Sitrep Flash 22/07

Belarus Military forces

INSTITUT ACTION RESILIENCE

Since the start of the Ukraine's invasion, Belarus has played an ambiguous game:
providing complete support to the Russian forces attacking its Ukrainian
neighbour, multiplying declarations and military maneuvers hostile to Kyiv but
for all that not engaging directly in the War.

At a time when tensions between Minsk and Kyiv are

at their peak, the Institute offers an inventory of the
Belarusian army as of July 1, 2022.

Institut Action Resilience

Association Loi 1901
65, Cours Pierre Puget
13006 MARSEILLE
https://institutactionresilience.fr
 INSTITUT ACTION RESILIENCE

FROM INTEGRATION TO
SUBORDINATION:
A "SUPPORT ARMY" FOR RUSSIA
Since 2012, the Belarusian army no
longer has a sovereign strategic
command.

Fully included into the Regional Group of Forces

under Russian command, it falls under the Russian
Western Military District. In case of Wartime,
Belarusian units will be placed under the
command of a Russian general and integrated into
a Russian army in the Russian's Joint Strategic
Command West.
Belarus is trying to modernize its
armed forces, but this effort is slow
and piecemeal.

The latest "Defence 2030" modernization plan

(adopted in December 2019) comes up against
weak economic resources and remains dependent
on the goodwill of Belarus' allies (Russia and
China) who limited their technology transfers.

In reality, the Belarusian army is a

"support force" incapable of carrying
out operations independently but
intended to help and supplement
Russian forces in the West.

Its order of battle is unbalanced with a high

proportion of support or protection units
(communication, anti-aircraft defense, electronic
warfare...) to assist and support Russian
deployment towards the West.

Sitrep Flash 22/07 02/08

 INSTITUT ACTION RESILIENCE

BELARUS GROUND FORCES (1)

Composed with two tactical commands (a

reinforced division each) and a group of
special forces (Spetsnaz & airborne
troops), the Belarusian army is particularly
strong in terms of support weapons (radar,
electronic warfare), defense anti-aircraft
and logistic echelon.

Each combat brigade has about 2,000 men (4,500 men at

full strength).

4 Tanks battalions
14 Mechanized
infantry battalions

Sitrep Flash 22/07 03/08

 INSTITUT ACTION RESILIENCE

BELARUS GROUND FORCES (2)

47.000 men 30 % officers & specialists

(17.000 men ready for 60 % NCO & enlisted
operations)
10 % conscripts

Belarusian military capacity is limited by

small size, inefficient training and low
morale.

Officers & specialists are trained in Russian military

schools (1,500 in total since 1998).
Of 10,000 conscripts per year, 4,500 serve in the armed
forces.

Tanks
424 (280) Tanks 55 T-80
1.067 (662) Armor 350 T-72B/BM
972 (658) guns
19 T-72B3
(available)

Arty SPG
IFV / AFV
712 2S19 MSTA-S
750 BMP-2
116 2S5 Giatsint-S
70 BMP-1/BRM-1
108 2S3 Akatsiya
70 BMD-1
198 2S1 Gvodzika
35 MT-LB
22 BTR-D
Arty Towed
100 BTR-80
132 2A65
20 BTR-70/BTR-72MB1
48 2A36 Giatsint-B
52 Chinese light AFV
48 2A18 / D-30
MLRS
725 BM-30 Smerch
Arty Howitzer
50 BM-27 Uragan
48 2S9 Anonna
126 BM-21 Grad
61 2S12 Sani / SM120

Sitrep Flash 22/07 04/08

 INSTITUT ACTION RESILIENCE

BELARUS GROUND FORCES (3)

TALES OF THREE QUESTIONS

Questionable loyalty and motivation

Opposition to ithe conflict in Ukraine is strong within the

ranks of the Belarusian military.
Already during the crackdown on protest following the
rigged elections of August 8, 2020, the Lukashenko regime
appeared to lack means of control over its army, which
refused to engage in repression.
.

A limited offensive maneuvering capacity

Old equipment, low manpower and above all defective training cast doubt on the offensive maneuvering
abilities of Belarusian units.
The most recent exercises are under Russian supervision: Zapad, Union Shield... Apart from these big
demonstrations, training is limited to maneuvers at company level (and rarely at battalion level).

