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Labour Under Corbyn
Constraints on Radical
Politics in the UK
Prapimphan Chiengkul
 Labour Under Corbyn

“This book provides an overview of Corbynism from a critical political economy

perspective. Based on an extensive review of relevant materials, the book offers
a useful resource for students and scholars interested in this important period in
the history of the British Labour Party.”
—Scott Lavery, Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI),
University of Sheffield, UK
 Prapimphan Chiengkul

Labour Under Corbyn

Constraints on Radical Politics in the UK
Prapimphan Chiengkul
Faculty of Political Science
Thammasat University
Bangkok, Thailand

ISBN 978-3-030-60261-1 ISBN 978-3-030-60262-8 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60262-8

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: © Melisa Hasan

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Acknowledgments

This book is in part based on research funded by the Faculty of Political

Science, Thammasat University in 2018. The author would like to thank
the faculty for supporting its publication, as well as anonymous reviewers
for providing useful feedback. Last but not least, the author would like to
thank Ben King for his encouragement and for helping to proofread the
manuscript.

v
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
Labour Under Corbyn: An Overview 1
Methodological and Theoretical Approach 2
Main Arguments 9
Book Outline 11
References 12

2 Labourism and Structural Constraints Before 2015 15

Introduction 15
Parliamentary Socialism and Labourism Revisited 17
Ideological, Institutional and Material Political Economic
Constraints 19
Political Rules, Institutions and Conservatism 27
Conclusion 32
References 33

3 Labour Under Corbyn (2015–2020) 39

Introduction 39
The 2015 Labour Party Leadership Election 41
Mainstream Media and Conflicts Within the Labour Party 44
The 2017 General Election 48
Brexit and the 2019 General Election 52

vii
viii CONTENTS

Political Narratives, Structural Contradictions

and Fragmented Voters 58
Conclusion 63
References 64

4 Labour’s Policies to Transform the British Political

Economy 73
Introduction 73
Interpretations of ‘Corbynism’ in Political Science 75
The 2017 and 2019 Labour Manifestos Compared 78
Criticisms, Reactions from Elites and Potential Problems 87
Labour After Corbyn and the Future of Dissent 97
Conclusion 103
References 104

5 Conclusion 115
Summary of the Book’s Main Arguments 115
Final Reflections on the Book’s Relevance to Other Countries 118
References 119

Index 121
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract The chapter provides an overview of the book. It discusses

the methodological and theoretical framework, which draws on neo-
Marxist and neo-Gramscian perspectives. A summary of the book’s main
arguments and a chapter outline are also provided.

Keywords Corbyn · Coxian critical theory · Neo-Gramscian ·

Neo-Marxist · Eroding capitalism · State autonomy

Labour Under Corbyn: An Overview

After its defeat in the 2015 General Election, one might expect the
Labour Party to shift ‘right’ along the political spectrum to attract more
voters, according to the prevailing Downsian political common sense of
the day. Therefore, it was a surprise when Jeremy Corbyn, a lifelong left-
wing backbencher, won the Labour leadership election in late 2015, aided
by strong grassroots groups that helped his campaign. Corbyn was heavily
criticised by mainstream media and also by Labour members of parlia-
ment (MPs) who were dismayed by the party’s shift to the left. Labour
under Corbyn proposed to reorient the economy to serve progressive
socio-environmental goals and bring about an egalitarian transformation
of society. Labour did unexpectedly well in the 2017 General Election; the
party achieved a large increase in its vote share comparable to that which

© The Author(s) 2021 1

P. Chiengkul, Labour Under Corbyn,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60262-8_1
2 P. CHIENGKUL

saw Labour’s Clement Attlee become Prime Minister after the Second
World War. Nevertheless, the rise to power of a left-wing government in
the UK, a deeply conservative country, was undermined by various struc-
tural constraints. By the end of 2019 the Corbyn project was in terminal
decline; Labour’s position on Brexit, strategic political challenges from
the Right, and Corbyn’s unpopularity, amongst other factors, contributed
to Labour’s devastating defeat in the December General Election, which
was characterised by many seat losses in the so-called Labour ‘heartlands’.
Corbyn stepped down as leader in April 2020 whilst Labour members
engaged in tense debates about the party’s future direction.
Inspired by these developments, as well as by scholarly debates on the
Labour Party and the prospect of ‘parliamentary socialism’, this book
aims to provide an accessible yet critical analysis of the Labour Party
under Corbyn’s leadership in the context of contemporary British political
economy. It attempts to: (1) explore the socio-politico-economic devel-
opment in the UK that finally led in 2015 to the resurgence of radical
left-wing politics in the Labour Party; (2) analyse structural limitations
on left-wing politics, the prospect of a radical Labour government gaining
power, and the transformative potential of Labour’s economic and social
policies under Corbyn. Given ongoing discussions about the future direc-
tion of the Labour Party, it is more important than ever to reflect not
only on the immediate causes that led to Labour’s defeat in the 2019
General Election, but also on structural constraints on left-wing politics
and democratic socialism.
The following section discusses the methodological and theoretical
framework of the book, which draws on neo-Marxist and neo-Gramscian
perspectives. A summary of the book’s main arguments and a chapter
outline are also provided in this chapter.

Methodological and Theoretical Approach

This book adopts a qualitative research approach and relies on primary
sources such as statistics, and also a wide range of secondary sources such
as books, academic journals, Labour Party publications and reports by
non-governmental organisations. Its underlying epistemological stance is
that of critical realism; whilst subscribing to a foundationalist ontolog-
ical position and the idea that structures constrain and facilitate agents,
the study in this book also gives importance to how agents interpret
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

reality and shape these structures (Marsh et al. 2018, 193–194). More-
over, the book follows Marsh’s dialectical approach to the relationships
between structure and agency, where material and ideational structures
‘provide the context within which agents act’ and can also have effects
on agents even though they are not conscious of them (Marsh 2018,
207). Agents have their own preferences/objectives and interpretations
of context, which shape their actions and the structures in an ‘interactive
and iterative’ manner (Marsh 2018, 207–208).
The book also broadly adopts Robert W. Cox’s critical theory
approach, which commits to exploring the possibilities of a different
future. Based on historical analyses, critical theory seeks to clarify what
are feasible alternative transformations that serve as ‘a guide to strategic
action for bringing about an alternative order’ (Cox 1981, 130). Similar
to approaches adopted by Karl Marx and Antonio Gramsci, Coxian critical
theory subscribes to historical materialism and focuses on the dialec-
tical process at the level of real history, which enables the study of
how contradictions and opposed social forces may give rise to change
and alternative developmental paths (Cox 1981, 133–134). Overall, the
book draws inspiration from Cox’s conceptualisation of social forces,
historical structures and the possibility for transformative radical change.
However, to enhance this framework, the book also draws on various
neo-Gramscian and neo-Marxist writings, as well as from relevant critical
political economic writings, to analyse the Labour Party’s prospects of
advancing a radical left-wing political agenda in the UK, as the following
paragraphs briefly discuss.
First of all, it is important to ask whether the Labour Party should be
viewed as an agent that could advance a radical political economic agenda
in the UK, given that many neo-Marxists have warned of the limitations
of using the state to advance anti-capitalist and socialist causes. In the
1970s, the famous debate between Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas
on the nature of the state (see Miliband 1969, 1973; Poulantzas 1976)
raised important questions about how, in addition to state managers’
generally sympathetic stance to the capitalist status quo (the ‘instrumen-
talist’ perspective associated with Miliband), there are deep structural
constraints that limit the state from pursuing options that contradict capi-
talist interests, which means that changes in state personnel will not simply
bring about radical transformation of capitalist society (the ‘structuralist’
4 P. CHIENGKUL

perspective associated with Poulantzas).1 There are some contempo-

rary left-wing scholars, however, who have argued that capturing the
state to advance socialist agenda should not be ruled out. For example,
whilst accepting that there are elements of truth in both Miliband’s and
Poulantzas’ theories of the state, Coates (2013) argued that left-leaning
political parties could use the state to manage the capitalist economy in
favour of the labouring class, and also to instigate social redistribution and
institutional reforms (Coates 2013, 50). Drawing from Poulantzas’ work
on the democratic road to socialism (Poulantzas 1978) and Panitch and
Gindin (2017) also pointed to the importance of institutional reforms,
particularly that of democratising state apparatuses to support alternative
ways of organising the economy, such as by supporting collective property
rights and further socialisation of the economy (Panitch and Gindin 2017,
178–182). For Poulantzas (1978), the central concern of the democratic
road to socialism was how to combine social struggles within and outside
the state in order to radically transform the state, its apparatuses and
representative democracy, as well as promote direct democracy and self-
management bodies in a comprehensive manner (Poulantzas 1978, 79,
83–86).
Chapter 2 expands on the discussion above by exploring academic
debates on the Labour Party and the possibility of parliamentary socialism
in the UK. Chapters 3 and 4 also draw on the work of Erik Olin Wright
(2010, 2019) to help analyse the transformative potential of Labour’s
policies under Corbyn. Wright (2010) argued that the state should be
seen as ‘a hybrid structure’ containing contradictory non-capitalist and
(predominantly) capitalist elements (Wright 2010, 190), and that it is
an important site of struggle to push for transformative social change.
This, however, does not mean that bottom-up practices to challenge capi-
talism should be ignored, but that the state could be used to widen
space for bottom-up initiatives (Wright 2019, 64). Having ‘civil society-
based collective actors’ and progressive political parties working together
to ‘erode capitalism’ (Wright 2019, 121), as well as encouraging these
collective efforts (Wright 2019, 142–143), is also important.

