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How Negotiations End

Whilst past studies have examined when and how negotiations begin,
and how wars end, this is the first full-length work to analyze the closing
phase of negotiations. It identifies endgame as a definable phase in
negotiation, with specific characteristics, as the parties involved sense
that the end is in sight and decide whether or not they want to reach it.
The authors further classify different types of negotiator behavior char-
acteristic of this phase, drawing out various components, including
mediation, conflict management vs. resolution, turning points, uncer-
tainty, and home relations, amongst others. A number of specific cases
are examined to illustrate this analysis, including Colombian negoti-
ations with FARC, Greece and the EU, Iranian nuclear proliferation,
French friendship treaties with Germany and Algeria, Chinese business
negotiations, and trade negotiations in Asia. This pioneering work will
appeal to scholars and advanced students of negotiation in international
relations, international organization, and business studies.

i . w i l l i a m z a r t m a n is Jacob Blaustein Distinguished Professor

Emeritus of International Organizations and Conflict Resolution at
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is the
author and editor of such books as Preventing Deadly Conflict (2015),
Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat (2015), The Global
Power of Talk (2012), and Negotiation and Conflict Management; Essays
on Theory and Practice (2010), amongst others.
How Negotiations End
Negotiating Behavior in the Endgame

Edited by
I. William Zartman
The Johns Hopkins University
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DOI: 10.1017/9781108567466
© Cambridge University Press 2019
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First published 2019
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Zartman, I. William, editor.
Title: How negotiations end : negotiating behavior in the endgame / edited by
I. William Zartman.
Description: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, USA : Johns
Hopkins University, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018045933 | ISBN 9781108475839 (hbk) |
ISBN 9781108469098 (pbk)
Subjects: LCSH: Negotiation. | Decision making.
Classification: LCC BF637.N4 H687 2019 | DDC 302.3–dc23
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accurate or appropriate.
 Contents

List of Figures page vii

List of Tables viii
List of Contributors ix
Acknowledgements x
About the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN)
Network at the German Institute for Global and Area
Studies (GIGA) xi

Introduction 1
i. william zartman

Part I Cases 25
1 The Iranian Nuclear Negotiations 27
ariane tabatabai and camille pease
2 Greek–EU Debt Dueling in the Endgame 46
diana panke
3 Colombia’s Farewell to Civil War 62
carlo nasi and angelika rettberg
4 Chinese Business Negotiations: Closing the Deal 83
guy olivier faure
5 France’s Reconciliations with Germany and Algeria 104
valerie rosoux
6 Closure in Bilateral Negotiations: APEC-Member Free
Trade Agreements 122
larry crump

v
vi Contents

Part II Causes 147

7 Crises and Turning Points: Reframing the Deal 149
daniel druckman
8 Managing or Resolving? Defining the Deal 164
michael j. butler
9 Mediating Closure: Driving toward a MEO 185
siniša vuković
10 Mediating Closure: Timing for a MHS 201
isak svensson
11 Facing Impediments: Information and Communication 208
andrew kydd
12 Facing Impediments: Prospecting 221
janice gross stein
13 When is “Enough” Enough? Uncertainty 238
mikhail troitskiy
14 When is “Enough” Enough? Approach–Avoidance 256
dean g. pruitt
15 When is “Enough” Enough? Settling for Suboptimal
Agreement 265
p. terrence hopmann
16 Lessons for Theory 287
i. william zartman
17 Lessons for Practice 295
chester a. crocker

References 304
Index 341
 Figures

I.1 Effects of reframing and of high or low security points. page 10

5.1 The Franco-German and Franco-Algerian contexts
compared. 119
6.1 Network image of APEC member FTAs. 127
6.2 Closure in complex bilateral negotiations. 142
8.1 Life-cycle of an intractable conflict. 176
14.1 Approach and avoidance tendencies at different points
in a journey. 259
14.2 Approach–avoidance conflict when the approach tendency
dominates the avoidance tendency. 261
15.1 Leaving value on the table: suboptimal agreements. 267

vii
 Tables

3.1 Timeline of partial agreements in the Colombian peace

process page 63
6.1 Bilateral FTAs in force between APEC-member
economies 126
8.1 Types of conflict triggers 177
8.2 Typologies of closing behavior and associated strategies 180

viii
 Contributors

michael butler, Clark University

chester a. crocker, Georgetown University
larry crump, Griffith University
daniel druckman, George Mason University
guy olivier faure, Université de la Sorbonne
p. terrence hopmann, SAIS-Johns Hopkins University
andrew kydd, University of Wisconsin
carlo nasi, Universidad de los Andes
diana panke, Freiburg University
camille pease, Georgetown University
dean g. pruitt, George Mason University
angelika rettberg, Universidad de los Andes
valerie rosoux, Université Catholique de Louvain
janice gross stein, University of Toronto
isak svensson, Uppsala University
ariane tabatabai, Georgetown University
mikhail troitskiy, MGIMO University
siniša vuković, SAIS-Johns Hopkins University
i. william zartman, SAIS-Johns Hopkins University

ix
 Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my wonderful colleagues in the PIN group for letting me

move ahead with the idea of this book, which has been pursuing me for
a long time. I am pleased to thank the Diplomatic Academy of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro, and its director Ms. Satka
Hajdarpašić, for hosting the initial Workshop on this project in Cetinje in
July 2015. It was also good to have the initial research assistance of
Constance Wilhelm and the indexing of Rona Vaselaar.

x
 About the Processes of International
Negotiation (PIN) Network at the German
Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA)

The PIN Program, formerly at IIASA in Laxenburg, Austria, and then

Clingendael, The Hague, the Netherlands, is located at the German
Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg. Since
1988, it has been conducted by an international Steering Committee of
scholars and practitioners, meeting three times a year to develop and
propagate new knowledge about the processes of negotiation. The
Steering Committee conducts one to two workshops of scholars from a
wide spectrum of disciplines and nationalities every year devoted to the
analysis and improvement of the practice of negotiation. These work-
shops are part of the process of creating a book each year on aspects of
negotiation.
It also offers mini-conferences on international negotiations in order to
disseminate and encourage research on the subject. Such “Road Shows”
have been held at the Argentine Council for International Relations,
Buenos Aires; Beida University, Beijing; the Center for Conflict Reso-
lution, Haifa; the Center for the Study of Contemporary Japanese Cul-
ture, Kyoto; the School of International Relations, Tehran; the Swedish
Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm; the University of Cairo;
University Hassan II, Casablanca; the University of Helsinki; the UN
University for Peace, San José, Costa Rica; Toledo Center for Peace; the
Paris Biennale at Negocia; the Montenegro Foreign Ministry Summer
Program Young Diplomats; Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies in Bologna; Beçeşehir University in
Istanbul; and others.
The PIN Network publishes a semiannual online newsletter, PIN-
Points, and sponsors a network of over 4,000 researchers and practition-
ers in negotiation. Past Projects and the Program have been supported by
the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foun-
dation, the US Institute of Peace, UNESCO, the Carnegie Corporation,
and the Carnegie Commission for the Prevention of Deadly Conflict.

xi
xii About the PIN Network

Members of the PIN Steering Committee

Cecilia Albin, Uppsala University
Mark Anstey, Michigan State University in Dubai, formerly Nelson
Mandela University, Port Elizabeth
Moty Cristal, NEST, Israel
Guy Olivier Faure, University of Paris V – Sorbonne
Paul Meerts, The Netherlands Institute of International Relations,
Clingendael
Amrita Narlikar, GIGA–Hamburg
Valerie Rosoux, Catholic University of Louvain
Rudolf Schüßler, Bayreuth University
Mikhail Troitskiy, MGIMO University, Moscow
I. William Zartman, The Johns Hopkins University
Markus Kirchschlager, GIGA–Hamburg

Emeritus Members
Rudolf Avenhaus, The German Armed Forces University, Munich
Gunnar Sjöstedt, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs
Franz Cede, University of Budapest
Mordechai Melamud, CTBTO

PIN Publications
Zartman, I. William (ed.). 2019. How Negotiations End: Negotiating Behavior in
the Endgame. Cambridge University Press.
Rosoux, Valerie & Anstey, Mark (eds.). 2018. Negotiating Reconciliation in Peace-
making. Springer.
Troitskiy, Mikhail & Hampson, Fen Osler (eds.). 2017. Tug of War: Negotiating
Security in Eurasia. Center for International Governance Innovation.
Zartman I. William (ed.). 2015. Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the
Intifada. University of Georgia Press.
Melamud, Mordechai, Meerts, Paul & I. William Zartman (eds.). 2014. Banning
the Bang or the Bomb? Negotiating the Test Ban Treaty. Cambridge University
Press.
Faure, Guy Olivier (ed.). 2012. Unfinished Business: Why International Negoti-
ations Fail. University of Georgia Press.
Zartman, I. William, Anstey, M. A. & Meerts, P. (eds.), 2012. The Slippery Slope
to Genocide: Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Mass Murder. Oxford
University Press.
Zartman, I. William & Faure, Guy Olivier (eds.). 2011. Engaging Extremists. US
Institute of Peace Press.
 About the PIN Network xiii

Faure, Guy Olivier & Zartman, I. William (eds.), 2010. Negotiating with Terrorists.
Routledge.
Aleksy-Szucsich, A. (ed.). 2009. The Art of International Negotiations. Żurawia
Papers Volume 14. Institute of International Relations, University of
Warsaw.
Avenhaus, R. & Sjöstedt G. (eds.). 2009. Negotiated Risks: International Talks on
Hazardous Issues. Springer.
Bercovitch, Jacob, Kremenyuk, Victor A. & Zartman, I. William (eds.). 2008.
The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution. Sage.
Avenhaus, R. & Zartman, I. William (eds.). 2007. Diplomacy Games. Formal
Models and International Negotiations. Springer.
Zartman, I. William & Faure, Guy Olivier (eds.). 2005. Escalation and Negotiation
in International Conflicts. Cambridge University Press.
Zartman, I. William & Kremenyuk, Victor A. (eds.). 2005. Peace versus Justice:
Negotiating Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes. Rowman and Littlefield.
Spector, B. I. & Zartman, I. William (eds.). 2005. Getting It Done: Post-agreement
Negotiations and International Regimes. US Institute of Peace Press.
Meerts, P. & Cede, F. (eds.). 2004. Negotiating European Union. Palgrave
Macmillan.
Sjöstedt, G. & Lang, W. (eds.) 2003. Professional Cultures in International Negoti-
ation. Bridge or Rift? Lexington Books.
Faure, Guy Olivier. 2003. How People Negotiate: Resolving Disputes in Different
Cultures. Kluwer Academic.
Avenhaus, R., Kremenyuk, Victor A. & Sjöstedt, G. (eds.). 2002. Containing the
Atom: International Negotiations on Nuclear Security and Safety. Lexington Books.
Kremenyuk, Victor A. (ed.). 2002. International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches,
Issues (second edition). Jossey-Bass.
Zartman, I. William (ed.). 2001. Preventive Negotiation: Avoiding Conflict Escal-
ation. Rowman & Littlefield.
Sjöstedt, G. & Kremenyuk, V. (eds.). 2000. International Economic Negotiation:
Models versus Reality. Edward Elgar.
Zartman, I. William & Rubin, Jeffrey Z. (eds.). 2000. Power and Negotiation. The
University of Michigan Press.
Berton, P., Kimura, Hiroshi & Zartman, I. William (eds.). 1999. International
Negotiation: Actors, Structure/Process, Values. St. Martin’s Press.
Zartman, I. William (ed.). 1994. International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches
to the Management of Complexity. Jossey-Bass.
Spector, B. I. (ed.). 1993. Decision Support systems in Negotiation, special issue of
Theory and Decision XXXIV(3).
Spector, B. I., Sjöstedt, G. & Zartman, I. William (eds.). 1994. Negotiating Inter-
national Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development (UNCED). Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff.
Faure, Guy Olivier & Rubin, Jeffrey. Z. (eds.). 1993. Culture and Negotiation. The
Resolution of Water Disputes. Sage.
Sjöstedt, G. (ed.). 1993. International Environmental Negotiation. Sage.
Mautner-Markhof, F. (ed.). 1989. Processes of International Negotiations. Westview
Press.
 Introduction

