of the prevailing circumstance.
However, the terms and
REMEDIAL LAW
I. Civil Procedure
1. Q: In October 2010, the Supreme Court of
Indonesia affirmed the conviction of Mary Jane for
drug trafficking and sentenced her to death by
firing squad. Meanwhile, in the Philippines,
Cristina and Julius were arrested by the operatives
of the Anti-Human Trafficking Division of the
NBI, and were charged with qualified trafficking
in person and with the crime of illegal recruitment.
Upon arraignment, Cristina and Julius entered a
plea of “not guilty” on all charges.
The PDEA, PNP Crime Laboratory, and the DFA
went to Wirugonan Prison to interview Mary Jane.
She executed a document known as “Sinumpaang
Salaysay ni Mary Jane Fiesta Veloso,” where she
maintained her innocence and narrated how she
was recruited by Cristina and Julius. She alleged
that while in Malaysia, Cristina gave Mary Jane the
luggage, which was unusually heavy but, upon
checking, she found nothing inside. The luggage
was the same bag she used on her trip to
Indonesia.
The Philippine Government requested the
Indonesian Government to suspend the scheduled
execution of Mary Jane as her testimony is vital in
the prosecution of Cristina and Julius. The
Indonesian authorities however imposed some
conditions relative to the taking of Mary Jane’s
testimony. Thereafter, the State through the OSG,
filed a “Motion for Leave of Court to Take the
Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by
Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories under
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.”
Cristina and Julius objected to the motion
asserting that such method of taking testimony
will violate their right to confront the witness,
Mary Jane, and that depositions under Rules 23 is
limited only in civil cases. Can Mary Jane Veloso,
who was sentenced to death by the Indonesian
Government and who is presently confined in a
prison facility in Indonesia, testify by way of
deposition without violating the constitutional
right to confrontation of a witness by the accused?
A: YES. It is true that Cristina and Julius have no
opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to face in light
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conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that they
are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary
Jane by way of written interrogatories so as not to
defeat the first purpose of their constitutional right. In
this case, the trial court required Cristina and Julius,
through their counsel, to file their comment and may
raise objections to the proposed questions in the
written interrogatories submitted by the prosecution.
The trial court judge shall promptly rule on the
objections. Thereafter, only the final questions would
be asked by the Consul of the Philippines in Indonesia
or his designated representative. Also, the trial court
judge will be present during the conduct of written
interrogatories on Mary Jane.
This will give her ample opportunity to observe and to
examine the demeanor of the witness closely. Although
the deposition is in writing, the trial court judge can still
carefully perceive the reaction and deportment of Mary
Jane as she answers each question propounded to her
both by the prosecution and the defense. (People v.
Sergio, G.R. No. 240053, 09 Oct. 2019, J. Hernando)
2. Q: The owners of the land, through their attorney
in fact, MR, brought X before the barangay so that
the demand to vacate against X may be settled
amicably before the barangay. No amicable
settlement was arrived at. A complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed against X, who alleged in his
answer that the owners plaintiffs failed to appear
before the barangay and as such, the complaint
should be dismissed. During the pre-trial, the
parties underwent mediation before the Philippine
Mediation Center (PMC), and before the judge, in
Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR).
a. Should the case be dismissed for failure of
plaintiffs to personally appear before the
Barangay?
A: NO. Although Plaintiffs failed to personally appear
during the conciliation proceedings as required by
Section 415 of RA 7160, they were, however,
represented by MR. Plaintiffs substantially complied
with the law. The representatives appeared to undergo
conciliation proceedings before the barangay, but they
failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. Thereafter,
upon agreement of the parties, the Office of the
Punong Barangay issued a Certification to File Action.
During pre-trial, the parties again underwent mediation
before the PMC and JDR before the court. Still, no
 settlement was reached. Given the foregoing, the
purposes of the law, i.e., to provide avenues for parties
to amicably settle their disputes and to prevent the
indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts, have been
sufficiently met (Spouses Belvis v. Spouses Erola, G.R. No.
239727, July 24, 2019).
6.
b. Will the non-referral of the matter before the
barangay deprive of jurisdiction over the case?
A: No. The non-referral of a case for barangay
conciliation when so required under the law is not
jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed
waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss
(in summary procedure/small claims) or in a responsive
pleading as an affirmative defense (Spouses Belvis v.
Spouses Erola, G.R. No. 239727, July 24, 2019).
3. Q: Will the prescriptive period be initially tolled
when the amended complaints introduced new
demands?
A: No. The settled rule is that the filing of an amended
pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of
the original pleading; hence, the statute of limitation
runs until the submission of the amendment. It is true
that as an exception, this Court has held that an
amendment which merely supplements and amplifies
facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to
the date of the commencement of the action and is not
barred by the statute of limitations which expired after
the service of the original complaint. (Alpha Plus
International Enterprises Corp. vs. Philippine Charter
Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 203756, February 10, 2021,
J. Hernando Case)
4. Q: Does the effect of non-appearance apply when
only the plaintiff or the counsel is absent?
A: No. With the advent of AM 19-10-20-SC, Section 5,
Rule 18 has been clarified by already including the word
counsel and putting the conjunctive word “and”, to the
effect that it is only when both the party-litigant
(plaintiff or defendant) and his counsel fail to appear in
pre-trial that there be the concomitant consequence of
either a dismissal (plaintiff and counsel were absent), or
presentation of evidence ex parte (defendant and
counsel were absent). (Gemina vs. Heirs of Espejo, Jr.,
G.R. No. 232682, September 13, 2021, J. Hernando
Case)
5. Q: In what actions does extraterritorial service of
summons apply?
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A: Extraterritorial service of summons applies only
where the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if
the action is in personam (Gesolgon v. Cyberone, G.R. No.
210741, October 14, 2020, J. Hernando Case)
Q: Tina Sabado is a bank employee who is married
to Jay Sabado who works overseas as a ship
captain. Their marriage bore two (2) children.
However, their relationship became rocky which
resulted in Jay’s abandonment and utter disregard
for his family. Because of this, Tina suffered
psychological and emotional abuse. Tina filed a
petition for Temporary And Permanent Protection
Order (TPO & PPO), Support And Support
Pendente Lite against Jay. The trial court issued
the TPO in favor of Tina and ordered Jay to stay
away at a distance of 500 meters, and desist from
publicly humiliating her and other forms of abuse.
Jay is given five (5) days from notice within which
to file an opposition. The court sheriff made
several attempts to personally serve the summons,
petition, and TPO to Jay at his address, and at the
office of his employer, but to no avail. Instead,
Atty. Acosta, Jay’s counsel in a criminal case,
received a copy of the order and petition on
November 16, 2012.
On January 17, 2013, Jay filed an Entry of
Appearance with Opposition to the Issuance of
Permanent Protection Order where he asserted
that he was merely a chief officer and not a ship
captain. He also claimed that the couple acquired
four (4) properties during their marriage, and that
the condominium unit and parking slot are under
the name of Tina. He also denied humiliating her
in public although they had disagreements, and
claimed that he has been a good provider. He
prayed for the lifting of the TPO, denial of the
PPO, the determination of support and relieving
the respondent from posting a bond. He also
questioned the validity of the service of summons
which is fatal to the acquisition of jurisdiction over
his person as he claimed that he was out of the
Philippines for his overseas work.
RTC Makati issued a TPO and PPO in favor of
Tina, and denied the admission of Jay’s opposition
for having been belatedly filed two (2) months after
the issuance of the TPO, instead of the
non-extendible period of five (5) days under A.M.
No. 04-10-11-SC. Was the serving of the order and
 the TPO to Atty. Palermo considered a valid
service of summons?
A: No, the serving of the order and TPO to Atty.
Palmero is not considered a valid service of summons.
Under the Rules of Court and quoting GCP-Manny
Transport Services, Inc. v. Prinsipe, the notice to counsel is
equivalent to notice to client, however, it must be a
notice sent to counsel of record in order to bind the
client.
In the case at hand, Atty. Acosta was Jay's counsel in a
separate criminal case pending at that time before
Branch 140 of the RTC of Makati. Therefore, Jay had
no counsel of record yet with Branch 136 of the RTC
of Makati at the time Atty. Acosta received the copy of
the order and TPO.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant cannot be
acquired notwithstanding his knowledge of the
pendency of a case against him, unless he was validly
served with summons. Thus, serving the order and
TPO to Atty. Acosta cannot be considered a valid
service of summons.
However, Jay voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court when he filed the Entry of
Appearance with Opposition to the Issuance of the
Permanent Protection Order. By seeking affirmative
relief in his opposition without objecting to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, he thereby voluntarily
submitted to its jurisdiction. In effect, this cured the
invalid service of summons. (Sabado v. Sabado, G.R. No.
214270, May 12, 2021 (Hernando, J.))
7. Q: Maria Santos filed a collection case against her
lessee for failure to pay rental fees. While this
collection case was still pending for 4 years, she
filed a separate ejectment case against the lessee.
Is Maria Santos guilty of forum shopping?
A: No, Maria did not commit forum shopping. The
determinative factor in violations of the rule against
forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis
pendentia requires the identity of the parties, the
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, and the
identity of the two cases such that judgment in one
would amount to res judicata in the other.
As similarly ruled in Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation
Inc. v. Mabalacat Institute, Inc. (Hernando, J.), the
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ejectment case involves the issue of physical possession,
while the collection caste involves the issue of payment.
Thus, there is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for. (Santos Ventura Hocarma Foundation Inc. v.
Mabalacat Institute, Inc., G.R. No. 211563, September 29,
2021)
8. Q: Eduardo, a resident of Manila, filed before RTC
Manila a complaint for the annulment of a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage he signed in favor of Galaxy
Bank involving his Makati property. Galaxy raised
improper venue as affirmative defense arguing that
the complaint should be filed with the RTC of
Makati since the complaint is a real action
involving the ownership and possession of
Eduardo's Jot. Who is correct?
A: Eduardo is correct. As stated in the case of PNB
Republic Bank vs. Remedios Sian-limsiaco (Hernando,
J.), an action to cancel a real estate mortgage is
considered a personal action because the mortgage
contract itself does not involve a real property, but
merely the right to foreclose upon such real property.
Since a personal action may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or defendant resides at the election
of the plaintiff, Eduardo is correct in filing the
complaint in his city of residence. (G.R. No. 196323)
9. Q: Eliza voluntarily offered for sale to the
government, under Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, a parcel of land. Pursuant to
E.O. No. 405, Landbank made a valuation of the
land. Eliza, thereafter, rejected Landbank’s
valuation. Thus, the matter was endorsed to the
Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) and then was transferred to
the Office of Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD). The Regional Adjudicator
(RA) fixed the compensation. Not satisfied,
Landbank filed a petition for just compensation
before the RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court
(SAC). Eliza filed a Motion for Execution of
Judgment before the Office of the RA. The RA
granted the motion for execution and issued an
order directing the issuance of a writ of execution
and an alias writ of execution since the former was
returned unsatisfied. Landbank sought from the
SAC the quashal of the writ which the SAC denied.
Hence, it filed before the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition
for certiorari. DARAB granted. Does DARAB has
jurisdiction in granting the petition for certiorari?
 A: NO. Jurisprudence has settled that DARAB
possesses no power to issue writs of certiorari.
Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a
cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter of law.
It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus involves the exercise of
original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred
by the Constitution or by law.
As an administrative agency exercising quasi judicial but
not consummate judicial power, DARAB is inherently
incapable of issuing writs of certiorari. This is not
merely a matter of statutorily stipulated competence
but a question that hearkens to the separation of
government's tripartite powers: executive, legislative,
and judicial. DARAB's exercise of the innately judicial
certiorari power is an executive encroachment into the
judiciary. It violates the separation of powers; it is
unconstitutional. With or without a law enabling it,
DARAB has no power to rule on jurisdictional
controversies via petitions for certiorari. DARAB's
self-serving grant to itself of the power to issue writs of
certiorari in the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure
is itself a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. It must be annulled for running
afoul of the Constitution. (Heirs of Eliza Q. Zoleta v.
Landbank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205128, 09 Aug.
2017)
10. Q: Plaintiffs claimed that they are the registered
owners of three adjacent and contiguous parcels of
land in Quezon City which they acquired from
their parents in 1999. In 2001, they took actual
possession of the subject property and constructed
a concrete perimeter fence around it. They claimed
that in 2006, they discovered that defendants
destroyed portions of the perimeter fence, entered
the subject property, and constructed their houses
thereon, depriving plaintiffs of their possession.
Upon discovery, plaintiffs made demands for
defendants to vacate but the latter failed and
refused to remove their houses and structures. As a
result, plaintiffs filed a complaint before the proper
barangay authorities, but defendants still failed to
comply with their demand. On the other hand, the
defendant claimed that he entered Lot No. 5 of the
subject property by virtue of a deed of absolute
sale. To further substantiate his claim of prior
physical possession he averred that he paid real
property taxes as evidenced by receipt of payment,
proofs of billing of his Bayantel telephone which
he had installed in his residence in the year 2004,
and that he was able to procure a COMELEC
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registration application of his son, dated October