1 These are popular characterisations of the two perspectives that formed subsequent
debates, which arguably do not capture the nuances in Miliband’s and Poulantzas’ argu-
ments. The instrumentalist interpretation of Miliband’s work, for example, might overlook
the importance of state elite’s ideological socialisation and ideology’s role in perpetuating
capitalism (Konings 2010, 178–179).
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

As discussed previously, the book also uses a Coxian critical political

economy approach to enrich its analyses on the nature of the state, the
constraints imposed on the state by the global capitalist system, and the
prospect of transformative radical change. Cox (1981) argued that agents
cannot act absolutely freely as their actions are situated within ‘a frame-
work of action’ or ‘historical structures’ that can be studied through
a historical approach. It is further recognised that this ‘framework of
action’—‘a particular combination of thought patterns, material condi-
tions and human institutions which has a certain coherence among its
elements’—changes over time and that critical theory’s central concern
is to explore these changes (Cox 1981, 135). To analyse the current
historical structures that are constraining the actions of individuals, the
Coxian approach takes into account configurations of three main forces:
material capabilities, ideas and institutions. It also introduces a dialec-
tical element by studying emerging rival structures or configurations of
forces that could lead to alternatives (Cox 1981, 135–136). On this issue,
Marsh’s dialectical approach to the relationships between ‘the material’
and ‘the ideational’ provides supportive insight, as it highlights how both
the material and the ideational constrain the actions of agents, and affirms
that material reality does affect the effectiveness of narratives (Marsh
2018, 210–211).
Cox is famous for using his historical structures approach to study how
the world order came about, and how it might change and be transformed
through the interactions of social forces, forms of state and world orders
(Cox 1981, 141). This may not appear relevant to the study of British
political economy. However, the relevant insight from Cox is that social
forces, forms of state and world orders are interconnected and that at
each level dominant and rival structures of the three main forces—material
capabilities, ideas and institutions—continue to operate (Cox 1981, 137–
138). This is useful in the book’s conceptualisation of how competing
social forces could give rise to a different form of state, and also helps
to highlight how an analysis of the state, and of domestic politics, could
benefit from taking into account domestic and transnational forces. These
points are further explored below.
From a Coxian or neo-Gramscian perspective, the ‘form of state’ is
based on the characteristics of leading social forces that managed to
combine cross-class and factional interests and successfully form a hege-
monic ‘historical bloc’. By highlighting how social forces shape the nature
of the state, this theoretical conception of the state takes into account
6 P. CHIENGKUL

state–civil society relations and supports the view that there can be
different forms of state based on the results of political struggles (Bieler
and Morton 2006, 90–92). Notably, analyses of social forces should also
take into account seemingly ‘non-class’ issues such as ‘peace, ecology
and feminism’ (Cox 1987, 353, cited in Bieler and Morton 2006, 90)
and other forms of identity such as those based on nationalism, religion
and gender (Bieler and Morton 2006, 90). Moreover, the concepts of
‘class’ and class identity should be historicised based on the process of
economic exploitation rather than seen as a static category (Bieler and
Morton 2006, 90).
Central to a neo-Gramscian analysis is the focus on rival counter-
hegemonic historical blocs that engage in anti-capitalist transformative
politics (for example, see Rupert 2005, 492). Neo-Marxist perspectives
also provide additional insights on the conceptualisation of counter-
hegemony. As Poulantzas argued, advancing democratic socialism would
require a long process of modifying ‘the relationship of forces within the
state apparatuses’ (Poulantzas 1978, 81–82), so the democratic socialist
project ought to rely on broad-based popular alliances, such as women
and ecological movements, to guard against obstruction from capitalist
interests (Poulantzas 1978, 85–86). Whilst people are shaped by struc-
tural social relations, they should also be seen as ‘conscious initiators of
actions’, whether as individuals or as collective entities (Wright 2019,
123). Although the institutional limits to social empowerment are fixed in
stable capitalist democracies, it has been argued that there can be histor-
ical moments where these limits can be seriously challenged to establish
mutually beneficial class collaborations (Wright 2010, 363–364). In these
historical junctures, it is possible for the state to push through ‘symbiotic
transformations’ or reforms that strengthen capitalism as well as support
democratic socialist alternatives (Wright 2019, 110). Notably, Cox (1981)
did not prioritise institutions over the ideological or material forces, and
he recognised that ‘institutions may be out of phase’ with changes in ideas
and material forces, which could undermine their hegemonic positions
(Cox 1981, 137). Important to the construction of counter-hegemonic
projects are also ‘organic intellectuals’ who can help to contest hegemonic
ideas in society (Morton 2007, 92). However, organic intellectuals ought
to be wary of their elitist cosmopolitanism tendencies and instead try
to develop ‘national-popular’ strategies that are relevant to the socio-
economic needs and cultural demands of the general public (McNally
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

2009, 62). Chapters 3 and 4 return to these issues in their discussions

of the challenges that Labour faced under Corbyn.
Drawing on the framework discussed above, this book analyses Labour
under Corbyn as an attempt to establish a counter-hegemonic historical
bloc, and takes into consideration material capabilities, ideas and institu-
tions that constrained and/or enabled the Corbyn project. The following
chapters also explore structural economic problems that help to justify
the need to reform the capitalist economy. Needless to say, however, that
people perceive the causes and the solutions to their problems differ-
ently. Despite the potential of Labour’s policies under Corbyn to address
structural problems in the British political economy, as Chapters 3 and 4
discuss, Labour did not manage to convince enough voters to support its
transformative project. On this issue, the book makes use of Colin Hay’s
(1999) distinction between structural contradictions and the narration of
‘crisis’, and different types of responses to the identification of crisis. This
framework helps in the analysis of Labour’s failure to win power in 2019.
Another important insight from the Coxian perspective is how social
forces can operate beyond state boundaries, whilst states can be seen
as intermediaries between global and local forces (Cox 1981, 141). In
the post-World War II historical juncture, for example, international
economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank helped to propagate certain norms around the world. Certain
state agencies such as ministries of finance also adjusted domestic policies
to resemble generally accepted international norms. Additionally, since
the 1970s one can observe the dominance of internationally oriented
sectors over nationally oriented sectors, as well as a more prominent
role for finance capital over industrial capital (Cox 1981, 145–147). The
dominant position of finance capital in the UK and its regressive mate-
rial consequences for society are discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 also
explores Labour’s attempt under Corbyn to challenge the finance-led
growth model.
Under contemporary global political economic arrangements, it can
be argued that states are constrained from pursuing policies that deviate
from ‘international norms’ that reflect neoliberal economic ideas, which
include support for deregulation, free trade and foreign direct investment.
These ideas and policies support economic globalisation and serve to aid
capitalist accumulation (Lavelle 2008, 22). States are generally perceived
as structurally constrained because uninterrupted capital accumulation
relies (at least partly) on business confidence, and states might not pursue
8 P. CHIENGKUL

certain policies due to fear of transnational capital flight (for example,

see Rupert 2005, 486, and also see a brief overview of different perspec-
tives on globalisation and state autonomy in Marsh 2018, 210–211). It
has been argued, for example, that British governments have adopted
neoliberal policies, such as privatisation, deregulation, lower taxes and a
flexible labour market, due to capital flight concerns (Thompson 1996,
251). Chapter 2 discusses further how the New Labour and Conservative
governments before 2015 subscribed to these ideas.
It is important, however, to note that the extent of states’ autonomy
to choose what economic policies to implement is still being debated.
For example, Hirst (1999) used empirical evidence to suggest that capital
is not as ‘footloose’ as some believe, whilst states have some degree of
independence when it comes to macroeconomic policies (Hirst 1999, 84–
86). Consistent with the critical realist framework discussed above, the
book attempts to analyse structural factors that constrain state actions,
as well as how state managers interpret global structural constraints
on the state. The book also draws on the ‘structurationist approach’,
which conceptualises states and globalisation as ‘co-constitutive’ (Hobson
and Ramesh 2002, 8), to better understand strategies that states may
opt to pursue. Even though states are ‘embedded within, and shaped
by, domestic and global social forces/structures’, they also have agency
(Hobson and Ramesh 2002, 8). It has been argued that states may use
their positions in the global, regional and domestic realms to mitigate,
overcome or adapt to structural constraints, often by playing one spatial
realm against the others. For example, the state might become a member
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to halt domestic demands for
trade protectionism. However, as a member of the WTO, the state would
also be pressured to deepen its liberal economic policies. Overall, states
can be shaped by domestic as well as global structures, but this does not
completely take away its agency (Hobson and Ramesh 2002, 10–12). As
discussed in Chapter 3, some support the UK’s exit from the European
Union (Brexit) because it would allow the UK government to pursue
neoliberal policies even more intensely. Chapter 4 also returns to the issue
of state autonomy in its analysis of constraints on Labour’s policies to
transform the British political economy.
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

Main Arguments
The central argument of the book is that political economic contexts
before 2015 provided ideological, material and institutional conditions
that opened political space for a left-wing Labour Party. However,
dominant historical structures characterised by economic neoliberalism,
conservative ideas and political institutions, continued to provide the
‘frame of action’ that severely limited the possibility of a radical left-
wing Labour Party coming to power. Chapter 2 discusses how Labour’s
commitment to social democracy declined as Thatcherism and neolib-
eral economics rose to a hegemonic position in the late 1970s. It further
argues that, although New Labour governments (1997–2010) managed
to expand public expenditures for socially beneficial purposes, it also led
the UK deeper into an unbalanced, unequal and finance-led economy.
Despite its electoral successes, New Labour arguably left Labour with no
inspiring alternatives to austerity, neoliberal economics and finance-led
growth to offer voters after the 2008 economic crisis. In addition, it is
argued that material inequality, the centrist political economic consensus
and the hierarchical and elitist British political tradition contributed to
democratic disaffection in the UK, and that this discontent was partly
expressed in Labour grassroots’ support for Corbyn in the 2015 Labour
leadership election.
Another central argument of the book is that Labour under Corbyn
tried to establish a counter-hegemonic historical bloc and that, to a certain
extent, it was able to propagate alternative economic ideas and policies.
Labour challenged the primacy of the finance sector over the industrial
sector, promoted alternative models of ownership, and put forward a bold
green industrial strategy. It also challenged political norms through the
promotion of extra-parliamentary forces and grassroots political mobil-
isation. Nevertheless, as indicated by the General Election results in
2017 and 2019, the dominant historical structures continued to provide
the ‘frame of action’ that severely limited Labour’s electoral chances.
Chapter 3 discusses how, in addition to Labour’s strategic errors in the
2019 election and other shortcomings, the UK’s preoccupation with
Brexit stole the limelight away from Labour’s radical reform agenda.
Ultimately, Boris Johnson’s Conservative Party was more successful at
creating a new right-of-centre ‘hegemonic bloc’ based on the propagation
of populist Brexit narratives.
10 P. CHIENGKUL

