Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PDF Mapping Populism Approaches and Methods 1St Edition Amit Ron Ebook Full Chapter
PDF Mapping Populism Approaches and Methods 1St Edition Amit Ron Ebook Full Chapter
https://textbookfull.com/product/social-research-methods-
qualitative-quantitative-and-mixed-methods-approaches-1st-
edition-sigmund-gronmo/
https://textbookfull.com/product/comparative-education-research-
approaches-and-methods-2nd-edition-mark-bray/
https://textbookfull.com/product/methods-in-consumer-research-
volume-1-new-approaches-to-classic-methods-1st-edition-gaston-
ares/
https://textbookfull.com/product/doing-memory-research-new-
methods-and-approaches-danielle-drozdzewski/
Quick Sketching with Ron Husband: Revised and Expanded
2nd Edition Ron Husband
https://textbookfull.com/product/quick-sketching-with-ron-
husband-revised-and-expanded-2nd-edition-ron-husband/
https://textbookfull.com/product/neurophotonics-and-brain-
mapping-1st-edition-chen/
https://textbookfull.com/product/knowledge-solutions-tools-
methods-and-approaches-to-drive-organizational-performance-1st-
edition-olivier-serrat-auth/
https://textbookfull.com/product/methods-in-consumer-research-
volume-2-alternative-approaches-and-special-applications-1st-
edition-gaston-ares/
https://textbookfull.com/product/unifying-business-data-and-
code-1st-edition-ron-itelman/
Mapping Populism
PART I
Explaining populism 15
PART II
Populism and pluralism 55
PART III
Populism: conditions of possibility 97
PART IV
Between “the people” and elites 159
PART V
Issues and methodologies 221
Index 261
Figures
Paris Aslanidis is Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and the Hellenic
Studies Program at Yale University. His work on populism analyzes the phenom
enon at the level of political party systems as well as a type of social movement.
He is currently working on an intellectual history of populism that seeks to under
stand how the concept has been employed by political scientists, historians, soci
ologists, and economists. Among other academic journals, Aslanidis has
published with Political Studies, Democratization, Sociological Forum, Mobiliza
tion, and Quality & Quantity. His chapter on “Populism and Social Movements”
was recently published in The Oxford Handbook of Populism.
Chris Barker teaches political science at the American University in Cairo
College. He has previously held positions at Southwestern College, Harvard
University, Boston College, and Ohio University. He has published several
articles and book chapters on nineteenth-century liberalism and contemporary
political theory. His book, Educating Liberty: Democracy and Aristocracy in
J.S. Mill’s Political Thought, was published by the University of Rochester
Press in 2018.
Dylan Baun is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Alabama in
Huntsville. He received his Ph.D. in Middle Eastern and North African
Studies from the University of Arizona. His current research focuses on
popular youth clubs, political organizations, and social movements in mid-
twentieth-century Lebanon.
Albert J. Bergesen is Professor of Sociology and Director, School of Sociology,
University of Arizona.
Matthew E. Bergman recently joined the Department of Government at the Uni
versity of Vienna as a postdoctoral research scholar affiliated with the collab
orative research center “Political Economy of Reforms” based at the University
of Mannheim. He has previously served as a Lecturer of Political Economy,
Research Design, Political Analysis, and Legal Reasoning at the University of
California—San Diego. His research focuses on niche parties, issue competi
tion, voting behavior, and electoral systems in Advanced Industrial Societies.
Note on contributors xi
Back at the end of June 2016, a few days after the Brexit vote in Britain and
three weeks before the Convention of the Republican Party nominated Donald
Trump as its presidential candidate, our then colleague Carol Mueller
approached us with the idea of organizing an interdisciplinary conference on
the study of populism. With her support and leadership, we were able to bring
in March 2018 a group of 40 scholars to present and discuss cutting-edge
research on populism. This volume came out of the papers presented in this
conference. We wanted to thank Carol, who is now retired, for her leadership
in organizing this conference and for being a great colleague, friend, and
a mentor to both of us. We also wanted to thank the participants in the conference,
especially our key note speakers, Harvard Professor Theda Skocpol and historian
Thomas Frank, as well as New College of Interdisciplinary Studies, the School of
Social and Behavioral Sciences, and the College at Arizona State University for
their financial and organizational support.
