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SECURITY, CONFLICT AND COOPERATION
IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Italy in the New

International Order,
1917–1922
Edited by
antonio varsori
benedet to z acc aria
Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the
Contemporary World

Series Editors
Effie G. H. Pedaliu
LSE Ideas
London, UK

John W. Young
University of Nottingham
Nottingham, UK
The Palgrave Macmillan series, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the
Contemporary World aims to make a significant contribution to academic
and policy debates on cooperation, conflict and security since 1900. It
evolved from the series Global Conflict and Security edited by Professor
Saki Ruth Dockrill. The current series welcomes proposals that offer inno-
vative historical perspectives, based on archival evidence and promoting an
empirical understanding of economic and political cooperation, conflict
and security, peace-making, diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, nation-
building, intelligence, terrorism, the influence of ideology and religion on
international relations, as well as the work of international organisations
and non-governmental organisations.

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14489
 Antonio Varsori · Benedetto Zaccaria
Editors

Italy in the New

International Order,
1917–1922
Editors
Antonio Varsori Benedetto Zaccaria
Department of Political Science, Law, Department of Linguistics and
and International Studies Comparative Cultural Studies
University of Padova Ca’ Foscari University of Venice
Padova, Italy Venice, Italy

Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World

ISBN 978-3-030-50092-4 ISBN 978-3-030-50093-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50093-1

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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 Contents

1 How to Become a Great Power: Italy in the New

International Order, 1917–1922 1
Antonio Varsori

Part I Italy and the Allies

2 Lloyd George, Italy, and the Making of a New World

Order, 1916–1922 19
William Mulligan

3 Italy Through British Eyes, 1919–1920 41

Giulia Bentivoglio

4 France and Italy in the Making of a New Central

Europe, 1918–1922: Cooperation and Rivalry 59
Frédéric Dessberg

5 Wilson’s Parallel Diplomacy: The American Red Cross

and Italian Public Opinion, 1917–1919 89
Daniela Rossini

v
vi CONTENTS

6 The King’s Diplomacy from World War I to Its

Aftermath 113
Andrea Ungari

Part II Italy and the Vanquished Nations

7 Italy and Austria, 1918–1920: Overcoming

Hereditary Enmity 137
Maddalena Guiotto

8 Betraying the Allies? Italy, Hungary and the Béla Kun

Intrigue 167
Valentine Lomellini

9 Public Opinion in the Weimar Republic and the Image

of Post-War Italy, 1918–1922 185
Monica Fioravanzo

Part III Italy and the New Europe

10 Searching for a Policy for the New Europe: Italy

and the Eastern European Settlement at the Paris
Peace Conference 205
Francesco Caccamo

11 Encroaching Visions: Italy, Yugoslavia and the Adriatic

Question, 1918–1920 229
Massimo Bucarelli and Benedetto Zaccaria

12 Italy: The View from Moscow from 1917 to the Rise

of Mussolini 255
Elena Dundovich
 CONTENTS vii

13 Italy Faces the Birth of the League of Nations 281

Italo Garzia

14 A Mutilated International Order 309

Georges-Henri Soutou

Index 333
 Notes on Contributors

Giulia Bentivoglio is a lecturer at the University of Padova. She is the

author of many articles on British and Italian foreign policy. Among her
publications are The Two Sick Men of Europe? Britain and Italy Between
Crisis and Renaissance, 1976–1983 (2018); La relazione necessaria. La
Gran Bretagna del Governo Heath e gli Stati Uniti (1970–1974) (2011).
Massimo Bucarelli (Ph.D.) teaches History of International Relations
and History of European Integration at ‘Sapienza’ University of Rome.
He has authored and edited several books and scholarly articles on Italian-
Yugoslav relations in the twentieth century. Among them are Mussolini
e la Jugoslavia 1922–1939 (2006); Aldo Moro, l’Italia repubblicana e i
Balcani (2011); Italy and Tito’s Yugoslavia in the Age of International
Détente (2016); L’Italia tra la guerra e la pace: il problema dell’inter-
vento italiano nella Prima Guerra Mondiale e le conseguenze negli assetti
adriatici e balcanici (2018).
Francesco Caccamo is Associate Professor of Eastern European History
at the University of Chieti. Italy’s policy in Eastern Europe is one of his
main fields of research. On this subject, he published L’Italia e la “Nuova
Europa” (1919–1920) (2000) and Odissea arbëreshe (2012), and co-edited
L’occupazione italiana della Jugoslavia (2008).
Frédéric Dessberg is Assistant Professor at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
University, assigned to the Military Academy of Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan.
He currently heads the ‘European Defence and Security’ Department at

ix
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

the Military Academy Research Centre, is a member of UMR SIRICE

(Sorbonne), and holds a Jean Monnet European Chair. He specialises
in French policy in Central and Eastern Europe between the two World
Wars.
Elena Dundovich is Full Professor of History of International Relations
in the Department of Political Science, University of Pisa. She teaches
courses in History of International Relations, History of Eastern Europe,
and Geopolitical Dynamics in the Post-Soviet Area. She is Director of the
Ph.D. School in Political Science. Among her publications are Bandiera
Rossa trionferà? (2017) and Cornobyl’. L’assenza (2012).
Monica Fioravanzo is Professor of Contemporary History at the
University of Padova. She has held visiting positions at the FU of Berlin,
IFZ of Munich, and Columbia University in New York. Among her publi-
cations are Italia e Germania dopo la caduta del Muro. Politica, cultura,
economia, edited with F. Focardi and L. Klinkhammer (2019); 1943.
Strategie militari, collaborazionismi, Resistenze (2015), and Mussolini e
Hitler: la Repubblica sociale sotto il Terzo Reich (2009).
Italo Garzia was Full Professor of History and International Relations
at the University of Bari, Italy. He has published extensively in the field
of the international activities of the Holy See, with particular focus on the
papacies of Benedict XV, Pious XI and Pious XII, and the birth of the
League of Nations. His scholarly interests also include Adriatic relations
and the foreign policy of Aldo Moro. His works include La Questione
Romana durante la prima guerra mondiale (1981), Pio XII e l’Italia
nella seconda guerra mondiale (1988) and L’Italia e le origini della Società
delle Nazioni (1995).
Maddalena Guiotto is a Researcher at the Fondazione Museo Storico
in Trento. She specialises in the history of Italian-Austrian and Italian-
German relations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. She has
edited Italien und Österreich im Mitteleuropa der Zwischenkriegszeit/Italia
e Austria nella Mitteleuropa tra le due guerre mondiali (2018).
Valentine Lomellini is Associate Professor in History of International
Relations at the University of Padova, with a Ph.D. in Political Systems
and Institutional Changes. Among her most recent publications are La
grande paura rossa. L’Italia delle spie bolsceviche (1917–1922) (2015) and,
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xi

