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Muhamed Zulkhibri
Abdul Ghafar Ismail
Sutan Emir Hidayat Editors
Macroprudential
Regulation and
Policy for the
Islamic Financial
Industry
Theory and Applications
Macroprudential Regulation and Policy
for the Islamic Financial Industry
Muhamed Zulkhibri • Abdul Ghafar Ismail
Sutan Emir Hidayat
Editors
Macroprudential Regulation
and Policy for the Islamic
Financial Industry
Theory and Applications
Editors
Muhamed Zulkhibri Abdul Ghafar Ismail
Islamic Research and Training Institute Islamic Research and Training Institute
Islamic Development Bank Islamic Development Bank
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
v
Preface
In general, policymakers use simultaneously the set of monetary, fiscal, and prudential
policies that would ensure macroeconomic and financial stability. They believe that
this arrangement would set the foundations of steady growth. These policies that are
later combined together as macroprudential policy are recognized to adequately
address the financial system risk. However, it has become clear that developments
in the shariah-based financial system can be important for macroeconomic stability,
even when inflation is low (i.e., as the objective of monetary policy) and stable and
fiscal policy seems to be sound, because this system may be also exposed to the
consequences of episodes of financial instability.
Several countries, as reported in Kashyap et al. (2011), have already been using
a well-developed macroprudential framework to address systemic concerns before
the episodes of financial instability. The discussion on this framework has reached
a wide range of topics such as instruments, indicators, objectives, and systemic risk.
These topics are the main components of transmission channel on the working of
macroprudential policy. The practical model of macroprudential has also been
applied in several countries such as New Zealand, Japan, and India. They have
started to develop macroprudential toolkits for addressing financial systemic risk or
have reconsidered and recalibrated existing tools in the light of their potential appli-
cation at the systemic level.
Islamic financial system, which is relatively new Ibrahim and Ismail (2015), is
given a mandate to be part of the financial system, and the regulatory bodies such as
Islamic Financial Services Board and financial authority such as central bank and
financial services authority are assigned to regulate and supervise the system. At the
jurisdiction level, as mentioned in Ismail and Che Pa (2015), financial authorities
have started to incorporate macroprudential considerations into standard practices
for Islamic financial institutions.
Does each jurisdiction that practice the Islamic banking need to have a separate
macroprudential policy? Before we could answer this question, we ask on what we
know about macroprudential policy.
vii
viii Preface
For any public policy, it should have its objectives, tools and indicators, and more
importantly its mandate. All these elements will be discussed as follows.
Policy Mandates
What mandate does the financial authority have for implementing macroprudential
policy? In some jurisdictions, such as Malaysia, Pakistan, and Indonesia, the finan-
cial authority is explicitly given the responsibility for financial stability or for con-
tributing to financial stability—a responsibility that is usually implicitly or explicitly
part of the financial authority’s mandate. For example, the Central Bank of Malaysia
under the Article 27 of the Central Bank Act 2009 defines that “the financial system
in Malaysia shall consist of the conventional financial system and the Islamic finan-
cial system.” It has significant effect on the development Islamic monetary policy
instruments. In addition, under the Islamic Financial Services Act of 2013, the “ulti-
mate objective” of supervision (i.e., microprudential policy) is to promote the
“safety and soundness of banks and the banking system” and Shari’ah compliant
banking.
Objectives
Tools
Basically, macroprudential tools vary among the jurisdictions. For example, in New
Zealand (a good example of regulatory in place), countercyclical capital buffer
(CCB), adjustments to the minimum core funding ratio (CFR), sectoral capital
requirements (SCR), and restrictions on high loan-to-value ratio (LVR) residential
mortgage lending are among the instruments of macroprudential policy. But in other
countries, like India (an example of the presence of interconnected and diversified
financial landscape), countercyclical measures such as investment fluctuation
reserve and time-varying risk weights and provisioning norms to sectors such as
housing, commercial real estate, retail, and equity; policies to address the cross-
sectional dimensions of systemic risks such as dealing with interconnectedness and
common exposures and monitoring financial conglomerates; and framework for the
management of the capital account are used as macroprudential tools.
