PDF Hergenhahns An Introduction To The History of Psychology 8Th Edition Tracy Henley Ebook Full Chapter

Hergenhahn's An Introduction to the
History of Psychology, 8th Edition

Tracy Henley
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://textbookfull.com/product/hergenhahns-an-introduction-to-the-history-of-psychol
ogy-8th-edition-tracy-henley/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...
An Introduction to the Psychology of Humor 1st Edition

Janet Gibson
https://textbookfull.com/product/an-introduction-to-the-
psychology-of-humor-1st-edition-janet-gibson/
A History of Psychology: From Antiquity to Modernity

8th Edition Thomas Hardy Leahey
https://textbookfull.com/product/a-history-of-psychology-from-
antiquity-to-modernity-8th-edition-thomas-hardy-leahey/
The Muqaddimah An Introduction to History Ibn Khaldun
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-muqaddimah-an-introduction-
to-history-ibn-khaldun/
Biota Grow 2C gather 2C cook Loucas
https://textbookfull.com/product/biota-grow-2c-gather-2c-cook-
loucas/
An Introduction to Applied Cognitive Psychology 2nd
Edition David Groome
https://textbookfull.com/product/an-introduction-to-applied-
cognitive-psychology-2nd-edition-david-groome/
An Introduction to Applied Cognitive Psychology 2nd

Edition David Groome
https://textbookfull.com/product/an-introduction-to-applied-
cognitive-psychology-2nd-edition-david-groome-2/
Worldviews an introduction to the history and

philosophy of science Third Edition Dewitt
https://textbookfull.com/product/worldviews-an-introduction-to-
the-history-and-philosophy-of-science-third-edition-dewitt/
An introduction to work and organizational psychology :

an international perspective Third Edition Chmiel
https://textbookfull.com/product/an-introduction-to-work-and-
organizational-psychology-an-international-perspective-third-
edition-chmiel/
Health Psychology: An Introduction to Behavior and

Health Linda Brannon
https://textbookfull.com/product/health-psychology-an-
introduction-to-behavior-and-health-linda-brannon/
Copyright 2019 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203
Hergenhahn’s
An Introduction to the
History of Psychology
Eighth Edition
TRACY B. HENLEY
Texas A&M University — Commerce
Australia • Brazil • Mexico • Singapore • United Kingdom • United States
Copyright 2019 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. Due to electronic rights, some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s).
Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
This is an electronic version of the print textbook. Due to electronic rights restrictions,
some third party content may be suppressed. Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed
content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. The publisher reserves the right
to remove content from this title at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it. For
valuable information on pricing, previous editions, changes to current editions, and alternate
formats, please visit www.cengage.com/highered to search by ISBN#, author, title, or keyword for
materials in your areas of interest.
Important Notice: Media content referenced within the product description or the product
text may not be available in the eBook version.
Hergenhahn’s An Introduction to the © 2019 , 2014 Cengage Learning, Inc.
History of Psychology, Eighth Edition Unless otherwise noted, all content is © Cengage
Tracy B. Henley
Senior Vice President, General Manager, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. No part of this work covered by the
Social Sciences, Humanities & Business: copyright herein may be reproduced or distributed in any form or
Erin Joyner by any means, except as permitted by U.S. copyright law, without
the prior written permission of the copyright owner.
Product Director: Marta Lee-Perriard
Product Manager: Nedah Rose For product information and technology assistance, contact us at
Cengage Learning Customer & Sales Support, 1-800-354-9706
Production Manager: Brenda Ginty
For permission to use material from this text or product,

Project Manager: Seth Schwartz
submit all requests online at www.cengage.com/permissions
Content Developer: Laura Lawrie Further permissions questions can be emailed to
permissionrequest@cengage.com
Product Assistant: Leah Jenson
Marketing Manager: Heather Thompson Library of Congress Control Number: 2017952179
Manufacturing Planner: Karen Hunt

ISBN: 978-1-337-56415-1
Intellectual Property Analyst: Deanna
Ettinger Cengage
20 Channel Street
Intellectual Property Project Manager:
Boston, MA 02210
Betsy Hathaway
USA
Production Management, and
Composition: Lumina Datamatics Inc. Cengage Learning is a leading provider of customized learning
solutions with employees residing in nearly 40 different countries
Art Director: Vernon Boes and sales in more than 125 countries around the world. Find your
local representative at www.cengage.com
Text and Cover Designer: Jennifer Wahi
Cover Image Credit: The cover illustration Cengage Learning products are represented in Canada by
is a detail of the head of Venus from Nelson Education, Ltd.
“The Bath of Venus and Mars,” Giulio
To learn more about Cengage Learning Solutions, visit
Romano, Palazzo del Té, Mantua, Scala/Art www.cengage.com
Resource, N.Y.
Purchase any of our products at your local college store or at our
preferred online store www.cengagebrain.com
Printed in the United States of America

Print Number: 01 Print Year: 2017
“The great use of a life is to spend it for something
that outlasts it”.
—William James
Brief Contents
PREFACE xv
1 Introduction 1
2 The Ancient World 27
3 Rome and the Middle Ages 62
4 Renaissance Science and Philosophy 91
5 Empiricism, Sensationalism, and Positivism 120
6 Rationalism 165
7 Romanticism and Existentialism 191
8 Physiology and Psychophysics 215
9 Early Approaches to Psychology 243
10 Evolution and Individual Differences 273
11 American Psychology and Functionalism 313
12 Behaviorism 361
13 Neobehaviorism 397
14 Gestalt Psychology 429
15 Early Considerations of Mental Illness 456
16 Psychoanalysis 482
17 Humanistic (Third-Force) Psychology 523
18 Psychobiology 556
19 Cognitive Psychology 574
20 Psychology Today 598
RE FE REN CE S 619
Te xt Credit 663
NAME IND EX 665
SUBJ ECT IND EX 673 v
Contents
PREFACE xv Chapter 2 The Ancient World 27
Psychology’s Prehistory 27
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
The Neolithic Revolution 27
Problems in Writing A History of Psychology 2 Animism and Anthropomorphism 28
Where to Start 2 Myth and Magic 28
What to Include 2 Early Greek Religion 29
Choice of Approach 3 The First Philosophers 29
Why Study the History of Psychology? 4 Thales 30
What is Science? 6 Anaximander and Heraclitus 31
Revisions in the Traditional View of Science 7 Parmenides and Zeno 32
Karl Popper 8 Pythagoras 32
Thomas Kuhn 9 Empedocles 34
Paradigms and Psychology 11 Anaxagoras 35
Popper versus Kuhn 11 Democritus 35
Is Psychology a Science? 13 Early Greek Medicine 36
Determinism 13 Alcmaeon 36
Personal Responsibility 15 Hippocrates 37
Persistent Questions in Psychology 16 The Sophists and Socrates 39
Mind and Body 16 Xenophanes 39
Objective versus Subjective Reality 18 Protagoras 40
Rationalism versus Irrationalism 18 Gorgias 40
Nature versus Nurture 19 Socrates 41
What Is the Origin of Human Knowledge? 19 Plato 43
The Problem of the Self 20 The Theory of Forms or Ideas 43
How Are Humans Related to Nonhuman The Analogy of the Divided Line 44
Animals? 20 The Allegory of the Cave 44
Relativism 20 The Reminiscence Theory of Knowledge 45
vii
viii Contents
The Nature of the Soul 46 Chapter 4 Renaissance Science

Sleep and Dreams 46 and Philosophy 91
Plato’s Legacy 47 Challenges to Church Authority 91
Aristotle 47 Renaissance Humanism 92
The Basic Difference between Plato Francesco Petrarch 93
and Aristotle 48 Giovanni Pico 94
Causation and Teleology 49 Desiderius Erasmus 94
Sensation and Reason 50 Martin Luther 95
Memory and Recall 52 Michel de Montaigne 97
Imagination and Dreaming 52 Renaissance Science 98
Motivation and Emotion 53 Ptolemy as Precursor 98
The Importance of Early Greek Nicolaus Copernicus 98
Philosophy 54 Johannes Kepler 100
Galileo 101
Chapter 3 Rome and the Middle Isaac Newton 104
Ages 62 Principles of Newtonian Science 105
After Aristotle 62 Francis Bacon 106
Skepticism 62 Baconian Science 107
Cynicism 63 Science Should Provide Useful Information 109
Epicureanism 65 René Descartes 110
Philosophy in Rome 66 Descartes’s Search for Philosophical Truth 110
Stoicism 66 Innate Ideas 111
Neoplatonism 67 The Reflex 112
Emphasis on Spirit 69 The Mind–Body Interaction 113
Jesus 70 Descartes’s Contributions to Psychology 114
St. Paul 70 Descartes’s Fate 115
Emperor Constantine 72
St. Augustine 73 Chapter 5 Empiricism, Sensationalism,
The Middle Ages 76 and Positivism 120
Islamic and Jewish Influences 77 British Empiricism 120
Avicenna 78 Thomas Hobbes 121
Averroës 79 John Locke 124
Maimonides 79 George Berkeley 129
Toward a Reconciliation of Christian Faith David Hume 132
and Reason 80 David Hartley 138
St. Anselm 80 James Mill 141
Scholasticism 80 John Stuart Mill 143
Peter Abelard 81 Alexander Bain 147
St.Thomas Aquinas 83 French Sensationalism: Man as Machine 150
William of Occam: A Turning Point 85 Pierre Gassendi 151
The Spirit of the Times Before the Julien de La Mettrie 151
Renaissance 86 Étienne Bonnot de Condillac 154
C o n t e n t s ix
Positivism 156 Existentialism 200

Auguste Comte 156 Søren Kierkegaard 200
A Second Type of Positivism 159 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche 204
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as Psychology 210
Chapter 6 Rationalism 165
Chapter 8 Physiology and
Baruch Spinoza 166
Psychophysics 215
Mind–Body Relationship 167
Objective and Subjective Differences 215
Denial of Free Will 167
Bell-Magendie Law 216
Motivation and Emotion 168
Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies 217
Spinoza’s Influence 169
Adequate Stimulation 217
Gottfried Wilhelm Von Leibniz 169
Consciousness, Sensations, and Reality 218
Disagreement with Locke 170
Hermann Von Helmholtz 218
Monadology 171
Helmholtz’s Stand against Vitalism 219
Mind–Body Relationship 171
Rate of Nerve Conduction 220
Conscious and Unconscious Perception 172
Theory of Perception 220
Thomas Reid 173
Theory of Auditory Perception 222
Common Sense 174
Helmholtz’s Contributions 223
Direct Realism 175
Ewald Hering 223
Faculty Psychology 175
Space Perception and Color Vision 224
Immanuel Kant 176
Christine Ladd-Franklin 225
Categories of Thought 177
Early Research on Brain Functioning 226
Causes of Mental Experience 178
Phrenology 226
The Categorical Imperative 179 Pierre Flourens 228
Kant’s Influence 180 Paul Broca 230
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 181 Electrophysiology: Fritsch and Hitzig 232
The Absolute 181 The Rise of Experimental Psychology 233
Dialectic Process 182 Ernst Heinrich Weber 233
Hegel’s Influence 182 Gustav Theodor Fechner 235
Johann Friedrich Herbart 183
Psychology as Science 184 Chapter 9 Early Approaches
The Apperceptive Mass 185 to Psychology 243
Educational Psychology 185 Voluntarism 244
Herbart’s Legacy 186 Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt 245
Psychology’s Goals 247
Chapter 7 Romanticism and Wundt’s Use of Introspection 247
Existentialism 191 Elements of Thought 248
Romanticism 192 Perception, Apperception, and Creative
Jean-Jacques Rousseau 193 Synthesis 248
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 195 Mental Chronometry 249
Arthur Schopenhauer 197 Psychological versus Physical Causation 250
x C o n t e n t s
Völkerpsychologie 251 Intelligence Testing in the Army 303

