Lessons from the Kinzua
New York industrial centers for the plentiful mineral reserves
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Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the same price that he
An investigation into the collapse of the Kinzua Viaduct, a 103-year-old railroad
bridge and civil engineering landmark in Pennsylvania, offers insights that
may help to protect similar structures that are susceptible to damage from
high winds. By Thomas G. Leech, P.E., S.E., A.M.ASCE, Jonathan D. McHugh,
P.E., A.M.ASCE, and George Dicarlantonio, P.E.
O
n July 21, 2003, the Kinzua Viaduct—a 300 ft
(91 m) tall, 2,053 ft (626 m) long railroad bridge
in northwestern Pennsylvania approximately 16 mi
(26 km) south of the border of New York and Pennsylvania—
collapsed during a severe storm. A forensic investigation of the
spectacular failure of this civil engineering landmark revealed
that the viaduct had significant structural vulnerabilities that
previous inspections had failed to detect. Conducted by a
team of forensic engineers, material engineers, meteorologi-
Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, all
On July 21, 2003, the Kinzua Viaduct—a 103-year-old railroad bridge in northwestern Pennsylvania—collapsed in spectacular fashion during a tornado.
A forensic investigation of the failure of this pioneering structure revealed that the viaduct had significant structural vulnerabilities that were hidden
from view during previous inspections.
56 0885-7024-/05-0011-0056/$25.00 per article
cal scientists, and government engineers, the investigation also
determined that certain bridge structures are predisposed to
catastrophic wind damage and, therefore, should be classified
as “wind susceptible.” For the benefit of the bridge engineer-
ing community, the investigators developed eight recommen-
dations that may assist efforts to protect similar structures.
The original Kinzua Viaduct was constructed in 1882 for
a branch of the New York, Lake Erie, and Western Railroad
Company. In the latter part of the 19th century, demand by
Civil Engineering November 2005
Civ. Eng., 2005, 75(11): 56-61
of northern Pennsylvania spawned the development of a
complex rail network throughout the Allegheny Plateau, an
upland area in Pennsylvania and New York that contains myr-
iad intricate gullies and gorges. The plateau presented bridge
engineers of the day with many formidable challenges, not the
least of which was the 300 ft (91 m) deep Kinzua gorge.
The solution was a wrought iron railroad trestle consisting
of 41 spans—20 tower spans measuring 38.5 ft (11.75 m) in
length, 19 girder spans measuring 61 ft (18.6 m) in length, and
two 62 ft (18.8 m) end spans—for a total length of 2,053 ft
(626 m). Manufactured by the Phoenixville Bridge Company,
the towers, or “Phoenixville piers,” reached heights of 301
ft (91 m), each comprising four tubular wrought iron posts
9.75 in. (250 mm) in diameter that were fastened by horizontal
screws and diagonal wind bracing. The piers were anchored
via long wrought iron anchor bolts embedded in sandstone
pedestals that were quarried near the site. Forty Phoenixville
Bridge Company employees erected the viaduct using gin
poles and a gantry crane in 94 days.
At the time of its construction, the Kinzua Viaduct was the
longest and tallest bridge in the world, earning it the moni-
ker the eighth wonder of the world. The viaduct enabled
steam locomotives to carry coal and other natural resources
high above the deep stream valley, eliminating 8 mi (13 km)
of steep grades and treacherous terrain. However, excessive
vibrations and high crosswinds prevented trains from travel-
ing faster than 5 mph (8 km/h) while crossing the bridge.
With the advent of heavier rail loads in a time of rapidly
changing technology, the original bridge was dismantled in
1900. Although the original structure remained structurally
adequate, the Kinzua Viaduct was rebuilt as a steel struc-
ture with a span arrangement, tower geometry, and grade
line identical to those of the original bridge. In fact, the old
viaduct was used as an erection platform for the new super-
structure towers, which were mounted on the original stone
masonry pedestals. To secure the new steel superstructure to
the existing pedestals, the original wrought iron anchor bolts
from the first viaduct were reused. The western tower legs
were secured directly to the existing anchor bolts, while the
eastern tower legs were fitted with roller expansion bearings
so that the structure could expand laterally. Because the exist-
ing wrought iron anchor bolts were too short to accommo-
date the fitted expansion bearings used in the new design,
they were spliced to steel anchor bolt extensions by means of
steel collar-coupling assemblies.
The new viaduct also employed an innovative tower design
that such critics as the famed bridge engineer Gustav Linden-
thal considered a radical departure. The redesigned structure
featured riveted, latticed, built-up columns and a Vierendeel
lateral bracing system, omitting all diagonal sway braces.
