KYKLOS, Vol. 46 - 1993 ~Fase. 4, 473 - 495 The Impact of Interstate Conflict on Revolutionary Change and Individual Freedom ERICH WEEDE* 1, INTRODUCTION Social scientists disagree with each other about the meaning of the terms revolution or revolutionary change. According to LAQUEUR [1968, p. 501] revolution is defined by ‘radical change in the system of government’, not by violence or the use of force. By contrast, HUNTINGTON [1968, p. 264] defines revolution by structural change and violence. While HUNTINGTON and LAQUEUR at least agree that mere coups d’état are not revolutions, TULLOCK [1974] seems to regard coups as the most frequent kind of revolution and structural change as a rare byproduct. The definition to be used depends on one’s explanatory interests and theore- tical perspective. For the purposes of this paper, itis best to define revolutionary change by structural change only in order to cover the ‘industrial revolution’, as well as the great revolutions in France (1789), Russia (1917), or China (1949). The transformation of societies by economic growth may be no less revolutionary than the results of rebellion and violence were in the French, Russian, and Chinese cases. If one compares countries which both participated in the ‘European miracle’ [JONEsS, 1981] or the industrial revolution, but which differ in their experience of a political revolution — take France and the Netherlands, for example — then it seems that economic revolutions have even stronger structural effects than mere political revolutions despite the drama, violence and blood of the latter. “Professor of Sociology, Universitat 21 Koln, Lindenburger Allee 15,50931 Koln, Germany. Previous versions of this paper have been presented at the 4th World Peace Science Congress at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, May 18, 1992, and at the Inaugural Pan-European Conference of the Standing Group on Intemational Relations within the ECPR at Heidelberg, September 16-20, 1992. Its produc- tuon has been supported by WoLF-DIETER EsRWEIN and the Science Center Berlin and benefited from collaboration with EDWARD N. MULLER (Tucson, Anzona) in a proyect on violence, rebellion, and revolution which has been supported by travel grants from the Deutsche Forschungsgememschaft. 473 Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.ERICH WEEDE, Itis the purpose of this paper to argue that both types of revolutionary change, the comparatively fast and violent political revolutions as well as the compara- tively slow and peaceful types of revolutionary change, are strongly embedded in and affected by interstate politics. Both types of revolutions are shaped by interstate conflicts for the same reason: Interstate conflict affects the domestic balance of power between classes, ethnic or interest groups. The puzzle to be dealt with in this paper (but certainly not solved) is that interstate rivalry sometimes has a positive impact on individual freedom and material well-being and sometimes has a devastating impact on freedom and well-being. Unfortu- nately, there is still nothing better than crude and tentative hunches about the conditions determining whether the impact of interstate rivalry leads to a ‘positive’ or a ‘negative’ result. Ul, INTERSTATE CONFLICT, THE SECURITY DILEMMA AND THE EMPOWERMENT OF COMMON MEN’ IN SILENT REVOLUTIONS 1. Military Participation and Political Influence Where there is an interstate system, where states claim ultimate sovereignty and recognize no common and superior authority, where they are capable of war-making against each other, there is a security dilemma [HERZ, 1950]. Then, there is no alternative to self-help [WALTZ, 1979]. Rulers perceive the need to prevail in war. They may even perceive the need to expand in order to improve their prospects to survive future wars. At least for major units in interstate systems, there are incentives (o attempt to gain ‘security by superiority’ or ‘peace by strength’, Obviously, such a policy must be self-defeating for most political units. Conceivably, itis self-defeating for all states in the very long run”. This, however, is not the topic of this paper. For my purposes itis sufficient to notice the war-proneness of interstate systems and the difficulty of peacefully overcoming security dilemmas. Otherwise, the written history of mankind would not largely consist of a history of wars. 1. In the context of this paper 1t would be misleading to refer to ‘persons’ instead of ‘men’ By and large, men rather than women have been wamors. Participation in war by common men (e., by men outside of the ruling class) had political consequences to be discussed in this section ‘of the paper. Whale it may be argued that the subordinate role of women in most societies 1s related to their exclusion from warfare (see ANDRESKI [1968}), this topic 1s beyond the scope of this paper. 2, This is a statement about the national security consequences of the policy. Negative consequences in this respect at the state level do not rule out positive consequences in other respects, Teast of all at the state system (or ‘European’) level. 474THE IMPACT OF INTERSTATE CONFLICT If states are war-prone, then rulers depend on the willing cooperation of warriors. Military technology will decide whether rulers need a few elite warriors or masses of common men. Since the subjugation of armed men is always more difficult, more dangerous, and more costly than the subjugation of unarmed and defenceless persons, warrior status tends to generate political rights. MCNEILL {1982, p. 11] describes such a situation in the Middle Bast in the early part of the second millennium B.C.: “.. a small elite of chanot warriors exerersed decisive mulitary force and shared the political exercise of sovereignty with warlords whose commands were effective only when a majonty of the chariot-owning class concurred.” Since chariots were extremely expensive military equipment by the standards of the time, since only very rich men could afford a chariot and the horses to pull it, political rights could be restricted to a small ‘aristocracy’ of warriors. ‘The subjugation and exploitation of peasants by warriors and lords was ‘safe’. Since about 1200 B.C. iron replaced bronze in the Middle East. Iron was much cheaper than bronze. More men could afford effective weapons made out of iron than before. Coherent and relatively egalitanaan tribes at the edge of the river plains and of civilization could equip themselves with these weapons. Widespread owner- ship of weapons reinforced egalitarianism within these tribes, some of which succeeded in first overrunning and thereafter ruling the civilized plains. Somewhat later in ancient Greece a new military tactic transformed the battle-field and society. Heavily armed and armoured infantrymen, the hoplites, outperformed horsemen on the battle-ficld. MCNEIL [1963, pp. 198-200] ascribes nothing less than an egalitarian effect to this military revolution: “The ultumate basis of anstocrattc primacy was, of course, removed when the farmer-hoplite became the decisive factor on the battle-field In the ranks each man was the equal of his fellows... The phalanx, therefore, was the school which made the Greek polis... it greatly broadened the class of citizens who took an active part in polis affairs, for the hoplites who defended their city on the battle-field could scarcely be excluded from participation in civil affairs.” Political participation in most Greek city-states was extremely restricted, but not equally restricted everywhere. In Athens some kind of proto-democracy developed which enfranchised a larger part of the population than elsewhere. Again, this is related to military needs. The Athenian fleet depended on rowers. According to MCNEILL (1963, p. 203], “the landless Athenian whose only property was a strong back became able to play his part in the military affairs of the city. . Thereby his nght to be heard in the assembly was confirmed.” 