The Historical Misunderstanding of Wundt 252 Robert M.Yerkes 303
Edward Bradford Titchener 252 The Deterioration of National Intelligence 304
Titchener’s Relationship with Female Modern Testing 306
Psychologists 254 David Wechsler 307
Structuralism’s Goals and Methods 255
Mental Elements 256 CHAPTER 11 American Psychology and
Neurological Correlates of Mental Events 257 Functionalism 313
The Decline of Structuralism 257 Early U.S. Psychology 313
Early German Psychology 258 Stage One: Moral and Mental Philosophy
Franz Clemens Brentano: Act Psychology 258 (1640–1776) 314
Carl Stumpf and Berlin 260 Stage Two: Intellectual Philosophy (1776–1886) 314
Edmund Husserl and Phenomenology 261 Stage Three:The U.S. Renaissance
Oswald Külpe:The Würzburg School 263 (1886–1896) 314
Ebbinghaus, Müller, and Memory 265 Stage Four: U.S. Functionalism
Hans Vaihinger: As If 267 (1896 and Beyond) 315
Characteristics of Functional Psychology 315
Chapter 10 Evolution and Individual William James 316
Differences 273 James’s Crisis 317
Evolutionary Theory Before Darwin 273 The Principles of Psychology 318
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck 273 Stream of Consciousness 319
Herbert Spencer 274 Habits and Instincts 320
Charles Darwin 277 The Self 321
The Journey of the Beagle 277 Emotions 322
Darwin’s Theory of Evolution 279 Free Will 323
Darwin’s Influence 281 Pragmatism 324
Sir Francis Galton 282 James’s Contributions to Psychology 325
The Measurement of Intelligence 283 Hugo Münsterberg 325
The Nature–Nurture Controversy 284 Münsterberg’s Applied Psychology 327
Words and Images 285 Münsterberg’s Fate 328
Anthropometry 285 Mary Whiton Calkins 328
The Concept of Correlation 286 Granville Stanley Hall 331
James McKeen Cattell: “A Galtonian President of Clark University 332
in America” 287 Developmental Psychology 333
Individual Differences in Intelligence 289 Psychology and Religion 335
Alfred Binet 289 Francis Cecil Sumner 336
Charles Spearman 293 Hall’s Legacy at Clark University 339
Sir Cyril Burt 294 Functionalism at Chicago 340
Intelligence Testing in the United States 295 John Dewey 340
Henry Herbert Goddard 295 James Rowland Angell 342
Lewis Madison Terman 297 Harvey Carr 343
Leta Stetter Hollingworth 301 Functionalism at Columbia 344
C o n t e n t s xi
James McKeen Cattell 344 Purposive Behaviorism 418

Robert Sessions Woodworth 346 The Use of Intervening Variables 419
Edward Lee Thorndike 347 Tolman on Reinforcement 420
Beyond Functionalism 353 Tolman’s Influence 420
Behaviorism Today 423
CHAPTER 12 Behaviorism 361
Russian Objective Psychology 362 CHAPTER 14 Gestalt Psychology 429
Ivan Sechenov 362 Antecedents of Gestalt Psychology 430
Ivan Petrovich Pavlov 364 The Founding of Gestalt Psychology 431
Vladimir Bechterev 370 Max Wertheimer 431
Other Contributors 373 Kurt Koffka 432
John B. Watson and Behaviorism 374 Wolfgang Köhler 433
Watson’s Education 375 Isomorphism and the Law of Prägnanz 435
At Johns Hopkins 377 Psychophysical Isomorphism 436
Watson’s Objective Psychology 380 The Law of Prägnanz 438
Little Albert 383 Perception 438
Child Rearing 385 Perceptual Gestalten 439
Watson’s Legacy 386 Subjective and Objective Reality 441
William McDougall: Another Type The Gestalt Explanation of Learning 442
of Behaviorism 388 Insight 442
McDougall’s Psychology 388 Transposition 444
Instincts 389 Productive Thinking 445
Memory 446
CHAPTER 13 Neobehaviorism 397
Kurt Lewin’s Field Theory 447
Positivism 397 Life Space 448
Logical Positivism 397 Motivation 449
Operationism and Physicalism 398 Group Dynamics 450
Neobehaviorism 399 The Impact of Gestalt Psychology 451
Edwin Ray Guthrie 400
One-Trial Learning 401 CHAPTER 15 Early Considerations
Forgetting 402 of Mental Illness 456
The Formalization of Guthrie’s Theory 403 What is Mental Illness? 456
Clark Leonard Hull 404 Early Explanations of Mental Illness 457
Hull’s Hypothetico-Deductive Theory 406 Early Approaches to the Treatment of Mental
Reinforcement 406 Illness 458
Hull’s Influence 407 The Psychological Approach 459
B. F. Skinner 408 The Supernatural Approach 460
Skinner’s Positivism 410 The Biological Approach 461
Operant Behavior 411 The Return of the Supernatural Approach 462
The Nature of Reinforcement 412 Improvement in the Treatment of Mental
Skinnerian Principles 414 Illness 464
Edward Chace Tolman 416 Philippe Pinel 465
xii C o n t e n t s
Benjamin Rush 467 Evaluation of Freud’s Theory: Criticisms

Dorothea Lynde Dix 467 and Contributions 504
Emil Kraepelin 468 Beyond Freud 505
Lightner Witmer 469 Anna Freud 505
Tensions Between Psychological and Medical Carl Jung 508
Models 471 Alfred Adler 511
The Use of Hypnotism 472 Karen Horney 513
Franz Anton Mesmer 472
Marquis de Puysegur 475 CHAPTER 17 Humanistic (Third-Force)
John Elliotson, James Esdaile, Psychology 523
and James Braid 475 Mind, Body, and Spirit 523
The Nancy School 476 Antecedents of Third-Force Psychology 524
Charcot’s Explanation of Hypnosis Phenomenology 525
and Hysteria 476 Existential Psychology 526
Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus 526
CHAPTER 16 Psychoanalysis 482 Martin Heidegger 527
Antecedents to the Development of Ludwig Binswanger 529
Psychoanalysis 483 Rollo May 530
Sigmund Freud 484 George Kelly 533
The Cocaine Episode 486 Humanistic Psychology 537
Early Influences on the Development Abraham Maslow 537
of Psychoanalysis 486 Carl Rogers 543
Josef Breuer and the Case of Anna O. 486 Comparison of Existential and Humanistic
Freud’s Visit with Charcot 488 Psychology 547
The Birth of Free Association 489 Evaluation: Criticisms and Conclusions 548
Studies on Hysteria 489
Project for a Scientific Psychology 490 CHAPTER 18 Psychobiology 556
The Seduction Theory 490 Karl S. Lashley 557
Freud’s Self-Analysis 491 In Search of the Engram 558
The Oedipus Complex 492 Donald O. Hebb 559
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life 493 Cell Assemblies and Phase Sequences 560
Freud’s Trip to the United States 494 Roger W. Sperry 561
A Review of Freud’s Theory of Personality 495 The Split-Brain 561
The Id, Ego, and Superego 495 Ethology 563
Anxiety and the Ego Defense Mechanisms 497 Evolutionary Approaches 565
Psychosexual Stages of Development 498 Sociobiology 565
Freud’s Fate 499 Evolutionary Psychology 566
Revisions of the Freudian Legend 500 The Misbehavior of Organisms 568
The Reality of Repressed Memories 501 Behavioral Genetics 568
C o n t e n t s xiii