as editor, The Rise of Bolshevism and Its Impact on the Interwar Inter-
national Order (2020). She is currently working on the European State
response towards international terrorism during the Cold War.
William Mulligan is a Professor of Modern History at University
College Dublin. He has written widely on the First World War, including
The Origins of the First World War (2010) and The Great War for Peace
(2014).
Daniela Rossini is Professor of American History at Roma Tre Univer-
sity. Her recent publications are: Woodrow Wilson and the American Myth
in Italy: Culture, Diplomacy and War Propaganda (2008); Donne e propa-
ganda internazionale. Percorsi femminili tra Italia e Stati Uniti nell’età
della Grande Guerra (2015); and (as co-editor) 1917. L’inizio del secolo
americano (2018).
Georges-Henri Soutou is Professor Emeritus at Paris-Sorbonne (Paris
IV) University and a member of the Institut de France. His works focus
particularly on the First World War, and Franco-German relations and the
Cold War. Major publications in this context are: L’Or et le Sang. Les buts
de guerre économiques de la Première guerre mondiale (1989); L’Alliance
incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954–1996
(1996); La Guerre de Cinquante Ans. Les relations Est-Ouest 1943–1990
(2001); La Grande Illusion. Quand la France perdait la paix 1914–1920
(2015); and La guerre froide de la France 1941–1990 (2018).
Andrea Ungari is Full Professor in Contemporary History at Guglielmo
Marconi University and Adjunct Professor in Theory and History of
Political Parties at Luiss Guido Carli University, both in Rome. His
recent publications are La guerra del Re. Monarchia, Sistema politico e
Forze armate nella Grande guerra (2018) and the Atlante Geopolitico del
Mediterraneo 2019 (2019).
Antonio Varsori is Full Professor of History of International Relations
at the University of Padova, Italy. He is also a member of the Commis-
sion for the Publication of Italian Diplomatic Documents at the Italian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Among his most recent publications are
Radioso Maggio. Come l’Italia entrò in Guerra (2015), Storia inter-
nazionale. Dal 1919 a oggi (2nd edition, 2020), and, with Annalisa
Urbano, Mogadiscio 1948. Un eccidio di italiani fra decolonizzazione e
guerra fredda (2019).
xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Benedetto Zaccaria is currently a ‘Research Grant Holder’ in the

Department of Linguistics and Comparative Cultural Studies, Ca’ Foscari
University, Venice, Italy. He specialises in the History of International
Relations, with a focus on the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Among his
publications are The EEC’s Yugoslav Policy in Cold War Europe, 1968–
1980 (2016), La Strada per Osimo. Italia e Jugoslavia allo specchio (1965–
1975) (2018), and, with Antonio Varsori (eds.), Italy in the International
System from Détente to the End of the Cold War: The Underrated Ally
(2018).
 Abbreviations

AA Auswärtiges Amt
ACP Archivio Conferenza della Pace
ACS Archivio Centrale dello Stato
ADAP Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik
ADÖ Außenpolitische Dokumente der Republik Österreich 1918–
1938
AdR Archiv der Republik
AJ Arhiv Jugoslavije
ARC American Red Cross
ASMAE Archivio Storico Ministero degli Affari Esteri
AVPRF Archiv Vnešnej Politiki Rossijskoj Federacii
BL British Library
COMINTERN Communist International
CPI Committee on Public Information
DDF Documents diplomatiques français
DDI Documenti diplomatici italiani
DVP Dokumenty Vnešnej Politiki SSSR
FO Foreign Office
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IWM Imperial War Museum
LRCS League of Red Cross Societies
NARA National Archives and Records Administration
NPA Neues Politisches Archiv
ÖStA Österreichisches Staatsarchiv
PA Parliamentary Archives

xiii
xiv ABBREVIATIONS

PAAA Politisches Archiv des auswärtigen Amts

PCI Partito Comunista Italiano
RA Royal Archives
RKP Russian Communist Party
SHS Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca
SIS British Secret Intelligence Service
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
TNA The National Archives
 CHAPTER 1

How to Become a Great Power: Italy

in the New International Order, 1917–1922

Antonio Varsori

During the last decade, there has been a remarkable flow of new scholarly
publications, especially in English, French and German, on both the First
World War and the attempts by the victorious powers, starting with the
Versailles Conference, to create a peaceful and stable international order.1

1 For a review of historical contributions on the First World War in English, French,
German and Italian, see the thematic issue of Ventunesimo Secolo, Vol. 41, 2017, especially
the contributions by Erik Jan Zurcher, William Mulligan, Just Duelffer, Georges-Henri
Soutou and Monica Fioravanzo. As regards peace treaties, see Antonio Varsori, ‘L’Europa
dei trattati: alcune annotazioni interpretative’, in Pierluigi Ballini and Antonio Varsori
(eds.), 1919–1920: I trattati di pace e l’Europa (Venice: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere
e Arti, 2020). In general, also the seminal work by Adam Tooze, The Deluge. The Great
War and the Remaking of Global Order (London: Allen Lane, 2014); Zara Steiner, The
Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919–1933 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005).

A. Varsori (B)
University of Padova, Padova, Italy
e-mail: antonio.varsori@unipd.it

© The Author(s) 2020 1

A. Varsori and B. Zaccaria (eds.),
Italy in the New International Order, 1917–1922,
Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50093-1_1
2 A. VARSORI

Although many contributions have offered new interpretations and anal-

ysed areas and dynamics which were not limited to traditional problems,
such as the responsibility for unleashing the conflict, French-German
rivalry, the German Peace Treaty or the roles played by Woodrow Wilson,
Georges Clemenceau and David Lloyd George at Versailles,2 these multi-
faceted analyses seem to reveal some blank spots: that is, Italy’s political
role and diplomatic initiatives, during both the conflict and the building
of the so-called Versailles system. Obviously, there are a few exceptions,
such as the volume edited by Vanda Wilcox, Italy in the Era of the Great
War, but most of its chapters describe the military aspects of Italian
participation in the conflict, and some social and cultural problems; only
few short essays focus on Italy’s foreign policy and its role in the complex
political and diplomatic process which led to the post-war international
order.3 Even an interesting recent study, such as that by Alan Sharp,
who set the Paris peace treaties in a wider and long-term perspective,
limited its analysis to a few traditional references to the Adriatic ques-
tion, arguing that, during the post-war period, Italy was a ‘revisionist’
power.4 The most recent Italian interpretation offers a very different view
of Benito Mussolini’s foreign policy during the 1920s and early 1930s,
which, although with some exceptions, mainly supported the Versailles
system.5
Have Italian historians dealt adequately with Italy’s international role
during the ‘Great War’ and its post-war period? Probably inspired by

2 There are significant and increasing numbers of studies on the Ottoman Empire,
the Middle East, the effects of the war in extra-European areas such as the African
continent, India and the Far East: see, for example, Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment.
Self -Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007); Xu Guoqi, Asia and the Great War. A Shared History
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
3 Vanda Wilcox (ed.), Italy in the Era of the Great War (Leiden: Brill, 2018). In this
volume, only the chapters by Stefano Marcuzzi and Francesco Caccamo cover Italy’s
foreign policy and its relationship with the Allies; there are very few references to the
post-war period. There is also an interesting study which, however, was published more
than twenty years ago: James H. Burgwyn, The Legend of the Mutilated Victory. Italy the
Great War and the Paris Peace Conference (1915–1919) (Westport, CN: Prager, 1993).
4 Alan Sharp, Versailles 1919 A Centennial Perspective (London: Haus Publishing Ltd.,
2018), 21–22.
5 See, for example, Francesco Lefebvre D’Ovidio, L’Italia e il Sistema internazionale
dalla formazione del governo Mussolini alla grande depressione (1922–1929), 2 Vols,
(Rome: Vita e Pensiero, 2016).
 1 HOW TO BECOME A GREAT POWER … 3

recent foreign historiographic trends, the impressive historic production

by Italian scholars on the First World War (as usual with a few exceptions)
has focused on the social and cultural dimensions of the conflict; the
political and diplomatic aspects and the problem of Italy’s contribution
to the creation of a new international order have largely been neglected.6
The present volume, which is the result of a research project financed
by the Department of Political Science, Law and International Studies
of the University of Padova,7 thus aims at filling the gap in both Italian
and foreign historiography works on Italy, the international dimension of
the ‘Great War’ the post-war period, and at discussing whether through
Italy’s participation in the First World War and its involvement in the
process which led to the Versailles system, Rome achieved the goal of
being recognised as an important European power. This volume exam-
ines the period between 1917 and 1922, as these two years represent
a watershed in Italian history: Caporetto was a turning-point, not only
from a military viewpoint, but also due to the differing Italian role within
the Entente. In 1922, with the collapse of the liberal political system and
Mussolini’s coming to power, Italy’s foreign policy must be interpreted
in a different conceptual framework.
The following chapters cover the many under-researched aspects of
Italy’s international position between the late stages of the war and
the immediate post-war period. They are based on multi-archival and