I. William Zartman

“How do negotiations end?” is a subject that has eluded any systemic

research attention.1 Yet it is, after all, the basic question in the study and
practice of negotiation. How negotiated outcomes are determined is
the underlying concern of negotiation analysis, and the question of
negotiators’ behavior in obtaining closure focuses on the last lap in the
race. Closure is the point where Ikle’s (1964) three-fold option – Yes,
No, Keep on Talking – is collapsed into the first two; talking will
continue until the end but is now focused – like Oscar Wilde’s hanging –
on the immediacy of yes or no. This study focuses on that final phase of
the negotiations or the endgame. It seeks to understand how and why
negotiators act when they see themselves in a meet-or-break phase of the
negotiations in order to bring about a conclusion (successfully or not).
“Endgame” (like “ripeness”) is a frequently used term, the title of
some 250 books, half of them on Chess, where the term has a special
meaning, another half on Go, and one by Samuel Beckett (1957) that is
of little help in understanding closure. Like “love” and “war,” everyone
knows what it means but can’t easily define it. In diplomacy, it is often
invoked in a general sense, but with some hints at specialty. In the
collective account of the Iran hostage negotiations in 1979–1980, Robert
Owen (1985, 311) picks up “Final Negotiations” as “one last crash
campaign to resolve the matter within the thirty days remaining,” creat-
ing a deadline before the passage of presidential powers. “The process . . .
during those final two weeks . . . was essentially that of amending and
supplementing” (314), the endgame that McManus (1981, 205) calls
“the final dickering,” as the parties drove toward a joint declaration
(314). Warren Christopher said of that period, “‘I think they finally

1
The best treatment, of use in the present discussion, is, as usual Pillar (1983, 119–143),
looking at concession rates. The penultimate chapter in Ikle (1964) concentrates mainly
on behavior in the main part of the process. Shell (1999) examines closure tactics.
Gulliver (1979, 153–168) also looks at concession behavior. What is remarkable is that
none of these approaches has been pursued into a fuller analysis, or followed by any
literature in the past thirty years.

1
2 Introduction

developed a willingness’ to end the crisis” (McManus 1981, 206). The

same mode of activity characterized the twenty days at Dayton in 1995,
although Richard Holbrooke’s account (Holbrooke, 1998) does not
seems to identify any moment when he sensed that an end was ever
likely, only (as in Iran) necessary. Chester Crocker (1992, 397–398) in
“Reflections on the Endgame, 1988” of the Namibian negotiations
recalls that “by July and August, we had established our rhythm, . . .
engaged in nearly round-the-clock improvisations, bending with the
moves and signals.” In the Sudanese negotiations, Norwegian Minister
Hilde Frafjord Johnson (2011, 139, 141) notes that in April 2004
“the break had been useful . . . Both sides felt that they were very close
to agreement” and John Garang mixed his images: “We have reached the
crest of the last hill in our tortuous ascent to the heights of peace,”
to which Johnson adds, with a different geography, “the road ahead
was flat; the Protocols marked a paradigm shift.” All of these elements –
anticipation, deadline, turning points, trimming, rhythm, break,
reframing, direction – will come up in the following analysis. Although
they do not always appear with the punctuality of an alarm clock, the fact
that they do sometimes and are generally identifiable indicates the useful-
ness of the concept of an endgame.
This inquiry is particularly relevant to some exciting instances of major
negotiations that have recently taken place. Of major significance in
international politics are the negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran
over nuclear disarmament that drove to an agreement, the Joint Com-
prehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), analyzed here by Ariane Tabatabai
and Camille Pease of Georgetown University. Once total and immediate
withdrawal of sanctions and total elimination of enrichment capabilities
were seen as unlikely to be attained, the endgame hung on how much of
each was necessary for an agreement. Of major significance in inter-
national economic relations were the negotiations between the EU and
Greece, a clear case of dueling over two conflicting economic philoso-
phies before our eyes in the headlines, analyzed by Diana Panke of
Freiburg University. On the level of intrastate conflict, equally significant
was the peace process between Colombia and the FARC, which was,
after many previous tries, brought to fruition during the four years after
2012. It was only in the last year that the endgame appeared, when the
parties sensed that each was ready to attack the two remaining issues of
accountability and transitional justice that stood as a stone wall before
agreement. But then a second endgame was forced by the rejection of the
agreement in a national referendum, and the parties then rapidly com-
pleted an acceptable outcome, an analysis developed by Angelika
Rettberg and Carlo Nasi of Los Andes.
 Introduction 3

While these are the headline cases that make the inquiry so timely,
other instances stand out as well to attract attention. In negotiating
friendship treaties with Algeria and with Germany, a recall of the deep
scars derailed the process at the end in the first case but not in the
second, as analyzed in Chapter 5 by Valerie Rosoux. Closure is a major
issue in Chinese–Western business negotiations, where the relation is the
key and the agreement itself is incidental and epiphenomenal, and is
marked by typical but personal behaviors, as Guy Olivier Faure shows in
Chapter 4. Larry Crump shows that endgame in trade bilaterals is
sharpened by deadlines and taken over by political decision-makers.
Endgame, or the closure phase of the negotiations, occurs when the
parties, after having taken stock of where they are in the process, come to
the conclusion that an end – positive or negative – is in sight and they
need to address their behavior to making it happen. The upcoming
round(s) will move to a conclusion, and holding out thereafter for further
major gains would be costly and unproductive (Pillar 1983; Gulliver
1979). This phase is usually introduced by a Turning Point of Closure
as the negotiations turn from formula to details; as usual, the point may
be sharper in concept than in real time but nonetheless is of relevance. It
is sometimes preceded by a break in the negotiations to take stock and
produce a reframing of the issues, or by an important concession that
breaks the deadlock and opens the way to lesser, reciprocal concessions.
At this point negotiators sense an acceptable end toward which they are
driving, still trying to inflect it in a jointly or separately preferred direc-
tion or otherwise bring the negotiations to an end, although they may also
be engaging in a dueling or Indian wrestling game for competing
outcomes.2
There is no telling when that realization will arrive; it is a sense that the
negotiators come to during the process, alluded to using the same term
“sense” by Faure in Chapter 4. The conflict/problem and relevant pro-
posals have been thoroughly aired, the preliminaries are out of the way,
diagnosis and pre-negotiations have been handled and the negotiations

2
Pillar’s (1983, 119, 128) identification is “The first transition [Turning Point of
Seriousness] occurs when the bargainers come to view an agreement as possible; the
second [Turning Point of Closure] marks the moment they begin viewing it as probable.
At the end of Phase Two, the gap between the two positions has narrowed to where they
can now see the conclusion of the negotiation – most likely a successful one but a
conclusion in any case. The slack is gone from the negotiations, the remaining
differences are as clear as they will ever be, and the parties see their subsequent
decisions as resulting possibly in the breaking off of talks but not in their indefinite
prolongation. Phase Two usually ends with one side making a major concession that
ends the waiting game and makes the overall shape of the agreement clear for the first
time . . . There will be overall reciprocation which was largely absent in Phase Two.”
4 Introduction

have been going on for a while, the positions and interests have been
made clear, the formula (or competing formulas) have been established,
everything is on the table, and the dimensions of a Zone of Possible
Agreement (ZOPA) are clear and shared, although these understandings
may be revisited during the ensuing process. That sense of closure can
come as a prospective view, looking forward from where things stand and
the direction in which they lean: “there gradually emerged a sense that a
moment of new opportunity might be presenting itself” in the words of
Harold Saunders (1985, 289) on “The Beginning of the End” of the Iran
hostage negotiations But it can also come retrospectively, counting back
from a deadline that would close the process: “A great agreement is
within their [Bosnians’] grasp . . . We must give everyone a drop-dead
time limit. I mean really close Dayton down. This should not be a bluff,”
said Secretary Warren Christopher, and Richard Holbrooke (1998,
304–305) told them as he left, “We must have your answer within an
hour . . . Not suspend – close down. In an hour.”
If there is an agreement it will be overall less than the parties wanted
but enough to justify conclusion, either by signing or by leaving. Closure
situations come in two types: negotiations that reach an agreement when
Not Enough in comparison with original hopes and demands is still
enough to make an agreement (Type I), and those that do not reach
agreement because Enough was not enough (Type II). In the successful
cases (Type I), the parties agree even though they do not reach their
stated goals or bottom lines; a partial agreement was deemed sufficient to
provide a positive outcome. In the unsuccessful cases (Type II), the
parties settle important issues but even that amount of agreement is not
sufficient to warrant a final positive outcome. Under what conditions do
parties agree to agree on what (and what not) to agree on and under what
conditions is the progress insufficient to constitute the basis for an
agreement, and how do they behave in the last round?
Obviously the situations are on a spectrum, with extremes at either
end. There may be situations where both parties can get all they came
for; it is assumed that such situations are rare and, for present purposes,
uninteresting. There may also be situations where what they came for is
something else than an agreement, that there is no agreement on any-
thing, the parties are not ready to negotiate, and may be acting for side
effects (time, publicity, reputation, etc.) (Ikle 1964). These too are
outside this inquiry. But the assumption is that most cases of negotiation
are in the big gray area in the middle, where the parties cannot get
everything they want or thought they deserved, where red lines have to
be breached in spots, and yet they sense that the/an end is near and
attainable, where the rising question, as the end approaches, is whether
 Introduction 5

there is enough to constitute an agreement and how do they behave to

attain it? Why stop here, now? Should one continue to negotiate to try to
get more, would pushing further push agreement out of reach, is there
just or not quite enough to make for a positive outcome? As indicated,
there is no way of knowing that the end is really available or how long it
will take to get there, but, as the accounts testify, the sense that it is there
is usually palpable. Nor is there any way of telling – not even the
seriousness of the remaining issues – how long the endgame will take,
although it is generally short compared with the previous phases of the
negotiations.

