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 1

he German Campaigns in Norway, Finland and the USSR 1940-1945

CHRIS MANN & CHRISTER JORGENSEN

HITLERJS
ARCTIC
The German Campaigns in Norway, Finland
and the USSR 1940-1945
HelliSh L1brary Cataloguing Ul PubliC:ltion Data:
.\ carnl<>gue ret·ord fnr thi~ bot ol i., :1\ ailalolc
from tht Bmish Lihrary COJlt€11tS
Copyright@ 200~ Brown P:trt'''<Jri.s Linutcd

I B '\' 0- il J0-1899 -0

Fu•a published in the CK in .WO~ b~ In tra duction 6

Ian \Ibn Publishing I td
Ri' crdcne Busmcss~Park. Cbnpter I G ermany, Finland and the vVinter War 1'1
.\ lobe, Road, I Lersh~m.
Surm:K rJ 14RG,
L'l.. . Cbapte1· 2 The Invasion of Norway 32
135/lJlHi-l:! Cbapter 3 Hitler's Barbarossa Venture 62
.\ II nghi:S reserved. ~o part of this puhlicarion may be r~:pro CbapteT 4 Stalemate on the Frozen Front 98
duccd, stored m a retnevul ~)''>ttlll or transmitted in any form
or hv anv means, electronic, mech:~nk:ll,
phn~nco.p};ng. recording, or uth~:rw1se, '' ithout Cbapte1· 5 The War on the Arctic Convoys 116
prior permission in wrinng from rhe publi~her.

Ediwrialand design:
Cbapte1· 6 Red Storm - Stalin's Revenge 15 8
Brown Pam,orks Limited
8 Chapd Place Cbnpter 7 The Price of Occupation 186
Rh ingron Street
London Conclusion 202
FC1AJDQ
UK
C hapter otes 214
Ed1tors: Peter D.mnan, 'lhm 11:111
Picncre Re~earcb: Andre" \ \'cl>u, ~~k Cnrnish Bibliography 220
Design: andm H ortl1
\laps: Bob Gan,ooJ
Prrt~.luccion: \Ian \\ ·c~ lam!
Index 223

Prinred in H ong Kong

Ptc..tt RE CRf ot r~
iaps
Corhis: 35. 19 1
Rolccrtl lunrLihrarr: 10, 11.12- 13, l·t 15 (buth), 16, 1·. Scandinavia and the Baltic, 193 9 8
IR, 19 (both), 10. 1-i. .?'\. 21\-2-. .?1!.19, 30.32-33, H-.35,
36, 3 i, JM, 3V (hoth), 40-41, 41 , 43, 4(), 47, 48-4<'1, 50, 51.
51. B. H-55, 56, 57, '\tl-5'>, f\1, 61-(13. 68. 6Q. 70-i l. i~. The \iVi nter vVar, 1939-+0 22
7J, 76-77, 78, 79. Sl-1!3. tH. 111. l>i.91l-W, 116-11 ;-, 1211
(l>otl1J, 111. 122-113, IH 115, 116, 127, 130. 131 Cboth). The German Invasion of orway, 1940 4 5
132, 133, 135, 138, 14:?. 143. 144- 145. 146. 147, HR-149,
153 , 15+-155, 156-157. 18(1- 187, 11!8, 189, 192, 194, l'H,
196-111~ 20:?-!03,204, 105, ~06, 107, lOV. 211, ~13
Operation Barbarossa, June 1941 75
Stavka \Hiitan H i turic:al Resc:mh: 6-7, 64, 65, 66-t\i, R0-
8 1, 8), 8i. 88:89. V1, Y2-93, 94-9,, 96, IU0-101, 102. 102- The Arctic convoy routes 129
101, 105, 106, lOR, 109, I 10- IIJ , J 1.?, 113, J 14-115, l.M,
I J7. 140 (hoth), HI. 150, 151, 15R- 159. 1110, 162, 103, 165, The Soviet 1944 Summer Offensive 169
IM, 167, 171, 1-i2. 173 , 1-11, 1-7, 178, lliO. 11!1. II!.?. IIH,
IS-!, 1110, 198, 191l-IQ9, 200-201
TRI I Pu~tures: 210 The Far Iorthem Theatre, 6/9/44 to 30/ 1/45 174
6
-
I

Introduction
On laud aud on tbe seas, tbe area
around the Antic Cirde is inhospitable.
•Hilitary opemtiom in this 1·egion rLre
diffiwlt, dangerous and place grent
demands on logisticnl systems, and also
require special~)' trained soldiers.

he land and ~ea~ of the .\rcric Circle arc :1rnong

T the most inlw~pit,thle places on the planet.
During \ \ 'orld \\ 'ar ll, they were a bardefield on a ~c~de
beyond ::m~·thing th:H region had pre,·iousl~ "ill1e~~ed.
The climate m northern . candina\ia is harsh and
unforg1,ing. and makes the most extreme demand'> on
mili tary operation,. For e\:tmple, soldiers must con·
tend ,,;th the dangers of the em·ironment ns '' ell of
d10se of enem~ aclion. ,\ whole host of phrsic;~ l prob-
lems must be faced. In "inter. some of the haza rds arc
ob,·ious, such :ls h) pothermia, dehyd ration, ~no"
blindne ~ and e\ en sunburn. There is also :1 serious
possibiJjl} of frceling to death in temperatures that
rt:!!ltlarly re;~ch minu~ 40 degrees. T he wind-chill fac-
tor increases the chance of frostbite, and he;tt tnln~fc:r­
cncc may re.,ulr in Ocsh ~ricking to mer-allic pans of
weapons and 'chides. The latter require speci:~l oils,
hig her rates of m:lintenancc, :1nd there is an incrc;tsed
demand for fuel for both heating and t r;~n~port
engines must be turned m·er regularly or e,·en kept
running con.,t;~nrly. Soldiers operorin g in the-;c climates
also require a higher calorific imake.
All t.he :tho' e burden' a logistical system opcroting
in an area poorly ~en·ed by communication., hnk,.
Roads \\Cre limited in number and largely of poor
quality. \.s a result, ~upplie~ and troops usual!~ had to

Typi(llllfrrain in nortltrl'll Finlnml11nd tbe L'SSR. For tbr

bdlig rrmtJ in II 'o rld I I ,,,. II. 11 -.;-,,,; n l"tt)' dmumdinf{
r m ·ironmem m ;:;·lttd• to (Oil/Ina 11 mtlitiiT)' r1Tmp11i_v;n.
8 HI T L E R ' S ARCTIC \:\' AR
0 300 Miles
0 480 Km
Scandinavia and the Baltic, 1939
lltlontir Oct:nrt
Tbr nrcn ot•er u•bir/1
Get711tiii.Y. Finltwd and th<·
Sot· in Uuion fou!(bt thfir
Arrtir mmpaign. It v.·as n
tluntu tbat suclud in
hundrtds of tbnus1111dt of
mm ovtr four yrnrs of rrn1:
ll'TRODlJCT£0N 9
be transported b~· sea. As to survi,·ing man-made dangers, the frozen ground made
digging-in difficult if not impossible. .\ [en fighting in these climes had to be supreme-
ly fit. highly trained and well equipped: if they were not they suffered according!}'·I
H AZARDS AT SEA
Similar)~·, the fr·eez.ing Arctic waters proved a demanding combat environment. The
Gulf Stream may keep the sea route via the :"orth Cape open to Murmansk in win-
te r, but the seas it produces are :1mongst the roughest in the world. The residue of
the warm air carried north on the Gulf Strcnm collides with cold winds blowing
southwards from d1e North Pole. ,\lixed by the earth's rotation, this produces large
depressions, which in turn produce ferocious gales. The huge waves produced when
they break on ships soon rurn ro ice in the freezing 3ir. The ships pitch and roll and
rake on "green wa ter'', which ofren freezes in contact with cold steel. It huilds up into
heavy encrustations of thick ice. The accumulations add to the ship's top weight,
which causes the ship ro consume more oil or coal in her bunkers. thus reducing bot-
tom weight. So stability is reducc:d and the risk of capsizing is increased. The ice
causes deck machinery and weapons ro seize. Nlore mundanely, yet no less impor-
tant.ly for the comfort of Lhe crews, condiLions aboard, ranicularl y on small ships
such as destroyers, the most important combat vessds in these seas in \Vorld W;1r II,
were miserable given the cold, damp and perperual motion caused by the high seas.
F urthcrmorc, in winter ilie pack ice moving southwa rds can narrow the width of the
Arctic seas to a mere 128krn (80 miles) in places, reducing d1e chances of making an
unnoticed passage. Tn the summer the perpetual daylight similarly makes location by
hostile eyes more likely. The polar seas also produce unique navigational problems.
Compasses are affected by me )JrOximity of me North Pole. Even use of the sextant,
almanac and chronometer are hampered by the mist, fog, icc and overcast conditions
caused br aunospheric depressions. Ships often become losL, and during Lhe war such
stragglers were cnsy prer for enemy submarines. Once sunk or shot down, the
chances of survival were exrremelr limited in seas that seldom reach remperarures
above four degrees Celsius. Even if rescued, survival was not guaranteed as there was
litde undemanding of the process of hypothermia in World \ Var II. 2
Given these conditio ns, the struggle for the control of the European Arctic and
the nordlern waters around it is a relatively recent phenomena. Of course,
Scandinavia had seen more of irs fair share of "'ars in the pasr. After all, it was home
to the Vikings. Through most of sixteenth century the Danes and Swedes struggled
for the domin3nce of the Baltic after the break up of the Kalmar nion. However,
the brief Swedish rise to grear power status in d1e following I 00 or so yea rs under
Gusran1s Adolphus and his successors convinced the Danes to renounce the contest,
although they would take any ad,•antage thrown up by the seventeendl and eigh-
teenth cenruries' many wars. Sweden's main rival became Peter the Great's Russia,
and Sweden's hopes of mainrajning her Baltic empire disappeared after Charles Xll's
 10 IITTI. FR' .-\RCTlC \\' \R 1:'\ TRO DL.CT J O~ l I

DemocrJt GcHennnems thJt dominated the 111~0~ dw-.e w ~pend their mone~ el~e
11 here. T he '-"on1 eg1an' prm 1de .1 .. ultahle example of the ill-prcp:uednes' of the
Scandina1ians in the l.lre IIJ w... Field m.moeu1Te\ for the ann~ had been c:mcelled
m a1·e cn-.h. Jml 1hc na1 ~ h:nl not left port 'incc 11) 1 for similar reason>.
Equipmem wa~ •>h~olc>ccnt ,11 bc':>l: lllllllt:} h;lrl heen put aside to hur J single tank,
""'the :"nnwgian ..olther' could ~ec .It lca\t nne ~ample in their lifetime~. The air
force had hought Caprom Jircr.lft from ltJI) in 1932. not due to their qualiry but
hecause they could be paid for 11 ith dried fi')h! The :-\om egitms put their faith in the
Britbh Roy:d :"til) to keep the Germ.m., at hay :.1nd the Danes. prob:.~blr rightly, con-
cluded that there w;~s little the~· could do if Germ~ny decided to iuvJde. In ~orwa}
this anirucle wa~ m.tintaincd despite the fact that ~orwar's king, llaakon \ TO. had
predicted to lh~o: Briti~h .\drnir<~ l Sir J ohn Kcll) in 1932 that: •· rf Hitler comes to
po11 er in Ger111a11~ and m:.1n~1ges to hold on to it, then we shall h.we war in Europt!
hcforc the dt!l'lldc i.:, ou1 ... ,
.:\"eurr~lit) as :1 foreign poli~ i' dependent on rh c maintenJnce of the balance of
po11 e;:r. If th:n l1.1l.mcc tip~. ~n1.1llnaliom. for all their protestations of ncutralit), c:tn
, /J•df 1/u/rr. \41::.1 ./ur,uor be 'Cf)' \lllncrabk if tile) arc 'tr:lteglc-,111~ tmportJill to the1r aggressil'e neighbours.
oj' (,rnn•llll Hu tlraJtMI ' '' -\s King H :~ako1n -.o right!~ predicted. ll idcr becoming dictator in Germanr up:.et
ucurr mpp/1~1 of the European balance of p<m cr and \IUuld drag .:\"on1a) . Denmark and Finland into
Srtllltfiiiii~'II1TI 1run ore \\'orld \ \ 'ar U. Hitler 11ould :.1ho turn the t'Omdin;ll'mn pcmn:.ula into a battleground
r::ould brml{ ll {,rftl lli1r If for the first time in 12;; ~ c.IN, .1nd hi'> ll';lr 11 ould :.1lso bring modern war to the .\rcoc
f.1iled march on \ lo-.t:<l\1 in l-os. Despite thi~. wedish-Ru'>Si:m m·;llf) cunrinued FwnuJ. IIIIOf'l nr11r thr to tbt lrou t/t•··ltrt. for rhc lir'>t rime. I he srr.negic tmpcr:nh·c of the war against Brirnin would lead to
through mo\t of the rest of the centuf). The relat:iwl~ di~asrrous e>;penence of 1he j'r&m durtng tbr Wmtrr the Gcrnun in,asion of .:\"on1·ay. The great d:~sh
:'\:1polconil· \\'ar~ fur Denmark and Sweden com·inced both n:nions rh:1t m:unrc- lli1r "!1."'1111 1hr CSSR. bct11 ccn Genn~ll1 :-\:11ism :1nd $0\-iet communism
nance of a lo11 profile wa:. the best cour~c in intern:uional rcl.1tion~.l Denmark and \ o1.- 1btir ;;·mttr aumw - 11ould cuend to the far north. and into rhe freezing
s,, eden left rhe conre<.t for uomination of the Baltil' region tO Ru,si:.l .llld the Ill'\\ jlltl{f. Fbt glot'tl :! I rr \ea!o of rhc :"urth Cape as the \\'estern Allies tried w
rb ing pO\ICr. Germany.-! m ·n •fSI/l:f 10 pt·n·mt barr :.uppl~ tl1c cmbatrlcd So11et Union.
By the t11 cnricth ccmury Scandin:nia had been relegated to the periphery uf jTrsb Jtl(kiiiJ!, 111 rbr jiv:''" \II hough there i~ some schol<l rship on rhc
Europe politiC':llly :1~ ''ell :1~ gcogr.1phicall~. D enmark. ncwlr indepe11dcnt :"1!1'\1'3~ and lllrlill p111ll 011 ;.;·rllfJom. '-'onl'e~ian camp3if."11 ;mc.l \ n :tic convoys, there is little
wedcn :1 1! rcliecl o n a policy of neutrality i11 internat:ion:tl nffi1irs. Thi~ ~er1·ed then\ all 11 ork on II itler's camp:~ign in the Arctic. This book
well in \ \ 'orld \ \'ar l, and :~lrhough not untouched hy \l:lr - :1U rhrce narion,· mcrcham bring-. wgether the wider German im·oll'cmcnt in
~hippmg Occt~ :.uiTered hL':JI·ily in the f:1ce of Gem1an unresLTictt!d submarine warfare Sc-.mdiml' ia 11 ith the spedfic operntions :1g:1in~t the
- the three cmmtrie~ cmcrgcu more or less unscathed. Finl:lnd ~cized the opportunity Sn1 1Ct<. in the 'i cini t~ of .\lunnansk.fi Christopher
dtrown up hy the coll:.~p.,c of ' l ~urist Russia and d1e subscquem Bol... hc, ik Re' olurion \ l:mn has produced J srurly of Gennany's relarionship
and dcc:larcd her independence. Finland. like her Scandin:11 ian neighbour"). put her 11 ith Finland during the \\inter \ \ 'ar, thc Gennan in,·a-
m1st in t.he ne11 I) formed LeJ!-,"llC of '-'ations for 'iCcurity in the post11 ar 11 urltl uf the ,jon and IIC~up:nion (tf '\on1 a~ and the Arctic Com·oy
I910\ :tnd IIJ3(k \.~ the Lcah'UC pro' ed ineiTecrual in rhe fJce of j:.~panc!te, l r-Jiian ;md hattles, 11 hile Christcr Jorgensen has dealt 11 it h the
su h!>equcntl~ '-'ali Gennan Jggre-.<;ion. the :"ordic countries stated their .,tric1 neu- Gcnmn- ·u,iet llt.ruggle of 1941-45. Together the}
tralit} <llld hoped the ,!!':Jthering ~tonn 11 ould not break upon them. pn>1 1de a complete account and anal~ "Sis of H itler's
The wcde~.•1nd p.micularl) the Fmn-.. 11ith their lnrgc • m ict neighbour to the \ rct1c \\ ar. J struggle 11 hich although peripheral. had
casT, looked 111 nnprO\ c their defences. The .:\"on1eg;an Labour ;lnd D ani .. h ' ocial ... eriou' 1rnplic~Hions for the outcome of \ \·orld \ \'ar II.
I2 I3

Chapte1~ 1

GERMANY,

FINLAND

AND THE

WINTER WAR

Finland, like other Scandinavian

countries, endeavou'red to 'remain
neutral in international affairs.
Howeve1; political changes within
Genumzy and the USSR would lend to
the Winter War with the Soviet Union.

