
price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet
arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus
the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded
the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet
taken place.

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not
exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and
respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It
is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined
as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
10

government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public

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authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
11

constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is
the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the
legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and
inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
12

1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can
be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject
is referred to the legislature for action.13

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and
have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner
similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like
that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why
14

the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when,
or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute. 15

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they
quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the
Committee on Style. If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is given to QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-
vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified
Filipinos as against aliens?

THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove

the word "QUALIFIED?".

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against
whom? As against aliens or over aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word
"QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on the
setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (emphasis supplied by respondents)

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-
self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting other
further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution.
Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of
powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used
for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination
thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may
supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not
render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
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express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended
to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that
17

the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the
tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument 18

is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the
State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction,
as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it
does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19

Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of
principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives
to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights — are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and
Gaming Corporation speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity, the sanctity of family life, the vital
20 21 22

role of the youth in nation-building the promotion of social justice, and the values of education. Tolentino
23 24 25

v. Secretary of Finance refers to the constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights and on
26 27

education. Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare, the sanctity
28 29 30

of family life, the vital role of the youth in nation-building and the promotion of total human liberation and
31 32

development. A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable
33

constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only
principles upon which the legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances
an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself
by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is
a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explains — 34

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to out rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts,
sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other
natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
35

speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could
have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the
elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was
called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries and
official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. 36

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a
City. During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military
37

headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese
together with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950's and 1960's, the hotel
became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened
after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and
ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d' etat where an aspirant for vice-president was
"proclaimed" President of the Philippine Republic.

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For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the
hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that
the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of
the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also includes corporations
at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment.

And the amendment would consist in substituting the words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS"
with the following: "CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR
ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY
OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we

have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we
not give it preference?

MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What
about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?

MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the
preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.

MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS"
may refer only to individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities.

MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President. 39

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.

MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by the proponents, will
include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-
controlled by Filipinos. 40

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —

MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please
restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.

MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS

COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."

MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a

Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?
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 MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino
enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes."

MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues —

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE STATE
SHALL GlVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called "Filipino
First" policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions,
privileges and rights covering the national patrimony. 42

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was still
further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo —43

Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is
better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was never found in previous
Constitutions . . . .

The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can
make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It
certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be
counter productive and inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made
between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the former."

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as
one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that
the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the
hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and
marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. 44

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-
executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional
provision — by the government itself — is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the
duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently
need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot
simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or
guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt —

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution,
even before Congress acts — provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive
action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional
command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution
and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask
Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a
constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates. 45

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which
by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that
the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent
Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale
of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons
distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it
engages in is a "public function;" (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to
make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the
action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the
second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction. although entered into by
respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. 46

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When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of
the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power — legislative, executive and judicial.
Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three(3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the
Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding
rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the "Filipino First Policy provision of
the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance
that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the
award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to
be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly
written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the
Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental
law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to
47

the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of
a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino,
there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino
matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning
to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would
be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given
factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore
desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his
rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since
petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless.
Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only
if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the
case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional
mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or
personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the
foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause
of action.

Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally
made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the
foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes
or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so
than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding
documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm
clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

7|Page
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to
be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the
majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this
Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court
encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos
whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not
been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of
the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the
Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic
progress and development . . . in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court's First
Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements
were published in a major daily to the effect that injunction "again demonstrates that the Philippine
legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in
contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable,
it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not
adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It
will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses,
regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay
even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution
enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the
proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself
beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. 49

Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with
sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the
happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any
interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments,
while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism. 50

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder
solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district.
We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the
Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong
manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines.
Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth
century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul — a place
with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country. 51

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical
landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic
exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner
viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage,
which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos Manila Hotel — and all that it
stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is
entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national
patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple
meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of
the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and
protect the sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,

COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of
the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances
and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

8|Page
G.R. No. L-38969-70 February 9, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FELICIANO MUÑOZ, alias "Tony", et al., accused, MARVIN MILLORA, TOMAS TAYABA, alias "Tamy Tayaba"
and JOSE MISLANG, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Manuel B. Millora for appellant Marvin Millora.

Abelardo P. Fermin for appellant Jose Mislang.

Aquilino D. Baniqued for appellant Tomas Tayaba.