CHAPTER 19 Cognitive Psychology 574 CHAPTER 20 Psychology Today 598

Early Influences 575 Divisions of the American Psychological
Jean Piaget 576 Association 599
Cybernetics 577 Basic and Applied Psychology 600
Developments Around the 1950s 578 Training Clinical Psychologists 604
Language and Information 578 Psychology’s Two Cultures 605
Physiological and Gestalt Influences 580 Psychology’s Status as a Science 606
A Cognitive Revolution 582 Postmodernism 608
Artificial Intelligence 584 Ludwig Wittgenstein 609
The Turing Test 584 Is there Anything New in Psychology? 613
Are Humans Machines? 586
Cognitive Science 587
R E F E R E NC E S 619
The Mind–Body Problem Revisited 589
Connectionism 590 Tex t C re d i t 663
Neural Networks 591 NA ME IND E X 6 6 5
S U B JE C T INDE X 6 7 3
Preface
T he first edition of Hergenhahn’s An Introduction Hergenhahn died before the previous edition
began. He and the publisher had generated some
to the History of Psychology appeared in 1986, and it
wasn’t long before the book had become the mar- ideas for updates and improvements, and these were
ket leader. One recent online list even has the last passed along to inform the revisions. Still, much like
edition among the “top 100” books every serious being given the keys to dad’s classic car, the implicit
psychology student should read. Across more than admonition was “don’t wreck it.” All textbooks need
30 years, numerous independent reviewers, student to be updated periodically to include new scholar-
advice writers, and even competitors have contin- ship, to reflect current trends, and to allow for con-
ued to herald the work as the best in the field. Her- tinued self-improvement. Nevertheless, when a text
genhahn’s “secret recipe” has always contained four has been the market leader for 30 years one must be
ingredients. His was the first history of psychology careful that the changes don’t disrupt what has made
text to include what we’d now recognize as basic the work so successful for so long.
pedagogy; a rich set of images and chapters that fea- So, what has changed? Obviously, the title, and
tured summaries, study questions, suggested read- beyond that the other items detailed below. But
ings, bold-faced terms (defined in a glossary), etc., more importantly perhaps is what has remained un-
all elements that sadly still remain lacking in sev- changed. All the aforementioned pedagogy remains
eral current alternatives. Additionally, there was the intact, although in some chapters the number of study
book’s reader-friendly tone. With attention given to questions was reduced. The writing style remains
fun and interesting biographical tidbits—the sort of consciously student-friendly and engaging even as
stuff folks fondly remember long after other details the narrative was streamlined by a few pages in most
fade—it engaged the student. Third, it has always chapters. A new edition always includes updating the
been a truly scholarly work. Grounded both in orig- scholarly citations throughout the book, although little
inal source material and contemporary scholarship, was done to alter the breadth of coverage: The book
the book provided both comprehensive breadth as will always proudly be a comprehensive overview of
well as a depth of analysis unrivaled by works of sim- the history of psychology. And yes, those wonderful
ilar length. And last, when appropriate, Hergenhahn quotes are still here to give life to psychology’s past.
wisely let the voices of the past speak for themselves Hergenhahn believed that for students to fully
by using long quotations. Rather than paraphrase understand the concerns of contemporary psychol-
every idea, why not have students encounter Aris- ogy that they must know the origins of its research
totle, Hume, James, and Watson in their own words? questions, the roots of the theories those questions
xv
xvi P reface
emerge from, and the evolution of the methods used on subsequent developments is further highlighted.
to answer them. This book’s name change affirms a The material on G. E. Müller was expanded.
continued commitment to that end. ■■ Chapter 10: New examples related to pre-
Some of the specific changes made in this edi- Darwinian and Darwinian evolutionary accounts,
tion include the following: as well as clarification on the relationship between
■■ Chapter 1: Additional elements of historiog- Darwin and Wallace, were added.The coverage of
raphy are included, such as recognizing that all Cattell, Stern, and Hollingworth was expanded.
books are written from a “perspective.” Although The section on recent developments related to
the content remains essentially unchanged, the intelligence testing was updated and revised.
recurring issues of psychology that are first ■■ Chapter 11: Several new figures in early
introduced in the last half of the chapter were America are now introduced, including William
substantially re-ordered to improve the logical Marston. Clarifications were made to Hall’s
flow between topics. work and biography. The biographical material
■■ Chapter 2: Based on exciting new scholarship and research contributions for most of the
in cognitive archeology, a more substantial con- Functionalists were enriched.
sideration of psychology’s prehistory has been ■■ Chapter 12: Bechterev’s contributions to
added. The material on the Sophists and Socrates Russian psychology are better detailed.
was reorganized. ■■ Chapters 13 and 14: Coverage of the key behav-
■■ Chapter 3: What part of the medieval period is most iorists and Gestaltists was streamlined.
aptly considered a Dark Age, and why, was clarified. ■■ Chapter 15: Witmer’s connection to school
■■ Chapter 4: Minor additions, such as noting psychology is noted. Mesmer’s biography is

Tycho Brahe, were made to the discussion of expanded.
Renaissance Science. ■■ Chapter 16: Freud’s seduction theory was
■■ Chapter 5: Hobbes was condensed, Locke’s use of reframed. Coverage of repressed memories was
association was clarified, and small additions were reduced. The critical appraisal of psychoanalysis
made to Hume’s and J. S. Mill’s biography. The and Freud’s influence is now more balanced.
coverage of French Sensationalism was expanded ■■ Chapter 17: May on myth was revised and re-
to include Antoine Destutt de Tracy and others, organized. Maslow’s turn toward humanism is
as well as to highlight its mechanistic assumptions. clarified, though coverage of his minor contri-
■■ Chapter 6: Malebranche was moved to butions was reduced.
Chapter 1. A brief mention of other leading ■■ Chapter 18: The mentions of Franz and Beach
German Rationalists was made. Small additions were expanded. The sections on Ethology and
were made to the biography and scope of Evolutionary Approaches were reorganized.
influence of several figures. ■■ Chapter 19: Elements of the coverage of artificial
■■ Chapter 7: Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche intelligence and its implications were clarified.
are more explicitly connected with subsequent ■■ Chapter 20: The discussion of the APA and
developments in psychology.
APS was expanded. Coverage of the PsyD was
■■ Chapter 8: The opening material on objective revised.
and subjective difference was revised and simpli-
In sum, don’t let the title change concern you. This
fied. The biographical information on Young and
is still the Hergenhahn you know and love.
Fechner was modestly expanded.
■■ Chapter 9: Wundt’s empiricism is clarified. Respectfully,
The influence of Wundt, Stumpf, and Külpe Tracy B. Henley
Baldwin Ross “Bud” Hergenhahn (1934–2007) to the topic. That said, his specific focus shifted over
lived a colorful life that many students might be sur- time. Initially Bud was a hard-nosed experimen-
prised by. He was not just an impressive scholar (who talist with a behavioral approach to learning and
preferred writing longhand to using a computer) but child development. During the 1970s he acquired
also a soldier (in the Korean war), an outdoorsman a deeply held interest in the personality theories of
(who as a graduate student lived for a while in a tee- the American humanists. And eventually, he sought
pee), a family man (with seven children), a man who to master the philosophical foundations and histori-
enjoyed sports and games (and was a good golfer), cal roots of psychology.
and above all a person who was a fiercely indepen- Bud retired from Hamline in 1992, after
dent freethinker. 26 years of service and earning a reputation for being
Bud was born in Chicago in 1934. He served in a real “character” on campus. Through his classroom
the military and worked as a forest ranger at Mount teaching and his scholarly works, he directly influ-
Saint Helens before starting college. His undergrad- enced many students who would go on to careers
uate degree was completed at Western Washington in psychology. After Hamline, Bud relocated to Las
University and his graduate training at the Univer- Vegas to enjoy the good life, although he continued
sity of Arizona. He completed his dissertation in to revise his successful textbooks. In addition to his-
experimental psychology in 1966 and began his ac- tory, those included works on learning and personal-
ademic career at Hamline University in Minnesota ity (both co-authored with Matthew Olson).
immediately thereafter.
Psychology was always one of his principle pas- In memory,
sions, and he owned no books that were unrelated Tracy B. Henley, Rockwall, Texas
Matthew H. Olson, St. Paul, Minnesota
xvii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
T he primary purpose of this book is to examine the origins of modern psychology

and to show that most of the concerns of today’s psychologists are manifestations of
themes that have been part of psychology for hundreds or, in some cases, thousands
of years. So what sorts of things do contemporary psychologists study?
■■ Some seek the biological correlates of mental events such as sensation, perception,
or ideation.
■■ Some concentrate on understanding the principles that govern learning and
memory.
■■ Some seek to understand humans by studying nonhuman animals.
■■ Some study unconscious motivation.
■■ Some seek to improve industrial-organizational productivity, educational practices,
or child-rearing practices by utilizing psychological principles.
■■ Some attempt to explain human behavior in terms of evolutionary theory.
■■ Some attempt to account for individual differences among people in such areas as
personality, intelligence, and creativity.
■■ Some are primarily interested in perfecting therapeutic tools that can be used to
help individuals with mental disturbances.
■■ Some focus on the dynamics of groups, social interaction, and how people influence
one another.
■■ Some study how language develops and how, once developed, it relates to a variety of
cultural activities.
■■ Some explore computer programs as models for understanding human thought
processes.
■■ Still others study how humans change over the course of their lives as a function
of maturation and experience.
2 CHAPTER 1
And these are just a few of the interests that history is often fragile and that limits what we can say
engage contemporary psychologists. Such diverse about the distant past. In part then, the pre-Socratic
activities are characterized by an equally rich Greeks are simply where we first have enough material
diversity of methods and theoretical assumptions to rightfully begin. But these early Greek explanations
about human nature. Our aim then will be to see of human behavior and thought processes are also the
where these methods and theories began, as well ones that Western philosophers and psychologists have
as how they evolved into their present form. been reacting to ever since.
Problems in Writing What to Include

A History of Psychology Typically, in determining what to include in a
Historiography is the study of the proper way to history of anything, one traces those people, ideas,
write history. The topic is complex, and there are and events that led to what is important now. This
no final answers to many of the questions it raises. book, too, takes this approach by looking at the
In this section, we consider a few basic matters that way psychology is understood today (in the West-
must be addressed when writing a history. ern world) and then attempting to show how it
became that way. Stocking (1965) calls such an
Where to Start approach to history presentism , as contrasted
with what he calls historicism—the study of the
Literally, psychology means the study of the psyche, or past for its own sake without attempting to relate
mind, and this study is as old as the human species. the past and present. Copleston (2001) describes
Ancient peoples, for example, surely studied one historicism as it applies to philosophy:
another to determine who was reliable and trust-
worthy, and evidence suggests that they attempted If one wishes to understand the
to account for dreams, mental illness, and emotions. philosophy of a given epoch, one has
Was this psychology? to make the attempt to understand the
Or did psychology commence with the first sys- mentality and presuppositions of the men
tematic explanations of human cognitive experience, who lived in that epoch, irrespective of
such as those proposed by the early Greeks? Plato and whether one shares that mentality and
Aristotle, for example, created elaborate theories that those presuppositions or not. (p. 11)
attempted to account for such processes as memory, Alternatively, presentism attempts to understand
perception, and learning. Is this then the point at the past in terms of contemporary knowledge and
which psychology started? standards—which is a practical goal for any text-
Perhaps psychology only came into existence book. As Lovett (2006) observes, no matter how
when it emerged as a science in Germany late in much historicism is emphasized, presentism cannot
the 19th century? This option seems especially be completely avoided:
unsatisfactory for two reasons: (1) It ignores the vast
philosophical heritage that molded psychology into To try to understand what historical events
the type of science that it eventually became and were like for those who participated in
(2) it omits important aspects of psychology that those events is reasonable and desirable, but
arose outside the realm of science. to conduct historical research—from the
As we will see at the start of the next chapter, selection of projects to the evaluation of
psychology’s history is as old as humanity. Although sources to the interpretation of findings—
we will consider briefly what came before, this without any regard for present knowledge
book’s coverage of the history of psychology starts is counterproductive. … If we ever hope
in earnest with the ancient Greeks. The data of to know where progress has happened
I n tr o d u cti o n 3
and where it has not happened, even if we Choice of Approach