One of the participants in the conference was Thomas J. Keil, who presented
empirical research tracking populism in the coal country of Pennsylvania. Tom
passed away at the beginning of August 2018, less than four months after the con
ference. Prior to his retirement, Tom was our colleague at the School of Social
and Behavioral Sciences and was a friend and mentor. We are grateful that the
conference provided an opportunity for us to see him again. We miss him.
Each one of us also wanted to thank their spouses and the families for their
continued support in our academic endeavors.
Introduction to collection
Problematizing populism
Amit Ron and Majia Nadesan
Populism was among the 2017 “words of the year,” with Wendalyn Nichols,
publishing manager at Cambridge University, observing that what
distinguished the word populism from other terms circulating that year was
that it “represents a phenomenon that’s both truly local and truly global, as
populations and their leaders across the world wrestle with issues of immi
gration and trade, resurgent nationalism, and economic discontent.” Populism
is a term whose first use in print has been traced to the U.S. magazine The
Nation in 1898, where it was deployed to describe the “People’s Party,”
a political movement of the “common man” opposed to the excesses of the
Gilded Age (Jäger, 2017). The meaning of populism was contested from its
first use to describe a movement located outside of conventional politics,
pitted antagonistically against industrialized America.
Were populists virtuous reformers or paranoid nativists? In the mid-twentieth
century, Richard Hofstadter (1964) argued the latter position, seeing a common
“paranoid style” in U.S. politics that linked turn-of-the-century populism to
McCarthyism. Populism was subsequently linked with authoritarianism and
fascism in an international research trajectory suspicious of its anti-pluralist
tendencies. Yet, this view of populism as antithetical to democracy has been
repeatedly challenged in debates over historical details and counterexamples of
inclusive populist mobilizations. These debates over populist meanings, forms,
and effects have assumed more urgency in the context of new avenues for political
participation enabled by the web 2.0 environment, leading some academic obser
vers, such as Benjamin Moffitt (2016), to describe populism in relation to political
performativity.
Although today, populism is ascendant as a term used to explain outbreaks
and mobilizations of political activity, there is little agreement on other aspects
of the meaning of the term and its designations. Populism is most often defined
as a concept of morally righteous people pitted against corrupted elites. Groups
often targeted in populist discourses include cultural, corporate, and governmen
tal elites. Populist objectives can be reform oriented or revolutionary. Examples
of movements described as populist span the political and cultural spectrum,
including social mobilizations as diverse as the 1960s-era civil rights movement
2 Amit Ron and Majia Nadesan
of possibility for mobilizations labeled populist? What does populist praxis look
like today in the era of the Internet and user-generated content? Are populists
today more susceptible to demagoguery? What effects are posited in response to
populist mobilizations? What is the relationship between populism and liberal
democracy? This collection grapples with these issues, focusing on fundamental
questions about the meaning of “the people” and unpacking relationships across
“the people,” populism, and democratic pluralism. In so doing, it raises funda
mental questions about the possibilities and challenges of inclusive democracy
free from mob rule in the Internet era, the tyranny of the majority, and the types
of expulsions that have been characteristic of democratic social organization.
These questions are especially pressing in the context of the urgent ecological
and population crises confronting human societies across the planet. The ques
tion of whether liberal democracy can deliver a sustainable future hinges in
significant part on the nature and objectives of populist social mobilizations.