6 Antonio Varsori, ‘Il centenario della Grande Guerra e la storiografia italiana’, in

Rossella Pace (ed.), La fatalità della guerra e la volontà di vincerla. Classe dirigente
liberale, istituzioni e opinione pubblica (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2019), 13–34.
Obviously, there are a few exceptions, such as: Andrea Ungari, La guerra del re. Monar-
chia, Sistema politico e forze armate nella Grande Guerra (Rome: Luni, 2018); Antonio
Varsori, Radioso maggio. Come l’Italia entrò in guerra (Bologna: il Mulino, 2015). Some
important studies had appeared in the past, such as: Luca Riccardi, Alleati non amici.
Le relazioni politiche tra l’Italia e l’Intesa durante la prima guerra mondiale (Brescia:
Morcelliana, 1992); Luca Micheletta, Italia e Gran Bretagna nel primo dopoguerra. Le
relazioni diplomatiche tra Roma e Londra dal 1919 al 1922, 2 Vols. (Rome: Jouvence,
1999); Pierluigi Ballini (ed.), Sonnino e il suo tempo (1914–1922) (Soveria Mannelli:
Rubbettino, 2011); Andrea Ciampani and Romano Ugolini (eds.), La Grande Guerra.
Un impegno europeo di ricerca e riflessione (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2018). See also
the monographic issue of Italia contemporanea, (256–257), 2009.
7 The research project, entitled ‘The opportunity to become a great power. Italy and
the new international order (1917–1920)’, supervised by Antonio Varsori, was financed
by the departmental research programme BIRD 2016. The editors of the volume would
like to thank the Department of Political Science, Law and International Studies of the
University of Padova for its support in publishing the present volume.
4 A. VARSORI

multi-national research combining documents from American, Austrian,

British, French, German, Italian, Russian and former Yugoslav archives,
for the first time. This volume is composed of three main sections,
dealing with the relations between Italy and its Allies, Rome’s attitude
towards its former enemies and Italy’s policy towards the ‘New Europe’
which emerged from the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire
and Germany’s defeat. At the conclusion of the book, Georges-Henri
Soutou, one of the best-known specialists in international history, presents
a thoughtful analysis of the attempt at creating a viable and peaceful
international order.
The problem of Italy’s international role and its aspirations to become
a great power had been the focus of attention in both liberal Italy’s
foreign policy and its domestic political discourse since the Unification.8
Despite all the efforts by the liberal ruling elites, on the eve of the First
World War Italy was perceived by most decision-makers and by public
opinion of the traditional ‘concert’ of Europe as the ‘least of the great
powers’—a definition in which the word ‘least’ was probably regarded as
the most ‘significant’. By the first decade of the twentieth century, north-
western Italy had undergone an early industrial take-off, its political and
institutional systems were fairly stable, and it could also boast a victo-
rious colonial war against the Ottoman Empire, leading to the conquest
of the Libyan coastline. However, Italy was still a partially underdevel-
oped nation, mainly and negatively influenced by widespread poverty,
mass migration, a high rate of illiteracy, poorly rooted monarchic and
political institutions, a liberal ruling elite split between a reformist faction
led by Giovanni Giolitti and a conservative right represented by Antonio
Salandra and Sidney Sonnino. Last but not least, the Liberal Party’s tradi-
tional dominance of the political scenario was threatened on the left by
the Socialist Party, which was greatly influenced by the revolutionary
maximalistic faction and, on the right, by the small but vocal national-
istic movement. There was also the influence exerted by the Catholics

8 See the still stimulating interpretations in the well-known study by Federico Chabod,
Storia della politica estera italiana dal 1870 al 1896. Le premesse (Bari: Laterza, 1951).
See also Emilio Gentile, La grande Italia. Il mito della nazione nel XX secolo (Rome-Bari:
Laterza, 2008).
 1 HOW TO BECOME A GREAT POWER … 5

and the Holy See, whose attitude towards the heirs of the Risorgimento
was often ambiguous, if not hostile.9
These contradictions, the fraught relationship with the Austrian-
Hungarian Empire due to increasing irredentism in the Italian-speaking
regions of the Empire, and diplomatic rivalry in the Balkans and the Adri-
atic were the main reasons for Italy’s decision to remain neutral at the
outbreak of the First World War, in spite of its membership in the Triple
Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. In fact, between June and
August 1914, the great European powers appeared to pay scant atten-
tion to Italy’s position: the Entente powers were content with Italy’s
non-intervention policy, Vienna regarded Italy as a very dubious ally, and
Germany thought that Rome’s neutrality was already a useful element
in the Central Powers’ strategy.10 Last but not least, in summer 1914 all
the conflicting nations, especially Imperial Germany, believed that the war
would be over quickly, and that there was no immediate need to involve
Italy in the hostilities.
As is well known, in Italy the outbreak of the war and its unfore-
seen prolongation led to a heated domestic political debate between
the ‘neutralists’ (the Socialists, Catholics and ‘Giolitti’ liberals) and the
‘interventionists’ (the nationalists, some radical democrats and former
revolutionary Socialists, the irredentists and some right-wing liberals). As
regards the last faction, Italy’s involvement in the war was to be both
the instrument and the evidence that it had achieved the status of a great

9 On Liberal Italy, see, for example, Alberto Aquarone, L’Italia giolittiana (1896–1915),
Vol. 1, Le premesse politiche ed economiche (Bologna: il Mulino, 1981); Giovanni Sabbatucci
and Vittorio Vidotto (eds.), Storia d’Italia, Vol. 3, Liberalismo e democrazia 1887 –1914
(Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1995). On Italy’s foreign policy before the ‘Great War’, see Enrico
Decleva, L’Italia e la politica internazionale dal 1870 al 1914. L’ultima fra le grandi
potenze (Milan: Mursia, 1974); Richard J. B. Bosworth, Italy: the Least of the Great Powers.
Italian Foreign Policy before the First World War (London: Cambridge University Press,
1979) and Richard A. Webster, Industrial Imperialism in Italy 1908–1915 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1975). On the Libyan war, see Luca Micheletta and Andrea
Ungari (eds.), L’Italia e la Guerra di Libia cent’anni dopo (Rome: Studium, 2013).
10 On Italy’s neutrality, see, for example, Alberto Monticone, La Germania e la
neutralità italiana 1914–1915 (Bologna: il Mulino, 1971); Giampaolo Ferraioli, Politica
e diplomazia in Italia tra XIX e XX secolo. Vita di Antonino di San Giuliano (1852–
1914) (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2007); Riccardo Brizzi (ed.), Osservata speciale.
La neutralità italiana nella prima guerra mondiale e l’opinione pubblica internazionale
(1914–1915) (Florence: Le Monnier, 2015); Giovanni Orsina and Andrea Ungari (eds.),
L’Italia neutrale (1914–1915) (Rome: Rodorigo, 2016).
6 A. VARSORI

