One Way of Being Ambiguous: The Univocity of "Existence" and The Theory of Tashkīk Predication in Rāzī and

One Way of Being Ambiguous: The Univocity of
“Existence” and the Theory of Tashkīk Predication in Rāzī

and Ṭūsī’s Commentaries on Avicenna’s
Pointers and Reminders
Rosabel Ansari and Jon McGinnis
Abstract. This study provides the historical background to, and analysis and
translations of, two seminal texts from the medieval Islamic world concerning the
univocity of being/existence and a theory of “ambiguous predication” (tashkīk),
which is similar to the Thomistic theory of analogy. The disputants are Fakhr al-Dīn
al-Rāzī (1149–1210), who defended a theory of the univocity of being, and Naṣīr
al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (1201–1274), who defended the theory of ambiguous predication.
While the purported issue is whether a quiddity can cause its own existence, the
debate extends further. Rāzī draws on several arguments that “existence” must
be predicated univocally of God and creature and then concludes that, given the
univocity of “existence,” God cannot be simple, but is a composite of the divine
quiddity and distinct attributes. In contrast, Ṭūsī denies that “existence” is said
univocally of God and creature and rather is predicated ambiguously/analogously,
and then defends divine simplicity.
A
mong contemporary Western philosophers of religion, when
the notions of the univocity of being and a theory of analogy
are discussed, the historical context is inevitably taken to be the
thirteenth-century debate between John Duns Scotus (1266–1308) and Henry
of Ghent (1217–1293), and then later Thomas Cajetan (1469–1534).1 In fact,
1
See Stephen Brown, “Avicenna and the Unity of the Concept of Being: Interpretations
of Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Gerard of Bologna and Peter Aureoli,” Franciscan Studies 25
(1965): 117–50; Richard Cross, “Duns Scotus and Analogy: A Brief Note,” Modern Schoolman: A
Quarterly Journal of Philosophy 89 (2012): 147–54; Cross, “Are Names Said of God and Creatures
Univocally?” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2018): 313–20; Garret R. Smith, “The
Analogy of Being in the Scotist Tradition,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2019):
633–73; Domenic D’Ettore, “Being as First Known and the Analogy or Univocity of Being: Scotus
versus Cajetan,” Review of Metaphysics 73 (2020): 741–70.
© 2022,
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 96, No. 4 pp. 545–570
doi: 10.5840/acpq2022818256
546 American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly
a parallel debate had already taken place in the Islamicate East between Fakhr
al-Dīn al-Rāzī (1149–1210), who defended a theory of the univocity of being,
and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (1201–1274), who defended and developed the Arabic
theory of tashkīk. This term, which literally means “to induce doubt” was used
in the Arabic logical works of Fārābī and Avicenna to designate Aristotle’s pros
hen homonymy. It is variously translated as “amphiboly,” “analogy,” “modula-
tion” and, as we prefer, “ambiguity.”2 In this article, we provide translations of
the two seminal texts for this Eastern version of the debate.
The debate takes place between two competing interpretations of Avicenna’s
(980–1037) philosophical summa, Pointers and Reminders (al-Ishārāt wa-l-
tanbīhāt) and particularly his famed “demonstration of the upright” (burhān
al-ṣiddīqīn) and his argument for divine simplicity.3 Pointers, which was not
translated into Latin, is an elliptical, even enigmatic, recitation of Avicenna’s
presentation of his philosophical system found in his monumental philosophical
encyclopedia, The Healing. In the present article, it is not our intent to adjudicate
2
The doctrine of tashkīk remains a contentious topic among scholars of Arabic and Islamic
philosophy. We do not intend to enter that fray but merely to present one of the historically
more important interpretations of it. For contemporary studies see: Harry Austryn Wolfson, “The
Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and Maimonides,” The Harvard Theological
Review 31, no. 2 (1938): 151–73; Janis Ešots, “The Principle of the Systematic Ambiguity of
Existence in the Philosophy of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra,” Afkar: Journal of ʿAqidah and Islamic
Thought 6 (2005): 161–70; Alexander Treiger, “Avicenna’s Notion of Transcendental Modulation of
Existence (taškīk al-wuǧūd, analogia entis) and Its Greek and Arabic Sources,” in Islamic Philosophy,
Science, Culture, and Religion Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas, ed. D. C. Reisman and F. Opwis
(Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012), 327–63; Thérèse-Anne Druart, “Ibn Sīnā and the Ambiguity of Be-
ing’s Univocity,” in Views of the Philosophy of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Sadrā Shīrazī, ed. M. A. Mensia
(Tunis: Tunisian Academy of Sciences, Letters and Arts Beït al-Ḥikma, 2014), 15–24; Daniel D.
De Haan, “The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing,” The
Review of Metaphysics 69 (2015): 261–86; Damien Janos, Avicenna on the Ontology of the Pure
Quiddity (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 434–77; Janos, “Avicenna on Equivocity and Modulation:
A Reconsideration of the asmāʾ mushakkika (and tashkīk al-wujūd),” Oriens (published online
ahead of print 2021, https://doi.org/10.1163/18778372-12340003; and Rosabel Ansari, “The
Ambiguity of ‘Being’ in Arabic and Islamic Philosophy,” Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 2020.
3
Shams Inati has translated the entirety of Pointers and Reminders into English in three
volumes with the title Remarks and Admonitions: Ibn Sīnā, Remarks and Admonitions, Part 1: Logic
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984); Ibn Sīnā’s Remarks and Admonitions:
Physics and Metaphysics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Ibn Sīnā and Mysticism.
Remarks and Admonitions: Part Four (London: Kegan Paul International, 1996). For a French
translation, see Amélie-Marie Goichon’s Livre des directives et remarques, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1999).
For an edition of the Arabic text, see Avicenna, al-Ishārāṭ wa-l-tanbīhāt, ed. J. Forget (Leiden: Brill,
1892). Presentations and analyses of Avicenna’s “demonstration of the upright” include Herbert
Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation, and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish
Philosophy (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 281–310; Toby Mayer, “Ibn Sīnā’s
Burhān al-Ṣiddīqīn,” Journal of Islamic Studies 12 (2001): 18–39; and Jon McGinnis, Avicenna
(Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), chap. 6.
One Way of Being Ambiguous 547
between Rāzī and Ṭūsī’s interpretations, but simply to provide translations of

this important debate and its general context. To this end we include a brief
presentation of the historical context and philosophical significance of the debate
and an outline of the argumentation, followed by the translations and notes.
I. History and Significance
As one of his last philosophical summas, Avicenna’s Pointers and Reminders

presented his most mature and definitive philosophical system.4 Yet, by design its
succinct form was intended to point to and to remind the student of philosophi-
cal theories without expounding them in detail. As a result, commentaries on
the text proliferated in the Islamic world over many centuries.5 The two most
foundational commentaries were those of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, a celebrated
Sunnī theologian of the Ashʿarī school and exegete of the Quran from Rayy (in
modern day Iran), and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, an equally famous Shīʿite theologian,
philosopher and astronomer from Ṭūs (also in modern day Iran). Although Ṭūsī’s
commentary has traditionally been considered the more sympathetic defense of
Avicenna against Rāzī’s famed critiques, recently Robert Wisnovsky has argued
that Rāzī followed Avicenna in “philosophical method,” whereas Ṭūsī followed
Avicenna in “philosophical doctrine.”6 On this view, whereas Rāzī sought to test
the validity of Avicenna’s theories, Ṭūsī thought that as commentator he should
establish the truth of Avicenna’s claim.7
It was in their commentaries on Pointers, Class (namaṭ) 4, 17 that points
of contention are raised concerning the status of existence, the problem of
predicating “existence” of both God and creation and the identification of God’s
quiddity and existence. Both Rāzī and Ṭūsī’s commentaries on this passage are
significant for raising issues that became foundational for Islamic philosophy
4
On the scholarly debates surrounding the dating of Pointers, see Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna
and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna’s Philosophical Words, 2nd ed.
(Leiden: Brill, 2014), 155–9; Jean Michot, “La réponse d‘Avicenne à Bahmanyār et al-Kirmānī:
Présentation, traduction critique et lexique arabe-français de la Mubāḥatha III,” Le Muséon 110,
no. 1–2 (1997): 143–221; David C. Reisman, “Review: A New Standard for Avicenna Studies,”
Journal of the American Oriental Society 122, no. 3 (2002): 562–77.
5
For a list of medieval Arabic commentaries on Pointers see Robert Wisnovsky, “The Nature
and Scope of Arabic Commentary in Post-Classical (ca. 1100–1900 AD) Islamic Intellectual
History: Some Preliminary Observations,” in Philosophy, Science & Exegesis: In Greek, Arabic &
Latin Commentaries-II, ed. P. Adamson and H. Baltussen (London: Institute of Classical Studies,
2004), 149–91.
6
Robert Wisnovksy, “Avicennism and Exegetical Practice in the Early Commentaries on
the Ishārāt,” Oriens 41 (2013): 349–78, at 373.
7
Robert Wisnovsky, “Towards a Genealogy of Avicennism,” Oriens 42 (2014): 323–63,
at 326.
over the following centuries and remain of interest among contemporary phi-
losophers of religion.
Of historical significance when considering Rāzī and his commentary is his
theological leaning. As noted, he was an Ashʿarite theologian. The Ashʿarites,
and particularly post-Avicennan Ashʿarites, had their own position concerning
God’s self (dhāt) or quiddity (māhīya) and its relation to necessary existence,
which is distinct from the Avicennan position. First, Ashʿarites in general were
willing to forego divine simplicity and to opt for a complex godhead. Second,
for post-Avicenna Ashʿarites the divine quiddity or self is increasingly viewed
as the grounds for such positive necessary concomitants as God’s omniscience,
omnipotence, wisdom and for some even his necessary existence.8
We now turn to a summation of the context of Avicenna’s text and his
“demonstration of the upright,” followed by Rāzī and Ṭūsī’s commentaries on
Avicenna’s claim that neither an attribute of a thing nor its quiddity can be the
cause of the quiddity’s existence.
II. Summary of the Argumentation
Rāzī and Ṭūsī’s commentaries concern Avicenna’s argument for a premise