As the 20th century progressed, nearby coal resources were
depleted, and rail traffic diminished. The viaduct remained
in service but activity was light. Finally, in 1959 the railroad
company sold it for scrap to the owner of a private salvage
company. Realizing its value, the owner did not have the
heart to dismantle the structure, and in 1963 he sold it to the
November 2005 Civil Engineering
had paid the railroad company.
The commonwealth then established at the site a state park
that featured the bridge as its centerpiece. Listed in the National
Park Service’s National Register of Historic Places in 1977 and
designated a civil engineering landmark by asce in 1982, the
viaduct was used by a private railroad concessionaire from 1980
through early 2002. That year, Pennsylvania’s Department of
Conservation and Natural Resources closed the structure after
a routine inspection uncovered severe deterioration in observ-
able structural elements of the towers. In 2003 repair work that
focused solely on the restoration of these visibly deteriorated
elements began and was in progress at the time of the collapse.
That fateful day, a series of unfavorable weather condi-
tions produced Pennsylvania’s severest storm of the summer.
Known in meteorological terms as a mesoscale convective
system (mcs), the intense storm formed in the afternoon over
a wide area that encompassed eastern Ohio, western Pennsyl-
vania, western New York, and southern Ontario. The system
produced a series of spiral-like cloud banks that moved in a
counterclockwise direction as the entire mcs tracked in an
easterly direction. At the leading edge of the front, the combi-
nation of wind shear and moisture with afternoon instability
initiated intense thunderstorms.
Intense, smaller vortices within the larger mcs system
sparked tornado activity at many locations. At the Kinzua
Bridge State Park, the National Weather Service reported that
an F-1 tornado—that is, a tornado with wind speeds of 73 to
112 mph (117.5 to 180.2 km/h)—touched down at approxi-
mately 3:20 pm local time, destroying vast swaths of the sur-
rounding forest. The distinct, large-scale debris field at the site
extended more than 1 mi (1.6 km) in a northerly direction,
revealing the counterclockwise, or cyclonic, winds within the
vortex and associated inflow winds trailing the vortex.
The tornado’s counterclockwise vortex extended as much
as 0.25 mi (0.4 km) in diameter. At touchdown, the lead-
ing edges of the rotating vortex produced high, straight-line
winds in the immediate vicinity of the structure. Because of
its counterclockwise rotation, the tornado initially attacked
the structure and the surrounding forest from the east. The
vortex was fed by concentrated inflows of air channeled along
discrete northerly tracts. These inflow winds were truly capri-
cious, directly attacking the structure but wholly bypassing a
construction compound approximately 200 ft (60 m) south of
the bridge where construction workers and park attendants
had assembled as they concluded their workday activities.
As the tornado proceeded north, a progressive failure of
the structure occurred as the towers collapsed in sequence
within approximately 30 seconds. Twenty-three of the via-
duct’s 41 spans collapsed in spectacular fashion. Eight sup-
porting towers, attacked by the easterly leading-edge winds,
fell to the west, while three other supporting towers, attacked
by the southerly inflow winds, fell to the north. The natural
disaster left an extensive debris field littered with twisted,
strewn metal and devastated the nearby Pennsylvania com-
munity of Mount Jewett, whose citizens were shocked by
the demise of their local treasure and sole tourist attraction.
57
 Following the collapse, the Department of Conservation
and Natural Resources followed the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Transportation’s established procedures for inves-
tigating catastrophic structural collapses. These procedures
set guidelines for employing a team of specialists entirely
independent of any current design, maintenance, construc-
tion, or rehabilitation activities associated with the structure
to conduct a thorough forensic and analytical investigation of
the structural failures. Convened in August 2003, the panel
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visited the site, determined the sequence of the collapse, and
conducted a detailed structural and metallurgical analysis of
the bridge and its components.
In its report, issued in December 2003, the board of inquiry
concluded that the viaduct collapsed because of a separation
failure of the anchor bolts and collar-coupling assemblies at
the base of the eastern tower legs at the interface between
the 1882 and 1900 construction. Preexisting fatigue crack-
ing within approximately 75 percent of the collar-coupling
assemblies drastically reduced the anchor bolt system’s uplift
capacity, essentially negating the safety factor normally relied
on in design. What is more, the board concluded that the
failed collar-coupling assemblies were not visually observable
at any time during previous inspection cycles, as the couplings
were hidden from view by washer assemblies.