CRUZ, J.:

Of the four persons convicted in this case, one has not appealed and thus impliedly accepted his sentence. The
others have questioned their conviction and insist that they are innocent. The prosecution did not think so, and
neither does the Solicitor General now. The brief for the appellee would affirm the finding of guilt and in fact even
increase the penalty.

The prosecution presented a bizarre case of arbitrary condemnation and instant punishment meted out by what
appear to be the members of a private army. Eleven persons, most of them bodyguards of the town mayor, went out
in a jeep at the behest of one of them who had complained of having been victimized by cattle rustlers. Having
found their supposed quarry, they proceeded to execute each one of them in cold blood without further ado and
without mercy. One was shot in the mouth and died instantly as his son and daughter looked on in horror. The
second was forced to lie down on the ground and then shot twice, also in the head, before his terrified wife and son.
The third, who was only sixteen years old, was kicked in the head until he bled before he too had his brains blown
out. To all appearances, the unfortunate victims were only innocent farmers and not the dangerous criminals they
were pronounced to be.

Bizarre but true, as the trial court agreed.

Of the eleven persons who were charged with murder in three separate informations, the four who stood trial were
found guilty. The other seven have yet to be identified and tried. The sentence of Feliciano Muñoz, who did not
1

appeal, has long become final and executory and is now being served. We deal here only with the appeals of the
2

other convicts, namely, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, and Jose Mislang, who all ask for a reversal.

The killings occurred in the morning of June 30, 1972, in Balite Sur, San Carlos City, Pangasinan. 3

As established by the prosecution, Feliciano Muñoz, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the other
seven unidentified men went to the house of Mauro Bulatao and asked for the address of his son Arsenic. All four of
them went inside while the rest surrounded the house. All eleven men were armed. Mauro, who was then bathing
his horse, was called by the accused. As he approached and while under his house, he was met by Millora who
simply shot him at arm's length with a "long firearm," hitting him in the mouth and killing him as he fell. At that
precise time, Muñoz, Tayaba and Mislang were standing by Millora, evidently giving him armed support. None of
them made any move to restrain or dissuade him. 4

After killing Mauro, the four accused dragged out of the house his sixteen year old son, Aquilino, and knocked him
down. Muñoz kicked him several times in the head as he lay on the ground while the others looked on in silent
approval or at least without objection. They then took the bleeding man with them to look for their third target,
Alejandro Bulatao. 5

In Alejandro's house, the group forced his wife, Juana to go with them and direct them to her husband. They found
him tending to their cows with his son Pedro. Muñoz ordered Alejandro and his wife to lie down and then, even as
Pedro pleaded for his father's life, shot Alejandro twice in the head, killing him instantly. Millora, Tayaba and
Mislang, along with their companions, merely stood by as the brutal act was committed. Juana watched her
husband's death in terror and the 12-year old boy made a desperate run for his life as one of the accused fired at
him and missed. 6

9|Page
The second victim having been murdered as the first, the accused then vented their violence on Aquilino, whom
Muñoz again brutally kicked as the others looked on. Aquilino was entirely defenseless. Finally, Muñoz ended the
boy's agony and shot him to death, hitting him in the head and body. Muñoz and Minora then picked up all the
empty shells and fled with the rest of their companions, leaving the terrified Juana with the two grisly corpses.7

The above events were narrated at the trial by Melecia Bulatao, Mauro's daughter and Aquilino's sister; Jose
8

Bulatao, Mauro's son and Aquilino's brother; Juana Bulatao, Alejandro's wife; and Pedro Bulatao, their son.
9 10 11

Their testimony was corroborated by Dr. Juanita de Vera, who performed the autopsy on the three victims.
12

Melecia and Jose testified on the killing of their father by Marvin Minora as the other accused stood by and the
mauling of their brother Aquilino before he was dragged away by the group. The trial court especially noted the
straightforward account given by Jose, who positively identified Minora as the killer and described the participation
of the others, including the savage kicking of his brother by Muñoz. Melecia earlier pointed to Mislang as the one
13

who had shot her father but changed her mind later on cross-examination and named Millora as the actual killer.
She explained her turn-about by confessing that she had earlier agreed to exonerate Minora in exchange for the
sum of P3,000.00 promised by his father although she actually did not receive the money. For her part, Juana
14

related how she was threatened with death unless she accompanied the accused to where her husband was. She
narrated in detail how Alejandro was killed before her very eyes and how Aquilino was later kicked and then also
shot to death, also by Muñoz, while the other accused stood by. Her testimony was corroborated by Pedro, her
15

son, whom the accused had also thought of killing because he was "talkative" and indeed was shot at when he
successfully escaped after his father's murder. 16