needed to show that God is uniquely the Necessary Existent through itself.
Avicenna’s argument spans Pointers 4, 16–20.9 Toby Mayer has summarized and
provided excellent analyses of Avicenna’s argument and Rāzī and Ṭūsī’s com-
8
See Juwaynī, A Guide to the Conclusive Proofs for the Principles of Belief, trans. P. E. Walker
(Reading: Garnet Publishing, 2000), §§ “A Statement of What Attributes God Requires” and
“The Knowledge of God’s Absolute Oneness; al-Ghazālī, Moderation in Belief, trans. A. M. Yaqub
(Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 2.2.1 and al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of
the Philosophers, ed. and trans. M. E. Marmura, 2nd edition (Provo: Brigham Young University
Press, 2000), disc. 6; Muhammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-Aqdām (= The
Summa Philosophiae of Shahrastānī), ed. and trans. A. Guillaume (London: Oxford University
Press, 1934), chaps. 5 and 8; and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, the present translation.
9
The presentation of these issues in Pointers most closely follows that of Avicenna’s Salvation,
“Metaphysics,” II.1–5, 12–3, which was not available in medieval Latin; an English translation
is available in Classical Arabic Philosophy, trans. J. McGinnis & D. C. Reisman (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing, 2007), 211–6. Most of the points, although not all, are scattered throughout
the Metaphysics of the Healing: discussion of the characteristics of the Necessary Existent in itself
and contingent existents is found at 1.6; the proof of the unity and uniqueness of the Necessary
Existent is found at 1.7 and 8.4–5. What is conspicuously absent from the Healing is Avicenna’s
unique demonstration that there is a Necessary Existent through itself. For discussions of exactly
where Avicenna presents his “metaphysical” proof for the existence of God in the Metaphysics of
the Healing, see Michael Marmura, “Avicenna’s Proof from Contingency for God’s Existence in
the Metaphysics of the Shifāʾ,” Medieval Studies 42 (1980): 337–52; and Daniel D. De Haan,
“Where Does Avicenna Demonstrate the Existence of God?” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 26
(2016): 97–128.
mentaries on these sections, and Fedor Benevich has provided an outstanding