Patterns of Closure
Once the negotiations enter into this final phase, how do they proceed?
The initial quotations and others’ analyses indicate that specific behav-
iors appear to be associated with the move toward closure, which are
different from behaviors during the previous course of negotiations
(Douglas 1962; Gulliver 1979; Zartman & Berman 1982; Pillar 1983;
Bartos 1976). Endgame behaviors look ahead toward the conclusion to
which they are aiming or heading and act strategically in order to get
there, a characteristic shared with endgame strategies both in Chess and
in Go (Frey 2016; Shotwell 2005). Such behaviors of course relate to the
basic process (as also in Chess and Go), to distributive and integrative
bargaining, to conflict management and conflict resolution, to payoff
maximizing or satisficing, etc. But whatever the particular outcome
pursued, the negotiators select various patterns of behavior to move them
to closure. What behaviors are typical and required to get the parties to
Yes (to refer to the title of a book that does not focus on this point in the
process)? What variables are helpful in analyzing the situation? In a word,
how do negotiators behave when they feel that they are close to the end of
negotiations, and why? Are there common dynamics and identifiable
patterns of behavior in the endgame? These are the questions that this
study addresses.
Some such modes stand out; others may appear less prominently, but
several predominate. Five different patterns of behavior appear very
clearly in model form (and muddily but nonetheless distinguishably in
reality): dueling, driving, dragging, mixed, and mismatched.3 The first two
patterns are reciprocal; the parties react to each other in the same terms
and expect that reciprocation: toughness leads to toughness, as in

3
Somewhat similar modes from different angles have been advanced in Pruitt (1981), Shell
(1999), and Ury, Brett, & Goldberg (1987).
6 Introduction

dueling, and softness leads to softness, as in driving (Pillar 1983, 101;

Zartman 2005). The other patterns are not reciprocal or matched:
toughness leads to softness and vice versa. The first two are related to
Rubin & Brown (1975): High Interpersonal Orientation (competitive)
and High Interpersonal Orientation (cooperative), taken as behaviors
rather than as personality types, with similar results identified for mis-
matching (see also Shell 1999, although there is relevance but less of a
direct equivalent with his five styles or Thomas–Killmann categories);
dragging may be related to Low Interpersonal Orientation behavior if
it covers the whole endgame and not just a single issue. The behaviors
may appear in parts before the Turning Point of Closure; in the endgame
they tend to become focused.
Three of the patterns can be appreciated by their behavioral character-
istics, sometimes a bit caricaturally:

Dueling Driving Dragging

Confrontation Cooperation/ Disengagement
convergence
Cliff hanging Regular progress Don’t like where this is
heading
Hanging tough Hanging positive How can we end this
gracefully?
End in doubt End in sight Approach–avoidance
Steely nerves Creative mind Soft landing
Hold out, face it off Move ahead, wrap it up Prepare LCD outcome
Classical chicken Creative chicken Chicken stalemate
Uncertain information Exploring information Uncertainty
Harden support for position Prepare support for Prepare for failure or LCD
outcome
Threaten Warn: If not, I’ll have to . . . Disengage
Ball is in your court Ball is in our court jointly Ball is in the net
Deal is far Deal is attainable Deal is avoidable
Bad cop Good cop Backing out
Late compromise, if at all Early compromise LCD compromises
Demand more Reciprocate Second thoughts
Emphasize bad collapse Emphasize good Emphasize gentle collapse
agreement
Re-examine BATNA/security Explore ZOPA Strengthen BATNAs
point
Entrapped in commitment Caught up in dynamics Slow down dynamics
Deadline Extend deadline if Time running out
progress
Prepare home for failure Evaluate success so far, Cut losses, make best of it
crest
Concession Compensation, Set issues aside
construction
 Introduction 7

The choice of the pattern is path determined by the previous bargain-

ing behavior of the parties. Thus the patterns capture both the individual
parties’ behavior and also the behavioral pattern of the encounter if
shared. The patterns of behavior are not sealed trains in a tunnel; the
parties can shift, probably inducing a shift or at least a strain in the other’s
behavior, but they cannot shift very often without destroying the engage-
ment of the other. A shift can occur at the very end: dueling in the crunch
after almost complete agreement by driving, or driving at the edge of the
cliff after the dueling has run its course, but such shifts probably require a
shift in negotiating or deciding personnel as well.
One pattern is dueling (Kitzantonis & Alderman 2015; de Gaulle
1962), also known as cliff-hanging and brinkmanship, in which the
parties face each other down to the wire until one of them blinks. This
is a pattern of reciprocal behavior, in which toughness has led to tough-
ness, and a low critical risk on the part of both parties leads the process
either to confirmed deadlock or to a prolonged shoot-out before one side
gives in (Bishop 1964). In critical risk terms, each side bets on the
chances of the other side’s capitulation and of the acceptability of
a deadlock if it does not capitulate.4 This is a hardened version of a
Chicken Dilemma Game (CDG) (only portrayable in a cardinal, not
ordinal, depiction), which incorporates the capitulation calculation but
not the relative cost of deadlock. Thus dueling parties attempt to per-
suade the opponent that they will not move and that a deadlock would be
quite acceptable to them, that is, to each the “expected cost [of break-
down] equals [or is less than] the expected benefit [of victory]” and each
party is indifferent between the two, and they also try to convince the
other that its calculation is wrong and that deadlock is indeed costly to
the other (Pillar 1983, 92–93). Expressed as security points, the Best
Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) for each is – or at least
is portrayed as – equivalent to or higher in value than an agreement, so
the parties are equal in power and work to reinforce their indifference
rather than seeking an accommodation with the other party’s position,
thus setting up a situation of deadlock or surrender. As a result, an
interesting aspect of the dueling pattern is that it drives the parties to
bargain on their security points rather than on the terms of a possible
agreement, pointing out quite publicly how acceptable for them deadlock

4
There are a number of calculations for critical risk; the most complete one is the ratio of
the difference between victory and losing (the southwest and northeast corners in a
Prisoners’ Dilemma Game matrix) and the difference between victory and deadlock
(the southeast corner) (Zeuthen 1930, 147; Pillar 1983, 93; Snyder & Diesing 1977,
49–52). Critical risk is a useful heuristic but more difficult to calculate than its definition
would suggest.
8 Introduction

is as an alternative and how unbearable the concessions needed to come

to an agreement, especially on the other party’s hard-line terms, and how
awful deadlock would be for the other, without doing much to improve
the terms of an agreement. In other words, both parties proclaim that
they really don’t need an agreement, at least on the other’s terms.
Another characteristic of dueling is that there is no agreement on a
Formula going into the endgame. The parties still hold different notions
of the nature of the problem, the terms of trade, and the notion of justice
underwriting the negotiation and hence the agreement. The parties never
got out of the competitive stage into a cooperative frame of mind (Pruitt
1981, 133–134; Zartman 1997a). Hence the duelers have an overcharged
agenda with little to have built up in preparation for cooperation. If there
is finally an agreement among duelers, it is most likely to favor one of the
parties.
Decisions in each pattern will have their characteristics. Decisions in
dueling will be strategic, i.e. determined by examining (intrapersonal) or
comparing (interpersonal) BATNAs, or personal/political, i.e. determined
by the strength of commitment to oneself or to the home audience, por-
traying the offers, deadlines, and BATNAs as fixed reference points. Stra-
tegic decisions depend on uncertain information about what one’s and the
other’s security point really is; political decisions depend on a judgment of
what one can get away with without breaking commitments. Dueling may
take place over a single issue but is more likely to occur over an entire
agenda or general concern or relationship that is not subject to decom-
position or fractioning, making compensation more difficult. Even when a
single issue is, literally, the stumbling block, it tends to take its importance
from its representation of the entire relationship. Parties will run down to
the wire (and push the wire if possible) to show their unshakability,
strengthening their position by public commitments, throwing away the
steering wheel in their chicken course while underscoring the catastrophe in
the other party’s security point (Schelling 1960; Coddington 1968). Thus,
the cost of capitulation increases as the parties move toward a decision.
Dueling is done before a public audience and is used to enforce commit-
ment; negotiators are always looking over their shoulder to create a public
opinion that then holds them prisoner. There is no question of handling the
major issues or any others early to create a positive bargaining atmosphere;
the Big One stands to the end as the symbol of the confrontation. Various
devices of presentation and misrepresentation as highlighted by prospect
theory will be employed (McDermott 2009; Kydd and Stein in Chapters 11
and 12 of this volume). Parties are unlikely to have similar purposes in the
negotiation; concessions are the only alternative to one side’s giving in
completely, but the posture of the parties makes concessions difficult;
 Introduction 9

compensation may be worth exploring and construction (reframing) is

uninteresting. Furthermore, there is no room for mediators in a dueling
encounter. They are not welcome, and if they do perchance appear in the
hope of being helpful, they are ignored, or worse, by one or both parties, as
the fate of Romeo reminds us.
Not surprisingly, the best examples of dueling come from failed
encounters, although the Cuban Missile Crisis negotiations were a concise
case with a positive outcome. The 2015 Greek debt negotiations, includ-
ing some interesting manipulation of the public to back the dueling, are a
sharp case of dueling examined by Diana Panke in Chapter 2. Negoti-
ations over Kosovo at Rambouillet in February 1999, over Syria in Geneva
I and II in February 2012 and February 2014, and negotiations in Sri
Lanka in 2006 through 2008 were all cases of dueling. In the first two cases
talks were later revived when the situation on the ground (including the
disposition of external players) had changed. For this reason, the choice of
the EU–Greece case is particularly instructive; one side finally capitulated.
Negotiators can of course stop dueling any time they want, but they have
to make sure that the decision to change is reciprocated, i.e. that both sides
agree to change, or else one party’s move will simply be seized upon as
capitulation. So duelers can come to an agreement, since their mode is
reciprocation if they snap, after appropriate and delicate soundings, to an
outcome that takes the best of both positions into account. This may
involve selected concessions or, better yet, compensation through an
exchange of items to which they assign different values (Nash 1950;
Homans 1961). The breakout of the deadlock in the first (2005) Iranian
negotiations was accomplished this way and permitted a pattern of driving
in the second (2013–2015) round. Examples are also to be found in
Chapter 6 by Crump. An unusual, well-executed reciprocated change
from dueling to driving occurred after the opening of the Israeli–
Palestinian talks at Oslo in 1993 (Zartman 1997b). Like all the others
above and below, illustrations are illustration, not perfect fits.
The second pattern is driving, in which the parties push and pull each
other gradually toward a convergence point, matching concessions and
compensations, as the parties work on each other down toward an
agreement. This too is a pattern of reciprocal behavior, in which softness
has led to softness and a high critical risk on the part of both parties leads
the process toward agreement, although only a comparison of the critical
risks can tell how long the concession game will go on or which side the
outcome will favor (if at all). In critical risk terms (Zeuthen 1930; Pillar
1983), each side bets on the chances of the other side’s concessions and of
the acceptability of a deadlock if it does not concede. This is an enlight-
ened version of a Chicken Dilemma Game (CDG) where the parties want
10 Introduction

to avoid a deadlock and so see the situation as an incitement to create a

mutually enticing outcome (MEO) (Goldstein 2010) (again only a car-
dinal depiction of the CGD can show which side the MEO will favor, if
any). Thus driving parties attempt to establish an ethos of requitement,
persuading the opponent that they will reciprocate any positive move and
expect the other to do the same, and also that a deadlock would be quite
unacceptable to them; that is, the expected cost of breakdown is much
higher than the expected benefit of agreement (Pillar 1983, 92–93). In
terms of security points or alternatives, when the alternative to a negoti-
ated agreement (BATNA, XSlo and YSlo in Figure I.1) is – or at least is
portrayed as – lower in value than an agreement and both parties are