24, 2003. Does plaintiff have prior physical
possession of the subject property which may
entitle him to recover in an ejectment suit of
forcible entry?
Yes. As a rule, "possession" in forcible entry cases
refers to prior physical possession or possession de
facto, not possession de Jure or that arising from
ownership. In addition, it was consistently held that
"possession can be acquired not only by material
occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject
to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and
legal formalities established for acquiring such right."
In this case, Plaintiff took actual possession of the
subject property and constructed a concrete perimeter
fence around it. Defendant’s' evidence of alleged prior
possession of Lot No. 5 of the subject property–such
as payment of real property taxes, or proofs of billing
of his Bayantel telephone which he had installed in his
residence in the year 2004, or that he was able to
procure a COMELEC registration application of his
son on October 24, 2003–are incidents that occurred
after Manolo took possession of the subject property.
Thus, plaintiff is entitled to recover in an ejectment suit
of forcible entry (Palajos v. Abad, GR No. 205832,
March 07, 2022, J. Hernando Case).
11. Q: May the mortgagor ask for writ of possession
without the need for bond required under Section 7
of Act No. 3135 without the mortgagor or his
successor-in-interest redeeming the foreclosed
property within the one year redemption period?
A: Yes. If the redemption period expires without the
mortgagor or his successor-in-interest redeeming the
foreclosed property within one year from the
registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds, the
title over the property consolidates in the purchaser.
The consolidation confirms the purchaser as the owner
entitled to the possession of the property without any
need for him to file the bond required under Section 7
of Act No. 3135. The issuance of a writ of possession
to the purchaser becomes a matter of right upon the
consolidation of title in his name while the mortgagor,
by failing to redeem, loses all interest in the property
(Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses De Jesus, GR
No. 221133, June 28, 2021, J. Hernando Case)
12. Q: Are the judgments or final orders issued by the
Board for Professional Teachers covered under
Rule 43?
 Yes. A Rule 43 petition to the CA includes all awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized
by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions, except those under the Labor
Code of the Philippines. Pertinently, this Court has
ruled that the list of quasi- judicial entities found in
Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is not
exclusive. With this in mind, the question now is
whether the Board for Professional Teachers is
considered a quasi- judicial agency that exercised
quasi-judicial powers when it issued its Decision. The
Board, by virtue of the power vested in it, clearly
exercised its quasi-judicial functions when it
investigated the case, held a hearing, and issued a
decision that affected the rights of a private party.
Given this, there is no question that the Decision of the
Board is covered by the jurisdiction of the CA and can
be subject of a Rule 43 petition (Professional Regulation
Commission vs. Alo, G.R. No. 214435, February 14, 2022, J.
Hernando Case).
13. Q: EA filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a
complaint for constructive dismissal against
Marble Training Center and his supervisor, PB. LA
found that EA was constructively dismissed and
was granted his monetary claim. There being no
appeal filed within the reglementary period, EA
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. PB
filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, where he
contends that the Center is a non-juridical entity
but a mere training facility run by TESDA and
created pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement
executed by and among the DTI, the Provincial
Government of Bulacan, the Marble Association of
the Philippines (MAP), the National Manpower
and Youth Council (now renamed TESDA). It
argued, among others, that the Center is a marble
processing facility run by TESDA and a
non-juridical entity without capacity to sue or be
sued.
a. Does the Center have the legal capacity to be
sued?
No, the Center has no juridical personality nor is it an
entity authorized by law to be a party to an action, and
thus has no legal capacity to be sued. Sections 1 and 2,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandate that only natural
or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may
be parties in a civil action and every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
parties-in-interest. In this case, the Center which
respondent seeks to hold liable has no juridical
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personality nor is it an entity authorized by law to be a
party to any action; it has no legal capacity to sue or be
sued and should not have been impleaded as defendant
in the instant case.
Given the foregoing, the proper remedy in this case is
the joinder of the proper parties, the mandatory rule on
joinder of indispensable parties is set forth in Section 7,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The Court finds that the
MOA Parties are indispensable parties as their interest
in the controversy is such that a final adjudication
cannot be made in their absence, without injuring or
affecting their interest (TESDA v. Ernesto Abragar
G.R. No. 201022, March 17, 2021).
b. Does the failure to implead the MOA Parties
render the proceedings void?
Yes, the failure to implead TESDA and the other
parties to the MOA renders the proceedings void,
which may be questioned at any time. The joinder of all
indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the
exercise of judicial power. While the failure to implead
an indispensable party is not per se a ground for the
dismissal of an action, considering that said party may
still be added by order of the court, on motion of the
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
and/or such times as are just, it remains essential—as it
is jurisdictional—that any indispensable party be
impleaded in the proceedings before the court renders
judgment.
In this case, the MOA Parties, which include TESDA,
are indispensable parties in this case. Thus, when EA
failed to implead them, it effectively produced two
conseuences: First, all subsequent actions of the lower
courts are null and void for lack of jurisdiction; second,
the case should be remanded to the trial court for the
inclusion of indispensable parties (Technical Education
And Skills Development Authority v. Ernesto Abragar G.R.
No. 201022, March 17, 2021).
14. Q: When does the doctrine of immutability of
judgment arise? What are the exceptions to the
immutability of judgment?
A: A decision or order becomes final and executory if
the aggrieved party fails to appeal or move for a
reconsideration within 15 days from his or her receipt
of the court's decision or order disposing of the action
or proceeding. (Taningco v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 215615,
December 9, 2020, J. Hernando)
 Thus, a judgment that has become final is immutable
and unalterable and can no longer be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct an
erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the
modification is made by the court that rendered the
decision or by the highest court of the land. In
addition, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely
because fundamental considerations of public policy
and sound practice demand that the rights and
obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense
for an indefinite period of time. It serves a two-fold
purpose, namely:
(a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and
thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of
judicial business; and
(b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of
occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts
exist. (Calubad v. Aceron, G.R. No. 188029, September
2, 2020, J. Hernando)
EXCEPTIONS:
1. The correction of clerical errors
2. The so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any part
3. Void judgments
4. Whenever circumstances transpire after the finality
of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable. (Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Spouses
Huang, G.R. No. 197654, August 30, 2017; Gocolay v.
Gocolay, G.R. No. 220606, January 11, 2021)
15. Q: Distinguish conclusiveness of judgment and res
judicata:
A: CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT — Any
right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action
before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between
the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim,
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions
is the same.
RES JUDICATA — 'a matter adjudged; a thing
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment.' It lays the rule that an existing
final judgment or decree rendered on the merits,
without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
-6-
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in
all other actions or suits in the same or any other
judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points
and matters in issue in the first suit.
16. Q: Which court has jurisdiction over petitions for
determination of just compensation?
A: Citing Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657, Congress
expressly granted the RTC, acting as SAC, the original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners.
Only the legislature can recall that power. The DAR has
no authority to qualify or undo that. The Court's
pronouncement in Veterans Bank, Martinez, Soriano,
and Limkaichong, reconciling the power of the DAR
and the SAC essentially barring any petition to the SAC
for having been filed beyond the15-day period
provided in Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules
of Procedure, cannot be sustained. The DAR regulation
simply has no statutory basis. (Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Escaro, G.R. No. 204526, February 10, 2021,
J. Hernando).
17. Q: What are the elements of a valid substituted
service of summons?
A: The following are the elements of a valid substituted
service of summons:
1. Impossibility of prompt personal service - For
substituted service of summons to be available, there
must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally
serve the summons within a reasonable period [ of one
month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service.
- "Several attempts" means at least three (3)
tries, preferably on at least two different dates.
In addition, the sheriff must cite why such
efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or
accepted.
2. Specific Details in the Return - The sheriff must
describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal
service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the
reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in
detail in the Return.
 3. A person of suitable age and discretion - If the
substituted service will be effected at the defendant's
house or residence, it should be left with a person of
"suitable age and discretion then residing therein." A
person of suitable age and discretion is one who has
attained the age of full legal capacity ( 18 years old) and
is considered to have enough discernment to
understand the importance of a summons.
4. A competent person in charge - If the substituted
service will be done at the defendant's office or regular
place of business, then it should be served on a
competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the
person on whom the substituted service will be made
must be the one managing the office or business of
defendant, such as the president or manager; and such
individual must have sufficient knowledge to
understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects
arising from inaction on the summons.
18. Q: S leased his parcel of land in favor of M. When
M reneged in his obligations to pay rent, S
instituted an action for collection of sum of money
against M in the MTC of Pampanga. While the
sum of money case was pending, S filed an
unlawful detainer case against M in a different
court. Was there forum shopping?
No. In the case at bar, there is no identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for between a suit for
collection of sum of money and an unlawful detainer
case, and that any judgment rendered in one of these
actions would not amount to res judicata in the other
action. The ejectment case stemmed from the prejudice
that S allegedly suffered due to the loss of possession
of the subject lot while the collection case was founded
on the appropriate amount of rental fees that are
allegedly due and the damages that S allegedly suffered
but which have no direct relation to its loss of material
possession. In a civil suit for collection of sum of
money, what is sought to be recovered is the payment
of rentals only without regard to the unlawfulness of
the occupancy. In addition, an action for collection of
sum of money may not be joined with an ejectment
suit, otherwise a misjoinder of causes of action would
ensue (Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v.
Mabalacat Institute, Inc. G.R. No. 211563, September 2021).
19. Mayor ME was charged with malversation through
falsification of official documents. Assisted by Atty.
KO as counsel de parte during pre-trial, he signed
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together with Ombudsman Prosecutor MO a Joint
Stipulation of Facts and Documents which was
presented to the Sandiganbayan. Before the court
could issue a pre-trial order but after some delay
caused by Atty. KO, he was substituted by Atty. NA
as defense counsel. Atty. NA filed a motion to
withdraw the “Joint Stipulation”, alleging that it is
prejudicial to the accused because it contains,
inter alia, the statement that the “Defense
admitted all the documentary evidence of the
Prosecution,” thus leaving the accused a little or
no room to defend himself, and violating his right
against self-incrimination.
Should the court grant Atty. NA’s motion?
No. The court should not grant Atty. NA’s motion. For
a pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it
must satisfy the following conditions: (1) the agreement
or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must be
signed by both the accused and their counsel. The
court’s approval is not needed to make the stipulations
binding on the parties. Such approval is necessary
merely to emphasize the supervision by the court over
the case and to enable it to control the flow of the
proceedings. Once the stipulations are reduced into
writing and signed by the parties and their counsels,
they become binding on the parties who made them.
They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts
stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position,
a party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally;
it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage
(Bayas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 143589- 91, November
12, 2002).
If in the pre-trial agreement signed by the accused and
his counsel, the accused admits the documentary
evidence of the prosecution, it does not violate his right
against self-incrimination. His lawyer cannot file a
motion to withdraw. A pre-trial order is not needed.
The admission of such documentary evidence is
allowed by the rules (ROC, Rule 118, Sec. 2)
20. Q: The Republic filed a complaint for recovery of
possession against Calubaquib, et al., who
allegedly entered a military reservation site and,
through strategy and stealth, took possession of a
five-hectare portion thereof. Calubaquib, et al.
then countered that their predecessor-in-interest
had been in open and continuous possession of the
property since the early 1900s. While they
acknowledge the issuance of the Proclamation,
they insist that the subject property is excluded
 from its operation, citing that the Proclamation
itself said it was “subject to private rights”. On the
basis of the foregoing admitted facts, the RTC
rendered a summary judgment, even without the
motion of either party. The RTC dismissed
Calubaquib, et. al’s claim of possession of the
property in the concept of an owner. Was the
summary judgment proper?
A: NO. The remedy of summary judgment without a