Unknown ammunition stocks

Preparation for Ukraine's invasion led to the building up

of large Russian stockpiles in Belarus. The heavy fights
during the initial campaign (from February 24 to the end
of March, until the Russian withdrawal) led to a
consumption and then a redeployment of these stocks
towards the Donbass. In addition, it seems that the
Russian forces have taken since the end of April, several
dozen trains of ammunition drawn from the bases of
Belarus.
What stock do Belarusian forces have left to wage a
high-intensity conflict?

Sitrep Flash 22/07 05/08

 INSTITUT ACTION RESILIENCE

BELARUS AIR FORCES

Fighters
11 MiG-29
28
13 MiG-29BM
4 Su-30

CAS/Tactical bombers
67 55 Su-25
12 Su-25M

Hélicopters
36 Mi-8/Mi-8MTV-5
62 21 Mi-24/35
3 Mi-26
2 Mi-2

Delays in delivery of modern equipment

Belarusian Air Forces have preferred to stop old equipments modernization in favor of obtaining more
recent aircraft, delivered in dribs and drabs by Russia. In 2015-16, they received 12 Yak-130 (training)
and in 2016-17, 12 Mi-8MTV-5 (helicopters for special forces).
Thus an order for 12 Su-30SM was placed in 2016-17. It was to be delivered between 2018 & 2020. To
date, only 4 devices have been received and 4 others are expected to be delivered in October 2022.

Reduced operational rate and limited number of modern projectiles

Apart from the low experience and motivation of pilots, the question of the availability & operational rate
of an Air Force reduced to the bare minimum remains an unknown factor. It was estimated at around 50%
in 2020.

Moder Air wars requires efficient and accurate projectiles (most recent missiles). Here again, the
Belarusian army suffers from a lack of resources and a lack of interest from its Russian and Chinese allies
in providing it with equipment outside of specific sectors where it plays its "auxiliary" role of the Russian
army in the West (electronic warfare, anti-aircraft missiles, etc.).

Sitrep Flash 22/07 06/08

 INSTITUT ACTION RESILIENCE

ASSESSMENTS
An "in being" Army whose offensive capabilities are reduced but which weighs on
the conflict with Ukraine by its mere existence.

Thus without even considering an implication, the presence of a force of 4 to 6

brigades well supported in artillery on the Northern border is enough to oblige
Ukrainian army to retain units to counter such threat.

If the situation goes badly in Eastern & Southern Fronts, Russia could be tempted
to force the commitment of an Army which, even unable to carry out an offensive
for more than a few days, will be sufficient to mobilize troops which may be
lacking in the main front at a decisive moment.

The political risks for the Lukashenko regime of getting involved in the invasion
are currently too great, especially compared to what its weak units can expect
against the Ukrainians.

But the turn of events could lead the Russian command to modify this risk/benefit
balance (currently against a Belarusian attack) and to play a kind of Belarusian "all-
out".

Sitrep Flash 22/07 07/08

 Sitrep Flash 22/07
WHAT CAN DO BELARUSIAN ARMY ?
INSTITUT ACTION RESILIENCE

Since the start of Ukraine's invasion, Belarus has played an

ambiguous game: providing strong support to the Russian
forces attacking its Ukrainian neighbour, multiplying
declarations and military maneuvers hostile to the Kyiv
government, but for all that not engaging directly in the
dispute.

At a time when tensions between Minsk and Kyiv are at

their peak, the question of military involvement can be
raised, but it is not easy for the Lukashenko regime, which
must arbitrate with strong opposition from its troops to
this conflict.
Example of a fanciful invasion plan of Western
A DECISIVE INVOLVEMENT IN SUPPORT OF RUSSIA: Ukraine in 3 days (sic) (source unknown)

Thanks to Belarus, the Russian army was able to :

- deploy its forces using the pretext of a joint exercise,

- use roads and bases to attack Kyiv and all the North and East of the country,

- maintain "pressure" on the northern border, mobilizing manpower and the attention of
the Ukrainian army.

For the moment, the Belarusian army is

effectively playing its role of
"complement" (anti-aircraft protection
facing the West, logistical support, etc.)
and diversion.

It cannot leave it to (for example) invade

Ukraine, except in the case of a strategic
situation in the Donbass requiring such
large-scale action, the success of which
will only depend on the choice of the
moment of the initial launching of an
operation with very small chances of
success.
Institut Action Resilience Footage of Ukrainian mining of
Association Loi 1901 border roads and railways by
Ukrainian forces in early July
65, Cours Pierre Puget
13006 MARSEILLE
https://institutactionresilience.fr