Although the term “populism” is modern, used by late-nineteenth-century
agrarian reformists, the concerns expressed by observers at the time regarding
populists’ susceptibility to demagoguery echoed classical skepticism regarding
the merits and democratic capabilities of “the people.” At the height of ancient
Athenian democracy, Plato promulgated pessimism regarding citizens’ capacities
to distinguish between pure rhetoric (truth) and sophistry, defined most bluntly
as persuasion devoid of truth and ethics. This example captures not only ancient
doubts about the wisdom of popular governance, but also the narrow delineation
of those designated as citizens with participatory rights in democratic societies.
Movements of the people have historically been engendered by such exclusions.
Exclusions can provide the unifying logic that binds “the people” into an entity.
Specific exclusions are locally determined, but there are historical patterns of
exclusion against ethnic and religious minorities, non-propertied residents,
women, and children. The constitution of peoplehood around exclusions has
historically raised observers’ concerns regarding reformist or revolutionary inten
tions. Efforts to manage social mobilizations of the people were enabled by the
new expert space of “public opinion,” which became a primary target of inter
vention by industry and government (Lippmann, 1965). Public opinion data
offered insights into the concerns of “the people,” represented as fragmented
into distinct demographic and interest groups. Issues identified through surveys
could be managed strategically, enhancing public consent and domesticating
the unknown dangers posed by democratic crowds. However, the capacity for
democratic elections in Europe and Latin America to produce popular, but authori
tarian, leaders amplified concerns about populism’s role in delivering democracy.
images of “the people” that are typically at play in discussions about populism:
as an identity group, as a social class, and as a political unit. We argue that even
though the three images we describe below often overlap, they each raise differ
ent research questions for those who are interested in studying populism.
The first image of “the people” is as an identity group, an ethnos, a people
who are tied together by a shared identity with allegedly deep bonds. Arguably,
this is the image of “the people” invoked by the Old Testament when it
describes how God instructs Moses to tell Pharaoh, “Let my people go”
(Exodus, 5:1). The research program that revolves around this image examines
the processes through which a particular identity, or a particular type of identity
category, is forged. For example, research can ask how certain ideas, values,
or groups come to be perceived as “American,” while others are excluded. Fur
thermore, the processes that shape political identities often shape the interests
associated with these identities. Accordingly, there are research questions about
how identities get affixed to interests and then to specific policies. Social science
provides a wide array of approaches for answering these questions, from theoret
ical frameworks that are rooted in social psychology and interpersonal dynamics
to those that understand identity production sociologically, in broader systemic
contexts composed of institutionalized social relations.
The second image of “the people” is as a social class, the plebs. This is the
image of “the people” invoked by Niccolò Machiavelli in The Prince (1532/
1988) when he writes that “[w]ell-ordered states and wise rulers have always
been very careful not to exasperate the nobles and also to satisfy the people
and keep them contented” (p. 66). In this image, what distinguishes “the
people” is their marginal social position vis-à-vis the elite, inextricably tying
the question of who constitutes “the people” to access to economic or social
power. For those who view “the people” through this image, research revolves
around the question of how the more fundamental properties of the hierarchical
social order present themselves as forms of political identities or political
movements. In this image, “the people” may have objective or real interests
that are different from their perceived interests. Not every political identity or
social movement that claims to speak on behalf of “the people,” or get wide
support from the non-elite, necessarily speaks for the real entity of “the
people.” That is, sometimes the people can be manipulated by elites who claim
to speak on their behalf (we will return to this theme in our discussion of
demagoguery).
The third image of “the people” is as a political entity unified by shared
terms of social cooperation. This is “the people” of “We the people” from the
Preamble to the U.S. Constitution. This image, which is rooted in the liberal
social contract tradition, understands the source of the authority of government
to be rooted in the consent of “the people.” Government is created, as John
Locke (1689/1980) describes, “where-ever any number of men, in the state of
nature, enter into society to make one people, one body politic, under one
supreme government” (pp. 47–48; §89). The power of government has to be
Introduction to collection 7
employed for the “good of the people” or the “public good.” This insistence
on the social contract legitimizes dissent when government is perceived as
acting inconsistently with the public will. Within the liberal-democratic trad
ition, there are different approaches to how these general intuitions about the
purpose of government and the source of its power can translate into a full
account of political power. The main philosophical and research questions are
therefore related to the notion of the legitimacy of the exercise of political
power in democratic societies. Are those who exercise political power acting
in the interest and consent of “the people?” What are legitimate avenues of
political expression and what happens when they fail?