The defense makes much of the fact that it was only months after the killings that it occurred to these witnesses to
denounce the accused and suggests that this delay should impugn their credibility. As correctly pointed out by the
trial judge, however, these witnesses were naturally deterred from doing so for fear that they would meet the same
fate that befell their relatives. These were humble barrio folk whose timidity did not allow them to report their
grievances beyond the barrio officials they knew, more so since the higher authorities appeared to be indifferent and
gave no attention, much less encouragement, to their complaints.

It is true that there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of these witnesses as painstakingly pointed out by
the appellants, but these are minor flaws that do not detract from the essential truthfulness of their accounts of the
17

ruthless killings. 18

The brutality of the murders and the veracity of the testimony of the said witnesses are emphasized by the medical
reports of the injuries sustained by the victims, as follows:
19

Mauro Bulatao:

1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper lip left side around 1 cm. in
diameter and with the exit at the middle of the back of the head around 1-1/2 cm. in diameter.

2. Gunshot wound at the lower lip left side of the mouth.

Alejandro Bulatao:

1. Lacerated gunshot wound at the left eye with the whole eye practically lacerated.

2. Lacerated gunshot wound of the right eye and the forehead practically opened with the brain
tissue outside.

Aquiline Bulatao:

1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper right jaw bone around 1- 1/2 cm.
in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the back of the head around 2 cm. in diameter.

2. Gunshot wound at the upper left shoulder out the middle of the left clavicle around 1- 1/2 inches in
diameter.

The three appellants invoked individual defenses which the trial court correctly rejected as false and unbelievable.
All claimed the Bulataos were killed as a result of an exchange of gunfire with a rather hazy group and each claimed
he was not involved in the shoot-out.

Testifying for Millora on the alleged encounter between the Bulataos and their adversaries, Victoriano Bacani said
that the latter included Tayaba, Mislang and five others who fled from the scene in a jeep. Graciano Muñoz,
20

corroborating Bacani, said he himself saw seven men in a jeep coming from the sound of the gunfire after he had
paid Mauro P400.00 to redeem his stolen carabao. Another witness for Millora, Orlando de los Santos, testified to
21

10 | P a g e
having seen the encounter between the Bulataos and the other group and declared that the former were armed with
carbines and Garand rifles. 22

The trial court rejected Bacani's testimony because he appeared hesitant and suspicious on the stand and did not
give the impression that he was telling the truth. Moreover, it took him all of one year to report the alleged shooting
23

encounter, which he also did not mention that same afternoon when he visited Mauro's family to condole with
them. It is also not believable that the group would flee because they had no more bullets when their supposed
24

three adversaries were already dead in the field. The alleged redemption made by Muñoz was described by the trial
court as preposterous, especially since no shred of evidence had been presented to show that Mauro was a cattle
rustler, let alone his 16 year old son. As for De los Santos, no firearms were discovered beside the dead bodies of
25

the Bulataos, including Mauro, who was found not in the supposed battleground but under his house, as testified to
by Dr. De Vera. 26

Millora's own defense was that he was in Dagupan City at the time of the killings, having gone there in the evening
of June 29, 1972. He claimed he had stayed there overnight with a female companion after drinking beer with Atty.
Antonio Resngit returning to San Carlos City only between 8 and 9 o'clock the following morning or June 30,
1972. The lawyer corroborated him, but he cannot be more credible than Mauro's own children, Jose and
27 28

Melecia, who positively identified Millora as the person who actually shot their father in the face and killed him
instantly. Such a traumatic experience could not have been forgotten by these witnesses who saw their father
murdered without warning or mercy nor could their memory of the heartless killer have been easily wiped out from
their minds.