only want to observe change, some level of
presentism is necessary; without the pres- Once the material to be included in a history of
ent, the very concept of “history” would psychology has been chosen, the matter of an
be meaningless. (p. 33) organizational approach remains. Most academic
histories, including this one, adopt a chronologi-
Letting contemporary psychology be a guide cal approach. Although that establishes a sensible
for deciding what individuals, ideas, and events progression, we will see that some topics, such as
to include in a history of psychology also serves to the mind–body problem or the question of nature
limit personal bias. Most textbook writers in the versus nurture, will recur. Many of these recurring
modern era work hard to present the material in as matters are introduced later in this chapter.
fair a fashion as possible, although an author’s own Another question of organization concerns how
interests and expertise cannot help but color that much to emphasize the influence of such non-
presentation. psychological matters as developments in other
Even when we let contemporary psychology dic- sciences, political climate, technological advance-
tate content, there remains the question of how much ment, and socioeconomic conditions. Together,
detail to include for any topic or person. Seldom, if these and other factors create a Zeitgeist, or a spirit
ever, is a single individual solely responsible for an of the times, which many historians consider vital
idea or a concept. Rather, individuals are influenced to the full understanding of any historical devel-
by other individuals, who in turn were influenced opment. For example, Ogburn and Thomas (1922)
by other individuals, and so on. A history of almost documented numerous discoveries that were inde-
anything, then, can be viewed as an unending stream pendently made by two people at essentially the
of interrelated events.The “great” individuals are typ- same time—a phenomenon we will also see in
ically those who synthesize existing nebulous ideas psychology—which suggests that “the time was
into a clear, forceful viewpoint. right” for such a discovery.
The usual solution is to omit large amounts of Instead of focusing on the Zeitgeist, an alterna-
information, thus making the history selective. tive option is to take the great-person approach by
Typically, only those individuals who did the most emphasizing the works of individuals such as Plato,
to develop or popularize an idea are covered. For Aristotle, Descartes, Darwin, or Freud. Ralph Waldo
example, Charles Darwin is generally associated Emerson (1841/1981) embraced the great-person
with evolutionary theory when, in fact, evolutionary approach to history, saying that history “resolves
theory had existed in one form or another for thou- itself very easily into the biography of a few stout
sands of years. Darwin documented and reported and earnest persons” (p. 138).Yet another possibility
evidence supporting evolutionary theory in a way is the historical development approach, showing
that made the theory’s validity hard to ignore. Thus, how various individuals or events contributed to
although Darwin was not the first to formulate changes in an idea or concept through the years.
evolutionary theory, he did much to substantiate For example, one could focus on how the idea of
and popularize it, and we, therefore, associate it with mental illness has changed throughout history.
his name. The same is true for Freud and the notion In his approach to the history of psychology,
of unconscious motivation. our discipline’s most noted chronicler, E. G. Boring
This book too generally focuses on those indi- (1886–1968; the President of the American Psycho-
viduals who either did the most to develop an idea logical Association in 1928), stressed the importance
or, for whatever reason, have become closely asso- of the Zeitgeist. Clearly, ideas do not occur in a
ciated with an idea. Regrettably, this approach does vacuum. A new idea, to be accepted or even con-
not do justice to many important individuals who sidered, must be compatible with existing ideas. In
deservedly could be mentioned in some detail. other words, a new idea will be tolerated only if it
4 CHAPTER 1
arises within an environment that can assimilate it. knows where modern psychology’s subject matter
An idea or viewpoint that arises before people are came from and why it is important. Just as we gain
prepared for it will not be understood well enough a greater understanding of a person’s current behav-
to be critically evaluated. The important point here ior by learning more about that person’s past expe-
is that validity is not the only criterion by which riences, so do we gain a greater understanding of
ideas are judged; psychological and sociological current psychology by studying its historical origins.
factors are at least as important. New ideas are always Boring (1950) made this point nicely:
judged within the context of existing ideas. If new The experimental psychologist … needs
ideas are close enough to existing ideas, they will historical sophistication within his own
at least be understood; whether they are accepted, sphere of expertness. Without such
rejected, or ignored is another matter. knowledge he sees the present in distorted
The approach taken in this book is eclectic. That perspective, he mistakes old facts and old
is, this book will show that sometimes the spirit of views for new, and he remains unable
the times clearly produces great individuals and that to evaluate the significance of new move-
sometimes great individuals shape the spirit of their ments and methods. In this matter I can
times. At other historical moments, we will see how hardly state my faith too strongly. A psy-
both great individuals and the general climate of chological sophistication that contains no
the times evolve to change the meaning of an idea component of historical orientation seems
or a concept. In other words, the eclectic approach to me to be no sophistication at all. (p. ix)
entails using whatever method seems best able to
illuminate an aspect of the history of psychology. Recognition of Fads and Fashions. While
studying the history of psychology, one is often
struck by the realization that a viewpoint does
Why Study the History not always fade away because it is incorrect; rather,
of Psychology? some viewpoints disappear simply because they
become unpopular. What is fashionable in psychol-
As we noted, ideas are seldom, if ever, born full-
ogy varies with the Zeitgeist. For example, when
blown. Rather, they typically develop over a long
psychology first emerged as a science, the emphasis
period of time. Seeing ideas in their historical per-
was on “pure” science—that is, on the gaining of
spective allows the student to more fully appreciate
knowledge without any concern for its usefulness.
the subject matter of modern psychology. However,
Later, when Darwin’s theory became popular, psy-
viewing the problems and questions currently dealt
chology shifted its attention to processes that were
with in psychology as manifestations of centu-
related to survival or adaptation. Today, one major
ries-old problems and questions is also humbling
emphasis in psychology is on cognitive processes,
and sometimes frustrating. After all, if psycholo-
and that emphasis is due, in part, to advances in
gy’s problems have been worked on for centuries,
computer technology.
should they not be solved by now? Conversely,
The illustrious personality theorist Gordon
knowing that our current studies have been shared
W. Allport (1897–1967; American Psychological
and contributed to by some of the greatest minds
Association President in 1939) spoke of fashions in
in human history is exciting.
psychology:
Understanding. George Santayana, a friend and Our profession progresses in fits and
colleague of America’s most famous psychologist, starts, largely under the spur of fashion.
William James (1842–1910), once quipped “Those … We never seem to solve our problems
who cannot remember the past are condemned or exhaust our concepts; we only grow
to repeat it.” A student with a historical awareness tired of them. …
Fashions have their amusing and rediscovered long after it had originally been
their serious sides.We can smile at the proposed. This fact fits nicely into the Zeitgeist
way bearded problems receive tonsorial interpretation of history, suggesting that some
transformation. … Modern ethnology conditions are better suited for the acceptance
excites us, and we are not troubled by the of an idea than others. The notions of evolu-
recollection that a century ago John Stuart tion, unconscious motivation, and conditioned
Mill staked down the term to designate responses had been proposed and reproposed sev-
the new science of human character. … eral times before they were offered in an atmo-
Reinforcement appeals to us but not sphere that allowed their critical evaluation. Even
the age-long debate over hedonism. … Copernicus’s “revolutionary” heliocentric theory
We avoid the body-mind problem but had been entertained by the Greeks many centu-
are in fashion when we talk about “brain ries before he proposed it. A final example is that of
models.” Old wine, we find, tastes better lateralization of brain function. Many believe that
from new bottles. the idea that the two cerebral hemispheres function
The serious side of the matter enters in radically different ways is a new one. However,
when we and our students forget that over 100 years ago, Brown-Séquard’s article “Have
the wine is indeed old. Picking up a We Two Brains or One?” (1890) was one of many
recent number of the Journal of Abnormal written on the topic. In fact, important scientific
and Social Psychology, I discover that … ideas can be rejected more than once before they
90 percent of their references [are] to are finally appreciated. The noted philosopher of
publications of the past ten years. … Is it science Paul Feyerabend (1987) said,
any wonder that our graduate students
The history of science is full of theories
reading our journals conclude that litera-
which were pronounced dead, then res-
ture more than a decade old has no merit
urrected, then pronounced dead again
and can be safely disregarded? At a recent
only to celebrate another triumphant
doctoral examination the candidate was
comeback. It makes sense to preserve
asked what his thesis … had to do with
faulty points of view for possible future
the body-mind problem. He confessed
use. The history of ideas, methods, and
that he had never heard of the problem.
prejudices is an important part of the
An undergraduate said that all he knew
ongoing practice of science and this
about Thomas Hobbes was that he sank
practice can change direction in surpris-
with the Leviathan when it hit an iceberg
ing ways. (p. 33)
in 1912. (1964, pp. 149–151)
No doubt, many potentially fruitful ideas in psy-
With such examples of how research topics chology’s history are still waiting to be tried again
move in and out of vogue in science, we see again under new, perhaps more receptive, circumstances.
that “factuality” is not the only variable determining And so, instead of asking the question, why study
whether to accept an idea. As Zeitgeists change, so the history of psychology? it might make more sense
does what appears fashionable in science, and psy- to ask, why not? Many people study U.S. history
chology is not immune to this process. because they are interested in the United States,
and younger members of a family often delight in
A Source of Valuable Ideas. By studying his- hearing stories about the early days of the family’s
tory, we may discover ideas that were developed at elder members. In other words, wanting to know as
an earlier time but, for whatever reason, remained much as possible about a topic or person of interest,
dormant. The history of science offers several including a topic’s or a person’s history, is natural.
examples of an idea taking hold only after being Psychology is not an exception.
6 CHAPTER 1
What is Science? and the systematic attempt to explain

these facts constitutes the theoretical
At various times in history, influential individuals component. As science has developed,
(such as Galileo and Kant) have claimed that psy- specialization, or division of labor, has
chology could never be a science because of its occurred; some men have devoted their
concern with subjective experience. Many natural time mainly to the making of observa-
scientists still believe this, and some psychologists tions, while a smaller number have occu-
would not argue with them. How a history of psy- pied themselves with the problems of
chology is written will be influenced by whether explanation. (p. 1)
psychology can be considered a science. To answer
the question of whether psychology is a science,
however, we must first define science. A Combination of Rationalism and Empiricism.
Science came into existence as a way of answer- As we will see in Chapters 5 and 6, in the modern
ing questions about nature by examining nature era there are two major approaches to understanding
directly rather than by depending on church dogma, where our knowledge comes from: rationalism and
past authorities, folk theories, or logical analysis empiricism. The rationalist believes that the validity
alone. From science’s inception, its ultimate author- or invalidity of certain propositions can often best be
ity has been empirical observation (that is, the determined by carefully applying the rules of logic.
direct observation of nature), but there is more to The empiricist maintains that the source of knowl-
science than simply observing nature. To be useful, edge is always based on sensory observation. Science
observations must be organized or categorized in draws on both positions.
some way, and the ways in which they are similar to The rational aspect of science prevents it from
or different from other observations must be noted. simply collecting an endless array of disconnected
After noting similarities and differences among empirical facts. Because the scientist must somehow
observations, many scientists take the additional step make sense out of what he or she observes, theories
of attempting to explain what they have observed. are formulated. A scientific theory has two main
Science, then, is often characterized as having two functions: (1) It organizes empirical observations
major components: (1) empirical observation and and (2) it acts as a guide for future observations.
(2) theory. According to Hull (1943), these two The latter function of a scientific theory generates
aspects of science can be seen in the earliest efforts confirmable propositions. In other words, a theory
of humans to understand their world: suggests propositions that are tested experimentally.
If the propositions generated by a theory are con-
firmed through experimentation, the theory gains
Men are ever engaged in the dual activity
strength; if the propositions are not confirmed by
of making observations and then seek-
experimentation, the theory loses strength. If the
ing explanations of the resulting revela-
theory generates too many erroneous propositions, it
tions. All normal men in all times have
must be either revised or abandoned. Thus, scientific
observed the rising and setting of the sun
theories must be testable. That is, they must gener-
and the several phases of the moon. The
ate hypotheses that can be validated or invalidated
more thoughtful among them have then
empirically. In science, then, the direct observation
proceeded to ask the question, “Why?
of nature is important, but such observation is often
Why does the moon wax and wane? Why
guided by theory.
does the sun rise and set, and where does
it go when it sets?” Here we have the
two essential elements of modern science: The Search for Laws. Another feature of science
The making of observations constitutes is that it seeks to discover lawful relationships.
the empirical or factual component, A scientific law can be defined as a consistently
observed relationship between two or more classes complex. In the history of philosophy and science,
of empirical events. For example, when X occurs, the concept of causation has been one of the most
Y also tends to occur. By stressing lawfulness, sci- perplexing matters (see, for example, Clatterbaugh,
ence is proclaiming an interest in the general case 1999; P. E. Meehl, 1978).
rather than the particular case. Traditionally, sci-
ence is not interested in private or unique events The Assumption of Determinism. Because a main
but in general laws that can be publicly observed goal of science is to discover lawful relationships,
and verified. That is, a scientific law is general and, science assumes that what is being investigated is
because it describes a relationship between empir- lawful. For example, the chemist assumes that chem-
ical events, it is amenable to public observation. ical reactions are lawful, and the physicist assumes
The concept of public observation is an important that the physical world is lawful.The assumption that
aspect of science. All scientific claims must be ver- what is being studied can be understood in terms
ifiable by any interested person. In science, there of causal laws is called determinism. Taylor (1967)
is no secret knowledge available only to qualified defined determinism as the philosophical doctrine
authorities. that “states that for everything that ever happens
There are two general classes of scientific laws. there are conditions such that, given them, nothing
One class is correlational laws , which describe else could happen” (p. 359). The determinist, then,
how classes of events vary together in some system- assumes that everything that occurs is a function of a
atic way. For example, exercise tends to correlate finite number of causes and that, if these causes were
positively with health. With such information, only known, an event could be predicted with complete
prediction is possible. That is, if we knew a person’s accuracy. However, knowing all causes of an event
level of exercise, we could predict his or her health, is not necessary; the determinist simply assumes that
and vice versa. A more powerful class of laws is they exist and that as more causes are known, pre-
causal laws, which specify how events are causally dictions become more accurate. For example, almost
related. For example, if we knew the causes of a everyone would agree that the weather is a func-
disease, we could predict and control that disease— tion of a finite number of variables such as sunspots,
as preventing the causes of a disease from occurring high-altitude jet streams, barometric pressure, and
prevents the disease from occurring. Thus, correla- the like; yet weather forecasts are always probabilistic
tional laws allow prediction, but causal laws allow because many of these variables change constantly,
prediction and control. For this reason, causal laws and the relationship between all of them is not fully
are more powerful than correlational laws and thus known. The assumption underlying meteorology
are generally considered far more desirable. (weather prediction), however, is determinism. All
A major goal of science is to discover the causes sciences assume determinism.
of natural phenomena. Specifying the causes of nat-
ural events, however, is highly complex and usu-
ally requires substantial experimental research. It Revisions in the Traditional
cannot be assumed, for example, that contiguity
proves causation. If rain follows a rain dance, it can-
View of Science
not be assumed that the dance necessarily caused The traditional view is that science involves
the rain. Also complicating matters is the fact that empirical observation, theory formulation, theory
events seldom, if ever, have a single cause; rather, testing, theory revision, prediction, control, the
they have multiple causes. Questions such as what search for lawful relationships, and the assumption
caused World War II and what causes schizophrenia of determinism. Some prominent philosophers
are not amenable to one simple answer. Even mun- of science, however, take issue with at least some
dane questions such as why did John quit his job or aspects of the traditional view of science. Among
why did Jane marry John are, in reality, enormously them are Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn.
8 CHAPTER 1
Karl Popper observations scientists will make. The next step

is to propose solutions to the problem (conjec-
Karl Popper (1902–1994) disagreed with the tra- tures) and then attempt to find fault with the pro-
ditional description of science in two fundamen- posed solutions (refutations). Popper saw scientific
tal ways. First, he disagreed that scientific activity method as involving three stages: problems, theo-
starts with empirical observation. According to ries (proposed solutions), and criticism.
Popper, the classic view of science implies that
scientists wander around making observations and
Principle of Falsifiability. According to Popper,
then attempt to explain what they have observed.
the demarcation criterion that distinguishes a sci-
Popper (1963/2002a) showed the problem with
entific theory from a nonscientific theory is the
such a view:
principle of falsifiability. A scientific theory must
Twenty-five years ago I tried to bring be refutable. Contrary to what many believe, if any
home [this] point to a group of physics conceivable observation can be made to agree with
students in Vienna by beginning a lecture a theory, the theory is weak, not strong. Popper
with the following instructions: “Take spent a great deal of time criticizing the theories
pencil and paper: carefully observe, and of Freud and Adler for exactly this reason. This is
write down what you have observed!” because those theories are vague, so no matter what
They asked, of course, what I wanted happens verification can likely be claimed. Popper
them to observe. Clearly the instruction, contrasted such theories with that of Einstein,
“Observe!” is absurd. … Observation is which predicts precisely what should or should
always selective. It needs a chosen object, not happen if the theory is correct. Thus, Einstein’s
a definite task, an interest, a point of theory, unlike the theories of Freud and Adler, was
view, a problem. (p. 61) refutable and, therefore, scientific.
For Popper, for a theory to be scientific, it must
So for Popper, scientific activity starts with
make risky predictions—predictions that run a real
a problem, and the problem determines what
risk of being incorrect. Theories that do not make
risky predictions or that explain phenomena after
they have already occurred are, according to Popper,
not scientific. In addition to vagueness, another
major problem with many psychological theories
(such as Freud’s and Adler’s) is that they engage
more in postdiction (explaining phenomena after
they have already occurred) than in prediction.
According to Popper, it is a theory’s incorrect
predictions, rather than its correct ones, that cause
scientific progress. This idea is nicely captured by
© Keystone/Staff/Hulton Archive/Getty Images
Marx and Goodson (1976):