Ar

YShi
Ey

Yr
Er
YE
E

Br
YSlo
Ex

X X
I XSlo XE Xr XShi B
Y

Figure I.1. Effects of reframing and of high or low security points

(BATNAs). AEB = zero-sum frontier; ArErBr = reframed positive-sum
frontier; YShi or YSlo = Y’s high or low security levels/BATNAs; XShi
or Xlo = X’s high or low security levels/BATNAs.
 Introduction 11

motivated by this shared difference, they play their bargaining against it to

gain concessions and arrive at an agreement (E) better than their unnego-
tiated alternatives, both sides caught between “it cannot fail” and
“we cannot give in.” This element of undergirding agreement is possible
because in driving the parties have come to an understanding on
the Formula for their negotiations (Zartman 1997a). They are now in
the stage of details and, although they can backtrack if the Formula is not
adequate, they have a basis on which to bargain as they seek to correctly
implement the Formula.
However, where the agreement will land depends on the position of
one party’s security point relative to the others’, and on the parties’ ability
to reframe their issues to produce a more positive sum than before, as
often happens within an endgame, as Druckman develops in Chapter 7.
If one party can get much the same result without negotiating and so its
security point is high (XShi in Figure I.1) and the other’s is low (YSlo), a
likely agreement (Ex) would be more favorable to the first (X) than to the
second (Y). If the reverse obtains (XSlo/YShi), the reverse outcome (Ey)
is likely to eventuate. However, if the parties are able to reframe the issues
in a way that produces benefits for both of them (the Ar/Br curve instead
of A/B), an outcome more attractive to both can be produced, with fewer
unaddressed issues left on the table, even if the security points of both
parties are high (Er), as discussed further in Chapter 15 by P. Terrence
Hopmann. (Figure I.1 also shows that, if both parties’ BATNAs are high,
as portrayed in the dueling pattern [XShi, YShi], they will need to
reframe the issues if they are to reach an agreement [Er] at all).
Decisions in driving will be creative and goal-oriented, looking for
possibilities of reframing the issues if necessary, enlarging an outcome
and crafting an agreement that maximizes the reach toward the min-
imum requirements of the parties. They will depend on an evaluation of
accumulated benefits, against “must-have red lines” and low BATNAs.
Although operating under the shadow of their security points, parties
tend to be convinced of the value of the agreement within their ZOPA
and decide individual issues on the basis of their requirement and
the issues’ contributions to maintaining the landing pad in prospect.
As agreement is given a value of its own, the cost of failure increases
(i.e. BATNA drops) as the parties move toward closure. Negotiators try
to maintain confidentiality during the final process to avoid misleading
leaks that would help spoilers; nothing is revealed until all is revealed, in
principle. The stage is cleared of minor issues at the beginning and even
issues of middling importance are handled early, to create momentum
and atmosphere. But at the same time, controlled communication is
important to keep public confidence but manage expectations, assuring
12 Introduction

support but controlling information. Parties try to build mutual trust to

facilitate the process, although they may turn tactically to dueling as a
threat or goad to remind of the push of a painful stalemate – but not too
much or too often or they will create a mismatched pattern and destroy
trust, as F. W. de Klerk did in South Africa in 1992.
Driving parties may have shared or different purposes, but will look for
concessions and compensations to build an agreement; where different
purposes make these difficult, parties will seek construction to reframe
the issues. In a driving encounter, parties tend to take apart issues and
handle them either seriatim or grouped for trade-offs. Focal points such
as split-the-difference will be useful where other, substantive criteria fall
short of agreement (Schüßler 2018). Working groups on individual
issues inhibit compensation among issues but facilitate mosaic
agreement. Deadlines can have a catalytic effect in producing agreement
but can be postponed to make eventual agreement possible as well, as
Angelika Rettberg and Carlo Nasi discuss in Chapter 3, and Larry
Crump discusses in Chapter 6. Although these actions appear positive,
they require effort and creativity to construct an agreement over stringent
“red lines,” playing against low security points for both sides, where the
deep unattractiveness of no-agreement (southeast corner) in the chicken
game creates a strong incentive to fill the northwest box with a mutually
enticing opportunity (MEO), as Andrew Kydd discusses in Chapter 11.
Deadlock on a stumbling block to the whole package often requires a
senior political figure to take over the bargaining and make for closure, as
shown a number of times in Chapter 6 by Larry Crump and in the Sudan
negotiations (Johnson 2011). The 2015 Iran non-proliferation negoti-
ations for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) are a rich case
of driving.
Again not surprisingly, driving is likely to produce a MEO somewhere
between the parties’ positions going into the endgame, although it must
not be thought that the parties will lock arms and dance to an agreement
or that the endpoint will be exactly in the middle. The preceding sen-
tence gives the key to the hard bargaining as each side, knowing/believing
that the other wants an agreement and therefore is willing to accept less
than its maximum, moderate, or even bottom demands, tries to pub-
lically wave the danger of collapse at their opponents – again the matter
of critical risk. It is at this point that the danger of approach–avoidance
analyzed in Chapter 14 by Dean G. Pruitt comes into view, threatening
to turn the driving process into a sudden duel. At some point, a “crest”
or final turning point may occur, after which the rest of the items are
rapidly resolved and the general feeling is one of being in the “home
stretch” (Zartman & Berman 1982, 188; Druckman 1986; Johnson
 Introduction 13

2011, 141). A crest is a point in the negotiations where enough is agreed

upon to constitute an acceptable accord, whatever else may be raised
(and is therefore a temptation to raise whatever else). A rich illustration is
found in the JCPOA negotiations of 2014–2015 with Iran. French
negotiations with Algeria versus Germany vividly illustrate how negoti-
ations at the crest can be either upset or untouched by external events,
depending on the strength of the commitment built up to that point, as
laid out in Chapter 5 by Valerie Rosoux. The 1990–1994 negotiations
between the National Party and the African National Congress in South
Africa, with all their ups and down, are another example, as were the
Northern Ireland negotiations of 1998. The examples amply show that
driving often produces an agreement but does not guarantee that out-
come, and does not obviate hard bargaining along the way.
For that, it may require third-party attention, so that the mediator
becomes the driver, bringing the conflicting parties along in its efforts.
Although mediation was seen to be unwelcome in dueling, there is
frequently an important place for it in creating a driving pattern, as
Chester Crocker emphasizes in Chapter 17. The most important phase
of the mediator’s work, at the beginning of the mediation and before
the endgame, is to ripen the parties’ perception that they are in a
stalemate and it hurts, and that a way out is available. Only then can
the mediator turn to helping fashion a MEO in the endgame. Thus, the
mediator needs to awaken the parties’ awareness to all the elements –
reciprocity, requitement, ZOPA, realistic security points – that they
would have developed by themselves in preparation for a directly negoti-
ated endgame but could not, and to keep them on track to the end. In a
word, the mediator begins by wanting an agreement more than the
parties, contrary to the popular assumption, and then has to transfer that
desire and need to the parties – or they would not need a mediator. This
was the case in the Namibian–Angolan negotiations, beginning in
1980 with the endgame in 1986–1987 (Crocker 1992), in the Sudanese
negotiations beginning in May 2002 until the endgame from October
2003 to May 2004 (Johnson 2011), in the Mozambican negotiations
beginning in the last version in July 1990 with the endgame between
August and October 1992 (Hume 1994), and in the Mindanao negoti-
ations in the latest round in 2010 with the endgame in 2014–2015
(Hopmann & Zartman 2014), among others. In these and other cases,
closure was completed through the action of the mediator as the driver.
The same two types, but unilaterally and non-reciprocally mis-
matched, produce a different pattern when one party behaves as a dueler
and the other as a driver. Each party expects the other party to operate on
the same model; if this is not the case, the bilateral logic of the behavior is
14 Introduction

destroyed, or indeed betrayed, and the parties become suspicious and

hostile of the other in mismatching. Each expects to find requitement in
his own terms, but when it is not forthcoming, the relationship turns very
sour. The dueler sees the driver as a softy and a patsy, the driver sees the
dueler as an exploiter, and the pattern is upset since it is not clear which
pattern is dominant (Rubin & Brown 1975, 158–159.) Gorbachev and
Reagan at the end of Reykjavík and Frederik de Klerk and Nelson
Mandela at the end of the CODESA phase are telling human examples.
These are interpersonal illustrations but, when the two sides meet, each
may be bearing a different pattern and expectation. Prime Minister
Menachem Begin came to Camp David I as a dueler and President
Anwar Sadat as a driver; the mediation of President Carter aside, the
meeting would have fallen apart if Begin’s staff (as opposed to Prime
Minister Begin) had not been bent on driving and despite the fact that
Sadat’s staff (as opposed to President Sadat) was mainly bent on dueling
(Quandt 1995). Many negotiations are mismatched, leading either to
collapse or to mutual socialization in one direction or another. The
socialization-on-the-job has to be dominated by one side/pattern or the
other, lest it merely solidify and intensify the mismatching. Parties and
Western mediators have often worked on rebel groups with no sense of
negotiation except dueling, to try to inculcate some ideas of driving
behavior, as in Darfur, Rwanda, El Salvador, Colombia, Bahrain, Casa-
mance, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere.
The third pattern is dragging, in which the parties alone or severally
come to see the outcome toward which they are heading as undesirable
and realize that they do not like it. They then work instead to provide a
soft landing that ends the negotiations without damage. The realization
can come in many terms: that the Formula is not really agreed or
adequate, that the details do not lend themselves to an agreement that
translates the Formula, that the negotiations are simply not heading
toward an enticing outcome, that insistence on a precise solution or an
issue would derail the rest of the agreement, and so on. The result can be
an effort to call it all off, or simply to push an issue or several aside,
putting off for later attention or inattention. Reciprocity, critical risk, and
Formulas do not play a systemic role, if they play any role at all. Camp
David II was not a case either of dueling or of driving but simply of
Arafat’s reluctance to negotiate at all, while everyone else was busy
coming up with ideas. Reagan dragged on the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) at Reykjavík in 1986 and dragged down the entire pending agree-
ment when Gorbachev threw in the issue at the last minute.
Dragging can also be partial and positive, indeed the key to an out-
come containing all the other points on which agreement was possible
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 au plus justement qu’il peurent ce jour tous les
camps, et y misent jusques as vespres bien bas. Au
20 soir, ensi que li rois d’Engleterre devoit aller au souper,
retournèrent li doi chevalier devers le roy, et
fisent juste raport de tout ce que il avoient veu et
trouvé. Si disent que onze chiés de princes estoient
demoret sus le place, quatre vingt banerés et douze
25 cens chevaliers d’un escut, et environ trente mil
hommes d’autres gens. Si loèrent li rois d’Engleterre,
li Princes ses filz et tout li signeur grandement Dieu,
et de bon corage, de le belle journée que il leur avoit
envoiie, que une puignie de gens que il estoient, ens
30 ou regart des François, avoient ensi desconfis leurs
ennemis. Et par especial li rois d’Engleterre et ses
filz complaindirent longement le mort dou vaillan
[191] roy de Behagne, et le recommendèrent grandement
et chiaus qui dalés lui estoient demoret. Si arrestèrent
encores là celle nuit, et le lundi au matin il ordonnèrent
dou partir.
5 Et fist li dis rois d’Engleterre, en cause de pité
et de grasce, tous les corps des grans signeurs,
qui là estoient demoret, prendre et oster desus le
terre et porter en un monastère priés de là, qui
s’appelle Montenai, et ensepelir en sainte terre. Et
10 fist à savoir sus chiaus dou pays que il donnoit
triewes trois jours pour cerchier le camp de Creci et
ensevelir les mors; et puis chevauça oultre par devers
Moustruel sus Mer. Et si mareschal coururent
devers Hedin, et ardirent Waubain et Serain; mès
15 au chastiel ne peurent il riens fourfaire, car il est
trop fors, et si estoit bien gardés. Si se logièrent ce
lundi sus le rivière de Hedin, au lés devers Blangis.
Et l’endemain il passèrent oultre, et chevaucièrent
devers Boulongne; si ardirent en leur chemin le ville
20 de Saint Josse et le Nuef Chastiel, et puis Estaples, le
Delue et tout le pays de Boulenois. Et passèrent entre
 les bos de Boulongne et le forest de Hardelo, et vinrent
jusques à le grosse ville de Wissan. Là se loga
li dis rois et li princes et toute li hos, et s’i rafreschirent
25 un jour; et le joedi s’en partirent, et s’en
vinrent devant le forte ville de Calais. Or, parlerons
un petit dou roy de France, et compterons comment
il persevera.