The board based its conclusions on forensic markers dis-
closed during the investigation. Four such markers were
apparent at the Kinzua site:
• Order markers, including the ordering of materials clustered
within a debris field (the inversion of clustered materials
within a debris field indicating the direct order of collapse);
• Directional markers, including the direction of fallen trees
and collapsed towers;
• Separation markers, including all evidence of “clean” breaks
(clean breaks being consistently observed at the interface of
the 1882 and 1900 construction);
• Fracture markers, including all evidence of consistent pat-
terns of small-scale fractures within members. Small frac-
tures were consistently observed in the collar-coupling
assemblies connecting the 1882-era construction to the
1900-era construction on the eastern side of the towers.
The board of inquiry ultimately concluded that wind speeds
in excess of 94 mph (151.2 km/h) initiated the failure and that
A rendering from 1900 shows the second Kinzua Viaduct, constructed of steel to resemble its predecessor, a wrought iron structure built in 1882.
58
the towers designated sequentially from south to north as 11
through 4 collapsed in a westerly direction. Immediately there-
after, towers 12, 13, and 14 collapsed in a northerly direction.
Evidence uncovered during the investigation reveals eight
lessons that may be of benefit to the bridge community.
Lesson 1: The design of tall, light structures with large
height-to-base aspect ratios will generally be governed by
lateral loading. Accordingly, these structures should receive
greater attention during initial design and periodic inspec-
tions. Wind-loaded bridges may be at risk if any compo-
nents in tension fail; such a failure can be expected to result
in the structure’s collapse or to render it unable to perform
its intended function. The board’s report recommends that
such structures be classified as “wind susceptible.” It also rec-
ommends that structures with a height-to-base aspect ratio
greater than 3:1 and, by extension, any tower bent structure
whose anchor bolt system can potentially sustain tensile ser-
vice loading during design wind loads be considered wind
susceptible. Furthermore, the report recommends that any
element of a structure that is subject to principal tensile stress
under full wind loading be singled out before inspection and
receive special consideration during inspections.
Recognizing that elements of structures susceptible to
wind damage may be vulnerable, the report’s authors rec-
ommend classifying as “wind critical” any member whose
failure when subjected to full wind load would result in col-
lapse or render the structure unable to perform. The term
“wind-critical member” is new and should be embraced by
the bridge community. The tie-down systems of many tower
bent superstructures, particularly railroad and “rails-to-trails”
structures, qualify as wind critical. If inadequate safety factors
exist, tie-down retrofits should be initiated before any other
planned repairs are carried out. Such structures as railroad via-
ducts with characteristically light superstructures and large,
windward superstructure areas will be subjected to overturn-
ing actions that will place a significant portion of the system
in a state of principal tensile stress, most acutely at the base of
the structure’s windward side. The catastrophic collapse of the
Kinzua Viaduct demonstrates that tall, slender structures are
indeed vulnerable to wind, and the presence of wind-critical
members can cause such structures to fail suddenly.
Civil Engineering November 2005
Civ. Eng., 2005, 75(11): 56-61
For the Kinzua Viaduct, the mechanics of collapse may
be easily visualized in an idealized, two-dimensional fash-
ion by examining the structure’s typical section. The 94 mph
(151.2 km/h) wind applied an estimated lateral force of 90 tons
(40 kN) to the structure’s 301 ft (93 m) tall towers. The struc-
ture’s windward, or eastern, side experienced uplift when the
wind speed was sufficient to shift the structure’s weight beyond
the bearings of the western face. When uplift exceeded the
capacity of the system’s “weak link,” failure occurred when the
expansion anchor bolt system separated. This particular failure
led directly to the total collapse of significant portions of the
structure.
Forensic evidence from the collapse site suggests that, on
average, three out of four anchor bolts within the anchor bolt
system at each of the collapsed tower legs were physically
unable to sustain any tensile resistance because of preexisting
fractures within the anchor bolt system’s coupling elements.
Furthermore, physical deterioration caused by corrosion was
observed on the anchor bolts, which temporarily resisted uplift
until overload and fracture occurred. Notably, the predicted
uplift force of 30 tons (13 kN) in the tallest tower at the time
of collapse was to be resisted by the four anchor bolts. The cal-
culated resisting tensile load at collapse—30 tons (13 kN)—
was approximately 20 percent of the theoretical capacity of the
four-bolt anchoring system for the entire tower. (The ultimate
tensile strength of the anchor bolts was determined by a labo-
ratory investigation that accounted for the effects of corro-
sion.) Physical deterioration of these wind-critical anchor bolt
systems was the primary cause of collapse.