It implies that the varieties of tool instruments are used in response to differences
in the structure of the financial system and the presence of a sound regulatory frame-
work. Basically, the set of policy tools currently being considered is mostly based
on existing microprudential and regulatory tools (i.e., caps on loan to value ratios,
limits on credit growth, additional capital adequacy requirements, reserve require-
ments, and other balance sheets restrictions).
Moving Forward
and housing markets and bank capital, suggest that some tools can help reduce
financial pro-cyclicality and lower crisis risks. Therefore, caps on financing to value
and debt service to income ratios seem; and asking for higher capital are important
to help in reducing booms, and thereby busts, in real estate markets, and bank’s
insolvency that become the major sources of instability. Reserve requirements and
targeted levies on foreign exchange exposures also help in reducing system-wide
vulnerabilities. Macroprudential policies are also needed to reduce the systemic
risks created by large financial institutions and social finance institutions. Questions
arise on the best institutional (in line with the view given by Ismail and Ahmad
(2006)) design for usage, e.g., who is made in charge of macroprudential policies.
The major issue, closely related to institutional design, is how the political economy
of macroprudential policies will play out. In addition, the way forward also has to
look into the implication on the reporting requirement, which may suggest a next
generation of balance sheets.
References
Ibrahim WHW, Ismail AG (2015) Conventional bank and Islamic banking as institutions: as many
similarities as differences. Humanomics 31(3):272–298
Ismail AG, Ahmad I (2006) Does the Islamic financial system design matter? Humanomics
22(1):5–16
Ismail AG, Che Pa AS (2015) Financial soundness indicators and the objectives of Shari’ah in
assessing the stability of Islamic banks. IRTI working papers 1436-11. Islamic Research and
Training Institute, Jeddah
Kashyap AK, Berner R, Goodhart CAE (2011) The macroprudential toolkit. IMF Econ Rev
59(2):145–161
Lim C, Columba F, Costa A, Kongsamut P, Otani A, Saiyid M, Wezel T, Wu X (2011)
Macroprudential policy: what instruments and how to use them? Lessons from country experi-
ences. IMF working paper no. WP/11/238. International Monetary Fund, Washington
Ngalim SM, Ismail AG (2014) An Islamic vision development based indicators in analysing the
Islamic banks performance: evidence from Malaysia, Indonesia and selected GCC countries.
IRTI working papers WP-1436-02. Islamic Research and Training Institute, Jeddah
Ngalim SM, Ismail AG, Yaa’kub NI (2015) A comparative analysis of the Maqasid Shari’ah of
Islamic banks in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries. In: Asutay
M, Turkistani AQ (eds) Islamic finance, political economy, performance and risk, vol 1.
Gerlach Press, Berlin
Acknowledgement
The Islamic Research and Training Institute, a research arm of the Islamic
Development Bank, Saudi Arabia, co-organized and sponsored the workshop, while
the University College of Bahrain (UCB), Bahrain, hosted the workshop on
Macroprudential Regulation and Policy for Islamic Finance Industry (MPRIF)
2015, Bahrain. The objective of the workshop was to bring together global experts
to advance the current knowledge frontier on Islamic finance.
The editors are grateful to Professor Dato’ Dr. Azmi Omar, Director General of
Islamic Research and Training Institute of Islamic Development Bank, for his sup-
port and encouragement. The editors would also like to extend their gratitude to
committee members of the workshop on macroprudential policy and regulation
(MPRIF 2015), Bahrain, scientific reviewers for this volume, and all contributing
authors.
xi
Contents
xiii
xiv Contents
xv
xvi Contributors
1.1 Introduction
In recent years following the financial crisis 2008/2009, efforts to strengthen the
financial system have been focused on the development of macroprudential orienta-
tion of regulatory and supervisory framework. Macroprudential policy seeks to
maintain financial stability by explicitly accounting for the “externalities” arising
M. Zulkhibri (*)
Islamic Research and Training Institute, Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
e-mail: khibri1974@yahoo.com
I. Naiya
Economic Research and Policy Department, Islamic Development Bank,
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
e-mail: inaiya@isdb.org
from the behaviour of individual institutions as well as the structure of the financial
system. Moreover, macroprudential approaches to regulation considers the systemic
implications of the collective behaviour of financial firms. Such approach and
policy can be used both to limit the ex-ante externalities that lead to an excessive
build-up of systemic risk, and the ex-post externalities that can generate inefficient
failures of otherwise sound institutions specifically in a crisis.