§ 287. Quant li rois Phelippes fu partis de la

30 Broie, ensi que ci dessus est dit, à moult seule gent,
il chevauça celle nuit tant que le dimence il vint en
[192] le bonne cité d’Amiens, et se loga dehors en l’abbeye
dou Gart. Quant li rois fu là arrestés, li baron et li
signeur de France et de son conseil, qui demandoient
pour lui, y arrestèrent ossi, ensi que il venoient. Encores
5 ne savoit li dis [rois[358]] le grant perte des nobles
et des proçains de son sanc que il avoit perdus. Ce dimence
au soir, on l’en dist le vérité. Si regreta grandement
monsigneur Charle son frère, conte d’Alençon,
son neveu le conte de Blois, son serourge le
10 bon roi de Behagne, le conte de Flandres, le duch
de Loeraingne, et tous les barons et les signeurs, l’un
apriès l’autre.
Et vous di que messires Jehans de Haynau estoit
adonc dalés lui, et cils en qui il avoit le plus grant
15 fiance. Et liquelz fist un moult biel service à monsigneur
Godemar dou Fay, car li rois estoit si fort courouciés
sus lui que il le voloit faire pendre; et l’euist
fait sans faute, se n’euist esté li dis messires Jehans
de Haynau, qui li brisa son aïr et escusa le dit monsigneur
20 Godemar. Et estoit la cause que li rois disoit
que cilz s’estoit mauvaisement acquittés de garder le
Blanke Take, et que par sa mauvaise garde li Englès
estoient passet oultre en Pontieu: pour quoi il avoit
receu celle perte et ce grant damage. Au pourpos
25 dou roy s’enclinoient bien li aucun de son conseil,
 qui volsissent bien que li dis messires Godemars
l’euist comparet, et l’appelloient traitteur; mès li
genlilz chevaliers dessus nommés l’escusa, et de
raison par tout. Car comment peuist il avoir deffendu
30 ne resisté à le poissance des Englès, quant toute
[193] li fleur de France mise ensamble n’i peurent riens
faire?
Si passa li rois son mautalent adonc, au plus biel
qu’il peut, et fist faire les obsèques, l’un après l’autre,
5 de ses proçains. Et puis se parti d’Amiens, et donna
toutes manières de gens d’armes congiet, et retourna
devers Paris.
Et jà avoit li rois d’Engleterre assegiet le forte ville
de Calais.

FIN DU TEXTE DU TOME TROISIÈME.

 VARIANTES.

§ 181. P. 1, ligne 1: Vous avés.—Ms. d’Amiens: Vous avés bien

chy dessus oy parler d’un respit et d’unes trieuwes qui furent
données et acordéez entre le roy englès et le roy David d’Escoce et
leur pays, sauf tant que li castiaux de Struvelin et li castiaux de
Rosebourcq, que messires Guillaumme de Montagut aida jadis à
parfaire et fortefiier contre les Escos, estoient mis hors de le trieuwe,
de quoy, revenut le roy englès en Engleterre, li Escot bastirent
tantost un siège devant Struvelin, et tant l’assaillirent et
constraindirent que il couvint le dit castiel rendre as Escos. Et s’en
partirent chil qui dedens estoient et qui loinguement l’avoient tenut
contre les dis Escos, simplement, car riens dou leur n’enportèrent.
Assés tost apriès la prisse de Struvelin, li biaux castiaux de
Rosebourcq fu emblés de nuit et escielléz, et pris li castellains qui le
gardoit, et jusques à six Englès avoecq lui, et li demorans tous ochis,
de quoy li rois englès fu de ces avenues moult courouchiéz et dist
bien que il l’amenderoit temprement et le feroit chier comparer as
Escos.
Ossi vous avés chi dessus oy parler coumment li roys englès
amoit si ardamment la belle contesse de Sallebrin, qu’il ne s’en pooit
ne savoit consillier, coumment que li comtes de Sallebrin, ses maris,
fu li ungs des plus privés de son consseil et li ungs de chiaux qui le
plus loyaument l’avoit tous jours servi. Si advint que pour l’amour de
la ditte damme et pour le grant desirier qu’il avoit de lui veoir, et sus
le couleur ossi pour remoustrer à ses gens le despit que li Escot li
avoient fait et encorres se mettoient il en painne dou faire tous les
jours qu’il avoient reconcquis le fort castiel de Rosebourcq et tout le
pays jusques à le chité de Bervich, et pour avoir sour ce le consseil
de ses gens quel cose on l’en volroit conssillier, il avoit fait criier une
grant feste de jouste à le Candeler, l’an mil trois cens quarante deux,
qui devoit durer quinze jours, en le cité de Londrez, et avoit mandet
par tout son royaumme et autre part, si acertes que il pooit, que tout
seigneur, baron, chevalier, escuier, dammes et dammoiselles y
venissent, si chier qu’il avoient l’amour de lui, sans nulle
escuzanche. Et coummanda especiaument au comte de Salebrin
que il ne laissast nullement que la comtesse sa femme n’y fust et
que elle n’amenast touttez lez dammes et dammoiselles que elle
pooit avoir entours lui. Li dis coens li ottria vollentiers, car il n’y
penssoit mies che qu’il y avoit. Et la bonne dame ne l’osa escondire,
mès elle y vint mout à envis, car elle penssoit bien pour quoy
c’estoit; et si ne l’osoit descouvrir à son marit, car elle se sentoit bien
si avisée et si atemprée que pour oster le roy de ceste oppinion. Et
devés savoir que là fu la comtesse de Montfort, et estoit jà arivée en
Engleterre un grant tamps devant la feste, et avoit fait sa complainte
au roy moult destroitement. Et li rois li avoit en couvent de renforcier
son comfort, et le faisoit sejourner dallés madamme le royne, sa
femme, pour atendre le feste et le parlement qui seroit à Londrez.
Fº 73 vº.
—Ms. de Rome: En ce temps estoit publiie une très grosse feste
qui devoit estre en la chité de Londres de quarante chevaliers et de
quarante esquiers dedens, parmi le roiaulme d’Engleterre et aussi
en Alemagne, en Flandres, en Hainnau et en Braibant. Et avoient
tout chevalier et esquier qui venir i voloient, de quelconques pais
que il fuissent, sauf conduit alant et retournant. Et estoit la feste
ordonnée à la relevée de la roine Phelippe d’Engleterre d’un fil que
elle avoit eu: si ques auquns de ces chevaliers qui estoient venu de
France en Escoce, s’en retournèrent par Londres arrière en lor pais
sans peril et sans damage. Fº 88.

§ 182. P. 2, l. 28: Ceste feste.—Ms. d’Amiens: Ceste feste fu

grande et noble que on n’avoit mies en devant veue plus noble en
Engleterre. Et y furent li comtez Guillaumme de Haynnau et
messires Jehans de Haynnau, ses onclez, et des Haynuiers, avoecq
les dessus dis, li sirez d’Enghien, messires Robers de Bailloeil, li
sirez de Lens, li castellains de Havrech, li sirez de Gonmigniez, li
sirez de Sars, li sirez de Faignuellez, li sirez de Mastaing, li sirez de
Chin, li sirez de Wargni, messires Sansses de Biaurieu, li sirez de
Montegni et messires Oufflars de Ghistellez. Et eult à le dite feste
bien douze comtes, huit cens chevaliers, cinq cens damez et
pucellez, touttez de hault linage. Et fu bien dansée et bien joustée
par l’espasse de quinze jours, sauf tant que uns moult gentilz et
jouenes bachelers y fu tués au jouster par grant mesavenue: che fu
messires Jehans, aisnés fils à monseigneur Henri, visconte de
Biaumont en Engleterre, biau chevalier jone, hardi; et portoit d’asur
semet de fleur de lis d’or à ung lion d’or rampant et ung baston de
gheullez parmy l’escut. Touttes les dammes et damoisellez furent de
si riche atour que estre pooient, chacune seloncq son estat, excepté
madamme Aelis, la comtesse de Sallebrin. Celle y vint le plus
simplement atournée quelle peult, par tant qu’elle ne volloit mies que
li roys s’abandonnast trop de lui regarder, car elle n’avoit penssée ne
vollenté d’obeir au roy en nul villain cas qui pewist tourner à le
deshonneur de li, ne de son marit.
Or vous noummeray lez contez d’Engleterre qui furent à ceste
feste, ossi bien que je me sui hastés de noummer les Haynuyers;
premiers, messires Henris au Tor Col, coens de Lancastre, messires
Henris, ses filz, comtez Derbi, messires Robers d’Artois, comtes de
Richemont, li coens de Norrenton et de Clocestre, li comtez de
Warvich, li comtes de Sallebrin, li comtez de Pennebrucq, li comtez
de Herfort, li comtez d’Arondiel, li comtez de Cornuaille, li comtez de
Okefort, li comtez de Sufforch et le baron de Stanfort, et tant de
barons et de chevaliers que li noummiers seroit uns detris.
Ainschois que ceste noble et grant feste fust departie, li roys
Edouwars eut et rechupt pluisseurs lettrez qui venoient de pluisseurs
seigneurs et de divers pays, de Gascoingne, de Bayone, de
Bretaingne, de Flandrez de par d’Artevelle à qui il avoit grant amour,
et des marces d’Escoce, dou signeur de Parsi et dou seigneur de
Ros, et ossi des bourgois et de le cité de Bourdiaux sus Geronde,
qui moult estoient constraint dez Franchois par terre et par aige, si
ques li roys respondi, par le consseil de tous ses hommez, voirez de
son consseil, as dis messaigez, si à point que chacuns s’en
contenta. Encorrez de rechief auques sus le partement de le feste,
ungs messages vint en grant haste deviers le roy et li apporta
nouvellez et lettrez de par monseigneur Edouwart de Bailloel,
cappitainne et souverain de le cité de Bervich. Et disoient ces lettrez
que li Escot faisoient ung très grant appareil et grant mandement
pour entrer environ Pasquez en Engleterre, et que sour ce il
ewissent consseil. Ensi eult li rois grant mestier d’avoir bon avis; car
sus l’estet qui venoit, trop de guerrez li apparoient de tous lés, car
ossi devoit li trieuwe fallir de li et dou roy de Franche, qui fu prise et
accordée à Arras en Pikardie, si comme il est chy desus contenus
en ceste histoire. Or eut li roys englès pluisseurs ymaginations, car
briefment il volloit secourir et comforter la comtesse de Montfort, ensi
que juret et proummis li avoit; et se ne fust che que il tendoit à aller
sus Escoche, il fust en propre personne adonc venus en Bretaigne.
Si ordonna et pria à monseigneur Robert d’Artois, son cher cousin,
que il y volsist aler et prendre tant de gens d’armes et d’archiers que
pour resister contre monseigneur Carle de Blois et reconcquerir le
pays concquis. Messires Robers li acorda vollentiers et fist sour ce
ses pourveances. Fos 73 vº et 74.
—Ms. de Rome: A celle feste vinrent de Hainnau li contes
Guillaumes, frères à la roine Phelippe, et messires Jehans de
Hainnau son oncle, li sires d’Enghien, li sires de Ligne, li sires de
Haverech, li sires de Gommegnies et pluisseurs chevaliers de
Hainnau et de Hollandes. Et durèrent les festes quinse jours. Et vint
dedens les festes la contesse de Montfort, qui amena Jehan son fil
et sa fille. Dont li rois ot grant joie et dist à la contesse: «Ma cousine,
vous me laisserés ces deux enfans, et je lor serai
pères.»—«Monseigneur, respondi la contesse, pour ce les ai je
amenés, et je les vous donne.» Li rois les mist tantos avoecques la
roine sa fenme. Li fils avoit neuf ans, et la fille quatre ans.
Celle feste fu bien joustée et bien festée. Et en ot le pris des
chevaliers de dehors li contes de Hainnau, et de ceuls de dedens
messires Renauls de Gobehen; et des esquiers d’Engleterre Jehan
de Qopelant; de ceuls de dedens et de ceuls de dehors, uns
esquiers de Flandres qui se nonmoit Franqe de Halle, et adonc le
retint li rois d’Engleterre, et devint son honme li dis esquiers.
 La feste se fust bien portée, mais il avint de cas de fortune que
mesires Jehans de Biaumont d’Engleterre, ainnés fils à messire
Henri de Biaumont, fu mors à ces joustes, dont on fu durement
courouchié.
A celle feste furent ordonné de par le roi et son consel liquel
iroient en Gascongne, à Bourdiaus et à Baione, et liquel en Bretagne
avoecques la contesse de Montfort, et liquel iroient tenir la frontière
d’Escoce, car li rois d’Escoce estoit retournés de France en son
pais; si ques on supposoit en Engleterre que il vodroit guerriier: pour
tant i voloient les Englois pourveir. Si i furent ordonné d’aler tenir la
frontière à l’encontre des Escoçois et demorer en la bastide de
Rosebourch messires Guillaumes de Montagut qui depuis fu contes
de Sasleberi; et aussi d’aler tenir la frontière contre les Irlandois
furent ordonné li contes d’Ormont et li contes de la Marce. Ces
festes passées, tout li signeur estrangier prissent congiet au roi et à
la roine et se departirent d’Engleterre, et retourna casquns en son
pais. Li contes de Hainau et mesires Jehans de Hainnau son oncle
montèrent à port à Ourvelle et arivèrent à Dourdresc en Hollandes.
Si demora li contes ens ou pais de Hollandes, et aussi fist son oncle,
qui sires estoit de Sconenehove et de la Hode, et li Hainnuier
retournèrent en Hainnau. Ensi furent faites ces departies. Fº 88 vº.
P. 3, l. 8: tués à jouster.—Ms. B 6: Et l’ochist le conte de Haynau,
mais amender ne le povoit. P. 219.
P. 5, l. 8 et 9: le signeur de Boursier.—Le nom de ce chevalier est
omis dans les mss. A 1 à 6, fº 101.