motion being filed is in derogation of a party's right to
a plenary trial of his case; the trial court cannot railroad
the parties’ rights over their objections. A summary
judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. The filing of a motion
and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are
important because these enable the court to determine
if the parties’ pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in
support of, or against, the motion are sufficient to
overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify
the finding that, as a matter of law, the claim is clearly
meritorious or there is no defense to the action. The
nonobservance of the procedural requirements of filing
a motion and conducting a hearing on the said motion
warrants the setting aside of the summary judgment.
Here, the trial court proceeded to render summary
judgment with neither of the parties filing a motion
therefor. (Calubaquib, et al. v. Republic, et al., G.R. No.
170658, 22 June 2011)
21. Q: Santa filed against Era in the RTC of Quezon
City an action for specific performance praying for
the delivery of a parcel of land subject of their
contract of sale. Unknown to the parties, the case
was inadvertently raffled to an RTC designated as
a special commercial court. Later, the RTC
rendered judgment adverse to Era, who, upon
realizing that the trial court was not a regular RTC,
approaches you and wants you to file a petition to
have the judgment annulled for lack of jurisdiction.
What advice would you give to Era? Explain your
answer.
A: The advice I would give to Era is that the petition
for annulment of judgment on lack of jurisdiction will
not prosper. It has been held that a special commercial
court is still a court of general jurisdiction and can hear
and try a non-commercial case. Hence, the special
commercial court has jurisdiction to try and decide the
action for specific performance and to render a
judgment therein.
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22. Q: A sues B for coJlection of a sum of money.
Alleging fraud in the contracting of the loan, A
applies for preliminary attachment with the court.
The Court issues the preliminary attachment after
A files a bond. While summons on B was yet
unserved, the sheriff attached B's properties.
Afterwards, summons was duly served on B. B
moves to lift the attachment. Rule on this.
A: I will grant the motion since the levy was invalidly
enforced. No levy on attachment pursuant to the writ
shall be enforced unless it is preceded or
contemporaneously accompanied by service of
summons. There must be prior or contemporaneous
service of summons with the writ of attachment. (Rules
of Court, Rule 57, Sec. 14)
II. Special Proceedings
23. Q: Luigi Santos filed a petition for change of name
under Rule 103 seeking to change his surname
from “Santos” to “Revilla” in his Certificate of
Live Birth. He alleged that sometime in 1991, his
parents, Lovely Guzman and Jose Marie Bautista,
Jr., a.k.a. Ramon Bong Revilla, Jr., met and
engaged in an intimate relationship. He was later
born as “Luigi Guzman.” His parents were never
married as Bong Revilla was already married to
Lani Mercado.
Luigi’s Certificate of Live Birth did not bear the
Revilla surname and his father was marked as
unknown. However, on April 24, 1996, Bong
Revilla executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment
recognizing the petitioner as his son. In 1999,
Lovely Guzman married Patrick Santos, who, in
turn, legally adopted Luigi in 2001. Thus, his name
was changed from “Luigi Guzman” to “Luigi G.
Santos.”
Although Luigi lived with his mother, he grew up
close to Bong Revilla and the latter’s wife and
children and was treated by the family as a
legitimate son. He also claimed that he used the
name “Luigi Revilla” when he entered show
business. Thus, he filed a Rule 108 petition in
order to avoid confusion, to show his sincere and
genuine desire to associate himself to Bong Revilla
and to the Revillas, and to ensure that his records
show his true identity as Bong Revilla’s son.
a. Was Rule 108 the correct remedy?
A: NO. Petitioner correctly availed himself of the
remedy under Rule 103 in order to change his surname
from “Santos” to “Revilla” to avoid confusion and to
show his sincere desire to associate himself to Bong
Revilla and the Revillas. By these allegations, petitioner
seeks to alter the designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which he lives and is best
known and not to effect any clerical or substantial
corrections. Unlike Rule 108, Rule 103 only requires
that the order reciting the purpose of the petition and
the date and place of the hearing be published and that
any interested person be allowed to appear and oppose
the petition. By virtue of the publication, all interested
parties were deemed notified and the whole world
considered bound by the judgment therein. The failure
to implead petitioner’s biological father and adoptive
father did not render the proceedings void as said
requirement does not apply to Rule 103. (Santos v.
Republic, G.R. No. 250520, May 5, 2021).
b. Should the petition for change of name be
granted?
A: NO. Luigi failed to prove that there is any
compelling reason to justify a change of surname from
“Santos” to “Revilla.” The use of the surname “Revilla”
would create further confusion rather than avoid it,
given that: (1) he has never legally used the name
“Revilla” despite having been acknowledged in 1996;
(2) he was legally adopted by Patrick Santos in 2001; (3)
he has used the name “Santos’’ for documentary
purposes since his adoption; (4) although he is publicly
known to be the son of Bong Revilla, he is known by
his peers as “Luigi Santos”; (5) even after a change of
surname, Patrick Santos shall continue to be the father
named in his birth certificate; and (5) he only began
using the surname “Revilla” when he entered show
business. The mere fact that petitioner began using a
different name, i.e., “Luigi Revilla,” when he joined
show business does not constitute a proper and
reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name.
Any confusion created by the use of said name is
mainly due to the unauthorized use of a name other
than the petitioner's true legal name. Convenience is
not a recognized ground for change of name, which
may be allowed only for compelling reasons that must
be alleged and proved. A sincere desire to associate
oneself to a certain person or family, without more,
does not justify a change of surname (Santos v. Republic,
G.R. No. 250520, May 5, 2021).
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24. Q: Which court has jurisdiction over settlement of
estate?
A: It depends upon the gross value of the estate of the
decedent:
1. RTC: gross value exceeds Two million pesos (P2
million)
2. MTC: gross value does not exceed Two million pesos
(P2 million) (BP 129, as amended by RA11576).
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
the material allegations in the petition (Cadimas v.
Carrion, G.R. No. 180394, September 29, 2008); hence,
it is not the actual gross value of the estate which is the
basis of jurisdiction but the alleged gross value of the
estate.
25. Q: Widow A leaves her two minor daughters with
her brother every night that she goes to work as a
prostitute in Milagros City. B, the father of the
deceased husband of A, filed a petition for habeas
corpus against A for the custody of the girls in the
Family Court in Legazpi City, which the court
granted. Upon learning of the petition, A brought
her children to Cebu City. B sought to have the
writ enforced against A in Cebu City. Resolve the
petition in the light of the following defenses of A.
i. The enforcement of the writ of habeas corpus in
Cebu City is illegal. Rule.
A: The writ of habeas corpus issued by the Family
Court in Legazpi City may not be legally enforced in
Cebu City. Under the law, a verified petition for a writ
of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be
filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be
enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs. Here, the petition was filed in
Legazpi City hence, the writ should not be enforced in
Cebu City, which falls under a different judicial region
(A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, Sec. 20).
ii. B has no personality to institute the petition.
Rule.
A: B, the father of the deceased husband of A, has the
personality to institute the petition for habeas corpus of
the two minor girls. Under the law, the award of
custody may be given to the grandparent, or if there are
several grandparents, the grandparent chosen by the
minor over seven years of age and of sufficient
discernment, unless the grandparent chosen is unfit or
disqualified. Here, the father of the deceased husband,
 as the grandparent, has the legal personality to seek
custody over the children. In fact, if the court finds that
the parents are unfit to care for and to have custody of
the minors, the court may designate either the paternal
or maternal grandparent of the minors, among others,
to take charge of the said minors. (A.M. No. 03-04-04-
SC, Secs. 2, 13, 18).
26. Q: On February 1991, Miguel was charged with the
crime of Murder before the RTC of Quezon City.
After trial, Miguel was found guilty as charged and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Pursuant to his conviction, Miguel was
delivered to Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa in
January 1994. Miguel's conviction was affirmed by
this Court in March 1996. Alleging that his
continued detention no longer holds legal basis in
view of RA 10592, otherwise known as the Good
Conduct Time Allowance Law, Miguel filed the
present petition for the issuance of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus in August 2015.
Will the Writ of Habeas Corpus issue?
A: No, the Supreme Court points out that Miguel failed
to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts. In Cruz
v. Gingoyon, “A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should
be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition.”
As to which court may grant the writ, Section 2, Rule
102 of the Rules of Court provides: The writ of habeas
corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any
member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the
Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the
instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be
made returnable before the court or any member
thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any
judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It
may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a
judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and
returnable before himself, enforceable only within his
judicial district.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court, the
appellate court, and this Court exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus. However, this does not mean that
parties are absolutely free to choose before which court
to file their petitions, thus: Mere concurrency of
-10-
jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom to
choose the court with which the petition shall be filed.
Petitioners should be directed by the hierarchy of
courts. After all, the hierarchy of courts 'serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitioners for the extraordinary writs.'
In sum, Miguel should have filed the present petition
before the RTC, absent any showing of special and
important reasons warranting a direct resort to this
Court." (Miguel v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,
UDK-15368, September 15, 2021, (Hernando, J.))
27. Q: Morada alleged that on October 14, 2015 at
around 8:00 a.m., she received a text message from
her daughter, Jennilyn, that Johnson was arrested
and detained by the barangay tanods of Barangay
176, Caloocan City for alleged theft of a mobile
phone in the house of another barangay tanod,
herein respondent Randy. On the same day,
Morada went to the barangay hall. At the barangay
hall, Rolly informed Morada that Johnson was
already released by either respondent Fernando or
respondent Romy from the custody of the
barangay.
In December 2015, Morada went to the Northern
Police District (NPD) to report that her son is
missing. Rumors circulated within Barangay 176
that Johnson had been extrajudicially killed and
that his body was mixed in cement in order to
conceal the incident. This prompted Morada to
institute a petition for the issuance of a writ of
amparo to determine whether respondents had
violated or threatened to violate Johnson's right to
life, liberty and security, and to compel
respondents to determine the whereabouts of
Johnson, and the person/s responsible for his
disappearance or possible death, among others.
The RTC denied the petition. The RTC held that
there was no showing of any refusal on the part of
the respondents to acknowledge or to give
information on Johnson's whereabouts such that
there was no intention to remove him from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time. Thus, the third and fourth elements of
enforced disappearance are absent. Did the RTC
gravely erred in not giving due course to the
petition?
A: No, there is no substantial evidence that exists to
compel the grant of the writ prayed for by Morada. The
elements constituting enforced disappearance as
 defined under RA 9851 are as follows: (a) that there be
an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization; (c) that it be followed
by the State or political organization's refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo
petition; and (d) that the intention for such refusal is to
remove subject person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.
In this case, there is no question that the first and
second elements are attendant in this case. However,
The Court agrees with the RTC that the third and
fourth elements are sorely lacking. While it is admitted
that Johnson was arrested for the alleged theft that he
committed in the house of Randy, it was sufficiently
established by the respondents that he was already
released from their custody on October 14, 2015, as
evidenced by the barangay blotter, signed by Johnson
himself. We accord greater weight to the documentary
evidence presented by the respondents exhibiting that
Johnson was no longer in the custody of the
respondents when he disappeared. Such evidence
strongly militates against Morada's claim of enforced
disappearance. Therefore, the Court agrees with the
RTC that Morada failed to prove by substantial
evidence her claim of enforced disappearance. (Morada
v. Rias, G.R. No. 222226, February 14, 2022, (Hernando,
J.))
28. Q: A petition for writ of kalikasan was filed with
the Supreme Court. A opposed the petition on the
ground that the direct filing of the petition with
the SC violated the hierarchy of courts. Rule.
A: No. The writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy
covering environmental damage of such magnitude that
will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for a
narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger
protection for environmental rights, aiming, among
others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution of a
case involving the violation of one’s constitutional right
to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends
political and territorial boundaries, and to address the
potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological
threats.
At the very least, the magnitude of the ecological
problems contemplated under the rules satisfies at least
one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of
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courts, as when direct resort is allowed where it is
dictated by public welfare. Given that the rules allow
direct resort to the Supreme Court, it is ultimately
within the Court’s discretion whether or not to accept
petitions brought directly before it (Segovia v. Climate
Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017).
III. Criminal Procedure
29. Q: Can a Void ab initio Marriage be a valid defense
in the prosecution for Bigamy even without a
Judicial Declaration of Absolute Nullity?
A: A void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the
prosecution for bigamy even without a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity. Consequently, a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of either the first and
second marriages obtained by the accused is considered
a valid defense in bigamy. Thus, when both the prior