Although it is unlikely that C.R. Grimm, the designer of
the second Kinzua Viaduct, could have imagined the extent to
which the anchor bolt systems would be degraded over time,
he appears to have had second thoughts about the wisdom
of reusing the original anchor bolts. In an article about the
viaduct that appeared in the January 1901 issue of the Transac-
tions of the American Society of Civil Engineers, Grimm addressed
previous criticism of his design of the structure, including
the decision to reuse the bolts. In that article, Grimm some-
what prophetically said that he agreed with the critics of his
design regarding the reuse of the old wrought iron anchor
bolts. “Strong[er] bolts should have been used with superior
details,” he wrote.
Twenty-three of the viaduct’s 41 spans collapsed, spans 4 through 11 falling to the west and spans 12, 13, and 14 falling in a northerly direction.
November 2005 Civil Engineering
Lesson 2: In spite of code provisions that logically depict
design wind loading as radiating from any direction, a false
notion prevails among the bridge engineering community that
prevailing winds will cause the worst wind damage. The com-
mentary to chapter 6 of Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and
Other Structures (asce 7) correlates the basic wind speeds given
in figure 6-1 of that publication to National Weather Service
data collected throughout the continental United States—
largely obtained from airport recording stations. The standard
does not include tornado data in the determination of wind
speed. Irrespective of coastal environments directly affected
by offshore weather phenomena, the inference remains that
critical wind speeds are associated with prevailing wind pat-
terns; other severe natural phenomena are discounted.
For the design of the second Kinzua Viaduct, Grimm chose
to fit the structure’s eastern tower legs with roller expansion
bearings at the bases of the tallest towers—4 through 14—to
enable the structure to respond laterally to thermal expansion
and eliminate certain thermal stresses. The choice of these
released bearings in this configuration was undoubtedly influ-
enced by the direction of the prevailing wind. Because of the
bridge’s north–south orientation, during strong prevailing west-
erly winds the eastern bearings would lie on the leeward side of
the structure and be subject to high compressive loading from
the tower’s overturning response. It is likely that the original
designer did not seriously consider strong winds from the east.
Of the four forensic markers—order, direction, separation,
and fracture—determined by the investigators, the direc-
tional markers provided the best indication of wind direction
at the moment of collapse. Towers 11 through 4 collapsed in a
westerly direction, while towers 12, 13, and 14 collapsed in a
northerly direction. These findings offer the most convincing
evidence that prevailing westerly winds were not present and
did not cause the collapse of the Kinzua Viaduct.
Lesson 3: The collapse of certain towers in a distinctly west-
erly direction and other towers in a distinctly northerly direc-
tion indicates that high-velocity winds came from multiple
directions during a single event. This notion of multiple wind
directions within one extreme event can best be explained
within the full meteorological context. As noted earlier, the
storm that destroyed the Kinzua Viaduct was part of a larger,
59
 organized complex of thunderstorms. The motion of the mcs
was toward the east at approximately 40 mph (64.4 km/h), and
the motion of individual thunderstorms within the mcs was
northeastward at 40 to 50 mph (64.4 to 80.5 km/h). The mcs
acquired a distinct comma shape as it traversed northwestern
Pennsylvania, indicating the presence of a counterclockwise
circulation. This circulation and associated low pressure had
a horizontal scale of approximately 190 mi (300 km) and was
not the circulation that led to the Kinzua Viaduct collapse.
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The storm that destroyed the Kinzua Viaduct was located
in the northern portion of the comma-shaped, larger-scale
mcs. The storm contained a long-lived mesocyclone—that is,
a circulation smaller in scale than the much larger rotation
associated with the mcs but larger in scale than the intense
rotation in tornadoes. Although not all mesocyclones are
associated with tornadoes, most significant tornadoes occur
in the presence of mesocyclones. This particular mesocyclone
was approximately 2.5 to 3 mi (4 to 5 km) in diameter, and
it extended from near the ground to an altitude of approxi-
mately 3 mi (5 km).
The mesocyclone of the Kinzua Viaduct storm was associ-
ated with intermittent tornado damage as it moved north-
northeast at 40 to 50 mph (64.4 to 80.5 km/h) across McKean
County, Pennsylvania. Because of the counterclockwise
motion of this mcs, the storm touched down to the east of
the structure and proceeded north with leading-edge winds
directed westward, contradicting the designer’s assumptions
of the likely prevailing wind direction. The tornado produced
a complex damage pattern, most likely as a result of its fast
forward movement and its interaction with rugged terrain.