sketch of the historical developments after Avicenna leading up to Rāzī.10
In very general terms, Avicenna’s argument for divine uniqueness moves in
three steps. In the first step (4, 16), Avicenna lays out the logical space for how
a quiddity might be multiply realizable, that is, how two or more individuals
of the same kind, and so sharing a common quiddity, might differ. The key
elements in his analysis are (1) that factor which the two have in common and
(2) that factor by which they differ. Further, that by which they differ may be
either (a) a necessary concomitant or (b) an accident. These two dimensions
give rise to four possibilities:
(1a) what they have in common is a necessary concomitant of that by
which they differ, e.g., animality is a necessary concomitant of both
humanity and horseness;
(1b) what they have in common is accidental to that by which they differ,
e.g., white is accidental to snow and to ivory;
(2a) that by which they differ is a necessary concomitant of what they have
in common (Avicenna claims that this is option is a non-starter, since
it means that the two necessarily differ by that very factor which they
have in common);
(2b) that by which they differ is accidental to what they have in common,
e.g., a white human and black human.
If, then, there were two necessary existents, they would have in common being
a necessary existent and they would differ either accidentally (1b and 2b) or
because of some necessary concomitant of the difference-making feature (1a).
In step two (4, 17, which is translated below), Avicenna argues that a
quiddity cannot be the cause of its own existence. Here the general argument
is that a cause must exist prior to its effect, but in this case the existence of the
quiddity is the purported effect. Thus, the quiddity would need to exist before
it exists if it were the cause of its own existence, which is certainly paradoxical,
if not a contradiction.
Step three (4, 18–20) in effect claims that either (I) the quiddity of the
Necessary Existent is identical to its individuated existence, that is, being the
Necessary Existent itself is what individuates it from all other things, or (II) the
10
Toby Mayer, “Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique of Ibn Sīnā’s Argument for the Unity of God
in the Išārāt and Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī’s Defence,” in Before and After Avicenna: Proceedings of the
First Conference of the Avicenna Study Group, ed. D. C. Reisman (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 199–218;
Fedor Benevich, “The Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd): From Avicenna to Fakhr al-Dīn al-
Rāzī,” in Philosophical Theology in Islam: Later Ashʿarism East and West, ed. A. Shihadeh and J.
Thiele (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 123–55.
quiddity of the Necessary Existent is other than its individuated existence, and
so the existence of the quiddity must be caused either (II.A) through itself or
(II.B) through another. At 4, 18, Avicenna additionally argues that all the pos-
sible internal relations for a multiply realizable quiddity identified at 4, 16 in
some way involve the quiddity’s being caused by another. Consequently, none
of these internal relations can apply to the Necessary Existent; otherwise, that
whose existence is necessary through itself would have its existence through
another, a contradiction.
This completes the list of the premises for Avicenna’s argument for the
uniqueness of the Necessary Existent. Either (I) the quiddity of the Necessary
Existent is identical to its individuated existence, which is Avicenna’s preferred
position, or the existence of a necessary existent’s quiddity is caused either
(II.A) through itself or (II.B) through another. (II.A) and (II.B), however are
both impossible, by arguments given in 4, 17 and 4, 18 respectively. Therefore,
(I), the Necessary Existent differs from all other existents precisely in being the
Necessary Existent, and so there can only be one Necessary Existent. Using ba-
sically the same premises, Avicenna further argues that the Necessary Existent
must be absolutely simple.
Rāzī’s response to Avicenna’s argument comes primarily in his remarks on
Pointers 4, 17. That response contains three steps. First, after presenting Avicenna’s
argument that a quiddity cannot be a cause of its own existence, he sets up the
first of two destructive dilemmas ([R2]–[R9] below). He begins by claiming that
“existence” is predicated of things either equivocally or univocally.11 He then
provides six arguments, which he ascribes to “the philosophers,” used to show that
“existence” cannot be an equivocal term and so must be predicated univocally
of all things. These arguments range from the serious to the somewhat playful.
A serious example is that the univocity of being is what grounds the universal
and absolute truth of the Law of Excluded Middle, namely, that something
either exists or does not exist. That is because if existence were equivocal, then
something could exist1 and not exist2. A more playful example is that puns play
on the equivocal sense of a term; however, there simply are not (and presumably
cannot be) any puns playing on the term “existence.”
In step two (R10–R16), Rāzī argues against the Avicennan position con-
cerning the relation between the divine quiddity and necessary existence. He
first repeats Avicenna’s argument that either (I) God’s quiddity is identical to
necessary existence or (II) is added or joined to it, in which case the existence of
11
While Averroes raises a somewhat similar complaint in his Epitome of the Metaphysics, bks.
I & III, namely, that Avicenna purportedly thought that being was said univocally of Aristotle’s ten
categories, Stephen Menn has shown that this characterization is not accurate. See Stephen Menn,
“Avicenna’s metaphysics,” in Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays, ed. P. Adamson (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), 143–69, at n. 35.
God’s quiddity is caused either (II.A) through itself or (II.B) through another.
Rāzī, following Avicenna, immediately rejects (II.B), since it implies that the
Cause of all causes has a cause other than itself. He then provides four arguments
against Avicenna’s view that God’s quiddity is identical to his existence, all of
which implicitly or explicitly appeal to his premise that existence is a univocal
notion. For example, existence is either (1) accidental to quiddity or (2) not
accidental to quiddity or (3) indifferent to being either accidental or not ac-
cidental to quiddity. Given the univocity of existence, if (2) existence were not
accidental to quiddities, but essential and necessary, then all quiddities would
exist necessarily. If (3) existence is indifferent to being accidental, then, appeal-
ing to a principle of sufficient reason, there must be some external cause that
explains why existence is not accidental to God, in which case the Cause of all
causes has a cause. Therefore, (1), existence must be accidental to all quiddi-
ties, including the divine quiddity. A second argument is that if “existence” is
a univocal notion, and if, as Avicenna maintains, God’s quiddity is identical to
his existence, then to have knowledge that God exists entails having knowledge
of God’s quiddity. Avicenna, however, denies that we can know God’s quiddity,
and yet he affirms that we can know God’s existence, and thus he is committed
to the conclusion that God’s quiddity cannot be identical to his existence. A
series of other arguments make the same point.
In the third and final step (R17–R20), Rāzī responds to Avicenna’s argument
that a quiddity cannot be a cause of its own existence. He provides two criti-
cisms of Avicenna and explains in what sense quiddity can be prior to existence.
In his first criticism, Rāzī notes Avicenna’s assumption that causes are prior to
their effects. He further notes that if that priority is essential priority, in the sense
that an efficacious cause produces its effect, then priority is certainly granted. If,
however, priority means priority in existence, then the premise begs the question
against those who claim that the quiddity causes its own existence. The second
criticism notes that not even Avicenna thinks that all causes exist prior to their
effect, since the receptive or material cause ultimately exists simultaneously with
its effect. Rāzī suggests that if being prior in existence is not necessary for the
material cause, then perhaps it not necessary for the efficient cause, at least in
the case of God.
Rāzī ends by addressing two objections to the thesis that a quiddity can be
essentially prior to, and efficiently cause, its own existence. The first objection
and Rāzī’s response is of particular significance and historical note. The objec-
tion is that a thing either exists or does not exist. Thus, the quiddity considered
as prior to causing its existence is a non-existent; however, a non-existent, a
“no-thing” if you will, cannot be the cause of anything; ex nihilo nihilo fit. Rāzī
responds that the conclusion does not logically follow, since it rests on a false
dichotomy. A thing either exists or does not exist or is neutral with respect to
existence. Quiddities are neutral with respect to existence. While the introduc-
tion of the neutrality of existence may at first appear ad hoc, Rāzī can point to
precedents.12 In addition to Suhrawardī, who famously championed the priority
of essence over existence, Avicenna in the Isagoge of the Healing maintains that
quiddities might exist either extra-mentally or mentally. He then continues,
quiddities can be considered in three ways: as they exist extra-mentally, as they
exist mentally, and as they exist in themselves independently of either particular
mode of existence.13 For Avicenna, while it is true that a quiddity always exists
either extra-mentally or mentally, and so never is independent of some man-
ner of existence, it still can be considered independent of both and as such it
is distinct from existence. Rāzī simply helps himself to the same analysis. The
divine quiddity in itself is distinct from its existence and is a cause of its own
existence. Thus, the divine quiddity is not something non-existent causing its
existence, but something neutral with respect to existence causing its existence.
While Ṭūsī’s commentary on Avicenna, which is more correctly a super-
commentary on Rāzī’s commentary, touches on all of Rāzī’s comments, as Ṭūsī
recognizes, virtually the entirety of Rāzī’s argumentation rests on his premise
that “existence” is predicated univocally and applies to all things equally. For
Ṭūsī, the philosophers do not maintain that “existence” is applied univocally,
but only that it is not applied equivocally. Ṭūsī then bemoans that the crux of
the problem is Rāzī’s ignorance of ambiguous (tashkīk) predication, which stands
between pure univocity and pure equivocity.
Ṭūsī’s response proceeds in two steps. The first step is to explain the nature
of ambiguous predication and how “existence” applies ambiguously to differ-
ent things, and particularly of the Necessary Existent and contingent things.
The second step’s purpose is twofold, both to defend Avicenna against Rāzī’s
criticisms and to attack directly Rāzī’s claim that a quiddity can be a cause of
its own existence.
In Ṭūsī’s first step ([T5]–[T9] below), he lays out his account of ambigu-
ous predication, which allows him to pass between the horns of Rāzī’s dilemma.
Historically, pre-Avicennan philosophers, like al-Fārābī, as well as Avicenna
himself, had already used the theory, albeit in other contexts. After Avicenna, the
theory went through further modifications, the history of which is the subject of
ongoing scholarly debate. Suffice to say, before reaching Ṭūsī, it was developed
and popularized by Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (1154–1191).14 Suhrawardi rec-
ognized the significance of ambiguous predication for the problem of predicating
12
For some of the history surrounding the neutrality of essence, see Benevich, “The Neces-
sary Existent,” §3: Priority of Essence over Existence.
13
Avicenna, The Healing, Logic: Isagoge, ed. and trans. Silvia Di Vincenzo (Berlin/Boston:
Walter de Gruyter, 2021), 1.2, §2; also see Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing, 5.1.
14
Benevich, “The Necessary Existent,” 133–4.
‘existence’ of God and creature, and used it to allow for degrees of perfection in
existence. Ṭūsī’s account of ambiguous predication allows him to respond to Rāzī’s
dilemma precisely because it allows for ontological differences between God and
creatures, while denying that “existence” is predicated equivocally of the two.
Ambiguous predication, Ṭūsī tells us, occurs when a term has a single
meaning that is applied in a single sense but unequally to different things. This
inequality in ambiguous application may refer to (1) priority and posteriority,
(2) the primary and its privation, or (3) intensity and weakness. The term “ex-
istence” is predicated with all of these differences. When predicated of God, its
meaning is prior, primary, and more intense than when it is predicated of other
things. Moreover, Ṭūsī continues, any sense of a term predicated unequally of
different things cannot be a part of the quiddity of those things, since whatever
essentially belongs to a thing is not the sort of thing that can differ with respect
to that thing. As such, existence is not a part of the quiddity of anything, God or
creatures. Instead, it is inseparable from, but also external to and non-constitutive
of, the quiddity, and so does not belong to anything’s true nature, that is, its
quiddity. Keeping these points in mind, Ṭūsī says that one easily can avoid Rāzī’s
confusion, since there is a way that “existence” can be predicated unequally and
non-constitutively, namely, ambiguously.
Having explained how God and other things can share the single sense
of existence without making their existences equal, that is, having to predicate
“existence” univocally of both, Ṭūsī’s next step (T10–T17) is to respond to Rāzī’s
arguments that deny Avicenna’s identification of God’s quiddity and existence. He
begins by explaining why existence need not be, as Rāzī maintained, accidental,
or at least not to God. His argument appeals to his account of ambiguity. He
gives the examples of how varying degrees of light and heat apply differently to
different things; the light of the sun and the vital heat of living things are ulti-
mately essential and even necessary for vision and life, whereas other forms of
light and heat are accidental to seeing and life. Analogously, existence is essential
and necessary to God, but accidental to contingent things.
Ṭūsī then introduces a distinction between (1) God’s individual existence,
which is beyond human comprehension and identical to his essence, that is, his
true reality, and (2) absolute existence, which is common to all things, includ-
ing God. The distinction can be traced back to Suhrawardī and his argument
that existence is in fact an intentional object (muʿtabara).15 In other words, there
is nothing outside the mind that is simply existence, i.e., absolute existence;
rather, existence is a construct of the mind abstracted from the concrete par-
ticulars that inhabit the world, that is, the individual existences. Later in our
15
Suhrawardī, The Philosophy of Illumination, ed. and trans. J. Walbridge and H. Ziai (Provo:
Brigham Young University Press, 1999), 1.3.3, at ¶¶ 56–68.
text (T16–T17), Ṭūsī links this distinction between individual existence and
abstract existence with Avicenna’s distinction between, respectively, “existence
in concrete particulars” and “existence is conceptualization.”16 In the present
context, he simply notes that when we intellectually grasp God’s existence, we
grasp absolute existence with respect to God, namely that there is a God, but
not God’s individual existence, i.e., what God is. A mundane example of the
strategy makes it clear: one hears a noise in the attic and so grasps that there is
something in the attic, even though one might not know what that something
is, namely, either what kind or individual thing it is.
Now that Ṭūsī has made clear that “existence” can vary in its application to
different things, and that this common existence is distinct from God’s specific
existence, he directly attacks Rāzī’s claim that a quiddity can be a cause of its
own existence (T15–T17). He argues that a precondition for a cause to produce
a particular effect, e.g., this quiddity, is that the cause is itself a particular. To
be a particular cause, however, is just to be or to be in some existing concrete
particular, and so to exist as or in that particular. Ṭūsī then concludes that it is
simply absurd that something’s existing is a precondition for its existing.
He adds that a quiddity is never entirely severed from some mode of exis-
tence. Even if we can consider the quiddity without considering existence—as
in, e.g., Avicenna’s famous horseness as such example from Metaphysics 5.1—the
quiddity under consideration must still have an intellectual existence insofar as
it is an intentional object or object of consideration (muʿtabara), a point that
we have already seen Ṭūsī make in another context. As merely an object of the
intellect, Ṭūsī observes, no quiddity can be the cause of any external effect, let
alone its own external existence, and this point is all the more obvious for a
quiddity considered in itself. Consequently, even if God has a quiddity (and
this point was a matter of considerable debate), that quiddity could not cause
its own existence. Instead, to whatever extent that God can be said to have a
quiddity, that quiddity is identical to his individual existence. Here ends Ṭūsī’s
response to Rāzī.
To summarize briefly, Rāzī and Ṭūsī have, to some extent, the same goal.
They both seek to preserve the intelligibility of “existence” when it is predicated
of God and the world, but without forgetting how God’s existence differs from
the world’s existence. Rāzī, on the one hand, achieves this goal by arguing that
God’s quiddity causes its own existence and that existence is accidental to the
quiddity. On the other hand, Ṭūsī identifies God’s essence with his existence
but says that the common meaning of “existence” does not preclude its being
said of God in a way different from how it is said of other things.
Avicenna, The Healing, Logic: Isagoge, 1.2, §2.

