Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Textbook Introduction To Modern Ew Systems Andrea de Martino Ebook All Chapter PDF
Textbook Introduction To Modern Ew Systems Andrea de Martino Ebook All Chapter PDF
Andrea De Martino
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://textbookfull.com/product/introduction-to-modern-ew-systems-andrea-de-martin
o/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...
https://textbookfull.com/product/an-introduction-to-the-ancient-
world-lukas-de-blois/
https://textbookfull.com/product/a-modern-introduction-to-fuzzy-
mathematics-apostolos-syropoulos/
https://textbookfull.com/product/introduction-to-modern-
cryptography-3rd-edition-jonathan-katz/
https://textbookfull.com/product/a-pure-soul-ennio-de-giorgi-a-
mathematical-genius-andrea-parlangeli/
Introduction to Electronic Defense Systems Filippo Neri
https://textbookfull.com/product/introduction-to-electronic-
defense-systems-filippo-neri/
https://textbookfull.com/product/eloquent-javascript-a-modern-
introduction-to-programming-marijn-haverbeke/
https://textbookfull.com/product/akehurst-s-modern-introduction-
to-international-law-alexander-orakhelashvili/
https://textbookfull.com/product/an-introduction-to-modern-
astrophysics-2nd-edition-bradley-w-carroll/
https://textbookfull.com/product/introduction-to-embedded-
systems-a-cyber-physical-systems-approach-edward-ashford-lee/
Frightened Rabbit
Electronic Warfare
Introduction to
MODERN
In answer to great demand, Artech House is proud to present this newly
SECOND EDITION
MODERN EW SYSTEMS
Introduction to
revised and updated edition of the bestselling book, Introduction to Modern
EW Systems. The second edition has been greatly expanded to include a wealth
of new material, from remote piloted airborne systems, directed energy weapons,
EW SYSTEMS
and noncooperative air surveillance, to electronic warfare (EW) radar band sensor
next generation architectures, real-time data links, and smart jamming.
This authoritative resource presents the latest EW techniques and technologies
related to onboard military platforms. Practitioners gain expert design guidance
on technologies and equipment used to detect and identify emitter threats, offering
an advantage in the never-ending chess game between sensor-guided weapons SECOND EDITION
and EW systems. This unique book provides deeper insight into EW system
principles of operation and their mathematical descriptions, arming professionals
with better knowledge for their specific design applications. Andrea De Martino
Moreover, readers get practical information on how to counter modern
communications data links that provide connectivity and command flow among
the armed forces in the battlefield. Taking a sufficiently broad perspective, this
comprehensive volume offers a panoramic view of the various physical domains
– RF, infrared, and electronics – that are present in modern electronic warfare
systems. This in-depth book is supported with over 340 illustrations and more
than 450 equations.
De Martino
ARTECH HOUSE
BOSTON I LONDON
www.artechhouse.com
Andrea De Martino
artechhouse.com
All rights reserved. Printed and bound in the United States of America. No part of
this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or
mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
All terms mentioned in this book that are known to be trademarks or service marks
have been appropriately capitalized. Artech House cannot attest to the accuracy of this
information. Use of a term in this book should not be regarded as affecting the validity
of any trademark or service mark.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
CHAPTER 1
Introduction to Electronic Warfare Scenarios 1
1.1 Definitions and Electronic Warfare Role in the Military Field 1
1.2 Main Weapon Systems of Interest to EW 3
1.2.1 Artillery Systems 5
1.2.2 Missile Systems 7
1.2.3 Active Homing Missiles 11
1.2.4 Passive IR-Guided Missiles 12
1.2.5 Sea-Skimming Missiles 13
1.2.6 ARMs 14
1.2.7 Theater Ballistic Missiles 15
1.3 Remotely Piloted Airborne Systems 17
1.3.1 UAVs 18
1.3.2 USVs 18
1.4 DEWs 20
1.5 EW in Symmetric Conflicts 22
1.6 EW in Asymmetric Conflicts 27
References 28
CHAPTER 2
Evolution of Signal Emitters and Sensors 29