power. By the early months of 1915, both the Central Powers and the
Entente began to regard Italy’s intervention or its prolonged neutrality as
a valuable asset. The German government made every effort to main-
tain Italy’s neutrality, while the Entente powers thought that, if Italy
changed sides, the military balance would tilt in its favour, thus ending the
strategic stalemate of the conflict. Italy’s entry into the ‘Great War’ was
the outcome of a decision taken by Prime Minister Salandra and Foreign
Minister Sonnino, with the consent of King Victor Emmanuel III and
the indirect support of the interventionist mobilisations in the radioso
maggio (‘radiant May’) of 1915. This choice was not only influenced
by domestic considerations (the opportunity to strengthen the monar-
chic institution and to weaken the Giolitti faction, etc.) and contingent
foreign policy interests (e.g. the perspective of territorial expansion), but
also by the belief that Italy’s aspiration at being recognised as a ‘great
power’ could only be fulfilled through its participation in the conflict. On
the basis of the secret London Treaty, which had been signed in April
1915, Italy would obtain large territorial gains (the Brenner frontier with
the Italian Trentino and the German-speaking South Tyrol, Trieste, the
Istrian Peninsula, most of the Dalmatian coast and its islands, plus the
Albanian harbour of Valona and a zone of influence in the Anatolian
Peninsula).11 In fact, Italy’s early military initiatives were very cautious,
and its army rapidly became entangled in static trench warfare, very similar
to that which the Anglo-French and German forces were experiencing on
the Western Front.12 Italy’s opportunity to change the balance in the
war was therefore lost and its strategic importance became less relevant
in the eyes of its Allies. In London, Paris and Petrograd, there was a
growing feeling that Italy was pursuing a ‘private’ war against a minor
and less powerful enemy, Austria-Hungary, and that it had little willing-
ness to coordinate its war effort with the major Allies, which were bearing
the ‘real’ burden of the conflict. This belief appeared to be confirmed by
the fact that the Italian government declared war on Imperial Germany

11 See Brunello Vigezzi, Da Giolitti a Salandra (Florence: Vallecchi, 1969); Varsori,

Radioso maggio.
12 On Italy’s military strategy, see Piero Pieri, L’Italia nella prima guerra mondiale
(1915–1918) (Turin: Einaudi, 1968); Marco Mondini, Il capo. La grande guerra del
generale Luigi Cadorna (Bologna: il Mulino, 2017); Pietro Neglie and Andrea Ungari
(eds.), La guerra di Cadorna 1915–1917. Atti del Convegno Trieste-Gorizia 2–4 novembre
2016 (Rome: Ufficio Storico SME, 2018). On political aspects, see Piero Melograni,
Storia politica della grande guerra (Bari: Laterza, 1963).
 1 HOW TO BECOME A GREAT POWER … 7

only in 1916; last but not least, the Italian authorities appeared unable to
pursue an effective propaganda campaign in order to inform the Entente
public opinions of the nation’s war effort. The Allies’ poor opinion of
their Italian partner was also confirmed by their decision to leave Rome
out of the secret Franco-British-Russian plans for the destiny of the
Ottoman Empire: it was only in April 1917, due to the so-called Saint-
Jean de Maurienne Agreement that Britain and France recognised the
region of Adalia as the Italian area of influence in Anatolia after the end
of the hostilities and the probable partition of the Ottoman territories.13
The year 1917 marked a turning-point in Italy’s international posi-
tion.14 Between late October and early November, the Italian army
suffered a dramatic defeat at Caporetto and was compelled to conduct
a sudden retreat, in some cases a true rout: about 265,000 Italian
soldiers were taken prisoners, and substantial areas of north-east Italy
were occupied by the victorious Austrian-Hungarian and German armies.
The enemy offensive was halted only in mid-November along the River
Piave, a few miles from Venice.15 As a consequence of the defeat, a
new government was formed under a moderate liberal politician, Vittorio
Emanuele Orlando, although Sidney Sonnino maintained his role as
Foreign Minister. At Rapallo, in early November, Orlando and Sonnino
had a meeting with the British Prime Minister Lloyd George and the
French Prime Minister Paul Painlevé. The Italian leaders were compelled
to beg for Allied military support, but both the British and the French
required the resignation of Generals Luigi Cadorna and Carlo Porro as
the pre-condition for the despatch of British and French divisions along
the Piave front. The Italians were compelled to comply with the Allies’
‘diktat’, although Orlando had already decided that Cadorna would have
to leave the command of the Italian troops. Two days later, Lloyd George

13 On the Italian war as a conflict mainly against the Habsburg Empire, see Nicola
Labanca and Oswald Überegger (eds.), La Guerra italo-austriaca (1915–1918) (Bologna:
il Mulino, 2015); on relations between Italy and the Allies during the war, see Riccardi,
Alleati.
14 On the importance of the year 1917 in a wider perspective, see David Stevenson,
1917: War, Peace and Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
15 On Caporetto, see the recent contribution by Nicola Labanca, Caporetto. Storia e
memoria di una sconfitta (Bologna: il Mulino, 2017). For a balanced interpretation of
the role played by the Italian Army during the First World War by a foreign scholar,
see John Gooch, The Italian Army and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2014).
8 A. VARSORI

and Painlevé had a meeting with King Victor Emmanuel at Peschiera,

during which the decisions taken at Rapallo were confirmed.16 Due to
Caporetto, as well as the Rapallo and Peschiera agreements, Italy’s posi-
tion vis-à-vis the Allies and the United States appeared to be even weaker
than before. This was in fact only partially true and, in a wider and
longer-term perspective, Italy’s international role underwent a significant
improvement.
First of all, it must be noted that, in November 1917, partly as a
consequence of the collapse of the Russian army, the Kerenskij govern-
ment had been overthrown by the Bolsheviks and Russia was no longer
an effective ally; in addition, a few months later at Brest-Litovsk, the
Lenin government signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers which
offered Germany the opportunity of moving several divisions from the
Eastern to the Western Front; in December 1917, the Romanian govern-
ment, which had joined the Entente in 1916, was compelled to surrender
and most Romanian territory was occupied by the Germans. However,
also on the Western Front, the military situation of the Allies was not a
positive one, and only a few months before Caporetto the French High
Command had been compelled to face mutiny by some units. However,
in spite of everything, the Italian Army had been able to stabilise the
front and the new Commander-in-Chief, General Armando Diaz, started
reorganising the Italian armed forces: the ‘home front’ did not collapse
and the Orlando government was able to mobilise many sectors of Italian
society through a patriotic appeal to the defence of the nation against the
traditional enemy of the Risorgimento era. For their part, the Allies and
the United States tried to coordinate their war effort and strategies: the
Rapallo Conference became the first meeting of the Allied Supreme War
Council, which became an important forum in which the major issues
relating to the Allied ‘grand strategy’ were discussed and solved. Italy
was a full member of the Council, and the Foreign Minister Sonnino was
able to discuss, with his colleagues, important military and political ques-
tions such as the Allied attitude towards the Bolshevik government.17 For
his part, King Victor Emmanuel developed a sort of personal diplomacy,
owing to his personal contacts in British influential milieus, in order to