Critics of populism sometimes ally themselves with political realists in claiming
that political processes cannot be evaluated using the standard of popular “legitim
acy,” and that the very attempt to rank more or less legitimate forms of political
representation is misguided. But rankings of legitimacy have a certain utility, par
ticularly when many stakeholders are involved in producing and applying criteria.
Questions of legitimacy have taken on added importance in a context Castells
(2019) described as a “rupture between citizens and governments,” deriving in
significant part from the “gradual collapse of a model of representation” (p. 5)
capable of excising the tools necessary for collective collaboration. It is important
to stress with this example that public opinion is used to invoke a concept of “the
people” as a real social category, the values and interests of which can be directly
represented and addressed. For example, a politician can claim to speak for “the
people” as a class by virtue of the results of an election or other empirical data
concerning constituent values and attitudes.
Given the complexities of representing populist movements and their
relationships to “the people,” research must speak to and be reflexive about issues
of communication, power, authenticity, and legitimacy. We must ask how commu
nications produced by everyday people, politicians, the media, and academics,
among other forms of agency, invoke “the people” and how symbolic and material
populist mobilizations reproduce or transform existing power relations in society.
We must interrogate the authenticity of populist movements and representations,
and in so doing grapple with complex issues of representation, including the ques
tion of authenticity itself, especially in the Internet era. We must also acknowledge
our positionality as researchers, confronting the possibility that our representations
of populist mobilizations are also shaped by power relations.
and cultural conditions that make the emergence of populism possible and
shape value inflections and political performances? These types of questions
are central to historical and comparative approaches to populism that address
how social institutions and inequalities engender populist mobilizations, whose
rise to power is enabled or confined by the strength of key leaders, core insti
tutions, and access to communications networks. Several chapters in this col
lection address these questions by examining the economic conditions that
make it possible to mobilize on behalf of “the people.” In particular, they
emphasize the increase in economic inequality that sharpens the experiential
distinction between “the people” and elite groups, foregrounding the failures
and inadequacies of existing ideational and institutional foundations.
Other chapters in this collection address the socio-psychological conditions of
possibility for populist beliefs. The first approach to understanding how people
hold populist beliefs entails cognitive and ideological mapping. This entails delim
iting populist beliefs among targeted populations (such as anti-elitist sentiments
among working-class white voters) and situating them in the context of a web of
beliefs that are tied together by some inner logic (such as a narrative of American
decline). This form of explanation opens the door to an engagement with the val
idity or truth value of particular belief systems (such as the existence of a “new
world order”). It also encourages another approach, which addresses how populist
leaders and/or mobilizations strategically articulate and deploy existing beliefs in
their communications to target audiences.
Is populism irrational?
The role of contemporary media in enabling populist mobilizations and in
shaping representations of their aims and ethics cannot be underestimated. The
Internet has disrupted centralized control over the production of mass-mediated
messages, enabling outreach and fostering social networks that have the poten
tial to become visible populist mobilizations. Moffitt’s The Global Rise of
Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation (2016) argues that
new media play a critical role in contemporary populist movements and
that a historicized view of populism today is best represented by the idea of
political style, “a repertoire of embodied, symbolically mediated performance”
(pp. 28–29). If populism today is a political style, then what affective (i.e.,
emotional) characteristics dominate its performative style?
Ronald Jacobs and Eleanor Townsley (2018) argue that new media encourage
an “agonistic process of positioning” defined in terms of today’s unrestrained pro
liferation of divergent performances of truth and justice on mediated platforms,
which add to challenges to institutional authority (p. 345). They point out that
these divergent performances illustrate reflexive modernization as social groups
interrogate the conditions of their everyday lives and mass-mediated realities.