and subsequent marriages were contracted prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, a void ab initio marriage
can be raised as a defense in a bigamy case even
without a judicial declaration of its nullity. Nonetheless,
an action for nullity of the second marriage is a
prejudicial question to the criminal prosecution for
bigamy. (Pulido v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
220149, 27 July 2021, (Hernando, J.))
30. Q: Aside from the offended party, may any person
file a complaint before the prosecutor?
A: Yes. Section 3, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
enumerates the persons who are authorized to file a
criminal complaint. The "complaint" mentioned in this
provision, however, refers to one filed in court for the
commencement of a criminal prosecution for violation
of a crime. This does not refer to a complaint filed with
the Prosecutor's Office. As a rule, a criminal action
contemplated under Rule 110 is commenced by a
complaint or information, both of which are filed in
court. Thus, if a complaint is filed directly in court, the
same must be filed by those persons delineated in
Sections 3 and 5 of the same rule, such as the offended
party. In the case of an information, the same must be
filed by the fiscal or prosecutor. However, a
"complaint" filed with the fiscal or prosecutor from
which he/she may initiate a preliminary investigation
may be filed by any person. (Talabis vs. People, G.R. No.
214647, March 4, 2020, (Hernando, J.))
31. Q: Are courts bound by the opinion of the
prosecutor regarding probable cause?
 A: No. Once the information has been filed before the
courts, the dismissal, conviction, or acquittal of the
accused rests on their sound discretion; they are not
bound by any change in the opinion of the prosecutor
or his superior regarding probable cause. The courts
should not blindly follow the resolutions issued by the
Department of Justice and should determine on their
own whether there is probable cause to hold the
accused for trial. (Debuque vs. Nilson, G.R. No. 191718,
May 10, 2021, (Hernando, J.))
32. Q: What is meant by the duty of conducting a
searching inquiry?
A: It is a mandatory requirement which ensures that
the plea of guilty was voluntarily made and that the
accused comprehends the severe consequences of his
plea. This means asking a myriad of questions which
would solicit any indication of coercion,
misunderstanding, error, or fraud that may have
influenced the decision of the accused to plead guilty to
a capital offense. (People v. Pagal, G.R. No. 241257,
September 29, 2020)
The searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused
on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full
comprehension of the consequences of
the plea. Although there is no definite and concrete
rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a "searching
inquiry," the Court held that the following guidelines
should be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself:
a. how he was brought into the custody of the
law;
b. whether he had the assistance of a competent
counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and
c. under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations;
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to
whether he had conferred with, and completely
explained to, the accused the meaning and
consequences of a plea of guilty;
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of
the accused, such as his age, socio-economic
status, and educational background, which may
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give
a free and informed plea of guilty;
4. Inform the accused the exact length of
imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the
law and the certainty that he will serve such
sentence because a plea of guilty carries with it not
-12-
only the admission of authorship of the crime
proper but also of the aggravating circumstances
attending it, that increase punishment;
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which
he is charged and fully explain to him the elements
of the crime which is the basis of his indictment.
Failure of the court to do so would constitute a
violation of his fundamental right to be informed
of the precise nature of the accusation against him
and a denial of his right to due process;
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a
language known and understood by the latter; and
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the
accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The
accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or
reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.
(People v. Pagal, G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020)
33. Q: What are the instances when arrest without
warrant is lawful? (I-HERB-LWP)
A: A peace officer or a private person may, without
warrant, lawfully arrest a person:
a. In Flagrante Delicto - When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
b. Hot Pursuit - When an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on his personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed the crime;
c. Escapee - When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has Escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another (ROC, Rule 113,
Sec. 5);
d. Rescuee - When a person who has been lawfully
arrested escapes or is Rescued, at any time and any
place within the Philippines (ROC, Rule 113, Sec.
13);
e. When the Bondsman arrests a prisoner out on bail
for the purpose of bringing him to court; and
f. Where the accused released on bail attempts to
Leave the country Without the Permission of the
court (ROC, Rule 114, Sec. 23).
34. Q: What is an improvident plea?
A: A plea of guilty to a capital offense without the
benefit of a searching inquiry or an ineffectual inquiry,
as required by Sec. 3, Rule 116, results in an
improvident plea of guilty. There is an improvident plea
when there is failure of the court to inquire into
whether the accused knows the crime with which he is
charged and to fully explain to him the elements of the
crime. It constitutes a violation of the accused’s
fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature
of the accusation against him and a denial of his right
to due process.
It is the duty of the trial court when the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense:
1. to conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea,
2. to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused,
3. to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to
present evidence and to allow him to do so if he
desires (People v. Pagal, G.R. No. 241257, September
29, 2020)
NOTE: Withdrawal of an improvident plea - At any
time before the judgment of conviction becomes final,
the court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to
be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty.
(ROC, Rule 116, Sec. 5)
35. Q: What is “Neypes Rule”?
A: If the motion for reconsideration or new trial is
denied, the movant has a “fresh period” of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the notice of the order denying or
dismissing the motion for reconsideration within which
to file the notice of appeal. The “fresh period” rule
applies not only in Rule 41 (RTC-CA), but also in Rule
40 (MTC-RTC), Rule 42 (Petrev, RTC-CA), Rule 43
(Petrev, QJA-CA), and Rule 45 (RTC, CA-SC) This was
adopted to standardize the appeal period. (Neypes vs.
Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633).
Q: Is the Neypes Doctrine applicable in criminal
cases?
A: Yes, The Supreme Court held that the “fresh period
rule” previously laid down in Neypes v. CA shall
likewise be applicable to criminal cases for the
following reasons:
-13-
a. Section 39 of BP 129 does not distinguish between
a civil and criminal case in setting the period to
appeal at 15 days from the “notice of the final
order” appealed from. Note that the court in
Neypes held that the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration or for New Trial is the “final
order” referred to in BP 129; and
b. The provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 and Section
5 of Rule 122, though differently worded, mean
exactly the same. That the appeal period stops
running from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed, and begins to run again
upon receipt of the order denying such motions.
There is then no reason why the period of appeal
which is stayed in civil cases should likewise not be
stayed in a criminal case when a motion for new
trial or reconsideration is filed. (Yu v. Samson-Tatad,
G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011)
36. Q1: Can denial of a motion to quash be subject of
appeal or certiorari?
A1: As a rule, No. Motions to quash are interlocutory
orders that are generally unreviewable by appeal or by
certiorari. If the motion to quash is denied, it means
that the criminal Information remains pending with the
court, which then must proceed with the trial to
determine whether the accused is innocent or guilty of
the crime charged against him. Only when the court
promulgates a final judgment of conviction can the
accused question the deficiencies of the Information by
raising them as errors by the trial court and as an
additional ground for his exoneration in his appeal.
(Radaza vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 201380, August 4,
2021, (Hernando, J.))
EXCEPTIONS (J-E-S-W-A):
a. when the court issued the order without or in
excess of Jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion;
b. when the interlocutory order is patently
Erroneous and the remedy of appeal would
not afford adequate and expeditious relief;
c. in the interest of a more enlightened and
Substantial justice;
d. to promote public Welfare and public policy;
and
e. when the cases have Attracted nationwide
attention, making it essential to proceed with
dispatch in the consideration thereof.
Under these instances, appeal is considered an
inadequate remedy for a denied motion to quash and
 certiorari may be allowed instead (Radaza vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 201380, August 4, 2021,
(Hernando, J.))
Q2: Is lack of authority of an officer to file an
Information, while a ground for quashal, a
jurisdictional defect?
A2: NO. Earlier jurisprudence had viewed the lack of
authority by the officer filing the Information under
paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court as a non-waivable ground additional to
paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of the same provision. It
was the prevailing principle that an Information filed by
an officer who had no authority to do so shall be
considered jurisdictionally infirm for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused and over the subject
matter or the offense.
The ratio underlying this principle was that an
Information filed without such proper authorization
was a defective Information, and a defective
Information can never be the basis of a valid
conviction.
However, this legal maxim set by jurisprudence has
already been rendered old and obsolete with the advent
of Gomez v. People. It was therefore held that a
handling prosecutor's lack of prior written authority
from the head prosecutor in the filing of an
Information does not affect a trial court's acquisition of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person of the
accused. Such a prosecutor who filed an unauthorized
Information but without bad faith or criminal intent is
considered as a de facto officer coated with a color of
authority to exercise acts that remain valid and official.
(Radaza v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 201380, August 4,
2021, (Hernando, J.))
37. Sergio and Lacanilao offered Mary Jane a job as a
domestic helper in Malaysia. Upon arriving in
Malaysia, Sergio informed Mary Jane that the job
was no longer available but promised Mary Jane a
new job. Mary Jane was sent to a trip in Indonesia
with a luggage given by Cristina. However, Mary
Jane was apprehended in Indonesia for carrying
2.6 kilograms of heroin in her luggage. Mary Jane
was charged with drug trafficking and eventually
found guilty as charged and sentenced to death by
firing squad. After the affirmation of her
conviction, Mary Jane was brought to a prison
facility to await their execution by firing squad.
Meanwhile, in the Philippines, Sergio and
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Lacanilao were arrested. Thereafter, they were
charged with qualified trafficking in person, illegal
recruitment, and estafa. PDEA, PNP and DFA
went to Indonesia in order to obtain the affidavit of
Mary Jane since her testimony is vital in the
prosecution of Sergio and Lacanilao.
Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of
Court to Take the Testimony of Complainant Mary
Jane by Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories.”
It averred that the taking of Mary Jane’s testimony
through the use of deposition upon written
interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the
Revised Rules of Court because she is out of the
country and will not be able to testify personally
before the court due to her imprisonment. Sergio
and Lacanilao immediately contend that averring
that the trial court judge gravely abused her
discretion in the issuance of the assailed
Resolutions.
Q1: Is the prosecution's resort to Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court in taking Mary Jane's testimony as
a prosecution witness proper?
A1: The extraordinary factual circumstances
surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant the resort to
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
At the outset, the Court is always guided by the
principle that rules shall be liberally construed in order
to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. Simply put, rules of procedure should
facilitate an orderly administration of justice. They
should not be strictly applied causing injury to a
substantive right of a party to the case.
This precept has been elucidated by the Supreme Court
in De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, to wit: [T]he rules of
procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules of
Court envision this liberality. This power to suspend or
even disregard the rules can be so pervasive and
encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court
itself has already declared to be final, as we are now
compelled to do in this case. And this is not without
additional basis. x x x
There are several instances wherein the Court has
relaxed procedural rules to serve substantial justice
because of any of the following reasons:
a. matters of life, liberty, honor or property;
b. the existence of special or compelling
circumstances,
c. the merits of the case,
d. a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules,
e. a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and
f. the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.
Nonetheless, the Court always reminds party litigants
that bare invocation of "the interest of substantial
justice" is not a magic phrase that will automatically
oblige the Court to suspend procedural rules. To stress,
"procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed
simply because their non-observance may have
prejudiced a party's substantive rights. Like all rules,
they are required to be followed except only for the
most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed." (People v. Sergio, G.R.
No. 240053, October 9, 2019, (Hernando, J.))
Q2: The Court allowed the taking of deposition
through written interrogatories of Mary Jane in
Indonesia in the criminal case for human
trafficking filed against the accused. The Judge
was present during the taking of deposition. The
accused objected because according to them, it
violated their right to confrontation. Does the
deposition by written interrogatories violate the
constitutional right of Sergio and Lacanilao to
confront a witness?
A2: NO. The deposition by written interrogatories will
not infringe the constitutional right to confrontation of
a witness of Sergio and Lacanilao.
The deposition by written interrogatories in criminal
proceedings is pursuant to the right to due process of
the accused.
38. Q: Passing through a checkpoint, the petitioner
Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories
will curtail Mary Jane's right to due process. The
benchmark of the right to due process in criminal
justice is to ensure that all the parties have their day in
court. It is in accord with the duty of the government