In real scientific life theories typically
contribute not by being right but by being
wrong. In other words, scientific advance
in theory as well as experiments tends to
be built upon the successive corrections
of many errors, both small and large. Thus
the popular notion that a theory must be
Karl Popper right to be useful is incorrect. (p. 249)
In Popper’s view, all scientific theories will It was assumed that the world consists of knowable
eventually be found to be false and will be replaced “truths,” and that following scientific procedures
by more adequate theories; it is always just a allowed science to systematically approximate those
matter of time. For this reason, the highest status truths. In other words, scientific activity was guided
that a scientific theory can attain, according to by the correspondence theory of truth, “the notion
Popper, is not yet disconfirmed. Popperian science is that the goal, when evaluating scientific laws or
an unending search for better and better solutions theories, is to determine whether or not they cor-
to problems or explanations of phenomena. Brett respond to an external, mind-independent world”
(1912–1921/1965) made this point effectively: (Kuhn, 2000a, p. 95). Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996)
changed that conception of science by showing
We tend to think of science as a “body
science to be a highly subjective enterprise.
of knowledge” which began to be accu-
mulated when men hit upon “scientific
Paradigms and Normal Science. According
method.” This is a superstition. It is more
to Kuhn, in the physical sciences, one viewpoint
in keeping with the history of thought
is commonly shared by most members of a sci-
to describe science as the myths about
ence. In physics or chemistry, for example, most
the world which have not yet been
researchers share a common set of assumptions or
found to be wrong. (p. 37)
beliefs about their subject matter. Kuhn refers to
Does this mean Popper believed that nonscien- such a widely accepted viewpoint as a paradigm.
tific theories (including those of Freud and Adler) Kuhn defines the term paradigm as “the entire
are useless? Absolutely not! He said, constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so
on shared by the members of a given [scientific]
Historically speaking all—or very nearly
community” (1996, p. 175). For those scientists
all—scientific theories originate from
accepting a given paradigm, it becomes the way of
myths, and … a myth may contain import-
looking at and analyzing the subject matter of their
ant anticipations of scientific theories … I
science. Once a paradigm is accepted, the activities
thus [believe] that if a theory is found to be
of those accepting it become a matter of exploring
non-scientific, or “metaphysical” … it is not
the implications of that paradigm. Kuhn referred to
thereby found to be unimportant, or insig-
such activities as normal science. Normal science
nificant, or “meaningless,” or “nonsensical.”
provides what Kuhn called a “mopping-up” oper-
(1963/2002a, p. 50)
ation for a paradigm. While following a paradigm,
Popper used falsification as a demarcation scientists explore in depth the problems defined by
between a scientific and a nonscientific theory but the paradigm and utilize the methods suggested by
not between a useful and useless theory. Many the- the paradigm while exploring those problems.
ories in psychology fail Popper’s test of falsifiability Kuhn likened normal science to puzzle solving.
either because they are stated in such general terms Like puzzles, the problems of normal science have
that they are confirmed by almost any observation an assured solution, and there are “rules that limit
or because they engage in postdiction rather than both the nature of acceptable solutions and the
prediction. Such theories lack scientific rigor but steps by which they are to be obtained” (Kuhn,
are still often found to be useful. 1996, p. 38). Kuhn saw neither normal science
nor puzzle solving as involving much creativity:
Thomas Kuhn “Perhaps the most striking feature of … normal
research problems … is how little they aim to
Until recently, it was widely believed that the scien- produce major novelties, conceptual or phenom-
tific method guaranteed objectivity, and that science enal” (1996, p. 35). Although a paradigm restricts
produced information in a steady, progressive way. the range of phenomena scientists examine, it does
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
as it appeared in human affairs, which, however, he concealed from
the multitude. (Arist. Rhetoric, lib. vii. c. 5.)
With regard to moral predictions on individuals, many have
discovered the future character. The revolutionary predisposition of
Cardinal Retz, even in his youth, was detected by the sagacity of
Cardinal Mazarine. He then wrote a history of the conspiracy of
Fresco, with such vehement admiration of his hero, that the Italian
politician, after its perusal, predicted that the young author would be
one of the most turbulent spirits of the age! The father of Marshal
Biron, even amid the glory of his son, discovered the cloud which,
invisible to others, was to obscure it. The father, indeed, well knew
the fiery passions of his son. “Biron,” said the domestic Seer, “I
advise thee, when peace takes place, to go and plant cabbages in thy
garden, otherwise I warn thee thou wilt lose thy head upon the
scaffold!”
Lorenzo de Medici had studied the temper of his son Piero; for we
are informed by Guicciardini that he had often complained to his
most intimate friends that “he foresaw the imprudence and
arrogance of his son would occasion the ruin of his family.”
There is a singular prediction of James the first, of the evils likely
to ensue from Laud’s violence, in a conversation given by Hacket,
which the King held with Archbishop Williams. When the King was
hard pressed to promote Laud, he gave his reasons why he intended
to “keep Laud back from all place of rule and authority, because I
find he hath a restless spirit, and cannot see when matters are well,
but loves to toss and change, and to bring things to a pitch of
reformation floating in his own brain, which endangers the
stedfastness of that which is in a good pass. I speak not at random;
he hath made himself known to me to be such a one.” James then
relates the circumstances to which he alludes; and at length, when
still pursued by the Archbishop, then the organ of Buckingham, as
usual, this King’s good nature too easily yielded; he did not, however,
without closing with this prediction: “Then take him to you! but on
my soul you will repent it!”
The future character of Cromwell was apparent to two of our great
politicians. “This coarse, unpromising man,” observed Lord
Falkland, pointing to Cromwell, “will be the first person in the
kingdom if the nation comes to blows!” And Archbishop Williams
told Charles the First confidentially, that “There was that in
Cromwell which foreboded something dangerous, and wished his
Majesty would either win him over to him, or get him taken off!”
The incomparable character of Buonaparte, given by the Marquis
of Wellesley, predicted his fall when highest in his power. “His
eagerness of power,” says this great Statesman, “is so inordinate; his
jealousy of independence so fierce; his keenness of appetite so
feverish, in all that touches his ambition, even in the most trifling
things, that he must plunge into dreadful difficulties. He is one of an
order of minds that by nature make for themselves great reverses.”
After the commencement of the French Revolution, Lord
Mansfield was once asked when it would end? His Lordship replied,
“It is an event without precedent, and therefore without prognostic.”
The fact is, however, that it had both; as our own history, in the reign
of Charles the First, had furnished us with a precedent; and the
prognostics were so plentiful, that a volume of passages might be
collected from various writers who had foretold it.
There is a production, which does honour to the political sagacity,
as well as to his knowledge of human nature, thrown out by Bishop
Butler in a Sermon before the House of Lords, in 1741; he calculated
that the unreligious spirit would produce, some time or other,
political disorders, similar to those which, in the 17th century, had
arisen from religious fanaticism. “Is there no danger,” he observed,
“that all this may raise somewhat like that levelling spirit, upon
Atheistical principles, which in the last age prevailed upon
enthusiastic ones? Not to speak of the possibility that different sorts
of people may unite in it upon these contrary principles!” All this
has literally been accomplished!
If a prediction be raised on facts which our own prejudice induce
us to infer will exist, it must be chimerical. The Monk Carron
announces in his Chronicle, printed in 1532, that the world was
about ending, as well as his Chronicle of it; that the Turkish Empire
would not last many years; that after the death of Charles V. the
Empire of Germany would be torn to pieces by the Germans
themselves. This Monk will no longer pass for a prophet; he belongs
to that class of Chroniclers who write to humour their own
prejudices, like a certain Lady-prophetess who, in 1811, predicted
that grass was to grow in Cheapside about this time!
Even when the event does not always justify the prediction, the
predictor may not have been the less correct in his principles of
divination. The catastrophe of human life, and the turn of great
events, often turn out accidental. Marshal Biron, whom we have
noticed, might have ascended the throne instead of the scaffold;
Cromwell and De Retz might have become only the favourite
generals, or the ministers of their Sovereigns. Fortuitous events are
not included within the reach of human prescience; such must be
consigned to those vulgar superstitions which presume to discover
the issue of human events, without pretending to any human
knowledge. In the science of the Philosopher there is nothing
supernatural.
Predictions have sometimes been condemned as false ones, which,
when scrutinize may scarcely be deemed to have failed: they may
have been accomplished, and they may again revolve on us. In 1749,
Dr. Hartley published his “Observations on Man;” and predicted the
fall of the existing governments and hierarchies, in two simple
propositions; among others—
Prop. 81. It is probable that all the civil governments will be
overturned.
Prop. 82. It is probable that the present forms of Church
government will be dissolved.
Many indeed were terribly alarmed at these predicted falls of
Church and State. Lady Charlotte Wentworth asked Hartley when
these terrible things would happen? The answer of the predictor was
not less awful: “I am an old man, and shall not live to see them.” In
the subsequent revolutions of America and France, and perhaps
latterly that of Spain, it can hardly be denied that these predictions
have failed.
The philosophical predictor, in foretelling some important crisis,
from the appearances of things, will not rashly assign the period of
time; for the crisis he anticipates is calculated on by that inevitable
march of events which generate each other in human affairs; but the
period is always dubious, being either retarded or accelerated by
circumstances of a nature incapable of entering into his moral
arithmetic. There is, however, a spirit of political vaccination which
presumes to pass beyond the boundaries of human prescience,
which, by enthusiasts, has often been ascribed to the highest source
of inspiration; but since “the language of prophecy” has ceased, such
pretensions are not less impious than they are unphilosophical. No
one possessed a more extraordinary portion of this awful prophetic
confidence than Knox the reformer: he appears to have predicted
several remarkable events, and the fates of some persons. We are
informed that when condemned to a galley in Rochelle, he predicted
that “within two or three years, he should preach the Gospel at St.
Giles’s, in Edinburgh,” an improbable event, which nevertheless
happened as he had foretold. Of Mary and Darnley, he pronounced
that, “as the King, for the Queen’s pleasure, had gone to mass, the
Lord, in his justice, would make her the instrument of his
overthrow.” Other striking predictions of the deaths of Thomas
Maitland, and of Kirkaldly of Grange, and the warning he solemnly
gave to the Regent Murray, not to go to Linlithgow, where he was
assassinated, occasioned a barbarous people to imagine that the
prophet Knox had received an immediate communication from
heaven.
An Almanack-maker, a Spanish friar, predicted, in clear and
precise words, the death of Henry the Fourth of France; and Pierese,
though he had no faith in the vain science of Astrology, yet, alarmed
at whatever menaced the life of a beloved Sovereign, consulted with
some of the King’s friends, and had the Spanish almanack before his
Majesty, who courteously thanked them for their solicitude, but
utterly slighted the prediction: the event occurred, and in the
following year the Spanish friar spread his own fame in a new
almanack. This prediction of the Spanish friar was the result either of
his being acquainted with the plot, or from his being made an
instrument for the purposes of those who were. It appears that
Henry’s assassination was rife in Spain and Italy before the event
occurred.
Separating human prediction from inspired prophecy, we can only
ascribe to the faculties of man that acquired prescience which we
have demonstrated, that some great minds have unquestionably
exercised. Its principles have been discovered in the necessary
dependance of effects on general causes, and we have shewn that,
impelled by the same motives, and circumscribed by the same
passions, all human affairs revolve in a circle; and we have opened
the true source of this yet imperfect science of moral and political
prediction, in an intimate, but a discriminative, knowledge of the
past. Authority is sacred when experience affords parallels and
analogies. If much which may overwhelm, when it shall happen, can
be foreseen, the prescient Statesman and Moralist may provide
defensive measures to break the waters, whose streams they cannot
always direct; and the venerable Hooker has profoundly observed,
that “the best things have been overthrown, not so much by
puissance and might of adversaries, as through defect of council in
those that should have upheld and defended the same[33].”
“The philosophy of history,” observes a late writer and excellent
observer, “blends the past with the present, and combines the
present with the future; each is but a portion of the other. The actual
state of a thing is necessarily determined by its antecedent, and thus
progressively through the chain of human existence, while, as
Leibnitz has happily expressed the idea, the present is always full of
the future. A new and beautiful light is thus thrown over the annals
of mankind, by the analogies and the parallels of different ages in
succession. How the seventeenth century has influenced the
eighteenth, and the results of the nineteenth, as they shall appear in
the twentieth, might open a source of PREDICTIONS, to which, however
difficult it might be to affix their dates, there would be none in
exploring into causes, and tracing their inevitable effects. The
multitude live only among the shadows of things in the appearance
of the PRESENT; the learned, busied with the PAST, can only trace
whence, and how, all comes; but he who is one of the people and one
of the learned, the true philosopher, views the natural tendency and
terminations which are preparing for the FUTURE.”
FATALISM, OR PREDESTINATION.
Under the name of materialism things very different from those