Efforts to strengthen the financial system have been focused on the development
of macroprudential orientation of regulatory and supervisory framework for finan-
cial stability. Macroprudential policy is increasingly seen as a way of dealing with
the different dimensions of systemic risk. Macroprudential approaches are widely
adopted by many central banks and regulators for supervision and regulation in
order to maintain financial stability and, ultimately, improve social welfare by
aligning private incentives with social objectives. The literature on financial stabil-
ity has made a distinction between micro- and macroprudential perspectives on
financial institutions. Borio (2003) argues that the macro- and microprudential per-
spectives change towards their objectives and their understandings about the nature
of risk.
Macroprudential measures are defined as regulatory policies that aim to reduce
systemic risks, ensure stability of the financial system as a whole against domestic
and external shocks, and ensure that it continues to function effectively (BIS 2010).
The main purpose of the macroprudential regulation focuses on the financial system
overall welfare, while the traditional microprudential regulation focuses on increas-
ing the security and stability of the individual financial institutions. However,
research to address the issue of financial stability and macroprudential is limited
particularly pertaining to Islamic financial institutions. Without deeper understand-
ing on these issues, understanding and analysis are insufficient that can create the
condition for ill-informed policy decisions.
The research is intended to fill the gap in the academic literature and policy
implementation concerning macroprudential policy in a dual banking system. The
research provides a deeper understanding of the issues with respect to the specific
macroprudential policy and regulation as well as tools that could be employed to
mitigate systemic risks for both conventional and Islamic financial institutions.
Thus, the objective of the research is to synthesize the growing literature on macro-
prudential policy for conventional and Islamic banks and provide stylized facts with
respect to macroprudential policies and regulations as well as macroprudential
implementation tools for selected Muslim countries.
This chapter is set out as follows: Section 1.2 reviews related literature per-
taining to financial inclusion, governance and institution. Section 1.3 provides
the stylized facts of Islamic macroprudential policy and regulation implementa-
tion in selected Muslim countries in comparison with conventional macropru-
dential policy and regulation. Section 1.4 provides analytical discussions on
macroprudential policy and regulation. Finally, Section 1.5 offers conclusions
and recommendations.
1 Macroprudential Policy and Regulation in a Dual Banking System: An Exploratory… 5
Following the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2007, theoretical work on macro-
prudential policies has flourished in recent years. One important lesson from the
financial crisis is that, alongside monetary policy and microprudential supervision,
macroprudential policy is also needed in order to maintain financial stability.
Macroprudential regulation is rooted in the same fundamental market inefficiencies
that rationalize microprudential interventions, but addresses such externalities
between banks (or other financial institutions) and between the financial sector and
the real economy. A literature on macroprudential regulation is now emerging. It
builds on existing strands of the banking and financial frictions literature (Bernanke
and Gertler 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore 1997; Bernanke et al. 1999).
Macroprudential literature traditionally focuses on two risks: risks over the
cycle: credit booms and asset price booms (“time” dimension); and risks across
financial institutions: network risks (“cross section” dimension). Two approaches
can be broadly identified in the literature. One highlights that individual price taking
agents tend to “over borrow” without internalizing the full general-equilibrium
impact of their decisions, and shows how macroprudential policy can induce agents
to internalize such negative externality (Bianchi and Mendoza 2010; Bianchi 2010).
The second focuses on the role of macroprudential policies in dampening the pro-
cyclicality caused by financial frictions and, therefore, in mitigating the cyclical
effect of macroeconomic shocks. This strand of research provides an analytical
framework where the optimal combination of monetary policy and macroprudential
policy can also be studied.
Despite the fact that the theoretical literature assumes that macroprudential tools
effectively meet their objectives, it is still an unsettled issue in practice. Recently, a
number of empirical studies have tried to assess the effectiveness of macropruden-
tial policies on a sample of countries from different regions, notwithstanding the
challenge of quantifying policy measures (Galati and Moessner 2014; Claessens
et al. 2013; Grace et al. 2015; Kashyap et al. 2011). Overall, most of this empirical
literature indicates that some individual macroprudential instruments, such as loan-
to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios, reserve requirements and dynamic
provisioning, have been effective in curbing excessive credit and asset price growth.