W orld \Var II came to Scandinavia on 30

~ovembcr
bours ~orway and
1939. Like her Scandina\rian neigh-
weden, FinJand had stated her
neutralirr on the outbreak of war in September 1939,
but declarations of neutrality counted for little '' ith
Europe's dictators. The O\'iet invasion of Finland was
a direct consequence of Gennan diplomacy; it is
unlikely Stalin would have moved ag.~inst the Finns
\\;thour the assurance of German non-intervention

Drusrd in ~.:·imrr rnmoujlngr 1111/fomrs. n Finnish rlnny mnfhinr-

;,tm tenm prrpnrts to mrrt 11 Rrtldnny nl/n(k during thr liljmn·
Hiu: 8 Drmnbrr /9)9.
 1-l HI TLER' ARCT I C \\'A R GER\1 \"\) . Fl'\ L.-\ :-\0 A~D

Gt>rm.m trqap•. {'111"1 of tl•l'

811/tir Di.-isinn. nrb,m~··

fir,• ;::itb l<rd fim·n 111

1-/rlsin/.:i ,/urmr:t; tbr 1-'11111/!b

c,~" 11 i~r

the opporruniry rn gain their <..'Ountry's independ-

ence. On -J. Decem her 191 7, Pehr Albin Svinhut\ ud
pre~ented tl1c &luskllllffl, the Finnish parliament,
with "hat '' '" later called the D eclaration of
Independence. "hich '' :t<> passed two days later.
The ne\\ gmernmenr's main concern wa<; to
prodded br the ,\Jolorm·-Rtbbemrop P:1ct of .\ ugust 1939. llo\\C\cr. German~· had Rum.m Bnl<lotTil·lt~~drr achie' e foreign recognition of Finnish mde-
lon~-standing links'' ith FiniJnd. and J So\'iet dCLo~ "uuld c:learl~ alter tl1e balance Lmm tltPJ bnprd rbnt pendence. The .cnnans, "ho had enjoyed a
of flO'' er in the Raltic, perhaps e\·en threaten German trnn ore ~upplies from Fmland -:onltl Jltrcumb to 11 long period of ~ucccss against Russi:1 in
s\\Cdcn, and give the \\'estern ·\llie:. (Great Britain :md Fr.mce) .m opportun ity to IIJ /111/1//11/Sf rrt·o/utiOIIIII/d I 9 16- I 7. ''ere keen tO foster the separatist ren-
dabble in Scandina,•ian affair~. llirler's reasons for gi,·ing 'Lalin a free hancl in then .m·k 111111111 u·itb dcncic~ of the nationalities within the Rus~ia n Empire, and thcreh)
Finland by brgel~· in the free hand it g<H e him in the \ \ bt. The Ccrm:ms main- RuJJtll. Tbr u·nm'"'· 011 the undermine its a hi lit) to fight. So the Genmn~ appro' cd of Finland's action~ and the
Rusfillll Coll/111/!tllr for
tained :111 aloof neutrJiit) in the \ \ 'inrcr \ \ 'ar, but the~ noted '' ith interest the per- rtr:t;bt " Lmm 's u:ijt. Finns "ere eo~ger for Cem1an support. 1-IO\\ e'er, e\ en Germany was unwillin!( to
II in~ Lt•a~t TruHI.:J. ll~"f!,<'d
fonnancc of the Red \nn~ and their analysis of this '' ould hJ\ e prnfnund implic-J- recognize Finland before Russia did. ''eden. Finl.lnd's neighbour. and the re~t of
Fml/tJb !Oflltlut< to <ri:r
tion:. for the future. Gi,·en the Jntccedents of German- Finni'h rel.mons. this stanct' \\estern Europe concurred. Germany therefore imi\lcd that Finland .tpproach
pcr.=-rr m tbrtr ou·n to/111111.
mtght appear strJnge. G enmn milita~· im oh-ement '' ith Finland dated hack to the Lenin' Bol,he,ik Gon~rnmenr in Petrograd. ,,., dearl~ this was me onl~ central
l.1st ~·ears of \\'orJJ \\'ar I. and rc\ulted in the esrabli,hmem of important links authority in Ru~!>ia '' orth the n:-~me. Jndecd. tl1c German~ ''ere .It the time negoti:n-
ber\1 een the f-inni h and German~ militaries. ing \lith the Bol,h~·,·ik' for a Russian e.xit from \\'orld \\ 'ar I.
Finhmd had been p:m of the Russi:m Empire since 1809. -\lthuul;rh iniri:·dl)· giYen :\ dclcg:ttion of Finni~h ~ocialists met Lenin on 2i' December. H e pro11tised to

con. iderahle autonomr. atll.:mpb at Russificarion in the e:u·l~ t" cnticth century had recognize Finnish inclcpentlencc, and rhc Central C:ommiuee of the Bolshevik Parry
CJU'>ccl considerable resentment. 'o when rhe Bobh~:,·ik coup in Perrogr:1d 0\·cr- apprm·ed his deci,ion in principle me foliO\\ ing cia~. Lenin reasoned that a Finni<,h
t.hrcw the Pru\'isional GO\·ernmcnt in :-.;0\ ember 191 i'. the Finni'h lc,1dcrship S<l\\ re\'olurion would \O()n foii0\1 and hi~ Commi,!>ar for \\ ·ar. Leon Trotsk·y. :tthi!>ed
16 HLT L ER'S A RCT I C WAR G E R .\I..\ :--.· Y. F I '\ L -\ .:'\" D \ :'\' D T lJ ~ \\ . 1 ~ T E R \ L \ R I7

them to take~'' ift action to ~eize power. The finni sh Go,·ernment wa~ ~imilarl~ ruld The hnn1~h people, although united i11 their dc"re
that the Bolshcnks "ould accept Finnish independence. and a deleg;Hion he;lded b~ for inde~nJcncc. "ere less unified in their ideas for
s, inhul' uJ gain~:d Lenin '~ ncceprance on 3 I December. Th1s was raufied b~ the Finland\ furure. The gulf lkmecn rhe bourgeois
Central Commmec on 4 Januaf)· 191 K Lenin had been forced w deal "ith rhe finnish Gmernmt:nt and the Finnish lefr grc\1. The
Finnish bourgeois gm·ernmem because the Finnish socialis~ held ~imila r ,·iew s on EJuslumta gr.1med the gm·crnment full power to ~tab­
indtpendcnce. Lenin full) t:xpecred that he would <;<>On be dealing '' llh :1 Finnh.h li~h ~111 arm) and restore order, as the countr) had been
workers' go,·ernmcnt, which. in time no doubt. would request union .1s :1 republic in racked "1th \trike) and rioting. This was ,;ewed u~ ;I
the new Ru~~i:m Federation of :\':nions.' direct challenge b~ t.ht: Finni~h labour mo\'cment, and
imperial Germany h~1d encouraged the Finns to press for independence. did IIIUCh to bring the radicals and moderate~ on the
although offici;.~ I recognition did not come until 6 J:lnu:lr} 191 R. Germ;~n 'tr:HCg) left wgether. Bod1 sides began arming rapidl). The
dictated that Finnish rerritOf)' could be used to funher the isol.1tion of Russia. gun-running of the left'~ militia uniL~ - the so-called
There would, no doubt, he useful trading opporrunities too. France harl rt:cog- Red Guards - between Viipuri and Perrograd led to
nizcd the Finnish declaration two days earlier, desperate not to dri,·e the new full-scr~lc fighting on the Karelian Isd1mus on IQ
nation into German hands. llowcvcr, France was too cut off from the northeast- . I mn.·hmr-gllll romp"".Y Janu:u1.! The fighting soon spread. On :!7-28 January
ern B:~lti c to he of :In} great use to Finland in rhe struggle ro maint:lin the lnrer·~ frnm tbr Bt~ltic Dh: isi ou the Red Guards seized Helsinki, :md elemen[S of the
Ocdgling n:lrionhood. Geography. pure and simple, dictated to \1 hom rhc Finnish tuk<mrrs ll,l{llimr Rttl go' crnmt:nt rn:'lnaged to flee ro ' ·aasa and set up a
Go' crnment "ould have ro rurn. Gu11rds nrt~r Htmko. rump admini~tr:uion in the \\ 'hite - as the gO\ ern-
s
ment forces ''ere known- heanland of Ostrobothnja.
flrnrr.tl :·un tftr Go/1: <11111-

1/lllflllrJ tl•r (;,,.,,,111 B,Jftu Tl!E FI.:--~ISH Cl\ 11. \ \' \R

Dt:·moll 111 t bt Fmllfsb The Finni~h Chi! \\·ar "as a \\:tr of frontline~ and con\'entional offcnsi,•es. The
(Jut II in: \\'hires held ~orrhern Fml.md, O!>trobot.hnia and ~arclia, and the Reds controlled
most of the ma1or cities, industrial centre' and the soud1. The t.'Onntry was roughly
di,·ided on a line from the Gulf of Bothnia to Lake Ladoga. The size of forces was
fairl~ "ell m:nched, probably in the region of 70,000 combatants each, although esti-
mates' ·•f). The Reds" ere poor I) tr.tineJ, equipped and led for the most parr, hUL had
the dubious adnunage of the half-hearted 'uppr>rt of the Russian troops that rcmruncd
in Finland. Thc~e were more tJ)!eful a~ a source of equipment. The \ \' hitt'S had simil:tr
deficiencies in tr-Jining nnd equipment, and thei r lJualiry of leadership '~ri~:d. They
were, hm1 e,·cr, commanded h~ :1 number ofTsari~t-trained Finnish officers and Swedish
'olumeers, ~md were led b) one C.1rl Cu!>taf ,\ lannerheim, a general who had served in
the Imperial Rus.~ian \rm} .md w;1~ e;l<;i)~ the mn~t al •lc commander of the ti,;l \\ar.
The one tir~t-cb:.s fonnation mailable w the \\'hires \\.1~ the 1ith Jager B:malion . .-\s
p:1rr of rhe ,,;der mm ement fnr Fii'UUsh inucpendcnce, a number of Finnish 1 olunteers
undertook milit:tf)' trnining at Lock.tedt in Gcnnanr under speci:1l arrangementS \\ith
the German authorities. 'l11e numher of 'olumcers S\1 elled. ;md a Jager (light infant[)·)
battalion \1.15 fonncd as part of the Imperial Gennan \nny in .\lay 1916. It sa" sen·icc
in the Kurland ar~a ag:unst the Ru"1:1n l.rm) in 1916-li. but as the situation in Finlanc.J
worsened the unit rerumed, lJncling .u \ aas:tm Fehruaf)· 191 . .\lannerheim prompt-
ly broke the unit up. tllll<, pro1 iding a <.':ldr..: of C\'}>Crienced officcl'!o and noncommis-
~ioned officers (~COs) ,duch he put to work trainin~ his army.
18 H I TLER ' S .-\RCTJC \\'AR G E R.\ l A::\Y, FTl\ LA~D ~\::--: D THE \YT~TER \\'AR 19

Joorbim ;:on Ribbmrrop,

So•·it·r t!io,rtor ]o.··c•pb
Hiiler's .\linisrrr for
Sralm (left J r:·itb bis
Fortigu Affitirs. In August
/·orogn ,\ /iumrr 1/nloroi".
19J9 be 'll:tllt t o .lfosco<!' to
Tbt• /,tttt'l· sigurd tbc• uou-
fiunli-:.r rlu 11011-nggrnrion
ill.f.J(I"t'ssion t rM ry ;:: it b .\ 11-:.i
trertt_y with Srnlin 's
GrrmiiiiJ' on :! ; . I ugrm
Soviet Uuiou.
1!J J 9. tbus t.<ol11ting
"'iu/,wd ej]'tah·t~l·

AJthough ;\lannerheim's early campaigns me t ''i th success, the wa r was sho rtened fo rced to sign three somewhat disach·a ntageous ag reements: a peace treaty forbid-
C11rl Gu.rtllj Emil
by G ennan interve ntion, which the Finnish commande r considered unnecessary and d ing Finland to deal with other nations wit hout Ge rma n appro \'al; a trade and
.I ltnw erhe i 111, Fitm isb fi t•ld
undesirable. H e accepted that Ge rman imrolvcment saved lives, but believed it ma ritime agreement g ranting Ge rma ny econo mic prefe rence; and 11n undertaking
11/1/I"Sbll/. .rtllftS'I/11111 111/d
lmdermined the aehie,·emem of Finnish independence and this tnoti,·ated him to that Finland wo uld pay fo r the costs of all Ge rman military inten ·ention.-1 £,·en in
lllltioulll brro. Bom 11
drh·e his ad,•ance fo r·ward as qu ickl)' as possible.3 1\,•o \\ nite gO\·ernmem offic ials in 19 18. Finland was learning that Ge rman a id did no t come wit ho ut serious co nse-
Russian nntionnl. br rou to
Berlin had requested Gem1an milirary a id in early F cbruary witho ut offi cial sanction. quences. Gi\·e n his government's accepta nce ;\ bnne rhe im "lO}'all y bo wed to the
tbe rnnk of mujor-~t;mrml
A week later Gem1any announced that it wo uld accede to the Finnish request, in inevirable."5 The main G erman fo rce, General Rudige r \'On de r Goltz's Baltic
i11 tbr Jmp(rinl Russian
e ffect, inviting itself to the assistance of Finland. On hearin g the news, :\ rannerh eim D i"isio n of some II ,000 men, landed in Finland o n 3 April 19 18. Three tho usand
. lrm_y.
threatened to resi{:,'l l and the gove rnmem was somewha t perplexed to find irself mo re nrri,·ed fou r d~rs bter. T he capture of H e lsinki fo llowed soo n after, and the
20 HITLER'S -\R( I IC \\'-\R GER\l \.:\ \. 11.:\"'L-\'\D -\:\0 lllf \\ 1'.-TE R \\- \R 21

b~t nUJor c1ty in Red hnntl~ fell on 2ft \pnl, with rh~ tina! ~urrender occurring in L ntil <lbout Jul~ Jl)Jh, thh pro-German poliC) made considcro~blc 'cn,c.
mul-\ ht) on rhe Karcli.m hthmu\. Gennan~ \1 J\ the tlomm.mt power in E.l\tern F.urope. and until me failure of the
\lanm:rhcim had pu~h~:d the hnrJcr w1th Russia in K.treha ea'>t\l~ml' and the unofti- LudenJorff Offt:n'l' c on Lhe \\'estern From that month might po:.~ibl~ h;tH:
chJI fi~hring over" here the fronner 11ith Bolshe1ik Rus~1.1 would l.ty nun hied on through emerged \'icturiou~. llo'~ c1·er, Finland':. Genn;lll urlent:lllOn wa~ mdely brought to
I9 I H. I91 Q and mto I <>20. llc>" c1 cr, Finland's relarion~hip "id1 ( oermanr wd her ob,i- an end b~ the defe,H of Imperial Germany by the \ \e., tern \llics in ~m·ember 191 ~.
ou~ ambition~ in the north had <,enou~ lmplJCllOUII\ for rmbnd'.., rd,ltiOil\ \1 ith the -\rapid change 111 chrectmn had to follcm: Prmce F ricdrich Karl of Hesse renounced
\\ e\tem -\llies. The Gcnmn' "ere pre-.<;ing the Finn~ \lith nffel' ot aid in c-aprunng the his clann rn the Finru~h mronc and me la:.t G~:rman troop~ left Finnish \Oil Ill nud-
rest of karclia if they helped a Gennan thrust to\\ard' tht: Bnn">h ha'e at \lunnansk Oecembc:r. !"he \\c,tern \lilt:' "ere conciliato~. keen rouse Finland in their tight
(Brteish and Finnish rroo~ had already dashed at Pctsamo). Furthennorc. the tr~:arie'> <Jg.tin~t Bol~he1 1!.. Ru,,tJ. llowC'·er, \\'estern rccognmon of f mmsh \tare hood on I~
~igned "ith the Gcrnl<UlS did more than ju~t pl~c<: the ~nung,r.ue under GennJn p:1rron- Tf,,. R, ...,,.c.,.""m followed 111rh rhc f.1durc of th1~ poliC). The Finns" ere able to conclude a peac~ "ith
age, the) offered the prospect of Gennan econom1c pcncrranon that would cffecri,·cly 111111 .t~~r(«illll trflll) Lenm'~ g:ovcrnnwnt, "hich was in the midst of the Ruw1-Puli~h \ \':tr and ".t~ eager
n1rn Finland into a Gennan colony.11 The Finns had also agreed w han! a Gennan prince allou•(lf lla!cr r11 mtsb to limit the number •Jf pru.. pccti' e enemie' on Rm,la \ borders. The Tn..'al}' ofT:!rtu.
elected king. lne,irnhly, Gern1an influence c\'tendcd deep inro milir..1~ afF.urs, and m Pfll11111f 111 ,1 rbrcr-::. ,.,/.: signed on H Octoher 1<720. wa~ little more than .1 '>t:trlemem of frontier' Jnd ccr-
,\b) I 918 the f!O' ernmcnt had mstrucred .:\lanncrheim Lhat the arn1r 'hould be <'•llllf''''fl.ll. 1Ito(,,,.( t.nnl) did not e'LJhlhh a basis for friendly rehmon ... Indeed. tht:: trt:,ll} \\JS proi>Jbl~

rcfnrn1ed :1long Gcrn1:111 line' ~~~ Gcml<tn offil-<:!1', t!''-enuall~ h.mding Lhe re~pon~ibih- (,n m.m troop' m p,lf.md m too ad1anrngcou., for finland, placmg the border a., tt did a mere 25km (15 nule~)
ry of Fmhnd', defence mer to (,erlllan~. _\lannerhetm promptl~ rc'lgned. ''ltpt.ml..r 1'1}0 from rhe uur..k1rh of Petrogrnd.