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to follow a fair process of decision-making when it acts
to deprive a person of his liberty. But just as an accused
is accorded this constitutional protection, so is the State
entitled to due process in criminal prosecutions. It must
likewise be given an equal chance to present its
evidence in support of a charge. Here, the trial court
acted within its jurisdiction when it granted the taking
of Mary Jane's deposition by written interrogatories.
The grant of the written interrogatories by the
Indonesian Government perceives the State's
opportunity to present all its desired witnesses in the
prosecution of its cases against Sergio and Lacanilao.
It is afforded fair opportunity to present witnesses and
evidence it deems vital to ensure that the injury
sustained by the People in the commission of the
criminal acts will be well compensated and, most of all,
that justice be achieved. Hence, the right of the State to
prosecute and prove its case have been fully upheld and
protected. Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must
balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused
alone. The interests of society and the offended parties
which have been wronged must be equally considered.
Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial
of justice, and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph
of justice; for, to the society offended and the party
wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must
be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one
hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.
(People v. Sergio, G.R. No. 240053, October 9, 2019,
(Hernando, J.))
NOTE: Right to confrontation. The right to
confrontation is part of due process not only in
criminal proceedings but also in civil proceedings as
well as in proceedings in administrative tribunals with
quasi-judicial powers.
It has a two-fold purpose:
1. primarily, to afford the accused an
opportunity to test the testimony of the
witness by cross-examination; and
2. secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the
deportment of the witness (People vs. Sergio,
G.R. No. 240053, October 9, 2019, (Hernando,
J.))
was flagged down. The police asked for the
registration of his motorcycle. He could not
produce the registration of his motorcycle. Finding
this suspicious, the police inspected the
compartment of his motorcycle and found a small
 block of marijuana. For which reason, the accused
was arrested. Is the search valid?
A: Yes, the search is valid. The subsequent arrest is
likewise valid. In Uy vs. People, the SC considered the
fact of petitioner’s not being able to produce the
registration of his motorcycle as enough reason for the
police officer to conduct an extensive search.
Ordinarily, search of vehicle is limited to routine or
visual search. However, the situation, in the case at bar,
creates probable cause which would justify a reasonable
belief on the part of the law enforcers that either the
petitioner is a law offender, or that the contents of the
vehicle are, or have been, instruments of some offense
(Rolando Uy vs. People G.R. No. 217097, February 23,
2022, (Hernando, J.))
NOTE: Inspections at checkpoints are not violative of
an individual's right against unreasonable searches if
limited to the following:
a. the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fairgrounds;
b. simply looks into a vehicle;
c. flashes a light therein without opening the
car's doors;
d. where the occupants are not subjected to a
physical or body search;
e. where the inspection of the vehicles is limited
to a visual search or visual inspection; and
f. where the routine check is conducted in a
fixed area (Rolando Uy vs. People G.R. No.
217097, February 23, 2022, (Hernando, J.))
39. Q: In issuance of a search warrant, what is the
extent of particularity of the place that the warrant
must state?
A: The requirement of particularity as to the things to
be seized does not require technical accuracy in the
description of the property to be seized, and that a
search warrant may be said to particularly describe the
things to be seized when the description therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow it to
be described. (Diaz vs. People, G.R. No. 213875, July 15,
2020, (Hernando, J.))
40. Q: What procedures are covered by the Rule on
Cybercrime Warrants?
A: The Rule on Cybercrime Warrants covers the
procedure for the application and grant of warrants and
related orders involving the preservation, disclosure,
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interception, search, seizure, and/or examination, as
well as the custody, and destruction of computer data,
as provided under RA 10175, otherwise known as the
“Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” (A.M. No.
17-11-03-SC, Sec. 1.2).
41. Q: Will the Rules of Court apply in cases covered
by the Rule on Cybercrime Warrants?
A: Yes. The Rule on Cybercrime Warrants supplements
the existing Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
provisions shall continue to govern the preliminary
investigation and all stages of prosecution of criminal
actions involving violations of RA 10175, including all
crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and special laws, committed by,
through, and with the use of information and
communications technologies (A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC,
Sec. 1.3).
42. Q: What is the effect of failure to observe the
requirement of using body-worn cameras (or
alternative recording devices) during the execution
of a search warrant?
A: The failure to observe the said requirement, without
reasonable grounds, shall render the evidence obtained
inadmissible for the prosecution of the offense for
which the search warrant was applied.
In addition, law enforcement officers may be liable for
contempt of court for failing to adhere to the said
requirement or for intentionally inferring with the
camera’s recording abilities. Nonetheless, the said
liability shall not apply if the cameras were not activated
due to their malfunction and the officers were not aware
of the malfunction prior to the incident (A.M. No.
21-06-08-SC, Sec. 7, Rule 3)
Q: Effect of failure to observe the requirement of
using body-worn cameras on arrest made.
A: Failure to observe the camera requirement shall NOT
render the arrest unlawful or render the evidence
obtained inadmissible. Facts surrounding the arrest may
be proved by the testimonies of the arresting officers,
the person arrested, and other witnesses to the arrest.
However, a law enforcement officer who fails, without
reasonable grounds, to use the required recording device
or intentionally interferes with the device’s recording
abilities, may be liable for contempt of court. The
liability shall not apply if the devices were not activated
 due to their malfunction and the officers were not aware
of the malfunction prior to the incident (A.M. No.
21-06-08-SC, Sec. 5, Rule 2)
43. Q: What are the different types of Cybercrime
Warrants?
A: There are four (4) kinds of Cybercrime Warrants, to
wit:
a. A Warrant to Disclose Computer Data
(WDCD) is an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines, signed
by a judge, upon application of law
enforcement authorities, authorizing the latter
to issue an order to disclose and accordingly,
require any person or service provider to
disclose or submit subscriber’s information,
traffic data, or relevant data in his/her or its
possession or control (A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC,
Sec. 4.2).
b. A Warrant to Intercept Computer Data
(WICD) is an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines, signed
by a judge, upon application of law
enforcement authorities, authorizing the latter
to carry out any or all of the following
activities: (a) listening to, (b) recording, (c)
monitoring, or (d) surveillance of the content
of communications, including procuring of
the content of computer data, either directly,
through access and use of a computer system
or indirectly, through the use of electronic
eavesdropping or tapping devices, at the same
time that the communication is occurring
(A.M. No. 17-11- 03-SC, Sec. 5.2).
c. A Warrant to Search, Seize and Examine
Computer Data (WSSECD) is an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of
the Philippines, signed by a judge, upon
application of law enforcement authorities,
authorizing the latter to search the particular
place for items to be seized and/or examined
(A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC, Sec. 6.1)
d. A Warrant to Examine Computer Data
(WECD) is required to be applied for and
obtained by law enforcement authorities,
upon acquiring possession of a computer
device or computer system via a lawful
warrantless arrest, or by any other lawful
method, and before searching the said
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computer device or computer system for the
purpose of obtaining for forensic examination
the computer data contained therein (A.M.
No. 17-11-03-SC, Sec. 6.9).
IV. Evidence
44. Q: Luis Arriola was charged with estafa under
Section 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City. It was alleged that Arriola willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously defraud Ingeborg Del
Rosario, when by means of false manifestation and
fraudulent representations he made to the latter to
the effect that he was the real estate broker of
Pasencia Candelaria. It was also alleged that
Arriola represented that he had the authority to sell
and receive payments in selling a parcel of land
located in Tagaytay City owned by Candelaria and
could facilitate the issuance of a new TCT in the
name of Del Rosario. Lastly, by means of another
deceit of similar import, Arriola induced and
succeeded in inducing Del Rosario to give and
deliver and in fact the latter gave and delivered to
Arriola the total amount of P437,000 representing
full payment for the land.
The RTC of Makati City convicted Arriola of
estafa. It found that the prosecution sufficiently
discharged its burden of proving Arriola’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Aiming to be exonerated, Arriola asserts that the
sole evidence presented by the prosecution
showing his alleged deceit was only the phone
conversation that transpired between Del Rosario
and Candelaria, and thus, rested on mere hearsay
evidence which should not have been admitted by
the trial court. Did the Court err in giving credence
to the hearsay evidence of the prosecution?
A: NO, the totality of circumstantial evidence
sufficiently established Arriola’s guilt for estafa by
means of deceit.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does declare
hearsay as generally inadmissible testimonial evidence:
Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal
knowledge; hearsay excluded.—A witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception x x x Evidence is called hearsay when its
probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the
 competency and credibility of some persons other than
the witness by whom it is sought to produce it.
A person who introduces a hearsay statement is not
obliged to enter into any particular stipulation, to
answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to
reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities,
to remove any ambiguities; and that he/she entrenches
himself/herself in the simple assertion that he/she was
told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or
absent author. For this reason, the rule against hearsay
testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The
hearsay rule, however, does not apply to independently
relevant statements.
People v. Umapas is instructive on the matter: “[W]hile
the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made
by another person given for the purpose of establishing
the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly
hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement on the record is merely to
establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of
such statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or
falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact
that such a statement has been made, the hearsay rule
does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a
matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the
statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a
fact. This is the doctrine of independently relevant
statements.”
Del Rosario’s testimony can and will be admitted as
evidence only for the purpose of proving that such
statements regarding Arriola’s lack of authority to sell
the subject property were, in fact, made and uttered by
Candelaria. This is circumstantially relevant to the
instant case and within the competence of Del Rosario
to confirm. Also, Del Rosario’s account as to the fact of
her conversation with Candelaria and the latter’s stand
against Arriola’s authority to sell, irrespective of its
veracity, is considered as an independently relevant
statement that may properly be received as evidence
against Arriola. (Arriola v. People, G.R. 199975, February
24, 2020 (Hernando, J.))
45. Q: Several firearms were seized from the house of
Dalisay, but the Office of the Prosecutor ordered
that such items were not in violation of RA 10591.
However, when the counsel of Dalisay filed a
Motion to Release Seized Items, Judge Jose
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allegedly directed Dalisay to shoulder the amount
of P100,000.00 representing the Judge's travel
expenses to Camp Crame to personally verify the
licenses for the subject firearms. Judge Jose, on the
other hand, argued that it was Dalisay who moved
for him and his court personnel to have the
licenses personally verified, and offered to
shoulder their travel expenses. He further
questioned the presentation of a mere photocopy
of Certification from the PNP-Firearms and
Explosives Office (FEO) and when the original
was presented, there were some inconsistencies in
the signatures therein.
Are the FEO-issued certifications sufficient
evidence in determining the presence or absence
of a valid license or permit to own or possess
firearms?
A: Yes, FEO-issued certifications are sufficient
evidence, and thus, should be accepted by the courts in
determining the presence or absence of a valid license
or permit to own or possess firearms. OCA Circular
No. 11-2011, citing Del Rosario v. People, provides that
certifications issued by the FEO Records Section are
sufficient proof of the fact of possession or
non-possession of a valid license to own or possess
firearms or explosives in the offense of Illegal
Possession of Firearms. OCA Circular No. 11-2011
further states that personal appearances of FEO
records personnel is not required in order to establish
the authenticity of FEO-issued certifications. (Maulana
v. Noel, A.M. No. RTJ-21-006, March 15, 2021(Hernando,
J.))
46. Q: Panis, Santiago, Flores and Galingana were
charged with the crime of Murder of Brgy. Capt.
Artemio Garcia with the use of illegal firearms.
Panis, Santiago and Flores pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged while Galingana remains at
large. Panis died during the pendency of the case.
The witness, Johnny, corroborated the testimony of
Artemio, Sr. wherein his father was shot on his way
back to his house after he had coffee with him.
PCI Laggui, testified that Panis and Santiago were
lawfully arrested right after the shooting incident.
However, the Defense for Santiago raised a
different account of the incident where they
professed alibi and denial. They claimed that at
the time of the incident, he was asleep in his
house, together with his wife and children. Flores
and Panis visited him at his farm and tried to
 persuade him to participate in the killing of
Artemio, Sr. He refused. Santiago’s daughter
corroborated the testimony of his father. Johnny
committed minor inconsistencies in his testimony
when he positively identified the accused as one of
the assailants.
Are inconsistencies in minor details ground for the
denial to give credence to persuade the guilt of the
accused?
A: No. In the case of People v. Licayan, the Court
explained that discrepancies in testimonies concerning
minor details and not actually touching upon the
central fact of the crime do not impair their credibility.
These inconsistencies tend to strengthen their
credibility because they discount the possibility of their
being rehearsed. In this case, 243 Johnny’s testimony
was straightword, categorical, and sufficient to convict