However, this reflexive modernization can promote and amplify political and
cultural alienation and resentment in a technological context of high connectivity
Introduction to collection 9
but deep economic inequality. Populism can emerge as a sort of social contagion
in this line of research, characterized by a politics of resentment and irrational
political beliefs.
In an academic review of American and European theorizing about popu
lism, Paul Jones (2018) argues for the primacy of Theodor W. Adorno, Else
Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford’s The Authoritar
ian Personality (1950) in understanding nineteenth-century and twentieth-
century populism, even in the American context. Historians have been tempted
to romanticize late-nineteenth-century American populists by marginalizing
nativist, racist, and anti-Semitic leanings, a point made by Hofstadter’s The
Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R (1955). Jones argues that Hofstadter’s
description of the paranoid elements of American populism is indebted to the
psycho-political “authoritarian” personality style.
This collection problematizes universalizing accounts of the populist phe
nomenon as irrational political affect by introducing and interrogating multiple
populist rationalities. There exists no singular form of populist rationality and/
or irrationality (Laclau, 2005). Yet, one of the questions troubling empirical
research on populism is whether in explaining populist beliefs, or the bond
between populist leaders and followers, it is necessary to “look under the
hood,” disclosing psychological processes and they are embedded in and inter
act with particular social and political contexts.
This affirmative view of populist praxis is not, perhaps, the most popular
among academic and news media observers. The historical record suggests
there are empirically grounded consequences regarding deployments of binary
logic as a rhetorical strategy for unifying a collective. The binary logic of
a discourse or rhetoric based on the distinction between those who belong to
“the people” and the “other” has two consequences. First, it makes it easier to
slip into Manichaean language and portray the others, the outsiders, as the
enemy of “the people.” Second, it pushes those who use this framework to
treat “the people” as a single entity and thus to under-emphasize, ignore, or try
to eradicate the differences between and across groups within “the people.”
This skeptical approach to populism is illustrated in Jan-Werner Müller’s What
Is Populism? (2006), in which he adopts the language of populism as
a political logic, but identifies key attributes of that logic, including a strong
anti-pluralism deriving from populists’ belief in their moral singularity. Steven
Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt adopt this pessimistic reading of populism in How
Democracies Die (2018), in which they argue that authoritarian populism pre
sents a clear danger to fragile pluralist democracies.
Despite these concerns, few of the chapters in this collection adopt the
position that populism is necessarily anti-pluralist. Although contributors
acknowledge the validity of the slippery slope invoked with “the people,” they
argue that “the people” can both be plural and recognize themselves as such.
Generally speaking, the pluralist populist argument focuses less on the particular
arguments that are made, rightly or wrongly, on behalf of “the people,” and
more on the processes that allow people to engage collectively. One implication
of this focus on the process is that more pluralist populists are less interested in
establishing clear boundaries between “the people” and their enemies. While cer
tain populist rhetorics view “the people” unidimensionally as members of
a single group, when real people interact, especially in the intense purposeful
interaction of forming social movements, they encounter each other as complex
human beings. These interactions allow participants to identify commonalities
and to develop respect and appreciation for differences.
References
Castells, M. (2019). Rupture: The crisis of liberal democracy. R. Marteau (Trans.).
Cambridge, UK: Polity.
Hofstadter, R. (1955). The age of reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. New York, NY: Alfred
A. Knopf.
Hofstadter, R. (1964). The paranoid style in American politics: And other essays.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Jacobs, R. N., & Townsley, E. (2018). Media meta-commentary and the performance of
expertise. European Journal of Social Theory, 21(3), 340–356.
Jäger, A. (2017). The semantic drift: Images of populism in post-war American historiog
raphy and their relevance for (European) political science. Constellations, 24, 310–323.
