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Ethics
Theory and
Contemporary Issues
Ninth Edition
Barbara MacKinnon
University of San Francisco, Professor of Philosophy, Emerita
Andrew Fiala
California State University, Fresno, Professor of Philosophy
Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202
Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues, © 2018, 2015, 2012 Cengage Learning
Ninth Edition
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Contents
iii ❮❮
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iv CONTENTS
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CONTENTS v
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vi CONTENTS
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CONTENTS vii
READING The New Jim Crow • Michelle Approaches to Animal Ethics 468
Alexander 400 Sentience, Equal Consideration,
Are Prisons Obsolete? • Angela Y. and Animal Welfare 469
Davis 401 Animal Rights 472
Speech in Favor of Capital Punishment
(1868) • John Stuart Mill 402 READING All Animals Are Equal • Peter
A Theory of Just Execution • Lloyd Singer 477
Steffen 406 The Case for Animal Rights • Tom
Regan 486
Review Exercises 415 Speciesism and the Idea of
Discussion Cases 416 Equality • Bonnie Steinbock 487
Review Exercises 488
—16— Environmental Ethics 417 Discussion Cases 489
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viii CONTENTS
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Preface
This ninth edition of Ethics: Theory and Contem- This edition offers expanded and continued cov-
porary Issues contains a substantial revision of the erage of the following topics: global (non-Western)
text and extensive update of the empirical mate- philosophy and religion, the prisoner’s dilemma
rial contained in the chapters focused on contem- and the tragedy of the commons, social justice and
porary issues. Andrew Fiala joined as coauthor on economic inequality, mass incarceration and decar
decar-
the eighth edition. In the ninth edition, we have ceration, restorative justice, environmental justice,
included new learning apparatus, especially tables biotechnology and bioengineering, gene editing,
that outline possible moral positions with regard vegetarianism and the ethics of hunting, circuses,
to the issues considered. As in past editions, each race and racism, pacifism, gay marriage, global pov-
chapter begins with a detailed, accessible intro- erty, LGBT and transgender issues, Black Lives Mat-
duction that prepares the student to read accom- ter, Syrian refugees, the precautionary principle, and
panying selections from important and influential climate change. This edition includes some famil-
philosophers. The book remains a comprehensive iar readings from previous editions and some new
introduction to ethics in theory and practice. It also additions. In some cases, older readings have been
continues to emphasize pedagogy through clear shortened to make room for new readings and short
summaries, engaging examples, and various study excerpts by a more diverse set of authors, includ-
tools—such as review exercises and discussion ing some emerging voices. New readings include:
cases. Each chapter begins with a list of learning John Lachs on relativism, Hilde Lindemann on femi-
objectives, and the book ends with an extensive nism, a new essay on abortion by Bertha Alvarez
glossary of key terms. Manninen, U.S. Supreme Court Obergefell Deci-
sion, Naomi Zack on Black Lives Matter, Iris Marion
ADDITIONS AND CHANGES Young’s “Five Faces of Oppression,” Pope Francis
Although the basic elements remain the same, this and Ayn Rand on economic issues, Michelle Alex-
new ninth edition includes the following additions ander on the New Jim Crow, Tom Regan on ani-
and changes from the eighth edition. Each chapter mal rights, the Transhumanist declaration, Andrew
in Part I has been revised to focus on readability. All Fitz-Gibbon on peace, and Garret Hardin on global
introductory and empirical material in each chapter poverty.
in Part II has been updated to incorporate the latest
information about contemporary issues and current Key Elements
affairs. These updates include recent statistics, rel- Each chapter of Ethics: Theory and Contempo-
evant cases, and contemporary examples. rary Issues contains an extended summary of key
ix ❮❮
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x PREFACE
concepts and issues written in clear, accessible prose. Pedagogical Aids This text is designed as an acces-
These detailed summaries go beyond the short intro- sible, “user-friendly” introduction to ethics. To aid both
ductions found in most ethics anthologies to provide instructor and student, we have provided the following
students with a thorough grounding in the theory pedagogical aids:
and practical application of philosophical ethics.
As previously noted, these discussions have been
❯ a list of learning objectives at the beginning of
each chapter (new to this edition)
thoroughly updated to include detailed information
on current events, statistics, and political and cul-
❯ a real-life event, hypothetical dialogue, or
updated empirical data at the beginning of each
tural developments.
chapter
The theory chapters in Part I present detailed
❯ diagrams, subheadings, and boldface key terms
summaries of the theories and major concepts, posi-
and definitions that provide guideposts for read-
tions, and arguments. The contemporary issues
ers and organize the summary exposition
chapters in Part II include summaries of:
❯ study questions for each reading selection
❯ current social conditions and recent events, with ❯ review exercises at the end of each chapter that
special emphasis on their relevance to students’ can be used for exams and quizzes
lives ❯ a glossary of definitions of key terms (new to
❯ conceptual issues, such as how to define key this edition)
words and phrases (for example, cloning,
cloning ❯ discussion cases that follow each chapter in
terrorism, and distributive justice) Part II and provide opportunities for class or
❯ arguments and suggested ways to organize an group discussion
ethical analysis of each topic ❯ topics and resources for written assignments in
❯ tables outlining possible moral positions, linked the discussion cases
to normative theories and key authors. ❯ tables outlining moral positions (new to this
edition).
Throughout this text, we seek to engage read-
ers by posing challenging ethical questions and then A Digital Solution for Students and
offering a range of possible answers or explanations. Instructors:
The aim is to present more than one side of each issue MindTap for Philosophy for Ethics: Theory and
so that students can decide for themselves what posi- Contemporary Issues is a personalized, online
tion they will take. This also allows instructors more digital learning platform providing students with an
latitude to emphasize specific arguments and con- immersive learning experience that builds critical
cepts and to direct the students’ focus as they see fit. thinking skills. Through a carefully designed chapter-
Where possible throughout the text, the rela- based learning path, MindTap allows students to
tion of ethical theory to the practical issues is indi- easily identify the chapter’s learning objectives;
cated. For example, one pervasive distinction used draw connections and improve writing skills by
throughout the text is between consequentialist and completing essay assignments; read short, manage-
non-consequentialist considerations and arguments. able sections from the e-book; and test their content
The idea is that if students are able to first situate knowledge with critical thinking Aplia™ questions.
or categorize a philosophical reason or argument,
then they will be better able to evaluate it critically ❯ Chapter e-Book: Each chapter within MindTap
in their thinking and writing. Connections to related contains the narrative of the chapter, offering an
concepts and issues in other chapters are also high- easy to navigate online reading experience.
lighted throughout the text to help students note ❯ Chapter Quiz: Each chapter within MindTap
similarities and contrasts among various ethical ends with a summative Chapter Test covering
positions. the chapter’s learning objectives and ensuring
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PREFACE xi
students are reading and understanding the ❯ Digital flash cards are premade for each chapter,
material presented. and students can make their own by adding
❯ Chapter Aplia Assignment: Each chapter images, descriptions, and more.
includes an Aplia assignment that provides auto-
MindTap gives students ample opportunities for
matically graded critical thinking assignments
improving comprehension and for self-evaluation to
with detailed, immediate feedback and expla-
prepare for exams, while also providing faculty and
nations on every question. Students can also
students alike a clear way to measure and assess
choose to see another set of related questions if
student progress. Faculty can use MindTap as a turn-
they did not earn all available points in their first
key solution or customize by adding YouTube videos,
attempt and want more practice.
RSS feeds, or their own documents directly within
❯ Ethics Simulations: Each chapter offers an
the e-book or within each chapter’s Learning Path.
interactive simulated ethical dilemma, allowing
MindTap goes well beyond an e-book and a home-
students to make decisions and see the implica-
work solution. It is truly a Personal Learning Experi-
tions of their choices.
ence that allows instructors to synchronize the reading
❯ Chapter Essay Question: Every chapter ends
with engaging assignments. To learn more, ask your
with essay prompts that ask students to explore
Cengage Learning sales representative to demo it for
and reflect on concepts from the chapter and
you—or go to www.Cengage.com/MindTap.
build writing and critical thinking faculties.
❯ KnowNOW! Philosophy Blog: The KnowNOW! Instructor’s Resources:
Philosophy Blog connects course concepts with
The Instructor’s Companion Site features an Instruc-
real-world events. Updated twice a week, the
tor’s Manual, PowerPoint Lecture Slides, and a
blog provides a succinct philosophical analysis of
robust Test Bank (Cengage Learning Testing pow-
major news stories, along with multimedia and
ered by Cognero).
discussion-starter questions.