Santiago. Minor inconsistencies refer merely to
collateral matters which do not touch upon the fact of
the commission of the crime. The credibility of
witnesses can be assessed by the trial court since it
possesses the first hand opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses. The trial court is in the best
point to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.
Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial
court. These are important especially in the face of
conflicting testimonies. (Poeple v. Santiago, G.R. No.
234780, March 17, 2021 (Hernando, J.)
48. Atty. T borrowed from A the amount of Five
LEGAL ETHICS
V. Legal Profession
47. B alleges that Atty. R committed acts constitutive
of a Violation of the lawyer’s oath of Professional
Responsibility. As then the Municipal
Administrator of Binangonan, Rizal, Atty. R issued
a Closure Order on B’s store. When she returned
the Closure Order back to them, the enforcers
changed the date and added the phrase "w/
BILLIARD". Thereafter, Atty. R ordered the
seizure of billiard accessories to which B protested
since the Closure Order did not include the seizure
of the said items. B and her father secured the
necessary business permits for the sari-sari store,
videoke machine, and billiard table. The
Municipal Treasurer issued another Closure Order
(Second Closure Order) against B’s father for
failure to pay such fines and penalties. Atty. R
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maintains that he was merely performing his job of
implementing the local tax ordinance. As the
Municipal Administrator, he is tasked to enforce
the local tax ordinance that was allegedly violated
by B’s family.
Q: Did B sufficiently show that Atty. R committed
acts constitutive of a Violation of the Lawyer's
Oath and the CPR?
A: NO. Atty. R’s acts could not be considered as
violations of the Lawyer's Oath and the CPR. Atty. R
was merely performing his official duties as Municipal
Administrator of the Municipality, particularly the
implementation of the Closure Order against the
businesses operated by B’s family and matters related
thereto. As Municipal Administrator, one of his duties
is to "assist in the coordination of the work of all the
officials of the local government unit, under the
supervision, direction, and control of the governor or
mayor, and for this purpose, he may convene the chiefs
of offices and other officials of the local government
unit. The implementation of a closure order and the
issuance of business permits may be considered well
within this function as a Municipal Administrator.
Significantly, B failed to prove by substantial evidence
that in the performance of his functions, Atty. R
committed acts in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and
the CPR. (Baygar v. Rivera, AC No. 8959, October 7, 2020,
Hernando J.)
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) and in
exchange for the said amount Atty. T issued a
post-dated check of the same amount. When A
deposited the check, it was dishonored for the
reason that the account was closed. A sent a
demand letter to Atty. T and in his response,
offered his Mercedes Benz as payment and
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same in
favor of A. Atty. T failed to give A the original copy
of the Certificate of Registration, claiming that he
forgot to bring it. The physical possession of the
car was not turned over to A because Atty.
Tumanda allegedly needed it for his business
ventures. A later found out that Atty. T sold the
same car to F. A then sent another demand letter
and later on filed criminal complaints for Estafa
and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP 22)
against Atty. T. Even with due notice, Atty. T failed
to file an answer and to attend the mandatory
conference before the IBP. In the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP found Atty. T was guilty
of violating Canon 1 of the CPR for issuing a
worthless check and recommended that Atty. T be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same offense will be dealt with more
severely. In its Notice of Resolution, the Board of
Governors (BOG) of the IBP adopted the findings
of the Investigating Commissioner but modified
the recommended penalty to suspension from the
practice of law to three (3) years. The BOG further
directed Director E of the CBD to prepare an
extended resolution explaining the BOG's action
of increasing the period of suspension. Director E
issued an Extended Resolution explaining that
Atty. T's acts of repeatedly changing his address to
evade his obligation and of failing to answer and
participate in the proceedings of the instant case
are aggravating circumstances warranting the
imposition of a longer period of suspension.
Q: Were Atty. T’s actions in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility?
A: YES, Atty. T’s actions were in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon 1,
Rule 1.01, and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 as well as Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court. In this case, Atty. T
obtained a loan from A in the amount of P500,000.00
and in exchange thereof issued a worthless check to
complainant. This fact alone is a ground for
disciplinary action as it constitutes gross misconduct. It
indicates his unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed upon him and his lack of personal honesty and
good moral character rendering him unworthy of
public confidence. In Ong v. Atty. Delos Santos, the Court
explained that a lawyer who issues a worthless check is
in breach of his oath to obey the laws. A penalty of
one-year suspension from the practice of law is usually
imposed upon a lawyer who issues a worthless check.
However, considering the attendant circumstances in
the instant case, the Court agrees with the IBP and the
OBC that the penalty imposed should be increased to
three years. Aside from issuing a worthless check,
respondent has acted in utmost bad faith when he sold
to a third person the Mercedes Benz which he
previously sold to complainant and would have served
as full payment for the loan obligation. Such an act is a
clear violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It is a deceitful conduct that shows his
lack of honesty and good moral character. Respondent
Atty. T had been using several addresses to avoid being
traced and to evade his obligation to Andaya. In fact,
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because of this, the IBP had to send copies of the
Notice of Hearing to the different addresses of Atty. T
as he could not be located. Such aberrant behavior lays
bare his lack of integrity and moral soundness. All these
circumstances taken together justify the imposition
upon respondent of a three-year suspension from the
practice of law. (Andaya v Tumanda, A.C. No. 12209,
February 18, 2020, Hernando J.)
49. Rev. Father S, Director of the Prison Ministry of
the Diocese of Butuan sent a letter to the Office of
the Court Administrator denouncing the
extortionate activities committed by A against the
detainees of the Provincial Jail of Agusan. This was
supported by the affidavits of R and M claiming
that the Judge was extorting money in exchange of
the detainees’ liberty. The OCA investigation
shows that the criminal cases decided by Judge A
which was subject of his extortion activities were
decided in haste and without regard to procedural
rules that cast doubt on regularity of the acquittal
of all accused. Judge A denied all the accusations,
and insisted that the same were false, baseless and
concocted by an evil and malicious mind for the
sole purpose of besmirching his unblemished
record of service in the Judiciary. Pending review
of this administrative case, the Court received the
letter from the respondent's wife dated September
13, 2017 informing about Judge A’s demise.
Subsequently, the counsel for the late judge filed a
Notice of Death and Motion to Dismiss. The OCA
disagreed with the urging of the respondent's
counsel to dismiss the complaint in view of his
intervening demise.
Q: Is the death of the respondent judge during the
pendency of the administrative case filed against
him a ground for the dismissal of the case?
A: The death of the respondent should not result in the
dismissal of the administrative complaint.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct
of a judge must be free of every whiff of impropriety
not only in regard to his discharge of judicial duties, but
also to his behavior outside his office and even as a
private individual. Indeed, judges should be extra
prudent in associating with litigants and counsel who
have matters pending before them in order to avoid
even the mere perception of possible bias or partiality.
In view of this, whether or not Judge A really
demanded money in exchange for either the liberty of
 R and M or the dismissal of the criminal case filed
against them even became immaterial herein. By simply
meeting and talking with them as the accused whose
cases were then pending in his sala, Judge A already
transgressed ethical norms and compromised his
integrity and impartiality as the trial judge.
Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
grave misconduct constituting violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct is a serious offense that results in
dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of
the benefits, and perpetual disqualification from
reappointment or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned and controlled
corporations, except accrued leave credits.
Had Judge A not died, he would have been meted the
extreme penalty of dismissal, with the concomitant
forfeiture of all retirement and allied benefits due to
him, except accrued leaves, as an accessory penalty.
Considering that his intervening death has rendered his
dismissal no longer feasible, the accessory penalty of
forfeiture of all such retirement and allied benefits,
except accrued leaves, then becomes the viable
sanction. (Re: Investigation Report on the Alleged Extortion
Activities of Presiding Judge Gadofredo B. Abul, Jr., A.M. No.
RTJ-17-2486 September 8, 2020, Hernando J.)
50. Mr. Ice filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Atty.
Amazona, before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for notarizing an allegedly false
document. Mr. Ice alleged that Atty. Amazona
notarized a letter signed by a certain Lotho,
Director and Auditor of South Forbes Phuket
Mansions Homeowners Association, Inc.
According to them, this letter was used to facilitate
the registration of the homeowners association.
Mr. Ice averred that the said letter falsely stated
that most buyers of the subdivision lots were out of
the country and as such, it was highly improbable
to secure their signatures. They claimed that Atty.
Amazona knew that such assertion was untrue
because he was in constant communication with
the residents of South Forbes Phuket Mansions,
including complainants. They further claimed that
the list of members with corresponding signatures
attached to the letter was also false, since it
referred to their attendance during a meeting for a
property manager, and not for a homeowners
meeting for the registration of the homeowners'
association when in fact there was none.
-21-
Investigating Commissioner Cabrera
recommended the dismissal of the administrative
complaint against Atty. Amazona for lack of merit.
Commissioner Cabrera opined that the mere act of
notarizing the letter is not in itself a violation of the
Notarial Rules since respondent merely attested to
the fact that Lotho has personally appeared before
him and subscribed to the truth of the contents of
the said letter. Comm. Cabrera stated that the truth
or falsity of the allegations in the said letter is the
sole responsibility of affiant Lotho and does not
extend to the respondent as notary public. In its
Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors resolved
to adopt the findings of fact and recommendation
of Comm. Cabrera in dismissing the complaint.
Q: Was Atty. Amazona liable for notarizing an
allegedly false document?
A: NO, Atty. Amazona is not liable for notarizing the
document. The complainants failed to establish
through substantial evidence a cause for disciplinary
action against the respondents. Every person is
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Settled
is the rule that in disbarment proceedings, the
complainant must satisfactorily establish the allegations
of his or her complaint through substantial evidence.
Mere allegations without proof are disregarded
considering the gravity of the penalty prayed for.
Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
cannot be given credence. The complained act does not
constitute any violation of the Rules of Court, the
Notarial Rules, nor the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Atty. Amazona merely performed his duty when he
attested to the fact that Lotho personally appeared and
signed the said letter before him. The truth or falsity of
the contents of the letter is the responsibility of the
Lotho, especially since no substantial evidence was
presented to prove that Atty. Amazona knowingly
notarized a false document. (Ick v. Amazona, A.C. No.
12375, February 26, 2020, Hernando)
51. V charged Atty. J with violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for representing
conflicting interests. Villamor alleged that R and
Atty. J coaxed her into organizing a lending
company. R volunteered to handle the day-to-day
operation while Atty. J would handle the legal side
of the business. Persuaded by these
representations, V acceded. True to his word,
respondent took care of the registration of the
company with the Securities and Exchange In determining whether a lawyer is guilty of violating
Commission as well as preparation and drafting of the rules on conflict on interest under the CPR, it is
some legal documents such as the Articles of essential to determine whether:
Incorporation. In addition, when the company (1) a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or
needed additional funds, Atty. J informed Villamor claim in behalf of one client and, at the same
that she could borrow from Y. Soon after, Atty. J time, to oppose that claim for the other client;
delivered the amount of P500,000.00 to Villamor, (2) the acceptance of a new relation would
which amount was infused into the lending prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of
business as additional capital. Atty. J then undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
prepared a promissory note where all three of them invite suspension of unfaithfulness or
signed as co-borrowers. V, however, was neither double-dealing in the performance of that duty;
given a copy of the said promissory note nor had and
any occasion to meet Y. (3) a lawyer would be called upon in the new
relation to use against a former client any
In March 2007, Atty. J requested V to sign blank confidential information acquired through their
SEC pre-printed AOI forms. That same month, connection or previous employment.
Atty. J gave V a copy of the Certificate of
Registration of their lending company which they In this case, Atty. J used confidential information he
named as V Credit, Inc. To her surprise, V noted acquired from V through their connection therefrom
that respondent and R each own 30,000 shares of for his new relation with Y, to the prejudice of V.
stock or 48% of the company despite the fact that Therefore, Atty. J is guilty of violating the Code of
they only contributed a minimal amount of money. Professional Responsibility. (Villamor v Jumao-as, A.C.
In April 2008, respondent told V to issue a No 8111, December 09, 2020, Hernando J)
postdated check amounting to P650,000.00 in the
name of Y as a belated security for their loan of
P500,000.00, with 40 P150,000.00 representing
accrued interest. Respondent assured Villamor
that said check will not be negotiated. In May
2008, Atty. J and Retubado left V's company and
joined Y's 3E's Debt Equity Grant Co., also a
lending company. Subsequently, V also came to
know that Atty. J and R were trying to convince the
collectors of V Credit, Inc. to abandon V and to
join their new lending company. They told V's
collectors to remit their collections to 3E's Debt
Equity Grant Co. since V owed Y the amount of
P650,000.00 and that they could join their new
company after they have fully remitted the amount
of P650,000.00. Worse, on October 8, 2008, Atty. J
sent a demand letter to V, for and on behalf of Y,
demanding payment of P650,000.00.