16
Preface to the Translations

The translations that follow are intended for those who know no Arabic. To
this end we deemed it best to aim for idiomatic, readable philosophical English.
Consequently, our translations take some liberties; these are of two kinds. First,
in a very limited number of places, we paraphrased the text slightly to make the
philosophical sense more accessible. Second, several eloquent Arabic construc-
tions sound redundant or cumbersome when translated literally into modern
English; frequently we simply render these by paragraph breaks, periods, com-
mas, quotation marks and the like.
Finally, most of our notes are simply explanatory or provide the historical
context of an argument. Many of the themes that Rāzī and Ṭūsī take up are
mirrored in the Latin Christian West; see, for example, Thomas Aquinas’s De
ente et essentia and the notion of ens commune and Duns Scotus’s Ordinatio,
particularly the parallels with Ordinatio Bk. 1, dist. 3 qq. 1–2 and Rāzī’s discus-
sion.17 The relationship between Eastern and Western discussions is beyond the
scope of this article.
III. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt 4, 1718
<355>
“Sometimes a thing’s quiddity may be a cause (sabab) of one of its attributes,
and one of its attributes may be a cause of another attribute, for example, the
differentia for the proprium. However, neither a quiddity that does not exist nor
any other attribute can be the cause of the attribute that is a thing’s existence,
since the cause is prior in existence, and there is nothing prior in existence before
existence” [Avicenna, Pointers 4, 17].
[R1] Commentary: Here is the second premise needed to establish the dem-
onstration mentioned about divine uniqueness and unity.19 It is that a thing’s
quiddity may be a cause of one of its attributes, and likewise an attribute of a
quiddity may be a cause of another attribute; however, neither the quiddity nor
one of its attributes may be a cause of its very own existence, since the cause
(ʿilla) is prior in existence to the effect. Thus, if the quiddity were a cause of its
own existence, it would exist prior to its own existence <356>. It then follows
that either something would be prior to itself or the thing would be an existent
17
We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this reference.
18
Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, ed. ʿA. Najafzāda, 2 vols. (Tehran: Anjuman-i Ās̲ār
va Mafākhir-i Farhangī, 2005).
19
The demonstration is given at Pointers 4, 18–20 where Avicenna gives a proof of the impos-
sibility of there being more than one Necessary Existent. Rāzī understands Pointers 4, 16–17 to give
two necessary premises for that proof: (1) what is common to concrete individuals is other than
that through which they differ (4, 16), and, (2) things cannot cause their own existence (4, 17).
twice,20 which is absurd. That is because we shift the discussion to the first
existence, which is just like the discussion about the former, and so a regress
follows.21 This is the gist of this chapter.
[R2] Know that the discussion concerning this issue is among the greatest
of metaphysical inquiries, yet intellects and understandings have been muddled
about it. I will indicate what has been well said and is valuable in it, while as-
signing the detailed investigation to the rest of my written works. I say, there
is no doubt or uncertainty that God (may He be exalted) is an existent. Thus,
“existent” is said of him and of contingent existents either [1] equivocally or
[2] univocally.22
[R3] The first [of these two options] is to say that applying the term “exis-
tent” to the Necessary and the contingent is like applying “al-ʿayn” [“spring”]23
to its [distinct] referents or [the Arabic color term] “jawn” to black and white.24
The well-regarded philosophers, however, agreed that this option is false (even
if one group of skilled speculative theologians held it). The philosophers raised
several problems to show that this position is false.25
[R4] First, we know necessarily that the opposite of denial is affirmation.
Thus, if the affirmation were not to have some single thing that is understood
and that obtains, then the denial would not have one single opposite but would
have multiple [opposites]. That, however, would violate our necessary knowledge
that something’s either being or not being exhausts [the possibilities].26
20
Namely, the existence as cause of its existence and the existence as effect of having caused
its existence.
21
If the quiddity causes its own existence, then either the quiddity’s existence-as-cause is
prior to itself, which is absurd, or it simultaneously causes its existence-as-cause and its existence-
as-effect. Its existence-as-cause explains its existence-as-effect, but not its existence-as-cause, which
will need another cause; and an infinite regress ensues.
22
Literally: through [1] the sharing of a term or [2] the sharing of a meaning.
23
The Arabic term al-ʿayn is reported to have at least forty-seven meanings (others say even
a hundred!) and used seventeen different ways in the Quran alone; see E. W. Lane, Arabic-English
Lexicon (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1985).
24
In Arabic there is a large class of words that can mean both one thing and its contrary, as
in the case of the Arabic color term jawn. An English example of a word falling within this class
is “cleave,” namely, to adhere closely and to split or divide.
25
While some of al-Rāzī’s arguments that follow are structurally similar to ones found in
Avicenna, the contexts of Avicenna’s arguments never concern the univocity of existence. A more
likely candidate for Rāzī’s source is Suhrawardī, who in turn likely drew upon Abū l-Barakāt al-
Baghdādī. See Benevich, “The Necessary Existent.”
26
The argument is that the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) requires that something either is
or it is not, where is seems to require a single sense for the universal validity of LEM. That some-
thing either is or it is not is equivalent to something either is an existent or it is not an existent. Thus,
if “existent” were an equivocal term then the universal validity of LEM would be jeopardized. Cf.
Avicenna, Categories, ed. G. C. Anawati, M. M. Khuḍayrī, A. F. Ahwānī and S. Zāyad (Cairo:
The General Egyptian Book Organization, 1959), 2.1, 60, 10–12: “Were this not so [namely that
[R5] The second [argument] is that we can divide existents into the Nec-
essary and the contingent. The source of the division is inevitably that there is
something common between the divisions, for it is invalid to say al-ʿayn is either
a knee or a spy.27 At best the intended referent for the term al-ʿayn could be this
or that. In this case, the division stands up, and the source is something with a
common meaning because the thing that is named by such and such a term is
an intelligible, relative state and is common to the two things.28
[R6] The third [argument] is that when we give the proof that the world
must be from some existing [cause] that produces an effect, we certainly know
<357> that whatever produced this effect exists. Were we afterwards to become
uncertain about whether that existent is something Necessary or contingent or
a substance or an accident, the fact that we are uncertain about which division it
belongs to would not call into question our certain knowledge that it exists. If we
believed that it is Necessary, and then became uncertain whether it is something
contingent, the belief that it is Necessary would not remain. Thus, were being an
existent not something common to all of these divisions, the certain knowledge
that it is an existent would also not remain when there is uncertainty concerning
these divisions, just as the certain knowledge that it is Necessary does not remain
when there is uncertainty concerning [whether] it is contingent.
[R7] The fourth is that whoever claims that existence is not something
common [that is, one who claims “existence” is said equivocally] has unwittingly
claimed that it is something common. [That is] because, if the existence of each
and every thing is different from the existence of another, there is no single thing
that we can judge as being not common. Instead, there will be infinitely many
things understood. [Thus] in order to recognize whether [existence] is or is not
something common one must consider each one of them. Since, however, there
is no need for that, and yet the judgment about existence’s not being something
existence has a common sense], something would exceed the contradiction’s two extremes, for
each one of the contradiction’s two extremes would be multiple things and in fact there would
not be a single extreme. Instead, existence in all of them is a single account with respect to what
is understood.” It should be noted, however, that Avicenna’s general intention here is to show that
existence is neither a purely equivocal nor a purely univocal term.
27
An example of such false division in English would be to say that “spring” subdivides into
a class of pouncing and a class of a rope for hauling a ship into position.
28
The argument is that one can divide a single thing into distinct classes only when there is
something common to the divided classes beyond just the name. For example, the class of animals
can be divided validly into humans and horses, but it cannot be divided validly into the members
of the kingdom Animalia and brutish cads, since this would equivocate on the word “animal.”
Similarly, if “existent” is divided validly into the Necessary Existent and contingent existents, that
is because existence is common to both.
common is [supposedly] uniform across all existents, we know that existence is