REsct:Ts 01 I'! IF FI:-..XISII Cr\lL \\' \R

fhe result~ of the Fimmh Ci1il \\"ar had serious implil-ation~ for tht:: fuwre. Tht: \\,tr
had done much to c~t'Jhlish a number of pattern~ of beha' iour which would be the key
to Finland's role m the world in the I 920s and I!)30s, and m " orld " 'ar TI. rt did much
to cement Finl.md\ animos1ty towards Rtt,.,i:t - nm that mi' was difficult - particular!~
gi1 en the \\ 1me'' imerpreurion of the cil-il 11 ar a' :1 "ar of lilx:r.~rion ag-Jin~t hoth
Russia and :.uch "Red" Ru.,.,ian 1dca., a' Bol;;he' hill. J'he ~treak of wo-Ru$\l,m/anri-
So,iet preJUdiCe th.ll r.1n through man~ Finm~h pohnt·tans n1.1cle :lt'l·onunod.mun "iu1
their much larger ne1ghbour diffimlt "hen rdation~ "orsened in the late I<J3()...
Funhemmrc, me geo~rJphil:al conditions created h~ the I<>20 trC.Il}' \1 im Soliet Ru,,IJ
thre" up a ~trntegic impei"Jtl\e for the Smiet L-mon. ,1., a potentially hostile borde r l.t)
within •lrtillel') r.tnge of the outskirts of its ~econd CitY, The war also led to me c..ub
lishmcnr of a Finnbh \nn~ and .\Janncrheim's impressi1c milita~· reputation. ' I h3t
aml}. howc1·er, had .tbsorbed German influences and the 11ar had forged links bct11 cen
the Finm~h and C1ennan militaries..\lwy men of th~ .f.Jg~r battalion - a fonnanon
aained and 'hapt·d b~ the Germ.m' -"em on to h.11 t. o;uccc,,fuJ careers in the Finnio,h
rruhrn~. pcrh.lJ)', mo't famou~ly Erik Hetnnch~. who commanded the Ann~ of Isthmus
Juring the \\inter \\ ar: The e lmk:. wt::re mamt:uned throughout the mten1 .lr ~ e.1r,,
tlesp1tc tht: \\co,Lern orienucion of Finland's fon.:ign pohC). Th~) would be extreme!~
useful "hen J'inland fought ;llnng-;it!~ Gern1an~ after the 111\',l~lon of the Sm;ct Cnion
in Ju ne 1941. C..mwer..cly, the experience of dealing~~ ith rhe Gennans during th~: ci,·il
war seem!> to h.l\ e h~1tl it.' innuence on \ lanncrhcim, "ho would pro1e rt:m.ll'k.Jhl~
adept at keeping: mcm :nann's lcn~>th. hminng their mnucncc and maintaining l"inni~h
mdepcndcncc e' ~:n though both countries" ere cng-agetlm a "ar Jgaimt the L'SSR.
22 H i TLER'S ARCTIC \\'\R
• Russian territory 0 50 \ liles
0 80 Km
- Russi:m g:uns b~ I 940 treat}
Red Army attacks
Bnitic Sen
Tbougb tbt Sorier c.; nion
ga111ttl urrit01J ''sa ruult
of tbe Il'inttr II ar. tbr
couflm ,·n•ra/(d t!Jt frtblt
Tllltl/rt of tbt Rr4 .INIIl' 's
Ct1p11bilirirs. U'hicb u•as not
lo>'l on milittll')' pl111111e1·s
in Btrlin.
GER\fA:\"Y, FI:'\L-\'\0 -\~0 THE \\'l"TFR \\'AR 23
Fmnish foreign polic.:~ in the inrcrw~r years wa~ based around a reliance: on the:
le3gue of :\atiom. Hm1 e1·cr, when it hel·ame mcre<t-.ingl} de.tr th•ll league mem-
bcr~hip wa~ <1 ~orne\\ h:H ineffectu:JI insumnce polic~ agamst foreign aggression, the
Finns were forced ro rely on a r,rric.:r polic:y of neutralt~. The most imponanr task
remaim:d the maintenance of Finnish sccuri~ against the po.,~iblc thrc.:at of the
Soviet L'nion. Possible allic:~ were fc:11. rdation~ 11 ith $11 eden 11 ere cool. no Jssur-
ance::s of assistance from Grear Britain ''nd France if the So,·iet Cnion attacked were
forthcoming. Jnd ~o neurrali~ wa., the onl~ option. A 10-year non-aggression pact
was signed wirh rhe SoYier L'nion in 1?32. \'t:t this wa:. no mure an insurance:: of
So,·ict good intention~ th;u1 the .,imiLtr paclS the L'SSR signed with Germany and
Poland in the same period. llowe1·er, although rdations "ith the Soviets were
strained despite rhe 19J1 rrca~ . it \I :IS nor until :\azi Germany's aggressive forci!-rn
policy began to undermine the European ba!Jnce in the late- 1930s that Finland's
security became seriously threatened.
IliTLER -~'0 T liE RE.\R.\ U~G OF GFR \ l.~'\,\'
.\ dolf IIitier hecame chancellor of German~· in January 19.B. ,\Jmost at once he set
out ro rebuild German military power, di~reg;lrding the prmisions of the 1919
Treat) of Vers;lilles, which forbade Gern1an rearmament. Great Britain <~ nd France
were un'llilling to enforce the \ 'ersJilles settlement, and this seemed equally the case
when Germany began to challenge the trea~··s territorial clauses. Gern1any remilita-
rizcd the Rhineland in I Q_ifl, Anschluss (L' nion) with -\ust ria followed in .\larch 1938
and by rhe summer of that year Hitler was thrc:1tening CzechosJo,·:~kia m·er the
Sudetcnland. This hlarantl~ ;~ggressi1 e German foreign policy was of serious concern
to the Sm·ier L'nion ..-\li:cr all. llitlcr had made no ~ecret of his dislike of rhe USSR
in ,\Iriu KJIInpf. nor in his pronouncements once he gained power.
The Smicr concern wa~ th:Jt in an effort to defl ect ::\"azi aggression away from the
\ Vest. the British might rry to direct the Germans northeast into the Baltic region.
This ide<l certainly worried Jo~eph '\ralm, the Sm·ier dictator, who reckoned that,
"[Finbnct] rna~ well become the springbo;trd for anti-SO\·iet mo' es from either of the
bourgcoi~ impenalist grouping~ - rhe German and Anglo-Frcnch-. \ merican." H e
belie,·ed that it was possible. "that they arc plonmg together for joint action against
rhe L' SSR. Finland might be urged against us as a skirmish for a major war. "h
Strangely. these ,;c:ws ''en: not held hy the Sodet L'nion alone; Sweden also began
tn wor~ that Finland might rurn ro Germany for milira~· help.11 \ !though rhese
fears were groundlc.:s~. it sho11' rhat it was not only the L'SSR that was grippetl b)
paranoia over Finland's possible pro-Gem1an orientation.
In mid- \ pril 1938, the ~econd secreta~· of the Smict cmbas~·y, Boris YartsCI', called
on Finnish Foreign;\ linister RudolfHolsn.IO Yansc1· warned H olsri that \ loscow was
cominced of Genn:Jn) 's aggressi1·e intent and that this would impinge on Finnish
territory. Tic s;1id that the Sodct L'nion .;ought guarantees that Finland would not
~4 JIITI rR'~ \RC 11( \\ -\R (,J R\1\....,Y. FT:\L\'."D \'\:LJ 1111 \\1'\. !ER \\ \R 25

J'nmub rrnup < 1111 {'·llt' d
,/u r m ri, rbr II /1/Ur II .1 r:
/J·t Fmm "" '/ t\Yrllou
M 111111 ,/"1/!inv. In prur •• r
tbm1 fi·om tb . <u!.l.
"J~ tounn~ the rq~inn. ln FmiJnd he in,pccrc:d the fortt Jlc;JUOJh th.n the Finrh \\ere
humedl~ h1uldm~ un th~ 1-:.Jrehan hthmu' in the "ake of \nner <lCrion,.
The c.enn.m' h.ld. h0\1 C\ cr. tll.Hie .111 .lpproach to ~L.llldlll;l\ IJ thJt 'pnng. ulfcnng
'':on1 .1\, \\\eden and Fmland non-.•g!:-rrc"ton pacb. I h" "'"rejected in \IJ\, .mgcr-
ing the C.erm.tn' hut not molli~ mg the Sm ICt~. ">onethtle". Httlcr 11a'> lmle hmh-
cn:d h~ thl' \tanu: of these count ric' on the pcriphc~ of F uropc. Hi~ m.un omccm
\\OIS th;n he: 111mld not ha1·c to tight hoth rht: \\-e~tern \llie,, C. rear Brit;tin .md h.mce.
.md the ...,o, Ill l ni•m if hi~ J!!'!-.'Tl',,i,·c: policy to\\ ar.J, Pol.tml re,ultcJ in 11 .1r. Thl
!'>o,icts. mcatm htle, "l;'rt: Jt,appoimcd in thetr elt'on, to 'ecure clo,e mil iran link.
'' nh Cre.n Rnr.un .mJ Fr.lncc. \11 '-•wier Forci!:-rn \ ltm-.n:r \laxim Lit\ lllO\ ''a\
replaced b~ \'~ ache,l.l\ \ lolotm. ~t.1lm '., nght-hand man :111d impormnd~, 1,!1' en rhe
.'\,l,i', mllid :mti-Semitism. not.fewi'h like his prcdcc:ew1r. ~t:1lin 11 a~ 'ending a 'ignal
to the (.cnll•lll' that hJ\ mg Luled to lind ~ecurtf) Ill l'llllJUnc:tion 11ith the \\'c!>tcm
(JI)\\ cr... h~c '' ·'' "illing to deal '' tth rhe ""\.tz•'· Joachun mn Rthhenrrop. the German
forei~rn mmMcr. read the 'if.rn' mrrel'tl~ and informed I lttler rh.n the . 011ct' ,cemt:d
to be con~1Jenn~ .1 uuhrnry p.11..1: 11 tth the Bnri,h and French. Thi~ \\,IS enough to pu~h
llitler forll.ml. lie needed m he 'urc rhc So,·ict!. \\ould not "l'rosc hi' proposed

Jssist ( ;erm;m~· in :1 furure 11 ;Jr .1g.1in't the So\'iet LTnion. and that the Sol'iet' would l'wni~f· lronp < nmh " "' "!
gi\'C rinl.md .111~ hdp rC(jlllr~d ;lg-.lill't Geml:my. Yart\~\ II ..... rchuff.:d. L'hl "io,·ich ,, ;:'llfl" ptlr dl/11111{ o/11

tried ag.tin through more onhodo\ ch.1nnd<> m -\pnl 19.W. demanding the leJ'~ of .. ,..,..,It / , 1/o, .., J<l>

certain j,f:tnd' in the Gulf uf Finl.lnd in rerum for rcrmory Ill c;htcm ~.m:lta . r he }0111/J I~ ,,, , • ' '·

llC\1' Finni.;h lclrci~n mmi,tcr n,a, I· rUo llol,ti h.lll rcrin:d. due ro Ill hc.Jith .md Fml.wd\ .w/d/ (1"< ;:·,,..

the f:~ct he h.td made ~ome offcn'i'c remarks about llitler at a diplomatic dinner m /oan~1., ~ rll-!r.lllml j an.
Gcne,·a ·l!{ain rejected the So,·iet propnsals.ll He c.t.ned that the S01·iet intention
to offer ;JUtoll\;lltC help would he "incomparihle '' ith the .lutonom~ :~nJ 'm cretgnf)
of finland", .md thJt Finl:lnd ''ould regard "such a mea,urc J-. .Jggre,,i•m."l~ Tht:,l'
were har:.h ''on), .md they added ro ~onet unc•he. ~'1\ en that the independent B.1ltil·
,t.lte<> - I ;ll\1;1, Lithuani:J and E,wma - 11crc mking a .;uml.lr \t.mcc. ' 1(, mah· mat-
n:rs wor~c Genct-.11 I !alder, the \ \ 'ehnmcht (Gcrman \rml'd I orccs) chief of 't;~l'f,
-
 1 ~
26 lllTLLR'~ \RC Ill.\\ -\R -I

101 J\ton of Pol.md ••tnd he needed an agreemenr ~oon o;n that the Pnh'h ramp.u~n ol the t'\llt num B.llttt" p<mc~'>. ·1 ht' h.-.J.mn· ut power had 'hifted: C.erman} and the
could be launched and fini;hed before rh~o. 11 inn:r ram~. 'ioner l-mon h.1J come to an undcl't.mdtn~. '' htch left FmiJnd htghl} ntlner-.1hlc.
ll itlcr nc:c:dc:d Ill mmc: l~t~t. F'ru:drich Schulenberg. the Gennan .unha"ador in It t(J()I.: Hider link more rhJn J 11 cek ro .Kr. German} im aded Poland on
\ lo<<.<lll, miormed \ lolotm ·• I he Retch C.o1 c:rnment arc of the optnton th:Jt there '' 1 ~eptcmhc:r IIJ W ( oreat Bmain and France decbrcd 11 :~r on Germany on .~

no que,tinn hell\ ecn the Bahtc Sl.'a and the Blad, Sc:a 11 hich cannm lx: \c:ttlccl to rhc ~eptcmbcr. l he ')c-.mdlllJI i.m n.murh Jll dc:d.trc:d their nc:utr:~lit}. The\ \·esrern \Hie'
complete ''lll,fac:tion of hoth countries'', ami he requestl.'d "a 'peed~ daritkation ol could do little to help the Pnlc,. '-,cnmh Pot.~h re,lst.mce colbJhc:tl in t11o \\Ct!b and
(,cm1:lll-RU"I~n rdatton~.~~~ Stalin and \lolotm re,pont!cd <.:.1Uttou'l) ..tnd it took I /1111/SI """/(If ~'(.1/11/111 the l<nnpaign 11 a~ 01 cr in a munth. <;ultn idt 11 11 ,1, time to take what he felt ";h h"
I lirlcr\ direct inrcn·enrion to hurry rhr ptnccs<; along when hr trkgrammrd ~t.Jiin un R""''"' ,/,,,,{ .lurttlfl. tbt' own. On 1- l)eptemhcr the Red \nn~ occupied much of ea~rern Poland, .md .Jt rhc
20 -\ugmt 19W asking hun m recci1 c I'On Rtbbemrop. Th1s came Jt ju,t rhe nght rime ,.,,,,,. 11.11· I I•• R..J hcg~nning of October the !-lm·let~ tnrccd r.,l<llll;l. I lthu,ml<l ;tnd Lat'\ia to cede milita~