Q: Are Atty. J’ acts constitutive of a violation of

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

A: Yes, Atty. J violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility (CPR) for representing conflict of
interest. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interest except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

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Q: Illustrate how courts acquire jurisdiction over the
parties.
Meaning Jurisdiction over the parties refers to the power
of the court to make decisions that are binding
on persons (De Pedro v. Romasan Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 194751, November 26,
2014)
Civil Jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired as
Cases soon as he files his complaint or petition (De
Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, G.R.
No. 194751, November 26, 2014; Heirs of Josefina
Gabriel v. Cebrero, G.R. No. 222737, November 12,
2018) because by the mere filing of the
complaint, the plaintiff, in a civil action,
voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction
of the court (Guy v. Gacott, supra; See also Onstott
v. Upper Tagpos Neighborhood Association, Inc., G.R.
No. 221047, September 14, 2016).
Generally no docket fees are required in
criminal cases. However, if a claim for damages
has been instituted with a criminal case, then a
docket fee is required for the claim for
damages.
The court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the accused upon lawful arrest or voluntary
surrender. (Rule 113)
Special The court acquires jurisdiction over the case
proceedin and over the petitioner upon publication.
gs cases
The requirement of special services in a special
proceeding is not generally jurisdictional, as a
general rule, they are only in compliance with
the due process clause of the Constitution.

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in

civil cases is acquired service of summons.
However, "even without valid service of
summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant if the latter
voluntarily appears before it." "If the defendant
knowingly does an act inconsistent with the
right to object to the lack of personal
jurisdiction as to them, like voluntarily
appearing in the action, they are deemed to
have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
of the court." (Jorgenetics Swine Improvement Corp.
v. Thick & Thin Agri-Products, Inc., G.R. Nos.
201044 & 222691, May 5, 2021, J. Hernando)

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant

cannot be acquired notwithstanding his
knowledge of the pendency of a case against
him, unless he was validly served with
summons. Thus, serving the order and TPO to
Atty. Palmero cannot be considered a valid
service of summons. (Sabado v. Sabado, G.R.
No. 214270, [May 12, 2021, J. Hernando)
Intervenor - The court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the intervenor upon
approval of the motion for leave to intervene.

Criminal It does not have to acquire jurisdiction over the

cases plaintiff because it is the same party as the
People of the Philippines.

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ANNEX A: Different Modes of Appeal

RULE 40: RULE 41: RULE 42: PETITION RULE 43: PETITION RULE 45: PETITION
ORDINARY APPEAL ORDINARY APPEAL FOR REVIEW (MTC FOR REVIEW (QJAs FOR REVIEW ON
(MTC to RTC) (RTC TO CA) TO RTC TO CA) TO CA) CERTIORARI (RTC
TO CA TO SC)

As to mode of appeal

Notice of appeal/ Notice of appeal/ Petition for review with Verified petition for Petition for review on
Record on appeal with Record on appeal with the CA [Sec. 1, Rule 42] review with the CA [Sec. certiorari with the SC
the court of origin the court of origin With: Certificate of 5, Rule 43] [Sec. 2(c), Rule 41]
(MTC). [Section 5, Rule (RTC) [Sec. 2(a), Rule Non-Forum Shopping. With: Certificate of With: Certificate of
40] 41] Non-Forum Shopping. Non-Forum Shopping.

Filed with

Filed with the MTC Filed with the RTC Filed with the CA Filed with the CA Filed with the SC
(Court of origin) (Court of origin)
Appeal to the CA Appeal to the CA Appeal to the SC
Appeal to the RTC Appeal to the CA

As to issues involved

Questions of fact or Questions of fact or Questions of fact, Questions of fact, Only questions of law
mixed questions of fact mixed questions of fact questions of law, or questions of law, or
and law and law mixed questions of both mixed questions of both

As to flow

MTC → RTC RTC (exercising original MTC → RTC Quasi-judicial agency RTC (exercising original
JD) → CA (exercising appellate exercising quasi-judicial JD), CA, Sandiganbayan,
jurisdiction) → CA functions enumerated CTA (en banc) → SC
therein, except
judgments or final
orders issued under the
Labor Code, CSC,
Ombudsman
(administrative/
disciplinary cases) →
CA

Subject of appeal

Case decided by an Case decided by RTC in Case decided by RTC in Awards, judgments, final Case where only
MTC. exercise of original exercise of appellate orders or resolutions of question of law are
jurisdiction [Sec. 2(a), jurisdiction or authorized by any raised or involved [Sec.
Rule 41] QJA in the exercise of 2(c), Rule 41]
its quasi-judicial
functions [Sec. 1, Rule Appeal by certiorari
43] from a judgment or final
order or resolution of
EXCEPT: Judgments or the CA, the

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 RULE 40: RULE 41: RULE 42: PETITION RULE 43: PETITION RULE 45: PETITION
ORDINARY APPEAL ORDINARY APPEAL FOR REVIEW (MTC FOR REVIEW (QJAs FOR REVIEW ON
(MTC to RTC) (RTC TO CA) TO RTC TO CA) TO CA) CERTIORARI (RTC
TO CA TO SC)

final orders issued under Sandiganbayan, the RTC

the Labor Code [Sec. 2, or other courts
Rule 43] whenever authorized by
law [Sec. 1, Rule 45]