Empirical studies for cross-country (Claessens et al. 2013; Cerutti et al. 2015) and
individual countries (Kupiec et al. 2013; Aiyar et al. 2014) indicate the impacts
from others are minor or even run in the opposite direction, whereas work on cross
sections of countries supports effectiveness from particular macroprudential tools
on credit expansion (McDonald 2015; Lim et al. 2011).
Lim et al. (2011) review the use of key macroprudential instruments in 46 coun-
tries up to 2010 and estimate the effectiveness of individual instrument tightening
in reducing procyclicality of financial risks, and conclude that many of the fre-
quently used instruments have been effective in lowering systemic risks. Arregui
et al. (2013) extend the analysis to 2011, focusing on the direct impact of the
6 M. Zulkhibri and I. Naiya
Interaction between
prices and financial
stability Monetary
Policy Risk-taking incentives
Fiscal and
Macroprudential Competition
Structural
Policy Policy
Policy
Financial impact of
tax and structural Micro- Link between
measures prudential systematic and
Policy idiosyncratic risk
Fig. 1.1 Interaction between macroprudential policy and other policies. Source: authors’
illustration
for consistency between these policy areas. Figure 1.1 provides interference between
macroprudential, microprudential policy with other policies. Arrangements for
macroprudential framework have evolved over the years reflecting the evolution of
central banking and financial regulations. Some key attributes are nevertheless
essential to ensure effective and efficient macroprudential policies. Sound macro-
prudential policies require thorough expertise and analysis of systemic develop-
ments in the whole financial system and their interactions with the wider economy.
Given their expertise in these areas and their position at the heart of the financial
system, central banks are well placed to play a leading role in macroprudential
policies.
Table 1.1 provides comparative perspectives between macro- and micropruden-
tial within the context of current regulatory framework. The two differ in objective,
focus, and approach, view of risk, and in their calibration of tools. The macropru-
dential dimension focuses on the financial system as a whole to limit the chances of
system-wide distress and avoid significant losses in terms of real output. The micro-
prudential dimension focuses on individual institutions to limit the likelihood of
failure of individual institutions and protect consumers (investors and depositors)
regardless of systemic consequences or impact on the overall economy.
Microprudential supervision can thus fail to identify risks that emerge at the sys-
temic level. The two approaches view risk differently: the macroprudential dimen-
sion considers risk to be endogenous since institutions can collectively affect
economic transactions, while the microprudential dimension assumes risk to be
8 M. Zulkhibri and I. Naiya
exogenous since individual institutions will generally have little impact on the
economy. While the microprudential approach is bottom-up. Some differences may
also reflect historical and institutional aspects, including whether prudential powers
are located with central banks or divided among separate agencies.
Different models might prevail ranging from the central bank as designated macro-
prudential authority (centralized model) to a committee outside the central bank
with the monetary authorities represented in the macroprudential committee (decen-
tralized model). Two elements play key roles in effective institutional arrangements
for macroprudential policy: (1) authorities with a clear mandate for macroprudential
policy and (2) a mechanism for policy coordination and communication of assess-
ment of the issues related to financial stability (IMF 2011). In other words, macro-
prudential policy can be pursued by either a single institution or a committee
composed by several representatives, although some variations might be observed.
The choice among the different models is mostly influenced by traditions, current
institutional frameworks for other policies and political economy considerations.
For instance, the centralized model is mostly observed in countries where the cen-
tral bank is in charge of microprudential supervision. Table 1.2 describes an institu-
tion with a mandate for macroprudential policy as an institution in emerging markets
that is explicitly given the mandate or the responsibility to address systemic or
system-wide financial risk by its settlement law.
Each of the models has its specific strengths and weaknesses. In particular, the
centralized model tends to increase the willingness to act by clearly defining
mandate and responsibilities. Relatedly, it might also reduce political pressures.
1
This would be extremely valuable to ensure that decisions are taken rapidly and
without undue delay. It also greatly enhances synergies and coordination between
monetary, microprudential and macroprudential policies, which might enhance and
facilitate the decision-making process by internalizing the potential trade-off among
those policies. However, failures in macroprudential policies could significantly
affect the credibility of monetary policy-makers or microprudential supervisors,
especially in the absence of clearly separate accountability frameworks for mone-
tary and prudential actions. In addition, coordination with authorities in areas that
do not fall under the centralized macroprudential authority’s competences may be
more difficult in the centralized model.