((Jr the So1 ictleadcr. ,,, fighting had hrokcn out 11ith th~;: Japane~c for the: ~c:c:ond 1 C<lr ,l,.,m mt/rnd I ::r..s-5 base~ to the l'SSR on rhctr tcrmonc:<.. \ ., \ hnncrhc1m J~ked on the fall of Polnnd:
runnmg on the \ l ongohan- \ lanchunan frontier. Stalin Jl<;o fe:~red J t'\1 o-from 11 ~~r. ~·til,/ 111 Jimr 11/l•lltl•; "/ .. \nd \\ ho'c tum i~ next,\\ hen the appl.'titL of tiJC\C genrl~;:mcn nlider and Stalin) ha..
:~nd m :~mid ir he 11 J\ prepared to tnl\1 I Titler. By 23 \ugust, \'on R1hhcntrop .md /t'{Ninlf. in ''"''' h •IV..!imt mllnaged to gro11 ?"1-1 Finl.utd 11\h w find uut Yc:~ ~oon. The summons to.\ [o,coll to
,\lolotm had ~igncd :t non-aggrr-,.,ion pact. The pact l'lll1t'Jint:d a secret protucol tbt- 1/,mnrrJ.rnll l.11u di~cus~ "concrete que~nons" C;JillC on 5 Ocrohcr 11139. rhe Finni,h ncg:otiato~ head-
di1 iding F umpe into ed by Juho P::tJsJkl\i were gtl·cn 'c:~ lmlc lcc11.1~ •.md on IJ October Paasaki1·i wa~
Sm iet ~•nd (.;erm:m forced ro reject the So1 tl.'t de1mnd for J lr.l'l.' on the pon of llanko a~ J milita~· h."~·
spheres of mtluencc. l'ht the: mo1ement of the: trontic:r on the "-.trciiJI1 Isthmus 11 e,t'\,·;ml' by some "Okm (43
Baltic '>LJl~' and Finhmd miles}, and cco;o;1on of certain i~l.tml' 111 the Cuff of fmland in rcrurn for large area~ of
w~r~ pi.K~d m t,1l111 \ Eastem K.!reh.t. \ ~ccoml Jnd rhml round ot tJib .1chte\·c:d nothing before: Ji,cuo;sions
~phcrc:. Poland wa~ to be hrol.:e down irrctn~1abl} on 13 '\'01emh.:r. It"·" clear finland could expect no '"P-
~plit down the mtddlc .md pon from nut,ide. "hile .1 numhc:r ,,f high-r.mking Gennans had argued that FinlJnd
a "hole serie' of n·onom- should :J<.:qme.,n: tn the ':loner dcnlJntk It 'ecm<. th.tt the Gt:nnans were as surpri~ed
tc meJ,ures were .tgreed . as mo~r of Europe 11 hen rhe \o1 tct' Jrt.tcked on ~0 ' m·ember.l5
For Httler it meanr thar
he could deal "irh Poland
"1thout Sm 1~t int~;:n ~n­ .....-egoti.ttJOns hJ1ing fJJied . ..,tJitn rc.,OI\'Cd ro 'ettle the m-.mcr b) forl'C. It is dear that
oon, :md once he h,lll fin- he c\pcctc:d dte cJmpaign w he 111 c:r qwckl} 111 much the same way as the C..emun..
i~hed 11 ith the Poles he had defe.tted Poland . ..,orne nftkcr~ ot the Red \rm~ urged c-aution, bm the prc\·Jilmg
could turn wc~tll ard~ \1ew was that Finbnd 11 nuld he delc;ltcd m I II to 11 da) '·'" Gi,·cn the 1ast d isparity in
wtthour concern ro lw. forces thts 11a~ not ,m entircl~ unrc~Nm.thle as~umpnon. The Finnish An11} numbered
eastern frontiers. Fur 30.000 men; it 11a~ ill-cttuippcJ ~~ ith rc~.ml to modern weapons \Uch as tanks and air-
St.tlin it mcanr that he craft. The Sm 1er comm.mdcr Ccncral "-inII \ lcrcrskm·. hatl 600,000 troops (the Red
could deal \imil,trly 11 nh \ rm) 11nuld e1·entttall~ commit 1.100.000 men). Lni-.hl~ ~upported hy 1500 tanks ,md
the BJltil states and 3000 aircrJft.l- I lo11C11..r, the l'inn' 11ere 11clllc:d ;md motiwtcd and Familiar 11ith d1c
Finland tf he so cho,e. terrain and comhnon-.. f'h..: ~.1me <.<~nnot be .,.ud of the Red -\nny. 11 hose officer corp'
Gennan} '., need for a free had been dccim.ncd alter ~talm', recent purges.
hand in Poland :md. ~ub­ -V'ter J 'uged loorder IIKtuc:nl. \ lc:rct'-l..m '., torcc' rolled m·er the Finni'h fronoer
sequcntl~. the \\'e..t h.td m ~i\ '"del) ~eparatcJ JJ, a nee\ 01 cr .1 1400I..m (~flH-rnil~;:) front. Gi\en the inho'-
'>Caled finland\ fate. In pitable mrurc uf mo~t uf the frnmter. the Finm~h commander-in-chief. \ IJnnerheml,
the late- I 030s FinLtnd 11.1~ .1hle to c;oncentnlt<.: thl.' bulk ol hi~ Ioree~ on rhe Karclian hchmu,. 11ere.:!O.OOO
had heen ahlc to 'hc:lter men clug-m hchmd the \ l.tnncrheim I. me- .1 .,ene' of field works stretching acros:> the
under the munt.tl hosohty ISUunu' - mJnJged to hold th~ mJin '' r1ght of the ~o,·iet ad1 ance. 'ome I HO.OOO
1t{ lllTLI.:.R'S \RCIIC \\-\R

the British Jmha."Jdor in Pan.... Ohwr ll.mc~. "no (,cnnan C\t:ept an ;,tbo;olute e\trem-
l'•t c:m lt:cl Jnything but .tu•tc: dNumlon .It 't'CII\1! the Ru-..tan~ att.tck the: Finn' - the
~ordic race par e.Kellcnce - \\ hc"c tmlcpcndcnw 11 .1' onfruUII~ 11 on b~ ( .c:nn,ln Jid."l'
The Bnn'h .md Frcnrh h.td npccrc:d .1 GcrmJn oft~n.,l\·c on the \\c,rcrn I ront
within weeks of the outbrcJk •1l "ar. \\n~cn it tailed tel mJr~:riJiize. the~ iound rhcm-
'eh'e-. l1X1king to ';t·,mdm,ll ia .1-. ,1 rm;.m-. to hrc.:;tl.. the .!c.tdlocl... G~:nnan~ ohraincc.l "ell
m·er half irs iron ore 1m ports from nonhc:m "" cd~n. There wa~ a "gro11 ing belief in
S11edi~h iron ore J~ tlte \chil11..'' heel of the Ccnn.m 11.1r cconom('l'1 The une\-pt:ct-
cc.llr resolute Finni~h rc:'i~t<tncc to the St11 ict\ pro1 idcd the .-\llie~ 11ith the opporrunity
to in ten ene in Sc:mdin:t\1;1, :111d hlucl.. !'Ill ctft,h iron ore: ..upplie~ to C'><:m'l<tn} under the
pretext of aiding the l'inm. In carl~ l'chnt.tf)' I~HO, the British and French
Gol'crnmenrs decided to ~end .111 c\pcdirionaf) Ioree ro Sc:tndinavi~l, ostensibly to help
Fmnub !1·1 troops mrb 11s Finland. Howe1 cr. tltis force 11 ould Lmd .tr '-.•n ik in '\'on\ :t~, and seize the iron urc
thrsl' mflirtrd 11111/IY mines in norrhcm 'wcden hdi1re prm iding am militaf)· support ro the Finns. Thb plan
mwulnc·r 0 11 rhr Rtd -Inn.\ required :H the \'ef) le,l~t the .tcqut~:,ccncc of 1hc '\'on1 Cg'l<ll" :lnd )11 cJc,, '' htch "'"
,{1/1'/IIJ( tbt II 'intrr rr ;u: extremely unlikely. gil'cn the tim counrnc-.· ducnmncd neutrality. Brinsh pn:par.mons
Frostltut mrd hun~rrr .tddtd wenr ahead throughout FcbruJI')" .md carl~ \ !Jrch I9·Hl. Ho" c1 er. acri1 arion of tht:
to tbr <i~tlrtr · :.. Qtr. plan reqUired an appt:;ll h} r ml,md for help.

men, throughour Detcml~r 111thour forcing .\bnnerhe1m m commit h1~ rc,crYC'>. -\ftcr l'innHh troQps on ;;:111<h
1- Dec:cmhlr the Sm 1ct' broke ofT tlm offensi\c. The Sm tet pu.-.h north of Lake Jm·ml!; tbt IVmttr Hlu:
Lllloga "a~ l.trgcr than \ bnncrht·im haJ anriciparcd. and he: ''as furced to dra11 on his (h,mlu to tmining .wd
re-;er\'e~ rn -.r.thtlm~ the o,tnution. In the fJr nonh the Srmet~ e.t<;il) c:lptured the pon of ,lf.UIJII c/qthmv,. casts offrost-
Pch.nno hut f.tilcd to pu<,h farther ~outh. By late December the Finm were ahie to mo1·e bit, ;;·rrr :·irnJ,i/iJ unl·nuan
on to the ofli:n,il <:: ~pectacular 1ic:mries were secured by Colonel Tahda at ·rbh-ajim·i 11111011g Fmnl!b so/durs.
on 14 December .utd Colonel Siialas1 uo <lt Suomassalmi in carl~ Januaf), "here 11 ith

the '<tren~th of ruughl~ '' brigade he desrrorcd rwo crack So1iet dili~ion-.. These suc-
ces.,e~com· meed ..omc 111 the rinni .. h Gol·emmenr that the W:lr \1 J\ II llln;thlc. :tlrhmtgh
\ lanncrheim 11 ·'' .tl11 ·'Y' ,1\\.m.: th.n the srr.ttcgic situation rcnwneJ f.'11In. I fowc1·er,
thc..,c e1 cnt.., did at lc:N prm okc J chJngc in So1iet polit:ic-Jl :md miljwf) pollq.
The Soneto, Jb.mdnncd thetr pl.111 to put 111 p!Jce a puppet rcgtme under the 1crcnm
Fmm'<h commum'<t Ono huu,incn. and continuott'< cont.lct wa' t:'tabltshcd lxt11 ct:n the
mo go1cmmenL-. from ~C) JJnu.u~ 19-HI. The Fmmsh ll-Jrgmning JXl,IOOil 1\J., ~trcngth­
ened h} the tntcrc:'t th:tt Grc:tt Brit:tin :md Frnncr ''ere no11 taking in th<: conllit:t. The
\\ c.. rcm \lhe' h.td .11 uncc condemned th~ Sonc:t 1111 :hton JnJ 11ere much heartened b)
the difficulue~ Ill 11 hich the Red \rmy found i~clf. Indeed. the Bno~h al'<l hoped rhat
the rinm,h-Smict \\Jr. or \\imcr \\ar. might also embart".l!>s the C.em1an~. ·lo quote
 30 lllTLER'S \RC I IC. \\~-\R GER\1-\'\'l, 1·1:\"L-\'\'D -\:\"D ' IIIF \\"1'\TER W .\R ~I

The Finn' \\t:rc dc,pcnm: for milira~ mJH:ncl, Jnd .1lrhnugh the free 11orld \ ·;lmn ' tanner, I]Ue\lll med the German tnim~ter 111 llcl~mla. \\ iperr Hm Blucher. ht•
e\prc:,~cd 11~ Jdmir.mon .md ") mp.tth) for l'inLtnd. 1cry little pt.H:llc:.tl ;m] w,1., forth- limml•tub •. "-'(!.''<'II similar!) tTittCJted rmL1nd for its mgratitudc re~·mltn!! 1918 and its current "do11 n-
t:Oilllng. .;;,, eden, althuugh refu,ing ro tntc:n·cnL in the ":1r. did .n least 'dl FiniJnd •11(1\flfl//11, It 11/jill'(l/1/t'II/J right unfricndh" ,Jttitude towards Genn,my. lie 11 .trncd ' I:Jnner that Gennany 11 ould
c:on.,ider:tble quanti tie., of ;trm' and ~upplie~. and allowed ~omc KOOO men to ,-olun- ~·11!• ::/•1• I• to 1-rc.ul• tf.r not nllm1 the \!lie~ to 'ccun: bases in the north ;md th.1t 'ut·h a concession would be .1
tecr to tight for Fmland. Genn.tn). h1111 cn:r, rcmainec.l 'mcrl) neurral. '1 hts 11 a' , c~ \/dllllt'l'bt/11/ (.1111 . m.•"tF bdb for ( ,erm.tn}. ( hht.nl i..e. Gcn11<111) ':. ~lltltlldl: 11 as. ''Gennan~ has no parr 111
much in line '' ith Hider\ the Finni'h \\ ar.'':l I lc ccrrainly rejected "(anner\ wgge,onn that Gcnnany tmght
hclief thJt Gt.>rman) <lpproach the ':lm Kt L nion "irh regard~ to opening peace negotiations.
11 ould nor becomt:
imohed 10a • 0\'ll:t-
I· inmsh 11 ar. Indeed, he \ lcanwhile, the Sm iet' had .1lso rcorganllC:d thctr mtlttal') c.lpahilities..\ leretsl.:o1
wa' somewhat scornful: 11 ,,s rt.>placcJ h) the far more capaule Scm) on Timmhcnko. The Red Army 11:1~ rein-
''I ha1·e no grcar regard forced, and an mten~tl e tr:-uning programme wa~ dcl·clupcd using close cooperanon
for countries of the between mfanrl'). t.lnk,, .mtllt:l') and aircraft. OurinL: late Februal')' and early \larch
'\orth. E1er since I <:ame 1940, Timo~henko dchverec.l mass unk, a1r .1nd .lrttllel') .ltl<tcb on the .\lannerheim
m po11 cr. the paJX:rs of Line until he broke it. Once through. he made for \itpurt, "hich he Clptured on II
S11 eden, :'\om a~ anc.l \Llrch. \l;mnerhcim. 'ectng the posicion 11:1~ hopclc''· J<h·i.,ed the go,·emment to
Ftnland ha' e ned wJth make peace. I he l'tnn\ d.:hated 11hethcr to .1cccpt Brin'h ;md French aid. but right-
one :uwrhcr in insulting ~~ con,idered \uch help would he of extremely luntred '.1luc and thu~ sued for peace.
me personally ... I h~11 c \ delegation flc" ru \ hJ\C0\1 and sie,rncd the peace treaty on 12 .\ larch 1940.
trul) no rea~on to feel an) Hostilitie' ce.t,ed the follc>ll ing dar. The Fim1~ 11 ere forced to cede the Karelt:m
frtenJ.,hip towards coun- Isthmus, their <,ccond cit) of \'iipuri, are:~s 11 t:\t .md north of Lake Ladog-a and a 30-
tries 11 hose pre~~ ha1 e year lease on the I !.mko Penm~ub to the L' SR. ·1 he \\inter \V:1r was Ol'er.
treated me with such The implic.mon' of the \\ "mrer \\'ar 11ere \t!rlOU\ for Scandina,ia. The -\nglo-
indignity. ~-\s for Finland. Frcnch mtervennon pl.m h.1J tlrawn J litler·~ attention to their e~ident imere't m rh~:

..e.:mg th<1t Gem1an~ in north. H~: therefore onlcrcd plans for a fuJI.,c.lle IOI,NM of'\on1·a) . •\!.to the resul~
191M, through \·on cler of the 11 ar. thl·re 11 ere t\\ o kc) t\Sues. The Sm tct l'mon hJd won a dangerous ncto~.
Goltz\ t:\llCdttion. helped Finland II.!'> deep!} cmhitterl·d and cxtremel) hc>~rilc l!J\\ards 1t~ 01iet netghhour, .md
Fml.md out of a difficult would rokc the tiN opportunit)' to h:11 e it., n•1 cn~e. ·1'hus Finhmd would react positivd)
'lpor, I should think th<lt 11 hen Hitler 'uggcsrcd ,, ne11 war against the ~OI'1Cts, some 18 months later. \ \'ithout
we arc entitled to expect the \\ intt:r \\'ar. Gemuu1y 11 ould ha,·e still im .1ded the Smict L'nion in 1941. but the
greater gratitude and con- tm·a.,ion would hJ1e been planned differently and would not ha1·e included the Fu111'·
'iderarion than 11 c han: Second!). the poor performance of the Sm ict troop' g-a1e Hitler the tmpre\ston
been ;tccordcc.l. ··10 that the Rcd \nny could ca.. il) be defe.aed . .\ C.trm.m general ~taff ev-aluation of lo~te
Thc German~ had e1 en December !9V>. prepared after ib failed offen.,i,·e, concluded that the Red \m1y,
blocked the passage of k" ilS m quanti[) .1 g~gantic military instrument ... leader.,htp itself, howc\'lr, too
ltali.tn :1id to the Fum~ and young and inc\penenccd ... The Ru,~ian ·ma~s· j., no march for an arm) 11 ith mod-
refused to t:1·en honour ern equipment .1nd 'upenor leadership.":: Or, J<, put ~nme" hat more colourfullr b}
Finnish anns order-. Swedish hismrian Christcr jtlrgensen, ''the 11 ar g;tl'e I Iitler the fatal impression th:n
pl,lced before the outbreak the Red Army 11 ''~ rotten to the core and led b) milital) blockheads.'':3 Thu~ f litlcr
of 1\ ar. \\'hen the ne11 and the \\chnn.H:ht would serious!~ undere.,unute tht: Soviet L"nion's abilit) to
Finmsh forc1gn mint~ter, resi~( 11 hen he illl Jded 111 June 1941.
 ChapteT 2

THE INVASION

oF NoRWAY
The German invasion of Norway was a
daring use of land, sen and air powe1:
The Germans quickly oven·an Norway's
paltry defences and then defeated British
and French troops that were landed in
tbe nonb of the country.