generally understood are designated: it is the same with respect to
fatalism. If it be maintained that every thing in the world, and the
world itself, are necessary; that all that takes place is the effect of
chance or of blind necessity, and that no supreme intelligence is
mixed with, nor in fact mixes with existing objects; this doctrine is a
kind of fatalism, differing very little from atheism. But this fatalism
has nothing in common with the doctrine which establishes the
innateness of the faculties of the soul and mind, and their
independence upon organization. We cannot, then, under the first
consideration, be accused of fatalism.
Another species of fatalism is that which teaches that in truth there
exists a Supreme Being, creator of the universe, as well as of all the
laws and properties connected with it; but that he has fixed those
laws in so immutable a manner, that every thing that happens could
not happen otherwise. In this system, man is necessarily carried
away by the causes that compel him to act, without any participation
whatever of the will. His actions are always a necessary result,
without voluntary choice or moral liberty; they are neither
punishable or meritorious, and the hope of future rewards vanishes,
as well as the fear of future punishment.
This is the fatalism with which superstitious ignorance accuse the
physiology of the brain[34], that is the doctrine relative to the
functions of the most noble organization in the world. “I have
effectually proved,” says Dr. Gall, “that all our moral and intellectual
dispositions are innate; that none of our propensities or talents, not
even the understanding and will, can manifest themselves
independent of this organization. To which also may be added, that it
does not depend upon man to be gifted with organs peculiar to his
species, consequently with such or such propensities or faculties.
Must it now be inferred that man is not the master of his actions,
that there exists no free will, consequently neither a meritorious nor
an unworthy act?”
Before this conclusion is refuted, let us examine with the frankness
worthy of true philosophy, how far man is submitted to the
immutable laws of his Creator, how far we ought to acknowledge an
inevitable necessity, a destiny, or fatalism. To unravel confused
ideas, is the best method of placing truth in its clearest point of view.
Man is obliged to acknowledge the most powerful and determined
influence of a multitude of things relative to his happiness or misery,
and even over his whole conduct, without of himself being able either
to add to, or subtract from that influence. No one can call himself to
life; no one can choose the time, the climate, or the nation in which
he shall be born; no one can fix the manners, laws, customs, form of
government, religious prejudices, or the superstitions with which he
shall be surrounded from the moment of his birth; no one can say, I
will be master or servant, the eldest son or the youngest son; I will
have a robust or a debilitated state of health; I will be a man or a
woman; I will have such or such a constitution: I will be a fool, an
idiot, a simpleton, a man of understanding, or a man of genius,
passionate or calm, of a mild or cross nature, modest or proud,
stupid or circumspect, cowardly or prone to voluptuousness, humble
or independent: no one can determine the degree of prudence or the
foolishness of his superiors, the noxious or useful example he shall
meet with, the result of his connexions, the fortuitous events, the
influence of external things over him, the condition of his father and
mother, or his own, or the source of irritation that his desires or
passions will experience. The relations of the five senses with
external things, and the number and functions of the viscera and
members, have been fixed in the same invariable manner; so nature
is the source of our propensities, sentiments, and faculties. Their
reciprocal influence, and their relations with external objects, have
been irrevocably determined by the laws of our organization.
As it does not depend upon ourselves to have or see when objects
strikes our ears or our eyes, in the same manner our judgments are
necessarily the results of the laws of thought. “Judgment, very
rightly,” says Mr. Tracy, “in this sense is independent of the will; it is
not under our controul, when we perceive a real relation betwixt two
of our perceptions, not to feel it as it actually is, that is, such as
should appear to every being organized as ourselves, if they were
precisely in the same situation. It is this necessity which constitutes
the certainty and reality of every thing we are acquainted with. For if
it only depended upon our fancy to be affected with a great thing as if
it were a small one, with a good as if it were a bad one, with one that
is true as if it were false, there would no longer exist any thing real in
the world, at least for us. There would neither be greatness nor
smallness, good nor evil, falsehood nor truth; our fancy alone would
be every thing. Such an order of things cannot even be conceived; it
implies contradiction.
Since primitive organization, sex, age, constitution, education,
climate, form of government, religion, prejudices, superstitions, &c.
exercise the most decided influence over our sensations and ideas,
our judgments and the determination of our will, the nature and
force of our propensities and talents, consequently over the first
motives of our actions, it must be confessed that man, in several of
the most important moments of his life, is under the empire of a
destiny, which sometimes fixes him like the inert shell against a rock;
at others, it carries him away in a whirlwind, like the dust.
It is not then surprising that the sages of Greece, of the Indies,
China and Japan, the Christians of the east and west, and the
Mahomedans, have worked up this species of fatalism with their
different doctrines. In all times our moral and intellectual faculties
have been made to take their origin from God; and in all times it has
been taught that all the gifts of men came from heaven; that God has,
from all eternity, chosen the elect; that man of himself is incapable of
any good thought; that every difference between men, relative to
their faculties, comes from God; that there are only those to whom it
has been given by a superior power who are capable of certain
actions; that every one acts after his own innate character, the same
as the fig tree does not bear grapes, nor the vine figs, and the same
that a salt spring does not run in fresh water; lastly, that all cannot
dive into the mysteries of nature, nor the decrees of Providence.
It is this same kind of fatalism, this same inevitable influence of
superior powers, that has been taught by the fathers of the church.
St. Augustine wished this very same doctrine to be preached, to
profess loudly in the belief of the infallibility of Providence, and our
entire dependence upon God. “In the same manner, he says, no one
can give himself life, no one can give himself understanding.” If some
are unacquainted with the truth, it is, according to his doctrine,
because they have not received the necessary capacity to know it. He
refutes the objections that might be urged against the justice of God:
he remarks that neither has the grace of God distributed equally to
every one the temporal goods, such as address, strength, health,
beauty, wit, and the disposition for the arts and sciences, riches,
honors, &c. St. Cyprian at that time had already said, that we ought
not to be proud of our qualities, for we possess nothing from
ourselves.
If people had not always been convinced of the influence of
external and internal conditions relative to the determination of our
will, upon our actions, why, in all times and among every people,
have civil and religious laws been made to subdue and direct the
desires of men? There is no religion that has not ordained abstinence
from certain meats and drinks, fasting and mortification of the body.
From the time of Solomon the wise down to our own time, we know
of no observer of human nature that has not acknowledged that the
physical and moral man is entirely dependant on the laws of the
creation.
DIVINATION,
Is the art or act of foretelling future events, and is divided by the

ancients into artificial and natural.
Artificial Divination,
Is that which proceeds by reasoning upon certain external signs,
considered as indications of futurity.
Natural Divination,
Is that which presages things from a mere internal sense, and
persuasion of the mind, without any assistance of signs; and is of two
kinds, the one from nature, and the other by influx. The first is the
supposition that the soul, collected within itself, and not diffused, or
divided among the organs of the body, has, from its own nature and
essence, some foreknowledge of future things: witness what is seen
in dreams, ecstasies, the confines of death, &c. The second supposes
that the soul, after the manner of a minor, receives some secondary
illumination from the presence of God and other spirits.
Artificial divination is also of two kinds; the one argues from
natural causes; e. g. the predictions of physicians about the event of
diseases, from the pulse, tongue, urine, &c. Such also are those of the
politician, O venalem urbem, et mox peuturam, si emptorem
inveneris! The second proceeds from experiments and observations
arbitrarily instituted, and is mostly superstitious.
The systems of divination reducible under this head, are almost
incalculable, e. g. by birds, the entrails of birds, lines of the hand,
points marked at random, numbers, names, the motion of a sieve,
the air, fire, the Sortes Prænestinæ, Virgilianæ, and Homericæ; with
numerous others, the principal species and names of which are as
follows:—
Axinomancy,
Was an ancient species of divination or method of foretelling future

events by means of an axe or hatchet. The word is derived from the
Greek, αξινη, securis; μαντεια, divinatio. This art was in
considerable repute among the ancients; and was performed,
according to some, by laying an agate stone upon a red hot hatchet.
Alectoromantia,
Is an ancient kind of divination, performed by means of a cock,
which was used among the Greeks, in the following manner.—A
circle was made on the ground, and divided into 24 equal portions or
spaces: in each space was written one of the letters of the alphabet,
and upon each of these letters was laid a grain of wheat. This being
done, a cock was placed within the circle, and careful observation
was made of the grains he picked. The letters corresponding to these
grains were afterwards formed into a word, which word was the
answer decreed. It was thus that Libanius and Jamblicus sought who
should succeed the Emperor Valens; and the cock answering to the
spaces ΘΕΟΔ, they concluded upon Theodore, but by a mistake,
instead of Theodosius.
Arithmomancy,
Is a kind of divination or method of foretelling future events, by

means of numbers. The Gematria, which makes the first species of
the Jewish Cabala, is a kind of Arithmomancy.
Belomancy,
Is a method of divination by means of arrows, practised in the East,

but chiefly among the Arabians.
Belomancy has been performed in different manners: one was to
mark a parcel of arrows, and to put eleven or more of them into a
bag; these were afterwards drawn out, and according as they were
marked, or otherwise, they judged of future events. Another way was,
to have three arrows, upon one of which was written, God forbids it
me; upon another, God orders it me; and upon the third nothing at
all. These were put into a quiver, out of which one of the three was
drawn at random; if it happened to be that with the second
inscription, the thing they consulted about was to be done; if it
chanced to be that with the first inscription, the thing was let alone;
and if it proved to be that without any inscription, they drew over
again. Belomancy is an ancient practice, and is probably that which
Ezekiel mentions, chap. xxi. v. 21. At least St. Jerome understands it
so, and observes that the practice was frequent among the Assyrians
and Babylonians. Something like it is also mentioned in Hosea, chap.
vi. only that staves are mentioned there instead of arrows, which is
rather Rhabdomancy than Belomancy. Grotius, as well as Jerome,
confounds the two together, and shews that they prevailed much
among the Magi, Chaldeans, and Scythians, from whom they passed
to the Sclavonians, and thence to the Germans, whom Tacitus
observes to make use of Belomancy.
Cleromancy,
Is a kind of divination performed by the throwing of dice or little

bones; and observing the points or marks turned up.
At Bura, a city of Achaia, was a temple, and a celebrated Temple of
Hercules; where such as consulted the oracle, after praying to the
idol, threw four dice, the points of which being well scanned by the
priests, he was supposed to draw an answer from them.
Cledonism.
This word is derived from the Greek κληδων, which signifies two
things; viz. rumour, a report, and avis, a bird; in the first sense,
Cledonism should denote a kind of divination drawn from words
occasionally uttered. Cicero observes, that the Pythagoreans made
observations not only of the words of the gods, but of those of men;
and accordingly believed the pronouncing of certain words, e. g.
incendium, at a meal, very unlucky. Thus, instead of prison, they
used the words domicilium; and to avoid erinnyes, said Eumenides.
In the second sense, Cledonism should seem a divination drawn
from birds; the same with ornithomantia.
Coscinomancy.
As the word implies, is the art of divination by means of a sieve.

The sieve being suspended, after repeating a certain form of words,
it is taken between two fingers only; and the names of the parties
suspected, repeated: he at whose name the sieve turns, trembles or
shakes, is reputed guilty of the evil in question. This doubtless must
be a very ancient practice. Theocritus, in his third Idyllion, mentions
a woman who was very skilful in it. It was sometimes also practised
by suspending the sieve by a thread, or fixing it to the points of a pair
of scissars, giving it room to turn, and naming as before the parties
suspected: in this manner Coscinomancy is still practised in some
parts of England. From Theocritus it appears, that it was not only
used to find out persons unknown, but also to discover the secrets of
those who were.
Capnomancy,
Is a kind of divination by means of smoke, used by the ancients in

their sacrifices. The general rule was—when the smoke was thin and
light, and ascended straight up, it was a good omen; if on the
contrary, it was an ill one.
There was another species of Capnomancy which consisted in
observing the smoke arising from poppy and jessamin seed, cast
upon burning coals.
Catoptromancy,
Is another species of divination used by the ancients, performed by

means of a mirror.
Pausanias says, that this method of divination was in use among
the Achaians; where those who were sick, and in danger of death, let
down a mirror, or looking-glass, fastened by a thread, into a fountain
before the temple of Ceres; then looking in the glass, if they saw a
ghastly disfigured face, they took it as a sure sign of death; but, on
the contrary, if the face appeared fresh and healthy, it was a token of
recovery. Sometimes glasses were used without water, and the
images of future things, it is said, were represented in them.
Chiromancy,
Is the art of divining the fate, temperament, and disposition of a

person by the lines and lineaments of the hands.
There are a great many authors on this vain and trifling art, viz.
Artemidorus, Fludd, Johannes De Indagine, Taconerus, and M. De le
Chambre, who are among the best.
M. De le Chambre insists upon it that the inclinations of people
may be known from consulting the lines on the hands; there being a
very near correspondence between the parts of the hand and the
internal parts of the body, the heart, liver, &c. “whereon the passions
and inclinations much depend.” He adds, however, that the rules and
precepts of Chiromancy are not sufficiently warranted; the
experiments on which they stand not being well verified. He
concludes by observing, that there should be a new set of
observations, made with justness and exactitude, in order to give to
Chiromancy that form and solidity which an art of science demands.
Dactyliomancy.
This is a sort of divination performed by means of a ring. It was

done as follows, viz. by holding a ring, suspended by a fine thread,
over a round table, on the edge of which were made a number of
marks with the 24 letters of the alphabet. The ring in shaking or
vibrating over the table, stopped over certain of the letters, which,
being joined together, composed the required answer. But this
operation was preceded and accompanied by several superstitious
ceremonies; for, in the first place, the ring was to be consecrated with
a great deal of mystery; the person holding it was to be clad in linen
garments, to the very shoes; his head was to be shaven all round, and
he was to hold vervein in his hand. And before he proceeded on any
thing the gods were first to be appeased by a formulary of prayers,
&c.
The whole process of this mysterious rite is given in the 29th book
of Ammianus Marcellinus.
Extispicium,
(From exta and spicere, to view, consider.)