§ 183. P. 5, l. 16: En ce temps.—Ms. d’Amiens: Encorres fu il

consilliet au roy que il envoiast l’evesque de Lincolle deviers le roy
David d’Escoce, son serourge, pour tretier une trieuwe à durer deux
ans ou troix, car tant de grosses besoingnes li appairoient à l’estet
prochain que il ne poroit mies bonnement à touttes respondre. Li
roys ne s’acordoit mies à ce consseil et disoit que ce seroit à trop
son grant blamme se il requeroit les Escos de trieuwe; mès ses
conssaulx li disoit: «Salve se grace,» car il avoit par tant de foix ars
et courut sus les Escos que de ce ne pooit avoir nul reprouvier, et
que c’estoit grans sens pour un seigneur, quant il a troix ou quattre
guerrez, et il en poet l’une atrieuver, l’autre amoiener, le tierce
apaisier, et le quarte guerriier: si ques li roys, par le consseil de sez
hommez, pria à l’evesque de Lincolle que il y volsist aller. Et chils
l’acorda vollentiers. Enssi se departi ceste feste. Li comtes
Guillaumez de Haynnau et messires Jehans de Haynnau prissent
congiet au roy et à le roynne, et s’en retournèrent arrière en leur
pays avoecquez leurs gens. Si envoya li roys le seigneur de Fil
Wautier, le seigneur de Pont Cardon, messire Jehans Camdos, qui
estoit adonc jones bacelers, le seigneur de Multonne, le seigneur de
Brassetonne, le seigneur de Lantonne et pluiseurs autrez, à tout
deux cens armurez de fier et cinq cens archiers, à Bourdiaux et à
Baione, pour aidier à deffendre le frontierre contre le comte de Lille,
le comte de Pierregoth, le comte de Quarmain, le comte de
Commignez, le comte de Villemur, le seigneur de la Barde, le comte
de Bruniqiel et pluiseur aultre qui là tenoient les camps et y
faissoient très forte guerre et herioient si chiaux de Bourdiaux, que il
n’osoient wuidier hors de leur ville. Or lairons ung petit à parler de ce
et retourons à l’evesque de Lincolle, et quel cose il trouva en
Escoce, et coumment il fu respondus dou dessus dit mesage qu’il
portait de par le roy d’Engleterre, son seigneur.
Il est bien voirs que li evesques de Lincolle esploita tant par ses
journées qu’il vint à Bervich, où il fu liement recheus de monseigneur
Edouwart de Bailloeil, qui en estoit cappittainne. Là sejourna li
evesques tant que ungs hiraux d’Engleterre eut estet en Escoce
querre ung sauf conduit au roy qui se tenait en Haindebourcq, pour
le dit evesque et toutte se mesnie: si ques sus le sauf conduit li
evesquez se parti et s’en vint devers le roy David et les barons et
seigneurs d’Escoce. Il fu volentiers oys de tout ce qu’il leur
remoustra, et li respondirent qu’il en aroient avis. Si fu la responsce
telle et faite d’un baron d’Escoche, messire Archebaux Douglas, et
dist: «Sire, li rois mon seigneur et tous ses conssaux ont bien oy ce
que vous requerés. C’est li entension dou roy nostre seigneur et de
ses hommez, que nul respit vous n’enporterez ne arrés; car nous
sommes tout pourveu de gueriier sus le roy d’Engleterre et sus son
pays, et de contrevengier les despis et dammaiges qu’il nous a fais.»
Et quant li evesques de Lincolle entendi che, si fu tous courouchiéz
et se repenti moult, quant onequez y avoit entré pour faire messaige.
Si se parti adonc des Escos sans congiet et sans amour, et s’en
revint au plus tost qu’il peult en Engleterre et trouva le roy à Londrez
et une partie de son consseil à qui il fist relation de son messaige. Et
quant li roys l’eut oy, si fu durement courouchiés et dist bien que,
tout maugré lui et son consseil, on li avoit envoiiet, et que jammais
cilx blasmes ne lui seroit absolz. Tant estoit li roys yreux que à
painnes le pooit on appaisier, et dist que jammès n’aresteroit, si aroit
si menet les Escos et si destruit leur pays, que jammais ne seroit
recouvret, en quel aventure qu’il dewist mettre che qui dechà le mer
estoit. Si envoiia tantost as pors et as havenes de mer coummander
que on ne laiaist nullui passer jusques à tant que on oroit autres
nouvellez. Et fu par ensi detriiés li voiaiges de monseigneur Robert
d’Artois et de la comtesse de Montfort qui en grant destrèce de coer
estoit de ces avenues. Ossi chil qui devoient aller en Gascoingne
furent contremandet. Et fist li roys ung especial mandement et
coumandement à estre touttez mannierres de gens portant armes, à
Ewruich, le jour de le Pasque ou trois jours apriès; et qui en
deffauroit, il perderoit sa terre, le royaume d’Engleterre et l’amour
dou roy. Fº 74.
P. 6, l. 17: Ewruich.—Mss. A 1 à 6: Bervich. Fº 101 vº.