something common.29
[R8] The fifth is that just as our intellects grasp about instances of black
that they are equal in blackness (and likewise for all of the specific natures) so in
the same way our intellect grasps about existents that they are equal concerning
absolute existence. Thus, if one could deny this latter proposition, one could
deny those former propositions too. That would result in never affirming a
resemblance among things.30
[R9] The sixth is that were one to mention a poem in which the last word
of each verse is “existent,” everyone would know that the rhyme is repeating
[the same sense of the word]. If he made the last word of each verse to be, for
instance, “spring” such that each verse was suited to one of the [many] senses
of “spring,” one would not say that the last word of each verse is repeated. If
everyone did not necessarily know that the sense of “existent” is one and the
same with respect to all things, they would not have judged here that there is
a repetition [of the same sense] just as <358> they did not judge it [to be the
same] in [the case of “spring”].31
[R10] This then summarizes what they have said to undermine the claim
that “existent” applies equivocally to what is Necessary and to what is contin-
gent, and on the whole the philosophers unanimously agree on its falsity. Since
this option is false, we have [this] to say. If it were established that the existence
of God (may He be exalted) is equal to the existence of contingent things qua
existence, then one of two things must be the case: Either God’s existence (may
He be exalted) is joined with some other quiddity or it is not. The first option
is what many of the speculative theologians adopt. In this case, they say that
God’s existence (may He be exalted) is additional to his quiddity and one of the
29
This argument is directed against a thesis that assumes that existent is predicated equivo-
cally not only of classes of thing, like the Necessary Existent and contingent existents, but also of
every particular instant of an existent, like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. In that case, if someone,
S, holds the claim that “existent” is predicated equivocally, such a claim would require that S
survey an infinite number of instances, but it is not the case that S surveys an infinite number of
instances. Therefore, S does not hold the claim that “existent” is predicated equivocally, and so S,
without being aware of it, presumably holds that “existent” is predicated univocally.
30
The argument assumes some theory of universals, namely that whenever we classify various
species of things, whether colors or the like, we can do so precisely because there is some universal
that all the instances of that species have in common, like blackness or the like. We classify things
as existents and so there must be some universal notion, existence, that they all have in common.
Rāzī’s argument here nicely parallels Avicenna’s own argument at Pointers 4, 1. We are grateful to
an anonymous reviewer for this observation.
31
Presumably the linguistic evidence is that when one hears “existent” used multiple times
in a sentence or set of sentences, there is no expectation that a pun or word play is taking place,
which gives some credence to the belief that existence is a univocal notion.
attributes of his true nature (haqīqa).32 The second option is what the majority of
the philosophers adopt. They say that his existence (may He be exalted) is itself
his true nature and they express this idea by, “his individual existence (innīya,
lit. “thatness”) is identical to his quiddity” [or “his thatness is identical to his
whatness”].33 The Sheikh [i.e., Avicenna] confirmed this account by an [often]
related proof, and there is no reason not to repeat it again along with our own
additional appraisal of it.
[R11] If, then, God’s existence (may He be exalted) were additional to
his quiddity (may He be exalted), it would be contingent. [That is] because,
according to this appraisal, his existence is one of his quiddity’s attributes, and
there is no appraisal of an attribute without a subject of attribution. In that
case, his existence (may He be exalted) needs his quiddity, and whatever needs
another is contingent. Thus, if his existence were something additional to his
quiddity, it would be contingent. He would also inevitably have some cause,
since, as you know, what is contingent needs a cause, and that cause is either
[God’s] quiddity or something else. The second [option, namely that the cause
of God’s existence is something other than his quiddity] does not work because
if his existence (may He be exalted) were acquired from something else, then the
Creator would be a contingent34 effect needing something else to produce it (may
God be exalted highly above that!). The first [option, namely that the cause of
God’s existence is his quiddity] also does not work because if his quiddity (may
He be exalted) were a cause of his existence, it would be prior in existence to
itself, the cause necessarily being prior in existence to the effect. In that case, the
absurdity noted earlier follows. This is the appraisal that the Sheikh relied on to
undermine [the claim] that [God’s] existence (may He be exalted) is something
other than his quiddity.
[R12] Know that we have strong clear proofs that the third option is incor-
rect, that is, the one that the Sheikh chooses, namely that [God’s] existence (may
He be exalted) is equal <359> to the existence of contingent things with respect
to its being existence; and furthermore, that to some quiddities existence is not
32
For the view that existence is additional to God’s self, see al-Ghazālī, Moderation in Belief,
II.2.i–ii and al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, disc. 6.
33
See Avicenna, Metaphysics 8.4 [3]. The question of whether the Necessary Existent’s quiddity
is equal to its existence or whether it simply has no quiddity is the subject of much discussion. As
a starting point, see E. M. Macierowski, “Does God Have a Quiddity According to Avicenna?”
Thomist 52 (1988): 79–87; and more recently Damien Janos, Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure
Quiddity, 539–50. For a discussion of Ghazālī’s response to Avicenna see Jon McGinnis, “Simple
is as Simple Does: Plantinga and Ghazālī on Divine Simplicity,” Religious Studies (2022): http://
doi:10.1017/S0034412522000130. Post-Avicennan interpretations of and reactions to Avicenna
on this point are chronicled in Benevich, “The Necessary Existent.”
34
In some manuscripts mumkin, “contingent,” is absent.
accidental, and indeed [God’s] existence subsists through itself.35 We point to