The Instructor’s Manual provides useful sug-
MindTap also includes a variety of other tools that gestions for lectures and classroom activities, based
support philosophy teaching and learning: directly on the content in this book. Answers to
many review exercises or study questions are pro-
❯ The Philosophy Toolbox collects tutorials on vided, as well as questions for further thought.
using MindTap and researching and writing aca- The PowerPoint Lecture Slides offer a chapter-
demic papers, including citation information and by-chapter breakdown Cengage Learning Testing,
tools, that instructors can use to support students powered by Cognero, new to this edition, allows
in the writing process. instructors to author, edit, and manage Test Bank
❯ Questia allows professors and students to search content. Instructors can create multiple test versions
a database of thousands of peer-reviewed jour
jour- and instantly deliver them through their learning
nals, newspapers, magazines, and full-length management system right to the classroom.
books—all assets can be added to any relevant Interested instructors can find and access all this
chapter in MindTap, and students can content by adding the ninth edition of this book to
❯ Kaltura allows instructors to create and insert their bookshelf on Cengage.com.
inline video and audio into the MindTap platform.
❯ ReadSpeaker reads the text out loud to students IN SUMMARY
in a voice they can customize. We have sought to make this ninth edition of Ethics:
Ethics
❯ Note-taking and highlighting are organized in a Theory and Contemporary Issues the most compre-
central location that can be synced with Ever
Ever- hensive ethics text available. It combines theory
Note on any mobile device a student may have and issues, text and readings, as well as up-to-date
access to. empirical information about contemporary moral
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xii PREFACE
problems. It is designed to be flexible, user-friendly, of South Carolina; Dusan Galic, College of DuPage;
current, pedagogically helpful, and balanced. Erin Anchustegu, Boise State University; Christina
Tomczak, Cedar Valley College; Susan Brown, Uni-
❯ The flexible structure of the text allows instruc- versity of West Florida; Philip Cronce, Chicago State
tors to emphasize only those theories and applied University; William Rodriguez, Bethune Cookman
ethical topics which best suit their courses. University; Robert Arp, Johnson County Community
❯ The text is user-friendly, while at the same time College; Jason Gooch, Yakima Valley Community
philosophically reliable. It employs pedagogical College; Jason Flato, Georgia Perimeter College; and
aids throughout and at the end of each chapter, Eric Severson, Seattle Pacific University.
and provides extensive examples from current Barbara MacKinnon especially wants to thank
events and trends. The exposition challenges the students in her classes at the University of San
students with stimulating questions and is Francisco. Over the years, they have contributed
interspersed with useful diagrams, charts, and greatly to this text by challenging her to keep up
headings. with the times and to make things more clear and
❯ The text not only provides up-to-date coverage more interesting. She also appreciates the support
of developments in the news and in scientific of her husband and fellow philosopher, Edward
journals but also on ethical issues as they are MacKinnon. She dedicates this book to her two
discussed in contemporary philosophy. wonderful daughters, Jennifer and Kathleen. Andrew
❯ It offers a balanced collection of readings, includ- Fiala is thankful for Barbara’s hard work throughout
ing both the ethical theories and contemporary the previous editions of this book and for the oppor-
sources on the issues. tunity to transform his classroom teaching experi-
❯ Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues, ninth ence into a useful text for teaching ethics.
edition, is accompanied by a broad range of We also wish to acknowledge the many profes-
online and textual tools that amplify its teach- sional people from Cengage Learning and its ven-
ability and give instructors specific pedagogical dors who have worked on this edition, including:
tools for different learning styles. Debra Matteson, Product Manager; Adrienne Devlin,
Content Developer; Megan Garvey, Content Devel-
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS opment Manager; Lauren MacLachlan, Production
We wish to thank the many people who have made Manager; Margaret Park Bridges, Senior Content
valuable suggestions for improving the ninth edi- Project Manager; Marissa Falco, Art Director; and
tion of the text, including Marie Gaudio-Zaccaria, Kritika Kaushik, Project Manager, at Cenveo Pub-
Georgia Perimeter College; K.C. Warble III, University lisher Services.
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HISTORY OF ETHICS TIME LINE xiii
Ancient
500 B.C.E. 400 300 200 100 0 100 C.E. 200
Socrates Jesus
Sappho 469–399 Zeno ? 4 B.C.E.–C.E. 29 Plotinus
637–577 351–270 205–270
Plato Philo Judaeus
Buddha 427–347 20 B.C.E.–C.E. 40
557–477 Aristotle Sextus Empiricus
384–322 60–117
Confucius Marcus Aurelius
552–479 121–180
Medieval
C.E. 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300
Augustine Anselm Aquinas
345–400 1033–1109 1224–1274
Boethius
480–524 Abelard Scotus
Mohammed 1079–1142 1265–1308
570–632 Avicebron Ockham
1021–1058 1285–1347
Maimonides
1135–1204
Avicenna Averroes
980–1037 1126–1198
Modern
1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
Bacon Locke Hume Kierkegaard Moore
1561–1626 1632–1704 1711–1776 1813–1851 1873–1958
Hobbes Leibniz Kant Marx Rawls
1588–1679 1646–1716 1724–1804 1818–1883 1921–2002
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Ethics and Ethical Reasoning 1
Learning Outcomes
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
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2 PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
theories and concepts that can be used to help us basic ethical questions. In Chapter 2, we discuss the
avoid begging the question in debates about ethical world’s diverse religious traditions and ask whether
issues. The second half looks in detail at a number there is a set of common ethical ideas that is shared
of these issues. by these traditions. In this chapter, we clarify what
It is appropriate to wonder, at the outset, why we ethics is and how ethical reasoning should proceed.
need to do this. Why isn’t it sufficient to simply state
your opinion and assert that “x is wrong (or evil, WHAT IS ETHICS?
just, permissible, etc.)”? One answer to this ques- On the first day of an ethics class, we often ask stu-
tion is that such assertions do nothing to solve the dents to write one-paragraph answers to the ques-
deep conflicts of value that we find in our world. We tion, “What is ethics?”
know that people disagree about abortion, same- How would you answer? Over the years, there
sex marriage, animal rights, and other issues. If we have been significant differences of opinion among
are to make progress toward understanding each our students on this issue. Some have argued that
other, if we are to make progress toward establishing ethics is a highly personal thing, a matter of private
some consensus about these topics, then we have opinion. Others claim that our values come from
to understand why we think certain things are right family upbringing. Other students think that ethics
and others are wrong. We need to make arguments is a set of social principles, the codes of one’s soci-
and give reasons in order to work out our own con- ety or particular groups within it, such as medical
clusions about these issues and in order to explain or legal organizations. Some write that many people
our conclusions to others. get their ethical beliefs from their religion.
It is also insufficient to appeal to custom or One general conclusion can be drawn from these
authority in deriving our conclusions about moral students’ comments: We tend to think of ethics as
issues. While it may be appropriate for children to the set of values or principles held by individuals
simply obey their parents’ decisions, adults should or groups. I have my ethics and you have yours;
strive for more than conformity and obedience to groups—professional organizations and societies,
authority. Sometimes our parents and grandparents for example—have shared sets of values. We can
are wrong—or they disagree among themselves. study the various sets of values that people have.
Sometimes the law is wrong—or laws conflict. This could be done historically and sociologically.
And sometimes religious authorities are wrong—or Or we could take a psychological interest in deter-
authorities do not agree. To appeal to authority on mining how people form their values. But philosoph-
moral issues, we would first have to decide which ical ethics is a critical enterprise that asks whether
authority is to be trusted and believed. Which reli- any particular set of values or beliefs is better than
gion provides the best set of moral rules? Which set any other. We compare and evaluate sets of values
of laws in which country is to be followed? Even and beliefs, giving reasons for our evaluations. We
within the United States, there is currently a conflict ask questions such as, “Are there good reasons for
of laws with regard to some of these issues: some preferring one set of ethics over another?” In this
states have legalized medical marijuana or physi- text, we examine ethics from a critical or evaluative
cian assisted suicide, others have not. The world’s standpoint. This examination will help you come to
religions also disagree about a number of issues: a better understanding of your own values and the
for example, the status of women, the permissibil- values of others.
ity of abortion, and the question of whether war Ethics is a branch of philosophy. It is also called
is justifiable. And members of the same religion moral philosophy. In general, philosophy is a dis-
or denomination may disagree among themselves cipline or study in which we ask—and attempt to
about these issues. To begin resolving these con- answer—basic questions about key areas or sub-
flicts, we need critical philosophical inquiry into ject matters of human life and about pervasive and
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Chapter 1 ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning 3
significant aspects of experience. Some philoso- Ethics, or moral philosophy, asks basic questions
phers, such as Plato and Kant, have tried to do this about the good life, about what is better and worse,
systematically by interrelating their philosophical about whether there is any objective right and wrong,
views in many areas. According to Alfred North and how we know it if there is.