16 The verbatim reports of the Rapallo and Peschiera conferences are available in The
National Archives, Kew, (TNA), FO 371/3440, ‘War 1918’.
17 On the Italian role in the Supreme War Council, see I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani
(DDI), Series VI, Vol. IX; Vol. X; Vol. XI.
 1 HOW TO BECOME A GREAT POWER … 9

promote Italy’s war goals.18 The Italian authorities also launched more
effective propaganda initiatives, which aimed at enhancing Italy’s contri-
bution to the Allied war effort,19 while some French and British divisions
fought on the Italian front until the end of hostilities, thus strength-
ening the image of a common war experience.20 Last but not least,
the Italian authorities appeared to support Wilson’s ideals, described in
his ‘Fourteen Points’: in Rome, in April 1918, under the auspices of
the Orlando government, the representatives of the oppressed national-
ities of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire (Czechs, Poles, Romanians and
Southern Slavs), as well as representatives of the Italian-speaking areas of
the Empire, held a conference, in which a commitment to the achieve-
ment of self-determination was made, as well as Italy’s support to such a
goal. In this context, the Italian High Command favoured the creation of
a Czech-Slovak Legion, composed of former prisoners of war, who were
to fight against the Habsburg forces along the Italian front.21 Wilson’s
ideals, promoted by effective US propaganda, seemed to have a strong
influence on Italian public opinion, favoured by the traditional Italian-
American friendship thanks to the existence of numerous and influential
Italian communities in the United States.22
However, this positive image of Italy’s participation in the final stages
of the ‘Great War’ on the Allied side concealed some serious contra-
dictions. In spite of the Rome Conference of oppressed nationalities,
Sonnino’s attitude towards the claims by the Southern Slavs was very
cautious—a suspicion which was reciprocated by the Slovene and Croat
nationalists, who were fully aware of the contents of the London Treaty,
which had been published by the Bolsheviks.23 In both London and Paris,

18 See Andrea Ungari’s chapter in this volume and, id., La Guerra.

19 Luciano Tosi, La propaganda italiana all’estero nella prima guerra mondiale:
rivendicazioni territoriali e politica delle nazionalità (Udine: Del Bianco, 1977).
20 Mariano Gabriele, Gli Alleati in Italia durante la Prima Guerra Mondiale (1917 –
1918) (Rome: Ufficio Storico SME, 2008).
21 On the oppressed nationalities conference in Rome, see, for example, Francesco
Leoncini, Alternativa mazziniana (Rome: Castelvecchi, 2018).
22 See Daniela Rossini’s chapter. Also by the same author, Woodrow Wilson and the
American Myth in Italy. Culture, Diplomacy and War Propaganda (Cambridge, MA and
London: Harvard University Press, 2008).
23 See, for example, DDI, Series VI, Vol. VIII, doc. 546, Sonnino to Paris, London,
Washington, Corfu, 15 April 1918.
10 A. VARSORI

there were increasing doubts regarding the feasibility of Italy’s aspirations

towards the future balance in the Adriatic, which was perceived as too
ambitious and ‘imperialistic’.24 Last but not least, almost immediately
after the end of hostilities, misunderstandings and frictions emerged, espe-
cially with the French military authorities in the Balkans and along the
Adriatic coast, about defining the areas to be occupied by the armies of
the victorious powers.25 There were also skirmishes with troops of the
new Yugoslav state, which the Italian authorities, especially the military,
perceived as hostile and which wanted to take the place of Austria-
Hungary as Italy’s main competitor in the Adriatic and the Balkans.
Italy’s position at the Versailles Conference, the open clash between
the Italian delegation and President Wilson on the ‘Adriatic question’,
Orlando and Sonnino leaving the conference in April in protest against
Wilson’s appeal to the Italian people, and the humiliating return to Paris
in May, leading to the resignation of Orlando’s government, are well-
known episodes, which have usually given rise to autonomous studies
related to the Paris Peace Conference and held the attention of many
historians.26 Foreign scholars’ evaluations of Italy’s international role,
even in recent studies, have been largely influenced by what happened in
spring 1919 in the French capital, and by the emerging myth of the ‘muti-
lated victory’ and its apparent domestic implications, from D’Annunzio’s
occupation of Fiume to Mussolini’s ‘march on Rome’.27 Although these
aspects are obviously important, to focus only on these episodes is partially
misleading if we are to present a more complex and realistic interpretation
of Italy’s role in the Allied attempt to create a new international order,
because a long-term perspective is necessary. First of all, as regards the
‘Adriatic question’, during the second half of 1920, the Yugoslav position

24 TNA, FO 371/3230, memorandum ‘Possible Revision of our Treaty with Italy’, by

H. Nicolson, 2 March 1918; FO 371/3138, Memorandum ‘Notes on a suggested frontier
of Jugoslavia’, by the General Staff War Office, 10 December 1918; FO 371/3139,
memorandum ‘The Trentino and Alto Adige. Political Conditions, Possible Frontiers’, by
the General Staff War Office, 5 December 1918. On Britain’s attitude, see chapters by
William Mulligan and Giulia Bentivoglio.
25 On the relations between the Italian military and the French authorities, see the
chapter by Frédéric Dessberg.
26 See, for example, Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers. The Paris Conference of 1919
and its Attempt to End War (London: John Murray, 2002), 288–314.
27 Robert Gerwarth, The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917 –1923
(London: Penguin Books, 2017), 153–170, 220–226.
 1 HOW TO BECOME A GREAT POWER … 11

clearly weakened, due to the decline of Wilson’s popularity in the United

States, while Britain and France showed less and less interest in Belgrade’s
claims. In the meantime, negotiations had started between Count Carlo
Sforza, the new Foreign Minister in the Giolitti Cabinet and the Yugoslav
leaders. In early November 1920, the defeat of the Democratic candi-
date James Cox at the US presidential election marked the return of the
Republicans to the White House and America’s commitment to an isola-
tionistic policy towards Europe, which implied the end of Washington’s
support of the Yugoslav state. For their part, Great Britain and France put
pressure on Belgrade to achieve a compromise with Italy, whose position
was regarded of some importance in the organisation of the new world
order.
The outcome of this favourable contingency led to the rapid conclu-
sion of a bilateral treaty between Italy and Yugoslavia, signed in Rapallo in
November 1920. Thanks to this agreement, Italy gained a strong strategic
border with Yugoslavia, which included the whole Istrian Peninsula and
several Adriatic islands; Italy renounced her claims to the Dalmatian coast,
but maintained sovereignty of the town of Zadar (Zara).28 Most of the
goals of the London Treaty (1915) had been attained, and Italy enjoyed
strong and stable eastern and northern frontiers, as both the Entente
powers and the United States had not objected to Italy’s annexation of
the German-speaking area of South Tyrol, in spite of its obvious contrast
with the principles of nationality and self-determination.
For his part, Sforza aimed at promoting friendly relations with
Belgrade, especially with the Serbian leadership, and at strengthening
Italy’s position in the Balkans through political and economic influence,
rather than open confrontation.29 It is interesting to note that, in spite
of the London Treaty and the Saint Jean de Maurienne agreements, the
Giolitti government abandoned all its ambitions at creating an Italian
sphere of influence in Anatolia, as Sforza very quickly realised that Mustafa
Kemal would be able to create a new Turkish state on the basis of strong
nationalistic feelings. In the opinion of Italian diplomacy, it would be
better to develop friendly relations with nationalistic Turkey rather than