As to manner

Filing a notice of appeal Filing a notice of appeal File a verified petition File a verified petition File verified petition for
with the court which with the court which for review with the CA, for review in 7 legible review on certiorari with
rendered the judgment rendered the judgment paying at the same copies with the CA, with the SC [Sec. 1, Rule 45]
or final order appealed or final order appealed time to the clerk of proof of service of a Petitioner shall pay the
from and serving a copy from and serving a copy said court the copy thereof on the corresponding docket
thereof upon the adverse thereof upon the adverse corresponding docket adverse party and on the and other lawful fees to
party. party and other lawful fees, court or agency a quo. the COC of the SC and
depositing the amount The original copy of the deposit the amount of
Docket fees shall be If required, the record of PHP 500.00 for petition intended for the PHP 500.00 for costs at
paid to the clerk of court on appeal shall be filed costs, and furnishing CA shall be indicated as the time of the filing of
of the MTC. and served in like the RTC and the such by the petitioner. the petition. Proof of
manner [Sec. 2, Rule 41] adverse party with a service of a copy thereof
copy of the petition Upon the filing of the on the lower court
Matter of Right; Filed with the court of origin [Sec. 1, Rule 42] petition, the petitioner concerned and on the
All records are elevated from court of origin shall pay to the COC of adverse party shall be
the CA the docketing submitted together with
and other lawful fees the petition [Sec. 3, Rule
and deposit the sum of 45]
PHP 500.00 for costs
[Sec.5, Rule 43]

As to period

Within 15 days after Within 15 days from Within 15 days from Within 15 days from: Within 15 days from
notice to the appellant notice of the judgment notice of 1. notice of the award, notice of
of the judgment or or final order appealed a. the decision judgment, final order or a. the judgment or
final order appealed from sought to be resolution, or final order or
from. Where a record of reviewed or 2. the date of resolution
Where a record of appeal is required, file b. the denial of a. its last publication, if appealed from,
appeal is required, file a notice of appeal and petitioner’s MNT publication is or
a notice of appeal and a record on appeal or MR filed in due required by law for b. the denial of the
a record on appeal within 30 days from time after its effectivity, or petitioner’s
within 30 days from notice of the judgment judgment [Sec. 1, b. the denial MNT or MR filed
notice of the judgment or final order [Sec. 3, Rule 42] of petitioner’s MNT in due time after
or final order. Rule 41] or MR duly filed in notice of the
accordance with the judgment [Sec.
governing law of the 2, Rule 45]
court or agency a quo
[Sec. 4, Rule 43]

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ANNEX B: Different Kinds of Jurisdiction
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF VARIOUS PHILIPPINE COURTS
Exclusive Original
Expropriation
Labor Dispute
Forcible Entry & Unlawful
Detainer
Authority to Conduct
Administrative
Investigations over Local
Elective Officials and to
Impose Preventive
Suspension over Elective
Provincial or City Officials
Public School Teachers
Enforcement of a Money
Claim Against a Local
Government Unit
RTCs are courts of general jurisdiction
NOTE: Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary disputes
between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province, it follows that RTCs
have the power and authority to hear and determine such controversy.
RTC because it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. It does not involve the recovery of sum of
money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take property
for public use.
GR: An action for damages for abuse of right as an incident to dismissal is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.
XPNs:
1. The labor arbiter has no jurisdiction for claims of damages based on quasi-delict which has
no reasonable connection with the employer-employee relations claims under the LC.
2. It is the regular courts that has jurisdiction where no employer-employee relationship exists
between the parties and no issue involved may be resolved by reference to the LC, other
labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement.
The MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction. Under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure,
MTCs, MTCCs, and MCTCs have jurisdiction over all cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered.
It is entrusted to the Secretary of Local Government and concurrent with the Ombudsman upon
enactment of R.A. No. 6770. There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has
repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act.
The Ombudsman must yield to the Division School Superintendent in the investigation of
administrative charges against public school teachers.
XPN: If the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the
committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.
COA has the primary jurisdiction to pass upon the money claim. It is within the COA’s domain to
pass upon money claims against the government or any subdivision thereof as provided for under Sec
26. of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. Courts may raise the issue of primary
jurisdiction sua sponte (on its own will or motion; means to act spontaneously without prompting from
another party) and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it as the
doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power between judicial and administrative bodies and not
for the convenience of the parties.
-26-
ANNEX C: Post Judgment Remedies

Remedies before judgment becomes final and executory Remedies after judgment is final and executory
1. Motion for reconsideration 1. Petition for relief from judgment
2. Motion for new trial 2. Action to annul a judgment
3. Appeal 3. Petition for certiorari
4. Collateral attack of a judgment

Rules of Court, Rule 37

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

DEFINITION/ Directed against a judgment or a final order. It does New trial is a remedy that seeks to temper the severity
NATURE not refer to one for interlocutory orders, which often of a judgment or prevent a failure of justice.
precedes a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The grant of a new trial is, generally speaking,
These motions are prohibited in cases covered by the addressed to the sound discretion of the court which
Rule on Summary Procedure [Sec. 19] and those falling cannot be interfered with unless a clear abuse thereof
under the Rules of Procedure on Small Claims Cases is shown.
[Sec. 16].
● Also prohibited in actions for unlawful
detainer and forcible entry because they are
governed by Rules of Summary Procedure.

WHERE FILED With the trial court which rendered the questioned judgment.

WHEN FILED Within the period for taking an appeal within 15 or 30 days from notice of the judgment.
● No motion for extension of time to file shall be allowed.
● Period of appeal depends on whether it is by mere notice or by record.
○ If by notice: Within 15 days after notice to the appellant of the judgment or final order
appealed from
○ If by record: Within 30 days from notice of judgment or final order. (Only in special
proceedings and cases which allow multiple or separate appeals)
● These periods begin to run upon receipt by the counsel of notice of the decision or final order appealed
from. Notice to counsel is notice to the parties. Service on the party represented by counsel is not the
official notice and receipt.

EFFECT OF Interrupts the period of appeal.

FILING

GROUNDS 1. Damages awarded are excessive 1. Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable

2. Evidence is insufficient to justify the decision negligence (FAME) which ordinary prudence
or final order could not have guarded against and by reason
3. Decision or final order is contrary to law of which such aggrieved party has probably
[Sec. 1, Rule 37] been impaired in his rights, or
2. Newly discovered evidence, which he could
It is not sufficient to mention the ground relied upon. not, with reasonable diligence, have
It is necessary for the motion to specifically point out discovered and produced at the trial, and
the findings or conclusions. which if presented would probably alter the
result [Sec. 1, Rule 37]

Requisites on newly discovered evidence:

-27-
 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

a. The evidence was discovered after trial.

b. Such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even
with exercise of reasonable diligence
c. It is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching
d. Evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment, if admitted.

Gross negligence of counsel is not a ground for new

trial.

FORM The motion shall be made in writing stating the The motion shall be made in writing stating the
ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which
shall be served by the movant on the adverse party. shall be served by the movant on the adverse party.

A motion for reconsideration shall point out
specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment
or final order which are not supported by the evidence
or which are contrary to law, making express reference
to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the
provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such
findings or conclusions.
A motion for new trial shall be proved in the manner
provided for proof of motions. A motion for the cause
mentioned in the first ground shall be supported by
affidavits of merits which may be rebutted by
counter-affidavits.
A motion for the cause mentioned in the second
ground shall be supported by affidavits of the
witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be
given, or by duly authenticated documents which are
proposed to be introduced in evidence.

PRO FORMA MOTION

● One which does not satisfy the requirements of the Rules and will be treated as a motion to delay the
proceedings

Non-compliance with this requirement would reduce the motion to a mere pro forma motion. A pro forma
motion does not toll the reglementary period of appeal even if timely filed

A motion for reconsideration was previously held to be pro forma because of these reasons:
a. Second motion for reconsideration
b. It did not comply with the rules that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be
contrary to law or not supported by evidence
c. If failed to substantiate the alleged errors
d. It merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law
e. The adverse party was not given notice thereof

If the circumstances of the case do not show an intent to delay the proceedings, the courts should be slow to
declare the same outright as pro forma.

RESOLUTION Within 30 days from the time it is submitted for resolution.

REMEDY Appeal from the judgment or final order itself within a fresh period of 15 days from receipt or notice of the
WHEN order denying or dismissing the motion.
MOTION

-28-
 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

IS DENIED May the order denying the motion for reconsideration be assailed by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65? NO. Because of the
amendment by AM 07-7-12-SC of Rule 41, the order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration was
deleted from matters subject of a Rule 65 petition.

FRESH PERIOD This rule provides that the movant has a “fresh period” of 15 days from receipt of the order denying or
RULE OR dismissing the motion for reconsideration within which to file a notice of appeal.
NEYPES RULE ● Period for appeal of losing party does not start from the date of the notice to him of the judgment.
● Does not apply when no MR or MNT has been filed, in which the 15-day period for appeal runs from
notice of the judgment.
● BASIS: Section 2 of Rule 40 and Section 3 of Rule 41. (“judgment or final order”)

Aside from Rule 41, this also applies to Rule 40 governing appeals from MTC to RTC, Rule 42 on petitions for
review from RTC to CA, Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA, and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the SC.

This rule does not apply to administrative appeals (e.g. from HLURB to OP).

Yu v. Samson-Tatad – the Neypes rule applies to criminal cases.

EFFECT OF The court may amend such judgment or final order The original judgment or final order is vacated. The
GRANTING accordingly. The amended judgment is in the nature of case stands for trial de novo and will be tried anew.
a new judgment which supersedes the original.

PARTIAL If the court finds that the motion affects the issues as
RECONSIDERA to only a part or less than all of the matters in the
TION/NEW controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties
TRIAL to it, the order may grant a reconsideration to such
issues if severable without interfering with the
judgment or final order upon the rest.
If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear to
the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less
than all of the matter in controversy, or only one, or
less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a
new trial as to such issues if severable without
interfering with the judgment or final order upon the
rest.

EFFECT: When less than all of the issues are ordered

retried, the court may either enter a judgment or final
order as to the rest, or stay the enforcement of such
judgment or final order until after the new trial.

RULE ON General Rule: A party shall not be allowed to file a Second motion may be allowed as long as based on
SECOND second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or grounds not available or existing when the first motion
MOTION final order. was made.

Exception: Unless there are extraordinarily persuasive
reasons and only after an express leave shall have been
first obtained.
A motion for new trial shall include all grounds then
available and those not so included shall be deemed
waived. A second motion for new trial, based on a
ground not existing nor available when the first
motion was made, may be filed within the time herein
provided excluding the time during which the first
motion had been pending.

IN APPEALED May be filed within 15 days from notice thereof, with At any time after the appeal from the lower court has
CASES proof of service on the adverse party. The motion shall been perfected and before the Court of Appeals loses
be resolved within 90 days from the date when the jurisdiction over the case, a party may file a motion for

-29-
 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

court declares it submitted for resolution.
Pendency of the MR shall stay the execution of
judgment or final resolution sought to be reconsidered
provided that it is:
a. Filed on time
b. By the proper party
new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence.
It must be accompanied with affidavits showing the
facts constituting the grounds therefor and newly
discovered evidence.
It shall be resolved within 90 days from the date when
the court declares it submitted for resolution.

Exception: When the court, for good reasons, Does not apply to SC but applies to the CA.
otherwise directs

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