Jones, P. K. (2018). Insights from the infamous: Recovering the social-theoretical first
phase of populism studies. European Journal of Social Theory, 22(4), 458–476.
doi:10.1177/1368431018772507
14 Amit Ron and Majia Nadesan
“Presently the music starts again, and the spirit known as ‘Ngardaddi’ is seen to be
stealthily creeping towards the fire, his body lying flat upon the ground and his legs
dragging behind.”
CHAPTER XXVII
RELIGIOUS IDEAS
1. The median basilic vein is being slit. Note ligature above the biceps.
2. The blood which is spurting from the incision is being collected on a shield.
The men sit in a row at the back of the fire, with their thighs asunder
and their legs bent in the knees; their chins are resting upon their
chests whilst they beat the backs of their heads with small bundles of
brushwood, keeping time with their song and with the performance of
the warrior.
When, after a while, the music ceases, the warrior is seen to be
lying asleep beside his captive. The ancestors become restless and
begin to move sideways, first in a body to the left and then to the
right; then they move backwards and forwards. This movement is
peculiarly weird since the performers do it by shuffling over the
ground in the sitting posture, with their arms held erect, but bent in
the elbow.
Presently the music starts again, and the spirit known as
“Ngardaddi” is seen to be stealthily creeping towards the fire, his
body lying flat upon the ground and his legs dragging behind. He
advances very slowly, turning his face towards the ground, in search
of the fire which escaped from heaven. He wears a tall head-dress
quite thirty-two inches long, which consists of a tightly fitting
hemispherical cap carrying a column in its centre, at the top of which
a bundle of split black-cockatoo feathers is attached. The feathers
are from the male bird’s tail, and the brilliant red patches in them are
representative of fire. The whole structure is made of paper-bark and
human hair-string, the outer surface being decorated with ochre,
pipeclay, charcoal, and vegetable-down. Vide Plate XXXII.
All the time the men at the fire-side are beating time with their
hands and simultaneously turn their heads from side to side, to all
intents and purposes quite unconcerned about the Ngardaddi who is
gradually crawling near to them. This is done to entice the thief
nearer and lead him to believe that he is unobserved. All of a
sudden, however, when the spirit is about to touch the fire and is in
the act of snatching it from the tribesmen, one of the group on either
side of the fire throws a handful of dry grass upon the smouldering
heap. The flame responds immediately and casts a bright light all
around.
Alarm is raised by the tribesmen by clapping their hands together
violently. The spirit collapses and lies flat upon the ground at full
length. Two or three of the men nearest by seize some of the burning
grass and hit the prostrate figure over the head. The spirit jumps to
his feet and treads the ground as if endeavouring to make his
escape. Seeing this, the men at the fire rise quickly and treat their
victim most unmercifully with bundles of burning grass and twigs.
Eventually each of them seizes a fire-brand and digs the burning end
deeply into the spirit’s back and the unfortunate fellow eventually
decamps into the darkness amidst the bellowing whoops of his
victors.
The air is fouled for some distance around by the smell of the
burned skin, reminding one of the stench in a smithy when horses
are being shod. The back of the spirit-impersonator is naturally
severely scored by the cruel treatment it is subjected to, but the
fellow takes it all in good faith and without flinching.
The object of the ceremony is twofold. Firstly all members of the
community who are present, men, women, and children, are taught
to appreciate the value of fire, and secondly it is believed that the
exemplification of so harsh and drastic a treatment for attempted
theft will tend to make abortive any schemes of the evil spirits.