The decentralized model has a relative advantage that discussions on macropru-
dential policy among those different authorities take place within a committee and
that decisions taken by the macroprudential authority are (in principle) backed by
an agreement among the different parties around the table. This at the same time
may result in the main drawback of the decentralized model, namely the risks of
inaction bias and the need for making compromises among the authorities which
might reduce the effectiveness of any action taken. While all models present various
strengths and risks for effective conduct of macroprudential supervision, mecha-
nisms might be designed to mitigate somewhat some of the drawbacks of these
institutional arrangements. In general, such mechanisms include strong account-
ability and governance frameworks. Beside the existence of separate accountability
frameworks for monetary and prudential actions, this includes the publication of a
policy strategy and regular public communication related to the assessment of sys-
temic risks made by the macroprudential authority and the accompanying action.
Given the importance of macroprudential policies and the potential impact on the
economy, regular reporting to Parliament might also help to enhance legitimacy. Other
mechanisms are specifically targeted at dealing with the drawbacks of either one of
the models. For instance, collaboration agreements and regular exchange of informa-
tion with other relevant authorities might help mitigate some of the drawbacks of the
centralized model. Governance arrangements such as a “comply or explain” mecha-
nism (see next section) and a decisive vote for the central bank in case of disagreement
might mitigate the risks of inaction bias in the decentralized model.
Timely and effective macroprudential policy action requires adequate powers and
instruments. Macroprudential authorities might have a wide range of powers and
instruments at their disposal, generally depending on the institutional models used.
In the centralized model, authorities have mostly direct control over specific
macroprudential tools and their calibration. This direct power tends to enhance
prompt action by the authorities and mitigate the risks of inaction bias. In a decen-
tralized model, however, powers are usually limited to formal recommendations,
which might be coupled with a “comply or explain” mechanism. In this case, instru-
ments need to be activated by another institution than the designated authority.
12 M. Zulkhibri and I. Naiya
Instruments under consideration range from rather indirect measures, which alter
the cost of funding through capital and liquidity requirements, to very direct mea-
sures to control availability and price of credit. One important distinction is between
tools geared towards addressing the time-series dimension of financial stability
(procyclicality in the financial system) and tools that focus on the cross-sectional
dimension (on how risk is distributed at a point in time within the financial system
and contributions to systemic risk of individual institutions). For instance, the time
series dimension captures the evolution of risk over time, i.e. the procyclicality of
risk (Borio et al. 2001; Borio and Zhu 2008; Shin 2009).
Intermediate objectives of macroprudential policy in the banking sector are to: (1)
mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage (credit); (2) mitigate and
prevent excessive maturity mismatch and market illiquidity (liquidity); (3) limit
direct and indirect exposure concentration (concentration) and (4) limit the systemic
impact of misaligned incentives with a view to reducing moral hazard (impact).
Capital-based and credit-based instruments are at the centre of the policy debate.
Figure 1.2 exhibits countries around the world that have used the two most popular
macroprudential instruments to restrain unsustainable lending in mortgage markets.
»Hän on kadonnut.»
»Tarkoitatte —»
»Ei, ei; me olemme juuri saaneet sen selville. Hän on ollut poissa
kymmenen päivää.»
Poliisi oli etsinyt turhaan läpi koko seudun, sen tiesin; se oli pannut
liikkeelle kaiken kykynsä löytääkseen sen salaperäisen naisen, joka
oli käynyt herra Holladayn konttorissa, eikä ollut saanut selville
jälkeäkään hänestä. Mutta tämä ei lannistanut rohkeuttani; sillä
toivoin voivani alkaa etsintäni tietämällä asioita, joista poliisilla ei ollut
selkoa. Brooks, ajuri, voisi sanoa minulle…
»Mille puolelle?»
»Niin, sen hän tekikin. Panin sen erityisesti merkille, sillä minusta
tuntui kummalliselta, ettei hän antanut minun kyyditä sitä katua niin
pitkälle kuin hänen tarvitsi mennä. Se on niin siivoton seutu se.»
