ATTY. HOWARD M. CALLEJA, ET AL. v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL.

G.R. No. 252578

December 7, 2021

FACTS: On 37 separate petitions for certiorari, the petitioners assail the

constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 2020. The petitioners came from
different sectors of society. Members of former and incumbent members of Congress,
members of Moros, journalists, taxpayers, registered voters, members of IBP, students
and members of the academe and even former members of the SC.

As a response to the growing problem of terrorism as the Human Security Act of 2007
was insufficient to say that it addressed the terrorism in the Philippines, this is because
its passage, terrorism still persist. Thereafter, Duterte certified the necessity to
immediately enact HB 6875 in order to address the urgent need to strengthen the law
on anti-terrorism act. This was approved on the following day. Thereafter, the enrolled
bill was submitted to Office of the President and was signed into law.

This prompted the several petitions assailing the constitutionality of the ATA.
Particularly, among other things, they claim that ATA infringes on the right to due
process and smothers protected speech without any valid and compelling government
interest. They alleged that Section 4 is overly broad such that it can smother protected
speech.

According to them, Sec. 4 enumerates specific terroristic intents but does not identify
the outcomes or outward indicators that would enable the ATC or a law enforcer to
objectively attribute such terroristic intents to any specific act. The petitioners allege
that Sec. 4 likewise declares that such terroristic intent can be attributed to any act
regardless of the stage of execution.

In effect, petitioners argue that a law enforcer can point to any act, including speech,
and declare it as a terrorist act based on their subjective belief, rather than based on
any objective criteria, that the act or speech is animated by one of the enumerated
terroristic intents.

ISSUE: Whether Section 4 of ATA is constitutional.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court ruled for the unconstitutionality of Section 4 of ATA.
In its lengthy discussion, the Court discussed that pursuant to the long-standing
principle in statutory construction that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution.

The Constitution, however, abhors prior restraints on speech. Thus, a law does
not enjoy the presumption of constitutionality if it restrains speech. Instead,
a presumption of unconstitutionality arises. This presumption proceeds from the
constitutional command under Section 4, Article III that no law shall be passed
abridging free speech, expression, and their cognate rights. In such cases, therefore, it
becomes the burden of government to establish the law's constitutionality.

1
In the case at bar, the "Not Intended" Clause of Section 4's proviso is unconstitutional
under the strict scrutiny test. Applying this test, the government has the burden of
proving that the regulation: (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is
narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.

Here, the government has not shown that said clause passes strict scrutiny. While
there appears to be a compelling state interest, such as to forestall possible terrorist
activities in light of the global efforts to combat terrorism, punishing speech intended
"to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to
create a serious risk to public safety" is not the least restrictive means to achieve the
same. To the Court, for speech to be penalized it must pass
the Brandenburg standard, which the "Not Intended Clause" completely discounts.
Furthermore, there are already provisions that subsume such standard, such as the
provision on Inciting to Terrorism. Thus, as it stands, the "Not Intended Clause" only
blurs the distinction between terroristic conduct and speech, and hence, is not
narrowly tailored to subserve the aforesaid State interest.