Moreover, the intense inflow winds generated by the tornado
attacked the structure from the south. In some locations, trees
were blown over in multiple directions, indicating intense
winds blowing in two different directions at different times.
Lesson 4: A tall, slender structure is an elastic body and so
responds by vibration when acted on by sudden loading. Upon
initiation of wind loading, the towers at the Kinzua site, canti-
levered from their bases, began vibrating laterally at their natu-
ral frequency (the fundamental mode) of approximately 1 Hz.
Evidence at the bases of the towers, including noticeable elon-
gation of the anchor bolts at the bases of the eastern legs of two
towers—3 and 15—that did not collapse, strongly attests to the
structure’s significant vibration or oscillation during this storm
event.
As the wind speed quickly increased, the amplitude of
vibrations within each tower increased. It is estimated that
the tallest tower went through at least four cycles of oscil-
lation before collapse. Although vibration did not create a
resonating condition, internal forces were amplified by cor-
responding inertial effects. For the analysis upon which the
threshold wind velocities were established, a dynamic load
factor of 1.1 was computed to reflect the system’s lateral
dynamic response. Typically, wind-induced inertial effects
are not recognized by design codes. In assessing the true
capacity at limit state of very tall structures, inertial effects
should be included.
60
Lesson 5: As illustrated by the collapse of the Kinzua Via-
duct, it is apparent that when structures vulnerable to wind
are subjected to extreme wind loading, the normal notion of
safety factor against failure or, alternatively, design load fac-
tors, should be reevaluated. This reevaluation should consider
the nonlinear relationship of wind speed to wind pressure and
the nonlinearity of the computed safety factor with respect to
wind loading. Such a structure as the Kinzua Viaduct should
reasonably be expected to sustain an F-1 tornado with maxi-
mum wind speeds of 112 mph (180.2 km/h), approximately
12 percent greater than the design speed.
Furthermore, the following factors should be recognized:
• Wind pressures are proportional to the square of wind
speed.
• Maximum expected uplifts vary in nonlinear fashion with
respect to wind speed.
• Wind-critical members, such as anchor bolt systems, are
of cardinal importance in sustaining uplift under extreme
wind events.
• Wind-critical members may deteriorate over time.
Additionally, for proper design a reasonable margin of over-
load between the strength limit state and the service limit state
should be provided. The margin of overload should be mea-
sured as the ratio of wind velocity at the desired strength limit
state to the design wind velocity. For the Kinzua Viaduct, this
reasonable margin of overload was initially provided and may
be considered consistent with the upper-bound, critical wind
threshold. However, fatigue cracking and corrosion reduced
this margin below the expected service limit state, ensuring
eventual failure.
To emphasize the need to establish the correct relationship
between the required safety factor and the design wind speed,
a parametric study was conducted by the board of inquiry uti-
lizing the geometry and weight of tower 11 of the viaduct as a
base model. The study revealed that normally accepted safety
factors associated with extreme wind events—in other words,
a safety factor of 1.5—support only marginally increased wind
velocities over the design velocity. What is more, the study
found that an F-1 tornado with a limiting velocity of 112 mph
(180.2 km/h) does not provide a reasonable margin of over-
load with respect to the design velocity.
The following recommendations are offered to guard
against premature failure of wind-critical members in struc-
tures that are vulnerable to wind damage. First, all codes
should recognize the term “wind-critical member,” defined
as “a component in wind-induced tension whose failure is
expected to result in the collapse of the bridge or the inability
of the bridge to perform its function.” Second, wind-critical
members should be proportioned such that every wind-criti-
cal element provides a limit state capacity based on the ulti-
mate tensile strength of the member. Load factors consistent
with a well-defined limiting wind velocity at failure should be
appropriately applied.
Lesson 6: At the interface of the 1882 construction and the
1900 construction, an unusual accommodation was made in
the 1900 design. For the latter, the 1882 stone foundations,
Civil Engineering November 2005
Civ. Eng., 2005, 75(11): 56-61
Mechanics of the Towers’ Collapse
94 mpg (42 m/s)
Weight Fractured collar-
coupling assembly
Washers
Eastern Separation
face
Western Bearings
face
Anchor bolt
Bearings
Anchor bolts unable to resist
13 kN tensile force
designed as counterweights, and the anchor bolt systems were
reused for the new structure. At the construction interface,
the anchor bolts on the eastern legs of 11 towers—the same
towers that collapsed—were extended vertically via collar-
coupling assemblies to accommodate roller bearing nests. The
collar couplings were surrounded by a series of large steel plate
washers that rendered the collar couplings unobservable to the
naked eye during periods of routine inspection.