2.1 Introduction 29
2.2 Sensor Electromagnetic Spectrum and Atmospheric Propagation 30
2.3 Radar Principles and Types 32
2.3.1 Radar Equation 36
2.3.2 Radar Structure 37
2.3.3 Radar Clutter Signal Processing 39
2.3.4 Radar Signal Processing Fundamentals 43
2.3.5 Automatic Detection 56
2.3.6 Pulse Compression 61
2.3.7 Surveillance Radars 62
2.3.8 LPI Radars 63
2.3.9 Pulse Doppler Radars 76
2.3.10 Tracking Radars 85
2.3.11 SAR 102
2.3.12 Bistatic and Passive Covert Radars 106
vii
CHAPTER 3
EW RF Band Sensor Systems 165
3.1 EW RF Band Sensor Systems 165
3.2 EW Radar Bands Sensors 166
3.2.1 RWR Architecture 166
3.2.2 ESM Architecture 168
3.2.3 ELINT Architecture 168
3.3 EW Sensor Sensitivity 170
3.3.1 Conclusions 176
3.4 POI 177
3.5 EW Radar Band Sensor Architectures 184
3.5.1 Architecture of Past Generation Intercept Receivers 184
3.5.2 EW Radar Band Sensor New Architectures 194
3.5.3 DSP Technologies 203
3.5.4 EW Radar Band Sensor Next Generation Architectures 207
3.6 Detection and Classification of LPI Radars 208
3.7 Emitter Deinterleaving and Sorting 215
3.8 Emitter Identification 219
3.8.1 Specific Emitter Identification 220
3.9 Communications ESM 223
3.9.1 CESM 224
3.9.2 COMINT 230
3.10 SIGINT 230
3.11 Conclusion 233
References 233
CHAPTER 4
RF Direction Finding and Emitter Location Techniques 237
4.1 Introduction 237
4.2 Amplitude Comparison DF Methods 237
4.3 Phase Comparison Monopulse DF Measurement Methods 245
4.3.1 Correlative Phase DF 249
4.4 Time Difference DF 254
4.5 Emitter Location 261
4.5.1 Triangulation 263
4.5.2 Trilateration 266
4.5.3 Operational Mobile PET System 268
4.5.4 Frequency Difference on Arrival Passive Location Technique 275
4.5.5 Inverse Passive Location 279
4.6 Conclusions 282
References 284
CHAPTER 5
Electronic Countermeasure Systems 287
5.1 Introduction 287
5.1.1 Typical RECM Requirements and Missions 289
5.1.2 EW Radar Jamming Equation 290
5.2 RECM Architecture 293
5.3 DRFM 297
5.3.1 Phase-Sampled DRFMs 300
5.4 RECM Transmitters 304
5.4.1 RTDL 315
5.5 Chaff 317
5.6 CECM Systems 319
5.7 Infrared ECM Systems 324
5.7.1 Flares 330
5.7.2 Combined DIRCM-Flares Countermeasures 331
5.8 Conclusions 331
References 332
CHAPTER 6
ECM Techniques and Sensor ECCMs 335
6.1 Introduction 335
6.2 ECM Principles and Techniques Used Against Surveillance Radars
and Related ECCMs 335
6.2.1 Frequency Agility in Transmission 336
6.2.2 PRI Agility 336
6.2.3 Ultralow Sidelobes 336
6.2.4 Multisidelobe Canceller 337
6.2.5 Sidelobe Blanker 341
6.2.6 Adaptive Arrays 342
6.2.7 Noise Jamming 343
APPENDIX A
Signal Detection in Sensor Receivers 393
A.1 Integration of Successive Radar Pulses 398
A.2 Coherent Detection 399
References 400
APPENDIX B
Introductory Concepts of Estimation Theory 401
B.1 Maximum Likelihood Function Estimator 403
B.2 Least-Squares Method of Estimation 404
Reference 406
APPENDIX C
Antennas and Phased Array Antennas 407
C.1 Antenna Types 410
C.2 Array Antennas 412
References 423
APPENDIX D
Analog Modulation Methods 425
D.1 Amplitude Modulation 425
D.2 Angle Modulation 426
D.3 Quadrature Modulation 427
Reference 428
APPENDIX E
Evaluation of BER Increase for Noise and CW Tone Jamming in Communication
Systems Employing BFSK Modulation 429
References 433
APPENDIX F
Radar Pulse Compression Waveforms 435
F.1 Linear FM 435
F.2 Binary Phase-Code Pulse Compression 435
F.3 Polyphase Codes 438
F.4 Costas Codes 440
F.5 Further Coding 441
F.5.1 NLFM 441
F.5.2 Complementary Codes (Golay Codes) 441
F.6 Combined or Compound Barker Codes 442
F.7 Multicarrier Phase-Coded Signals 442
References 445
Index 449
The formal military terminology [1] defines electronic warfare (EW) as a military
action whose objective is the control of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). This
objective is achieved through offensive electronic attack (EA), defensive electronic
protection (EP), intelligence gathering and threat recognition electronic warfare
support (ES) actions. The present definitions give to each function a broader scope
with respect to the previous terminology, which was, respectively, electronic coun-
termeasures (ECMs), electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCMs) and electronic
warfare support measures (ESMs).