Whitehead, “Philosophy is the endeavor to frame a One objective of ethics is to help us decide what
coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas is good or bad, better or worse. This is generally
in terms of which every element of our experience called normative ethics. Normative ethics defends
can be interpreted.” 1 Some contemporary philoso- a thesis about what is good, right, or just. Norma-
phers have given up on the goal of building a sys- tive ethics can be distinguished from metaethics.
tem of general ideas, arguing instead that we must Metaethical inquiry asks questions about the
work at problems piecemeal, focusing on one partic- nature of ethics, including the meaning of ethical
ular issue at a time. For instance, some philosophers terms and judgments. Questions about the relation
might analyze the meaning of the phrase to know, between philosophical ethics and religion—as we
while others might work on the morality of lying. discuss in Chapter 2—are metaethical. Theoretical
Some philosophers are optimistic about our ability to questions about ethical relativism—as discussed in
address these problems, while others are more skep- Chapter 3—are also metaethical. The other chapters
tical because they think that the way we analyze the in Part I are more properly designated as ethical
issues and the conclusions we draw will always be theory. These chapters present concrete normative
influenced by our background, culture, and habitual theories; they make claims about what is good or
ways of thinking. Most agree, however, that these evil, just or unjust.
problems are worth wondering about and caring From the mid 1930s until recently, metaeth-
about. ics predominated in English-speaking universities.
We can ask philosophical questions about many In doing metaethics, we often analyze the mean-
subjects. In the philosophical study of aesthetics, ing of ethical language. Instead of asking whether
philosophers ask basic or foundational questions the death penalty is morally justified, we would
about art and objects of beauty: what kinds of things ask what we meant in calling something “morally
do or should count as art (rocks arranged in a cer- justified” or “good” or “right.” We analyze ethical
tain way, for example)? Is what makes something language, ethical terms, and ethical statements to
an object of aesthetic interest its emotional expres- determine what they mean. In doing this, we func-
siveness, its peculiar formal nature, or its ability tion at a level removed from that implied by our
to reveal truths that cannot be described in other definition. It is for this reason that we call this other
ways? In the philosophy of science, philosophers type of ethics metaethics—
metaethics meta meaning “beyond.”
ask whether scientific knowledge gives us a picture Some of the discussions in this chapter are metaethi-
of reality as it is, whether progress exists in science, cal discussions—for example, the analysis of vari-
and whether the scientific method discloses truth. ous senses of “good.” As you will see, much can be
Philosophers of law seek to understand the nature learned from such discussions.
of law itself, the source of its authority, the nature
of legal interpretation, and the basis of legal respon- ETHICAL AND OTHER TYPES
sibility. In the philosophy of knowledge, called OF EVALUATION
epistemology, we try to answer questions about “That’s great!” “Now, this is what I call a delicious
what we can know of ourselves and our world, and meal!” “That play was wonderful!” All of these
what it means to know something rather than just to statements express approval of something. They do
believe it. In each area, philosophers ask basic ques- not tell us much about the meal or the play, but they
tions about the particular subject matter. This is also do imply that the speaker thought they were good.
true of moral philosophy. These are evaluative statements. Ethical statements
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4 PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
or judgments are also evaluative. They tell us what “That is a good knife” is an evaluative or nor-
the speaker believes is good or bad. They do not sim- mative statement. However, it does not mean that
ply describe the object of the judgment—for exam- the knife is morally good. In making ethical judg-
ple, as an action that occurred at a certain time or ments, we use terms such as good, bad, right,
that affected people in a certain way. They go further wrong, obligatory, and permissible. We talk about
and express a positive or negative regard for it. Of what we ought or ought not to do. These are evalu-
course, factual matters are relevant to moral evalua- ative terms. But not all evaluations are moral in
tion. For example, factual judgments about whether nature. We speak of a good knife without attribut-
capital punishment has a deterrent effect might be ing moral goodness to it. In so describing the knife,
relevant to our moral judgments about it. So also we are probably referring to its practical usefulness
would we want to know the facts about whether for cutting. Other evaluations refer to other systems
violence can ever bring about peace; this would of values. When people tell us that a law is legiti-
help us judge the morality of war. Because ethical mate or unconstitutional, that is a legal judgment.
judgments often rely on such empirical informa - When we read that two articles of clothing ought not
tion, ethics is often indebted to other disciplines such to be worn together, that is an aesthetic judgment.
as sociology, psychology, and history. Thus, we When religious leaders tell members of their com-
can distinguish between empirical or descriptive munities what they ought to do, that is a religious
claims, which state factual beliefs, and evaluative matter. When a community teaches people to bow
judgments, which state whether such facts are good before elders or use eating utensils in a certain way,
or bad, just or unjust, right or wrong. Evaluative that is a matter of custom. These various normative
judgments are also called normative judgments. or evaluative judgments appeal to practical, legal,
Moral judgments are evaluative because they “place aesthetic, religious, or customary norms for their
a value,” negative or positive, on some action or justification.
practice, such as capital punishment. How do other types of normative judgments
differ from moral judgments? Some philosophers
• Descriptive (empirical) judgment: Capital punish-
believe that it is a characteristic of moral “oughts”
ment acts (or does not act) as a deterrent.
in particular that they override other “oughts,” such
• Normative (moral) judgment: Capital punishment
as aesthetic ones. In other words, if we must choose
is justifiable (or unjustifiable).
between what is aesthetically pleasing and what is
We also evaluate people, saying that a person is morally right, then we ought to do what is morally
good or evil, just or unjust. Because these evalua- right. In this way, morality may also take prece-
tions also rely on beliefs in general about what is dence over the law and custom. The doctrine of civil
good or right, they are also normative. For example, disobedience relies on this belief, because it holds
the judgment that a person is a hero or a villain is that we may disobey certain laws for moral reasons.
based upon a normative theory about good or evil Although moral evaluations differ from other nor-
sorts of people. mative evaluations, this is not to say that there is no
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Chapter 1 ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning 5
relation between them. In fact, moral reasons often against simplistically deriving an ought from an is
form the basis for certain laws. But law—at least in Hume’s law. From this perspective, it is not logi-
the United States—results from a variety of political cal, for example, to base our ideas about how we
compromises. We don’t tend to look to the law for ought to behave from a factual account of how we
moral guidance. And we are reluctant to think that actually do behave. This logical mistake was called
we can “legislate morality,” as the saying goes. Of the naturalistic fallacy by G. E. Moore, an influ-
course, there is still an open debate about whether ential philosopher of the early twentieth century.
the law should enforce moral ideas in the context of Moore maintained that moral terms such as good
issues such as gay marriage or abortion. are names for nonempirical properties that cannot be
There may be moral reasons supporting legal reduced to some other natural thing. Moore claimed
arrangements—considerations of basic justice, for that to attempt to define good in terms of some mun-
example. Furthermore, the fit or harmony between dane or natural thing such as pleasure is to com-
forms and colors that ground some aesthetic judg- mit a version of this fallacy. The problem is that we
ments may be similar to the rightness or moral fit can ask whether pleasures are actually good. Just
between certain actions and certain situations or because we desire pleasure does not mean that it is
beings. Moreover, in some ethical systems, actions good to desire pleasure. As Moore suggested, there
are judged morally by their practical usefulness for is always an open question about whether what is
producing valued ends. For now, however, note that natural is also good.
ethics is not the only area in which we make norma- Now, not everyone agrees that appeals to nature
tive judgments. in ethics are fallacious. There are a variety of natu-
ralistic approaches to thinking about ethics. One
SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE NATURALISTIC traditional approach to ethics is called natural law
FALLACY ethics (which we discuss in detail in Chapter 7).