some of [the proofs] here.
[R13] The first [proof ] is that the existence that is common to the Neces-
sary and to the contingent insofar as it is existence36 either [1] requires that it
be accidental to the quiddity or [2] requires that it not be accidental to it or
[3] it does not require either one of the two restrictions. If [1] it requires that
[existence] be accidental to the quiddity, then in all cases existence must be ac-
cidental to [the quiddity], because the concomitant of one [and the same] true
nature occurs wherever [that nature] occurs. In that case, God’s existence (may
He be exalted) is accidental to his quiddity, and that is what is sought. If [2]
[existence] requires that it not be accidental to some quiddities, then [for the
same reason as for (1)] in all cases existence must not be accidental to its quiddity.
In that case, the existence of contingent things could not be accidental to their
quiddities, which flies in the face of the consensus. Moreover, contingent things
are existents, and so if they are not an existent through an existence accidental
to them, they must be an existent through an existence that is identical to their
quiddities. In that case, “existent” is said equivocally of the existents and we are
back to the option that we showed to be false.37 As for [3]—[namely], if it is said
that existence is neither required to be accidental to a quiddity nor required to
be non-accidental to it, then it is not restricted by either one of these two but by
some separate cause. In that case, there would be no independent confirmation
of the existence itself of the Necessary Existence insofar as it is, except through
some external cause. Thus, the Necessary Existence would not be the Necessary
Existence, which is inconsistent.38
[R14] The second is that the philosophers agreed that human intellects
do not grasp the true reality of God himself (may He be exalted), while <360>
they agree that we do grasp his existence (may He be exalted). How can this be
when according to them absolute existence is what is first conceptualized?39 This
requires that his true reality (may He be exalted) be distinct from his existence
(may He be exalted). This is the proof that they always depend on when they
go on the attack [to show] that the existence of contingent things is additional
35
Here Rāzī’s complaint is not with the former claim that “existence” is said univocally, but
with the latter claim that God’s quiddity is identical to his existence.
36
In some manuscripts mawjūd, “existent.”
37
See (R3–R9) above.
38
Position [3] is again that existence might be indifferent to being non-accidental (hence
Necessary) or being accidental. In that case, there would be some external cause that explains
why some existence is accidental and another is Necessary. Of course, the Necessary Existent or
God is not caused in any way.
39
Avicenna discusses this point at Metaphysics 1.5 [1] where he says that that the meaning
of “existent” is impressed on the soul in a primary way.
to their quiddities. They say that our intellect might grasp the quiddity of the
triangle while doubting its existence, and that what is known is distinct from
what is not known.40 Similarly, since the existence is known, while the true nature
is not known, the existence must be distinct from the quiddity, otherwise what
is the difference [between the two cases]?41
[R15] The third is that if the true nature of [God] (may He be exalted) were
only abstract existence along with the remaining negative restrictions, then those
negative restrictions would not be included within the causality of the existence
of contingent things. [That is] because privation is not a cause of existence nor a
part of it [i.e., of the cause of existence].42 Now when those negative restrictions
are not taken into account in the causality of contingent things, then [God’s]43
causing contingent things would be only because of that [abstract] existence.
Thus, when that existence is equivalent to the existence of the rest of the existents,
the rest of the existents would be equivalent to his existence (may He be exalted)
with respect to his causality of contingent things. In that case, the existence of
everything would be equivalent to God himself (may He be exalted) with respect
to his attributes and his actions.44
[R16] The fourth is that they agreed that what is true of any single in-
stance of the specific nature is true of the rest of its single instances. Using this
premise, they aimed to prove, along the lines that we established earlier,45 that
the celestial spheres have matter and that the school of Democritus was wrong
about the atom. Also, by [this premise] they aimed to prove that there are no
void intervals.46 In this case, they said that since the [void] intervals in some
40
The reference seems to be to Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.5 [9].
41
The argument relies on the philosophically dubious, but oft repeated premise—assumed
even by Avicenna in his famous flying man thought experiment—that whatever is known is not
identical to what is unknown. God’s existence can be known, while his quiddity cannot be known,
so God’s existence cannot be identical to it.
42
The Arabic pronoun hā can refer to either a feminine singular referent, and so translated
“it,” or to a non-personal plural referent, and so translated “they/them/their.” Here we understand
the referent to be the feminine singular ʿilla, “cause”; it also could refer to “the contingent things,”
though that is not likely.
43
Some manuscripts have the pronoun hā, “their.”
44
The argument assumes the Avicennan claim that apart from God’s being the Necessary
Existent through itself, all other divine attributes are either negative (Avicenna, Metaphysics 8.4
[2]) or identical to God’s existence (Avicenna, Metaphysics 8.6). Given that privative and negative
restrictions are not included in what it is to be an efficient cause, the only actual or formal feature
that could be included in God’s causality is his existence. Consequently, since Rāzī had argued that
for the philosophers all existents are purportedly equivalent in existence, he concludes that contin-
gent existents on Avicenna’s view should be equivalent to God in causality, which is clearly false.
45
See Avicenna, Pointers, 1, 7 and 2, 17.
46
See Avicenna, Physics, ed. and trans. J. McGinnis (Provo: Brigham Young University
Press, 2009), 2.8 [9–10].
locations require matter, they must always require it, because there is no varia-
tion in what the realized specific nature requires. Given that as established, we
say that existence, qua existence without the other accidents, is one and the
same specific nature, and so it cannot vary <361>. For us [creatures], however,
existence is an accident requiring and in want of a quiddity. Thus, how is one
to understand the complete reversal in the similar case of this existence for God
(may He be exalted), a self-subsistent substance [whose existence] is such that
he is the most powerful of existents and most intensely self-subsisting of them?47
[R17] As for the argument that the Sheikh uses to prove that God’s exis-
tence (may He be exalted) cannot be something added to his quiddity, all of its
premises are conceded except his claim that if the quiddity were a cause of its
own existence, it would be prior in existence to itself, since the cause is prior in
existence to the effect. We deny this priority and his proof in a number of ways.
[R18] The first is that in 5, [7] of this work we will explain (if God, may
He be exalted, wills) that if by the cause’s being essentially prior to the effect
one means something that produces an effect, then this is certainly conceded.48
On the other hand, if one is claiming that the cause is prior to the effect in
existence, then the gist of it is that a cause produces its effect only after it exists,
and this just begs the question. Indeed, we maintain that the cause producing
the existence of God (may He be exalted) is precisely his own quiddity without
reference to any preceding existence. Thus, what you have to say just returns
to the subject of dispute, merely stating it differently, and so is useless. If by
“priority” something beyond what produces an effect is meant, then that is not
conceivable, let alone credible.
[R19] The second [way of denying Avicenna’s proof ] is to desist [from the
first way of denying it] and ask why you said that every cause is prior in existence
to the effect?49 Do you not think that the quiddities of contingent things are
receptive of their [individual] instances of existence, and so that their quiddities
47
Rāzī notes again that for Avicenna the divine attributes are either negations or identical to
God’s existence. Since all existence as existence is supposedly equivalent, the only way for Avicenna
to explain how God differs from creatures is to appeal to negations and privations, which hardly
seem capable of explaining such apparently positive features of God as being a self-subsistent, and
even the most intensely self-subsistent, substance and the most powerful existent.
48
Rāzī appears to be drawing on a sense of essential priority that Shahrastānī (1086–1153)
developed in his Nihāyat al-Aqdām, 7–11. There Shahrastānī notes that while the philosophers
frequently identify essential priority with causal priority, essential priority is more general. Essential
priority also includes, for instance, the essential priority of the number 1 to the number 2, which,
though not merely a priority of order, is not a priority by causality, since 1 does not cause 2 (even
though 2 requires or is conditional on there being 1).
49
The following argument and responses in the rest of the chapter apparently rely on Ghazālī,
The Incoherence of the Philosophers, disc. 6 [8–12].
are receptive causes50 of their existence? In this case, the receptive cause is not [at
all] necessarily prior to the effect in existence. If it is such, why might there not
be something like it with respect to the efficient cause? Also, at the beginning
of the present chapter of this book51 the Sheikh mentioned that something’s
quiddity might sometimes be a cause of one of its attributes. Thus, we say, when
the quiddity is a cause producing one of its own attributes, it is a cause of that
attribute. Now its priority to that attribute cannot be with respect to existence
unless the cause not only is the quiddity itself, but also the existing quiddity, but
he admitted that the cause is the quiddity itself. Thus, the priority of the cause
producing <362> its effect does not need to be in terms of existence.
[R20] If one says that, since existence is not considered in the quiddity’s
producing its effect, and whatever does not exist is something non-existent, the
quiddity in its state of non-existence would be something producing its own
existence, which is absurd, we say that, from our claim that the quiddity’s caus-
ing its own existence does not depend upon the quiddity’s existence, it does not
validly follow that the quiddity in its state of non-existence would be something
that produces existence. Similarly, it does not validly follow from saying that the
contingent quiddity’s being receptive to existence does not depend upon that
quiddity’s existence that [the quiddity] in its state of non-existence is receptive
to existence. Instead, the truth is that the quiddity as such is something different
from [both] its existence and its non-existence. We are only making that which
produces the existence that very quiddity, and that does not preclude its being
devoid of existence.52
[R21] One might say: Just as you all allow that before existing, its quid-
dity produces its own existence, why not allow that before the existence of the
world, the world’s quiddity produces its existence? In that case, the existence of
the agent could not be proved through the existence of the actions. We say that
intuition (badīha) is split between two positions. On the one hand, we intuitively
know that as long as something does not exist it cannot cause the existence of
something else. On the other hand, we know that it is likely that something
50
That is, the quiddity functions like the analogue of a material cause in contingent existents.
51
See Avicenna’s base-text, Pointers 4, 17, above, where he claims, “Sometimes a thing’s
quiddity may be a cause of one of its attributes.”
52
Rāzī’s suggestion is that when considering the quiddity, one can consider it as (1) existing
or (2) not existent or (3) indifferent with respect to either existing or not existing. The suggestion
ironically has some support in Avicenna himself; see Avicenna, The Healing, Logic: Isagoge, 1.2,
§2. There Avicenna claims that there are two modes of existence, “existing in concrete particulars”
and “existing in conceptualization.” In other words, things exist either extra-mentally or mentally.
He went on however, to claim that the quiddity can be considered in three ways: extra-mentally,
mentally, and in itself, that is, independent of either of the modes of existence. Rāzī is thus sug-
gesting that the quiddity in itself, i.e., independently of any particular mode of existence, can
cause its existence as a concrete particular.
exists on account of itself, where what is understood by, “something exists on

account of itself ” is that it itself necessitates its own existence. Once intuition
reflects and is certain about the division, [it will see that] what we say is correct.
[R22] This completes the discussion of this issue. Regarding it, know that
any position beyond one of the three that we mentioned is impossible. One
must also take care in distinguishing each one of these positions from the other
in order that the discussion concerning this issue quickly become clear. All suc-
cess is through God.
IV. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Ḥall mushkilāt Kitāb al-Ishārāt