The EA function definition includes, in addition to the previous ECM function,
the use of directed-energy weapons (DEWs), antiradiation missiles (ARMs), and
electromagnetic pulses and electromagnetic nuclear pulses (EMPs and NEMPs) to
destroy enemy electronic equipment.
The EP function definition includes, in addition to the previous ECCM func-
tion, the use of the electromagnetic emissions control (EMCON), electromagnetic
hardening of the electronic equipment, EW frequency deconfliction, and commu-
nications security (COMSEC) actions.
EW
ES EP
EA
ECCM
EMCOM
SIGINT ESM EM hardening
Soft kill Hard kill
ELINT RESM COMSEC
ECM
COMINT CESM
ARM DEW
The ES function definition is not much different from the ESM definition, as
both include near real-time threat recognition in support of immediate decisions
relevant to EA, EP, weapon avoidance, and targeting actions.
The classification of the EW functions is shown in Figure1.1.
EW is one of the military actions of command and control (C2) warfare, whose
objective is to obtain C2 superiority by breaking the connectivity of the adversary
C2, thus leading to success in military operations. C2 systems are in fact the links
through which the commanders’ decisions, based on the information and intelligence
that flow through those systems, are communicated to battlefield forces.
A C2 system is a network of nodes, each consisting of a number of subsystems,
such as sensors, navigation systems, command and data fusion centers, and com-
munication links. A critical node is an element whose disruption or destruction
immediately degrades the ability of a C2 to effectively conduct combat operations.
C2 warfare (C2W) consists of five military actions, which are integrated in both
C2-protection and C2-attack actions:
Usually OPSEC and military deception are most effective during the so-called com-
petitive phase, which is the introductory phase to a military conflict, while all the
five above actions are essential to war.
OPSEC is the process of denying an enemy’s information about its own capa-
bilities and intentions by controlling and hiding its own information about mili-
tary planning.
PSYOP is a planned process of conveying influential messages to enemy groups
in order to convince them to perform actions that are beneficial to their own forces.
Deception operations are meant to degrade the accuracy of hostile intelligence
gathering, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR), in order to
lead the adversary to draw misleading conclusions about their own forces, capabili-
ties, and disposition.
EW supports deception operations with electromagnetic deception on intelli-
gence collection, communications, and radar systems.
Physical destruction of a critical node is the most selected and effective option.
It involves the use of weapons and of targeting and battle damage assessment (BDA)
functions, usually accomplished by electronic and optical imagery equipment. EA
also participates in the destruction process by the use of ARMs against radars and
communication sources and by DEWs in the disruption or burnout of adversary
electronic equipment.
In conclusion, in the military field (and specifically in the C2W framework)
EW plays an important role as EA supports C2W-attack in combat operations, EP
contributes to C2W-protection against enemy electronic attack and ES provides
information that can be used to plan its own C2-attack and to assess the battle
damages of the hit sites, providing feedback on the effectiveness of the C2W plan.
In this chapter after a brief description in Section 1.2 of the principles of opera-
tion of the main weapon systems that are driven by electronic sensors (and thus poten-
tially prone to EW actions), we will deal with the EW applications in the symmetric
conflicts (Section 1.3) and subsequently in the asymmetric conflicts (Section 1.4).