475 Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.ERICH WEEDE A similar idea has been suggested by ANDRESKI [1968, p. 27]. In his view, military manpower needs determine whether a society is more or less egalitar- ian. ANDRESKI even suggests a measurable indicator of military manpower needs, i.e., the military participation ratio. In his own work, ANDRESKI provides much qualitative support from different societies and periods of history for this Proposition. Most cross-national regression studies with post-World War lI data also tend to confirm the expected relationship between higher military partic- ipation ratios and more egalitarian income distributions (CHAN [1989]; Dixon and Moon [1986]°; GARNIER and HAZELRIGG [1977]; KRiEsBERG [1979, p. 379]; WEEDE and JAGODZINSKI [1981]; WEEDE and TEFENBACH [1981]; WEEDE [1992b]). Where rulers do not need common men for military purposes, they face little incentive to respect their needs. 2. Interstate Rivalry and the Rise of the West Although the military may provide some degree of equality within the warrior community, it remains hierarchically organized and tends to extol the virtue of obedience to superiors. Certainly, the military is not an adequate school where common men learn how to make their own decisions. Nevertheless, I want to argue that interstate conflict and the security dilemma which generate the demand for soldiers contributed to the invention of limited government and relatively safe property rights, to the liberation of individuals from oppressive rule and to the European* miracle by which Wester Europe and its North American daughter societies became the first civilization to overcome mass poverty and mass starvation. “The rise of the West’ or ‘the European miracle’ may be the prime revolution in the history of mankind. Writers as diverse as ALBERT [1986], ANDRESKI [1984], CHiRor [1986], HALL [1985], Jones [1981], WALLERSTEIN [1974] and WEBER [1923/1981, pp. 288-289] agree that interstate conflict and political disunity within Western Europe contributed to economic growth and develop- ment. My own view of the matter [WEEDE, 1990a, 1990b] owes the greatest intellectual debts to Jones [1981] and HAYEK [1960], and lesser ones to 3. While Dixon and Moon [1986] do not directly assess the impact ofthe military participation ‘on income inequality, therr findings on the determinants of a ‘quality of life’-index provide indirect support for ANDRESKI's views. 4, The term ‘Burope’ 18 used here as an abbreviation for “Westem Europe’. While the borders of eaviltzations are always fuzzy, the line between Catholic and Orthodox Christendom (in the middle ages) is acceptable for my purposes. 476THE IMPACT OF INTERSTATE CONFLICT ALBERT [1986], ANDRESKI [1984], CoLtins [1980], NorTH [1981], and ‘WEBER {1923/1981}. HAYEK’s role in this synopsis is special, because he is the ‘one who analyzes best the beneficial effects of individual decision-making in contrast to public decision-making by rulers, the beneficial effects of private property in contrast to commonly held property, and the beneficial effects of freedom and competition on incentives, on the application of knowledge, and on the allocation of resources. Reading the economic history of Europe and Asia from such a perspective provides the following account: The great Asian civilizations, especially China which was economically and technologically the most advanced society during the Buropean middle ages, were burdened with political unity while Western Europe was characterized by cultural unity and political fragmentation. Interstate conflict in Burope led to many European wars. But conflict between relatively small European states and autonomous principalities® (at best the size of Chinese provinces) also effec- tively limited governmental power over subjects, whether producers or traders. Conflict between political units within a single civilization provides an oppor- tunity for subjects to vote with their feet against outrages of oppression”. In huge empires there is no such check on arbitrary rulers and their Klepto- cratic inclinations. The combination of rivalry between comparatively small political units and trade in mass consumption goods contributed to European traders being conceded relatively safer property rights than their Asian counter- parts. If some European prince tended to rob merchants crossing his territory, they could avoid it. If another European prince promised safe conduct against ‘some modest protection fee, merchants would prefer routes through his territory to alternative routes. By their protection fees they would strengthen the less Kleptocratic prince vis-a-vis his more kleptocratic rivals”, Safer property rights 5. Today, we are used to take sovereignty as an all or none affair. In the (European) middle ages and in early modem tumes, however, princes could owe loyalty to kings or emperors, but their ‘command of their own military forces made their behavior a matter of choice. So, ‘sovereignty” has been a matter of degree, and sovereignties have been nested. Here, autonomy in everyday decision-making matters, not the degree of legal sovereignty. The ‘Holy Roman Empire’ had more existence in law or myth than on the battle-field, 6. In this interpretation of European economic history, ‘exit” is more important than ‘voice’, By contrast, HixsciMaN [1970] 1s inclined to regard (collective) voice as a frequently preferable altemative to (individual) exit. 7. Since early European trade consisted mostly of mass consumption goods (like salt, grain, or ordinary wine), the merchandise value of each convoy was lower than in Asia where long distance trade mostly concemed luxuries. Trade in commodities for mass consumption implies more {frequent convoys than trade in commodities for ruling class consumption. Low unut value combined ‘with frequent occasions to collect fees for safe-conduct makes it easier for rulers to concede property sights to merchants than the Asian pattem of moving goods of high value infrequently. 471 Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.ERICH WEEDE in Westem Europe than throughout Asia contributed to reduced transaction costs, thereby increased the volume of trade and reinforced the regional division of labor. Specialization according to comparative advantage and gains from trade did contribute to European economic development. Interstate conflict in European history contributed not only to the spread of relatively safe property rights of merchants, but also to comparatively decent treatment of peasants in West European history. Peasants could run away: to other territories or to towns where they became free after about a year. By its very existence an interstate system tends to limit the powers of ruling classes and governments compared with continent-sized unitary empires. Political disunity in Europe also limited the scope of governmental decisions. In 15th century China the Ming court could outlaw overseas trade and the building of vessels fit for the high seas, The court succeeded in making this tuling effective —and in ending the Chinese era of exploration, thus leaving the Oceans to the Europeans. At worst, European rulers could prevent their bit of Europe to participate in the exploration of the globe and in exploiting the opportunities of overseas trade. Nobody in Europe had the power to overrule European curiosity and adventurousness on a continental scale, Political fragmentation also limited the power of governments to regulate prices. In almost all traditional societies there exist notions about just prices. By and large, just prices result from traditional price patterns. Just or traditional prices are incompatible with scarcity prices responding to changes in supply and demand. In order to allocate resources efficiently, economies need scarcity prices rather than ‘just’ prices. In general, political and religious authorities tend to support what they believe to be ‘just’ (in fact: inefficient) prices. Where trade crosses political borders, where neighboring political units compete rather than collude with each other, no authority can make just prices prevail. Again, political conflict undercuts the ability of governments (which control only part of the economically relevant area) to do much harm. Interstate rivalry between comparatively small states does not prevent per- secution of minorities within states. But it mitigates its effects’. Jews and Christian heretics often had to leave their homes in order to escape from the worst. Often they found a new home in other European states. They took their knowledge with them, they spread innovation across Europe. The role of Protestant refugecs from France in strengthening the economies of Holland and Prussia is probably the best known example of the diffusion of productive 8. The most murderous penods of European history were those, where a single ruler (lempo- ranly) succeeded in subdueing large parts of Europe. Hitler and Stalin provide pertinent examples. 478THE IMPACT OF INTERSTATE CONFLICT techniques by refugees. Again, these beneficial effects derive from the limi- tiation of power of European governments by conflict between relatively small states”. To summarize this excursion into European history, the point of departure is a system of competing states. Conflict between states constituted a forerunner to and a functional equivalent of constitutional limitations of governmental authority. Interstate rivalry provided ‘checks and balances’ before constitutions did. Limited government, relatively safe property rights for the lower strata of society, an inability to suppress scarcity prices or innovations from above, and the spread of innovations by refugees contributed to the rise of capitalism in the West. The creeping empowerment of producers and traders in West Euro- pean history enabled Europe and North America to overcome mass poverty and mass starvation before the great Asian civilizations did!°. The greater degree of freedom in Europe than in Asia, the greater degrec to which European rather than Asian producers and traders could make their own decisions (and reap most of the benefits therefrom) largely resulted from interstate competition in Europe and resulted in miraculous economic growth. 3. Some Observations on Contemporary East Asia and Reforms in Previously Communist Countries One may plausibly argue that some of the recent economic miracles in East Asia are also related to intemational conflicts. In discussing the European experience above, a basic argument was that interstate rivalry acts as a strong brake on the predatory inclinations of unchallenged governments. Few govern- ments in the contemporary world faced challenges, as the ROC on Taiwan or the ROK in the south of the Korean peninsula did. Since their defeat on the Chinese mainland and since their near-defeat in the Korean war' !, ruling classes in both countries knew that the prospects of survival for their regimes depended 9. In polities ‘small 1s beautuful’ because it reduces the cost of escaping for ordinary subjects ‘and thereby reduces the scope of power of the ruling class or prince. As I have argued elsewhere (WeEDE [1990a, 1990), interstate conflict in Europe was not alone in contributing to the nse of Iumited government and comparatively safe property rights. The separation of church and state, ‘autonomous towns, and feudalism also contributed to European economic and political develop- ment. 10. For some documentation of arbitrary rule and confiscation in the great Asian civilizations (Chuna, India, Islam) and in Russta, of the corollary distortion of incentives and the increase of transaction costs, see Jones [1981], Pures [1974] and YaNo [1987]. 11. Of course, South Korea was saved from communism only by American intervention. 479 Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.ERICH WEEDE on the loyalty of all strata of society, on the productivity of their economies in order to support their heavy military burdens, and for the first decades on American support'”, Taiwan and South Korea are outliers on three variables: first, on the seriousness of the security dilemma they face; second, on their growth record; third, on the egalitarian character of their income distributions, especially if one controls for their, by now, intermediate level of economic development. Finally, political and economic reform in communist-ruled societies also results from international rivalry and competition. So far, the reforms in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe expanded political participation and individual freedom without reversing or even halting economic decline, whereas reforms in Mainland China contributed very little to civil liberties and political rights, but significantly to economic growth. Imespective of the degree and success of these reforms, the reforms have to be explained by international pressure. From the perspective of ruling elites, institutional reform is toredefine Property rights, to improve incentives, to reduce transaction costs and to stimulate economic growth. In principle, ruling communists in the late 1970s or 1980s and ruling princes in European history faced a similar situation and choice, which has been described by NorTH [1981, p. 29] in these terms: “Relatively inefficient property nghts threaten the survival of a state in the context of more efficient neighbors, and the ruler faces the choice of extinction or of modifying the fundamental ownership structure to enable society to reduce transaction costs and raise the rate of growth * 12, But the availability of Amencan support would be enhanced by domestic acceptance of the regime and by imitating or at least pretending to imitate American capitalism. Pretending to ran the economy according to capitalist principles contributed to creeping capitalism and, by now, to flourishing capitalism. Of course, there is substantial disagreement about the causes of the East Asian miracles (see WADE [1992]). By and large, I tend toward a modified version of the neoliberal ‘consensus, where the modification distinguishes between two types of interventionism. If interven- tion 1s caused by Kkleptocracy or rent-seeking, it is more harmful than in those cases where the objective is the achievement of national security. 480THE IMPACT OF INTERSTATE CONFLICT IIL. INTERSTATE CONFLICT, REBELLION, AND REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE, I. SKOCPOL’ s Account of the Great Revolutions Structural change as well as violence are matters of degree. Here, I shall start by focusing on the great revolutions where the degree of structural change as well as of coercion has been extraordinary'®, SKOcPOL's [1979] treatise of the great revolutions in France, Russia, and China is a natural starting point because of her interest in international conflict, although her work has attracted some significant criticism (ARJOMAND [1986], TAYLOR [1988]). Moreover, her reading of the Russian revolution in particular is open to challenges of historical accuracy and interpretation (Pires [1990], MCDANIEL [1991}) 4 Butno analyst surpasses her focus on linkages between interstate conflict and revolution’*, The great revolutions occurred in slates under severe extemal pressure. France had lost the Seven Years’ War against Britain less than a generation before the revolution. Moreover, the financial and economic repercussions of the war did not end in 1763 with the Peace of Paris, nor did Franco-British rivalry for hegemony in Europe and overseas. France was a kingdom under continuing extemal and financial pressure. Her prestige had suffered from the losses in the great war. In the case of Russia, external pressure was much stronger than in the French case. By 1917, Czarist Russia had lost control over huge territories, the army was essentially beaten and almost in a state of dissolution. And before World War I, Czarist Russia had suffered another humiliating defeat from Japanese hands in 1905. Military pressure was as great or even greater in the Chinese case. In the 1930s and early 1940s China lost control to the Japanese over the important industrial region of Manchuria, over the traditional capital Beijing and over the new capital Nanjing as well as over all of coastal China and the most economically advanced regions of the country. 13, My focus on the great revolutions rather than lesser rebellions and irregular transfers of pohtical power partially reflects traditional sociological concerns. It1s also motivated by frequently ‘made claims linking interstate conflict and revolution as well as revolution and freedom (or 1's abolition). 14. Tomention just one of the contestable issues which are neglected here: In SkOcPOL’s [1979] book, structural charactenstics of the countryside (and intemational relations) dominate the analysis. But in France and in Russia crucial events happened in the capital cites. 15. This does not say, however, that her evaluation of the impact of intemational conflict is unique. LaQueur (1968, p. 501], for example, subscnbes to quite similar views: ‘War appears to have been the decisive factor in the emergence of revolutionary situations in modem umes; most revolutions, both successful and abortive, have followed in the wake of war (the Pans Commune of 1871, the Russian revolution of 1905, the various revolutions after the two world wars, including the Chinese revolutions).’ See also HUNTINGTON [1968] and Ty [1978]. 481 Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.ERICH WEEDE, International rivalry and hostility forced France, Russia, and China to com- pete with more advanced nations, whether Britain, Germany, or Japan!®, Under external pressure the ruling classes of France, Russia, and China had to attempt to extract more resources from the people than before. Tax moncy and military servicemen were needed, i.e., the external pressure reinforced or generated domestic distributional struggles. External defense or the glory of the nation are collective goods. Subjects (or citizens for that matter) prefer to see others pay for them. According to SkocPoL [1979], efficient resource extraction in all cases needed the assistance or at least acquiescence of the landholding classes in their own taxation. In France and in China recruitment of administrators from the landholding classes amounted to the penetration of government by the landholding classes. Lacking a strong centralized and independent administration, neither prerevo- lutionary France nor prerevolutionary China could collect the necessary re- sources, Freeriding tendencies within the landholding classes sabotaged the capability of the French and Chinese ruling classes for collective action, including collective action to preserve their privileges. By contrast, the Czarist administration was centralized enough to be capable of resource extraction. Although the landholding nobility in Russia nearly monopolized the most important positions in the Czarist administration and army, Czarist absolutism provided the ruling class with the capability to overcome the freeriding tendencies within itself by threats of coercion and selective incentives. But the superiority of German over Russian armies in ‘World War I led to the breakdown of the Russian front, of ruling class authority and of their repressive capabilities. Although the route to the breakdown of the old order differed in France and China from the Russian route, with France and China being unable to mobilize resources against upper class resistance and freeriding and with Russia's army being beaten by a foreign enemy, the root cause, i.e., international competition with more advanced societies, as well as the results, i.c., a breakdown of the coercive apparatus of the states were identical. 16. This interpretation of the great revolutions 1s not unchallenged. Conceming the French revolution GOLDSTONE [1991, p. 172] objects: “..in terms of the size of its manufacturing and ‘commercial sector, France was not ‘lagging’ behind Britain, France’s output in trade and industry sn 1789 was larger than England's, And it was not the nsing cost of war, and French inability to pay that led to the fiscal crisis. The Amencan War of Independence, in real terms, was France's least costly war of the eighteenth century.” Such criticism, however, cannot be extended to ‘SKOCPOL’s interpretation of the Russian and Chinese revolutions. 482‘THE IMPACT OF INTERSTATE CONFLICT So far, my sketch of SKocPoL's explanation of the great revolutions links external and military competition between states with revolutionary poten- tial among the losers. Putting pressure on state finances and/or armies may decrease the coercive capabilities of governments to such a degree that mass rebellion may succeed. Actually, the prerevolutionary crises were more than mere threats to national or imperial security. Simultancously, they were economic crises imposing new hardships on the lower classes of society, i.e, the peasants. ‘As argued elsewhere (RULE [1988, chapter 7]; WEEDE [1992a, chapter 21)), deprivation is not enough to explain peasant rebellions. The peasants must be capable of collective action. There must be peasant organizations, solidarity and leadership. There must not be daily control of peasant activ- ities by members of the upper classes. There must not be cross-cutting cleavages dividing the peasants from each other and linking them to elite factions. According to SkOcrot [1979], these conditions were largely met in France and in Russia, while the Chinese peasantry was originally inca- pable of collective action on its own and tied by clan, family or clientilism to the middle or even upper classes. The Communist cadres needed decades to build the organizational infrastructure for mass rebellion. The prerevolu- tionary government could not effectively interfere with the communist build-up of a revolutionary potential because of its own division, ineffi- ciency and corruption and because of the war with Japan. Whether the peasants are capable of collective action from the very begin- ning, as in France and Russia, or only after a dedicated effort at mobilizing them, as in China, the end result is the same again: peasant rebellion and the breakdown of governmental authority in the countryside. The simultaneity of the collapse of government under externally-derived pressure and of mass rebellion from below are essential components of the great revolutions. According to ADELMAN [1985] and SkocPoL [1979], the major effect of the great revolutions has been the building of stronger states who were better able to compete in international conflicts. Postrevolutionary (Napoleonic) France overran most of Continental Europe, before it was defeated by the British, the Russians, and their allies. Postrevolutionary Russia (i.¢., the Soviet Union) defeated Germany in World War II. And postrevolutionary China certainly is a stronger state than prerevolutionary China was. While SKocroL's theory raises a lot of diverse issues, two of them are of utmost importance in the context of this paper. First, is international conflict involvement as important a deter minant of revolutionary upheavals as she suggests? Second, how do the effects of long-term silent revolutions, like the European miracle, compare with the effects of short-term violent revolutions? 483 Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.ERICH WEEDE 2. Is War the Midwife of Revolution? International conflict involvement is important in the analysis of revolutions, because it affects the balance of power within societies!” - Military defeat upsets this balance more radically than anything else. Still, one may join ECKSTEIN [1980, p. 159-160] in questioning the strength of the relationship: ‘Examples of revolutions after lost wars abound: France in 1871; Russta in 1905 and 1917; Turkey in 1918; China after World War Il. Unfortunately, countercases can be invoked just as readily: Japan ot Italy after the last great war, for instance. Pethaps these cases only show that losing @ war 1s not a sufficient condition for revolution; but then, neither 1s it a necessary condition, of even a ‘normal’ occurrence (e.g , France, 1789; Mexico, 1910; Cuba, 195 cetera.” Of course, SkOcPOL’s international conflict involvement or rivalry with more advanced states, like MCDANIEL’s [1991] vulnerability to foreign threats, is a much broader background condition of revolutions than is military defeat!®, While the French revolution of 1789 is not covered by military defeat unless one accepts implausibly long time lags, it is covered by the more inclusive category of rivalry with a more advanced state, i.c., Britain in the French case!®, But rivalry with more advanced states might be too broad a category, because italso concems many non-revolutionary states and therefore tells us little about which societies are vulnerable to revolutions. HUNTINGTON [1968, p. 275] states explicitly what seems implied by SkocPou’s as well as by McDANIEL Ss theory: the most advanced states are least vulnerable to revolution”. ‘As soon as SkOcPOL [1979] had published her book, another great revolution occured in Iran. This is a difficult case for her theory. Iran’s degree of 17. It may also be argued that revolution strongly affects the likelihood of war involvement [watr, 1992]. 18, BUENO DE MEsquiTA, SIvVERSON and WoLLzR [1992, p 638] deplore: ‘No research directly addresses the possible linkage of war to revolutionary domestic upheaval in an explicit manner using a ngorous rescarch design * Their effort to remedy this situation provides some interesting findings, such as ‘war participation itself approxtmately doubles the chances of the regime's being violently overthrown by domestic opponents as a consequence of war participation’ [p. 642] or “regumes that initiate wars and do not prevail are at the highest nsk of being replaced, while those who initiate and win war are at relatively little risk’ [p. 643] Unfortunately, the dependent vanable “violent regime change’ covers mass rebellions, revolution and mere coups d'état. 19. In the context of this paper, it matters little if one stresses the British advantage in fiscal ‘modemization instead of economic modemuzation, as GoLDsToNe (1991] does. 20. In HUNTINGTON’s [1968, p. 266] theory revolution is an ‘explosion of political participation’. Inhis view, revolutions occur im modemuzing societies where institutional capabilites do not suffice to deal with new demands for political participation. 484THE IMPACT OF INTERSTATE CONFLICT involvement in international conflict was not significantly greater than that of most other states. True, Iran was geopolitically vulnerable because of an overpowering neighbor, but America effectively deterred Soviet moves against Iran. In respect to the Gulf sheikdoms Iran came closer to being the local bully rather than being bullied around. The Shah's regime was involved in no war and therefore could not lose it. The instruments of repression remained avail- able without being ruthlessly applied. While the Shah’s ‘failure of nerve’ is not an explanation of events, it may serve as a shorthand description of the puzzle. ‘The predominantly urban character of the Iranian revolution also does not fit with SkocPoL’s rural focus. In some respects MCDANTEL’s [1991] explanation is half-way in between SKOCPOL’s [1979] and HUNTINGTON’s [1968] theory. Like SKOCPOL, MCDANIEL gives much weight to vulnerability to foreign threats. Like HUNTINGTON, McDanie believes that modernization is destabilizing. In MCDANIELs anal- yses of the Russian and Iranian revolutions geopolitical vulnerability has driven autocratic modernization. In MCDaNIEL’s view, autocratic modemization is likely to lose the support of traditional groups without replacing it by support from moder groups. So, revolution seems to occur, because of the specific response to international challenges, i.e., autocratic modernization. While this explanatory sketch seems broadly consistent not only with the Russian and Iranian cases analyzed in depth by MCDANIEL [1991], but also with the French and Chinese cases, it suffers from the existence of much evidence where autocratic modemization”’ did nor result in violent revolution: Japan after the Meiji-restauration, Prussia-Germany in the 19th and early 20th century, Turkey after the Kemalist takeover, South Korea and Taiwan after World War II, even Franco Spain where autocracy was peacefully replaced by democracy after the autocrat’s death. ‘The dissolution of the Soviet empire and the liberation of East European states in 1989 and the breakup of the Soviet Union itself in the early 1990s, also calls the impact of international conflict on revolutions into question. Like SKOCPOL’s [1979] agrarian societies before, the Soviet Union did compete with ‘a more advanced state, America, for global power. As in other revolutionary societies to be, this unequal competition put great strain on the Soviet economy and society. But there was no war, much less a defeat. The Red Army and the KGB could have crushed dissent at home and in the neighboring client-states. 21. While McDANEEL [1991, p 71) says that there have been only two experiments in autocratic modemuzation, I find st hard to imagine what the Iranian and Russian cases have in common with each other, but what distinguishes them from all of the cases of autocratic modemuzation which I mention above. 485 Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.ERICH WEEDE While such a crackdown might have been bloody, again the means were available without being ruthlessly applied. SkoCPOL [1979] is a writer in the historical sociology tradition. She does not say which facts are forbidden by the theory, or under which conditions the theory would be refuted. But it is possible to provide an explanation of the collapse of the Soviet Union which is broadly consistent with SkocPOL’s [1979] perspective of revolutions. The Soviet Union surely suffered from international competition with a more advanced state. There also was deterio- rating economic performance [MURRELL and OLson, 1991]. The nuclear balance of terror, the military strength of the Soviet Union, and the democratic character of her opponents provided military security for the Soviet Union, while her declining economic performance — in particular if compared to her Western rivals ~ provided a strong stimulus for Gorbachev’s reforms. As DEuDNkY and IKENBERRY [1991-1992, p. 97] have written, ‘a world domunated by liberal stats affords remaining slliberal states both @ need and an ‘opportunity to liberalize.” So, Gorbachev's reforms which initiated the revolutionary change and the expansion of political participation should be seen as a response to interna- tional challenges. Liberalizing an authoritarian regime is difficult. It implies reducing the degree of regime repressiveness. On the route from a truly repressive regime, as the Soviet Union was until the mid-1980s, to a democratic or liberal regime, one can hardly avoid a semi-repressive transition period. Semi-repressiveness, however, maximizes the vulnerability of a state to rebellion and violence [MULLER and Weep, 1990]2. Legitimate, effective and non-violent channels for political participation do not yet exist, but repression no longer sufficiently deters rebellion. Intemational challenges anda liberalizing response from above making room for challenges from below and from the imperial periphery are not the entire story. Loss of confidence at the top delegitimized the regime and undermined its willingness to apply its still ample capabilities for repression [D1 PALMA, 1991]. Or, as PETTEE [1938] or HUNTINGTON [1968, p. 267} point out, some old regimes simply collapse. For some period of time, there exists a kind of vacuum. So it was in the USSR in 1991 and somewhat carlier in her European client-states. 22. Simulary, GuRR [1974] points out that political systems in between autocracy and democ- racy are less likely to persist than either pure type 486THE IMPACT OF INTERSTATE CONFLICT ‘The speed of the collapse of Communist rule in Eastern Europe constitutes a puzzle in itself, Part of the explanation seems to be preference distortion [Kuran, 1991], In a totalitarian society people face strong incentives to generate a facade of conformity. In such a society one avoids a lot of trouble, if one’s rulers get the impression that one’s preferences fit their's. When most people do not reveal their true preferences, but project distorted images, then itis very difficult for anyone to know much about the distribution of preferences in society. For quite some time, a regime may look like being built on considerable popular acquiescence without benefiting from significant support. An exogenous shock, such as the renunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine and thereby the withdrawal of Soviet support from client-state regimes, may en- courage some people to express their truc preferences. Thereafter, others join in and a bandwagon develops. Once there is a bandwagon the previous defenders of the old regime may lose the courage to defend the old order. Instead some of them start to distort their own preferences by saying that they have always been deeply skeptical of the old regime and collaborated only to prevent worse things from happening. So, preference distortion in favor of the old regime may soon give way to new preference distortions where people place bets on the likely winners of the ongoing struggle for political power. The appearance of indecisiveness at the top can signal that the old preference distortion no longer pays, generate a mass withdrawal of acquiescence and even start a new kind of preference distortion ina very short period of time. In the Soviet Union herself, the unraveling of the old regime was probably stimulated by glasnost, ie., by expanding freedoms of thought, speech, writing, assembly and association. Glasnost itself can most plausibly be attributed to the economic crisis in the USSR which undermined her capability to compete with the more advanced West. So, international conflict is an indirect, but key ingredient in the ultimate collapse of Communism in Russia and the Soviet Union. Events in 1989 in East Germany must have been triggered by Gorbachev’s failure to visibly support Honnecker at his fall visit as well as by the opening of the Hungarian route to the West for would-be refugees from East Germany”. 23, From an organizational rather than a cognutive perspective, COLLINS [1988] provides an altemauve explanation. Inmy view, CONS” and KURAN’s explanations are compauble with each other. In COLLINS” account, disorganization is contagious and likely to gather momentum once the process 1s started. 24. Again, my interpretation of events stresses the importance of ‘exit’ rather than ‘vorce’. According to HiRscaiMaN’s {1970} earlier work, exit tends to undermine voice His recent analysis of the fate of the East German regime, however, conclades ‘that enlarging the opportunuty for exit ‘can on occasion make for more rather than less participation and voice” (HiRsCHMAN {1993, p.177). Tam inclined to suspect thatthe effectiveness of vorce quite often depends on exit opportunities. 487 Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.ERICH WEEDE The price of preference distortion had gone down steeply. Again, international factors played a key role in the collapse of the regime. Once the outside protector USSR had withdrawn her support, the old regime stood naked and collapsed within weeks. 3 The Effects of Revolutions Conceming the results of great revolutions, SkocPOL’s [1979, 1988] strength- ening of the state is observable in all cases: in Napoleonic and postreyolutionary France, in Communist Russia and China, also in theocratic Iran. It is still too early to judge the results of the Soviet collapse. But the strengthening of the state after successful revolutions has been obtained by spilling a lot of blood. The notorious guillotine has only been a beginning. The number of victims of Soviet Communism has been estimated in the order of magnitude of 60 millions (RUMMEL [1987, 1990]). In Communist China the number of victims has surpassed 30 millions (Domes [1985], RUMMEL [1987]). In the Soviet Union as in China millions of victims died of policy-induced starvation rather than in front of a firing squad or in concentration camps. It is plausible to link their death directly to regime efforts to take a shortcut to great power status, irrespective of the human cost at home. A strong state that could do what it pleased to do to its people also was the result of the Iranian revolution. The Postrevolutionary regime of the mullahs killed about twenty times as many People as the late Shah and his Savak (RUMMEL [1987, p. 25]). But the regime generated revolutionary terror and a readiness for martyrdom in the population that made it possible to withstand and repell the Iraqi attack against Iran. Revolutions may succeed in building strong states or in generating new and effective political institutions. Their other results have been aptly summarized by HuNTINGTON [1968, p. 308/9 and 311]: ‘The immediate economic results of revolutions are almost entirely negative... Revolutions produce hitle liberty..." Itremains to be seen whether the ultimate results of the ‘revolution’ in Eastern Europe constitute an exception”. Whatever these will be, revolutionary change 25. Of course, 1f you defie revolution by structural change and violence, its dubious whether the transformations in most East European societies have been violent enough to qualify as revolutions. 488‘THE IMPACT OF INTERSTATE CONFLICT in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union was initiated by policy reversal at the top rather than by mass rebellion from below. IV. SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS: INTERSTATE CONFLICT AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM Reviewing the evidence from historical and sociological analyses generates the following impression. On the one hand, interstate conflict has provided exit options for subjects and increased the dependence of rulers on subjects in order to fight neighboring rulers. Thus, interstate conflict contributed to limited government and freedom as well as to political participation and some redis- tribution of political rights from the top to the lower or middle classes. In the very long run, the impact of international rivalry on revolutionary change looks liberating by curtailing the power of rulers. Depending on military technology, strategy and tactics, 1.e., on the usefulness of deploying large numbers of soldiers, international conflict may also have an equalizing impact. These two effects shouldbe distinguished analytically. While the limitation of government and the safeguarding of private property rights (which are almost two sides of a single coin) promote freedom and self-determination, the equalization of political rights may give everybody a say in the election of rulers without necessarily limiting state power and promoting individual freedom. West European welfare states demonstrate that political equality may be compatible with the transfer of more and more decision-making from the individual (or small groups, like families or small businesses) to the government, On the other hand, some states have collapsed under external pressure. As the Iranian revolution demonstrates, serious external conflict involvement is not a necessary condition of collapsing state structures and revolution. Nor is, it a sufficient condition even for less advanced states competing with more advanced states. Otherwise, the Soviet Union should have collapsed much earlier. Nevertheless, external pressure does compel the governments of less advanced societies to place significant burdens on their subjects”*, thereby reinforcing domestic strife. Whether the govemment simply collapses because ruling elites lose their faith in themselves or because of military defeat, revolutionary change after transfers of political power aims at building strong 26. In many states it 1s sumply false to call the inhabitants citizens. The term citizen suggests that they have rights. Regrettably, many states withhold nghts from their mhabitants. At least in Bntish English the term ‘subjects’ 1s relatively neutral “Her mayesty's subjects" do enjoy nghts after all. 489 Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.ERICH WEEDE states, in order to survive in the international struggle for power. In pursuing this aim revolutionary regimes tend to be more ruthless than even traditional autocracies. Freedom and human rights and thousands or millions of lives tend to be among the fatalities of fast and violent revolutions. Intemational rivalry may affect individual freedom and rights not only positively via recognition of property rights or negatively via revolution, but also directly. Recently, GoLDSTONE [1991, p. 479] suggested that ‘the crucial catalyst of democracy has most often been defeat in war’.Germany, Italy and Japan after World War II are well-known examples. But the ‘glorious revo- lution’ in England (1688) also followed a successful invasion, and French democracy was restored in 1871 after the third Napoleon's defeat against Prussia-Germany. The early examples demonstrate that the establishment of a more democratic regime than existed before defeat does not necessarily depend on being defeated by a democratic power. Although GOLDSTONE’s proposition is intriguing, HUNTINGTON [1991, p. 18] provides a useful reminder of the ambivalence of the effects of war and defeat in his discussion of World War I and the first wave reversing democratization: “The war that had been fought to make the world safe for democracy had instead unleashed movements of both the Right and the Left that were intent on destroying it” Since the immediate impact of World War I was positive, HUNTINGTON’s [1991, p. 35] general warning seems applicable to military defeat: “Circumstances that contribute to the initial establishment of a democratic regime also may not ‘contribute to its consolidation and long-term stabality.” Weimar Germany provides a pertinent example. The overall impact of international conflict on freedom via revolutionary change is very difficult to judge. The effect of international competition on individual freedom might depend on its degree, on the avoidance of violent revolution and/or on the role of intellectuals in postrevolutionary regimes. Where international conflict curtails the arbitrary power of rulers and puts pressure on them to grant property rights, there both individual freedom and economic development expand. Where interstate conflict increases the man- power needs of states, rulers, or armies, there an expansion of political rights and some income equalization is likely, Where too much interstate conflict or the modernizing response to it lead to multiple sovereignty and revolution, there property rights, individual freedom, and political participation rights are likely to suffer. 490‘THE IMPACT OF INTERSTATE CONFLICT Although defeat in war need not result in revolution and the curtailment of individual freedom, but may result in the establishment of democracy and the expansion of liberty, this is a costly and dangerous route. Therefore, the expansion of freedom seems best served by some modest amount of interstate conflict, by moderate threats to regime security rather than by extreme threats to regime security. Between the 17th and the 19th century, social norms (including interstate law, but also encompassing tacit understandings between ruling princes about honorable behavior) have had some mitigating impact on conflict and war in Europe”’. Or, the impact of international competition may be reduced by natural barriers to conquest, such as the English Channel was for centuries. It may be no coincidence that individual liberty took firm roots first in geopolitically privileged Britain rather than on the Continent, that liberty’s earliest firmly established continental home was Switzerland where a natural mountain foriress manned by tough warriors detcrred the expansive desires of neighboring powers. Intemational conflict contributes to revolutionary change which may either concer the economy or the political regime. The comparatively slow economic change of events like the ‘European miracle’ or the ‘industrial revolation’ largely results from what rulers, producers and merchants do in response to challenges and opportunities. In fast-moving political revolutions, however, intellectuals play a primary role (HUNTINGTON [1968, pp. 290, 300]). While there are significant doctrinal differences between them, the greatest revolu- tionary leaders of the 20th century — Lenin, Mao and Khomeini — are all intellectuals’®. Perhaps, fast and violent revolutionary change has been so perilous for individual freedom and human life, because the collapse of tradi- tional authority or foreign challenges and a nationalist response provided an opening for intellectuals to seize state power, in order to impose some vision of human improvement from above. According to HUNTINGTON [1968, p. 264/5], ‘Revolution 1s a characteristic of modemuzation, It 1s one way of modernizing a traditional society, and it was, of course, as unknown {o traditional society in the West as rt was unknown to traditional societies elsewhere. Revolution ts the ultimate expression of the modemizing 27. Unconditional surrender was still regarded as an unreasonable demand, except where Europeans dealt with peoples deemed to be ‘uncivilized’ 28. The role of intellectuals n the Russian revolution 1s thoroughly documented in Ptres [1990]. For a more general treatment of personal characteristics of revolutionaries, see Rerat (1980). ‘Although REFAt (1980, p. 130] does not call most revolutionanes ‘intellectuals’, he notes “relatively high education and prestigious occupations” in leaders and cadres. 491 Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.ERICH WEEDE, outlook, the belief that itis within the power of man to control and to change his environment ‘and that he has not only the ability but the right to do so." If revolutions are about the implementation of some secular political vision, then intellectuals are their obvious leaders and cadres. Or, ina HaYEkian [1988] spirit: Revolutionary intellectuals overrate the power of reason, they commit the fallacy of constructivism, and make their human guinea pigs suffer the consequences. While traditional rulers in politically disunited Europe had little Power to commit errors on a truly grand scale, great revolutions have been quite successful in establishing this power and in abusing Although Pipes [1990, p. XXIII] following comment primarily concerns revolutions made by atheist intellectuals, it seems to fit revolutions made by pious believers equally well: ‘Post-1789 revolutions have raised the most fundamental ethical questions: whether itis proper to destroy institutions built over centunes by tral and error, for the sake of ideal systems; whether ‘one has the right to sacrifice the well-being and even the lives of one’s own generation for the sake of generations yet unbom; whether man can be refashioned into a perfectly virtuous being... For post-1789 revolutionary struggles, in the final analysis, are not over politics but over theology.” ‘Supreme values look more attractive to intellectuals than to men of practical affairs. Specialists in supreme values feel justified to impose any burden on their subjects for often inherently unattainable goals. They are the leaders on the road to totalitarianism [BERNHOLZ, 1991]. 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Sometimes, it 1s a matter of a few years, as in the great French or Russian revolutions. Both types of revolutionary change are rarely considered together. Those who analyze structural changes in economies tend to argue that interstate competition curtails the power of rulers, contnbutes to safe property nghts and indrvidual freedom, and ultimately to economic development. ‘Those who analyze violent revolutions tend to argue that interstate conflict contributes to regume collapse and that revolutionary govemments ruthlessly build strong states without much consid- eration of human costs. Whether or not intemational conflict promotes freedom seems to depend on the degree of foreign pressure, on the collapse of domestic regimes as well as on the role of intellectuals ‘ZUSAMMENFASSUNG. Revolutionarer Wandel bezicht sich manchmal auf Jahrzchnie oder Jahrhunderte, wie bei der *industnelien Revolution’ oder dem Aufstieg des Westens. Manchmal bezieht er sich auf wenige Jahre, wie bei den grossen Revolutionen in Frankreich und Russland. Beide Arten des revolutio- ‘dren Wandels werden selten zusammen betrachtet. Wer strukturellen Wandel in Volkswirtschaf- ten analystert, tendiert zu den Hypothesen, dass zwischenstaatlicher Weltbewerb die Macht der Herscher beschrankt, zur Sicherung der Eigentumsrechte und personlicher Freiheit beitragt und letztendlich 2ur wirtschafilichen Entwicklung Wer gewaltsame Revolutionen analysiert, tendiert ‘za den Hypothesen, dass zwischenstaatlicher Konflikt zum Zasammenbruch des Regimes beitrigh, dass revolutionire Regime ohne Rucksicht auf Menschenopfer starke Staaten aufbauen wollen. Ob intemationaler Konflikt zur Forderung der Freihett beitragt oder nicht, scheint vom Ausmass auslandischen Drucks, dem Zusammenbruch des Regimes und der Rolle der Intellekruellen abaubangen. Resume Le changement révolutionnaire couvre parfois des décennies ou des siécles, comme ‘la révolution industrielle’ ou la croissance de l'Ouest. Parfors ausst, il ne dure que quelques années, comme les grandes révolutions frangaise ou russe. Ces deux types de changement révolutionnaire sont rarement abordés ensemble. Ceax qui analysent les changements structurels dans les 6conomies tendent de ‘démontrer que Ia concurrence entre les étais réduit les pouvorrs des gouvemants, contribue & préserverles droits de propriété et la liberté indtviduelle, et concourt finalement au développement Economique. Ceux qui analysent les révolutions violentes tendent de démontrer que les conflts anterétatiques contribuent a I"effondrement des régimes, que les gouvemements révolutionnaires impitoyablement contrusent des états forts sans beaucoup de considération pour les codts humains, [La question de savoir st oui out non Je conflit nterétatique mine & la liberté dépend du degré de pression exereée par I’étranger sur l'effondrement des régimes intemes aussi bien que sur le réle des ntellectuels. 495 Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.