wa-l-tanbīhāt 4, 1753
<570>
. . .54
[T1] This is another premise for divine unity. An example of something’s
quiddity being a cause of one of its attributes is twoness’s being a cause of two’s
evenness. An example of some attribute, the differentia, being a cause of another
attribute, the proprium, is rationality’s being a cause of the [capacity] for won-
der. An example of some attribute, the proprium, being a cause of an attribute,
another proprium, is the [capacity] for wonder’s being a cause of risibility. An
example of some attribute, an accident, being a cause of another attribute is
color, attributed to body, [and its] being a cause of its being visible.
[T2] The difference between existence and the rest of the attributes here is
that the rest of the attributes exist only because <571> of the quiddity, whereas
the quiddity exists because of the existence. Therefore, the rest of the attributes
may proceed from the quiddity, and some of them may proceed from others,
whereas existence cannot proceed from any of them.
[T3] The Eminent Commentator [Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī] was completely
muddled about this passage. Because of it, he wrongly believed that the intel-
lects of intellectuals and the understandings of the philosophers were altogether
muddled. That is because, by many proofs that he got from them, he inferred that
existence does not apply equivocally to existents. He then went on and judged
that existence is one and the same thing in everything equally even to the point
that he declared that the existence of the Necessary [i.e., God] is equal to the
existence of contingent things (may He be exalted above that!).
[T4] Next, since he believed that the existence of contingent things is
accidental to their quiddities, and also that the existence of the Necessary is
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt (= Ḥall mushkilāt al-Ishārāt), ed. Ḥ.
53
Z. Āmolī, 2 vols. (Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb, 2004–2007).

54
The omitted text is Avicenna, Pointers 4, 17 cited in full above in the lemma to Rāzī’s
commentary.
equal to the existence of contingent things, he judged that the existence of the
Necessary is also an accident of his quiddity. Thus, his quiddity is other than his
existence (may He be greatly exalted above that!). He wrongly believed that if
he did not make the existence of the Necessary an accident of his quiddity, then
the [Necessary] Existent would be equal to the caused instances of existence or
that “existence” would apply equivocally to the existence of the Necessary and
the existence of the others. <572>
[T5] The origin of this error is [Rāzī’s] ignorance about ambiguous appli-
cation. [That is] because what applies ambiguously to different things does not
apply to them equivocally in the way that “ʿayn” (“spring”)55 applies to the things
understood by it, but [applies] to all of them in a single sense. Still, it does not
[apply] equally in the way that “human” applies [equally] to individual instances
of [humans]. Instead [what applies ambiguously] differs either:
(1) by priority and posteriority (in the way “continuous” applies to mag-
nitude and to the body that possesses magnitude) or,
(2) by the primary and its privation (in the way that “unit” (wāḥid) applies
to that which is fundamentally indivisible and to that which is divisible
in some way other than that by which it is one [wāḥid])56 or
(3) by intensity and weakness (in the way that “white” applies to snow
and ivory).57
[T6] “Existence” brings together all of these different [ways], for it applies
to (1) the cause and its effect by priority and posteriority, to (2) substance and
accident by the primary and its privation and to (3) what is fixed and not fixed,58
like blackness and motion, by intensity and weakness. Moreover [it applies] to
the Necessary and the contingent in [all] three ways.
[T7] It is impossible that the single sense that is said unequally of different
things be the quiddity or a part of the quiddity of those things. [That is] because
neither the quiddity nor its parts differ; rather, [the single sense] is precisely an
external inseparable or separable accident, for example, as “whiteness” is not
55
On the many senses of the Arabic al-ʿayn see n. 23.
56
For example, one can speak of 1 as a single thing, which is the basic unit of number,
which in the ancient and medieval world was viewed as a plurality of units. One can also speak
of, for instance, 2 as a single thing, although not single in the way that the unit is, since 2 and the
rest of the numbers ultimately are divisible into units. Thus, the unit is primary and a principle
preceding numbers.
57
Cf. Avicenna, Categories 1.2, 10.
58
“What is fixed and not fixed” are divisions of continuous quantity. The fixed continuous
quantity is what can exist in an unchanged state over time such as a linear or planar quantity,
whereas the non-fixed continuous quantity is what exists only inasmuch as it is changing, like
motion or time (Avicenna, Categories 2.4, 119).
said equally of snow’s whiteness and ivory’s whiteness. In this case, it is not at
all a quiddity or a part of the quiddity of the two, but is something outside [of
their quiddities] that is a concomitant of them. That is because between the two
contrary limits that apply to colors, there is a potentially infinite [number] of
species of colors that have no specifically differentiated names, <573> but one
name with one sense applies ambiguously to each of that group, like whiteness,
redness and blackness. That sense is a non-constitutive concomitant of that group.
[T8] In the same way, existence applies to the Necessary’s existence and the
existence of contingent things whose individual identities (hūwīyāt [= ipseities])
differ and have no specifically differentiated names. I am not saying [existence
applies] to the quiddities of contingent things, but to the instances of existences of
those quiddities. I mean that it also applies to them as something concomitant,
external and non-constitutive.59
[T9] Once this settles in, this Eminent one’s confusions are entirely solved.
That is because, just as the philosophers hold, “existence” applies in [only] one
sense to what is below it. From that, however, it does not follow that the things
in which [existence] is an inseparable concomitant—namely, the existence of
the Necessary and the existences of the contingent things—are equal in reality,
since things that differ in [their] true nature still might share one [and the same]
concomitant.60 Here I will recount his spurious arguments in detail and indicate
the ways they are resolved.
[T10] Among the spurious arguments that he alleges undermine the phi-
losophers’ statement61 that the Necessary’s individual existence is its quiddity is
. . . [here (R13) is paraphrased] . . . <574> From what was just said, you know
the answer. Consider the light that is common but applies to lights unequally.
Obviously, sunlight educes (yaqtaḍī, literally “lays claim to”) the sight of one
with very poor eyesight, unlike the rest of the lights. Likewise, some of the heat
that is common obviously educes the disposition for life62 or the disposition for
59
According to Ṭūsī, “existence” is predicated of different existents in the way that “whiteness”
or “colored” are predicated of particular instances of white and colored things. Thus, “white” is
said ambiguously of snow and ivory, where one is bright while the other is dull (it also, of course,
is said ambiguously of the infinite varieties of white in between). This use of “white” is unlike the
equivocal use of “white” when one speaks of “white snow” and “white space” (the latter of which
means unused space regardless of color). Thus, when “existence” is said of the Necessary Existent,
that is, God, and of contingent existents, that is, creatures, it is said only ambiguously and so
the single sense of “existence” is applied to God in an infinitely greater degree than to creatures.
60
In the Discussions (= al-Mubāḥathāt, ed. Muḥsin Bīdārfar [Qom: Intishārāt Baydar, 1992],
218, §648), Avicenna makes the point that things of which “existence” is predicated ambiguously
must differ from each other in essence, but can share a concomitant.
61
See Avicenna, Metaphysics 8.4 [3].
62
The reference is to the innate or vital heat of Galenic medicine; for a discussion see Richard
J. Durling, “The Innate Heat in Galen,” Medizinhistorisches Journal Bd. 23, H. 3/4 (1988): 210–2.
the alternation of the species form unlike the rest of the [types of ] heat. That
is because of the difference in the quiddity of the things with which light and
heat are inseparable concomitants.63
[T11] Also, if, as he erroneously believed, “existence” were [applied] equally,
then the contingent would be what needs a cause necessitating something ac-
cidental, while the Necessary would be what does not need [a cause]. [That is]
because the absence of something accidental does not need the existence of a
cause; rather, the absence of what is accidental is sufficient for it. The truth,
however, is what we initially said.64
[T12] Also, among [his spurious arguments] is that . . . [here (R14) is
paraphrased] . . . The answer is that the true reality, which [human] intellects do
not grasp, is his proper existence, which differs from the rest of the instances of
existence in individual identity and which is the first principle of the universe.
The existence [that human intellects] grasp is <575> the absolute existence that
is a concomitant of that [proper] existence and of the rest of the existences. It
is [absolute existence] that is the first [thing] conceptualized.65 Now, grasping
the concomitant does not require grasping that of which it is concomitant with
respect to [its] true reality, otherwise from grasping existence one would neces-
sarily grasp all of the proper existences. His true reality, which is not grasped
(may He be exalted), and the existence, which is grasped, requires that his true
reality (may He be exalted) be distinct from the absolute existence that is grasped,
not from his proper existence.
[T13] Also, among [his spurious arguments] is . . . [here (R15) is para-
phrased] . . . The answer is that the Necessary’s true reality is not general existence;
63
Existence is found in radically different intensities that can have results that are different
in kind, which make saying “existence” of different things an ambiguous predication. It is like
“light,” which is said of sunlight and can be seen even by one nearly blind and the light of a flick-
ering candle that might only barely be seen by one with perfect eyesight; or heat, which in some
instances, like the vital heat of humoral medicine, results in life, while in other instances of heat,
like fire, life does not result. Likewise, existence can be accidental in creation but not in God. Its
different degrees of intensity allow it to apply to God and creatures differently.
64
Rāzī’s argument assumed that if one kind of existent requires that existence is either
accidental (i.e., non-essential) or not, then all kinds of existents must require that existence be
accidental or not. Ṭūsī’s point is that given the ambiguous predication of “existence,” it may be
predicated essentially of some existents and non-essentially, i.e., accidentally, of others.
65
The term “proper existence” (wujūd khāṣṣ) appears in Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.5 [9] with
regard to the case of grasping the triangle to which Rāzī refers. In Avicenna, however, the term
applies to the reality of the quiddity considered apart from its modes of existence. In contrast,
Ṭūsī’s use of the term seems to be influenced by Fārābī’s On the Perfect State where “proper ex-
istence” refers to the unity through which a quiddity is circumscribed and distinguished from
another (Fārābī, On the Perfect State, ed. and trans.Richard Walzer (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1985) 1 [5], 68.10).
rather, it is nothing but his proper existence, which is unlike the rest of the
existences in [that] his subsistence is through himself.66
[T14] Also, among [his spurious arguments] is that . . . [here (R16) is
paraphrased] . . . The answer is that existence is not a specific nature, because
the specific nature is in the individuals equally and applies to them univocally,
whereas existence is not like that.67
[T15] Next, in this chapter, he objected to the Sheikh’s claim that if the
quiddity were to necessitate its existence, then [the quiddity] would be prior in
existence to existence by saying . . . [here (R18) is paraphrased] . . . The answer
is that we know necessarily that the cause’s producing its effect is conditioned
upon its being prior in existence, and nothing is conditioned upon itself. Also,
grant that to be prior is to produce an effect,68 still it is inconceivable that the
quiddity produces its effect other than when it is in the concrete particulars. In
that case, its being in the concrete particulars—I mean its existence—would be
a condition for the appearance of its existence—I mean its being in the concrete
particulars. This would be absurd!69
[T16] He said next . . . [here (R19) is paraphrased] . . . The answer is that
his discussion of this is based upon his conception that the quiddity perdures
in the external world without its existence, and thereafter existence inheres in
it, which is wrong, because the quiddity’s being is its existence. The quiddity is
66
This response simply repeats the previous distinction between existence considered in
abstraction from the proper existence of any particular existent and proper existence belonging to
particular existents. For example, while a horse exists and I exist, and so it is proper to predicate
“existence” of both of us, the horse has equine-existence while I have human-existence, and these
specific ways of existing cannot be predicated of both of us equally.
67
The argument again relies on the differences between univocal predication and ambiguous
predication. Existence is unlike, for example, the specific nature, human, for while “human” is
predicated of every individual instance of human univocally, “existence” is not predicated univo-
cally but only ambiguously of every existent.
68
Rāzī’s complaint again was that the philosophers take “to be prior” to mean not merely
being prior essentially (in the sense that there must first be a cause if there is to be an effect), but
also to be prior in existence, and so they have begged the question.
69
Rāzī’s claim was that the conditional, “if anything is a cause, then it exists prior to its effect,”
is tautologically true, for a cause’s priority to its effect may be causal instead of temporal. In that
case, to say that the cause is prior to its effect is just to say that the cause, insofar as it is a cause,
is causally prior to its effect (which just means the cause causes its effect). Ṭūsī has two responses.
The first is that Avicenna’s original claim should be read, “If anything exists-as-a-cause of its ef-
fect, then it exists absolutely prior to that effect.” To-exist-as-a-cause and to-exist-absolutely (i.e.,
considered independent of any particular manner of existence) are different nuances of existence.
Thus, there are distinctions between the use of “existence” in the antecedent and the consequent,
and so the conditional is not tautologically true. Ṭūsī’s second response is much like the first: a
quiddity as such is not a cause (since it may either exist or not exist); rather, a cause is a concretely
existing quiddity, but there is a concrete existing quiddity only if the quiddity exists. Thus, exist-
ing is a necessary condition for a quiddity’s being a cause, but it is not identical to being a cause.
abstract-able from existence only in the intellect. Not in that it is severed from
existence in the intellect, for being in the intellect also is an intellectual existence,
just as being in the external world is an external existence. Instead, the intellect
is of the character to take notice of [the quiddity] <577> alone without taking
notice of existence.70 The absence of the consideration of something is not the
consideration of its absence. Consequently, then, attributing existence to the
quiddity is something intellectual, unlike the attribution of whiteness to the
body, for the quiddity does not have a singular existence and an accident called
“existence” that has another existence such that they join together as what receives
and what is received. Instead, when the quiddity is, its being [the quiddity] is
its existence. The upshot is that the quiddity is receptive to existence only when
it exists in the intellect, and it is impossible for it to be an efficient cause of an
external attribute when it exists only in the intellect.71
[T17] Next, he said . . . [here (R19) is paraphrased] . . . The answer is that
to ignore the existence that accompanies the quiddity when [the quiddity] is
necessitating an attribute does not require that [the quiddity] be separated from
existence just when [it is] necessitating [that attribute]. That is because its being
separated from existence while it is what it is, to say nothing of its producing an
effect, would be absurd. Consequently, it is inconceivable that it produces the ex-
istence from which it is separated during the producing [of that very existence].72
[T18] This, then, is an explanation of the rot that this Eminent one held.
These discussions, while long-winded, are unrelated to the lemma of the text in
this place. Since, however, this man talked on and on about this issue, which, of
the divine issues, is the greatest matter of concern in this text and in the rest of
70
Cf. Avicenna, The Healing, Logic: Isagoge 1.2, §2, where he introduces the consideration of
a quiddity qua quiddity without regard to mental or external existence and again in Metaphysics
5.1 and Avicenna’s famous discussion that horseness in itself is just horseness.
71
Ṭūsī’s summary of Rāzī’s position is that quiddities, as they exist extra-mentally in the
world, are such that they are receptive to existence, which is accidental or super-added to them
causing them to exist as particulars. In this respect, the quiddity as receptive is the analogue of
the material cause. Rāzī then demanded a principled explanation for why the quiddity can be a
receptive cause before existence is added but an efficient cause cannot be a cause before existence is
added. Ṭūsī’s response is to draw upon the Avicennan distinction (see Avicenna, Introduction 1.2,
§2) between the quiddity as it exists extra-mentally and mentally. The quiddity can be considered
the receptive or material cause insofar as that quiddity exists mentally taken in abstraction from
any existence that it might have in reality. In contrast, no quiddity can be causally efficacious on
extramental things merely insofar as it exists mentally, but only insofar as it exists extra-mentally.
72
Rāzī’s claim was that a quiddity considered in itself, and so without consideration of either
existence or non-existence, can be the cause of its existence. Ṭūsī’s response is, again, that while
the quiddity’s being a cause can be considered independent of its existence, the quiddity’s being
what it is, and so existing as what it is, can never be separated from it. A similar point applies to
the quiddity’s being a cause.
his texts, noting his mistakes is necessary; otherwise, the beliefs of the beginners
would be corrupted by following his lead.73
Stony Brook University, New York