The distinction between descriptive and norma- Natural law ethics focuses on human nature and
tive claims is a central issue for thinking about eth- derives ethical precepts from an account of what
ics. We often confuse these issues in our ordinary is natural for humans. Natural law ethicists may
thinking, in part because we think that what we argue, for example, that human body parts have
ordinarily do is what we ought to do. Many people natural functions and that by understanding these
are inclined to say that if something is natural to natural functions, we can figure out certain moral
us, then we ought to do it. For example, one might ideas about sexuality or reproduction. Opponents
argue that since eating meat is natural for us, we might argue that this commits the naturalistic fal-
ought to eat meat. But vegetarians will disagree. lacy, since there is no obvious moral content to be
Indeed, there is no necessary relation between what seen in the structure and function of our body parts.
is ethical and what is natural or customary. It is thus A more recent version of naturalism in ethics
not true that what is natural is always good. But focuses on evolutionary biology and cognitive sci-
people often make the mistake of confusing facts of ence. From this perspective, to understand morality,
nature and value judgments. Most of the time, we we need to understand the basic functions of our
are not attentive to the shift from facts to values, species, including the evolutionary reasons behind
the shift from is to ought. Consider an example used moral behavior. We also need to understand how
by the eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume, our brains function in order to explain how pleasure
who noticed that incest appears to be quite natural— works, why some people are psychopathic, and why
animals do it all the time. But human beings con- we struggle to balance egoistic and altruistic moti-
demn incest. If it is natural, why do we condemn it? vations. One version of this naturalism is known
Hume pointed out the problem of deriving an ought as sociobiology—an idea that was introduced by
from an is; philosophers after Hume named the rule the biologist E. O. Wilson. 2 “If the brain evolved
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6 PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202
Chapter 1 ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning 7
the other. However, with “good” and “bad” there is of making good judgments. Sometimes this is surely
room for degrees, and some things are thought to be true, as when we are overcome by anger, jealousy,
better or worse than others. or fear and cannot think clearly. Biases and preju-
Other ethical terms require careful consideration. dice may stem from such strong feelings. We think
For example, when we say that something “ought” prejudice is wrong because it prevents us from judg-
or “ought not” to be done, there is a sense of ing rightly. But emotions can often aid good deci-
urgency and obligation. We can refrain from doing sion making. We may, for example, simply feel the
what we ought to do, but the obligation is still there. injustice of a certain situation or the wrongness of
On the other hand, there are certain actions that we someone’s suffering. Furthermore, our caring about
think are permissible but that we are not obligated some issue or person may, in fact, direct us to more
to do. Thus, one may think that there is no obliga- carefully examine the ethical issues involved. How-
tion to help someone in trouble, though it is “mor- ever, some explanation of why we hold a certain
ally permissible” (i.e., not wrong) to do so and even moral position is still required. Simply to say “X
“praiseworthy” to do so in some cases. Somewhat is just wrong” without explanation, or to merely
more specific ethical terms include just and unjust express strong feelings or convictions about “X,” is
and virtuous and vicious. not sufficient.
To a certain extent, which set of terms we use
depends on the particular overall ethical viewpoint INTUITIONISM, EMOTIVISM,
or theory we adopt. This will become clearer as we SUBJECTIVISM, OBJECTIVISM
discuss and analyze the various ethical theories in Philosophers differ on how we know what is
this first part of the text. good. They also differ on the question of whether
moral judgments refer to something objective or
ETHICS AND REASONS whether they are reports of subjective opinions or
When we evaluate something as right or wrong, dispositions.
good or bad, we appeal to certain norms or rea- To say that something is good is often thought
sons. If I say that affirmative action is unjustified, I to be different from saying that something is yel-
should give reasons for this conclusion; it will not be low or heavy. The latter two qualities are empirical,
acceptable for me to respond that this is merely the known by our senses. However, good or goodness
way I feel. If I have some intuitive negative response is held to be a nonempirical property, said by some
to preferential treatment forms of affirmative action, to be knowable through intuition. A position known
then I will be expected to delve deeper to determine as intuitionism claims that our ideas about ethics
whether there are reasons for this attitude. Perhaps I rest upon some sort of intuitive knowledge of ethi-
have experienced the bad results of such programs. cal truths. This view is associated with G. E. Moore,
Or I may believe that giving preference in hiring whom we discussed earlier. 6 Another philoso-
or school admissions on the basis of race or sex is pher, W. D. Ross, thinks that we have a variety of
unfair. In either case, I will be expected to push the “crystal-clear intuitions” about basic values. These
matter further and explain why it is unfair or even intuitions are clear and distinct beliefs about ethics,
what constitutes fairness and unfairness. which Ross explains using an analogy with mathe-
Reason-giving is essential in philosophical eth- matics: just as we see or intuit the self-evident truth
ics. However, this does not mean that making ethi- of “2 + 2 = 4,” we also see or intuit ethical truths:
cal judgments is and must be purely rational. We for example, that we have a duty to keep our prom-
might be tempted to think that good moral judg- ises. As Ross explains,
ments require us to be objective and not let our feel- Both in mathematics and in ethics we have certain
ings, or emotions, enter into our decision making. crystal-clear intuitions from which we build up all that
Yet this assumes that feelings always get in the way we can know about the nature of numbers and the
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8 PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
nature of duty . . . we do not read off our knowledge of One worry, however, is that our emotions and
particular branches of duty from a single ideal of the feelings of sympathy or disgust are variable and rel-
good life, but build up our ideal of the good life from ative. Our own emotional responses vary depending
intuitions into the particular branches of duty.7 upon our moods and these responses vary among
A very important question is whether our intu- and between individuals. Emotional responses are
itions point toward some objective moral facts in the relative to culture and even to the subjective dis-
world or whether they are reports of something sub- positions of individuals. Indeed, our own feelings
jective. A significant problem for intuitionism is that change over time and are not reliable or sufficient
people’s moral intuitions seem to differ. Unlike the gauges of what is going on in the external world.
crystal-clear intuitions of mathematics—which are The worry here is that our emotions merely express
shared by all of us—the intuitions of ethics are not internal or subjective responses to things and that
apparently shared by everyone. they do not connect us to an objective and stable
Another view, sometimes called emotivism, source of value.
maintains that when we say something is good, we Other moral theories aim for more objective
are showing our approval of it and recommending it sources for morality. From this standpoint, there
to others rather than describing it. This view is asso- must be objective reasons that ground our subjec-
ciated with the work of twentieth-century philoso- tive and emotional responses to things. Instead
phers such as A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson. But it of saying that the things we desire are good, an
has deeper roots in a theory of the moral sentiments, objectivist about ethics will argue that we ought to
such as we find in eighteenth-century philosophers desire things that are good—with an emphasis on
Adam Smith and David Hume. Hume maintains, for the goodness of the thing-in-itself apart from our
example, that reason is “the slave of the passions,” subjective responses. The ancient Greek philosopher
by which he means that the ends or goals we pursue Plato was an objectivist in this sense. Objectivists
are determined by our emotions, passions, and sen- hold that values have an objective reality—that they
timents. Adam Smith maintains that human beings are objects available for knowledge—as opposed
are motivated by the experience of pity, compassion, to subjectivists, who claim that value judgments
and sympathy for other human beings. For Smith, merely express subjective opinion. Plato argues that
ethics develops out of natural sympathy toward one there is some concept or idea called “the Good” and
another, experienced by social beings like ourselves. that we can compare our subjective moral opinions
Emotivism offers an explanation of moral knowl- about morality with this objective standard. Those
edge that is subjective, with moral judgments resting who want to ground morality in God are objectivists,
upon subjective experience. One version of emotiv- as are those who defend some form of natural law
ism makes ethical judgments akin to expressions of ethics, which focuses on essential or objective fea-
approval or disapproval. In this view, to say “murder tures of bodies and their functions. Interestingly, the
is wrong” is to express something like “murder— approach of sociobiology tends not to be objectivist
yuck!” Similarly, to say “courageous self-sacrifice is in this sense. Although the sociobiologist bases her
good” is to express something like “self-sacrifice— study of morality on objective facts in the world, the
yay!” One contemporary author, Leon Kass, whom sociobiologist does not think that moral judgments
we study in Chapter 18, argues that there is wisdom represent moral facts. Instead, as Michael Ruse
in our experiences of disgust and repugnance—that puts it,
our emotional reactions to things reveal deep moral Objective ethics, in the sense of something written on
insight. Kass focuses especially on the “yuck factor” tablets of stone (or engraven on God’s heart) external
that many feel about advanced biotechnologies such to us, has to go. The only reasonable thing that we, as
as cloning. sociobiologists, can say is that morality is something
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Chapter 1 ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning 9
biology makes us believe in, so that we will further The Structure of Ethical Reasoning
our evolutionary ends.8 and Argument
One of the issues introduced in Ruse’s rejection To be able to reason well in ethics you need to under
under-
of objectivity in ethics is the distinction between stand what constitutes a good argument. We can do
intrinsic and instrumental goods. Instrumental this by looking at an argument’s basic structure.
goods are things that are useful as instruments or This is the structure not only of ethical arguments
tools—we value them as means toward some other about what is good or right but also of arguments
end. Intrinsic goods are things that have value in about what is the case or what is true.
themselves or for their own sake. For example, we Suppose you are standing on the shore and a perper-
might say that life is an intrinsic good and funda- son in the water calls out for help. Should you try to
mentally valuable. But food is an instrumental good rescue that person? You may or may not be able to
because it is a means or tool that is used to sup- swim. You may or may not be sure you could rescue
port life. From Ruse’s perspective, morality itself is the person. In this case, however, there is no time
merely an instrumental good that is used by evolu- for reasoning, as you would have to act promptly.
tion for other purposes. Morality is, from this perper- On the other hand, if this were an imaginary case,
spective, simply a tool that helps the human species you would have to think through the reasons for
to survive. The selfish gene hypothesis of Richard and against trying to rescue the person. You might
Dawkins understands individual human beings conclude that if you could actually rescue the perper-
instrumentally, as carriers of genetic information: son, then you ought to try to do it. Your reasoning
“We are survival machines—robot vehicles blindly might go as follows:
programmed to serve the selfish molecules known
as genes.” 9 This runs counter to our usual moral Every human life is valuable.
view, which holds that human beings have intrinsic Whatever has a good chance of saving such a life
or inherent value. The idea that some things have should be attempted.