It is stressed that Juana Bulatao and her son Pedro also categorically declared that Millora was with the group that
she took to the field where her husband and Aquilino were killed by Muñoz. 29

Tayaba and Mislang offered a common defense, also of alibi. Both claimed that Mislang having complained of cattle
rustlers, a group of policemen, including Tayaba, stayed in the former's house the whole night of June 29, 1972,
leaving only at 8 o'clock the following morning of June 30, 1972, after Mislang had served them
breakfast. Significantly, however, barrio Bacnar where Mislang's house was located, is only two kilometers from
30

Balite Sur. Moreover, the trial court doubted the testimony given by Sgt. Lomibao, who corroborated them and
31

spoke of having heard the gunfire narrated by Millora's witnesses. The decision noted that Lomibao was
mysteriously absent when the police chief and Dr. de Vera went to the scene of the crime at 9 o'clock that morning
to investigate the killings. In fact, it expressed the suspicion that Lomibao and Patrolman Liwanag, who also testified
for the accused, might have been among the seven unidentified persons who were with Muñoz and the three
appellants herein when the Bulataos were murdered. 32

All told, we affirm the findings of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses at the trial and
assess their credibility. As we said in a previous case:

We see no reason to reverse the factual findings of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to assess their credibility. The written record will not
show that nuance of tone or voice, the meaningful contrast between the hesitant pause and the
prompt reply, and the expression or color or tilt of face that will affirm the truth or expose the
fabrication. All these subtle factors could be considered by the trial judge in weighing the conflicting
declarations before him, and we do not find that he has erred. 33

We agree that the three appellants, together with Muñoz and their seven other companions, participated in the
killings of the three Bulataos in the manner described by the witnesses for the prosecution. The defenses of the
herein appellants should be, as they properly were, rejected as undeserving of belief in the light of the more
convincing and telling evidence submitted by the government.

However, we do not accept the different degrees of participation assigned by the court a quo to each of the
appellants in each of the three offenses imputed to them. In Criminal Case No. 0176, Millora was found guilty as
principal and Muñoz and the other two herein appellants only as accomplices, and in Criminal Case Nos. 0177 and
0178, Muñoz was found guilty as principal and the herein appellants only as accomplices. In support of this
34

finding, the trial court said that there was no evidence of conspiracy to justify holding each of the accused equally
liable for the three murders.

We hold that there was. Indeed, it is clear that from the very start, when the eleven men went out to look for the
suspected cattle rustlers, there was already an agreement among them to ferret out and punish the Bulataos whom
they had condemned beforehand. They knew whom they were looking for. They knew where to look for them. They
sought each of them with drawn and ready weapons. When they reached Mauro Bulatao's house, four of them went
inside while the rest deployed themselves in strategic positions. When Millora shot Mauro, the appellants and the
others stood by with guns at the ready. Nobody moved to dissuade or stop him. Together they dragged Aquilino
from the house and the rest watched while Muñoz kicked him in the head while helpless on the ground. Together,
they took him with them and then forced Juana Bulatao to lead them to her husband. The rest stood by with their
weapons as Muñoz shot Alejandro in the head. No one interceded to stop him from also killing Aquilino. There is no

11 | P a g e
question that the group moved in concert, pursuing a common design previously agreed upon, that made each of
them part of a conspiracy. As such, each of them is liable in equal degree with the others for each of the three
35

killings. Each member of the conspiracy to commit the crime of murder is guilty as a co-principal, regardless of who
actually pulled the trigger that killed the three victims. It is settled that in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. 36

Each of the three killings constituted the crime of murder, qualified by alevosia. There was treachery because every
one of the three victims was completely helpless and defenseless when shot and killed by the accused with no risk
to themselves. Mauro was completely taken by surprise when he was shot in the face. Alejandro was lying down
when he was shot in the head. Aquilino was seated when he was shot in the head and shoulders. None of the three
victims had a chance to resist.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death, but this was modified by Article III, Section 19(l) of the 1987 Constitution providing as follows:

Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.

Conformably, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty whenever it was called for under
the said article but instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua as mandated by the above provision. The
maximum period of the penalty was thus in effect lowered to the medium, the same period applied, as before, where
the offense was not attended by any modifying circumstance, with the minimum period, i. e., reclusion
temporal maximum, being still applicable in all other cases. The three-grade scheme of the original penalty,
including death, was thus maintained except that the maximum period was not imposed because of the
constitutional prohibition.

In People v. Gavarra Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the abolition of the death penalty
37

under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua" thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period.
Later, without categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera in People v.
Masangkay and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People v. Atencio divided the modified penalty into three
38 39

new periods, the limits of which were specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People v. Intino, as follows: the
40

lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the
medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum.

The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the conclusion that the
doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III, Section 19(l) of
the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the opposite view,
which was in fact shared by many of those now voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court, however, is of the
belief that the original interpretation should be restored as the more acceptable reading of the constitutional
provision in question.

The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby limited
the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be divided
into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel
that Article III, Section 19(l) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it
to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.