The collar couplings were easily recognized in the debris
field after the collapse. Visual examination of the collar cou-
plings at the site revealed longitudinal splits within a large
number of the anchorages. Visual examination, later con-
firmed by scanning electron microscopic examination of the
fractured surfaces, also indicated that most of those fractures
existed before the collapse. The observed flat and smooth
surfaces of the fracture, together with the absence of plastic
deformation, are indicative of fatigue cracking. The speci-
mens viewed under higher magnifications with the scanning
electron microscope supported a determination of fracture by
a fatigue mechanism. The fatigue cracks appear to have propa-
gated throughout the entire cross section of the collars under
lateral cyclic loading, effectively reducing the tensile capacity
of the affected couplings to zero before the collapse.
These collar couplings became the “weak links” of the
anchor bolt system’s wind-critical elements. In their find-
ings, the forensic investigators emphasize the need to inspect
by destructive or other physical means any unseen elements
within a corrosive environment that can be characterized
as wind critical. If such an inspection is not possible, the
member should be assigned zero structural capacity for the
purpose of calculating uplift.
Lesson 7: As part of the 1900 design, the superstructure of the
Kinzua Viaduct was fitted with wind locks in alternating units
of two and three spans to permit longitudinal thermal super-
structure movement. The wind locks allowed free longitudi-
nal movements and restricted lateral movements via a pocket
assembly of limited longitudinal dimension. The study of the
November 2005 Civil Engineering
debris field revealed that the structure broke freely at each wind
lock. In essence, the wind locks segmented the structure during
the collapse. As the tornado moved northward, the wind speed
pulsated, initially increasing and then decreasing in intensity
throughout the extreme wind event. Had the pocket assembly
comprising the wind locks been detailed initially to fully antici-
pate thermal movement, wind movements, and allowances for
other uncertainties of calculation, a larger internal lateral sys-
tem redundancy would have developed, and the disaster’s cata-
strophic effects may have been averted. Modification of wind
locks for similar tower bent type systems should be considered
for wind-susceptible structures.
Lesson 8: One important and often overlooked component
of forensic investigations is eyewitness testimony. Although
accounts may come from persons without scientific training
and be emotionally charged, they are nonetheless an impor-
tant component of an investigation. Written statements from
17 observers of the Kinzua collapse were taken within a week
of the disaster. The observers were principally maintenance or
construction workers who were stationed at the site on July
21. Although no one actually “saw” the collapse because of the
intense winds and rain, the accounts provided unique insights
into the collapse. For example, the field superintendent had
noted the number of independent concussion sounds during
the collapse, and his account was indispensable in determining
the exact order of the collapse. His testimony helped to com-
plete the board of inquiry’s understanding of the mechanism
of the collapse. Without this testimony, the precise sequence
of collapse could not have been independently corroborated.
The lessons learned from the Kinzua Viaduct’s collapse
provide bridge engineers and bridge owners with valuable
insights and a better understanding of the response of wind-
susceptible structures under extreme wind loading. A new
notion of wind-critical members is needed to better under-
stand these structures. Future analyses of structures that meet
these definitions must address capacity at the strength and ser-
vice limit states consistent with expected design wind pres-
sures and with appropriate consideration for overload. n
Thomas G. Leech, P.E., S.E., A.M.ASCE, is a vice president and Jona-
than D. McHugh, P.E., A.M.ASCE, a project structural engineer for
Gannett Fleming, Inc., of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. George Dicarlan-
tonio, P.E., is the section chief for bridge and roadways at the Pennsylva-
nia Department of Conservation and Natural Resources. This article is
based on a paper that was presented at the 2005 New York City Bridge
Conference and included in the proceedings of that event. Permission to
publish this article has been granted by the Bridge Engineering Associa-
tion, the New York City–based organizer and sponsor of the confer-
ence (see www.BridgeEngineer.org). The authors wish to acknowledge
the efforts of all members of the board of inquiry, including members of
the staff of the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural
Resources, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, the meteo-
rology department within Pennsylvania State University’s College of
Earth and Mineral Sciences, Lehigh University’s Advanced Technology
for Large Structural Systems Center, and Gannett Fleming, Inc.
61