At least three main groups usually constitute the armed forces of a country and its
alliances: army, navy, and air force (marines can be considered as a navy army),
each tasked with different missions with respect to defending the country or alli-
ance’s territory and to the war actions in enemy foreign territories. In the execu-
tion of those missions the armed forces have at their disposal a number of different
platforms (aircraft, drones, ships, tanks, armored vehicles, and soldiers) employing
weapon systems, such as munitions, guns, and missiles, whose task is the destruc-
tion of enemy assets.
Destruction of enemy assets is preferably accomplished from a distance in order
to prevent any harm to your own assets (the greater the distance, the safer are your
own assets, and there is less probability of an effective enemy retaliation). Modern
weapons are conceived to reach targets at even longer ranges and to cover such
distances at even higher speeds in order to reduce the time for an effective enemy
defensive reaction, thus increasing the probability of success of the weapons. The
provision that the weapons systems have sufficient aiming accuracy at long distances
is ensured by electromagnetic sensors (with electronic equipment) that detect and
accurately track the targets at long distances, thus allowing bombing, the guidance
of artillery fire, or the course of missiles toward the target. A graphical representa-
tion of the various air attack to ground assets [2] is shown in Figure 1.2.
An air force mission is to ensure air/space superiority and air defense over the
territories of interest. Accomplishment of those tasks is performed by an integrated
air defense system (IADS) that is comprised of a number of assets, including:
• An air defense system composed of ground and airborne early warning radars,
C2 centers for SAM, and AAA for defense of important sites and airports;
• Air superiority (or counterair) fighter A/C;
• Intruder/strike A/C;
• Various types of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
The objectives of EW are as follows: to control the EMS in order to gain superiority
for your own armed forces, and to operate against the enemy’s sensors in order to
locate them as well as to perform actions aimed at reducing their performance by
amplifying their weaknesses and limits, which in turn will dilute the effectiveness
(i.e., the kill probability) of their associated weapon systems.
In the following, the operation principles of main weapon systems are briefly
described, deferring a detailed discussion on the operation and limits of their driv-
ing sensors to Chapter 2.
The main weapon systems employed by the armed forces are comprised of the
following types:
Air-surface missile
stand-off range
Bomb delivery range
Bomb delivery
range
Level
Fixed wing delivery bombing
Speed: 175–300 m/s 1 to 4 km
Altitude: 50–3000 m
Toss bombing
2 to 6 km
Strafing
0.5 to 2 km
Air-surface missiles
4 to 40 km
Theatre
ICBM
Ballistic missiles
Cruise missiles
Anti-ship missiles
Battlefield missiles
Iron bombs
Range (km)
Figure 1.3 Typical standoff ranges of land and maritime attack weapons as compared to the
range span of air defense systems.
Effective
atmosphere Manned bomber
limit
In the case of mobile targets, usually aircraft, the AAA FCS is provided with
a tracking radar which, upon the two-dimensional (2-D) (dimensions: range and
azimuth) data designation from a surveillance radar, starts an acquisition search
in elevation of the designated target. As soon as the target is acquired, the tracking
radar continuously provides the FCS with accurate 3-D (range, azimuth, and eleva-
tion) target coordinates and velocity, which allow it to determine the kinematics
data of the target. With this data and from the extrapolation of the target’s trajec-
tory, it is possible to determine the interception point of the fired projectile with
the target, as shown in Figure 1.5.
A number of shots have to be fired in order to achieve the required kill prob-
ability. During the shooting time, the tracking radar measures the miss distances of
the shot projectiles from the aircraft in order to enable the FCS to correct the gun
aiming and the computed projectile trajectory. In the case of hit success, the track-
ing radar also provides the kill assessment of the target engagement.
The kill probability of the AAA is mainly dependent on the measurement accu-
racy of the target kinematics, the trajectory data as provided by the tracking radar,
and in minor way from the lethality radius of the projectile.