My swimming out to rescue this person has a good
intrinsic value is an idea that is common to a variety
chance of saving his life.
of approaches that claim that ethics is objective. The
Therefore, I ought to do so.
intrinsic value of a thing is supposed to be an objec-
tive fact about that thing, which has no relation to
Or you might conclude that you could not save this
our subjective response to that thing. Claims about
person, and your reasoning might go like this:
intrinsic value show up in arguments about human
rights and about the environment. Do human
beings, ecosystems, or species have intrinsic value, Every human life is valuable.
Whatever has a good chance of saving such a life
or is the value of these things contained within our
should be attempted.
subjective responses and in their instrumental uses?
In this case, there is no chance of saving this life
This question shows us that the metaethical theories because I cannot swim.
are connected to important practical issues. Thus, I am not obligated to try to save him (although,
if others are around who can help, I might be
ETHICAL REASONING AND ARGUMENTS obligated to try to get them to help).
It is important to know how to reason well in think-
ing or speaking about ethical matters. This is helpful Some structure like this is implicit in any ethi-
not only in trying to determine what to think about cal argument, although some are longer and more
controversial ethical matters but also in arguing for complex chains than the simple form given here.
something you believe is right and in critically eval- One can recognize the reasons in an argument by
uating positions held by others. their introduction through key words such as since,
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10 PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
because, and given that. The conclusion often con- what lying actually is. Must it be verbal? Must one
tains terms such as thus and therefore. The reasons have an intent to deceive? What is deceit itself?
supporting the conclusion are called premises. In a Other conceptual issues central to ethical arguments
sound argument, the premises are true and the con- may involve questions such as, “What constitutes a
clusion follows from them. In the case presented ear
ear- ‘person’?” (in arguments over abortion, for exam-
lier, then, we want to know whether you can save ple) and “What is ‘cruel and unusual punishment’?”
this person and also whether his life is valuable. We (in death penalty arguments, for example). Some-
also need to know whether the conclusion actually times, differences of opinion about an ethical issue
follows from the premises. In the case of the earlier are a matter of differences not in values but in the
examples, it does. If you say you ought to do what meaning of the terms used.
will save a life and you can do it, then you ought to Ethical arguments often also rely on factual
do it. However, there may be other principles that claims. In our example, we might want to know
would need to be brought into the argument, such whether it was actually true that you could save
as whether and why one is always obligated to save the drowning person. In arguments about the death
someone else’s life when one can. penalty, we may want to know whether such pun-
To know under what conditions a conclusion ishment is a deterrent. In such a case, we need
actually follows from the premises, we would need to know what scientific studies have found and
to analyze arguments in much greater detail than whether the studies themselves were well grounded.
we can do here. Suffice it to say, however, that the To have adequate factual grounding, we will want to
connection is a logical connection—in other words, seek out a range of reliable sources of information
it must make rational sense. You can improve your and be open-minded. The chapters in Part II of this
ability to reason well in ethics first by being able to book include factual material that is relevant to ethi-
pick out the reasons and the conclusion in an argu- cal decisions about the topics under consideration.
ment. Only then can you subject them to critical It is important to be clear about the distinction
examination in ways we suggest here. between facts and values when dealing with moral
conflict and disagreement. We need to ask whether
Evaluating and Making Good Arguments we disagree about the values involved, about the
Ethical reasoning can be done well or done poorly. concepts and terms we are employing, or about the
Ethical arguments can be constructed well or con- facts connected to the case.
structed poorly. A good argument is a sound argu- There are various ways in which reasoning can
ment. It has a valid form in which the conclusion go wrong or be fallacious. We began this chapter by
actually follows from the premises, and the prem- considering the fallacy of begging the question
ises or reasons given for the conclusion are true. An or circular argument. Such reasoning draws on
argument is poorly constructed when it is fallacious the argument’s conclusion to support its premises,
or when the reasons on which it is based are not as in “abortion is wrong because it is immoral.”
true or are uncertain. An ethical argument always Another familiar problem of argumentation is the
involves some claim about values—for example, ad hominem fallacy. In this fallacy, people say
that saving a life is good. These value-based claims something like, “That can’t be right because just
must be established through some theory of values. look who is saying it.” They look at the source of the
Part I of this book examines different theories that opinion rather than the reasons given for it. You can
help establish basic values. find out more about these and other fallacies from
Ethical arguments also involve conceptual and almost any textbook in logic or critical thinking.
factual matters. Conceptual matters are those that You also can improve your understanding of ethi-
relate to the meaning of terms or concepts. For cal arguments by making note of a particular type of
example, in a case of lying, we would want to know reasoning that is often used in ethics: arguments
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Chapter 1 ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning 11
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12 PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
principles that are supposedly applicable to all ethi- That was good because it helped Jim develop his
cal situations. Does this form of reasoning give due self-esteem—or it was bad because it caused Jim
consideration to the particularities of individual, to believe things about himself that were not true.
concrete cases? Can we really make a general judg- (Consequences)
ment about the value of truthfulness or courage that
will help us know what to do in particular cases in Although we generally think that a person’s motive
which these issues play a role? is relevant to the overall moral judgment about his
or her action, we tend to think that it reflects primar
primar-
TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY ily on our moral evaluation of the person. We also
In Part I of this book, we consider the following types have good reasons to think that the results of actions
of moral theory: egoism and contractarianism, utili-
utili matter morally. Those theories that base moral judg-
tarianism, deontological ethics, natural law, virtue ments on consequences are called consequentialist
ethics,, and feminist ethics. These theories differ in or sometimes teleological moral theories (from the
terms of what they say we should look at in mak- Greek root telos, meaning “goal” or “end”). Those
ing moral judgments about actions or practices. For theories that hold that actions can be right or wrong
example, does it matter morally that I tried to do the regardless of their consequences are called noncon-
right thing or that I had a good motive? Surely it sequentialist or deontological theories (from the
must make some moral difference, we think. But sup- Greek root deon, meaning “duty”).
pose that in acting with good motives I violate some- One moral theory we will examine is utilitari-
one’s rights. Does this make the action a bad action? anism. It provides us with an example of a conse-
We would probably be inclined to say yes. Suppose, quentialist moral theory in which we judge whether
however, that in violating someone’s rights, I am an action is better than alternatives by its actual or
able to bring about a great good. Does this justify the expected results or consequences; actions are then
violation of rights? Some theories judge actions in judged in terms of the promotion of human hap-
terms of their motive, some in terms of the character piness. Kant’s moral theory, which we will also
or nature of the act itself, and others in terms of the examine, provides us with an example of a non-
consequences of the actions or practices. consequentialist theory, according to which acts are
We often appeal to one of these types of reason. judged right or wrong independently of their conse-
Take a situation in which I lie to a person, Jim. We quences; in particular, acts are judged by whether
can make the following judgments about this action. they conform to requirements of rationality and
Note the different types of reasons given for the human dignity. The other ethical theories that we
judgments. will examine stress human nature as the source of
what is right and wrong. Some elements of these
theories are deontological and some teleological. So,
also, some teleological theories are consequentialist
Motive Act Consequences
in that they advise us to produce some good. But if
the good is an ideal, such as virtue or self-realization,
then such theories differ from consequentialist the-
ories such as utilitarianism. As anyone who has
That was good because you intended to make Jim
tried to put some order to the many ethical theories
happy by telling him a white lie—or it was bad
knows, no theory completely and easily fits one clas-
because you meant to deceive him and do him harm.
(Motive) sification, even those given here. Feminist theories
That was good because it is good to make people of care provide yet another way of determining what
happy—or it was bad because it is always wrong to one ought to do (see Chapter 9). In Part II of this
tell a lie. (Act) text, we will examine several concrete ethical issues.