T he Finnish-Sm iet \\inter War brieflr shifted the

'' orld\ .mention to Scandina,·ia. .-\!though
Bnmh .1nd l"rench plan~ to break the deadlock of the
wPhone~ \\'ar" m the West by inrerrening had come to
nothing, their e'ident interest in the region led Hitler
to order the ima~ion of Denmark and .i\'orway in an
effort m fore~tall any furure Allied plans. The German
im a~ion "a~ a ~pcctacular tactical success. It was a
hrilliantl) executed campaign, in which t:he Germans
showed a remarkable grasp of operations in "three
dimensions, land, sea and air.'' 1 Indeed, it is arguable
thJt the German in,·asion of ~orway was the first
proper "combined-arms" operation. It was also
littler', fir.,t l.md 'ictory against t:he \\'estern .-\!lies.
The Brtmh, French and :--:on,egians were compre-
heml\cl) defeated. but not without inflicting serious
lo"e' on the Germans. panicularl) to the

Grm/.111 troop; 111 IIUW/1 111 \'or..:·a.l tm ]-I April I 9-10. Tb~ btpo.I-

IIIQIII/I(t/-;;·r.tp<J/1 lJ 1111 \IG J-1 11/0(bittt 1!,1111. z:hi<h had II C)di(

,..,,. ofjirt of YOO tTI/mtlt '' 111111//lt.
.H IliTLFR'~o, \RC"l IC \\ \R THE I'\\'\"'10'\ OF '\O R\\'.\Y ~)

lvit'fNllarine. the C.erm.m '\. .11 \. 11 hich 11 ould ha1 e t.•ruciJI tr.ltcf!lt' unplicmon' ior I td~un f,/111 lm, (n~l·r) ch<~llenge the Ro~<ll '\.,n:. I lo11e1·cr. he lamented that
the rc•a of the '' ar. tl•r I uu.frr Dj rb :It present hi~ "~urf.1ce lorces ... are so infenor in num-
One of the fe11 book' I lulcr rc.td on na,·.tl 'tratet.') 11,1, \ n \dnur.tl \\olfl!ang Yo1 ·~'·wf;,,.,,, "J'1onal ber and 'itn:ngth to those of the British Fleet ... that
\\'cgener'~ Tbc )ca )tmr,·~'l ~t(rb.·lliwld 11;,-, 11hich "·"' puhh,hnlm 1'12'1. \\egencr'.. 'l .1nl~ng /J, ;.,, ,,,,/.- they can do no more than sho11 they know hcl\1 to the
the~i~ "<h that the C.enn.m I lu.:h ._,c 1' l'kct in \\ 'orld \ \ 'ar I 'hould h.l\ c ch.tllcngcd 1 IIJ 1 1 prtmf 1111111>/tr uf gall:tntl)." '\onethclc"· he had no intention of repeat
It' re,trictlon to tht 'outhCIT p ol the '-'nrth 'l~ mp<"ed b) the Bnti'h Rn~ ;tl \or::-,rt b1 1/tr/rr. ing the mistake., of\\'orld \\ ar I. and 11 hen the: Bnu~h
'\,1\}- The Rriri'h h.1d intJ'H"cd .1 \<or .md-Bergcn :tlu..:bd~, 11 h1ch 11 n' IJctlltltcd h~ 'oughr ro impo'e the1r hlocbde on German~ once
a wmpathetic but o'tcn,ihl~ neUll.JI :'\on' a~. \\t.~eiH. t."tmduded rh.1t the hio..:bJ~ more: hi~ thought\ \<IOn turned to ~01'\IJ~. On 10
could b.ne been hrul..en ~~~the ''11lt tx.cupJtion ,f '\.om ,1~, 11herc the Gcnnan '\a,_ \llftOII•''' rtaliu t.frolo(!,m October 19-'9, Raeder recommended to Ilitlc:r thlt it
could ha,·c estahli~hcd u,lful 'rr.ltcl!ll h.t'in.: 1/jr,J R '"''"-~ (/•tlo-.::1 would a1d the suhmanne war against Grear Bm;~in to
The ourbreak of" ar 111 Septemher Jl) W "'" '1e11 ed 11 nh ron,rdc r.thk pcssim1~m mtrtJdtll<'d Qtmlmf!. to tb• capture ba~es on the '\om cgtJn coJst.3
b~ the Commander-in-Chic! of Lite J....ric~r;marinc. C.raml \d111ir.tl Frich Racd.:r. I le '"mm'""lr' 11/ ,,,. r;rm11111 Hitler. howe1 c:r, had little interest in Scandina1 ia.
had been assured b~ llnlcr th.u 11 .H '' 11h Gn::Jt Bntam <~nd rr.tncc "ottld not occur \,tt·l. l.n. b R,,.,/o; 111 lib main concern 11a' the fonhcoming campaign in
until 1944. hy 11hu:h tillll' rhc (.crm.m '\:a\\ 11nuld be in .1 pmirion 'criou,Jy w [),·,wrf..r /'I)'J. rhe \\est. RJcder\ concern~ 11 ere no more th;m <I di'i-
tracnon from the more serious business in hand. and he
therefore turned do11n the admiral's propo,al. Raeder
tried again on h Dc:ccmhc:r and rc:cei1ed the same
lnswer. llowe1·er, a '"'~ ~oon appeared to change the
FUhrer's thinking. The '\a11 political theorist. ,\]fred
Rosenberg, \ugge~tcd that Raeder should meet hi~
~on1·egian prore~e. \~dkun Quisling. head of <1

peripheml but 1oc.tl e\trcmc right-wing part) m '\nrw;ty, the Xasjonal Samlmg (~S
- '\a tiona! L nit)). R;leUer readily accepted. For Qui,Jing th1' "as an opportunit) m
gain support for the'\\ from the Gennan '\. a'1· 11 htlc: the Bntish threat- no11 man-
lfesnng it,clf in the \nglo- French plan to mten·ene in the Finnish- 01iet \ \'ar- 11 ;h
his trump card. Raeder. keen to further his p);m, for n;n al bases in ~orwa). and
Rosenberg. 11 ho lud c:n11'aged the incorpomtton of racial!~ "pure~ ~OI'\\3} into the
Greater Reich. thercfo1·e ensured Quisling recei1cd an .1Ud1ence 11ith Hitlt:r.-1Jn fatt,
Hitler \I';J~ intcre,tcd enough in Quisling to meet him twice, on I 4 and 18 D ecember.
Hitler'~ ba,ic pu,ition 11 a~ that he would prefer :-:on1 ay to remain neULral, hut to
reassure Qui,)ing concerning the ~OI'\1 cgian \ fear. of <I British ,;olatron of
'\"omcgtJn neutr.tltt~. he ci;Hmed that he 11ould land in '\.'orway 11ith si.\. eight.
rwch-e di1i~ion,, and c1 en more if neces~lf}'. to beat the Bntish to the po~t- I Ie \1 <l'
much in fa, our of '\on1 egian neutrnlit). bur if e1·er he detected the slighte!>t Britt~h
intention of entering '\.on1 ay. he promi~cd to inten ene.
llitlcr ordered .1 o;tudy uf a po~o;ible in' ;Non codc:named Studir .\'ord. and
Gene: raJ .Jodi. the Chief of Operations at the Ohcrkommando der \ \ 'ehrmacht
(0 K\ \' - \ rmcd Force' II igh Command), noted that it should be carried out With
the "sm:~llesr po~"hle ,r,tff". It wa~ oh1 iou'l) a largely theoretical exercise, 3S

H1tler '"1' emph,Hic in his insistence thJt he felt a neutral ~on1 ay 11 a~ 111

Germany·~ beo;t imerl'\t.

36 HITLER'S ARCTIC W-\R THE l~'T.-\STO~ OF KOR\VAY 37

The OK\\' had a first draft ready on 20 January 1940. and HiLler ordered tht: G.·nn.w Gt•l•tr'.{.~;tif(rr
establishment of a Sondcrstab (special staff) to prepare operational pl:ln~ for ''hat (molllll•llll troops) on p.mulr

was 110\\ codenamed Tlest·riibung (\ \ 't:ser Exercise). ~onethcless , e\·en though pLm- (opposirr). Tbr 1rtl Gebirv..•
ning continued apace, it was clear the process remained ac:11.lemic, as \dmiral Krankc Di:•i.rion spr•trbettd rbe
of the Sonderstab later noted: "1 was under tht: impression that [I litler and Jodi! Go·nnm attack 011 Xor.:·•'J·
were not firmly resoh·ed to execute the operation." This somewh:lt hene,olent atti-
rude changed O\'ernighr ,,·ith the boarding by the Royal ~a,·y of the .-lltmnrk, the
supply ship of the pocket battleship GrnfSpel!- which had been scurded in the Ri,er
Plate on 17 December 1939- and the liberation of 303 ~!lied merchnnt st:aman held
on board in Jossingfjord, ~orway, on 14 February 1940. Hitler was outraged and
Raeder noted that: "The evenr threw a whole new Light on the matter for it showt:d Gmntl .-Jtlminll Erich
that the Oslo government was no longer capnble of t:nforcing its neutrality." 5 Ratda mpportttl 011
OK\\' planning suddenly gained new imperus as Hitler was nO\\ co•winced that
the British were about to intervene in ~orway. '·Equip
ships, put units in readint:ss," he demanded of Jodi. •--'
who calmly replied that no commander for the expedi-
tion had yet been appointed. General Keitel, the chief
of the OK\\', suggested General ~ikolaus \'On
F'alkenhorsr, and he was summoned to see the Fi.ihrt:r
on 20 February.6 Von Falkenhorst had ser...-cd with von
der Goltz in Finland in 1918, and this apparently qual-
ified him for operations in the north.\ \ 'ht:n he met the
Fuhrer the following day, llitlcr asked him abour his
t:xperiences in Finland. rold the general that a British
invasion of~orway was expt:cted imminently, and scm
-
him off to come up with an outline plan. Hitler w;IS

convinced that Allied dominance in Scandinavia would

open up the Baltic Sea and Germany's undefended
Baltic coast to the Royal ~av}, and cut Gennany off
from the vital Swedish iron ore. Keitel belie,·ed that
von Falkenhorst had been summoned ro Berlin merely
to be sounded our, but Hitler either got carried away or
decided that he had found his man. \ \ 'hate\·er the case,
Hitler seems to have made a very firm decision. I Ie
gave von Falkenhor~t a rough idt:a of what he wanted.
Falkenhorst was told he had fi,·e divisions at hi> di~pos­
al, and that only the major ports need be caprured.
Hitler wanted to see hjs idt:as that C\'ening.
' 'on Fa Ikenhorst promptly, "went to tO\\ n and
bought a Baedeker, a rourist guide, in order to find our
what "Norway was like ... 1 had no idea; [ wanted ro
38 HITLER'S ARCTIC \\'.\R fifE 1'\.\ -\SIO'\. OF ::\OR\\ \Y 39

know where the ports ''ere, how n1:1n~ mh:Jbitams

i\orway had, and what kind of country this was ... I
absolutely djd not know what to expect.''- lle returned
to Hitler at five, had his plan appr01·ed and was told to
get on 11ith the der:1iJed planning.
\"on Falkenhorst selected his staff from X.'U Corps,
which he had commanded prior to this assignment,
with the :1ddirion of n:l\'al experts such as Admiral
Krankc. It was an extraordinary break with standard
Gennan practice that a corps headquarters, the lowest
le\·el in the command structure, should be planning an
operation that would under normal circumstances be
given to a n army or .trmy group headquarters.
H oweYer. Hider wanted to keep Tl csertibtmg out of tht:
hands of the Oberkommando der H eeres (OKH -
Army Uigh Command), in which he had littl~: tnl!>t.
Essentially the in\'asion of 0!orwar was OK\\· respon-
sibility.ll \'on Falkenhorst's plan built on Kranke's
Sondcrstab work and added some inno\'ations of its own. The most si~,>11ificant was Frttlloz Httltlr,; Cbirf•1"thr
the occupation of Denmark as a· stepping stone to ~orwar and to pro1ide forward GrnmTI Srnff of rbr
air bases for the Luftwafft: (German Air Force). In it'> esst:ntials, hO\ICYer, it 11:1s an Grrmnn li"III.Y. v:n.< l.:rpt 011 rt:quo::,tt:\1. Tht: portly commander of thc Luftwaffe.
audacious if strrughtforward operation. Tbe first echelon would consist of six groups tbe J'rillf{tS of tbl! pl111minx l !ermann Goring, was enraged that rurborne units had
arracking the six main objectives: for rbr im·1uion of Soru·,,~. h~:o::n pla~.:t:d under mn f:dk~:nhorsr's command, but his
Group I: "~anik", consisting of 2000 men of the 3rt! Gebirgs (.\lountain) protest:. to I liclcr 11 ere to no a1·ail. The na,~· at least
Division transported by 10 destroyers and escorted by the banle cruisers St'bamborst ,,,1s more emhw.iaslic.
and Gneisenau. On 3 .\larch I litler decided to launch II 'eseriibung
Group ll: "Trondheim", with l iOO men carried br four destroyers escorted by the .-1/fm/}nd/ (opposite 11borrJ hetor~: Gt•lb . .-\s rhe Bmish and French frantically tried
ht:31')' cruiser Admiml Hipper. v:ns Clmf of OptmtioiiS nt tn pt:rsuadt: Finhmd to ;-u;ct!pt their aid in tht: days
Group lU: "Bergen", with 1300 men aboard two destroyers escorted by the lighr OJ.:II; tbr ~flier tb11t before the Finns signed the ceac;etire with the Soviets,
crujsers Kiiln and Kiinigsbn·g. btmdlrd rbt S111-.::rgitm 1 litlo::r <.:on~•d~:rcd launching the operation early to
Groups IV and \ ': ''Kristiansand" and "Egersund", with tht: cruiser NII"IYrttbe. the ommn11 plt111s. forestall the .\Jlics. The Peace of .\loscow between
depot ship Tsing Tau, three torpedo boats and four minesweepers. Lht: Finns and Sm iets, hm1 C\ er, allowo::d preparations
Group VI: ''Oslo", with the spearhead of the l63rd Division, the operation's gen- to continue :It a calmer pace, and on 7 .\brch Hitler
eral staff and elements such as the Gestapo, aboard the cruisers 8/iicher, Liirzov: and forma II} authorized the use of land forces in the oper-
Emden and escorted by three destroyers. ;Jlinn. four inf;mtry di,-i,iom- the 69th, 163nl, I !;j l st
On 2R february Tlitlcr approved the plan but a number of problems arose. and I 96th - the 3rd Gebirgs Oi\'ision and the I I th
lresmibung would not be allowed to clash with Plan Gelb. the offensi1·e in the \\'est. \lotoriz~:d Riflt: Brigade 11ere assigned to "orway
Von Falkenhorst was therefore hea1 ily restrictt:d in the number of airborne troops Gmmt! .Yikoln11s t'nll (tht: II th \ lotorized Rifle Brigade 11as later replaced
he could deploy (only four companies of paratroopers with ont: airbome regiment in Ft~lkmborsr (npposit.. brlou') b) the 21-+th fnfantl') Di1 ision). Denmark would be
reserve), wrule General Halder, d1e OKH eruef of staff. who was IJrgel) unaware of pl111111td tbr Gemu111 attJckcd h} the I lOth, 19Ath and 2 Hth Infantry
what w:~~ going on, only grudgingly rele~sed the mounroin troops von F:1lkenhorst inl'ltsion of \o,-..·,~1'· Di1·isions under General Kaupisch. The airborne ele-
40 III TLER'S ,\R CTIC \\'~R T I H. I"\\' -\ SI 0 :\' 0 F :\' 0 R \\'A 'I 4I

ment. ai> mentioned, was a mere four companies of the - th :\.ir Di' i.,ion.'1 The X \tr -\dmiralt~ "J'> ;tuthorit~d to min~ th\." l e;td., on N \pnl. Churchill named the oper-
Corps 11 a., to pro1 1de air .,upport .md tr-ansport. It 11 a' ;lt thi' late 'rage that the 11 md- ation"\\ ilfrcd", "bcc.m~e h~ lt.,clf 1t \\,JS o;o .,mall and innocenr."ll -\sa re,ult. con-
mg do11 n of \I !ted plans in Scandina1ia remO\·ed the operation\ JU'ntic.mon, .1nd siderable Ro~al "a'! unit'> ~ct out for the "orwcgian coast on 8 ~\pril. bur b~ then
Jodi and Raeder expressed their doubts, but moral JUSntit·Jnon' rarcl~ bothered the German ima~1on tleet h.tJ alr~ad~ ~ailed.
Adolf llitler. Both Raeder and Jodi soon 01ercame their rc'>en arion'> ami ~up ported Early on rhe mornmg of - -\pnl -\dmir.tl Liiqen~. the na1·al commander of
IIitier\ dcc1s1on of 2 \ pnl to set''\ \ 'eser Day" for 9 ~pnl. H t.w:rubunl{, ordered h.., llag-.h1p, Gur/UII•Itl, ro leave \\ llhelm5ha,·en "ith the re.,t of
Oddl) enough, the British de termination to halt Swedish tron ore did not the '' 1rh Group 1 for ~anik 11hile Group II headed for Trondheim. Theile were not the first
the f,lilun.: to aid Finland. Ill \\'ins ton Churchill. the first Lord of the \dnm.tl~. Gennan .,hip., to .,,u(, ho" cH~r Sc11ing all '-=on1·~)!. major pons. some as far north
remained resolved to halt the sea p.tssage of ore supplies from the "Of\\cgian pon lhr Grrmn11 hm:~y cruts-rr as the .\rctic Circle, m J ~1nglc mm·c meant that Jlthough the enure first 11:We of
of 1\'an·ik southwards ro Germany \\ithin the ;\'on,·egian Leads (the Baltic mule Rluchcr :nu mnk l~l' n troops were carried a hoard 11 ar,htp\, the lighter warships, such as destro~·crs, would
from !>Outhcrn Swedish ports thar were blocked by ice during the winter). 1(> force singlr \'ot'k'rgi,, shrll1hn1 h:n-e to be refuelled. F urthermore, i>Upplies and he;wy equipment needed to be car-
the German ore ships out into the open sea, where they might be prey w the Ro) .II l.wdulm the miJJ/e of hrr ried by transport~. Bmh t:lnker!'. ami transport~" ere slower, and thus in order to syn-
"\:wy, he advoca ted the mining of .'\onl'egian rerritori:~l w:~ter~. The Britbh '"""""""o" holt/. chronize their mo1·es some clements had ~ailed e1•cn earlier, berween 3 and 6 April.
Liitjen,' force 11a'i sponed b) Royal Air Force (R\F)
Co;l~t;tl Command aircraft chat morning. but the
Bntish \dmiml~ did not believe that the GemlJn ship~
11 ere he;ldmg for " omay. Rather. it was believed that
the lapiml ~hi pi> "ere intending to break out into the
-\tlantic and .llt.lCI.. merch.1nt shipping.11 To counter
thl~. the Bnmh I l ome Fleet sailed from its base at
S1.·Jpl Flo'' and headed northeast in an effort to block
the prc:'>umed Gennan mo1·e towards the Atlantic.
'\,onethele''· the ~nd Cruiser quadron, under \ 'ice-
\ dmiral Fd11 .ud-Collms, was ordered to patrol an area
off the "on1 cgian coast north ofSm1-anger. By that time,
ho11 e1 er, Group I 11 .1~ north of this pmition. Admiral Sir
Charle~ Forbes, Commander of the !lome Fleet, might
hal'e -,rill caught Group II heading for Trondheim or
Group Ill 11 hich h;td not yet !>ailed, but he was expecting
:1 German breakout into the Atlantic and, in British
tenm, that 11;1~ str:Hef.rically more important.
\!though Group) 1 and n had enjop:d considerable
luck thu' far, the destroyers ~truggled to mamt;tin tht:
)peed of 26 knots set by G11t'ismau, and br the morning
of l) \pril were scattered. One does nor need to dwell
too long on the condiuons belo" der.:b for the 200
troops .tboard ~:ach 1·essel. The destroyer Halls
Llidnllilf/11 had become separated from Group I and
m;tde chJncc contact 11 ich the British destroyer 1L\ IS
Glo;.,·u·orm. "hich similarly 11as separated from the
Bnu~h b;Jttlccrul)t:r Rmo-c.·n, undertaking .1 minmg
4-1 HITLER 'S ARCTIC \\'.\R THE J~V-\SIO~ OF !\'ORWAY 4-3

rhe early hours of 9 \pril. The Rmor:·11 gained ,1 number of hits on Gnrisrnnu but sub-
sequentlr lost much with Liitjens. who was not eager to continue the fight despite
lm supt!rior firt!polll!r, nnd ~o cont,lCt w;1s not re-establi~hed . \\nitworth ordered his
destroyers back ro \ 'csrfiord. bur by then ~anik was already in German hands.
Indeed, this p3llern had been repeated en:rywhere. The German groups h<1d Cl'ad-
cd tlw llome fleet. and by da1111 on 9 \pril 11 ere in position off ~arvik, Trondheim,
St:ll'anger. Bergen, Egersund and Oslo.
Only now were the :"\orwegians waking up ro the fact that a German im·asion of
their counay 11as under 113}'. The :\on,·egian Admiral~· had receil'ed news of a vast
am1ada of Gt!rn1an ~hips pa~sing Denm:1rk, but when questioned the German na1·al
:nrache in Oslo cl:!imed that he "supposed the fleer had s:~iled ro protect the German
coast ... l'millate in the evening of 8 .-\pril both the [1\'orwegianJ gmernment and
Tbr ligbr .-rrwrr Emden general staff at the Admiralty remained entirely ignorant of the whole operation.
lEIIS part Qftb~ German -\cLUall~ no one e\pected it.''H
foru rh,ll Jl1tonprrd rn This was nor entirely the case. Since 5 April Colonel IIatledal. the ~om•egia n
cnpwn: Oslo l~l' surpnst. Army chief of staff, alarmed by the reports emanating from Berlin and Copenhagen.