Contrary to common portrayals, it is argued in Chapter 4 that Labour’s

policies under Corbyn went beyond the promotion of a centralised
state and conventional ‘tax and spend’ policies. Moreover, it would be
misleading to characterise the policies as populist, nationalist, backward
looking and anti-business. Labour’s economic policies aimed to redress
structural economic problems such as inequality and uneven regional
development, and sought to tackle contemporary challenges such as
climate change and disruptive technologies. Labour wanted to increase
productivity and investments in the economy, and to secure long-term
economic growth. In addition, it clearly promoted economic democracy,
the devolution of power and progressive internationalism. Labour’s poli-
cies were likely to face great opposition, including from transnational
capital groups and state bureaucracy. If Labour had come to power,
their policies might also have required adjustment and further develop-
ment due to possible implementation problems. Nevertheless, the book
generally argues in favour of Labour’s economic policies under Corbyn;
the policies contained important political economic ideas embedded in
progressive social goals, and were supported by valid economic argu-
ments.
Whilst it is natural for the Labour Party to focus on winning elec-
tions, the book argues that the party also needs to adopt a long view
of political struggle for radical change so as not to shrink the space for
progressive politics. This is why, even after Labour’s bitter disappoint-
ment following its 2019 General Election defeat, it is important to guard
against reactionary responses to shift the party back to the centre-ground.
It is argued that, post-Corbyn, Labour and the Left could continue to
popularise progressive political and economic ideas, support bottom-up
economic initiatives and institutions at the local level, campaign for polit-
ical reforms, and foster alliances at the international level. Chapter 4
briefly discusses how the post-coronavirus economic situation has opened
up opportunities for the Left to promote progressive economic alterna-
tives, although the political outcome is far from certain. It is up to the
post-Corbyn Labour Party to navigate through the changing political and
economic landscape and create broad-based political support in society to
effect change.
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

Book Outline
Chapter 2 discusses academic writings on the Labour Party and parlia-
mentary socialism. It then analyses the material, ideological and institu-
tional political economic conditions before 2015 that both constrained
and facilitated the Corbyn project. This includes discussions of the rise
of the New Right and neoliberalism, as well as the emergence of ‘New
Labour’ and the centrist political consensus that lasted many years.
Furthermore, the chapter discusses the UK’s conservative-leaning political
rules, norms and institutions, including its powerful right-wing main-
stream media, and argues that they help to constrain the prospects of
radical politics in the UK.
Chapter 3 focuses on structural constraints and political obstacles that
Labour faced under Corbyn. In the first section, various factors that
contributed to Corbyn’s victory in the 2015 Labour leadership election
are explored. The second section then discusses conservative constraints
that limited Labour’s electoral chances, as well as conflicts within the
party. The third and fourth sections discuss Labour’s 2017 and 2019
General Election campaigns and results, including how Brexit compli-
cated the situation in 2019. The fifth and final section further analyses
Labour’s political challenges. Its analysis draws on Hay’s (1999) concep-
tualisation of crisis narratives and structural contradictions, as well as Erik
Olin Wright’s (2010, 2019) work on democratic socialist transformation.
Chapter 4 focuses on Labour’s policies under Corbyn, which aimed
to promote a radical transformation of the British political economy. The
first section briefly describes how the chapter takes a different view to
that of mainstream accounts of Corbynism in political science literature.
The second section summarises important components of Labour’s 2017
and 2019 manifestos. The third section evaluates criticisms directed at
Labour’s economic policies. The possibility of strong opposition to the
implementation of these policies if Labour had come to power is also
discussed. The fourth and final section draws on socialist writings and the
book’s Coxian/Gramcian theoretical approach to reflect on Labour after
Corbyn and the future of dissent for the Left.
The final chapter summarises the book’s main arguments. It also
discusses how the study of the Labour Party under Corbyn in this book
might be relevant to the study of politics in other countries where
neoliberal economic policies and political centrism are increasingly being
questioned.
12 P. CHIENGKUL

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———. 1987. Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making
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———. 1973. “Poulantzas and the Capitalist State.” New Left Review
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articles/ralph-miliband-poulantzas-and-the-capitalist-state.
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Transformation.” In Reflections on the Future of the Left, edited by David
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 CHAPTER 2

Labourism and Structural

Constraints Before 2015

Abstract The chapter discusses academic writings on the Labour Party

and parliamentary socialism. It then analyses the material, ideological
and institutional political economic conditions before 2015 that both
constrained and facilitated the Corbyn project. This includes discussions
of the rise of the New Right and neoliberalism, as well as the emergence
of ‘New Labour’ and the centrist political consensus that lasted many
years. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the UK’s conservative-leaning
political rules, norms and institutions, including its powerful right-wing
mainstream media, and argues that they help to constrain the prospects
of radical politics in the UK.

Keywords Parliamentary socialism · New labour · Finance-led growth

model · Right-wing media · British Political Tradition

Introduction
Jeremy Corbyn was perhaps the most unlikely person to become leader
of the Labour Party in 2015. Some of the Members of Parliament (MPs)
who agreed to nominate him for the leadership election did so not
because they believed in his left-wing ideas, but because they were certain
that he would not win and that he would only help to ‘broaden the

© The Author(s) 2021 15

P. Chiengkul, Labour Under Corbyn,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60262-8_2
16 P. CHIENGKUL

debate’. When Corbyn won the leadership election, many social commen-
tators, academics, Labour supporters, activists and politicians sympathetic
to the progressive cause in the UK were divided on whether to support
him and ‘the Left-turn’ of the Labour Party. Their reluctance and oppo-
sition can partly be traced back to old debates on the Labour Party and
‘parliamentary socialism’, and also to mainstream interpretations of the
lessons for the Left that were drawn from political developments in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, including the rise to dominance of Margaret
Thatcher in British politics, and also the subsequent electoral successes of
‘New Labour’. The 2019 General Election defeat reignited this discussion
on the extent to which Labour’s commitment to socialist values acts as a
hindrance to winning elections.
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section builds
on the theoretical discussion in the last chapter on the transformative
potential of the state in capitalist societies. It discusses selected examples
of academic writings on the possibility that the Labour Party could help to
advance parliamentary socialism, particularly that of R. H. Tawny, Ralph
Miliband, Stuart Hall, Leo Panitch, Colin Leys and David Coates. The
second and third sections then focus on analysing the material, ideolog-
ical and institutional political economic contexts before 2015 that both
constrained and facilitated the Corbyn project. In the second section, the
historical development of the British political economy and the Labour
Party since the Second World War are explored, with a focus on the New
Labour years under Tony Blair. The third section then discusses the UK’s
conservative-leaning political rules, norms and institutions, including its
powerful right-wing media, which encourage a centrist political consensus
and constrain the prospect of radical left-wing politics in the UK.
Overall, this chapter argues that New Labour managed to use
economic growth to fund public spending whilst in office, but that it
also encouraged a finance-led and unbalanced economy that supports the
perpetuation of structural inequalities. After the financial crisis of 2008,
Labour’s neglect of alternative left-wing ideas meant that it could not
offer inspiring progressive alternatives to austerity, neoliberal economics
and a finance-led growth model. This was arguably a missed opportunity
for the Left and for radical politics. In addition to the short-term goal of
winning elections, it is argued that the Labour Party ought not to retreat
from consistent ideological struggle to advance democratic socialism in
the UK, since this is important to securing its electoral chances in the
long term. Furthermore, it is suggested that material inequality, together
 2 LABOURISM AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS BEFORE 2015 17

with the hierarchical, elitist British Political Tradition (BPT), might have
helped to create democratic disaffections in the UK, which have partly
been expressed as grassroots support for Corbyn. Nevertheless, Labour
under Corbyn was significantly constrained by conservative ideas and
institutions, as discussed in Chapter 3.

Parliamentary Socialism and Labourism Revisited

In the 1930s, R. H. Tawney suggested that ‘[t]he greatest weakness of
British Labour … is its lack of a creed’ or, in other words, its lack of
common political goals and the means to achieve them (Tawney 1932,
reprinted in 2011, 23). Tawney argued that if this underlying problem
remained unsolved, then, all of Labour’s moderate attempts to trans-
form society would likely disappoint. Instead of merely concentrating on
wining power, the Labour Party needed to prepare itself to become a
socialist government, and it needed to educate people as to how a socialist
Labour government would be met with significant opposition (Tawney
1932, reprinted in 2011, 23–31).
Many decades later in 1983, Ralph Miliband argued that leaders of
the Labour Party had little commitment to socialist objectives and that
they only wanted to solve immediate, short-term problems within the
capitalist framework, rather than fundamentally transform society. Labour
governments had not only accepted the capitalist economic system; they
had also accepted the centralised and elitist democratic system. They
consented to hereditary monarchy and House of Lords peers, and priori-
tised parliamentary political process and winning elections over grassroots
and extra-parliamentary political activities (Miliband 1983, reprinted in
2015, 291–292, 305). Miliband therefore uses the term ‘Labourism’, as
opposed to socialism, to describe the Labour Party’s ideological advocacy
of reform within the boundaries of capitalism (‘ideology of adaptation’),
which is different from an ideology of transformation such as that of
Marxism (‘ideology of rupture’) (Miliband 1983, reprinted in 2015,
293).
In another call for transformation, Stuart Hall (1988) argues that mass
mobilisation is needed to advance socialism and unpack ‘the oldest capi-
talist system in the world’ (Hall 1988, 187). Reflecting a Gramscian
perspective, Hall emphasises the fundamental importance of transforming
‘popular consciousness in a socialist direction’ (Hall 1988, 187) and
18 P. CHIENGKUL

engaging in ‘the politics of populism’ in a way that would unite hetero-

geneous groups of people with different interests around the ‘root’ ideas
underlying the party’s socialist programme (Hall 1988, 191).
Recent reflections on the role of the Labour Party in advancing parlia-
mentary socialism include, for example, those of Panitch and Leys (2001).
They argue for a ‘new socialist project’ that could rise from the anger
and disappointment with global capitalism. Important to this project
are democratic discussions in the party, similar to that of the New Left
project in the 1970s. One crucial element of the new socialist project is a
radical reconceptualisation of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary prac-
tices (Panitch and Leys 2001, 268). This involves discussions of how to
radically reform the party and the state so that the extra-parliamentary
party is not merely seen as subservient to parliament. Other important
tasks include finding mainstream media platforms for the Left to help
support massive-scale political mobilisation (Panitch and Leys 2001, 263,
270–271). Another recent contribution comes from Coates (2013), who
suggests that the next Labour government ought to be more committed
to socialist values such as equality, social justice and deepening demo-
cratic practices. It should also champion democratic management of the
economy and commit to bringing a ‘fundamental rupture’ with neoliber-
alism, including the ways in which capital are being regulated by the state
(Coates 2013, 47–48). Although structural contradictions in capitalism
cannot simply be ‘legislated away’, a left-wing government should recog-
nise these contradictions and try to ‘widen the space for social reform by
managing capital in the interests of labour’ (Coates 2013, 50).
A left-wing political party arguably faces a much more difficult task
compared to that of a conservative party, because a left-wing party has
to engage in ‘hegemonic’ politics, as opposed to ‘technocratic’ poli-
tics (Coates 2013, 51). To bring about progressive change, a left-wing
government has to build an effective counter-hegemonic project that
contests ‘the policy status quo and the ideological status quo’ (Coates
2013, 51). Similar to the writings of other socialist thinkers, Coates
(2013) highlights the importance of preparing for a left-wing Labour
government that is likely to face significant resistance. This includes ‘shap-
ing’ the electorate ahead of time by educating them on how a Labour
government will try to transform society, so that they are well-prepared to
support the party’s ‘new social contract’ and know how to handle conser-
vative media. With widespread support from the electorate, a left-wing
 2 LABOURISM AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS BEFORE 2015 19

government would likely be able to implement some progressive social

and institutional reforms (Coates 2013, 49–51).
The socialist scholars discussed above advocate turning the Labour
Party into a mass-mobilisation party capable of challenging hegemonic
ideas, promoting radical institutional reforms, and transitioning beyond
the capitalist economy. It can be argued, however, that past Labour
leaders tended not to share these views. Miliband, for example, criticised
the Wilson and Callaghan governments (1964–1970 and 1974–1979)
for cutting welfare services and curbing wages, which alienated poten-
tial Labour voters and those in the labour movement (Miliband 1983,
reprinted in 2015, 294–295). At one point, Miliband proposed estab-
lishing a new socialist party, since the Labour Party was a ‘dead end’
that trapped British socialists (Miliband 1983, reprinted in 2015, 303).
However, it can be argued that the actions of the Wilson and Callaghan
governments were constrained by the material conditions of the global
political economy in the late 1970s, which made Labour’s commitment
to social democracy unsustainable. As Hall (1988) argues, Labour leaders’
commitment to social democratic reforms was ‘undermined by funda-
mental weaknesses in British industrial capitalism and by the logic of
capitalism itself’ (Hall 1988, 186). The Labour governments in the 1960s
and 1970s chose to ‘reform’ rather than ‘transform’, and then finally
‘exhausted [the] political ideas of the last two decades’ (Hall 1988, 187).
This enabled the New Right and Thatcherism to establish ideological
hegemony and redefine people’s common sense in a way that deeply infil-
trated and gathered support from traditional labour supporters, such as
skilled workers and working women (Hall 1988, 188).
The next section continues to discuss the decline of Keynesianism and
social democratic policies in the 1970s, as well as British political economy
during the Thatcher and Blair years.

Ideological, Institutional and Material

Political Economic Constraints
It has been argued that, despite some flirtations with the idea of socialism,
the Labour Party was never committed to bringing about a socialist
society (Thorpe 1997, 234), and that its foundation was rooted in
many different schools of political thought, such as social liberalism and
Victorian ethical reformism (Jones 1996, 2). Given that Labour govern-
ments in the aftermath of the Second World War and in the mid-1970s
20 P. CHIENGKUL

paved the way for the foundation of a welfare state, and also adopted
what can broadly be described as Keynesian macroeconomic management
(Thompson 1996, 143–235), it is perhaps more appropriate to view the
Labour Party as a social democratic party. By the mid-1970s, however,
Keynesianism was increasingly discredited, not just in the UK but inter-
nationally, due to its inability to explain and cope with stagflation amongst
other issues, whilst monetarism emerged as the new dominant global
economic doctrine. The sterling crisis of 1976 also prompted the Labour
Party leadership to adopt a monetarist policy approach to secure loans
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Panitch and Leys 2001,
117; Thompson 1996, 236–237).
After the 1979 General Election defeat, left and right factions within
Labour bitterly competed for leadership, which led a group of Labour
MPs to split from the party to form the Social Democratic Party in 1981.
Another disastrous electoral defeat in 1983 was blamed on the supposedly
unpopular left-wing manifesto, now famously referred to as the ‘longest
suicide note in history’ (Kavanagh 1997, 182–183; Pimlott 2005, 179).
This narrative helped Neil Kinnock to become leader of the party in
1983 and enabled him to shift the direction of the party rightwards in
search of the centre-ground (Kavanagh 1997, 185; Thompson 1996,
224). Instead of taking on Thatcherism through the renewal of social
democracy and left-leaning platforms, the Labour Party slowly conceded
ideological ground and moved to occupy a centrist position in British
politics to appeal to median voters in a Downsian fashion (Garrett 1992,
378; Norris 2001, 32). This repositioning was solidified under Tony Blair,
who became leader in 1994 and rebranded the party ‘New Labour’. Its
policies on taxation and public spending, for example, were positioned at
the centre-ground of the left-right political spectrum (Norris 2001, 35).
New Labour’s landslide victory in the 1997 General Election is often
used as evidence to support the view that Labour lost four elections
between 1979 and 1992 because its policies were too radical and did not
therefore appeal to median voters (Wickham-Jones 2005/2006, 654).
One of New Labour’s legacies is the belief that ‘winning’ means being
in power, and that to win elections means appealing to the centre-ground
instead of trying to build support for left-wing ideas and policies (Panitch
and Leys 2001, 241). After 18 years as the Opposition, New Labour
sought to win the next election by adopting a pro-business approach
under the perceived constraints of globalisation. It has been argued, for
example, that prominent party figures, such as Peter Mandelson, believed
 2 LABOURISM AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS BEFORE 2015 21

globalisation imposed strong constraints on social and economic policies

(Panitch and Leys 2001, 245).
Anthony Giddens’ concept of ‘the Third Way’—an attempt to
modernise social democracy with a more friendly approach towards capi-
talism—is often cited as an inspiration for New Labour. However, the
‘Third Way’ has been criticised for its vagueness, which allows the
concept to accommodate different, even contradictory, political philo-
sophical views on how the government should promote core values, such
as opportunity, responsibility and community (White 2001, 5, 11). As
for the New Labour project, it involved attempts to balance market-
friendly neoliberal policies and social goals. The Labour government in
1997 continued many neoliberal economic policies similar to that of the
Conservative government that preceded it, including a finance-led growth
model and relatively low business taxes, prioritisation of reducing public
debt, extensions of privatisation, deregulation of the labour market, and
reduction of trade unions’ power (Beer 2001, 28; Farnham 1996, 593;
Gamble 2010, 648; Gray 2004, 43). A constrained discretion macroe-
conomic approach was used to establish ‘credibility’ with the markets
and the voters, in hope that the government could use this credibility
to pursue active macroeconomic policies when necessary (Weldon 2013,
22). New Labour’s abolishment of Clause IV of Labour’s Constitution,
which ended its commitment to nationalisation, can also be seen as an
attempt to win business confidence (Wickham-Jones 2005/2006, 667).
From 1999 onwards, however, the Labour government increased public
spending quite significantly, especially on the National Health Service
(NHS) and education (Gamble 2010, 649).
New Labour has been portrayed in different ways: as an attempt
to accommodate Thatcherism, as a result of the party’s gradual trans-
formation, as a modern form of social democracy adjusted to suit the
contemporary political economic context (Meredith 2008, 159), and as
a ‘hybrid’ socio-economic development regime (Lavery 2019, 8). Some
scholars argue that New Labour can be seen as a modernised form of
Keynesianism where, given the power of transnational financial capital,
the government needed to achieve a balance between ‘credibility’ and
fiscal policy space (Clift and Tomlinson 2007, 47–48). During its early
years in power, New Labour restrained its spending and focused on estab-
lishing credibility with the financial sector but, from 2000 onwards, social
spending significantly increased, including spending on health, education
and poverty reduction policies (Smith 2014, 605–608, 615). Hay (2007),
22 P. CHIENGKUL

however, argues that New Labour cannot be seen as Keynesian because

the budget surplus accumulated between 1997 and 1999, which was used
for investments from 1999 until the 2001 General Election and slightly
beyond, was not part of a strategy to promote full employment or to
manage the business cycle. Rather, public expenditure in this period can
more appropriately be interpreted as part of ‘the political business cycle’
(Hay 2007, 192).
Regardless of how New Labour is portrayed, it can be argued that
its reliance on finance-led economic growth to fund the expansion of
its public expenditures, and also on borrowing from the financial market
(especially since 2002), have proven to be unsustainable. Deregulation of
the financial sector helped spur economic growth that its socially redis-
tributive policies relied upon, but deregulation arguably also contributed
to the 2008 financial crisis that ended this model of development (Smith
2014, 615–616; also see Lavery 2019, 8–9). Moreover, New Labour’s
embrace of a finance-led growth model and its neglect of more funda-
mentally transformative progressive policies had long-term ideological,
institutional and material consequences that served to constrain the
Labour Party and left-wing politics in the years to come, as the following
paragraphs elaborate.
During the Thatcher era, trade and finance were prioritised at the
expense of British industry, which encouraged financial speculation and
deindustrialisation (Alavi 1997, 1906). Under New Labour, the Bank
of England was reformed to make it independent from the govern-
ment, and also to prioritise monetary policy (with inflation as the major
concern) over fiscal policy. The ideological consequence of such an insti-
tutional change is that macroeconomic policies are ‘depoliticised’ and
portrayed as technical matters (Hay 2004, 44), even though economic
policy decisions are inherently political. These reforms supposedly helped
to establish macroeconomic ‘credibility’, but it has also been argued
that ‘competitiveness’ was sacrificed as a consequence (Hay 2004, 50).
Using increases in the interest rate to control inflation was problematic
during the New Labour years because, whilst it might have been appro-
priate to deal with the housing boom concentrated around South East
England, it compounded recessionary effects in other regions and in the
manufacturing sectors. Prioritising anti-inflationary goals might have also
created a ‘vicious cycle’ of high interest rates and low investments in
physical capital, which further constrained the UK’s productive economy
(Hay 2004, 42–43). It has also been argued that traditional Keynesian
 2 LABOURISM AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS BEFORE 2015 23

characteristics of ensuring economic growth, based on rising wages, a

welfare state and government demand management, have instead been
replaced by ‘privatised Keynesianism’, in which economic growth is stim-
ulated by housing and low-to-medium income household debts, as well
as unregulated derivatives markets (Crouch 2009, 382, 392).
Overall, these economic policies led to an unbalanced economy where
the powerful financial sector thrived on speculations and private debts
whilst the manufacturing base was weakened. Other serious problems
include North–South domestic inequality and insufficient investments in
public infrastructures (Faucher-King and Le Gales 2010 cited in Diamond
2013, 95). In addition to pursuing a finance-led economic development,
it has been argued that New Labour pursued a ‘legitimation strategy’
through the expansion of public services in the areas of health, educa-
tion and public transport to benefit those left out of the finance-led
growth model (Lavery 2018, 31–32). Even though New Labour made
positive contributions to the improvement of public services, introduced
the minimum wage and reduced child poverty, it did not challenge
capitalism as an economic model (Weldon 2013, 24) or attempt to imple-
ment progressive redistribution of income and wealth (Gamble 2010,
650–651). Its support of minimal regulation of the labour market also
left British workers vulnerable to unemployment during recessions (Hay
2004, 47).
The unbalanced and unequal nature of the finance-led growth model
of the British economy became more apparent after the global economic
crisis of 2008. The mainstream account of the crisis, propagated by the
Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats, attributed its cause to the
debt and budget deficit of previous Labour governments (Craig 2015,
cited in Gamble 2015, 157–158), rather than a fundamental problem
with the growth model itself, and so policy responses focused on deficit
reduction rather than a renewal of the UK’s manufacturing base (Hay
2012, cited in Rogers 2013, 3). The Conservative Party propagated the
narrative that it was Labour’s over-spending that was to blame for the
economic crisis (Craig 2015, cited in Gamble 2015, 157–158). As the
third biggest party in Westminster at the time, the Liberal Democrats
endorsement of this narrative helped to overwhelm Labour’s response
(Gamble 2015, 158–159).
Blair’s successor as Labour leader and Prime Minister, Gordon Brown,
implemented some Keynesian measures during the initial phase of the
2008 economic crisis. However, these measures were abandoned in favour
Another random document with
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dint of pleading and main force he is induced slowly to retire, seeking
to cover the rear of the fleeing. And well it was, for a longer stay
would have proved fatal. But for the eagerness of the Mexicans to
secure as prisoner so magnificent a prize, they could easily have
despatched him. Aztecs made it a point to obtain as many prisoners
as possible, particularly chiefs and nobles, and white men, who
ranked even above these, in order to do honor to the war-god. This
effort was prompted by a deep religious obligation as well as by
warrior spirit.
Not far from the disastrous channel a horse was brought, upon
which Cortés was mounted, though wounded in the leg. Shortly
before, his chamberlain, Cristóbal de Guzman, a great favorite, had
ridden up with a charger to the relief of his master, only to be
surrounded with warriors and cut down, together with the animal,
[1166] while another rider was obliged to retreat with a lance-thrust in
the throat. On retiring from the section of causeway assigned to the
horse, another animal was killed and a third narrowly escaped.
Finally the troops reached the broader Tlacopan road, and now
Cortés, with the nine horsemen left in his division, was able to take a
firm stand against the enemy. Checked in their pursuit, and made
timid in their charges by the presence of the bold line of horses and
lances, they flung their missiles and insults with increased energy.
Suddenly two or three Spanish heads were cast before the
horsemen, with the cry: “Tonatiuh!” “Sandoval!” The meaning could
not be misunderstood, and as the Spaniards gazed on the gory and
disfigured faces a sickening fear crept over them. Could it be that
these beloved leaders had fallen! There was no time for deliberation.
Finding his own party now comparatively secure, Cortés hurriedly
sent messengers to recall the other divisions under Alderete and
Tápia.
There was hardly need for this message. The triumphant shouts
of the Mexicans in pursuit of the troops of Cortés and the increased
attack on their own had already warned these leaders. Still they
persevered, although their men manifested some discouragement. It
was not long, however, before two or three mutilated, bearded heads
were cast before them with the cry, “Malinche is dead!” “Tonatiuh and
all their men have fallen!” The leaders saw that farther advance was
useless, especially since the Mexicans now attacked with great fury.
The leaders kept their men in good order, and were already retiring
when the order of recall reached them. The streets there being wider
and easier, and the channels all filled, they found no trouble in
rejoining their general. Now jointly they retreated through the plaza
and down the Iztapalapan road, furiously pursued by the warriors,
who showed themselves more reckless than usual on seeing their
prey escape. The central temple was filling with a vast throng to
watch the onslaught, and on the summit the priests were already
burning incense and chanting in honor of victory, while the rabble
railed at the humiliated children of the sun.
Alvarado had meanwhile advanced along the road to Tlatelulco
from his causeway, leaving Sandoval to coöperate along the flank
and to direct the movements of the brigantines and the filling of the
channels. The advance was fiercely resisted by the Mexicans from
roofs, cross-lanes, and barricades, and hundreds had been severely
wounded, chiefly Tlascaltecs, only too many fatally, yet he
persevered. He was already near the market, the aim of all efforts,
when the drum and trumpet came to startle his men and to
encourage the Mexicans to greater resistance. Progress was now
almost checked, and soon came the cry, “Malinche is dead!”
“Sandoval and the other captains are dead!” “Behold their faces!”
And therewith several heads with gory beards were cast before
them. “This shall be your fate!”
Alvarado’s men were white with dismay, and but for the intrepid
courage of their leader the rout of Cortés’ party might have been
repeated. Making a bold stand with his Spaniards, he ordered the
Tlascaltecs to fall back and leave the retreat open. They needed no
second instructions to this end, for the bleeding heads lent wings to
their haste. Then grew the onslaught fiercer than ever, for the retreat
of Cortés’ forces enabled a larger number of enemies to turn against
Alvarado and Sandoval. The latter also received his cast of bloody
heads with a new string of prominent names, all calculated to inspire
terror. “By this time they had us all killed,” adds Bernal Diaz, “but, in
truth, we were all wounded, and filled with anguish concerning the
fate of our chief. Without God’s aid we could never have escaped
from the swords and clutches of the Mexicans.” Some pious
chroniclers, indeed, assert as usual that the virgin appeared in
person, together with perennial Santiago, to save the Spaniards from
their greatest peril.[1167]
Encouraged by the victories on land, the Mexicans had ventured
forth also in their canoes to harass the vessels which were occupied
in protecting the retreat of the armies. Unable in some instances to
leave their position, or impeded in their movement by stakes and
other obstacles, many of the brigantines were severely pressed, and
one, commanded by Briones, in Alvarado’s division, was actually
captured, with the loss of four men, one being taken alive. Jaramillo
came to the relief of the vessel, however, drove forth the enemy, and
kept them at bay.[1168] By this time both the forces of Alvarado and
Sandoval had reached the causeway, pursued by a great host,
reckless in their endeavor to inflict all the injury possible ere the
Spaniards escaped. Some delay occurred in crossing the only partly
filled channel to the causeway, and a number of soldiers were
detained waist-deep in water, seeking to lift a brigantine over the
stakes, for the auxiliaries were already away from the front; and all
this time the cavalry were compelled to remain before the causeway
to cover the infantry and bear the brunt of the terrible onslaught.
Charge after charge they made to keep back the advancing foe,
through the shower of blinding missiles, against the line of bristling
lances, amidst the whirling swords and clubs, until not a rider but felt
his arm droop and his body grow faint with loss of blood. Sandoval
himself had a number of wounds. “For God’s sake make haste and
retire,” he cried to his foot-soldiers, “or we shall all be lost!”
Finally the passage was clear, and they fell back along the
causeway, still fighting, and now exposed to the canoe sallies. On
reaching his quarters, Alvarado turned two cannon against the
swarm which sought to scale the camp, and this with the fusillade
procured a much needed respite.[1169] It was time, for the increasing
darkness would soon have added fresh dangers to the retreat.
Sandoval had already hurried away with a solitary companion to
seek the camp of Cortés and calm his fears.[1170] With a similar
object Andrés de Tápia had been sent with three horsemen from Fort
Xoloc to Alvarado’s camp, where he arrived with some scars from
marauding stragglers. Not wishing to discourage the soldiers, he
reduced the losses of his party to quite a small number, and made
light of the matter.
By this time the enemy had retired, but from the city rose their
shouts of triumph, and every temple was ablaze with fires to
celebrate the victory. The summit of the Tlatelulco pyramid, the
highest of them all, was the scene of great commotion, and soon the
sombre notes of the melancholy drum called it to attention. A number
of instruments now added their discordant notes, in clash and blast,
and a procession with torches, swinging censers, and religious
paraphernalia circled round with imposing ceremony. Then a space
was cleared, and a long file of naked men stood revealed. A cry of
horror burst from the gazing soldiers. There could be no mistake.
Distant as was the temple, the glare of fire clearly revealed the white
hue and bearded faces of their comrades, bound for sacrifice, and
plumed. Now they were made to march forward, and with blows to
dance before the idol to whom they had been consecrated. Ah, to be
a helpless looker-on at such a time! Again they formed in line
exhausted, and then one was seized by several priests and borne
struggling to the stone of sacrifice. He was thrown on his back and
held down by the limbs while the high-priest with ceremonious
flourish raised the glittering blade. The gazing soldiers clutched each
other’s hands in agony, as their eyes followed the instrument and
saw it plunged into the breast of the victim. They seemed to hear his
stifled cry, to feel the knife in their own heart, and realizing that they
were still safe they thanked heaven for their escape.[1171]
Victim after victim was carried to the stone, some with frantic
struggles, others resigned, and still others weighed down in helpless
fear of what they had beheld. Heart after heart was torn from the
gaping breasts and held before the idol, while the bodies were cast
down the steps. The skin, particularly of the head and upper body,
was removed and used as a dress for festive occasion, and the flesh
was hacked to pieces, the limbs for the banquet table, the trunk for
the beasts. After a while came darker-hued victims, and now the
Tlascaltecs and other allies shuddered. To them the sacrifices were
not so terrifying as to the Spaniards, but they could not unmoved
behold the cruel death of their countrymen. Then came more
processions, music, and idolatrous rites, followed by fresh
companies for the sacrifice, white and dark; and so passed the night,
until the horror palled on the gazers, and many expressed the
opinion that the priests were pretending sacrifice by producing the
same bodies upon the stone several times so as to inspire greater
fear. This belief was strengthened when they observed similar
ceremonies take place on other minor temples, and by the
continuance of the sacrifices for several days. The offering at the
minor temples consisted chiefly of the lower class of allies. All the
pyramids, however, received a quota of heads from Spanish, leading
native, and equine victims, wherewith to decorate their summits.
[1172]
 Aware that the sight of the sacrifice, purposely intensified for
Spanish edification, must have stirred deeply the breasts of the
survivors, the Mexicans took advantage of this to attack the camp of
Alvarado during the night. “Behold the fate in store for you all!” they
cried, casting in half-roasted pieces of flesh from white and dusky
bodies. “Eat, for we are satiated!” The Spaniards were too well
prepared to suffer from the assault, but it added to their sorrows. The
lesson had been costly, for about sixty men were lost, with six
horses, one gun, and a number of small-arms, while the ranks of the
allies had been diminished by from one to two thousand, and this
without reckoning the vast number of wounded.[1173]
When Sandoval reached Camp Xoloc and learned the news he
burst forth, “Señor Capitan, what is this? Where are the fine
counsels and warlike skill which you are wont to exhibit?” With tears
springing to his eyes, Cortés replied: “Sandoval, my son, my sins I
admit, but I am not so guilty in this matter as I appear. The officer
whom I charged to fill the channel failed to obey.” He further
intimated that Alvarado might be led by his daring into difficulties,
and bade Sandoval watch carefully over the safety of the western
and northern camps, particularly for the present, while Cortés was
restrained by his wounds.[1174] The injunction was needful in view of
the reoccupation by the Mexicans of the channels from which they
had lately been driven, and their harassing attacks, chiefly by night,
against the camps and fleets. Alvarado’s camp, as the nearest to the
city, was the most exposed, and Sandoval with his tried prudence
could be best relied on to counteract the recklessness of its
commander in repelling these attacks. Knowing the signal for the
sallies, usually a shot, the enemy were warned in time to retire, or to
form some trap or combination; so that the charge of the soldiers
carried little advantage.
On one occasion, it is related, a shield-bearer named Peinado
stepped outside the camp gate and found himself surrounded by a
horde of marauders. Escape was cut off. In this dilemma he began to
rattle his shield and sword, and shout, looking at the same time
toward the camp. The enemy assumed at once that he was
signalling to some party in ambush, and beat a hasty retreat.[1175]
For several days[1176] the Spaniards remained inactive. During this
time the Mexicans continued their daily sacrifice of captives, with
conspicuous rites and loud demonstrations.
As usual amidst trying scenes, there were here examples of the
devotedness of woman. In one of the encounters on the causeway to
drive back the prowling Mexicans, Beatriz Bermudez de Velasco,
wife of Francisco de Olmos, accompanied the soldiers, in cotton
armor, and with sword and shield. Such was the pressure of the
enemy that the troops were thrown into disorder and began to turn in
flight. With raised sword she planted herself in their path and cried,
“Shame upon you, Castilians! turn at once against this vile rabble, for
I will kill any man who attempts to pass this way.” So abashed were
the men by this resolute demeanor that they again fell upon the
Mexicans and defeated them.[1177] Other women of less valor did
equally good service as sisters of mercy, to tend and cheer the many
disabled. One, named Isabel de Rodriguez, attained quite a
reputation in curing wounds, a success attributed chiefly to her holy
invocation, for in applying the bandage she invariably uttered the
formula, “In the name of the father, the son, and the holy ghost, one
true God; may he cure and restore thee!”[1178]
Cortés found it absolutely necessary to resume operations in
order to prevent the utter demoralization of his men, although they
could advance no farther than the last canal on the Iztapalapan road,
which was strongly fortified to protect the plaza. On the Tlatelulco
side the channel separating the city from the causeway had been
reopened as a barrier. No serious effort was made to pass these
points, and the movements were effected with the greatest prudence
possible.
For this caution several reasons existed, based on momentous
consequences of the late defeat. In their exultation the Mexicans had
imprudently published the oracular utterance that within eight days
the Spaniards would be destroyed, though many Aztecs would also
perish.[1179] Care was taken that this divine proclamation should be
known in the Spanish camps, with the intent of disheartening the
allies and procuring their desertion. This main object accomplished,
it was hoped that neighboring districts might be again persuaded to
join in hostile operations, or at least assume a neutral attitude
against the isolated Spaniards. Severely harassed by all the strength
of the capital and its allies, the Spaniards would be unable to
maintain the siege or even to sustain their own position, particularly if
supplies were cut off, and so be obliged to retreat. Many indeed
looked upon the Spaniards as doomed, and tired besides of the long
siege, so contrary to native ideas of warfare, corps after corps of
their allies disappeared, in secret retreat to their homes. Others were
sufficiently shaken in their belief to lose all ardor, the more so when
they recalled the prophecy of disaster uttered by the hanged
Xicotencatl. Cortés and his officers did all they could to counteract
this influence by referring to previous failures of oracles, to the
comparatively small percentage of the late losses, the critical
condition of the besieged, and their efforts to gain advantages by
spreading lies. Let the allies but abide till the end of the term
mentioned by the oracle and they would be convinced of its falsity.
The last argument was perhaps the strongest that could be offered
under the circumstances, and it was decided to take no risks that
might imperil the proof.[1180]
These precautions were imperative in view of the effect of Aztec
machinations in the lake districts and outlying provinces. The lake
towns last to join the Spaniards relapsed into a frigid neutrality, and
might have risen but for the imposing proximity of the fleet and army.
Remoter districts assumed a more decided attitude, and from
Quauhnahuac came an urgent appeal for help against the attacks of
the Malinalcas and Cohuixcas, prompted by Mexico. Immediately
after the late victory Quauhtemotzin had sent envoys to these and
other provinces, in every direction, bearing heads or flayed skins of
Spaniards and horses, and other tokens, wherewith to impress their
story that more than half of the white besiegers were slain, and that
the remainder would soon perish, as declared by the oracle. It
behooved them, therefore, to decide at once whether they would join
for a share in the spoils, or be forever excluded from all favor at the
hands of victorious Mexico. Thus, while many were frightened into
severing their connection with the invaders, secretly or openly, more
aggressive provinces like Malinalco hastened to profit by the state of
affairs.
To detach troops under the circumstances was not agreeable,
and many officers objected, but Cortés considered that it would be
far more dangerous to Spanish prestige and prospects to encourage
such hostile movements by a passive demeanor. “It was now more
necessary than ever,” he writes, “to exhibit prowess and spirit, so as
to hide our weakness both from friends and foes.” Andrés de Tápia
was accordingly despatched with ten horse and eighty foot, together
with a considerable force of allies.[1181] In order to calm the many
remonstrances against the expedition, he was instructed to return
within ten days. Tápia found the enemy awaiting him in large force
near a hamlet not far from Malinalco, and at once prepared to attack,
assisted by the Quauhnahuacs. The ground being level, the horses
proved of great service, and the hostile army was presently in flight
toward Malinalco. This place was strongly situated on a height, well
supplied with water, so that Tápia considered it useless to attempt an
assault, much less a siege when so short a term had been allowed
him, and he accordingly returned.
 The complaint from Quauhnahuac was followed by a deeper wail
from Toluca and adjoining Otomí settlements in the mountain region
west of the lake. The Matlalzincas, devoted adherents of
Quauhtemotzin, had been induced to openly declare for him and to
invade their districts, preparatory to advancing against the
Spaniards. This intention had been already vauntingly proclaimed by
the Aztecs, and since the Matlaltzincas were both powerful and
warlike, the necessity for prompt measures became even more
apparent in this case. The tried Sandoval was intrusted with the
expedition, composed of eighteen cavalry, one hundred infantry, and
a large force of allies chiefly Otomís, which soon grew to about
seventy thousand. After a quick march he came to the smoking ruins
of some settlements and startled into flight a band of marauders,
who left behind them a quantity of plunder and provisions, including
some tender children still roasting on the spit. He pursued the
raiders, and after crossing a river[1182] came upon a larger force,
which turned as he approached, to seek safety within the town of
Matlaltzinco, over two leagues distant. The cavalry made terrible
havoc among them, and the infantry following in their wake, killed
more than two thousand. Those who escaped made a stand at the
town to cover the conveyance of families and effects to a fortified hill
close by. This was pretty well accomplished before the infantry came
up to assist in capturing the town. The defenders now fled, and the
place was entered and burned, after being rifled of what remained to
take. Since it was late, the assault on the hill was deferred till the
morning. There the natives maintained a loud uproar until some time
after midnight, when all became quiet. With early dawn the
Spaniards prepared to storm the hill only to learn that it had been
abandoned. A number of people were seen in the field, however, and
eagerly the soldiers revived the fading expectation for a fray. In a
twinkling they were among the rabble, and a number were slain
before the explanation gained ears that these people belonged to the
friendly Otomís. Sandoval now advanced on another fortified town,
whose cacique threw open the gates on beholding the hosts before
him, and not only offered his own submission, but promised to effect
the submission of the allied caciques and those of Malinalco and
Cohuixco. Regardless of the insinuations of the Otomís that such
promises could not be relied on, Sandoval returned to Mexico, and
four days later appeared there the caciques of all these provinces to
tender allegiance and aid for the siege.[1183]
Meanwhile the portentous eighth day had dawned on the
Spanish camps. Hardly less concerned than the natives, the soldiers
could not control their trepidation as they thought of the oracle,
although striving to appear indifferent. Nor were they without tangible
reasons for their fears. With a daily growing desertion among the
much needed allies, and fading enthusiasm among those who
remained; with supplies greatly reduced owing to the neutral attitude
assumed by surrounding districts; with fresh wars upon their hands,
which demanded not only more hardships but a division of their
weakened forces; with constant vigils and alarms amid the harassing
attacks of a triumphant foe; with a large number of wounded
deprived of needful care and comforts, and above all the ghastly
spectacle of a daily sacrifice of late comrades, attended by wild and
imposing celebrations—with all this gloom and distress it required
stout hearts indeed to remain steadfast. Yet they were firm; they
believed in the strength and justice of their cause, and in their
ultimate triumph, though momentarily dismayed, prayer afforded
them relief. It dissipated fear and infused fresh courage.
Thus passed the day, amidst fear and hope, and the Spaniards
still existed. The Mexicans do not appear to have made any special
effort to support the oracle by a determined attack. Nor had they
been able to open any effective communication with the mainland;
for although the lake towns had withdrawn their canoe fleet, they
offered no aid to the besieged, while the brigantines maintained too
strict a guard to permit many boats to gain the capital with supplies.
 The ninth day came, and now it was the turn of the Spaniards to
exult, for not only did they feel inspired with the belief that
providence was protecting them—and nobly the friars helped Cortés
to impart that stirring idea—but they were cheered with revived
animation among the allies and the early return of most of the
deserters. From Tezcuco, indeed, came additional troops under the
command of some Spaniards there stationed.[1184] Cortés greeted
the returning corps with rather cold forgiveness. He showed them
that besides carrying on the siege without their aid he had
undertaken victorious campaigns, and needed not their assistance.
Nevertheless, since they had served so zealously before, he would
not only overlook the grave crime of desertion, due partly to
ignorance of Spanish laws, but let them again share in the final
reduction of the city, and thus gain both revenge and riches. Cortés
could adopt no other course, for the siege could not be carried on
without the allies.
Under Spanish training the latter had besides grown very
efficient, as the following instance will illustrate: No sooner had the
eight portentous days passed by than Chichimecatl, the leading
Tlascaltec captain serving under Alvarado, disgusted with the idle
fears which had unmanned his people, and eager to retrieve them in
the eyes of the Spaniards, resolved to show both them and the
Aztecs what he could do. With the aid of the soldiers the first fortified
channel was captured, and the chief advanced into the city with his
own people only, the flower of his warriors, after leaving several
hundred archers near the passage to keep the route clear for retreat.
With unwavering columns he advanced along the main street and
captured the next canal passage after a fierce struggle. Then he
passed onward to the next, maintaining a sharp contest all the day.
Finally came the hour for returning, and the Aztecs bore down with
doubled fury on his flank and rear. The retreat was performed in
good order, partly owing to the foresight of leaving a rear body; and
Chichimecatl came back a lauded hero.[1185]
Messengers had been sent to the allies far and wide to
encourage them with the news of the non-fulfilment of the oracle.
Ojeda and Marquez went in person to Tlascala, partly also with the
object of procuring certain supplies. They left Alvarado’s camp at
midnight with only a few natives, and when about half-way to
Tepeyacac they perceived a train of men descending from the hills
with heavy burdens, which they deposited in a number of canoes.
Information was at once sent to Alvarado, who placed a guard along
the shore to check this smuggling that had evidently escaped the
cruisers.[1186] Ojeda’s party proceeded to Tlascala and brought a
large train of provisions.[1187] In addition to this the camps were
cheered by the arrival of a party of recruits with quite a mass of war
material, chiefly powder and cross-bows, relics of Ponce de Leon’s
Florida expedition.[1188] The war stores were particularly valuable; so
low had run the actual stock that Cortés was preparing more
Chinantec pikes to cover the deficiency in weapons.
Everything was again ready for a serious revival of hostilities.
Over six weeks had passed since the siege began, and the end
seemed little nearer than before. On the day of the defeat three
fourths of the city might be said to have been reduced; but nearly all
this advantage had been lost, owing chiefly to the narrow streets,
encompassed by houses which served both for attack and retreat,
and the numerous traps in the form of canals and channels. So long
as these obstacles remained the progress must not only be slow,
ever slower as advance was made, but the troops would be
constantly exposed to fresh disaster. One more defeat might ruin all,
and Cortés resolved to avoid risks. He would tear down every
building as he advanced on both sides of the streets, and fill up
every channel; “not take one step in advance without leaving all
desolated behind, and convert water into firm land, regardless of the
delay.” So writes the general, and yet he expresses regret for this
destruction of the city, “the most beautiful in the world.”[1189] In
pursuance of this plan he asked the allied chiefs to summon
additional forces of laborers with the necessary implements. They
eagerly consented, and within a few days the men stood prepared.

FOOTNOTES
[1143] ‘Eran esclavos del señor de Tenuxtitan,’ is Cortés’ definition of their
vassalage to Mexico. Cartas, 220.

[1144] A service which employed 20,000 carriers, 1000 canoes, and 32,000
convoy warriors, all at the expense of Tezcuco, says Ixtlilxochitl, Relaciones, 314.

[1145] His biographer admits to a certain extent the truth of the invectives, but
eager to please his Spanish masters he seeks rather to extol the self-sacrifice and
loyalty of his kinsman. He claims that with this reënforcement the Tezcucan
auxiliaries reached the improbable number of 250,000 men, of whom 5000
wounded were now sent home. ‘Next to God, Cortés owed to Tezcucan aid the
conquest and the planting of the faith.’ He further assumes that Ixtlilxochitl was
already king, and had been with Cortés since the fleet set sail, while his brother
Ahuaxpictzoctzin remained at Tezcuco to provide supplies. Hor. Crueldades, 21-
33. He contradicts himself on several points in his Relaciones, 314 et seq. Duran
also, as may be expected from a compiler of native records, extols the hero, ‘à
quien dió una espada dorada que Don Hernando Cortes traia y una rodela.’ Hist.
Ind., MS., ii. 493. With Ixtlilxochitl came half a dozen out of his hundred brothers.
Gomara, Hist. Mex., 198; Chimalpain, Hist. Conq., ii. 55. Torquemada, i. 548,
sends Cohuanacoch as general of the forces, while Clavigero allows King
Fernando Ixtlilxochitl to send his brother Cárlos Ixtlilxochitl. Storia Mess., iii. 202.
He is evidently confused with respect to the surname.

[1146] Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 177-8. Torquemada places the incident
earlier, i. 547. Cortés admits no losses of Spaniards this day.

[1147] Cartas, 222-3. ‘Los combidauan a çena, mostrando les piernas y braços.’
Gomara, Hist. Mex., 199.
[1148] Bernal Diaz speaks of a bridge attack which cost the lives of four
Spaniards, besides numerous wounded. Hist. Verdad., 145.

[1149] He enumerates also the cities of Mexicalcinco and Vitzilopuchtli. Hist. Mex.,
202. Herrera adds Mizquic. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xix.

[1150] Mazeoatzi, as Sahagun calls the cacique, sacrificed four chiefs,

Quauhtemotzin four more; the rest fell by the hands of priests. Hist. Conq. (ed.
1840), 187. He does not speak of a premeditated plan like Torquemada, i. 551-2,
and since the account comes from native sources it may be merely an
exaggerated version of a flotilla raid.

[1151] This was the lieutenant of Velazquez at Habana, who joined Cortés during
the Tepeaca campaign. Portillo was a soldier from the Italian wars. Bernal Diaz
adds that one brig was captured, but this is doubtful. Hist. Verdad., 143; Clavigero,
Storia Mess., iii. 214; Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 46.

[1152] Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 144-5.

[1153] Cortés exultantly claims that three fourths of the city is now captured.
Cartas, 227; Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 181; Torquemada, i. 550.

[1154] ‘No se hartauan de pescado, que tuuierõ pocos dias: y demas de la

hambre con q̄ peleauan, el sol, y el frio no les dio pequeño trabajo.’ Herrera, dec.
iii. lib. i. cap. xix.

[1155] ‘Soliti sunt hostes in prælio cadentes intra suos ventres sepelire,’ explains
Peter Martyr, dec. v. cap. viii., and with some truth.

[1156] Forty soldiers watched till midnight, when a similar number relieved them,
and they again were relieved two hours before dawn; all three divisions camping
on the spot. Often every man was kept awake by alarms. Bernal Diaz, Hist.
Verdad., 142-3. The old soldier waxes eloquent over the hardships, for he served
at this camp.

[1157] The Spaniards tried in vain to despatch him. Sahagun states that during
these attacks fifteen soldiers were captured, and shortly after eighteen more, who
were sacrificed in a temple of Tlacuchcalco ward, ‘donde agora es la iglesia de
Santa Ana.’ Hist. Conq., 183, ed. 1840, 188-9. One repulse took place in
Coyonacazco ward. Torquemada, i. 550-2. Spanish versions indicate no such
losses, and they may probably belong to the later great defeat.

[1158] Such is in main the version of Bernal Diaz; the other accounts differ greatly.
This author states that five Spaniards were captured, nearly all the men wounded,
and two rowers killed, for the brigantines in seeking to aid had become fast on
stakes and exposed to attack. Had the Mexicans not been so frightened by the
horsemen the loss would have been very great. Hist. Verdad., 143-4. Cortés
allows three or four captured. Cartas, 228; Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 196. Duran
places the scene where rose afterward the San Hipólito hermitage. Hist. Ind., MS.,
ii. 500. But for Quauhtlizcatzin, the prince who led the Tezcucan auxiliaries, all the
Spaniards would have been lost, exclaims Ixtlilxochitl, Hor. Crueldades, 36.
Herrera assumes that the fault lay with Alvarado for neglecting to fill the channel.
dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx.

[1159] ‘No solo no le culpo, mas loole.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 203.

[1160] The most serious attacks took place on June 24th and 25th, as if oracles
had impelled the Mexicans to seek the destruction of the Spaniards on the
anniversary of their reëntry into the city after the Alvarado massacre. The
Tlacopan camp lost ten soldiers and had a dozen severely wounded, including
Alvarado. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 142, 145.

[1161] Bernal Diaz seeks to convey the idea that he or his camp were opposed to
the attempt, Id., 146, but had it succeeded, he would probably have declared the
truth, that Cortés was urged on all sides to make the effort, as stated in Gomara,
Hist. Mex., 203, Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx., and Cortés, Cartas, 228-9.
Perhaps the general made objections chiefly to cover his responsibility in case of
failure.

[1162] Alderete’s party consisted of 70 infantry, 7 or 8 horsemen, and 15,000 to

20,000 allies, besides a force of laborers to tear down and to fill up; Tápia’s of 80
men and over 10,000 allies, and Cortés’ of 8 horsemen, 100 infantry, and an
immense number of allies. Cortés, Cartas, 230-1. Gomara and Herrera differ
slightly. Ixtlilxochitl says that his namesake followed Cortés with 8000 Tezcucans.
Hor. Crueldades, 37. This insignificant number makes it difficult to account for the
250,000 Tezcucans which he lately introduced into the camps. Chimalpain names
the three streets Cuahuecatitlan, Tecontlanamacoya, and the later Santa Ana.
Hist. Conq., ii. 62.

[1163] See Native Races, ii. 303; iii. 293 et seq.

[1164] He crossed the channel with fifteen soldiers to sustain the fugitives, says
Torquemada, i. 554; but this seems incorrect.

[1165] The claims to the honor of rescuing the general are conflicting. Gomara,
followed by Herrera and Torquemada, names ‘Francisco’ de Olea. Bernal Diaz,
who states that this soldier slew four of the captains holding Cortés, lets Lerma
dispose of the remainder. After this came other soldiers and Quiñones. Cristóbal
de Olea was quite young, 26 years of age, a native of Medina del Campo,
muscular, and skilled in arms, and a general favorite. Bernal Diaz adds other
particulars. Hist. Verdad., 146, 246. Ixtlilxochitl, on the other hand, claims for his
namesake the credit of having done what Spaniards claim for Olea, aided by his
Tezcucans, who kept the enemy at bay. This, he adds, is proved by a painting on
the gate of the monastery of Santiago Tlatelulco. Hor. Crueldades, 38-9. Herrera
briefly alludes to Ixtlilxochitl as coming up after Olea, and then relates with some
detail that at the same time came the Tlascaltec, Tamaxautzin he calls him, a
native of Hueyotlipan. He was afterward baptized as Antonio or Bautista, and
became a good Christian, the first native to receive extreme unction. dec. iii. lib. i.
cap. xx. Torquemada, i. 555, copies, but calls the man Teamacatzin. Both
evidently prefer Tlascaltec to Tezcucan records. In fact, Ixtlilxochitl adds certain
incredible particulars about the prowess of his wounded hero in pursuing the
Mexican general into a temple, although such pursuit could not have taken place
under the circumstances. See also Duran, Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 503, and Camargo,
Hist. Tlax., 130. Cortés writes that he would have been lost but for Quiñones, and
one of his men who lost his life to save him. Cartas, 233. A small chapel was
erected in the convent de la Concepcion to commemorate the escape. See
Saavedra, Indio Peregrino, canto 20.

[1166] Bernal Diaz assumes that Guzman rode up after Cortés was mounted, and
fell captive into Aztec hands. Hist. Verdad., 147.

[1167] ‘Como lo hallarán pintado en la Yglesia de Tlatilulco, los cuales Indios

confiesan haberle visto.’ Duran, Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 512. Why these patrons did not
give their aid before is a question to which Bernal Diaz answers ‘porque Nuestro
Señor Iesu Christo lo permitiò.’ Hist. Verdad., 146.

[1168] Herrera relates how two captains, Flores and Mota, advanced with their
vessels up a narrow channel. Flores was severely pressed at one time, and the
latter had to sally on the street to relieve him and enable the brigantines to gain
more open water. Flores died within a week of his wounds. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx.
Torquemada says that Briones’ vessel was lifted through a breach in the
causeway. i. 555. Bernal Diaz speaks of several such narrow escapes. loc. cit.

[1169] The artillerists being all disabled or dead, Pedro Moreno de Medrano,
afterward a settler at Puebla, took their place. Id.

[1170] Bernal Diaz writes as if Sandoval gained the camp at an early hour, rode
over to Fort Xoloc, and came back in time to aid in Alvarado’s retreat. But he
would never have ventured to leave his command and his comrade in their
danger; nor does it seem likely that he could have ridden the long distance to
Xoloc and back in time to join in Alvarado’s conflict, even if Cortés’ defeat took
place before ‘misa mayor,’ as he assumes. Hist. Verdad., 146-8. This author is
here very confused, assuming, for instance, that Sandoval was fighting from his
own camp instead of coöperating near Alvarado.

[1171] So deeply affected was Bernal Diaz, among others, by the sight, and by the
fear of himself falling captive—twice had he narrowly escaped—that he ever after
had an oppressive feeling before battle. He then had recourse to prayer, and this
invariably fortified him for the fight, so that he always maintained his reputation as
a good soldier. He enumerates several incidents to prove that he was esteemed a
brave man. Hist. Verdad., 157. Oviedo, referring to human sacrifices among the
Romans, observes that they could not have been half so fearful. iii. 515.

[1172] ‘Sacrificados los Nuestros, en el Momoztli, y Templo de su Maior Dios,’

observes Torquemada, i. 553, among other points, though all are not exactly true.
Huitzilopochtli’s image had been brought with the retreating Mexicans to
Tlatelulco. ‘Immediatamente sacrificati,’ says Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 212,
probably on authority of Gomara; but Bernal Diaz states that the sacrifices lasted
ten days, Hist. Verdad., 150; others write eight; one victim is said to have been
kept eighteen days. See also Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 192. Ixtlilxochitl states that
three victims were burned. Hor. Crueldades, 39.

[1173] A count revealed the loss of 62 men and 6 horses, says Bernal Diaz, Hist.
Verdad., 146, 152, 241, though he in one place leaves the impression that the
men were all captured alive. This could hardly be the case, for a ‘count’ would
reveal only the missing; none could tell how many fell captive. Yet Prescott boldly
assumes this number to have been taken, besides those who fell. Vetancurt
divides the figures into 40 captives and 20 dead, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 162, and
Clavigero also includes dead and captive in that number, while raising the dead
horses to 7. Storia Mess., iii. 212. Solis writes that over 40 Spaniards were carried
off alive, and that Alvarado and Sandoval lost 20. Hist. Mex., ii. 410. Bernal Diaz
acknowledges only a third of such loss between these two captains. Gomara gives
40 captives, several killed, 3 or 4 horses lost, and over 30 wounded. Hist. Mex.,
205-6. Ixtlilxochitl raises the allied loss to over 2000. Hor. Crueldades, 37-9. Fifty-
three Spaniards, says Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 192. In the cédula of March 7, 1525,
granting a coat-of-arms to Cortés, 50 are mentioned, but in his letter to the
sovereign the general acknowledges only 35 to 40 and over 1000 allies. Herrera
and Torquemada adopt these figures. Oviedo, iii. 516, lowers the number to 30.
Duran, who confounds the late repulse of Alvarado with the Sorrowful Night and
this defeat, allows 4 banners to be captured. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 501-4, 508.

[1174] Bernal Diaz gives this conversation with some detail, and names Treasurer
Alderete as the guilty officer who neglected to fill the channel, intimating that
Cortés had been heedlessly allured onward by the Mexicans, leaving Alderete to
attend to the filling. He even allows the treasurer to retort to the charge, in
Sandoval’s presence, that Cortés’ eagerness had been the cause of the neglect.
This is probably an invented account, based on Gomara’s statement that the
‘treasurer,’ no name being given, neglected to fill a channel on his route. Informed
of this, Cortés hastened thither to remedy the fault, only to meet the fleeing.
Herrera adopts this version, as do most writers, including Prescott; but it is
evidently wrong, for Cortés writes clearly that the misfortune occurred on his own
route, some distance above its junction with the Tlacopan road, to which they soon
retreated. On reaching this road he sent to recall the ‘treasurer and comptroller,’
who were leading their division victoriously at the farther end of it. Owing to their
care in filling channels ‘they received no injury in retreating.’ Cartas, 233-4. There
can be little doubt about this statement, since Cortés would have been only too
glad to cast the blame on any other division than his own. He does not even claim
to have been at the front, but in the rear, and near the spot where the neglect
occurred. The only question then is, who was the guilty officer? The ‘treasurer’
commanded the centre division, and although there were several treasurers, the
royal, late and new, and he who acted for the army, yet the new royal treasurer is
undoubtedly meant, and this appears to have been Alderete, according to the
statement of several authorities. Hence the accusation against Alderete must be
wrong; anything besides this must be conjecture.

[1175] ‘Bolviò à la grita, Andrés de Tapia [the captain of his party] matò mas de
sesenta Mexicanos,’ adds Torquemada, i. 558-9.

[1176] ‘Esto no fue sino cinco dias.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 149.

[1177] Similar women of courage were María de Estrada, the heroine of Otumba,
Beatriz de Escobar, Juana Martin, and Beatriz de Palacios. Herrera, dec. iii. lib. ii.
cap. i.

[1178] Oil was the chief remedy. Torquemada, i. 558-60. Bernal Diaz speaks of a
soldier named Juan Catalan who performed cures with the sign of the cross and
psalm-singing. The Tlascaltecs also besieged the man for his attentions. ‘Y
verdaderamente digo, que hallauamos que Nuestro Señor Iesu Christo era
servido de darnos esfuerço, ... y de presto sanauan.’ Not twenty of Alvarado’s
men were free from wounds at this time. Hist. Verdad., 142. Solis allows this
wonderful healing power to be attributed to no woman. Hist. Mex., ii. 412. But then
he was a strict priest, who saw woman chiefly as a feeble and adoring supplicant.

[1179] ‘Que de ai a ocho dias no auia de quedar ninguno de nosotros a vida,

porque assi se lo auian prometido la noche antes sus Dioses.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist.
Verdad., 149.

[1180] Solis, Hist. Mex., ii. 415, states, and Prescott hastily affirms, that nearly all
the allies deserted, and Bernal Diaz enumerates the mere handful that remained;
but this must be erroneous, as shown by the course of the narratives in general.
Two expeditions were sent forth about this time, and the large number of allies
which joined therein may account in part for the gaps which gave rise to the above
exaggeration. Cortés, indeed, alludes very indirectly to any defection.

[1181] Forty thousand, says Ixtlilxochitl, obtained chiefly from Quauhnahuac and
other towns subject to Tezcuco. Hor. Crueldades, 40. Herrera and others mention
no auxiliaries from the camp. Bernal Diaz is confused.

[1182] The Chicuhnauhtla, Ixtlilxochitl calls it.

[1183] ‘Y ellos le siruieron muy biẽ en el cerco.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 207.
Ixtlilxochitl claims of course that his Tezcucans formed the chief auxiliaries of
Sandoval. Bernal Diaz wrongly gives Tápia this expedition, which Cortés intimates
to have been sent about three days after the return of the Quauhnahuac party.
Cartas, 237.

[1184] Farfan and Villareal came, says Bernal Diaz, and Tecapaneca, cacique of
Topeyanco, led the returning Tlascaltecs. Hist. Verdad., 151.

[1185] Cortés leaves the impression that this incident took place during the days
when the Spaniards were making desultory entries into the city; but since he does
not speak of the oracle or the defection the affair is undecided. Torquemada, i.
557, intimates that Chichimecatl served under Sandoval, but this is wrong.

[1186] Ojeda magnifies the train of men to 4000 and the canoes to 3000. Herrera,
dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xxii.

[1187] Fifteen hundred loads maize, 1000 loads fowl, 300 sides venison, besides
other effects, including Xicotencatl’s confiscated property and women. Id.

[1188] Herrera intimates that the material may have been a consignment to Leon,
for which the disappointed owner sought a market. A vessel of Aillon’s fleet, says
Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 153.

[1189] Some time before he had expressed the same intention, and the fear that
little or no treasure would be recovered. Cartas, 222, 241. Ixtlilxochitl claims that
his namesake provided 100,000 men for the task, Hor. Crueldades, 42, and Bernal
Diaz states that this prince proposed purely a strict blockade as a safe and sure
plan. Hist. Verdad., 150. The result proves that this would have been the best and
as speedy as the one adopted, while the city would have been saved from
destruction. That the plan was ever seriously suggested among this impatient
crew is affirmed by no other authority.