A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares
the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of
legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort
to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. 41

At that, the Court finds that such resort, even if made, would not be of much assistance either in the case at bar.
Accepting arguendo that it was the intention of the framers to abolish the death penalty, we are still not convinced
from the debates in the Constitutional Commission that there was also a requirement to adjust the two remaining
periods by dividing them into three shorter periods. This is not a necessary consequence of the provision as
worded. The following exchange cited by those in favor of Masangkay is at best thought-provoking but not decisive
of the question:

FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those statutes-only
the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the penalty is abolished.

12 | P a g e
 MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about, because the statutes, especially
in the General Criminal Law, which is the Revised Penal Code, do not necessarily
punish directly with death. Sometimes it has a range of reclusion temporal to death
or reclusion perpetua to death. And what would be the effect on the judges, for
example, if the range is reclusion temporal to death and he can no longer impose the
death penalty? He will have difficulty in computing the degrees.

Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge will look at the specific situation.

FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have difficulty, but I suppose that the judges
will be equal to their tasks. The only thing is, if there is a range, the range cannot go
as far as death (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, 749).

FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death remain.

MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. But the range of the penalty for
murder consists of three periods. The maximum period of reclusion temporal under
the present status is the minimum period for the penalty for murder. The medium
period is reclusion perpetua. The maximum period is death. If we now remove the
death penalty, we will, therefore, have a range of penalty of 17 years, 4 months and
1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua. You cannot
divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has a duration of 30 years, it is an
indivisible penalty. Where do we get the medium period now until such time that
Congress gets around to accommodate this amendment?

FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about.
All we are saying is, the judges cannot impose the death penalty (Record, CONCOM
July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 750).

So there we have it — "this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about." Assuming that Commissioner
Bernas's answer reflected the consensus of the body, we are still not persuaded that it was the intention of the
framers to lower not only the maximum period but also the other periods of the original penalty. That is not
necessarily inferable from his statement that "the judges will be equal to their task," especially so since he also said
and we think with more definiteness-that "all we are saying is that the judges cannot impose the death penalty"
(Emphasis supplied). We understand this to mean that they were not saying more.

The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or merely to prevent its
imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is whether or not they also meant to require a
corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.

It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in Article III, Section 19(l) of the
Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It would have been so easy,
assuming such intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no doubt as to its meaning. One searches in
vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The writer of this opinion makes the personal observation that
this might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing and said another-or strangely, considering
their loquacity elsewhere — did not say enough.

The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases represented the unanimous
thinking of the Court as it was then constituted. All but two members at that time still sit on the Court today. If we
42

have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed before, it is not because of a change
in the composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after reflecting on the question
again in the light of new perspectives. And well it might, and can, for the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The
decisions of this Court are not petrified rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to
change as all life is. While we are told that the trodden path is best, this should not prevent us from opening a fresh
trial or exploring the other side or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.

Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks," whatever that means, we hereby
reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced by the
Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(l) does not change
the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum
penalties remains unchanged.

The Court relies that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not have arisen under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the death penalty and another
who committed the murder without the attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with
the same medium period although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough. But that is the
13 | P a g e
will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance
perhaps is the parable in the Bible of the workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he
had worked longer than others hired later in the day also paid the same amount. When he complained because he
felt unjustly treated by the householder, the latter replied: "Friend, I do you no wrong. Did you not agree with me for
a penny?'

The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute
and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them and have no
authority to modify them or revise their range as determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach
on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.

Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance
attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is
still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty we impose on all the accused-appellants for each of the three murders
they have committed in conspiracy with the others. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is
affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.

It remains to observe that the crimes inflicted upon the humble farmers would have remained unpunished were it not
for the vigilance of certain responsible officials, especially the police and the prosecuting officer, who took up the
cudgels for the victims' families. The courage and conscientiousness they displayed are still the most potent
weapons against those who, in their arrogance, believe that they can flout the law and frustrate justice because they
have the protection of powerful patrons.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and all the accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty as
principals in Criminal Case Nos. 0176, 0177 and 0178. Each of them is sentenced to suffer three (3) penalties
of reclusion perpetua, and to pay solidarily to the heirs of their victims civil indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00 for
each of the deceased, or a total indemnity of P90,000.00, with costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their
capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents.

SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF

ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of
initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of the
1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent and the main
1

sponsor of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as
2

"innovative". Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing
3

amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths
of all its members and (2) by a constitutional convention. For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we
4

resolved to give due course to this petition.