Height (m)
Va
t =T + t0
Vp
t = t0
α
XI Xo Range (m)
Va cos α
XI = Xo
Va + Vp cos α
Figure 1.5 Intercept point on the target trajectory of an AAA engagement.
t 1 + ∆t
command missiles are used for short ranges. The advantages of these systems are a
simple missile and the available high effective radiated power (ERP) of the tracking
radars employed on ground/ships that provides a good ECCM feature.
Beam-riding missiles have an onboard receiver that senses when the missile is not
aligned with the tracking radar boresight and provides data to the missile guidance
to command the missile to stay aligned with it. As shown in Figure 1.7, the missile
is forced to follow a trajectory that requires strong accelerations in the terminal
phase of the engagement even in the absence of target maneuvers. Therefore, this
type of missile guidance is mostly exploited against slow or nonmaneuvering targets
where only weak accelerations are required.
Semiactive homing missiles are provided with an RF seeker that has a receiver
capable of passively tracking in angles the scattered signal from a target when the
latter is illuminated by a powerful continuous wave (CW) or interrupted continuous
wave (ICW) tracking radar. The advantage of this type of missile is the absence of an
onboard transmitter, which is usually quite expensive. This type of missile, similar
to the active pulse Doppler (PD) missile, has the ability to discriminate between the
target and the clutter by using Doppler frequency signal processing. The angular
tracking signals are processed within a very narrow bandwidth (in the order of
1 kHz, and thus also achieving high receiver sensitivity), which is positioned at the
Doppler frequency fd relevant to the closing speed vc (i.e., fd = 2vc / λ = 2(vt + vm)/ λ ,
where λ is the transmitted wavelength and vt and vm are, respectively, the projections
of the target and missile speeds along the line target-missile, as shown in Figure 1.8.
The missile angular tracking accuracy in the terminal phase of the engagement
no longer depends on the distance from the tracking/illuminator radar as the seeker
is now close to the target. Since there is no more need for the missile to stay within
the illuminator beam, the missile can exploit the proportional guidance law, which
is depicted in Figure 1.9.
The missile is launched toward the predicted interception point while the seeker
antenna tracks the target. With reference to Figure 1.7, in which missile engage-
ment with the target is reported and the angle parameters are defined, it can be
shown that the correction commands to the missile velocity vector (i.e., only a
Lateral
Height (m) distance
(m) tI t0
tI t2 t1 t0
Target
scattered
energy
Reference
signal
Illuminator
Launcher
t=t 4
Intercept
Delayed t=t 3
missile
t=t 2
t=t 4
t=t 3 t=t 1
Missile Target
t=t 2 t=t 0
t=t 0
t=t 4
Advanced
missile t=t 3 Target
t=t 2
t=t 1
t=t 0
Figure 1.9 Proportional guidance law for trajectory of a semiactive missile during engagement with an
A/C.
•
As the lateral acceleration can be expressed as alm = vm g , from the above equa-
tion we have
• vt • •
alm = vm g = vmk a = kvt a = kalt (1.2)
vm
which means that the lateral acceleration imparted to the missile is proportional to
the target lateral acceleration alt. With this type of guidance, no lateral acceleration
is imparted to the missile in order to intercept a target flying in constant course.
Therefore, the full available acceleration of the missile can be spared and imparted
on the missile only in the case of a target evasive maneuver, and this provides the
missile with a longer intercept range and available residual acceleration in the ter-
minal phase of the engagement with the target.
Semiactive missile systems are very effective and constitute the majority of
medium- to long-range SAM population. The major disadvantage of this type of
guidance is constituted by the required constant target illumination during the
entire time of flight of the missile, which can be dangerous in case of an air-to-air
engagement, as the launching platform has to keep on the approach to the target,
thus becoming subject to possible retaliation from enemy aircraft.
Uplink
Downlink
Doppler processing of
seeker signal data and
correlation with other
information
they are lightweight), and also as short-range SAMs (due to the higher propagation
attenuation at low altitude), mostly as portable and shoulder-launched missiles (in
fact they are called MANPADs) for the defense of ground troops and armored
vehicles (unfortunately in recent times also by terrorists).
A description of the various types of IR seekers appears in Section 2.6.
Satellite
targeting
system
Targeting
Bomber aircraft data link
Over-the-horizon
targeting aircraft
Sea-skimming and
shallow diving
Attack aircraft terminal trajectories
Targeting
data link
Rotary wing
aircraft
Boat or ship launch
Submarine launch
Figure 1.11 Types of maritime missile attacks.