operation in the 1·icinity of\'esr:fjord . .-\desultory running battle followed as Captain Tht Gt•rnfnn htfll.')' rruisrr
Friedrichs of the Hnns Liidemmm rightly considered that his priority w:1s to deliver Admiral Hipper mxngu
his passengers to Narvik. Another lost Gennan destroyer, the Bernd t'On Ammr, blw1- rbt Brinsb Jmro,rtr H.l!S
dered on to the scene and soon found herself the GltnJ.r.vomJ's main quarry. Captain Glowworm 011 8 April
Rechel signalled for assistance and forrunatcly for the .-lmrin, Group U's heavy cruis- 1940. Tb~ 86rish ship u·"s
er, Admiml Hipper, was nearby. ln theory d1e comest between the I 0, 160-tOrulC mnk 111 rbt Jigbr.
(I 0,000-ton) Hipper and the 1366-tonne (1 345-ton) Gluwuwm should have been
extremely one-sided to say the least, bur the British ship held out long enough to relay
the position of the Gennan fleet and, after being terribly damaged and having used
up all her torpedoes, in an act of extraordinary courage and determination rammed
the Hippe1; tearing a 39.5m (J 30ft) gash down her starhOllrd side before being sunk.ll
Captain Heye of the Hippt'r managed, however, to get his ship safely into Trondheim
despite a four-degree list. The first shots of the 1\on1•egian campaign had been fired.
The Glovru.•o1711's message led the Admiralty to order Admir:~l Whitworth aboard
Rtm(fll'n to prevent any German ships entering \ restfjord. \Vhirworth began to con-
centrate his forces in open seas on the evening of the 8th. This enabled Commodore
Bonte to lead his German destroyer flotilla past him and into '\larvik 1\ith much skill,
and nor a little luck given the appalling weather. However, \ Vhitworth did by chance
clash with Bonte's escorts, Scbal71horst and G11eismau, as they sailed for open sea, in
-H HITLER' \RCIIC \\ -\R fHE 1:--.:T-\SIO'."" OF ~OR\\'\\ ·+'

h,,.J heen pre~'ing fur mohilil:l(Jon. It had been to no 3\ail. '\mthat the :\on\cgian
armed forces, eYen full~ mobili1cd, were that fonnid.1hlc. The Labour Party go\- 0 150 'lib
crnmenr that hat! domin;lted the political scene haJ placed m spcndmg priorit1e'
::=::f) Briti~h l:tndings (with datc.:s) 1-------;
0 140
c:J,c,,hcrc. and much ol the arm}. 113\}' and air force\ equ1pment wa' at best obso-
German attacks
lescent, as well as bcmg unc:rl~ ddic•ent in term' nf :~rmnur, ami-tank weaponry and
modern fighter aircraft. In theory. the six-di,ision am1~ on rnobilinnon ~hould h.l\ l'
been 56,000 men, e~pandcd to an ;)b,olurt: ma~imum of 106,000 men w1tb the addl-
oon of rerritonaltmlts.l' ruii-";:Jie mobilization had nc\Cr been pracrised, and e\ en
field manoeunes had been alx,J.shed to c;a,•e mone~. (,,,en f htlt:lbl's lack of succes:. The German Invasion
in urging mobilit.ation and the country's general 'it,lte of unreadiness. the of Norway. 1940
~on' egians "ere able to put no\\ here near this number of men 111 the field.

NOR\\""EGL\'\; 1:\'EP' I TTL DF

Shortly before 11:30 hour~. t\\O coastal defence fom at the mouth of Oslotiord
reportt:d that :t number of forc•gn ~hip-, of unkno" n nationali[} ''ere entering the
fiord. Hadedal alerted the Commander-in-Chief of the \ml} . Genen1l Laake. and
the go,·ernment. As the <.":Jbmet ,t\\cmhled it le-arned that h•r" had also appeared off
Bergen and that tht:~c 'c~'eb \\ere German. £.\traorc.linJnl}, the gon:rnmcnt
ordered only paroal mohth7,tnon and th•tt the ctll-up nutil:c' 'hould be 'ent by po)t!
,\leanwhile the ~omegian foreign minisrer, llalnbn Koht, ""~ being presented
'~ilh a demand for toml and unconditional capitulation by the German diplomat
Kurt Br'juer to a\ otd "enure!} u,eft:s) bloodshcu''. The '\:orwcgian Go\'ernmem
rejected the German note un.mimously. Brauer re~ponded \\hen mfonned of the
decision at abom 05:30 hour-. on 9 \pril that: kTherc will he fighttng and nothing
can sa' e } ou." But J'> Kohl pumtcd out. the shooting had alrc;1d~ started.Jfi
The German troops of (,eneral Eduard Dietl\ mount<lln dt\ t'irm were relie,·ed to
enter the calmer in,horc \\Jtcrs of Oforfiord, which lc..':ld~ to '\anik'~ port. The
2160km ( 1200-mile) journe} had been undertaken in terrible weather and the troop)
had been chilled, soaked and \\ ntcked \\ ith sea)icknc,). 'lo quote one of them, Franz
Piichler: "The sea wa' so rough that our quarters were in J terrible me~s. E'•erything
that was not nailed or )CrC\\ cd do" n had been flung abmu ... '.Jeep was our of the
question."!- The Dutbtr coli RodtT rc1mincd ou~idc the tjord as a guard. At the
mouth of the fiord. Commodore Bonte belie,ed th:H there \\ere No 'mall fortrcs~­
es, and so he detached the H11m l.udrmarm and the . lmon ~dmutt '' 1th their troop' to Tl•t Grnnan m r:•tSI!JII of
deal \1 it:h the '\:onH:gi<lfl po)ition~. lt rumed our German mrclhgcnce \\:tS \\Tong and \ ,,.k Jl k.u J J11ring
that these were onlr half-hUJit .md unm:tnned blnckhou'e'. lle detached three more oprrrtiiOII that slallfu!~)

)hips up Herjang'l>fjord to cJprure the army suppl) depot at Fh esg.trd, "hich •ur- '"m/tmrtl .nr. l11nd nnd
rcndercu without a shot being fired. t/1/ t'td rlrmrnts to
Bonte sailed inro the harbour \1 ith his three remaining' csscl~. II 'ilbelm I leidkamp. on·n;·brlm tbr Yon:· ef{WIIS
&rnd ron .-/nuin and Gearq; 1/.lu/r. H ere at Ltst he met o;omc nppo,itinn - the t\\o 1111d tb(fr Bnti!h mtd
coastal defence :.hip~ the Eufsa ld and rhe S orgr. Thc~c ancient \e ~els dated from FrtllrP ullirs
+6 HITLER'S ARCTIC \\'AR
Wii/J Oslfl srmrrJ. rbr
Grrmtws could rrinfora
tbl'ir JoNes m Xort."IIJ.
Tbur troops lulu jrm bun
luuded at Oslo bnrboru: 2-1
• lpril 19-10.
Troops aboard n Grrmnn
.tbip r:wir t o disrmbt1rk dur-
ing thr iu~'flsiou of X ol<l·ny.
THE 1:\'\':\SIO::" OF 0:0R\\'AY +7
1900. The Eidsi:o/d fired a warning shot across the Hitdknmp's bow. Bonte sent an
emissal) across to the 0-'orwegian ship who, when his request that the Germans be
allowed to enrer the harbour was refused, calmly stepped off the Eidr11old and fired a
red \ 'e11· canridge, at which signal the Hiedkmnp sent four torpedoes into the aged
1e~sel, ~ending it to the bottom with most its crew. The Sorge at least had some
warning, and was able to engage the Armin as it was tying up at the Post Peer.
However, its poor gunll.el)' allowed Captain Rechel to put a couple of torpedoes
into the Xorge, after which the German commander resumed landing his troops.
The 0-'orwegian milital)' response at ;'\lan·ik was even less effective: the command-
er of a battalion of the 13th Infant')' Regiment, Colonel Sundlo, surrendered
unconditionallr ,,;chin in an hour without firing a shot. General Dietl could report
ro 1on Falkenhorst in H amburg by 08:10 hours that 2\"an·ik was completely in
German hands.
At Trondheim d1ings went e\'en smoother for the Germans. The forts guarding
the approach \\ere taken completely by surprise and fired hopeless!~· at the passing
48 IIITLER'S ARCTIC WAR
German ships. Three destroyers and the troops were detached to deal with the forts,
while rhe Hippt!r and a single destroyer raced for the harbour. Two companies of the
I 38th .\lowltain Regiment detached from the 3rd Gcbirgs Di,;sion, under Colonel
\ \'e1ss, were enough to secure the town's immediate capirul.1tion. Then the Hippt•r
rurncd back to help deal with the coastal defence fom, which had succeeded in seri-
ously damaging one of the German desrroyers. It took l\I'O dars to subdue the
Grm11111 troops nt \ 'an.·1k
rm 9 .-lpnl 19+0. Soon nf rt r
this photogrnph :!'1/.f
tbt B1·itisb mnk this
111/ldt mifird dtstro_l'tr.
TH£ 10:\"ASlON OF i\'ORWAY 49
~n,bborn resistance of the men manning these fons. bur it was to little purpose given
that Trondheim itself had fallen without a shot. The small airfield at \ 'aernes, 32km
(10 miles) northeast ofTrondheim, held out until the following day.
tal..• m Admiral Schumdt's Group Ill narrowly missed the British llome Fleer off
St:wanger, and was outside Korsfjord which leads to Bergen, Norway's second city,
on schedule by 02:00 hours. He dropped a small force from General Tittel's 69th
infantry Division to deal with the fort at Kvaren, but so right was the schedule that
he h<td to push on past the 1\:orwegian position before it was captured. The battery
managed to score hits on the Bremse and Kn1'1 PeteJJ and inflict serious damage on
the light cruiser Konigsberg before they broke through the coastal defences. The
fort was finally taken after a Luftwaffe auack. The !':orwegian troops in Bergen.
howe1•er, quickly withdrew in good order, allowing the Ko111 to land her troops who
soon secured the city.
THE FIGIIT FOR KruST!AJ.'\SA.VD
Group f\ ' had considerable problems in entering Kristiansand harbour. Although
Lhe small town of Arendal was easily taken under cover of fog, Captain Rieve of the
Kndsrube found that the fog had hidden the enrrance ro the fjord. In the impr01mg
light the fortress on the island on Odderoy opened fire with such accuracy that Rieve
was forced to retreat. He then called for air support. At 07:00 hours he tried again in
the wake of a Luftwaffe air raid and was no more successful. The captain then
attempted to get the troops of the 163 rd Division ashore by torpedo boat, but he was
thwarred by the fog again, and in the process all but ran the Knrlsruhe aground.
Finally he resorrerl to subterfuge, and at 11:00 hours the Norwegian foru·ess received
a message in Norwegian code: "British and French destroyers coming to your help.
Do not fire." Tt was n deception tactic much used by the Germans on 9 April. As the
Gem1ans tried again the ~orwegi:m guns re1mined silent as they tried to identifY the
fog-shrouded warships. Apparently recognizing the french tricolour, the
Norwegians allowed them to pass and Rieve was finally able to occupy the town 12
hours behind schedule.IS The Group VI operation against the cable station at
Egersund was a 1·ery much more minor affair, and 150 cyclists of the 69th Division
easily caprured their objective,
Central to the German plan was the capture of a number of airfields. which would
.,_, be ,;tal for the projection of German air power in the later stages of the campaign.
Sola airfield near Suvanger was strafed by i\ Tesserschmitt Bf 11 Os :lt around 09:30
hours, and these were followed by II Junkers ju 52 transports led by Captain
Gunther Capito, each of which dropped 12 paratroopers. They soon routed the
Nomegian platoon guarding the airfield, although they suffered some loses to
Norwegian machine-gun ftre. Iu the following days, 180 Ju 52s flew in roughly 2000
troops of the 69th Division, who soon secured Stavanger, while three German s<."ll
transportS landed the di,;sion's 193rd Regiment.
50 HI TLER'S .\ RCTIC \\".-\R rt II·. I '\ \ 'A S l 0 .:\' 0 F '\' 0 R \\'A Y 5I

•\ similar coup de main \laS planned for Fomebu at 0 lo. but the n:l\JI operarion~
then~ c.lld not go to plan. Group,. had been spotted by Brili~h ~ubmarinc~ and had
suffered a hnnsing, if one-sided, encounter with tht! "\'on,eg-1<111 Jrmed tr:m ler Pol
111. A number of troops \\ere dropped off by the minesweepers and torpedo ho.w;
to capture the forts at Raub) and Bolaerene. The same force then nw,·ed .1gain't
the n:waJ base :It ff orten. f{m\C\er, the main defence~ in Q~Jofjord ~till lay ahead.
The main convoy approached the -t57m (500yd) channel through the Drohak no~r-
rows, in front of Forr Oscarborg, led by the heavy cruiser Bl1irbrr. The garnson
commander, 3\'<lrc of the age und inaccuracy of his 180mm guns, opened lire on
the German sh1p at poinr-blank range causing seriou~ d:1mage. It ''a' then h1l h~
t\\0 torpedoes from land-based tubes at Kaholmen. \t Oi:30 hour' an e\plosion m
the mag:uine of her secondary annamenr capsized the 8/ud;rr. One thou~.md men
went dm' n With her, mcluding 600 men of the 163 rd Inf.mtr) o,, j,wn and most
of the headquarter~ staff. Captain Thiele of the Lurzo::: took cornm;md, hut not
before hi~ ship had taken rbree hits. He ,,·ithdrew the remamdcr of the group .mtl
disembarked the troops to smrm the enem} pos1tions, and ordered the rc:~t ro make
the1r wa} to o,Jo by road. Despite repeated air attach the forh held out unnl the
foJlo,, ing da}. and onlr then was OsJo~ord deemed safe for Gennan ,hip~. ' J he cap-
ture of Oslo \\':l'i no\\ ~eriou'l} behind schedule.
Briwr 1111d Frwrh troops i11
northm \ 'or..."•t) 111 .lpril
I 'NO /11 v,mrr·,d, Alltrd 111J
to tlu \ 'oru·(v,i111u -.r11s
/t,tpbll~.trd 1111d tllilllr'JI"'tr.
/"nn•b llpwr trrwp< lll•ll•c
,, dr111111111t 11111dmg tn
\ rn'"l!.l\ [mm1r sbrp.
pufonll•llltt in f.,urft in
\ on."•l,l' 'It'liS Ius
.<patllml11r.
Thing<; nearly '' ent as d1samously at the airfield at Fomebu just outside Oslo.
The plan had required the ~ciL.ure of the airfield by paratroopers dropped by
Tl>(lr lieutenant 'lartin Dre,,e.,' Kampfg-t:)Ch\\:lder (bomber group) I, where the) \\Ould
be met by Captain Spiller, the German a1r attache. l hey would be followed 10 min-
utes later br Captain Richard \ \'agncr's Group I 03, which would land an infunrry
battalion. The} were escorted by Lieutenant \\'erncr H ansen's Zerstorcr
Geschwader (Destroyer Squadron) 76 of eight Bf I JOs.l 0 H owever, the fog was b:~d
over the Skagerrack and the squadron carrying the paratroopers was forced to turn
back. Goring had ordered that if rhc paratroopers failed to capture Fornebu, the rest
of the force mu't turn h;ld. :1nd the commander nf X ~o\ir Corps, General Geisler,
therefore ordered \\ agner to .1bort the m1~S10n.
\\ ·agner. ho'' e\ er. i!-rnored the order and pressed on. Hansen, commanding the Bf
llOs, \\J~ alread~ o\cr Fomebu ;md bru.,hed off the challenge of a handful of
'\'orwegian Gladiator b1planes '' hich h:1d managed to get into the air. He did not
kno'' that the paratrooper\ had returned to Gennany. E,·entually, \Yagncr's planes
arri,·cd and he made the fi~t approach onto the airfield, buc his aircraft were hit br
ground fire and he \\a' forced to pull up. H an~en, nm' desperate!~ ~hort of fuel,
decided to take mJttcrs mto h~S O\\ n hands and landed his aircraft. Once safclr on
the ground. the Bf 11 Os acted a~ mobile machine-gun positions and managed to drive
52 HITLER'S ARCTIC \\'.-\R
off the .Norwegian defenders. Enough of \\'agner's ju 52s then landed for their
troops to secure the airfield. By the afternoon, the whole of the 324th Lnfantry
Regiment had been landed along \\ith a full military band. It was a remarkable action
and Hansen's quick thinking and bra\'ery had s:wed the da). As General Geisler said
to Han~en when he arri\·ed at Fornebu two days later, "bur for your squadron, things
might have rurncd out \'cry differently. "20
The soldiers then made their way into Oslo, and the band held an imprompn1
concert in the centre of the city in an effort to persuade the Xomegian population
T TT E I~YASIO~ OF ~OR WAY 53
that the Germans were m control. Effecti\·ely they were. as the '!om·egian
Government and King !Jaakon had already fled to Hamar. The plan had been that
a special squad would capture these important figures in the early hours of the morn-
ing. but the sinking of the 8/iicber had put an end to any such possibility.
G,·rm•m troops ;:•,mb tbr :"\nnethdess, C:~ptJin Spiller was determined to do so. H e lo:~ded some of his para-
Lnfit'll}]'r mlnrr ,, Brimb troopers into :1 hus :~nd set off for Hamar. They were met outside Oslo by a scratch
position dunnv, thr figbtmg force led by the new l'\on,egian Commander-in-Chief. General Ouo Ruge (the
i11 Xnt7:'''.l· ineffectual L:1ake had been replaced earlier that day). The Germans were decisively
beaten, :md Spiller was killed. In his pocket was found a list of people to be arrested,
headed by King Haakon, the prime minister Johan ~ygaards\·old. and Carl Hambro,
head of the Stoning {the :'\orwegian parliament).! 1 ,\1eanwhilc, Vidl."1!n Quisling had
proclaimed a gO\ ernment of national unity and ordered tl1e population not to resist
the Genmn im·asion. Quisling's treachery merely stiffened i'-Jom·egian resistance,
and the Germans soon replaced him with an AdministraciYe Cow1cil.
lt had been a StuiUlingly S1.1ccessful da> for the Gennans. In addition to the seizure
of all II i!seriilnm.rts objecti\·es, Denmark had also fallen with barely a shot being fired.
The on I) hlack !>pot had heen the sinking of the 8/iicbe1· and the failure co capture the
Gcrmllfl momtt11i11 troops go king and government. l':ow it was simply a question of building up Gcm1an forces and
to grnuutl 11111/a t'llfl/IV firr conquering the I'\on' egi:111 interior. Von Fa Ikenhorst Ae11 in on I0 April. However, not
during 11 P•ttrolmtrtb of C\'erything was to go Germany~ way. The British and French had just pledged Nom·ay
X11n!il.: in .-lpril /940. their full support, and e\'en now me British were preparing an expeditionary force.
54 IIITLER'S ARC1 I C WAR TilE fi\'\'\510:\ OF i\'OR\\'-\Y 55

The Ro~ al ,,l\ ~. aftt.'r It'> \Otnewhar ineffectual perfnmllnce in the hmld- up to
II tsrmlmng;, began to make Its presence felt. The Germans, m .m effort to prm1dc
'uppltes for the tin.t 11 Jl e of their rroops. had intended to ha1 c tankers and supply
~hip' a Iread~ m ~on1 egian ports. On I} one tanker of the two intended for '-:<In tk
arril·ed. and none of the freighters. On I} one of the three de,nned for 1rondhe1m
arrived, and rhJt 11 a' four day' late. so it wa!> decided th.tr mo'r rcmforccmcnr, .mJ
supplies 11ould be channelled through Oslo. the safest and shoncst route. The
Briti~h .. ubnurine .,en ice had done much to Ji,rupt tht' Germ:Jn efforl. lndcc:d, the
Polt~h ~uhrnarinc Or:.el had sunk the transport Rio dr Janeiro on 8 -\pnl. ncar!} .Jicrt-
ing the Nomcgian'> to the German plan. :\t least 10 transports or ranker.. \\ere sunk
in the opening dap, of the im·asion. Captain\ \'arborton-Lce led five dcstro)'ers into
1
an-lkfjord and m:maged to sink rwo Gem1an destroyers, the 1/rulknmp. aho;ml
which Commodore Bonte died, and the Amon Schmidrr. \ \ 'arhorton-Lcc, howe1·cr.
til o British desrroyers in the action. On 13 April. the battleship
lost his life :md
Wnrspitr and ninc: dc,troyer.. c:ntered 'an ikfjonl and .,ank the:: rcm;tining \CI c:n
German destroyers. General Dietl and his men were now cur off.
l'\a1·al dominance'' as less complete off the coast of southern and ccntr.tl '\on1·a~,
a~ the German control of the air inhibited the Royal '•111's freedom of action. On
the tlrst d:~y the destroyer J L\lS Gurkha ,,·as sunk and the bartleshtp Rodur)' hit b~
Luftwaffe bomb'>. \cr the rr'<lffic I\ :IS nor all one 113}', as Fleer \ir \rm .urcrJft ~unk
the Kimif{Ibrrq; in Bergen harbour.

BRIT!Sll TROOPS L \.·\:D r.\ ~OR\\'A\

On 14 .\ pril. the fir..t British rroops were landed in cenrral :~nd north em '-:om a).
The Briti,h pl:1n centred around thc: recapture of Trondheim. Rc:jecting a frontal
assault down f rondheirn fjord. the British chiefs of staff decided to em·elop the port
b) landing Allied forces north and south of the city, at ~amsos .md \ndJisne .
\lcanwhilc, General Rugc with wh<~t ~onvegian forces he could muster hoped to

contain the Germans in the passes that led out from Oslo until Briti'h ,upport 011r 11} /)ml'i mr~t flj' rbr
arrived in sufficient numbers. Key to this was prc1•cnring the Germans forcmg their I J9rb Gtbtrv,.virgrr
way up the Gudbrandsdal, because, should they manage ro do so, the Allied nrack Rr,fl,llllrllt. v:bub fouv.hr
on Trondheim would be directly threatened from the rear, and imually thi' plan /w,nc 1\ ''' ,,.,,..,~. 111 .-lpt·il
appeared ro work. .mJ \l,n /'NO.
On 13 ,\pril, the day before the Bricish landed, C'n!rman troops began ro push our
from O'lo on three axe~: cast, north and wc:st. The Germans. \lith po1\crful air 'up-
port, qmckl~ swept aside the tmprOiised road blocks and scored '>omc qutck ,ut:Ce\\-
es. Between 13 and 14 \pril. a whole regiment surrendered ours1de 1 onsbcrg,
!>Outhwest of Oslo. and 3000 ~on,egians at Kong5'inger were forced to'' ithJra,,
into weden to a1·oid encirclement. \leanwhile, Genn.m aircraft conunued to homh
the impr01 ised mobiltzarion cenrrcs that the :"\on1·egians had set up. \et there were
still grounds for optimism. The terrain where Ruge intended ro make a \t;md. on a
line hetl\'ecn R:mdsfjord and Lake ,\ ljo\a, was rough and might very easily delay the
four Gem1an mechanized columns descending upon him.
Bet11 ccn 14 .md 17 April, h:1d '' e:nher largelr kept the Luftwaffe on the ground,
and thus the '\on1·cgian~ were able ro hold on until the \\'e:Jther lifted on the 18th.
Supported b~ tanks of Pan£er \htcilung (Banalion) ..W - mainly Panzer h and Tb,
although" numhcr of the .,hon-li,cd '\bFt P1Kph1 \I hea1-y tanks also sa11 sen·ice
in :'\on1·a} - the Germans 11ere able to caprurc Elvcmm and Hamar east of L:~ke
~ljosa, and Gjo11k and Raufoss to the I\ eSt. Ruge was gening desperate. He corn-
mined his last re~en·cs. 5000 men from the Bergen 011ision, and his defences were
further hampered b~ the dropping of 200 German paratroopers behind his front.
These men succeeded for a orne m cutung :"\on1egian lines of communication
before being rounded up by the ~on1egians on :?0 •\pril. \\'hen he leamed that the
Briti.,h I 48th Brig,tdc h,ld landed lt ·\ndal~ne<;. Ruge demanded that rather than
Another random document with
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 donos al ĝi, eĉ nur pro tio. Se mi povos ĝin resanigi,
malsovaĝigi, kaj kune kun ĝi trafi Neapolon, ĝi estos donaco
taŭga por ĉia imperiestro, kiu iam starus en ledaj ŝuoj.
Kalibano.
Ne turmentu min, mi petegas; mi pli rapide hejmen alportos la lignon.
Stefano.
Ĝi nun malsaniĝas, kaj ne tre saĝe parolas. Ĝi tuj gustumos el mia
botelo. Se ĝi neniam antaŭe trinkis vinon, tio, kredeble, forigos
ĝian malsanon. Se mi povos tute resanigi ĝin kaj konservi ĝin
malsovaĝe, mi troan monon ne postulos por ĝi, sed kiu ĝin
aĉetos, tiu pagos por ĝi taŭge.
Kalibano.
Vi ankoraŭ ne tre dolorigas min, sed, post ne longe, tion vi faros; mi
tion ekvidas per via tremo: nun, Prospero tuj agos ĉe vi.
Stefano.
Jen estas la maniero! Malfermu la buŝon: jen estas tio, kio vin
paroligos, kato. Malfermu vian buŝon; tio ĉi ŝanceligos vian
ŝanceliĝon, kaj bonege, mi certigas. Vi ne konas tiun, kiu estas
via bonfaristo. Ree malfermu vian faŭkon!
Trinkulo.
Ŝajnas al mi, kvazaŭ mi konus tiun voĉon! Ĝi eble . . . sed ne! li ĵus
dronis . . . Tiuj ĉi ĉiuj estas diabloj . . . Di’ gardu min! . . .
Stefano.
Kvar kruroj kaj du voĉoj! Mirinda monstro! Ĝia antaŭa voĉo servas
por bonparoli pri ĝia amiko; ĝia malantaŭa voĉo por elparoli
malpurajn vortojn kaj kalumnion. Se la vina enhavo de mia
botelo povos resanigi ĝin, mi ĝian febron kuracos. Nun, amen![6]
Mi tuj verŝos iom en vian alian buŝon.
Trinkulo.
Stefano! . . .
Stefano.
Ĉu via alia buŝo vokis al mi? . . . Di’ kompatu! kompatu! . . . Tio ĉi
estas ne monstro sed diablo! Mi tuj forlasos ĝin; mi ne posedas
longan kuleron![7]
Trinkulo.
Stefano! (se vi vere estas Stefano!) Tuŝu min kaj parolu al mi, ĉar mi
estas Trinkulo—(ne timu!)—via bona amiko Trinkulo!
Stefano.
Se vi estas Trinkulo, elvenu! . . . Mi detiros vin per la malpli longaj
kruroj; se iaj el ili apartenas al Trinkulo, tiuj ĉi estas ili. Vi ja
estas Trinkulo mem. Kiel okazis tio, ke vi fariĝis dorso al tiu ĉi
monstro?
Trinkulo.
Mi pensis ke ĝi estis mortigita per fulmofajro. Sed, ĉu vi mem ne ĵus
dronis, Stefano? Mi nun esperas, ke vi ne dronis. Ĉu la
fulmotondro estas pasinta?—Mi min kaŝis sub la kitelego de l’
monstro pro timo de la fulmotondro. Ho; ĉu vi tamen estas viva,
Stefano? Ho, Stefano! du Neapolanoj savitaj!
Stefano.
Ne tro puŝu min, mi petas; mia stomako ne tre firme agas.
Kalibano.
Belaĵoj, tiuj ĉi! Ĉu ne spiritoj? . . .
Mi genufleksu al vi, dio brava,
Pro la likvoro inda je ĉielo!
Stefano.
Kiel vi foriris? Kiel vi venis tien ĉi? Ĵuru, per tiu ĉi botelo, kiel vi tien ĉi
venis! Per tiu ĉi botelo (kiun mi faris el arboŝelo, per miaj propraj
 manoj, post kiam mi estis trafinta la bordon) mi mem fornaĝis
sur barelo da kanarivino, kiun la maristoj elĵetis al la maro.
Kalibano.
Mi tuj ĵuros, per tiu botelo, ke mi fariĝos via fidela subulo, ĉar ne
terdevena estas la likvoro.
Stefano.
(Al Trinkulo) Tien ĉi! ĵuru do kiel vi foriĝis.
Trinkulo.
Karulo, mi naĝis al la bordo, kiel anaso. Mi povas naĝi kiel anaso;
tion mi ĵuras!
Stefano.
Nu! kisu la libron![8] Kvankam vi povas kiel anaso naĝi, vi tamen
havas la mienon de ansero.
Trinkulo.
(Trinkinte) Ho, Stefano! Ĉu pli da tio ĉi estas?
Stefano.
Tutan barelon mi havas, maljunulo. Mia kelo sidas en ŝtonego ĉe l’
marbordo, kie mia vino estas kaŝita. Nun, monstro, kiel
kuraciĝas la febro?
Kalibano.
Ĉu ne falis vi de la Ĉielo?
Stefano.
De la luno, mi certigas. Mi iam estis lunloĝanto, dum kelka tempo.
Kalibano.
Mastrino montris vin, la hundon, l’ arbetaĵon;
Mi vidis vin en ĝi, kaj vin mi nun adoras!
 Stefano.
Bonege! tion ĵuru! kisu la libron.[9] Mi tuj replenigos ĝin per nova
enhavo! ĵuru!
Trinkulo.
Per la sunlumo! tio ĉi estas naivega monstro! Ĉu mi ĵus timiĝis pro
ĝi? Malsprita monstro! La lunloĝanto! ha! ha! Kia kredema
monstro! Bone vi suĉis, monstro, vere.
Kalibano.
Mi ĉiun fruktan colon sur l’ insulo montros:
Piedon vian kisu mi! Di’ estu mia.
Trinkulo.
Per la taglumo! Perfidega kaj drinkema monstro! Kiam ĝia dio
dormos, ĝi de li ŝtelos la botelon.
Kalibano.
Mi tuj kisos vian piedon; tuj via subulo mi mem ĵuros.
Stefano.
Venu do; genufleksu kaj ĵuru!
Trinkulo.
Mi mortiĝos per rido je tia azenidkapa monstro. Kia malestimebla
monstro! Mi preskaŭ volus ĝin bati . . .
Stefano.
(Al Kalibano) Venu! kisu.[10]
Trinkulo.
. . . nur ke la mizera monstro estas ebria. Abomena monstro!
Kalibano.
Mi fontojn montros, mi eltrovis berojn,
Por vi fiŝkaptos, kaj alportos lignon.
Ho! peston al tirana mastro mia!
Mi ne lin servos plu, sed vin mi sekvos,
Ho, mirigulo!
Trinkulo.
Monstro ridindega! ĝi faras mirindaĵon el malnobla drinkulo!
Kalibano.
Vin mi kondukos kie la pomarboj
Fruktege kreskas—Per ungegoj miaj
Elfosos trufojn, garolneston montros,
Kaj vin instruos por sciuron trafi,
Mi vin trovigos la avelarbaron,
Kaj foje sur ŝtonego mevojn kaptos . . .
Ĉu vi nun volas veni?
Stefano.
Ho, mi petas,
Antaŭen tuj, kaj plu ne vorton diru.
Trinkulo, ĉar la reĝo kune kun niaj aliaj kunmarveturantoj ĉiuj dronis,
ni tie ĉi heredos. (Al Kalibano) Portu mian botelon. Post ne
longe, kunfrato Trinkulo, ni ĝin replenigos.
Kalibano.
(Kantas ebriule) Adiaŭ, mastro, mastro, adiaŭ.
Trinkulo.
Monstro blekeganta! Drinkema monstro!
Kalibano.
(Laŭte kantas).
Mi por fiŝo ne plu faros digon,
Nek alportos lignon,
Nek ĝin eĉ ekfajros,
Nek pletegon gratos,
 Nek teleron lavos!
Ban! ban! ban! Ka-Kalibano, kantu:
Novan mastron amu,
Ne tiranon timu!
(Ekkriante) Libereco! he! ho! Libereco! libereco! he! ho! libereco!
Stefano.
Ho, brava monstro, nun, antaŭen marŝu!
(Ili foriras).
 Akto III.
Sceno 1.—Antaŭ la ĉambreto de Prospero.
(Venas Ferdinando portanta ŝtipon).
Ferdinando.
Labora ludo havas ĉarmon agan;
Humila tasko rekompencon celas.
Mizera estus mia nuna stato,
Se la mastrino, kiun mi obeas,
Al koro mia ne redonus vivon;
Ŝi, dolĉulino, penon plezurigas.
Dekoble por mi estas ŝi pli bona
Ol ŝia patro maldolĉema ŝajnas:
Li min devigas, per kruela povo,
Alporti milojn da ŝtipegoj tie
Kaj altan mason per ĉi tiuj fari.
La karulino—kiam ŝi min vidas
Sub peza ŝarĝo pene laciĝantan
Plorege diras: Humilega tasko
“Faranton havis noblan pli, neniam.”
Forgesas mi: sed tiuj dolĉaj pensoj
Laboron ĉarmas kaj l’ animon mian
Pli okupadas, ol fortuzo korpon.
(Venas Mirando, kun Prospero malproksime).
Mirando.
Ho ve! mi petas, tiel ne penadu!
Ke Dio volu per la fulmofajro
Bruligi ŝtipojn ĉiujn kolektotajn!
Demetu tion; tie ĉi ripozu.
La ŝtipoj ploros kiam ili brulos,
Ĉar ili vin lacigis. Mia patro
Atente legas nun; mi petas, sidu:
Ne trudos li vin dum de nun tri horoj.
Ferdinando.
Mastrino kara! eĉ la sun’ subiros
Hodiaŭ, antaŭ ol mi povos fari
La taskon devigitan.
Mirando.
Se vi volas
Sidiĝi tie, mi la ŝtipojn portos.
Demetu tion kaj al mi tuj donu:
En mason ĝin mi lokos.
Ferdinando.
Ne, karega!
Preferus mi muskolojn miajn kraki,
Aŭ spinon rompi ol vin vidi tiel
Humile penadantan, dum mi sidus
Mallaboreme.
Mirando.
Al mi bone decus;
Ja, kiel al vi tiel:—pli facile . . .
Ĉar estus en l’ afero mia volo,
Sed ne la via.
Prospero (flanken).
Ina kreitaĵo!
Vin ankaŭ trafis nun, l’ aminfektado!
Mirando.
Vi ŝajnas laca.
Ferdinando.
 Ne! mastrino nobla,
Por mi la nokto ŝajnas la mateno
Se staras vi proksime. Mi petegas—
Precipe ke preĝante mi ĝin povu
Esprimi—diru al mi vian nomon!
Mirando.
Mirando. (Flanken) Patro mia, mi forgesis:
Kaŝitan tion ĉi vi volus gardi.
Ferdinando.
Mirando! plej el ĉiuj admirinda!
Plej kara el plej karaj tra la mondo!
Multegajn sinjorinojn mi ekvidis:
Tre ofte eĉ belsona ina voĉo
Sklavigis tro atentan mian aŭdon;
Pro multaj ecoj mi virinojn ŝatis;
Neniam tamen trovis mi animon
Perfektan tiel, ke malbono ia
Ĉarmegan virton en ŝi ne malhelpis,
Aŭ ĝin surstrekis. Sed vi, ho! vi sole
Perfekta staras; senegalulino,
Vi el plej bona kreitaĵ’ devenas.
Mirando.
Neniun el la mia seks’ vidante,
Vizaĝon inan nun mi ne memoras
Krom mia, kiam vidas en spegulo.
El viroj, kiujn mi jam povus nomi,
Nur vi, amiko, kaj la patro kara
De mi konataj estas: eksterulojn
Neniam mi ekvidis por kompari
Al iu la alian—Modesteco
La plej ŝatita, for de mi, juvelo!—
Mi kunvivanton, krom vi, ne dezirus,
Nenian formon mi imagi povas
Ol via pli amindan. Iom vage
Mi babiladas, kaj la patran leĝon
Per tio mi forgesas.
Ferdinando.
Karulino!
Reĝido mi naskiĝis; Dio gardu,
Sed, mi nun eble eĉ jam Reĝo estas!
Mi do sklavecon tian ne elportus
Pli dolĉe ol la lipo tabanpikon . . .
Mirando! la animon mian aŭdu!
Tuj kiam vin mi vidis, mia koro
Eksaltis por vin servi, ĉe vi loĝas . . .
Kaj mi, la sklavo ĝia, pro vi, sole,
Ŝtipegojn portas nun.
Mirando.
Ĉu vi min amas?
Ferdinando.
Ĉielo! tero! estu atestantoj
Al mia diro, se ĝi estas vera:
Se ne sincera, en mi mem nuliĝu
Plej karaj la esperoj! Jes, Mirando,
Mi, super ĉiuj limoj de parolo
Vin amas, ŝatas, kaj honoras.
Mirando (plorante).
Tamen,
Je tio tiel bona mi ekploras.
Prospero (flanken).
Renkonto taŭga de du noblaj koroj!
Sur tion, kio inter ili venos,
Ĉielo, pluvu benon!
Ferdinando.
Kial plori?
 Mirando.
Ĉar mi ne estas inda, . . . ne maltimas
Donaci kion mi oferi volus . . .
Eĉ malpli preni mian koran vivon!
Sensence tamen veron kaŝi estus:
Ju pli kaŝita, des pli ĝi montriĝas.
For de mi do, kaŝema honto, iru;
Instruu min, vi, sankta senkulpeco!
Edzino via estos mi bonvole,
Kun mi edziĝi kiam vi deziros,
Aŭ mortos mi nur via servistino.
Min kunegalan povus vi rifuzi,
Sed vin mi servos, laŭ aŭ kontraŭ volo.
Ferdinando.
Mastrino mia estus: mi vin servu!
Mirando.
Ĉu kiel edzo mia?
Ferdinando.
Jes! pli kore
Ol sklavo iam liberecon volis!
Jen mian manon!
Mirando.
Kaj vi, mian prenu
Kun koro en ĝi . . . Ĝis ne longa tempo,
Adiaŭ, nun!
Ferdinando.
Miloble mil adiaŭ!
(Ferdinando kaj Mirando foriras).
Prospero.
Min tio ne ĝojigas kiel ilin
Per amo ĵus kaptitajn—Sed pli ĝoja
Ĝi igas min ol ĉio ajn en vivo—
Nun mia libro devas min konsili:
Ankoraŭ mi por fari multon havas
Eĉ antaŭ vespermanĝo.
(Foriras).