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Chapter 1 ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning 13
As we do so, we will note how various ethical theo- Most moral philosophers think that a course on
ries analyze the problems from different perspectives ethics is ethically useful. It should help students
and sometimes reach different conclusions about understand the nature of ethical problems and help
what is morally right or wrong, better or worse. them think critically about ethical matters by pro-
viding conceptual tools and skills. It should enable
CAN ETHICS BE TAUGHT? them to form and critically analyze ethical argu-
It would be interesting to know just why some col- ments. It is up to the individual, however, to use
lege and university programs require their students these skills to reason about ethical matters. A study
to take a course in ethics. Does this requirement of ethics should also lead students to respect oppos-
stem from a belief that a course in ethics or moral ing views because it requires them to analyze care-
philosophy can actually make people good? fully the arguments that support views contrary to
When asked whether ethics can be taught, stu- their own. It also provides opportunities to consider
dents have given a variety of answers. “If it can’t be the reasonableness of at least some viewpoints that
taught, then why are we taking this class?” a stu- they may not have considered.
dent wondered. Another student responded, “Look In this opening chapter, we have learned some-
at the behavior of certain corporate executives who thing about what the philosophical study of ethics
have been found guilty of criminal conduct. They is. We have considered a few metaethical issues. We
surely haven’t learned proper ethical values.” Still have provided a description of ethical reasoning and
others disagreed with both views. Although certain arguments. We have briefly considered the nature of
ideals or types of knowledge can be taught, ethical ethical theories and the role they play in ethical rea-
behavior cannot be taught because it is a matter of soning. We will examine these theories more care-
individual choice, they said. fully in the chapters to come, and we will see how
The ancient Greek philosopher Plato thought that they might help us analyze and come to conclusions
ethics could be taught. He argues that “All evil is about particular ethical issues.
ignorance.” In other words, we do what is wrong The reading selections for this chapter come from
because we do not know or believe it is wrong; and David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, first pub-
if we truly believe that something is right, we should lished in 1739, and from C. L. Stevenson, a philoso-
necessarily do it. Now, we are free to disagree with pher associated with the Anglo-American tradition
Plato by appealing to our own experience. If I know in twentieth-century philosophy. The excerpt from
that I should not have that second piece of pie, does Hume discusses the problem of deriving normative
this mean that I will not eat it? Ever? Plato might claims from descriptive claims, the problem of deriv-
attempt to convince us that he is right by examining ing an ought from an is, with a particular focus on
or clarifying what he means by the phrase to know. the question of the morality of incest. Stevenson dis-
If we were really convinced with our whole heart cusses the difficulty of connecting ethics and natural
and mind that something is wrong, then we might science, while also outlining an emotivist approach
be highly likely (if not determined) not to do it. to understanding ethical terms.
However, whether ethics courses should attempt to
convince students of such things is surely debatable. NOTES
Another aspect of the problem of teaching ethics
concerns the problem of motivation. If one knows 1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality
something to be the right thing to do, does there still (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 4.
remain the question of why we should do it? One 2. E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis
way to motivate people to be ethical may be to show (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).
them that it is in their own best interest to do the 3. E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge, MA:
right thing. Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 2.
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14 PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
4. See Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: 6. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethics (Buffalo, NY:
Oxford University Press, 1989). Prometheus, 1903).
5. See Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of 7. W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford:
Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals Clarendon Press, 1939), pp. 144–45.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 8. Michael Ruse, Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense?
Also see Morton Hunt, The Compassionate Beast: (New York: Springer, 1985), p. 237.
What Science Is Discovering about the Human 9. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 30th
Side of Humankind (New York: William Morrow, Anniversary Edition (Oxford: Oxford University
1990). Press, 2006), p. xxi.
R E A D I N G
Ethical Judgments and Matters of Fact*
DAV I D H U M E
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. How does Hume employ the fact of animal incest to advance his argument that morality does not consist merely
of “matters of fact” and that morality is not merely an “object of reason”?
2. Explain Hume’s idea that morality is a matter of feelings and sentiments.
3. Why does Hume have a problem with deducing an ought from an is?
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’pen’ance on dis promis’, I puts my ’pen’ance on dat, an’ dey all fails
me.
Lucy
You ain’t neveh put youah trus’ in Gawd.
Madison
Yassuh, I did, an’ Gawd He up an’ gimme de go-by too. What He
bin doin’ fo’ me? Nuthin’. Now I goin’ spit on my han’s an’ whu’l in an’
trus’ myse’f. An’ I feels lots betteh. I can feel conferdence wukin’ all
oveh me. I casts ’em all off. I’m lookin’ out fo’ myse’f. M-m-m—It took
me long time to git heah but now I’m heah let ’em look out for me.
[His voice rises to a chant.]
M—m—m—Midnight on de sea. All de lights out. I’m carryin’ hod
on Jacob’ laddeh to build me a new house an’ I’m buildin’ it high,
man. Don’ tech me. I’m a flame of fieh an’ I’ll singe you sho’. If dey
asks fo’ me tell ’em say, “I saw somethin’ sailin’ up but he was
headin’ fo’ a high hill on de sun an’ my eyes failed me.” Tell ’em say,
“He had de fo’ win’s runnin’ like stallions to fetch up wif him but dey
carried ’em out, an’ buried ’em in de valley. He bus’ dere hea’ts!” Tell
’em say, “He was herdin’ lightnin’s like sheep an’ dey wuz too slow
an’ he picked ’em up an’ sheared ’em an’ sent ’em home.”
Dat’s me, I’m de one you’ll be talkin’ bout. Fer why? ’Cause I cas’
off ever’thing an’ I puts my trus’ in myself an’ nuthin’ can’t hole me.
De mo’ I says it de mo’ I feels conferdence. I feels it a wukin’.
Lucy
You goin’ to wuk, Madison?
Madison
Yes, indeedy. I got to wuk an’ wuk ha’d. I can’t shirk none.
Lucy
What wuk you goin’ to do?
Madison
I’m a stock brokin’ man. I goin’ into de stock brokin’ business
tomorrer.
Lucy
How?
Madison
Buyin’ an’ sellin’, dat’s how an’ which too.
Lucy
De Devil’s wrastlin’ wif you, Madison, an’ you’s perishin’ fas’. Ef
you keeps on in dis paf you’ll lan’ mongs’ de rocks er mournin’. You’s
let somebody tu’n you roun’.
Madison
Not me. Nobody can’t tu’n me roun’. I dreamed it an’ I dreamed it
right, face fo’mos’ an’ on de run.
Lucy
How dream?
Madison
Las’ night an’ day befo’ yistiddy night an’ night befo’ dat. I wuz
layin’ groanin’, “O Lawd, how long,” an’ I heah a voice say, “Git up
an’ come a-runnin’.” Looks up an’ sees a fine w’ite saddle hoss.
Hoss say,
“Ride me right an’ I’ll guide you right.”
On I gits an’ off he goes, slick as a rancid transom car. Comes to
high hill lookin’ down on de sun an’ moon. Hoss stop an’ say,
“Brung you heah to give you noos
De worl’ is youahn to pick an’ choose.”
I ax him “How dat?” Hoss say:
“How is how an’ why is why,
Buy low an’ sell high.”
I say to him, “I got no money to buy. Wheah I goin’ git de fun’s to
buy low?” Hoss respon’:
“Trus’ yo’se’f an’ take youah own,
Git de meat an’ leave de bone,
Bus’ de nut an’ fling em de shell,
Ride an’ let em walk a spell,
Findeh’s keepeh’s, loseh’s weepeh’s,
I hope dese few lines find you well.”
I ax him who tole him all dis an’ hoss say:
“Ole hoss Grab will nevah balk,
All dis heah is w’ite man talk.”
Dat what de hoss say to me in my true dream ev’y night dis week
an’ I’m a-goin’ to bide by hit twell de las’ er pea time. ’Cause I’m er
true dreameh an’ my mammy she wuz befo’ me.
Lucy
What come of de hoss in de dream, Madison?
Madison
Dat’s all. Hoss went up in smoke an’ I come down in bed.
Lucy
Hoss went up in smoke! No, hit went down in smoke an’ fiah.
Madison
Now look-a heah, woman. I’m goin’ to make you a good livin’ f’um
now on. I’m goin’ into business termorrer. I’m goin’ in de specalatin’
wu’k. I’m goin’ to buy low an’ sell high.
Lucy
What kin you buy wif? You got no money.
Madison
[Hesitating but collecting his forces gradually.] Oh, ain’t I tell you
’bout dat? I got it in de dream.
Lucy
In de dream?
Madison
Um Hmmm. You know dat hoss I tole you ’bout. Well’m, jes’ fo’ we
pa’ted he prance up th’ough a starry fiel’ an’ come to a gyarden
fence. Oveh dat fence he lep an’, man, she was a fine gyarden.
“Whose patch dish yer?” I say to him. Hoss say:
“If you asks me grab what you see.”
Den he reaches down an’ pulls up a tu’nip wif his teef an’ gives it
to me an’ say,
“Dis gyarden truck will fetch you luck.”
[He watches Lucy furtively.] An’ I takes an’ sta’ts to peel dis tu’nip
an’ what does I find? I finds she’s a fine fat roll er bills, dem tu’nip
tops is greenbacks.
Lucy
So youah money is dream money?