»Niin», tiedän sen. »No, kun kyyditsitte häntä 28 päivänä, sinä
päivänä, kun hänellä palatessaan oli kamarineiti mukanaan, minne
hän ajoi silloin?»
»Niin.»
»Niin, hän meni yli oikealle puolelle katua aivan samoin kuin
edelliselläkin kerralla.»
»En, hänellä oli tiheä harso silmillään. Tuo toinen nainen oli hänen
mukanaan, ja hän sanoi vain 'Kotiin!' omituisella epäselvällä äänellä,
kun autoin heitä vaunuihin.»
Mutta mitä osaa hän oli jutussa näytellyt? Hetkisen harhailin kuin
sokea pimeydessä, mutta ainoastaan hetkisen. Olipa hänellä ollut
siinä mikä tehtävä hyvänsä, niin oli hänet selvästi jätetty vartioimaan
meitä, vakuuttautuakseen siitä, että me emme seuranneet
pakolaisia, valmistaakseen heitä ennakolta, jos oli vaaraa
pelättävissä. Nyt ymmärsin hänen huolensa neiti Holladaysta, 'minä
otan niin lämpimästi osaa hänen kohtaloonsa!' Hänelle oli tärkeätä
saada tietää, milloin me havaitsimme, että hän oli poissa. Ja hän oli
saanut sen tietää, vieläpä hän tiesi senkin, että minä olin aloittanut
hänen etsimisensä. Punastuin ajatellessani varomattomuuttani; ja
kuitenkin hän oli henkilö, joka herätti luottamusta. Kuka olisi häntä
epäillyt? Ja eräs vanha sananparsi, jota hän oli käyttänyt eräänä
iltana, muistui mieleeni:
Mutta raivoni meni ohi. Ei, hän ei saanut millään ehdolla tietää,
että epäilin häntä; siitä edusta en saanut luopua. Olihan mahdollista,
että minä vielä voisin hämmästyttää häntä, eksyttää hänet
harhateille, panna satimen hänen tielleen. Älykkyystaistelu tulisi
myöhemmin — ehkäpä jo tänä iltana — mutta tällä hetkellä en voinut
muuta tehdä kuin toteuttaa ensimmäisen suunnitelmani. Kuitenkaan
hän ei saanut epäillä, mihin suuntaan tutkimukseni menivät — minun
täytyi pettää hänet.
»Luulen, että olette oikeilla jäljillä, Lester», sanoi hän. »Mutta ette
voi toivoa voivanne tehdä itse paljoa. Se on sitäpaitsi laaja työ. Eikö
olisi parasta palkata viisi, kuusi yksityissalapoliisia ja alistaa heidät
valvontanne alle? Silloin voisitte säästyä tuosta hermostuttavasta
työstä ja samalla kertaa ennättäisi nopeammin etsiskellä talot.
Sitäpaitsi voisivat kenties kokeneemmat henkilöt saada ajatuksia,
jotka ehkä menevät teidän ohitsenne.»
»Sallikaa minun pysyä yksinäni vielä pari päivää!» sanoin, »en ole
vielä menettänyt toivoa onnistumisesta. Jos en onnistu, niin onhan
aikaa ottaa vierasta apua. Luulen joka tapauksessa panneeni asian
alulle, ja tahdon nähdä kuinka se kehittyy.»
»Tänä aamuna heti jälkeen kymmenen tuli eräs mies juosten ylös
portaita Cortlandkadun asemalle Seitsemännen puistokadun
ilmaradalla ennättääkseen junaan, joka juuri oli lähtemässä, mutta
kaatui äkisti asemasillalle sydäntaudin kohtaamana. Sairasvaunut
kutsuttiin puhelimella Hudson Streetin sairaalasta ja mies vietiin
sinne. Kello kahdentoista aikaan sanottiin, että hän todennäköisesti
tulisi paranemaan. Hän oli vielä liian heikko puhumaan, m.m. muiden
esineiden ohella löydettiin hänen lompakostaan kortti Cafe
Jourdainista Läntisen Houston kadun 54:stä. Sieltä kysyttyä saatiin
tietää, että hänen nimensä on Pierre Bethune, että hän on äskettäin
tullut Ranskasta ja että hänellä ei ole ketään sukulaisia tässä
maassa.»
Cafe Jourdainissa