University of Missouri, St. Louis, MO
73
We are grateful to Billy Dunaway for discussions and comments on our initial transla-
tions of these texts. We also want to thank two anonymous referees and the ACPQ editor, David
Clemenson, for their insightful comments and suggestions. Finally, we wish to acknowledge the
generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, which allowed us to do the translations
and research for this article.

One Way of Being Ambiguous: The Univocity of "Existence" and The Theory of Tashkīk Predication in Rāzī and

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One Way of Being Ambiguous: The Univocity of "Existence" and The Theory of Tashkīk Predication in Rāzī and

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One Way of Being Ambiguous: The Univocity of

“Existence” and the Theory of Tashkīk Predication in Rāzī

between Rāzī and Ṭūsī’s interpretations, but simply to provide translations of

I. History and Significance

As one of his last philosophical summas, Avicenna’s Pointers and Reminders

II. Summary of the Argumentation

Rāzī and Ṭūsī’s commentaries concern Avicenna’s argument for a premise

mentaries on these sections, and Fedor Benevich has provided an outstanding

Avicenna, The Healing, Logic: Isagoge, 1.2, §2.

Preface to the Translations

III. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt 4, 1718

common is [supposedly] uniform across all existents, we know that existence is

accidental, and indeed [God’s] existence subsists through itself.35 We point to

exists on account of itself, where what is understood by, “something exists on

IV. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Ḥall mushkilāt Kitāb al-Ishārāt

Z. Āmolī, 2 vols. (Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb, 2004–2007).

Stony Brook University, New York

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