§ 184. P. 6, l. 21: Li jours.—Ms. d’Amiens: A che especial

mandement que li roys fist, ne s’osa nulz escuser ne delaiier qu’il ne
fust, et vinrent de tous lés d’Engleterre à Ewruic, et furent là en
Paskèrez; meysmes la comtesse de Montfort, qui poursuivoit sa
besoingne, y vint avoecq monseigneur Robert d’Artois. Tant avoit li
roys englès là de gens, qu’il estoient bien cent mil, c’à piet, c’à
cheval; et tantost le jour de le Pasque passet, il se parti de Ewruich
et prist le chemin dou Noef Castiel sur Tin. Or entendirent li Escot
que li roys englès venoit sur yaus si efforchiement que toutte se
puissance y estoit avoecq lui, et en vollenté que de toutte destruire
et ardoir Escoce sans merchy. Si en furent, je vous di, li plus dou
pays d’Escoce tout effraé, car il sentoient leur pays et leur
besoingnes auques en bon estat, et point ne se veoient fort contre le
puissanche dou roy englès. Si se missent ensemble chil dou pais,
prelas, comtez, barons, chevalier et riche homme dez bonnez villez,
et vous dit qu’il y eut là mainte parolle retournée. Li aucun volloient
le guerre, li autre le respit; et li pluisseur amaissent mieux le pais, se
elle pewist estre. Si tenoient ossi li sage homme dou pays le roy à
outrageusement consilliet, quant telle responsce on avoit fait à
l’evesque de Lincolle, et que fort estoit se à ceste venue et
assamblée dou roy englèz trop cher ne le comparaient. Cez parolles
dessus dittez en plain parlement, present le roy et le grant consseil,
messires Guillaumme de Douglas, messires Jacquemes de Douglas,
ses onclez, messires Archebaux de Douglas, ses cousins, et tout chil
de ce sanch les reputoient à grant ynoranche et à grant faintisse. Et
disoient bien que c’estoient cil d’Escoche qui le plus à perdre avoient
aprièz le roy; mes pour aperdre villez et castiaux et tout leur
hiretaige, jà ne seroient en lieu ne en consseil où li oppinion de le
première responsce dessus faitte fuist brisie ne amoliie, car trop leur
retouroit à grant blamme et à vilain prejudisse à tous jours mès.
A che parlement y eut pluisseurs grosses parolles des uns as
autres, car chil de Douglas y estoient si grant et si cremut, et tant
avoient fait de biaux servicez au royaumme d’Escoche, que touttes
mannierrez de gens les en amoient, et meysmement li roys y
ajoustoit grant foy et grant sceurté. Nonpourquant il congnut assés
que li aucun s’astenoient assés de voir à dire pour le doubtanche
des dessus diz. Si emprist le parole de fait et dist: «Je sui, par le
grasce de Dieu, roi d’Escoche, et le tieng en hiretaige par le
sucession monseigneur Robert de Brus, de bonne memore, mon
chier père, qui vaillanment et poissanment le tint et deffendi, tant
qu’il vesqui, contre les Englèz. Depuis nous ont il fais moult de
dammaiges, lesquelx j’amenderoie vollentiers, se je pooie. Or
sommes nous emfourmet qu’il viennent très puissamment sour nous.
Si vous pri et carge en especial que vous me conssilliéz tellement
que ce soit à l’onneur de my et au commun prouffit de mon
royaumme, et que nuls n’y regarde grandeur, orgoeil, ne linage. Et
se vous sentés que nous soyons puissant pour combattre les
Englèz, se le dittes, et nous metons tout au devant à l’entrée de nos
pays.» Dont en y eut aucuns qui baissièrent les testez, et li aucun
qui se veurent acquitter, respondirent: «Sire, nenil, et ewissiens
encorrez otant de gens que nous avons.»—«Or coumande jou, dist li
roys, puisque combattre ne nous poons et que nous n’en sommes
point d’acort, que ceste besoingne soit dou tout cargie sur moy, sur
le comte de Moret, sus l’evesque de Saint Andrieu et sur l’evesque
d’Abredane.» Adonc tous li coummuns conssaux respondi: «Sire,
vous dittes bien.»
Ensi se departi chils parlemens, non que li roys d’Escoche
donnast congiet à ses gens, mès remforça son mandement de tous
lés; car il ne savoit mies coumment li tretiéz se porteroit entre lui et
le roy englèz. Conssaus entre ces quatre dessus noummés se porta
que li doy evesque, c’est assavoir chilz de Saint Andrieu et chilz
d’Abredane, se partirent d’Aindebourch, fondé et enfourmé quel
cose il devoient dire et faire, et vinrent sus sauf conduit deviers le
roy d’Engleterre à Durem, là où il se tenoit et attendoit ses os, et jà
en y avoit grant fuison au Noef Castiel sur Tin. Quant li doy evesque
d’Escoce dessus noummet furent devant le roy englès et aucun de
son consseil, telz que le comte de Lancastre, le comte Derbi,
monseigneur Robert d’Artois, le comte de Warvich, le comte de
Sallebrin, le comte de Norrenthon et de Clocestre, monseigneur
Richart de Stanfort, le seigneur de Biaucamp et messire Renaut de
Gobehen, ils enclinèrent le roy et tous les seigneurs par mannierre
de reverensce et dissent: «Sire, roys d’Engleterre, nous sommes
deviers vous envoiiet de par le roy d’Escoce, nostre seigneur, et tout
son consseil. On leur a dounnet à entendre que vous estez moult
esmeut de gueriier Escoce, enssi que vous avés fait autrefoix; et
bien est appairant ossi que la responsce que li evesquez de Lincole
vous fist, ne vous est mies bien agreable. Sachiés, sire, que à ce
jour que li evesques fu deviers nostre roy ou nom de vous, li rois,
nos sirez, avoit envoiiet en Franche deviers le roy Phelippe, pour ce
que certainnes convenences et alianches sont entre lui et le roy de
Franche. Et ne puet li roys nostre sirez, dounner, prendre, requerre,
demander ne accepter trieuwe ne respit enviers vous, sans le sceu
dou roy de France. En che s’est il obligiez et acouvenenchiéz par
sierment de roy solempnement juret et saielet. Or sont depuis li
messaiges qui en Franche avoient estet envoiiet, retournet, et puet
nos sirez, par le congiet dou roy de Franche, donner, accorder et
accepter trieuwez et respit jusques à un certain terme durant, dont il
n’est nus besoings de chy dire; mès nous sommes fort de par nostre
roy et tout son consseil de prendre et de dounner une trieuwe ung
an ou deux, s’acors le porte, et de che il vous en plaise à nous
respondre.»
Quant li roys englès eut oys les deux evesquez d’Escoce ensi
parler, si leur dist qu’il en responderoit vollentiers à l’endemain.
Ceste responsce leur souffi assés bien. Dont se conssilla li roys tout
ce jour quel cose en estoit bon affaire. Il voloit briefment, c’estoit
tous ses desirs, chevauchier avant sus Escoce, ou cas qu’il avoit ses
gens semons et assembléz en ceste instance. Touttez foix
finablement ses conssaux regarda et conssidera les besoingnes qu’il
avoit affaire en Franche, en Bretaingne et en Gascoingne, et que
ceste guerre as Escos leur estoit trop coustable et perilleuse à nul
prouffit; car s’il avoient tout ce que li royaummes d’Escoce puet finer,
il n’aroient mies le chevanche d’un droit si grant. Bien y pooient
mettre et peu prendre. Si consillièrent au roy que il presist une
bonne et ferme trieuwe à durer trois ans, puisqu’il l’en requeroient, et
que c’estoit grandement à sen honneur. Tant fu li roys conssilliéz
d’uns et d’autres que finablement une trieuwe fu acordée entre lez
Englès et les Escos, et devoit durer de ce jour jusques à le Saint
Jehan Baptiste, c’on compteroit l’an mil trois cens et quarante trois,
et de là en troix ans, et devoit chacuns tenir che qu’il tenoit. Et
pooient chevalier et escuier d’Escoce prendre les gages au roy
englèz, s’il leur plaisoit. Moult fu la comtesse de Monfort resjoïe de
ceste trieuwe, car par lez Escos avoient jà estet ses besoingnes
arrierées.
Ensi se departi ceste grande chevauchie. Et coumanda li roys au
seigneur de Fil Wautier, à monseigneur Jehan Camdos, au seigneur
de Multonne, au seigneur de Pont Cardon et à chiaux qui en
Gascoingne devoient aller, qu’il presissent leur carge de gens
d’armes et d’archiers et fesissent leur voiage. Dont s’appareillièrent li
dessus noummet signeur et vinrent au port de Hantonne, et
ordonnèrent là leur besoingne, et se missent en mer et singlèrent
deviers Gascoingne.
Or dirons de le comtesse de Montfort qui si bien exploita au roy
englès que li roys pria à monsigneur Robert d’Artois, au comte de
Sallebrin, au comte de Sufforch, au comte de Pennebrucq, au comte
de Kenfort et au baron de Stanfort et as pluisseurs autres, que il
volsissent prendre en cure lez besoingnes de le ditte comtesse, et
yaux partir hasteement d’Engleterre et venir en Bretaingne, et
gueriier tellement qu’il y ewissent honneur et la dame prouffit; et chil
signeur li eurent tout en couvent. Si se partirent dou roy et vinrent en
Cornuaille, et pourveyrent là leur navie pour venir en Bretagne. Si
estoient bien mil hommes d’armes et deux mil archiers et otant de
chevaux. De touttez ces gens estoit messires Robiers d’Artois chiés.
En che tamps escheirent les Pasquez si haut que environ Closes
Pasques eut on l’entrée dou mois de may, de quoy en le moyenné
de ce mois la trieuwe de monseigneur Carle de Blois et la comtesse
de Montfort devoit fallir. Or avoit la chevauchie d’Escoce si detriié la
besoingne de la dessus dite comtesse que la trieuwe estoit jà close,
quant elle se parti d’Engleterre. Si estoit bien messires Carlez de
Blois enfourmés dou pourcach que elle faisoit en Engleterre et de
l’ayde que ly roys englès ly devoit faire. Dont messires Loeys
d’Espaingne, messire Carlez Grimaus et messires Othon Doriie
estoient estaubli sus le mer à l’encontre de Grenesie, à trois mil
Geneuois et à mil hommez d’armes et seize gros vaissiaux
espagnolz, tous armés et tous fretéz, et waucroient sus le mer,
attendans leur revenue. D’autre part, messires Ghautiers de Mauni
et li signeur de Bretaigne et d’Engleterre qui dedens Hainbon se
tenoient, estoient durement esmervilliet de leur comtesse de ce que
elle demoroit tant, et si n’en ooient nullez certainnez nouvellez.
Nonpourquant, mout bien supposoient que elle ne demoroit mies
trop à se grant aise, et ne se doubtoient d’autre cose que elle n’ewist
eu aucun villain encontre sus mer de ses ennemis: se ne savoient
que pensser. Fos 74 vº et 75.
—Ms. de Rome: Mesires Carles de Blois fu enfourmés de verité
que son adversaire, la contesse de Montfort, estoit alée en
Engleterre au seqours, et i avoit mené ses enfans pour là demorer
dalés le roi. Si pensa sus li dis messires Carles moult longement, et
puis apella son cousin mesire Lois d’Espagne, ouquel ils avoit moult
grant fiance, et li dist: «Biaus cousins, ce seroit bon, se vous
l’acordiés, que une armée de gens d’armes de Geneuois et
d’Espagnols fust mise sus en la mer, et là waucrast, en attendant le
retour et la revenue de celle contesse de Montfort qui est alée en
Engleterre. Se nous le poions atraper, nostre gerre en seroit plus
belle.» A ce pourpos respondi li dis messires Lois et dist: «Vous
dites verité, et il en sera ce que vous vodrés, car je sui tous près à
faire vostre plaisir.»—«Grant merchis,» respondi messires Carles.
Depuis ne demora gaires de temps que mesires Lois d’Espagne, qui
bien savoit les usages et coustumes de la mer, se pourvei de barges
et de balengiers, et mist sus la mer son armée, où bien avoit deus
mille honmes parmi les Geneuois et les Espagnols, et disoit que
ceuls de sa partie n’avoient donné nulles trieuves sus mer, fors que
sus terre. Qant la contesse de Montfort ot ordonné toutes ses
besoingnes en Engleterre, et elle sceut quels gens elle aueroit, cinq
cens honmes d’armes et cinq cens archiers, et les devoient conduire
messire Robers d’Artois et li contes de Pennebruq, en lor compagnie
devoient estre li jones sires Espensiers, messires Edouwars,
mesires Guis de Briane, mesires Thomas de Walquefare, li sires de
Tallebot, li sires de Boursier, mesires Robers de Noefville, messires
Jehans Paule, mesires Lois Clifort, mesires Guillaume Chifeton,
mesire Richart de Pont Cardon et pluisseur aultre, et se ordonnèrent
et atendirent tout l’un l’autre à Pleumude.
Qant tout furent venu, gens d’armes et archiers, qui compagnier
devoient mesire Robert d’Artois et la contesse de Montfort, il
entrèrent en lors vassiaus et puis se desancrèrent et se missent en
mer, et orent si bonne aventure que onques ne veirent, ne
trouvèrent, ne encontrèrent la navie des Geneuois et des Espagnols,
des quels mesires Lois d’Espagne estoit chiés et conduisières, dont
depuis il furent moult esmervelliet: et la cause pourquoi ce fu, je le
vous dirai. Un petit avant ce que mesires Robers d’Artois et la
contesse de Montfort se departesissent dou havene de Plumude,
uns grans tourmens se mist sus mer, qui espardi tous ou en partie
les vassiaus à mesire Lois d’Espagne et à Othon Doriie et à Toudou,
et furent plus de quinse jours waucrant sus la mer et prendans terre
de isle en isle, avant que il se peuissent tous remetre ensamble. Et
en celle espasce la contesse de Montfort et mesire Robers d’Artois
entrèrent en Bretagne, et prissent terre ou havene de Brest et de
Hainbon, pour estre mieuls logiet à lor aise, dont messires Gautiers
de Mauni et tout li compagnon orent grant joie de lor revenue. Fº 89.
P. 6, l. 22: Evruic.—Mss. A 1 à 6, 8 et 9, 11 à 14, 18 et 19: Bervich.
Fº 101 vº.—Mss. A 20 à 23: Warwich, Fº 151.—Mss. A 23 à 29:
Everuich. Fº 117 vº.
P. 7, l. 5: Hartecelle.—Mss. A 1 à 6: Harteselle. Fº 101 vº.—Mss. A
20 à 22: Hartesellée. Fº 151.—Mss. A 23 à 29: Hartevelle. Fº 117.
P. 7, l. 6: quatre cens.—Mss. A 8, 9, 11 à 17, 20 à 29: trois cens.
Fº 93.—Mss. A 18, 19: à tout trois cens armeures de fier. Fº 102.
P. 7, l. 19 et 20: à l’encontre de Grenesie.—Mss. A 1 à 6: à
l’encontre, en l’isle de Grenasie. Fº 101 vº.—Mss. A 18, 19: à
l’entrée de Grenesie. Fº 102.—Mss. A 20 à 22: à l’endroit de
Gravelinges. Fº 151 vº.
P. 7, l. 21 à 23: en trente.... revenue.—Mss. A 1 à 6: et trente deux
gros vaisseaux espaignolz tous armez et tous fretez s’ancrèrent sur
la mer, attendans leur venue. Fº 101 vº.
P. 7, l. 22: waucroient.—Mss. A 8, 9, 11 à 17, 20 à 22: s’ancroient.
Fº 93.—Mss. A 18, 19: s’en entrèrent. Fº 102.