The Arunndta are quite convinced in their own minds that in the
days of their tribal fathers there was no water on the surface of the
ground they occupied; their ancestors in those times were compelled
to live on grass and succulent plants, no consideration being given to
the fact, as we have learned, that the vegetation derives its moisture
from outside sources. But it happened one day, when their
forefathers were out hunting, that they met with a number of strange-
looking men who were sitting around a pool of pure water from which
they were drinking. At the sight of the men, the strangers fled,
leaving the water behind. The hunters gave chase but all except one
disappeared and he made for a cave in the hills. The hunters closed
the mouth of the cave with a big stone and went back to the pool of
water to quench their thirst, but when they reached the spot, the
water had turned into a massive, round stone. The men made back
to the cave and removed the obstruction, but imagine their surprise
when they found the cave empty. Upon making a careful search,
however, they discovered a long cylindrical stick which had some
peculiar markings on it. They took the stick and walked once more
towards the petrified pool, and, lo, they beheld the stranger they
were looking for walking in the sky. When he saw the stick in the
hands of the hunters, he took the form of a cloud, and as he bent his
body towards the stick, his long matted hair fell forwards and from it
water poured upon the earth beneath. The hunters drank freely of
the precious fluid and when they looked skywards again the
cloudman had vanished.
From that day onwards the Arunndta medicine men (“Nangarri”)
have kept that spot sacred and taboo to the women and children;
they call the big stone “Imbodna” which means “the hailstone.” The
man who fled to the cave and then escaped from the hunters as a
vapour they call “Nangali,” the name for a cloud. The tribe has never
since been without water because Nangali left his magic wand in the
hands of their ancient sorcerers and whenever the country was
suffering from drought they could call upon him to appear in the sky
and bring forth rain.
Nangali is one of a group of celestial beings who have been
termed “Atoakwatje,” that is Water-Men; they are now looked upon
as Demigods who control all terrestrial supplies of water from their
abode in the clouds. The Atoakwatje are believed to have certain
mysterious connections with some of the tribal sorcerers who in a
sense parade on earth as their disciples and attend to the rain-
making ceremonies through which they are able to commune with
each other.
When the people are in need of water, the rain-makers assemble
around the Imbodna and one or two of them produce the sacred
stick, known to the Arunndta as “kwatje-purra,” literally meaning “the
reproductive organ of water,” and to the Aluridja as “kapi-wiyinna.”
Nowadays these sticks, which strictly speaking are of phallic
significance, are flat and more like a tjuringa in shape, and have a
number of peculiar markings on them. For a time the stick is laid
beside the great water-stone, and the sorcerers kneel while they
chant with a barely audible voice. They rise to their feet and the most
influential individual who is decorated with stripes of yellow
vegetable-down and wears a dog-tail tassel on his belt, lifts the stick
towards the sky and continues mumbling. The other members kneel
again and all present chat together. The man who is standing poises
the stick horizontally between his hands and rocks it one way, then
another; and this performance is frequently repeated.
When at length the principal performer sits down, the other men
leave the spot and run in a single file towards the camp, loudly crying
“kurreke ta ta” in imitation of the call of the spur-winged plover.
In the evening a general corroboree is indulged in; and all grown-
up persons, male and female, are allowed to join in. Several refrains
are forthcoming which are connected with ordinary rain or water
festivals. The principal rainmaker does not attend but joins the camp
again during the night. It appears that in the interim he has visited
the sacred cave, in company of one or two of his brother-sorcerers,
to hide the magic stick and preserve it for future use. Any
representative of the Atoakwatje group inherits the power to fashion
and use the rain-stick, but it is imperative that he learns the art under
the direction of a senior and duly qualified nangarri.
A ceremony directly connected with sun-worship belongs to the
old Arunndta people and is known as “Ilpalinja.” When the weather
has been and continues to be unpleasantly cold, and the mating
season of birds and animals has on that account been long delayed,
the men construct a large colored design upon the selected
ceremonial ground. Radiating from a point upon a cleared space,
many lines are drawn with red and white vegetable-down to
represent the rays of the sun; and these are intersected at different
distances from the central point by a number of concentric circles
which represent the fathers of the tribe. The centre of the design is
occupied by a stick which is supposed to incorporate some mystical
and sacred sun-creature known as “Knaninja Arrerreka.” The same
Ilpalinja-design is occasionally carved as the crest of the Knaninja
upon a sun-tjuringa. Vide Fig. 6.