28 See the chapter by Massimo Bucarelli and Benedetto Zaccaria and its bibliographic
references.
29 On the Rapallo Treaty and Sforza’s foreign policy, see Giancarlo Giordano, Carlo
Sforza. La diplomazia 1896–1921 (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1987), and the chapter by
Bucarelli and Zaccaria.
12 A. VARSORI

to support the policy of Greece and Britain, which aimed at partitioning

what was left of the Ottoman Empire.30 Thus, by early 1921, according
to the results of the foreign policy of the Giolitti government, it became
evident that the ‘mutilated victory’ was a myth, although it was to be
effectively exploited by the Fascist movement and Mussolini, mainly for
domestic purposes and its effectiveness as propaganda. Last but not least,
the final settlement of the Adriatic question demonstrated that it was in
the interests of both Great Britain and France to recognise Italy’s role as
a ‘great power’ in order to involve the government in Rome as a further
pillar of the Versailles system, as demonstrated by the acceptance of Italy’s
leading position in the Council of the League of Nations, although Italy’s
contribution to the negotiations which led to the creation of the new
international organisation had been of little significance.31
Between 1919 and 1920, Italian politicians and diplomats had been
compelled to focus their attention and energies on solving the Adriatic
question. However, contrary to the more common interpretation, the
Italian authorities did not forget either the implications of the various
peace treaties or the new and problematic balance in East Central Europe.
During the Paris Peace Conference, the Italian delegation demonstrated
both its interest and commitment in defining the borders of the new
states which were emerging from the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian
Empire.32 In a wider context, Italy’s attitude towards Poland’s terri-
torial claims was sympathetic, although the authorities in Rome were
more cautious in defining the German-Polish border; the Italian mili-
tary mission aimed at developing a policy which may be called a ‘super
partes ’ position, as had happened in the case of the Silesian frontier.
Also due to Italian support to the creation of a Czech-Slovak Legion,
for some time relations between Rome and Prague were characterised by
mutual friendship; they partially worsened only later, due to the closer ties

30 On this topic, see Fiorella Perrone, La politica estera italiana e la dissoluzione dell’Im-
pero Ottomano (1914–1923) (Lecce: I libri di Icaro, 2010). Italy’s disengagement from
Turkey had already started with the Nitti government. See also Giovanni Cecini, Il corpo
di spedizione italiano in Anatolia (1919–1922) (Rome: Ufficio Storico SME, 2010).
31 See the chapter by Italo Garzia and, in general, by the same author, L’Italia e le
origini della Società delle Nazioni (Rome: Bonacci, 1995). On Italy’s role in the League
of Nations, see Enrica Costa, L’Italia e la Società delle Nazioni (Padova: CEDAM, 2004).
32 See Francesco Caccamo’s chapter and, in general, by the same author, L’Italia e
la «Nuova Europa». Il confronto sull’Europa Orientale alla conferenza di pace di Parigi
1919–1920 (Rome: Luni, 2000).
 1 HOW TO BECOME A GREAT POWER … 13

created between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.33 Last but not least, even
before its entry into the war, Italy had aimed at creating positive relations
with Romania—a pattern in its foreign policy which was confirmed in
the post-war period, although Italy felt itself unable to challenge France’s
increasing influence in East Central Europe.34 The contradictions in the
Italian attitude towards the new states emerging from the dismemberment
of the Habsburg Empire were often the consequence of difficult relations
with the new Yugoslav state. However, it would be a mistake to eval-
uate the situation in the immediate post-war period on the basis of what
was to happen later, once Mussolini came to power with his ‘revisionistic’
rhetoric.
The clash with Belgrade over the Adriatic question and France’s policy
towards East Central Europe did contribute to the more nuanced policy
pursued by the Italian authorities towards the defeated nations. After the
end of hostilities, the Italian representatives in Vienna thought that Italy
could exert its influence on the new weak and impoverished Austrian
state, and put pressure on Rome in order to strengthen relations with
Vienna.35 For their part, the Austrian authorities appeared to accept the
perspective of developing friendly relations with Italy. It is of some signif-
icance that the Italian government demonstrated a sympathetic view of
Austrian claims on the Burgenland question, although Rome’s position
was once again the result of its hostility to the idea of a common border
between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.36 The creation of a stable Italian
influence on the Austrian Republic involved overcoming the serious
obstacle of the annexation of the German-speaking South Tyrol, although

33 See Donatella Bolech Cecchi, Alle origini di un’inimicizia. Italia-Cecoslovacchia

1918–1922 (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2008).
34 See Giuliano Caroli, La Romania nella politica estera italiana 1919–1965. Luci e
ombre di un’amicizia storica (Rome: Nagard, 2009), 17–76. In November 1918, Sonnino
had already stated Italy’s support to Romania’s territorial claims; see DDI, Series VI, Vol.
I, doc. 369, Sonnino to the National Council of Romanian Unity, 27 November 1918.
35 Sonnino appeared to share the views of the Italian representatives. See DDI, Series
VI, Vol. II, doc. 540, Sonnino to Macchioro, 27 February 1919; doc.794, Sonnino to
Macchioro, 13 March 1919.
36 See the chapter by Maddalena Guiotto.
14 A. VARSORI

only until Mussolini came to power, the liberal governments had pursued
a moderate policy towards the population of this region.37
In Budapest, after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, the head of
the first provisional government, Count Karoly, in a conversation with
the Italian military representative, stated that he was interested in having
friendly relations with Italy. Later, in spite of the creation of a Communist
regime, the Italian military representative in Budapest went to the point
of developing close ties with the Béla Kun government, and an attempt at
funnelling weapons to the Bolshevik regime was also made. The conflict
between Hungary and the Yugoslav kingdom over their future border
and the fate of the contested Banat region obviously played some part in
shaping Rome’s attitude towards Budapest. Italy’s policy was frustrated
both by the reaction of the Western Allies and by the rapid collapse
of the Communist government, although Hungary remained a point of
reference in Italy’s policy towards the Danube area.38
As regards Germany, although before the war there had been no
serious contrasts between Rome and Berlin, in the immediate post-war
period Italy could not and would not oppose the punitive policy pursued
by the Allies towards Germany: German public opinion strongly resented
Italy’s ‘treason’ and held a sympathetic view towards South Tyrolese
opposition to the Italian annexation.39 In spite of these serious obsta-
cles, especially during the government of Francesco Saverio Nitti (June
1919–June 1920), some influential diplomats also thought that Germany
could play an important role in reconstructing the world economy and
criticised the reparations policy advocated by the French government.40
Although Russia was not a defeated enemy, as in other Allied nations
Italy’s attitude towards Bolshevik Russia was strongly influenced by
domestic factors, especially the fear of a social revolution, largely inspired
by Moscow and the Italian Socialists’ enthusiastic reception of the Russian
model.41 There was therefore no serious attempt at establishing official

37 Andrea Di Michele, L’Italia in Austria da Vienna a Trento, in Raoul Pupo (ed.),

La vittoria senza pace. Le occupazioni militari italiane alla fine della Grande Guerra
(Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2014).
38 See chapter by Valentine Lomellini.
39 See chapter by Monica Fioravanzo.
40 On Nitti, see in general Francesco Barbagallo, Francesco S. Nitti (Turin: UTET,
1984).
41 See, for example, Valentine Lomellini, La grande paura rossa. L’Italia delle spie
bolsceviche (1917 –1922) (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2015). On the impact of Bolshevism in the
 1 HOW TO BECOME A GREAT POWER … 15