Madison
Well, no, not ezackly. De hoss whispeh sumpin in my eah an’ told
me how to make dat dream money real money. An’ I took de hint an’
done it today. An’ on dat money I’ll buy low an’ gouge ’em all good.
Lucy
How much you got?
Madison
Well’m— [He hesitates.] I got a little an’ den some. I got erbout—
fifty er so.
Lucy
Wheah you git it? [She catches hold of him.]
Madison
Tu’n me loose, woman. I goin’ to baid. I got to make early sta’t. [He
pulls off his coat.]
Lucy
[Wildly.] I ain’ goin’ to let you stay in sin. [She snatches the coat
from him.] I goin’ take dis money an’ make you say wheah you got it.
Madison
[Calmly regarding her with great good humour and breaking into a
laugh as she fails in her search.] Eh, yah, yah, sea’ch an’ look,
sea’ch an’ look.
Lucy
Oh, Madison, ain’ yo’ got no honin’ ter be hones’ at all?
Madison
Hones’! What kin’ er fool talk is dat? I done got my ear-string bus’
now an’ dem preachah wu’ds can’t fool me no mo’. You’ll neveh fin’
it, honey. ’Cause why? ’Cause I’m got it in my pants an’ I goin’ to
keep it f’um a foolish woman.
Lucy
[Running to him desperately.] You got to give it to me.
Madison
Gal, ef you don’ tu’n me loose I’ll git ugly. Now, look heah. I wants
to heah de las’ er dis. I got new ideahs. I got big plots en plans. I
done give you de plankses in my flatfo’m an’ I’m a-goin’ to stan’ on
hit. When I makes a lot mo’ money in de broker business I’m a-goin’
to give you all de gold youah ap’un’ll hold, ev’y day er youah life, an’
you won’ have to wait long. But till dat day an’ to dat time I’m de
treasu’eh er dis lodge an’ I’m de stake holdeh er dis race an’ dat
money stays in de pu’se in de hip er my ol’ jeanses.
[He says this last slowly and with growing emphasis
and as he ends, gives himself a resounding
thwack on the hip over his pocket. There is a
moment’s pause. He puts his hand hurriedly in the
pocket and then dazedly into one on the other
hip.]
Oh, my Lawd, Oh, wheah is it? I got to have it. Oh, I couldn’ lose it,
hit ain’ mine ter lose. Stay by me, Lucy, an’ he’p me fin’ it, git down
on youah knees, Lucy. Oh, wheah did I drop it? I’m gittin’ old an’
needs it. Ef I lose dis I lose all my push. I was jes’ goin’ into business
an’ we all wuz goin’ to fly high. I got to fin’ it. I ain’ give up. Lemme
think. Oh, I hopes some hones’ puhson foun’ it. Lemme come on
down—Know I put it on dat side ’cause dat de side Mistah Long he
wuz on—Oh, I’ll go crazy— [He strikes his forehead groaning.]
Lucy
[Starting.] Mistah Long! He’s cashiah in de Dime Savin’s! How he
give you money?
Madison
Oh, lemme see—he gimme de money an’ I put it right in yere. [He
fumbles again distractedly in his pocket.]
Lucy
[Pursuing him desperately.] Onliest money at de Dime Savin’s is
de money. You couldn’t draw hit out. You didn’ do dat,—you
couldn’—Tell me if you did fo’ I’ll fin’ it out tomorrer—Oh, tell me true
—you couldn’ when it’s in my name—tell me now fo’ I’ll find it out.
Madison
Oh, I can’t stand it.
Lucy
Ef you wan’ me to he’p you den be free wif me. How you draw
money from de Bank? I give you no papeh. You couldn’ draw de
money.
Madison
Wilson Byrd, he gimme de papeh.
Lucy
I give him no papeh.
Madison
He write it fo’ you.
Lucy
Oh, Gawd, dat w’ite man write my name. You drawed de money—I
see it now. You had dealin’s wif a fo’geh, Wilson Byrd.
Madison
Spar’ me an’ he’p me. He tol’ me ef I draw de money he’d take me
into business wif him an’ gimme de guitar besides.
Lucy
Did you spar’ me? Fifty dollahs! You said fifty, didn’ you? How
could you do hit? More’n six months’ ha’d slavin’. Six months mo’
befo’ I can resto’ it back. I could a bought de house tomorrer mo’nin’
an’ now hit’s six months off to pay in dat fifty. It was fifty, didn’ you
say? Maybe ’twuzn’ dat much. Tell me right. I’ll fin’ it out tomorrer.
Madison
Dis yere’ll kill me ef I can’t think.
Lucy
How much you draw? Tell me right. Look at me. Were hit fifty?
[She holds his eye.] Less? Mo’? How much? [She continues to hold
his lustreless eyes, reading them.] A hunde’d? Two hunde’d? Eight
hunde’d? [A pause ensues as she reads the truth in his face.] All of
hit! [She sinks in a chair.] Twelve yeahs’ labour sence I married you
an’ termorrer I wuz goin’ to mek de payment an’ we’d a bin undeh
owah own roof. I’m done. I could a paid off pa’t, mebbe fifty, but I
won’ las’ twelve yeahs mo’ at de same thing. But I thank Thee,
Lawd, dat it wuz stole f’um us all ef hit had to be stole.
Madison
Ef I could on’y think. Had hit in de bank—felt hit an’ had it on Thu’d
Street—slapped hit an’ had it at Joe’s house—slapped hit an’ had it
comin’ up de alley—jes’ fo’ I clum de hill—lemme see—clum de hill
—went in th’oo Wilson Byrd’s hedge fence—he gimme de guitar—
scrape my back comin’ out— [His face shows gradual recollection,
and suddenly brightens.] I knows now! Dat’s hit! In dat white man’s
yard wheah he gimme de guitar! I wuz jes’ goin’ to give him de
money when somebody grabbed him f’um behin’. He give a squawk
an’ skeered me. I run out th’oo his hedge fence an’ scrape my back.
I scrape de pocketbook out. She’s dere! In dat Wilson Byrd’s yard. I’ll
git it yit. Watch me. [He grabs his hat and runs excitedly toward the
door.]
Lucy
[Rushing toward him.] No, sumpin’ might happen. You might git
mix up wif him ergin. Lemme go, but I mus’ resto’ dis guitar at Uncle
Williams, as I go by his house. I’ll slip it on his porch. Maybe he’ll
neveh know it wuz gone. Oh, if somebody had seen it heah! How
could I have stood it?
Williams
Good evenin’, Lucy.
Madison
What he say? Do he know?
Lucy
[Desperately seizing the bag and pressing it into his hands as she
turns him again toward doorway at back.] Oh, I cain’ tell. On’y resto’
dis in case he don’ know er case he do. Now’s de one chance to be
hones’.
Madison
Huh. What erbout dat eight hunderd dollah?
Lucy
I don’ know. Trus’ Gawd an’ be hones’.
Madison
Huh uh. One of us has got to go look fo’ dat money.
Lucy
One of us has got to take back de guitar.
Madison
I’m goin’ fo’ de money.
Lucy
Den I’ll take dis. [She takes up the guitar and she and Madison go
toward door at back. Then she halts.] Oh, Madison, you can do bofe.
One of us has got to stay wif Uncle Williams. But take back de guitar
first.
Madison
All right. I’ll go. An’ I ain’t played on dis heah but twice. [He takes
the guitar from her.]
Lucy
Go now. Can you fin’ youah way to his porch in de dahk?
Madison
Will we find de money? Dat’s de p’oblem I wants de answeh fo’.
Lucy
[Haltingly, after a pause.] How—you like—de stove?
Williams
[Entering more vigorously than before.] Well’m, befo’ we goes any
furder we betteh come neareh de real p’int an’ question. I didn’ come
fo’ no stove dis night. [Madison shrinks back into the shadows.]
Lucy
[Slowly.] Yo’—don’—wan’—
Williams
No’m. To be sho’, I might tek de stove one er dese days, but dat
ain’ my erran’ now. Hit’s dis; does you know when we mek de
bargum about you buyin’ dis heah house?
Lucy
Twelve yeah ago.
Williams
Gal, you dreamin’! ’Tweren’t but las’ year. ’Twere de fus’ er
Octobah las’ year an’ I say I gives you de refusals fer one yeah.
’Membeh dat?
Lucy
Yassuh.
Williams
So fur so good. Now does you know what day de month dis is?
Lucy
Fus’ er Octobah.
Williams
Dat’s true as preachin’. Well’m, time’s up.
Lucy
What you mean?
Williams
I’m er man er my wuhd. Pay me de money an’ tek de house.
Lucy
Termorrer—
Williams
No. Termorrer won’ do.
Lucy
Why you push me so? Oh, please spar’ me an’ wait—wait anutheh
day.