On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on
Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
5

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;

2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;

14 | P a g e
 3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, a group of
6

citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the
Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in
proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election
registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other
volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first
fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process
involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed,
be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article
VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a
7 8 9

"Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion
10

from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:

DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT

OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4
OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least
twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.

Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the
COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order (a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition,
11

together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed
constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of
general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12
December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.

At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra;
representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor
Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on
12

the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.

After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill
No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative,
which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments.

(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for
in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to
amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this
deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a
single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional
initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This
indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take
effect only upon ratification and not after publication.

15 | P a g e
 (4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative
on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to
provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.

(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the
people's initiative.

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor
any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.

To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the
COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the
national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions
of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the
transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a
taxpayer's and legislator's suit. Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
14

course of law.

On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible
period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing
until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private
respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the
Constitution.

On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment on the petition. They argue
15

therein that:

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY
RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.

2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE

COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO
THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING
SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID
BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;

3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE

GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY"
PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN
ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;

4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A
DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;

5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO

REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26,
1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET
AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING
GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF
THESE LAWS."

6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION

DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND
REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT."
(SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
16 | P a g e
 7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT
SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).

Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment which starts off with an
16

assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . .
which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition,"
which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to
gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin
maintains as follows:

(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct
of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal,
since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.

(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend
the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as
of the day of the plebiscite.

(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.

(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution
because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only
those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.

As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million as
unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be
simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority
government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.

In the Comment for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor
17

General contends that:

(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on
Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3,
which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines
the same as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5
repeatedly mentions initiative on the Constitution.

(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because,
being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law
when he claimed that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.

(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal
with initiative on the Constitution.

(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not
a revision thereof.

(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under
the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of
R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.

On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the
aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents through
Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention

17 | P a g e
filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20
January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.

On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was
their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend
that:

(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution
because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., it would involve a change from a political
18

philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the
change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on
synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative which,
19

by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.

(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national
and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the political arena
to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the
concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective
proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the common good"; hence,
to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.

(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they
are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium for good
performance. 20

(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements
the people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who
may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the
contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the
signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may
oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of
the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC,
(I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people's initiative.
Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.

(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a
people's initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively
pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the
Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.

On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in

Intervention. He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's right to initiate
21

constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-
authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC
was empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he
contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to
order its publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an
initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required number of
registered voters. He also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority
and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's
role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the
call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.

On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.

The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the
following arguments:

(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.

18 | P a g e
 (2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the
initiative to amend the Constitution.

(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of
signatures.

(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by
Congress or a constitutional convention. 22

On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and
MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended
Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c)
requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated Comments on the
aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible
period of three days from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five
days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.

At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which the Court
formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing
the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local
Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft
"Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to,
the Constitution.

4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended
to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal
election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and
(c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on
the 1987 Constitution.

5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a
pending case before the COMELEC.

After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda
within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No.
21505.

On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments in the
main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a
sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of the House of
Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic
notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms,
of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.

Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention
of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda.
23 24

As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.

For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a
prejudicial procedural question.

19 | P a g e
 THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.

Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it
is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending case before the
COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:

28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent
Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and
under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.

29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction
and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is
an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the
body politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and
political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.

30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions
of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25

It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. The COMELEC made no ruling
26

thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12
December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. Earlier, 27

or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause
the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of
hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its
insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein.

It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition
because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of registered voters.
LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition,
which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be
treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28

A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure.

II

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered

20 | P a g e
 voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This provision is not self-executory. In his book, Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
29

Commission, stated:

Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending
the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it
still is dependent on congressional action.

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed
by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its
Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). That section reads as follows:
30

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section ___of the
Constitution. 31

After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new
formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of
the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night,
we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section
2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I
quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose
amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered
voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. 32

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:

FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.

First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10

percent, there are no details in the provision on how to carry this out. Do we
understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to the legislature?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the
legislature does not pass the necessary implementing law on this, this will not
operate?

MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing,
especially with respect to the budget appropriations which would have to be
legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We deemed it best that this matter
be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no
amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from the
date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could
21 | P a g e
 be proposed through the exercise of this initiative power would be after five years. It
is reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the National Assembly can
come up with the appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.

FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature — the details on how this is
to be carried out — is it possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people
for ratification is the work of the legislature rather than of the people? Does this
provision exclude that possibility?

MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature
itself as a body could propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it
fails to muster the three-fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent
assembly and submit that proposal to the people for ratification through the process
of an initiative.

xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is
to vest constituent power in the people to amend the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of
institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the
amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the
draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy
of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?

MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal
values, the Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require
a great deal of circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the
Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.

MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we
have a separate article in the constitution that would specifically cover the process
and the modes of amending the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted
now, to again concede to the legislature the process or the requirement of
determining the mechanics of amending the Constitution by people's initiative?

MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the
hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the
mechanics that would adequately cover all the conceivable situations. 33

It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND —
not to REVISE — the Constitution; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year,
has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as
embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the
operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. 34

xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of

initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
22 | P a g e
 subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as
if it were a self-executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this
process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into
a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision;
whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only
apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee. 35

Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
which the Committee accepted. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section
2 with the following:

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after
taking into account the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the
honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and
Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now
read as follows: "SECTION 2. — AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER
Of REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST
BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED
VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.

MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is

reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report
No. 7, we accept the proposed amendment. 36

The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a
legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:

MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the

legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative. . .?

MR. DAVIDE. It can.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature
from asking another body to set the proposition in proper form.

MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of

this particular right would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot
determine anymore the percentage of the requirement.

MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form
for submission to the people, may be subject to legislation.

MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other
words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish
or impair the right conceded here.

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 MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have
discussed be legislated?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to
— NOT REVISION of — the Constitution. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment

on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision." 38

Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments through initiative must be
more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved
is an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily
require a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a
constitutional convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit the
issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the National Assembly is
required, the import being that the process of amendment must be made more
rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end
to a law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree
to reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it
would require another voting by the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on
a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an
amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative or on
the National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39

The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version, which the
Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as

follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT
LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED
VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED
BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE
YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR
OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE

FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40

The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July
1986. Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an
41

amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again
approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42

However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing "percent"
to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second paragraph so that said
paragraph reads: The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. This
43 44

amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2.

The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.

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Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the
affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.

There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the
passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the
Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:

The Congress shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
45

with

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules implementing
the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be carried out."
46

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by
the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills
referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned
47

in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, which dealt with the subject
48

matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local
Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 solely
49

dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral
Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was
subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of Representatives. This approved bill
50 51

is now R.A. No. 6735.

But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation of the
exercise of the right?"

A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative
on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:

Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of
this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).

The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane
nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local
laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed
out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not
accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution"
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."

The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill
No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and appropriately used the
phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution
and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the
constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in
the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the
contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;

25 | P a g e
 c.2 the proposition;

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).

The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed"
only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.

Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the
latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If
Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of
interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far
more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle
on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative
and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is
not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is
proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if
what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This
classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for
emphasis and clearer understanding:

Sec. 3. Definition of terms —

xxx xxx xxx

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;

a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and

a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).

Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments
to the Constitution. 53

A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which
reads:

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election
called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of
the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).

(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local
governments; thus:

Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a
petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. . . .

26 | P a g e
 and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both national and
local initiative and referendum.

Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is
misplaced, since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
54

Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from
declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution
or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.

Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it
failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative
on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;

(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;

(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval;

(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines; and

(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;

(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;

(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as
a consequence thereof;

(d) The formulation of the proposition;

(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;

(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;

(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit concerned as to
whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;

(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters for their
approval, which must be within the period specified therein;

(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

(k) The limitations on local initiative; and

(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three
sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and
includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process
by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates
the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date
of effectivity of the approved proposition.

27 | P a g e
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of initiative. RA. No.
6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely
paying it a reluctant lip service.
57

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this
substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata
non delegari potest. The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
59

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and
regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in
itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a
standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform
in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
61

maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. 62

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to
satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

III

COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON

THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does
not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of
the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is
authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.

IV

COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.

Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the
right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate
legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.

Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the
Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district
is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the
required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his
petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the
petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue
63

28 | P a g e
through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each
legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4)
64 65

to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and
voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. 66

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it
cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known
that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or
under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said
petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of
paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996,
and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and
resources.

The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective
national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if
not academic.

CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept
in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in
complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that
system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and
to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on
Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.

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