contacts with the Communist regime, although Italy was not directly
involved in Western support to the ‘Whites’ during the Russian Civil
War. However, Italy’s policy towards Soviet Russia must be examined
from a longer-term perspective, which goes beyond 1922 and includes the
early initiatives of the Fascist regime. Although Mussolini and the Fascist
movement, which had both clearly exploited the ‘red scare’ as a useful
political instrument, had come to power, once the Bolshevik govern-
ment had triumphed over the ‘White’ generals and imposed its rule,
Mussolini’s government pursued a pragmatic policy towards Communist
Russia; Italy was one of the first ‘capitalist’ nations to renew diplomatic
relations with Moscow in the hope of creating close economic ties with
the Bolsheviks.42
In conclusion, although Italy did not play a military or political role
similar to that of Great Britain, France and the United States in the last
stages of the Great War and in the immediate post-war years, Italy was
not a passive element. It would be too easy to criticise Salandra’s and
Sonnino’s insistence on defending the London Treaty, their contradic-
tory claim over Fiume (Rijeka) and quitting the conference, since Italy’s
position was strongly influenced by domestic considerations, which may
have made any other attitude difficult. Italy’s territorial claims were partly
the outcome of imperialist ambitions, but they were also the consequence
of irredentistic feelings and the ideals of the Risorgimento which, in the
opinion of many Italians, did not differ greatly from French aspirations at
the revanche against Germany and recovering the lost provinces of Alsace
and Lorraine. In fact, the compromise achieved by the Giolitti govern-
ment due to the Rapallo Treaty was regarded in 1920 as a fair point
of reference for friendly relations with the Yugoslav state. The cause of
the renewed disagreement with Belgrade was Mussolini’s policy.43 The
whole Adriatic question negatively influenced Italy’s attitude towards the
states which had emerged from the collapse of the Habsburg Empire,
but relations with Poland and Romania were quite positive and Italy was
obliged to face France’s stubborn opposition to any Italian influence in

period between the two World Wars, see Valentine Lomellini (ed.), The Rise of Bolshevism
and its Impact on the Interwar International Order (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).
42 See the chapter by Elena Dundovich, and Giorgio Petracchi, Da San Pietroburgo a
Mosca. La diplomazia italiana in Russia (1861–1941) (Rome: Bonacci, 1993).
43 On Mussolini’s policy towards Yugoslavia, see Massimo Bucarelli, Mussolini e la
Jugoslavia (1922–1939) (Bari: Graphis, 2006).
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The rise of the new science of philology gave a fresh impetus to this
method of classification, which was adopted by F. Müller (1834-
1898), and utilised recently by Deniker and various other writers.
Other classifications, by means of cultural distinctions, have been
attempted. Among these may be noted that based on mythology and
religion of Max Müller, on institutions and social organisation of
Morgan and Ratzel, or on musical systems of Fétis.
Hippocrates. Hippocrates (c. 460-377), in his work, About Air,
Water, and Places, first discusses the influence of
environment on man, physical, moral, and pathological. He divided
mankind into groups, impressed with homogeneous characters by
homogeneous surroundings, demonstrating that mountains, plains,
damp, aridity, and so on, produced definite and varying types.
Bodin. Bodin, writing in 1577 Of the Lawes and
Customes of a Common Wealth (English edition,
1605), contains, as Professor J. L. Myres has pointed out,[128] “the
whole pith and kernel of modern anthropo-geography.... His climatic
contrasts are based on the Ptolemaic geography ... and he argues
as if the world broke off short at Sahara.... On his classification of
environments from arctic North to tropic South” he superposes “a
cross-division by grades of culture from civil East to barbaric West.”
128. Rept. Brit. Assoc., 1909 (1910), p. 593.
Buffon. Buffon followed Hippocrates. Man, said Buffon,
consists of a single species. Individual variations
are due to three causes—climate, food, and habits. These
influences, acting over large areas on large groups of people,
produce general and constant varieties. To these varieties he gave
the name of race. This doctrine was the main support of the
monogenists.
Alexander von The year 1859 marks a crisis in this field of
Humboldt, research, as in so many others. Alexander von
Ritter, and Humboldt (1769-1859), the Prussian naturalist and
Waitz.
traveller, spent the later part of his life in writing his
classic Kosmos, a summary and exposition of the laws and
conditions of the physical universe. Karl Ritter (1779-1859),
Professor of Geography at the University of Berlin, published,
between 1822 and his death, the ten volumes of Die Erdkunde im
Verhältniss zur Natur und zur Geschichte des Menschen. These
works formed the basis from which was developed the German view
of geography as a science of the co-relation of distribution. In 1859
Waitz, in his Anthropologie der Naturvölker, insisted on the inter-
relation between the physical organisation and the psychic life of
mankind.
Buckle. Between 1857 and 1861 appeared Buckle’s
History of Civilisation, in which the influence of
environment on mankind is strongly emphasised. “To one of these
four classes (Climate, Food, Soil, and the General Aspect of Nature)
may be referred all the external phenomena by which Man has been
permanently affected.”[129] The recognition of the environmental
influence has long been a characteristic of the French school. Ripley
(1900, p. 4) points out that, wherever the choice lies between
heredity and environment, the French almost always prefer the latter
as the explanation of the phenomenon. This is seen from the time of
Bodin (1530-1596) and Montesquieu (1689-1755), with their
objective explanations of philosophy, and Cuvier, who traced the
close relationship between philosophy and geological formation, to
Turquan (1896), who mapped out the awards made by the Paris
Salon, showing the coincidence of the birth-place of the artists with
the fertile river basins.
129. L.c., chap. ii.
Ratzel. Reclus. In Germany the exponents of these theories
were Cotta and Kohl, and later Peschel, Kirchhoff,
Bastian, and Gerland; but the greatest name of all is that of Friedrich
Ratzel (1844-1904), who has written the standard work on Anthropo-
Geographie (1882-91). Another monumental work is that by Élisée
Reclus (1820-1905), Nouvelle Géographie Universelle (1879-1894).
Le Play. A great stimulus to the development of
ethnological sociology was given by the school of
Le Play in France, the concrete application of whose theories was
worked out by Demolins and others, and published in La Science
Sociale and separate works. It is the essential procedure of the
followers of this school, in their studies in descriptive sociology, to
begin with the environment, and to trace its effects upon the
occupation of the people, their sociology, and so forth. The method is
an extremely suggestive one, and has led to many brilliant
generalisations. The danger consists in theorising from imperfect
data, and there is a tendency to attribute certain social conditions
directly to the influences of environment and occupation, where a
wider knowledge of ethnology would show that these or analogous
social conditions obtained in other places where they were not
produced by the causes suggested.
 RETROSPECT

On taking a brief final survey of the history of anthropology, one is

struck by the fact that, owing to the tendency of students to limit their
attention to one of the varied subjects which are grouped under the
term Anthropology, the progress of the science has been very
irregular.
Physical anthropology has had very numerous devotees, who
have approached the subject mainly from the point of view of small
anatomical variations; but even at the present day the significance of
many of the details is not understood, and very little advance has
been made concerning the criteria of racial anatomy. We have yet to
discover how adequately to describe or gauge the essential
anatomical distinctions between races and peoples. This problem is
complicated by our ignorance of the stability of physical characters,
and of how far or how speedily they are affected by change of
environment. At the present time the effects of miscegenation and of
environment afford fruitful fields for research. The imperfection of the
geological record is answerable for the relatively slow progress that
has been made in tracing the evolution of man as an animal.
Whereas the structural characters of man have been studied by
trained scientific men, the history of man from a cultural point of view
has mainly been investigated by literary men, who have approached
the subject from various sides, and, from lack of experience in the
field or by virtue of their natural reliance upon documentary
evidence, have often not been sufficiently critical regarding their
authorities. The comparative method has yielded most valuable
results, but it is liable to lead the unwary into mistakes. To employ
biological terms, analogy is apt to be mistaken for homology, since
customs or beliefs (which, it must be remembered, are in the vast
majority of cases extremely imperfectly recorded) may have a
superficial resemblance. If all the facts were known, they might be
found to have had a very different origin or significance.
Comparisons made within a given area or among cognate peoples
have a greater value than those drawn from various parts of the
world. What is most needed at the present day is intensive study of
limited areas; the studies already so made have proved most fruitful.
Although we know a good deal about many forms of social
organisation, we find that in very few cases is the knowledge
sufficiently precise to explain them, owing to the fact that the data
were not collected by adequately trained observers. In other words,
cultural anthropology has been too much at the mercy of students
who have not received a sufficiently rigorous training.
The objects made by man have only recently been subjected to
critical study. In this the archæologists have been in advance of the
ethnologists. The distribution of objects and its significance have
been studied more in Germany than elsewhere, and already afford
promising results.
Anthropology is slowly becoming a coherent and organised
science. The chief danger to which it is liable is that its fascination
and popularity, touching as it does every department of human
thought and activity, tend to premature generalisations.
The history of Anthropology, like that of most other sciences, is full
of examples of opposition from the prejudice and bigotry of those
who place more reliance on tradition than on the results of
investigations and the logical deductions therefrom; but the
reactionaries have always had to give way in the end.
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Bachofen. J. J. Das Mutterrecht. 1861.
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Beddoe, J. The Races of Britain. 1885.—The Anthropological
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Bendyshe, T. “The History of Anthropology.” Memoirs of
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Camper, P. Dissertation physique de M. Pierre Camper sur les
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Durkheim, E. De la division du travail social. 1893.—Les règles de
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 INDEX OF AUTHORS