Williams
No, I’m er business man. I kin sell de house fer mo’ money
termorrer but I hold’s to my wuhd ter sell it to you. I holds to it an’
loses money, but it falls due dis day an’ night an’ I won’ stretch it one
jump er my hea’t.
Lucy
You know—de bank—ain’t open—
Williams
Sign de check fer hit. You kin do dat, cain’t you?
Lucy
I—s’pose—I—kin.
Williams
Den up an’ do hit. Heah’s er check, all wrote out but de signin’.
[She takes the check he produces.] An’ heah’s one er dese fountum
pins. [She takes the pen.] Octobeh fus’—pay to Zek’l Williams—eight
hunderd dollahs. Des write “Lucy Sparrow.” [She mechanically turns
to do so.] Looks easy, sho’. But de law allows hit; dis writin’ out
money. [He pauses, then adds impressively.] Dat is, ef you got de
money in de bank. Co’se ef de money ain’ dah an’ you writes de
check fer hit de law puts you in State prism. [She stops and stares at
him.] [The pen falls from her hand and the check flutters to the floor.]
What de matteh? You wants de house, don’ you? [Lucy’s head
sinks.] An’ you got de money, ain’ you?
Madison
Dat’s de question. [He comes forward out of the shadow.]
Williams
[Seemingly observing Madison for the first time during the
evening.] Why, heighyo, Madison. I bin lookin’ fer you dis very
evenin’. Whah you bin?
Madison
Bin home.
Williams
Sho’ly not, Madison, sho’ly not all evenin’? Has you?
Madison
Yes.
Williams
Well, ain’ dat de whu’lygig? I wuz lookin’ fer you at Pratt’s sto’ at
eight o’clock an’ dey say you jes’ lef’ dah. You wuz dah, weren’t you?
Madison
No, suh.
Williams
Well, dere I am fool agin. An’ who you think done fool me?
Madison
Dunno.
Williams
Well, suh, ’tweren’t no one but— [He pauses a moment.] Wilson
Byrd.
Lucy
Byrd! [Springing to her feet with the shock.]
Williams
[After watching the two a moment.] So you ain’ got de money no
mo’, is you? [They are speechless before him.] I knows you ain’
’ca’se I knows who has got hit.
Madison
[Involuntarily.] Who?
Williams
I has. [He observes them and then chuckles softly.] I has de
money an’ de bargum’s closed, fer de goods is bin delivered an’
dey’re right in dis room in dat corner. One guitar at eight hunderd
dollahs. Insterments comes higher’n what dey did once but you
would have it an’ now you got it an’ everybody’s fixed.
Madison
[Groaning and bending over the table.] Oh!
Williams
Yassuh, de man what buys guitars at dat price su’tinly plays on de
golden strings. Eight hunderd fer one guitar makes ’m mighty near
twenty thousand dollehs er dozen. De cos’ er livin’ is shore gone up
but ef you mus’ you mus’.
Madison
Oh!
Williams
Well, I cain’ stay heah, I got er be amblin’ on. I much erblige ter
you to mek youah plans to move out er heah fo’ I got ter sell de
house befo’ sundown. Well, so long, an’ I hopes you gits all de good
er youah high price music. [He turns again with his feeble old man’s
step toward the doorway, putting on his hat.] I wish y’all good
evenin’.
Madison
[Moving toward him with the threatening determination of despair.]
Say, I’ve got to have dat money. I sees red. I’m gone bad an’ I’ll kill
befo’ I’ll lose hit.
Williams
You kill me! You tek money away from me! Why, you po’ grain er
chaff, you don’ know me. I’m a king in my own right. I got ways an’
means er pertecktin’ myse’f dat you don’ even dream on an’ I don’
need to lay a fingeh on you to do hit. Furdermo’ I could brain you wif
dis stick but ef you cross me I won’ be dat easy on you. Ef you don’
wan’ wuss’n dat don’ cross me no furder er youah troubles’ll begin
fer fa’r.
Lucy
Oh, please don’ lay nothin’ on him.
Williams
You po’ sufferin’ gal, I won’ lay nothin’ onto ’im but I’m a-goin’ to
tek sumpin’ off’n you. I’m goin’ tek de burding er dish yere pack er
laziness off’n you. An’ fus’ I wants ter show you dish yere piece er
papeh. [He produces a folded document and opens it.] Does yo’
know who wrote it? Answeh me. [He shoves the paper under
Madison’s eye.]
Madison
It looks like dat Wilson Byrd’s writin’.
Williams
Yassuh, an’ what’s mo’ it is dat man’s writin’. It’s his confession dat
he fo’ge Lucy Sparrow’s name. I saw dat man steal my guitar an’
follered him home. Dah I grabbed him, dah I foun’ de purse wif
Lucy’s name inside an’ dah I made dat thief write out his confession.
Knowed so much of his meanness already dat he had to do hit. An’
now I owns you. Does you undehstan’ dat? Answeh me.
Madison
Yas suh, no suh.
Williams
Well, I’ll take’n cl’ar up de myst’ry fer you. I got dis confession
outer Byrd an’ I got other things ter prove hit an’ I kin bring him an’
you too, bofe befo’ de gran’ jury.
Lucy
Oh, my sweet Jesus, save him. [The old man stands watching the
two before him for some time in silence. Lucy falls on her knees
before him.] Oh, don’t sen’ Madison to de lawyers.
Williams
No, Lucy, I ain’ wishful ter.
Lucy
You won’t?
Williams
Mebbe not. But fus’, les’ put all dis talk aside dat I bin talkin’ up to
now. I bin puttin’ on an’ pretendin’ in ordeh ter try you bofe an’ sif’ de
chaff from de grain in you. I des bin playin’ wif you ter see how good
you is an’ how ornry dish yere man er youahn is. Yit I’ll take an’ give
him er chance even so, an’ I’ll pluck him f’um de bu’nin’ ef he follers
de paf I p’ints out ter him. But we all got ter have cl’ar unde’stan’in’
’bout dat. Fus’ an’ fo’mos’ youah money is all safe wif me. De house
is youah’n.
Lucy
You means you sell it fer de money.
Williams
In co’se. You didn’t speck I’d steal too, like a w’ite man, did you?
I’ll fetch you de deeds fo’ hit fus’ thing in de mo’nin’.
Lucy
Oh, fu’give me, I was all mix up. But you won’ sen’ Madison to de
gran’ jury neitheh?
Williams
I say I ain’ honin’ ter.
Lucy
Oh, my Makeh, I thank Thee fo’ Thy mercy.
Williams
But I shorely goin’ to put dis man er youah’n th’oo er tes’ ter see
whetheh he’s fitten ter keep out er jail. Madison, will you tek er tes’?
Madison
[Humbly.] Yassuh. What is it?
Williams
A guitar.
Madison
A guitar!
Williams
Yassuh, dat’s hit, no mo’ ner no less. I’m goin’ give you dat guitar
—but—dere’s suhtinly goin’ to be a string tied to it. You kin take dat
guitar but you got to make somethin’ outer yourself wif her or back
she’ll come to me. You kin give lessons an’ learn folks music or you
kin write down de music you make, but you got to do somethin’ wif it
fer Lucy. You got to wake up or I’ll take de guitar. Which’ll it be?
Make youah choice.
Madison
[Crushed.] I’ll—keep de guitar.
Williams
An’ dat ain’ all. You got ter quit runnin’ wif Byrd an’ Byrd wif you,
you got ter be a better husban’ an’ you got to min’ everything Lucy
tells you. Will you do hit?
Madison
Yassuh.
Williams
An’ yo’ ain’ much of er temp’unce man neitheh, is you, Madison?
Madison
I’s a temp’unce man but I ain’ no frantic.
Williams
Well, suh, you got ter jine de frantics now. No dram drinking at all.
Will you quit hit er go ter jail?
Madison
I’ll quit.
Williams
Well, dat’s on’y a promise but I’ll shore hol’ you to hit er put you
behin’ de bahs. Why, look heah, man, does you know how you stan’
’pon top er dis yu’th? Does you know how you liken to er tree?
’Sposin’ sumpin’ wif er cool eye like er tree could see you an’ talk. I
cain’ jedge you ca’m but er tree could. Tree would look at you an’
say, “Does dat ’ere man wu’k?” Win’ ’ud whispeh, “No.” “Do he eat?”
“Yas ’n git fat,” respon’ de win’. “Who shines on him?” “His wife,” win’
say. “Do he put fo’th flower an’ bless de wife?” say de tree. “No.” “Do
he give shade an’ shelteh ter de wife?” say de tree. “No.” “Well,
chop’m down an’ bu’n him befo’ he rots,” say de tree. “Dat’s all.” But
mebbe I kin mek mo’ of him dan dat an’ so I’ll try prunin’ him an’
graftin’ some good labeh onto him. An’ I kin’ er think hit’ll save him