§ 185. P. 8, l. 3: Ensi.—Ms. d’Amiens: Ensi que messires Robiers

d’Artois, li comtez de Pennebrucq, li comtez de Sallebrin et li signeur
d’Engleterre et leurs gens, avoecq la comtesse de Montfort, nagoient
par mer au léz deviers Bretaingne, et avoient vent à souhet, au
departement de l’ille de Grenesie, à heure de relevée, il perchurent
le grosse navie des Geneuois, dont messires Loeys d’Espaingne
estoit chiéz. Dont dissent leur maronnier: «Seigneur, armés vous et
ordonnés vous, car vechy Geneuois et Espagnols qui viennent et qui
vous aprochent.» Lors sonnèrent li Englès leur trompettez et missent
les bannierrez et les pignons de Saint Jorge hors dessus leurs mas,
et chacuns barons par lui sa bannierre sus son vaissiel. Si
s’ordonnèrent bien sagement et s’encloirent de leurs archiers, et
puis nagièrent à plain voille enssi que li tamps là portoit; et pooient y
estre environ trente six vaissiaux, que grans, que petis, mès nuls si
grans, ne si fors de trop n’en y avoit que messires Loeys
d’Espaingne en avoit neuf. Et entre ces neuf avoit trois gallées qui
se remoustroient dessus tous lez autres; et en chacune de ces trois
gallées estoient li trois corps des seigneurs, messires Loeys,
messires Carlez, messires Othes. Si s’aprochièrent li vaissiel, et
coummenchièrent Geneuois à traire de leurs arsbalestrez à grant
randon, et li archier d’Engleterre ossi sour eux. Là eut grant tret des
uns vaissiaux as autres, et qui longement dura, et maint homme
navret et blechiet. Et quant li seigneur, li baron, li chevalier et li
escuier s’aprochièrent, et qu’il peurent des lanches et des espées
venir enssamble, adonc y eut dure bataille et crueuse, et trop bien s’i
portoient et esprouvoient li ung et li autre. Là estoit messires Robers
d’Artois, qui y fu très bon chevalier, et la comtesse de Montfort
armée, qui bien valloit ung homme, car elle avoit coer de lion, et
tenoit ung glaive moult roide et bien trenchant, et trop bien s’en
combatoit et de grant couraige. Là estoit messires Loeis d’Espaigne
en une gallée, comme bons chevaliers, qui vassaument et de grant
vollenté requeroit et se combatoit as Englèz, car moult les desiroit à
desconfire, pour lui contrevengier dou dammaige qu’il avoit euv et
recheuv ceste propre année asés priès de là, ou camp de Camperli.
Et y fist, ce sachiés, messires Loeys merveillez d’armes, et bien en
avoit l’avantaige, car il estoit en ung vaissiel qui se remontroit
deseure tous les autres, et si estoit si bons chevaliers par mer et par
terre. Là eurent li baron et li chevallier d’Engleterre ung très dur
encontre et perilleus, car il avoient affaire à forte gens, mais il
avoient bons cappittainnes et seurs chevaliers, bien deffendans et
bien assallans. Là eut fait mainte belle appertise d’armes, maint
homme mort, navré et maint reversé en l’aige, qui oncques puis ne
s’aidèrent. Si dura ceste bataille de relevée tout jusques au soir,
toudis combatant, trayant, lanchant et grans appertises d’armes
faisans. Si les convint sus le soir, par pure necessité, partir l’un de
l’autre et ancrer, car la vesprée se couvri, et une noire nuée monta,
qui l’air obscurchi durement. Lors se missent tout à l’ancre, et
entendirent as blechiés et as navrés remuer, bendeler et remettre à
point; et estoit leur entension que jammais de là ne partiroient, se
seroit li une des parties desconfite. Fº 75 vº.
P. 8, l. 4: Salebrin.—Les mss. A 23 à 33 ajoutent: le conte de
Sufforc, le conte de Kenfort, le baron de Stanfort, le seigneur
Despensier, le seigneur de Boursier. Fº 118.
P. 8, l. 8: Grenesie.—Mss. A 1 à 6: Gresile. Fº 102.—Mss. A 8, 9:
Grèce. Fº 93 vº.—Mss. A 15 à 17: Guenerre. Fº 103.—Mss. A 18,
19: Crète. Fº 102.
P. 9, l. 17 et 18: ou camp de Camperli.—Ces mots manquent dans
les mss. A 1 à 6, fº 102.

§ 186. P. 10, l. 4: Un petit.—Ms. d’Amiens: Ung petit devant

mienuit s’esleva ungs vens, ungs orages si très grans et une pleuve
si très grosse et ung tonnoirez et ungs esclistrez si mervilleux, que il
sambloit proprement que li mondez dewist finner. Et n’y avoit si hardi
ne si preu bacheler, ne qui tant ainmast les armez, qui ne volsist
bien estre à terre, car cez bargez et ces naves hurtoient lez unes as
autrez, et sambloit que elles se dewissent ouvrir et partir. Si
demandèrent consseil li seigneur d’Engleterre à leurs maronniers
quel cose leur estoit bon affaire; et il respondirent que d’iaux traire à
terre au plus tost qu’il poroient, car la fortune estoit si grande sus
mer, que, se li vens les y boutoit, il seroient tout en peril d’estre
noiiet. Dont entendirent il generaument à sachier lez ancrez amont
et les voilles, enssi qu’à demy quartier, et tantost eskipèrent et
eslongièrent il les ennemis qui gisoient devant yaux à l’ancre, qui
ossi n’estoient mies trop asceur. Et se boutèrent ou parfont et
n’osèrent sieuwir les Englès qui aprochoient terre, pour ce que leur
vaissiel estoient si grant que se il ewissent froté à terre en telle
fortune, il fuissent romput. Pour tant se missent il ou plus parfont;
mès à leur departement, il trouvèrent quatre nefs englesses cargies
de chevaux et de pourveanches, qui s’estoient tenut en sus de le
bataille. Si eurent bien consienche, quel tamps ne quel tempès qu’il
fesist, de prendre ces quatre vaissiauls et d’atachier as leurs, et de
prendre le haulte mer pour eskieuwer ce peril. Chilz vens et chil
fortune les bouta, ains qu’il fuist jours, plus de cent lieuwes enssus
dou lieu où il s’estoient combatu, et les nefs englesses arivèrent et
prissent terre à ung petit port assés priès de Vennes, dont il furent
tout resjoy quant il se trouvèrent à terre. Fº 75 vº.

§ 187. P. 11, l. 14: Ensi.—Ms. d’Amiens: Enssi et par ceste grant

fortunne se desrompi la bataille sus mer de monseigneur Robert
d’Artois et se routte à l’encontre de monseigneur Loeys d’Espaigne
et de ses gens. Si n’en scet on à qui donner l’onneur, car il se
partirent tout magret yaux et par le diverseté dou tamps. Touttez
voies, li Englès prissent terre assés priès de Vennes et ysirent hors
des vaissiaux, et missent leurs cevaux sus le sablon, touttez leurs
armeures et leurs pourveanches, et puis eurent consseil et advis dou
sourplus, coumment il se maintenroient. Si ordonnèrent à traire leur
navie deviers Hainbon et yaux aller devant Vennes, car assés
estoient gens pour assegier la dessus dite cité. Si se mirent et
chevauchièrent tout ordonneement celle part. Il n’eurent miez
gramment à aller, quant il y vinrent.
Adonc estoit dedens la cité de Vennes, de par monsigneur
Charlon de Blois, messires Hervis de Lion et messire Oliviers de
Clichon, li sirez de Tournemine et li sires de Lohiach, gardiiens et
cappittainnez de Vennes et dou pays environ. Quant chil seigneur
virent venus li Englès, et que il s’ordonnoient pour y mettre le siège,
si ne furent mies trop effraet, mès entendirent au castiel
premierement, puis as gharittes et as portes, et missent en chacune
porte ung chevalier et dix hommes d’armes, dix archiers et dix
arbalestriers, et s’ordounnèrent assés bien pour tenir et garder le
chité contre tous venans. Or vous parlerons de monseigneur Loeis
d’Espaingne et de se routte. Fos 75 vº et 76.
P. 11, l. 20: prisent terre.—Ms. B 6: Che fu environ le Saint Jehan
Baptiste l’an mil trois cens quarante deux que la guerre estoit jà
ouverte entre la contesse et Charle de Blois. Fº 220.
 § 188. P. 12, l. 16: Saciés.—Ms. d’Amiens: Sachiés que, quant cils
grans tourmens et ceste fortune eurent pris et eslevet et boutet en
mer le dessus dit monseigneur Loeys, il furent toutte ceste nuit et
l’endemain tant c’à nonne, moult tourmenté et en grant aventure de
leurs vies, et pardirent par le tourment deux de leurs petis vaissiaux
chargiés de pourveanchez; mais il en avoient concquis quatre sus
les Englès, plus grans assés. Quant che vint environ nonne, li
tempès cessa, li mers s’aquoisa. Si demandèrent li siegneur as
maronniers auquel lés il estoient plus priès de terre, et il
respondirent: «Dou royaumme de Navarre.» Lors furent li patron
moult esmervilliet, et dissent que li vens les avoit eslongniés enssus
de Bretaingne de six vingt lieuwez. Si se missent là à l’ancre et
atendirent le marée, si ques, quant li flos de le mer revint, il eurent
assés bon vent de quartier pour retourner vers le Rocelle. Et
costiièrent Baione, mès il ne l’osèrent aprochier, et puis toutte le
Gascoingne. Et fissent tant qu’il rapassèrent les reus Saint Mahieu,
et là se missent il à terre, et puis vinrent à Camper Correntin, et là se
reposèrent et rafrescirent pour entendre dez nouvelles. Si
envoiièrent deviers monseigneur Charlon de Bloix, qui se tenoit à
Rennes, à savoir quel cose il volloit que il fesissent. Or lairons nous
d’iaux à parler ung petit. Si vous recorderons dou siège de Vennez
et de monseigneur Robert d’Artois et de ses gens, coumment il se
maintinrent. Fº 76.
—Ms. de Rome: En celle prope sepmainne que li armée
d’Engleterre ariva en Bretagne, fallirent les trieuwes entre mesire
Carle de Blois et la contesse de Montfort.
Quant li dis mesire Carles, qui se tenoit en Nantes, sceut la verité
de la venue des Englois que ils estoient arivet en Bretagne, il pensa
bien que il aueroit la gerre. Si envoia tantos à tous lés, sus la mer,
pour oïr nouvelles de son cousin mesire Lois d’Espagne. Et fu
trouvés à le Bai en Bretagne, et jà savoit il que la contesse estoit
passée et retournée en Bretagne. Si fist tant li dis mesires Lois que il
vint à Rennes et trouva là mesire Carle de Blois, qui i estoit venus à
grant gent d’armes. Si ordonna tantos et pourvei li dis mesires
Carles gens d’armes par toutes ses forterèces, et senti bien que
pour celle saison les Englois tenroient les camps, se poissance de