Agassiz, L., 91
Allen, Grant, 142
Aristotle, 6, 14, 51
Avebury, Lord, 131, 141

Bachofen, J. J., 132

Balfour, H., 127
Barclay, 32
Bastian, A., 80, 82, 152
Beard, 120
Beddoe, J., 44
Bernier, F., 88 sq.
Bertillon, A., 49
Bertrand, A. J. L., 122
Blower, 92
Blumenbach, J. F., 25, 27 sqq., 99, 107
Boas, F., 69
Bodin, J., 110, 150 sq.
Bonstetten, G., 122
Bory de Saint-Vincent, 53, 91 sq.
Boucher de Perthes, J., 121 sqq.
Bourgeois, Abbé, 123 sq.
Boyd Dawkins, W., 115, 123
Breuil, H., 123
Brinton, D. G., 149
Broca, P. P., 35 sqq., 53, 71, 93
Brosses, C. de, 139 sq.
Buckland, W., 116 sq.
Buckle, H. T., 131 sq., 151
Buffon, G. L. L. Comte de, 18, 20 sqq., 55, 113, 150

Camper, P., 30 sqq.

Capellini, 124
Capitan, Dr., 123
Cartailhac, E., 123
Chambers, R., 59 sqq.
Chantre, E., 122
Christol, Tournal de, 117
Christy, H., 122
Comte, A., 131
Crawley, E., 142
Cunningham, D. J., 64
Cuvier, Baron G. L. C. F., 53, 57 sqq., 70, 91, 95, 152
Darwin, C., 62 sqq., 96
Daubenton, 32
Davis, J. Barnard, 123
Demolins, E., 152
Deniker, J., 93 sq., 108, 150
Dennett, R. E., 82 sqq.
Desmoulins, A., 91 sq., 107
Doornik, J. E., 33
Dorsey, J. O., 142
Draper, J. W., 131
Dubois, E., 76 sq.
Duckworth, W. H. L., 77, 97
Dupont, E., 117
Dupuis, C. F., 139
Durkheim, É., 135, 143

Ecker, J. A., 123

Edwards, W. F., 99
Ehrenreich, P., 142
Evans, J., 114, 122 sqq.

Fechner, G. T., 85
Flower, W., 93 sq.
Fontenelle, B. le B. de, 138
Fouillée, A., 85
Foy, W., 142
Frazer, J. G., 136, 142
Frere, J., 113
Frobenius, L., 142
Fuhlrott, C., 71, 123

Gallatin, A., 149

Galton, F., 47 sqq., 85, 87
Gerland, G., 98, 152
Giddings, F. H., 7, 135
Gillen, F. J., 142
Giraud-Teulon, A., 134
Gliddon, G. R., 53, 91, 107
Grattan, J., 33 sq.
Greef, G. de, 135
Greenwell, Canon, 123
Grimm, J. L. K., 139
Grimm, W. K., 139
Guyot, A. H., 131
Gumplowicz, L., 135

Haeckel, E., 91, 93, 96

Hamy, E. T., 38
Harrison, B., 125
Hartland, E. S., 142
Hauser, O., 73
Haworth, S., 17
Hellwald, F. A. H. von, 135
Herder, J. G. von, 110
Herodotus, 101, 108
Herschel, W., 49
Heusinger, 92
Hippocrates, 13, 150
Hobbes, T., 110
Hobhouse, L. T., 143
Hovelacque, A. A., 53
Howitt, A. W., 133
Hubert, H., 137, 143
Humboldt, A. von, 102, 151
Humboldt, W. von, 144, 149
Hundt, Magnus, 6
Hunt, J., 53, 64 sq., 67 sq., 79
Huxley, T. H., 60 sqq., 71, 92, 96

Jevons, F. B., 132, 136, 142

Kames, Lord, 53
Keane, A. H., 91, 95, 108
Keller, F., 119 sq.
Kölliker, 92
Kollmann, J., 19
Knox, R., 53, 107

Lamarck, J. B. A., 57
Lang, A., 137, 139, 141 sq.
Lartet, E., 122
Latham, R. G., 107, 147
Lawrence, Sir W., 16, 55 sq.
Le Play, 152
Letourneau, C., 134
Lindenschmidt, L., 123
Linnæus, K., 20 sqq., 54, 89 sq., 95
Lissauer, A., 123
Locke, J., 110
Lubbock, J. See Avebury
Lucretius, 101 sq.
Lyell, C., 117, 121 sqq.

McDougall, W., 7, 86, 136

MacEnery, J., 117 sq.
McLennan, J. F., 132 sq.
MacRitchie, D., 19
Maine, H., 133
Mannhardt, W., 140, 142
March, H. Colley, 127
Marett, R. R., 142
Mason, Otis T., 127
Mauss, M., 137, 143
Meigs, J. A., 32, 35
Mercati, 113
Monboddo, J. B., 56
Montelius, O., 123
Montesquieu, C. de S., Baron de, 110, 152
Morgan, L. H., 132 sqq., 150
Mortillet G. de, 123 sq.
Morton, S. G., 33
Müller, Friedrich, 93, 107, 150
Müller, F. Max, 140 sq., 145 sqq., 150
Myers, C. S., 46, 86
Myres, J. L., 99 sqq., 108, 110

Nicolucci, G., 123

Noetling, F., 124
Norris, E., 95
Nott, J. C., 53, 91, 107
Novicow, M., 135
Nyerup, R., 114

Owen, R., 64, 121

Pearson, K., 47, 87

Pengelly, W., 118, 120 sq.
Peschel, O., 107, 152
Peyrère, de la, 52, 113
Peyrony, M., 73
Pickering, C., 107
Piette, E., 123
Pitt-Rivers, A. H. Lane-Fox, 126 sq.
Post, H., 134
Powell, J. W., 149
Prichard, J. C., 53, 55, 95, 104 sqq.
Pruner Bey, F., 92

Quatrefages, A. de, 18, 35, 38, 44, 53

Quetelet, L. A. J., 47

Ratzel, F., 104, 107, 150, 152

Read, C. H., 127
Reclus, J. Élisée, 104, 152
Retzius, Anders, 33 sq.
Ribeiro, C., 124
Ridgeway, W., 109
Ripley, W. Z., 91
Ritter, K., 151
Rivers, W. H. R., 86, 134
Rivière, E., 122
Rolleston, G., 123
Ross, A., 139
Ross, E. A., 136

Saint-Hilaire, E. G., 59
Saint-Hilaire, I. G., 92
Schmerling, Dr., 117