The name of the officer who shewed and examined the entrails of
the victims was Extispex.
This method of divination, or of drawing presages relative to
futurity, was much practised throughout Greece, where there were
two families, the Jamidæ and Clytidæ, consecrated or set apart
particularly for the exercise of it.
The Hetrurians, in Italy, were the first Extispices, among whom
likewise the art was in great repute. Lucan gives us a fine description
of one of these operations in his first book.
Gastromancy.
This species of divination, practised among the ancients, was

performed by means of words coming or appearing to come out of
the belly.
There is another kind of divination called by the same name, which
is performed by means of glasses, or other round transparent vessels,
within which certain figures appear by magic art. Hence its name, in
consequence of the figures appearing as if in the belly of the vessels.
Geomancy,
Was performed by means of a number of little points or dots, made

at random on paper; and afterwards considering the various lines
and figures, which those points present; thereby forming a pretended
judgment of futurity, and deciding a proposed question.
Polydore Virgil defines Geomancy a kind of divination performed
by means of clefts or chinks made in the ground; and he takes the
Persian magi to have been the inventors of it. De invent. rer. lib. 1, c.
23.
⁂ Geomancy is formed of the Greek γη terra, earth; and μαντεια,
divination; it being the ancien custom to cast little pebbles on the
ground, and thence to form their conjecture, instead of the points
above-mentioned.
Hydromancy, ὑδροματεια,
The art of divining or foretelling future events by means of water;

and is one of the four general kinds of divination: the other three, as
regarding the other elements, viz. fire and earth, are denominated
Pyromancy, Aeromancy, and Geomancy already mentioned.
The Persians are said by Varro to have been the first inventors of
Hydromancy; observing also that Numa Pompilius, and Pythagoras,
made use of it.
There are various Hydromantic machines and vessels, which are of
a singularly curious nature.
Necromancy,
Is the art of communicating with devils, and doing surprising things

by means of their aid; particularly that of calling up the dead and
extorting answers from them. (See Magic.)
Oneirocritica,
Is the art of interpreting dreams; or a method of foretelling future

events by means of dreams.
From several passages of Scripture, it appears that, under the
Jewish dispensation, there was such a thing as foretelling future
events by dreams; but there was a particular gift or revelation
required for that purpose. Hence it would appear that dreams are
actually significative of something to come; and all that is wanting
among us is, the Oneirocritica, or the art of knowing what: still it is
the general opinion of the present day that dreams are mere chimera,
induced by various causes, have no affinity with the realization of
future events; but having, at the same time, indeed, some relation to
what has already transpired.
With respect to Joseph’s dream, “it was possible,” says an old
author, “for God, who knew all things, to discover to him what was in
the womb of fate; and to introduce that, he might avail himself of a
dream; not but that he might as well have foretold it from any other
accident or circumstance whatever; unless God, to give the business
more importance, should purposely communicate such a dream to
Pharoah, in order to fall in with the popular notion of dreams and
divination, which at that time was so prevalent among the
Egyptians.”
The name given to the interpreters of dreams, or those who judge
of events from the circumstances of dreams, was Oneirocritics. There
is not much confidence to be placed in those Greek books called
Oneirocritics; they are replete with superstition of the times. Rigault
has given us a collection of the Greek and Latin works of this kind;
one of which is attributed to Astrampsichus; another to Nicephorus,
the patriarch of Constantinople; to which are added the treatises of
Artimedorus and Achmet. But the books themselves are little else
than reveries or waking dreams, to explain and account for sleeping
ones.
The secret of Oneirocritism, according to all these authors,
consists in the relations supposed to exist between the dream and the
thing signified; but they are far from keeping to the relations of
agreement and similitudes; and frequently they have recourse to
others of dissimilitude and contrariety.
Onomancy, or Onomamancy[35],
Is the art of divining the good or bad fortune which will befall a man
from the letters of his name. This mode of divination was a very
popular and reputable practice among the ancients.
The Pythagoreans taught that the minds, actions, and successes of
mankind, were according to their fate, genius, and name; and Plato
himself inclines somewhat to the same opinion.—Ausonius to Probus
expresses it in the following manner:—
Qualem creavit moribus,
Jussit vocari NOMINE
Mundi supremus arbiter.
In this manner he sports with tippling Meroe, as if her name told
she would drink pure wine without water; or as he calls it, merum
mereim. Thus Hippolytus was observed to be torn to pieces by his
own coach horses, as his name imported; and thus Agamemnon
signified that he should linger long before Troy; Priam, that he
should be redeemed out of bondage in his childhood. To this also
may be referred that of Claudius Rutilius:—
Nominibus certis credam decurrere mores?
Moribus aut Potius nomina certa dari?
It is a frequent and no less just observation in history, that the

greatest Empires and States have been founded and destroyed by
men of the same name. Thus, for instance, Cyrus, the son of
Cambyses, began the Persian monarchy; and Cyrus, the son of
Darius, ruined it; Darius, son of Hystaspes, restored it; and, again,
Darius, son of Asamis, utterly overthrew it. Phillip, son of Amyntas,
exceedingly enlarged the kingdom of Macedonia; and Phillip, son of
Antigonus, wholly lost it. Augustus was the first Emperor of Rome;
Augustulus the last. Constantine first settled the empire of
Constantinople, and Constantine lost it wholly to the Turks.
There is a similar observation that some names are constantly
unfortunate to princes: e. g. Caius, among the Romans; John, in
France, England and Scotland; and Henry, in France.
One of the principal rules of Onomancy, among the Pythagoreans,
was, that an even number of vowels in a name signified an
imperfection in the left side of a man; and an odd number in the
right.—Another rule, about as good as this, was, that those persons
were the most happy, in whose names the numeral letters, added
together, made the greatest sum; for which reason, say they, it was,
that Achilles vanquished Hector; the numeral letters, in the former
name, amounting to a greater number than the latter. And doubtless
it was from a like principle that the young Romans toasted their
mistresses at their meetings as often as their names contained
letters.
“Nævia sex cyathis, septem Justina bibatur!”
Rhodingius describes a singular kind of Onomantia.—Theodotus,

King of the Goths, being curious to learn the success of his wars
against the Romans, an Onomantical Jew ordered him to shut up a
number of swine in little stys, and to give some of them Roman, and
others Gothic names, with different marks to distinguish them, and
there to keep them till a certain day; which day having come, upon
inspecting the stys they found those dead to whom the Gothic names
had been given, and those alive to whom the Roman names were
assigned.—Upon which the Jew foretold the defeat of the Goths.
Onycomancy, or Onymancy.
This kind of divination is performed by means of the finger nails.

The ancient practice was, to rub the nails of a youth with oil and soot,
or wax, and to hold up the nails, thus prepared, against the sun;
upon which there were supposed to appear figures or characters,
which shewed the thing required. Hence also modern Chiromancers
call that branch of their art which relates to the inspection of nails,
Onycomancy.
Ornithomancy,
Is a kind of divination, or method of arriving at the knowledge of

futurity, by means of birds; it was among the Greeks what Augury
was among the Romans.
Pyromancy,
A species of divination performed by means of fire.

The ancients imagined they could foretel futurity by inspecting fire
and flame; for this purpose they considered its direction, or which
way it turned. Sometimes they added other matters to the fire, e. g. a
vessel full of urine, with its neck bound round with wool; and
narrowly watched the side in which it would burst, and thence took
their prognostic. Sometimes they threw pitch in it, and if it took fire
instantly, they considered it a favourable omen.

PDF Hergenhahns An Introduction To The History of Psychology 8Th Edition Tracy Henley Ebook Full Chapter

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

PDF Hergenhahns An Introduction To The History of Psychology 8Th Edition Tracy Henley Ebook Full Chapter

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

PDF Hergenhahns An Introduction To The History of Psychology 8Th Edition Tracy Henley Ebook Full Chapter

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Hergenhahn's An Introduction to the

History of Psychology, 8th Edition

An Introduction to the Psychology of Humor 1st Edition

A History of Psychology: From Antiquity to Modernity

The Muqaddimah An Introduction to History Ibn Khaldun

Biota Grow 2C gather 2C cook Loucas

An Introduction to Applied Cognitive Psychology 2nd

Worldviews an introduction to the history and

An introduction to work and organizational psychology :

Health Psychology: An Introduction to Behavior and

Australia • Brazil • Mexico • Singapore • United Kingdom • United States

For permission to use material from this text or product,

Marketing Manager: Heather Thompson Library of Congress Control Number: 2017952179

Manufacturing Planner: Karen Hunt

Printed in the United States of America

The Nature of the Soul 46 Chapter 4 Renaissance Science

Positivism 156 Existentialism 200

Völkerpsychologie 251 Intelligence Testing in the Army 303

James McKeen Cattell 344 Purposive Behaviorism 418

Benjamin Rush 467 Evaluation of Freud’s Theory: Criticisms

CHAPTER 19 Cognitive Psychology 574 CHAPTER 20 Psychology Today 598

Neural Networks 591 NA ME IND E X 6 6 5

■■ Chapter 4: Minor additions, such as noting psychology is noted. Mesmer’s biography is

T he primary purpose of this book is to examine the origins of modern psychology

Problems in Writing What to Include

and where it has not happened, even if we Choice of Approach

What is Science? and the systematic attempt to explain

Karl Popper observations scientists will make. The next step

Marx and Goodson (1976):

Under the name of materialism things very different from those

Is the art or act of foretelling future events, and is divided by the

Was an ancient species of divination or method of foretelling future

Is a kind of divination or method of foretelling future events, by

Is a method of divination by means of arrows, practised in the East,

Is a kind of divination performed by the throwing of dice or little

As the word implies, is the art of divination by means of a sieve.

Is a kind of divination by means of smoke, used by the ancients in

Is another species of divination used by the ancients, performed by

Is the art of divining the fate, temperament, and disposition of a

This is a sort of divination performed by means of a ring. It was

(From exta and spicere, to view, consider.)

This species of divination, practised among the ancients, was

Was performed by means of a number of little points or dots, made

The art of divining or foretelling future events by means of water;

Is the art of communicating with devils, and doing surprising things

Is the art of interpreting dreams; or a method of foretelling future

It is a frequent and no less just observation in history, that the

Rhodingius describes a singular kind of Onomantia.—Theodotus,

This kind of divination is performed by means of the finger nails.

Is a kind of divination, or method of arriving at the knowledge of

A species of divination performed by means of fire.

You might also like