Sceno 2.—En alia parto de l’ insulo.

(Venas Kalibano portante botelon, Stefano kaj Trinkulo).
Stefano.
Ne parolu tiel: kiam la barelo estos senenhava, ni trinkos akvon, sed
nenian guton antaŭe; tial, staru kaj maltime marŝu.
Servantmonstro, drinku al mi!
Trinkulo.
“Servantmonstro!” kia insula petoleco! Oni diras, ke nur kvin loĝantoj
estas sur l’ insulo; ni estas tri el ili: se la du aliaj estas tiel
cerbigitaj kiel ni, la ŝtato ŝanceliĝos.
Stefano.
Drinku, servantmonstro, kiam mi ordenas: viaj okuloj preskaŭ ŝajnas
kiel se ili sidus en via kapo!
Trinkulo.
Nu, kie ili do estus, alie? Brava monstro estus ĝi, vere, se ĝi havus
okulojn en ĝia vosto.
Stefano.
Mia monstro dronigis sian langon en kanarivino. Miavice, la maro ne
povas min dronigi. Per tiu ĉi lumo! mi naĝis, antaŭ ol mi atingis
la bordon, tridek-kvin mejlojn, kun intertempoj . . . Vi estos mia
leŭtenanto, monstro, aŭ mia gardstaranto.
 Trinkulo.
Via leŭtenanto, se vi volas; sed, certe, ĝi ne estas staranto.
Stefano.
Ni ne kuros, Monsieur Monstro.
Trinkulo.
Certe, kaj ankaŭ vi ne iros, sed enŝlimiĝos aŭ, kiel hundoj,
ternestiĝos en kelka angulo.
Stefano.
Unuafoje en via vivo, parolu, malspritulo, se vi estas bona monstro.
Kalibano.
La ŝuon leku mi de Via Moŝto:
Lin[11] mi ne servos; li ne estas brava.
Trinkulo.
Vi mensogas, malklerega monstro; mi nun estas taŭga por policano.
Kiel! vi, diboĉama fiŝo! Ĉu estis iam ia timemulo, kiu drinkis tiom
da vino, kiom mi hodiaŭ? Ĉu monstran mensogon diras vi, kiu
nur estas duonfiŝo kaj duonmonstro?
Kalibano.
Jen! kiel li mokas min! Ĉu vi permesas tion, landsinjoro?
Trinkulo.
“Landsinjoro!” ĝi diras; ke monstro povas esti tiel malsprita!
Kalibano.
Jen! jen! ankoraŭ! mordu lin morte, mi petas!
Stefano.
Trinkulo, detenu vian langon. Se vi fariĝos ribelanto, la proksima
arbo . . . La honesta monstro estas mia subulo, kaj ĝin neniu
insultu!
 Kalibano.
Dankon al nobla mia mastro! Ĉu vi bonvolus min aŭdi denove, pri la
peto kiun mi jam faris?
Stefano.
Certe, mi volas. Genufleksu, kaj ĝin rediru. Mi staros kune kun
Trinkulo.
(Venas Arielo, nevidebla).
Kalibano.
Kiel mi antaŭe diris al vi, mi estas la subulo de tirano, sorĉisto, kiu
magie ŝtelis de mi la insulon.
Arielo.
Vi mensogas.
Kalibano (al Trinkulo).
Simia mokemulo, vi mensogas!
Ke mia mastro volu vin mortigi!
Mi ne mensogas.
Stefano.
Trinkulo, se vi ankoraŭ tedos al ĝi, dum ĝia rakonto per tiu ĉi mia
pugno! mi elrompos kelke da viaj dentoj!
Trinkulo.
Kion do? mi nenion diris.
Stefano.
Sufiĉe! silentu. (Al Kalibano) Daŭrigu!
Kalibano.
Mi diras, ke magie tiun ĉi insulon
Li de mi ŝtelis: se la Via Moŝto
Min volas venĝi, vi la povon havas . . .
Sed ne ĉi tiu timegulo.[12]
Stefano.
Certe.
Kalibano.
Vi estos insulestro: mi vin servos.
Stefano.
Nu! kiel tio fariĝos? Ĉu vi al la individuo povas min konduki?
Kalibano.
Jes, jes, sinjoro mia, lin dormantan
Liveros mi al vi, kiam vi povos
En lian kapon najlon martelumi.
Arielo.
Vi mensogas; vi ne povas.
Kalibano (al Trinkulo).
Skorbute makulkolorita besto!
Lin, mastro, multe batu, mi petegas!
Kaj de li prenu dian la botelon,
Por ke li poste nur marakvon trinku;
Ĉar la fontetojn al li mi ne montros.
Stefano.
Trinkulo, ne ludu kun danĝero plie: se unu vorto via ankoraŭ
interrompos la monstron, per tiu ĉi mia mano! mi tuj forpelos
malseverecon kaj gadon faros el vi.
Trinkulo.
Kial? Kion mi faris? Mi faris nenion. Mi pli malproksime tuj staros.
Stefano.
Ĉu vi ne ĵus diris, ke ĝi mensogas?
 Arielo.
Vi mensogas!
Stefano (batas Trinkulo).
Ĉu mi ankaŭ mensogas? Prenu tion! Se vi tion amas, diru ree, ke mi
mensogas.
Trinkulo.
Mi tion neniam diris. Vi estas frenezulo kaj ankaŭ surdulo.—Peston
al via botelo! Tion vindrinkado povas kaŭzi!—Epidemion al via
monstro, kaj la diablo forprenu viajn fingrojn!
Kalibano.
Ha! ha! ha!
Stefano.
Nun, daŭrigu vian rakonton. (Al Trinkulo) Mi petas, staru for de ni.
Kalibano.
Sufiĉe vi lin batu; post ne longe,
Mi, ankaŭ, tuj lin batos.
Stefano (al Trinkulo).
Nu, for staru.
(Al Kalibano) Daŭrigu.
Kalibano.
Kiel mi antaŭe diris,
Kutime li[13] en posttagmezo dormas:
De li preninte librojn, tuj vi povos
Lin sencerbigi; aŭ, per dika ŝtipo,
Premegi la kranion; aŭ elŝuti
Intestojn liajn, per borega vundo;
Aŭ, per tranĉilo, gorĝon lian tranĉi.
Memoru, tamen, ŝteli liajn librojn;
Sen tiuj kiel mi li malspritiĝos,
Kaj ne spiritojn povos li komandi:
Prosper’ de ĉiuj estas malamata
Simile de mi. Brulu do la librojn.
Li ankaŭ belajn havas bonajn ilojn,
Per kiuj domon povas li ornami:
Filinon tiel belan li posedas
Ke ŝin li nomas “senegalulino.”
Nur du virinojn jam ĝis nun mi vidis,
Ŝin, kaj patrinon mian Sikorakso.
Sed Sikorakson ŝi superas kiel
Bonego malbonegon.
Stefano.
Belulino!
Kalibano.
Jes, landsinjoro, taŭga kunulino
Por Via Moŝto, kaj idaron noblan
Ŝi naskos, kiam vi kun ŝi edziĝos.
Stefano.
Monstro, tiun ĉi viron mi mortigos. Lia filino, kune kun mi, estos Reĝo
kaj Reĝino (Di’ savu nin!) Kaj Trinkulo kaj vi mem estos vicreĝoj.
—Ĉu vi amas la konspiron, Trinkulo?
Trinkulo.
Bonege!
Stefano.
Donu al mi vian manon; mi bedaŭras, ke mi vin batis, sed, dum vi
vivos, ĉiam posedu sobran langon en via buŝo.
Kalibano.
Post duonhoro dormos la tirano:
Ĉu vi detruos lin?
Stefano.
 Jes, per honoro!
Arielo.
Mi tion diros tuj al mastro mia.
Kalibano.
Vi min gajigas, min plezur’ plenigas:
Ni ronde kantu, kaj petole dancu!
Stefano.
Kiel vi volos, monstro. Mi akceptas vian proponon. Venu, Trinkulo, ni
kantu!
(Kantas) Moku, kaj pelu, remoku, repelu;
Liberaj ni!
Kalibano.
Tio ne estas la ario.
(Arielo ludas la arion per tambureto kaj ŝalmo).
Stefano.
Kio estas tio?
Trinkulo.
Tio estas la ario de mia rondkanteto, ludata per la pentraĵo de Neniu.
Stefano.
Se vi estas viro, aperu en via simileco; se vi diablo estas, faru kion vi
volos.
Trinkulo.
Pardonu Di’ pekojn miajn!
Stefano.
Mortante, viro ĉiujn ŝuldojn pagas:
Mi vin maltimas . . . (Min pardonu Dio!)
 Kalibano.
Ĉu timas vi?
Stefano.
Ne, monstro, mi ne timas.
Kalibano.
Ne timu: plena je bruadoj strangaj
L’ insulo estas; sonoj dolĉariaj,
Ĉarmegaj, kiuj ne malbonon faras.
Ho, foje, ventaj, kordaj muzikiloj
Milope ludas; dolĉaj voĉoj kantas, . . .
Dormantan min tuj vekas, . . . redormigas, . . .
Grandegaj sonĝoj malfermante nubojn,
Belecon montras pretiĝante fali
Sur min, . . . sed elreviĝo tuj revenas . . .
Kaj mi bedaŭre krias por resonĝi.
Stefano.
Tio fariĝos noblega reĝlando por mi, en kiu mi havos muzikon
senpage.
Kalibano.
Kiam Prospero estos nuligita.
Stefano.
Tio estos post ne longe; mi memoras vian diron.
Trinkulo.
Nun la sono foriĝas: ni sekvu ĝin, kaj poste la aferon ni faru.
Stefano.
Konduku nin, monstro; ni sekvos.—Tiun ĉi tamburetiston mi tre
dezirus vidi—Li laŭte ludas, ĉu ne?
Trinkulo.
Ĉu vi venas, Stefano? Mi tuj sekvos.
(Ili foriras).

Sceno 3.—En alia parto de l’ insulo.

(Venas Alonzo, Sebastiano, Antonio, Gonzalo, Adriano,
Francisko, kaj aliaj).
Gonzalo.
Per Dipatrin’, ne povas mi plu marŝi,
Doloras tro maljunaj miaj ostoj:
Ne labirinto iam pli lacigis,
Ol niaj iroj kaj deiroj. Reĝo,
Per via pacienco, mi tuj restos.
Alonzo.
Sinjor’ maljuna, mi ne vin kulpigas,
Ĉar ankaŭ min atakas nun laciĝo,
Kaj senspritige super mi pezegas . . .
Sidiĝu, restu. Tie ĉi mi devas
Forlasi la esperon tiel flatan
Revidi filon mian. Ne, li dronis . . .
Kaj vane ni vagadis por lin trovi,
Dum maro mokas nian teriradon.
Ho ve! li mortis.
Antonio (flanken, al Sebastiano).
Mi tre ĝojas
Ke li plu ne esperas. Ne forlasu,
Pro malprospero, tiun entreprenon,
Pri kiu ni interligiĝis.
Sebastiano (flanken, al Antonio).
Bone:
Okazon proksimegan ni ekprenos.