1.2.6 ARMs
ARMs are equipped with a passive seeker that is similar to a small wideband
superheterodyne ESM receiver (see Section 3.4), which is capable of acquiring and
tracking in angles the signal transmitted by a selected surface radar or communica-
tion source and to home on it with high precision. ARMs are mostly of the ASM
type and are installed on board aircraft dedicated to the suppression of enemy air
defense (SEAD) missions.
The ARM seeker is cued by the airborne ESM system of the A/C, which upon
interception, identification, and location of the victim radar provides the ARM with
all the emitter data and verifies that the ARM is locked onto that emitter.
Once launched, the ARM seeker, using high-accuracy phase DF antennas, com-
putes from the received emitter signals (in a similar way as with the active homing
missiles) the angular commands to be sent to the guidance system in order to home
on the victim radar.
The ARM is a typical example of a standoff fire-and-forget weapon as it can
be launched from long distances without any further assistance from the launching
platform. Many ARMs have been developed that cover the complete radar bands
from 0.5 to 18 GHz. The only protective actions that the victim radar can use is
either to stop transmitting (however, this does not ensure survival as the missile can
home on it on the basis of memorized coordinates) or/and activate nearby decoy
transmitters that emit similar waveforms as the victim radar.
Table 1.1 lists aircraft characteristics, and Tables 1.2 to 1.5 provide insight into
the various missiles characteristics.
Aircraft Type Wing Span (m) Wing Area (m2) Number of Engines Combat Radius (km)
F/A-18 11.43 37.16 2 1,480
F-16 9.45 27.87 1 925
A-10 17.53 47.01 2 463
Mig 27 14.25 27.25 1 700
Saab AJ-37 10.60 46.00 1 1,000
Mirage 2000 9.13 41.00 1 1,480
Ballistic missiles are usually easy to detect and track once launched, but
their hypersonic terminal phase velocity represents a real problem for defensive
weapon systems.
Three strategies are possible for radar interception of ballistic missiles:
1. Radar intercept sees the boost phase by the slow-moving and highly visible
exhaust plume attached to the missile;
2. Radar intercept sees midcourse phase by the warhead, and if still attached,
the final stage at the apex of its trajectory;
3. Radar interception of the terminal phase involves engagement of the warhead
section as it dives on the target.
Boost phase intercept is the easiest from detection, tracking, and kinematic perspec-
tives. The exhaust plume can be seen from orbit and hundreds of kilometers away in
the air. The missile is climbing at a supersonic speed, and early in the boost phase,
will have all of its stages attached, presenting a large radar target. Ground- or sea-
based sensors have the capacity to detect TBM during launch phase depending on
their situation in the theater of operation. Warship missions can be defined precisely
as a surveillance and detection of TBM at earliest phase of launch.
Midcourse phase intercepts are arguably the most challenging from a detection
and tracking perspective, as the missile is at the peak of its trajectory and having
shed booster stages is a small and cool radar target. Cinematically, midcourse phase
intercepts are very demanding, mostly due to the high altitude of the missile during
this phase even if the missile’s speed is not particularly high as it flies across the
top of the ballistic arc. Due to the great variety of scenarios and of trajectories, the
surveillance of TBM tracks during midcourse would be performed by specific and
dedicated early warning radars.
Terminal phase intercept sees the delivery vehicle produce a prominent ionization
trail and heat signature as ablative coatings evaporate during reentry. The ioniza-
tion plume provides a much larger radar signature than the vehicle itself, permit-
ting a tracking system to cue precisely to the position of the warhead. The principal
tracking challenge is discrimination between the reentry vehicle and debris and/or
countermeasures reentering concurrently or maneuvering trajectories. Warship sen-
sors will have to detect and acquire reentry targets by themselves or with benefits
of cueing or designation provided by an overall TBM surveillance and warning
system. The main mission for the warship will be to lead for TBM interception,
and ships will be equipped with the capacity of acquisition, tracking, fire control,
and interceptor missile guidance.
We have to consider two missions for the warship sensor: