Wei Zhang 2022 The Biden Administration S Indo Pacific Strategy and China U S Strategic Competition

The Biden
Administration’s
Indo-Pacific Strategy
by 113.23.53.243 on 04/27/24. Re-use and distribution is strictly not permitted, except for Open Access articles.
and China-U.S.
Strategic Competition
China Q of Int' l Strategic Stud 2021.07:157-178. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
Wei Zongyou and

Zhang Yunhan
Abstract: The Biden administration has yet to announce its Indo-Pacific

strategy, but the overall framework seems all clear: it views China as the
main challenger, if not a direct threat, to its political, economic, and mili-
tary influence in the region, and vows to take diplomatic, economic, and
military actions to counterbalance China’s growing influence, preferably
with its allies and partners. The Biden administration has taken a series of
steps to unite its Asian and even European allies and partners, offered
economic alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), revamped
Wei Zongyou is a professor at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University. He can
be reached at wzy82cn@163.com. Zhang Yunhan is an M.A. candidate at the School of
International Relations and Public Affairs, Shanghai International Studies University, and
can be reached at zhangyunhan0207@163.com. This paper was funded by “The National
Social Science Foundation of China” (No. 20AGJ009).
OPEN ACCESS
°
c 2021 World Century Publishing Corporation and Shanghai Institutes for International Studies
China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, 157–178
DOI: 10.1142/S2377740021500068
This is an Open Access article, copyright owned by the SIIS and WCPC. The article is distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 (CC BY-NC) License which permits
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is used for non-commercial purposes.
157
158 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 7, No. 2
regional institutional architectures, and tried to shape the regional order to

its advantage. As a result, China-U.S. relations have deteriorated further
on Biden’s watch and is moving in the direction of confrontation.
Keywords: Biden administration; Indo-Pacific; strategic competition;

regional order.
Introduction
On January 13, 2021, a week before Joseph R. Biden’s inauguration, the Asia
Group announced that its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Kurt M.
Campbell, who was an assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific
affairs during President Obama’s first term and the chief architect of the
“Pivot to Asia,” would join the Biden-Harris administration as the Deputy
Assistant to the President and Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs on the
National Security Council.1 This new position (“Asia Czar”) would give
Campbell a broad mandate to manage interagency policy coordination and
report directly to the incoming national security adviser Jake Sullivan.2
This appointment was widely interpreted as Team Biden’s move to
elevate the Indo-Pacific region in its foreign policy planning. Since entering
the White House, the Biden administration has taken a series of steps to
strengthen its relations with Asian allies and partners, including putting
forward an alternative infrastructure initiative to balance against China’s
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), upgrading the Quadrilateral Security Dia-
logue (Quad) to summit level, and above all, designating China as a “near-
peer” strategic competitor. Although the Biden administration has yet to
formally announce its China policy and Indo-Pacific strategy, Washington’s
strategic posture vis-à-vis Beijing has become all clear. Even as Beijing
rejects Washington’s characterization of the bilateral relationship as one of
“stiff competition,” the growing bipartisan consensus and policy continuity
1 “Press
Release: Dr. Kurt M. Campbell to Join the Biden-Harris Administration,” Asia
Group, January 13, 2021, https://theasiagroup.com/press-release-dr-kurt-m-campbell-to-
join-the-biden-harris-administration/.
Rogin, “Biden’s Pick for Top Asia Official Should Reassure Nervous Allies,”
2 Josh
Washington Post, January 13, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/13/

kurt-campbell-biden-china-asia-nsc/.
The Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy 159
between the Trump and Biden administration with regard to China have
pushed the relationship in the direction of greater rivalry.
This article offers an overview of the Biden administration’s Indo-
Pacific strategy in general and China policy in particular. It argues that as
great power competition becomes the central issue in U.S. foreign policy
planning, President Biden is likely to center its emerging Indo-Pacific
strategy around Washington’s strategic posture toward Beijing. The Biden

administration will combine elements of the strategic approaches adopted
by the Trump and Obama administrations and put a premium on shoring

up regional and global alliances and partnerships to counter China’s
growing power and presence. Having announced the demise of the
decades-old engagement policy, competition will be the defining feature of
China-U.S. relations in years ahead. The Biden White House will also
ratchet up economic, political, military, ideological, and technological
pressures against Beijing in what it calls an “across-the-board” competition.
Bilateral cooperation and coordination on pressing global challenges like
climate change and public health crises or hot-button issues of common
concern such as the Iran nuclear deal and denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula may help cool down occasional flare-ups of tension but cannot
change the overall trajectory of a deteriorating relationship.
China: A Near-Peer Strategic Competitor
China-U.S. relations had taken a sharp turn for the worse during the Trump
administration. On President Trump’s watch, Washington abandoned the
four decades-old engagement policy toward Beijing, designated China as a
revisionist great power bent on overturning regional and world order,
imposed sweeping tariffs on Chinese goods, heightened scrutiny of Chinese
investment and influence in the United States, and initiated a partial
decoupling between the world’s two largest economies. The Trump ad-
ministration also put forward for the first time an Indo-Pacific strategy
aiming at balancing or even containing China’s increasing influence in the
region.3
3 U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2021),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/IPS-Final-Declass.pdf.
While Mr. Biden vowed to jettison Trump’s “America First” foreign

policy and much of Trump’s controversial domestic policy on the campaign
trail, he has preserved most elements of his predecessor’s strategic
approach to China since coming into the office in January 2021.4 His
administration has left the punitive tariffs in place, claiming that tariffs are a
legitimate foreign policy tool to defend U.S. economic interests. It has
expanded the entity list of Chinese military-related companies whose

commercial activities are deemed contrary to U.S. interests, in an attempt to
slow and stop the transfer of U.S. technology to the People’s Republic. It has
also maintained the discriminatory visa policy toward Chinese scholars and
students who want to study and conduct research in the United States.
Above all, Biden administration officials have announced the demise of the
longstanding engagement policy and regarded
China as a “near-peer” competitor intent on Having reversed
displacing the United State in the Indo-Pacific
most of his
in the near term and around the world in the
long run.5 immediate
On February 4, 2021, when Biden gave predecessor’s
his first major foreign policy speech at the U.S. domestic policies,
Department of State, he designated China as
President Biden
America’s “most serious competitor,” claimed
“American leadership must meet this new preserves core
moment of advancing authoritarianism, in- elements of the
cluding the growing ambitions of China to Trump White
rival the United States and the determination
of Russia to damage and disrupt our democ-
House’s strategic
racy,” and vowed to “confront China’s eco- approach to China.
nomic abuses; counter its aggressive, coercive
4 AlexLeary and Bob Davis, “Biden’s China Policy Is Emerging and It Looks A Lot
Like Trump’s,” Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/bidens-china-
policy-is-emergingand-it-looks-a-lot-like-trumps-11623330000.
Zheng, “U.S.-China Ties: Competition, Not Engagement from Now on, Kurt
5 Sarah
Campbell Says,” South China Morning Post, May 27, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/
china/diplomacy/article/3135066/us-china-ties-competition-not-engagement-now-kurt-
campbell.
action; to push back on China’s attack on human rights, intellectual prop-

erty, and global governance.”6
Secretary of State Antony Blinken also viewed Beijing as Washington’s
chief adversary and competitor, claiming that “China is the only country
with the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to seri-
ously challenge the stable and open international system all the rules,
values, and relationships that make the world work the way we want it to,
because it ultimately serves the interests and reflects the values of the
American people.”7 In other words, no other country than China can

seriously challenge the U.S.-led liberal order that it helped to establish in
the aftermath of the Second World War.
The Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
also reflects top officials’ grim assessment of China, stating that China “is
the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplo-
matic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to
a stable and open international system.”8 In April 2021, the U.S. intelligence
community issued its Annual Threat Assessment 2021, asserting that “China
increasingly is a near-peer competitor, challenging the United States in
multiple arenas especially economically, militarily, and technologically
and is pushing to change global norms.”9 This is the first ever U.S. official
document defining China as a near-peer competitor, representing a fun-
damental shift in strategic posture vis-à-vis Beijing. Since the end of the
Second World War, the United States has been vigilantly guarding against
any potential peer competitor. Now that Washington has found one, it
would mobilize all means and resources at its disposal to deter and frus-
trate the challenger.
6 Briefing Room, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” White
House, February 4, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/
2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/.
7 Antony Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People,” Department of State,
March 3, 2021, https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/.
8 Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance (Washington, D.C.:White House, 2021), p. 8,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
9 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community (Washington, D.C.: Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021), p. 4, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/
documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
The 117th Congress also shares the executive branch’s perception of

Beijing. In June 2021, the Senate passed a bipartisan bill United States
Innovation and Competition Act of 2021, which claims that China “is
leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, military, technological, and
ideological power to become a strategic, near-peer, global competitor of
the United States.” As a result, the Congress urges the Biden adminis-
tration to “adopt a policy of strategic competition with the PRC” and

integrate it into “part of a broader strategic approach to the Indo-Pacific
and the world.”10

In a word, the Biden administration views China as a near-peer
competitor with the economic, military, and technological potential to
challenge U.S. power and influence in the Indo-Pacific in the near term and
around the world in the long run, one which the United States must balance
and contain with full strength.
U.S. Allies and Partners: Strategic Assets
U.S. allies and partners are expected to play an irreplaceable role in the
Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. For Biden, U.S. allies and
partners around the world in general and in the Indo-Pacific in particular,
are important strategic assets that Washington can rely on in the growing
strategic competition with China. This view sets the Biden White House
apart from the Trump administration in that the former regards its vast
network of alliances and partnerships as a force multiplier whose interests
and voices must be taken into account, while the latter dismissed allies and
partners as expendable free riders.
President Biden praised U.S. allies and partners in his first major for-
eign policy address, claiming that “America’s alliances are our greatest
asset, and leading with diplomacy means standing shoulder-to-shoulder
with our allies and key partners once again.”11 Secretary of State Blinken
also emphasized the importance of U.S. allies and partners to U.S. strategic
objectives, saying that “Our alliances are what the military calls force
10 S.
1260, United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021, 117th Congress, 1st
Session, pp. 715, 727–728.
11 Briefing Room, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World.”
multipliers” and “our unique asset.” He vowed to revitalize U.S. ties with
allies and partners, “to reconnect with our friends and allies, and to rein-
vent partnerships that were built years ago so they’re suited to today’s and
tomorrow’s challenges.”12
Not long after Biden entered the White House, he sent Secretary of
State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin to visit Asian and European
allies and partners to reaffirm U.S. commitments. In March, Secretary of

State Blinken and Defense Secretary Austin visited Japan and South Korea,
and Mr. Austin visited India. In Tokyo, Blinken emphasized that the fact
that they chose Japan for their first cabinet-level overseas travel “is no
accident.” The trip highlighted the central and important purpose of reaf-
firming U.S. commitment to the alliance and aligning Japan and the
United States on the key issues of the time, “whether it is combating
climate change, dealing with cybersecurity, or dealing with global health
security.”13 Blinken also reaffirmed the vital importance of the U.S.-Japan
Alliance “as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-
Pacific region and around the world,” pledging to deepen U.S.-Japan
coordination in the areas of climate change, clean energy, cybersecurity,
supply chains, and Covid-19, in an attempt to promote “a Free and Open
Indo-Pacific.”14 In New Delhi, Secretary of Defense Austin renewed U.S.
commitments to allies and partners, defined the U.S.-India relationship as
“a stronghold of a free and open Indo-Pacific region,” and called for
working with India further on “information-sharing, logistics cooperation,
artificial intelligence, and cooperation in new domains such as space and
cyber.”15
12 Antony Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People.”

13 Office of the Spokesperson, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Japanese Foreign
Minister Toshimitsu Motegi Before Their Meeting,” Department of State, March 16, 2021,
https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-japanese-foreign-minister-toshimitsu-
motegi-before-their-meeting/.
14 Office of the Spokesperson, “The United States and Japan Expand Indo-Pacific Co-
operation,” Department of State, March 16, 2021, https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-
and-japan-expand-indo-pacific-economic-cooperation/.
15 Jim Garamone, “India, U.S. Look at Ways to Grow Partnership to Protect Indo-
Pacific,” Department of Defense, March 20, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/
Article/Article/2544434/india-us-look-at-ways-to-grow-partnership-to-protect-indo-pacific/.
Even as he dispatched top administration officials on overseas trips

to repair and revive decades-old ties with allies, President Biden also
intensified personal engagement with foreign leaders to reclaim America’s
leadership role on the world stage by leveraging his long career as a
Washington insider and foreign policy hand. Within ten months into his
presidency, Mr. Biden had attended the G-7 meeting, U.S.-NATO Summit,
U.S.-EU Summit, G-20 meeting, and the UN Climate Conference. He

played host at the White House to Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshi-
hide for the first foreign-leader visit of his presidency. The ensuing joint
leaders’ statement states that the U.S.-Japan Alliance is “unwavering” and
“advances a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific based on [a]
commitment to universal values and common principles, and the pro-
motion of inclusive economic prosperity.” During the meeting, the two
leaders expressed their “concerns over Chinese activities that are incon-
sistent with the international rules-based order,” “oppose[ed] any uni-
lateral attempts to change the status quo in the East China Sea,” and
“reiterated [their] objections to China’s unlawful maritime claims and
activities in the South China Sea and reaffirmed [their] strong shared
interest in a free and open South China Sea governed by international
law.”16
The logic behind the Biden administra- As the Biden
tion’s shuttle diplomacy with allies and part- administration sees
ners is quite simple: in the “stiff competition” it, allies and partners
with a near-peer competitor, the United States
cannot do it alone, and should line up allies
are the most valuable
and partners and mobilize all the resources strategic asset in the
available to compete from a “position of intensifying
strength.” Besides, with the its extensive net- competition with
work of allies and partners, the United States
can demonstrate to the world in general and
China.
the Indo-Pacific audience in particular that its
16 BriefingRoom, “U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement: Ù.S.-Japan Global Partnership

for A New Era,” White House, April 16, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2021/04/16/u-s-japan-joint-leaders-statement-u-s-japan-global-
partnership-for-a-new-era/.
competition with China is gaining wide support and therefore more

“legitimate.”
B3W: An Alternative to China’s BRI
The Trump administration put forward an “Indo-Pacific Economic Vision”

to revamp its development finance institution, and launched a Blue Dot

Network in partnership with Japan and Australia to compete with China’s
BRI. However, compared with China’s multi-trillion dollar infrastructure

initiative and the huge infrastructure appetite of the Indo-Pacific region,
Washington’s initiatives appear to be `too late, too slow, and too small’:
the whole budget for the “Indo-Pacific Economic Vision” is only
$115 million.17 The much trumpeted newly established U.S. International
Development Finance Corporation is a little bit better, with a budget of
$60 billion to facilitate private investment in development and infra-
structure in the developing countries around the world. As for the Blue
Dot Network initiative, aiming to establish a “high-quality infrastructure
standard” benchmark and certify infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific and
around the world, it never came to fruition.18 To compensate for its in-
competency, the Trump administration resorted to naming, shaming, and
smearing, to dissuade the regional countries from supporting and par-
ticipating in China’s BRI.
The Biden administration realized early on that to compete with
China, it’s not enough just to pointing fingers at the BRI or ask other
countries not to join, it has to offer something concrete and appealing. It has
also realized that it cannot compete with China dollar for dollar, project for
project, or do it all alone, given the daunting domestic challenges con-
fronting it and the huge infrastructure deficit in the Indo-Pacific and around
the world. It has to be done multilaterally, preferably with like-minded
allies and partners.
17 “Sec.Pompeo Remarks on Àmerica’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision,”’ U.S. Mission to

ASEAN, July 30, 2018, https://asean.usmission.gov/sec-pompeo-remarks-on-americas-indo-
pacific-economic-vision/.
18 Kaush Arha, “A Hidden Key to the G7’s Infrastructure Ambitions: Blue Dot
Network,” Atlantic Council, June 12, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-
atlanticist/a-hidden-key-to-the-g7s-infrastructure-ambitions-blue-dot-network/.
In March 2021, in a phone call with British Prime Minister Boris

Johnson, Biden suggested that democratic countries should have an infra-
structure plan to rival Beijing’s BRI. Biden said, “I suggest we should have,
essentially, a similar initiative, pulling from the democratic states, helping
those communities around the world that, in fact, need help.”19 This is the
first time the Biden administration publicly talked about offering its own
version of infrastructure initiative to compete with the BRI, and to do it

with democratic countries.
Biden expressed his desire to cooperate more with Japan on digital and
energy infrastructure development when Japanese Prime Minister Suga
visited the White House. During the visit the two leaders launched a new
Competitiveness and Resilience Partnership, and vowed to more closely
cooperate on clean energy, sensitive supply chains, digital economy, and
emerging technologies.20
In May 2021, the Council on Foreign Relations published a report on
China’s Belt and Road Initiative, in which it argues that, to compete with
China’s BRI, the United States can’t fight something with nothing, but has to
offer something genuine. “The United States has a clear interest in adopting
a strategy that both pressures China to alter its BRI practices and provides
an effective alternative to BRI one that promotes sustainable infra-
structure, upholds high environmental and anticorruption standards,
ensures U.S. companies can operate on a level playing ground, and assists
countries in preserving their political independence.”21 It calls for the Biden
administration to improve U.S. competitiveness, work with allies, partners,
and multilateral organizations to better meet developing countries’ needs.
“The United States cannot and should not respond to BRI symmetrically,
attempting to match China dollar for dollar or project for project. Instead,
the United States should focus on those areas where it can offer, either on its
Renshaw, “Biden Says He Suggested to UK’s Johnson A Plan to Rival China’s

19 Jarrett
Belt and Road,” Reuters, March 27, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-britain-

biden-china-idUSKBN2BI32M.
Room, “U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement: Ù.S.-Japan Global Partnership
20 Briefing
for A New Era,” White House, April 16, 2021.

21 Jacob
J. Lew et al., China’s Belt and Road: Implications for the United States, CFR Inde-
pendent Task Force Report, No. 79, May 2021, p. 5.
own, or in concert with like-minded nations, a compelling alternative

to BRI.”22
In June 2021, when Biden visited Britain to attend the G-7 Summit, he,
together with his dialogue partners, launched a new global infrastructure
initiative, Build Back Better World (B3W), as an alternative to the BRI. The
Biden administration maintained that B3W will be a values-driven, high-
standard, climate-friendly, and transparent infrastructure initiative. It will

be led by the G-7 and other like-minded partners of major democracies to
mobilize private-sector capital in four areas of focus climate, health and

health security, digital technology, and gender equity and equality with
catalytic investments from respective development finance institutions to
help narrow the $40+ trillion infrastructure need in the developing world.
“B3W will be global in scope, from Latin America and the Caribbean to
Africa to the Indo-Pacific.” Different partners will “have different geo-
graphic orientations,” with the United States likely focusing on the Indo-
Pacific region.23
So far, B3W remains a grand vision rather than a roadmap, lacking in
details concerning how to mobilize private investment, how much amount
of capital the United States and its global partners are willing to put in, and
how to coordinate their priorities. As some cautioned, how to invest in a
system for developing a sustainable pipeline of bankable projects to reduce
risks and stimulate private sector investment is a huge challenge, and the
U.S. government needs a central coordinator to streamline its multiple
domestic agencies and to coordinate multiple foreign partners in carrying
out the initiative.24
22 Ibid.
23 Briefing Room, “Fact Sheet: President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back
Better World (B3W) Partnership,” White House, June 12, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-
launch-build-back-better-world-b3w-partnership/; and Matthew P. Goodman and Jonathan
E. Hillman, “The G7’s New Global Infrastructure Initiative,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, June 15, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/g7s-new-global-
infrastructure-initiative.
24 Matthew P. Goodman and Jonathan E. Hillman, “The G7’s New Global Infrastructure
Initiative.”
QUAD: Strategic Platform to Counterbalance China
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD, also known as the Quad) is a se-
curity dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, which
was initiated in 2007 by then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and sup-
ported by the U.S., Australian, and Indian leaders to forge closer consultation
and cooperation among the democratic nations in the Asia-Pacific against a

rising China. Besides the security dialogue, the four countries also held their
first ever joint naval exercise, Malabar, which drew criticism and protests from
China. Unwilling to upend the decades-long friendly relations with China,
Australia under the Kevin Rudd administration withdrew from the grouping.
A decade later, in 2017, after Donald J. Trump had entered the White
House and declared China America’s chief competitor, the leaders of the
four countries agreed to revive the Quad during the ASEAN Summit in
Manila. On the sidelines of the 2017 ASEAN Summit, senior officials from
the United States, Japan, India, and Australia held a working-level meeting
to discuss how the four countries can increase coordination to promote a
“free and open Indo-Pacific” and rules-based order in Asia.25
In September 2019, the four countries upgraded the Quad by holding a
first ministerial-level dialogue in New York on the sidelines the United
Nations General Assembly, during which the four foreign ministers dis-
cussed how to facilitate the private sector investment in infrastructure,
strengthen cooperation in maritime security, promote human rights and
good governance, and build a rules-based Indo-Pacific order. A year later,
the four countries held a second ministerial meeting in Tokyo at the invi-
tation of then new Japanese Prime Minister Suga, to formalize the minis-
terial dialogue and call for coordination and cooperation in response to
such pressing challenges as the Covid-19 crisis, supply chain resilience,
maritime security, and so on.26
Panda, “U.S., Japan, India, and Australia Hold Working-Level Quadrilateral

25 Ankit
Meeting on Regional Cooperation: The `Quad’ Is Back,” Diplomat, November 13, 2017, https://
thediplomat.com/2017/11/us-japan-india-and-australia-hold-working-level-Quadrilateral-
meeting-on-regional-cooperation/.
26 “2nd
India-Australia-Japan-USA Ministerial Meeting,” Indian Ministry of External
Affairs, October 6, 2020, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/33098/2nd IndiaAustralia
Japan USA Ministerial Meeting.
While Trump deserved credit for reviving the Quad as a tool to form
a more “united front” in countering China, his “America First” doctrine,
transactional mindset, and erratic leadership style largely neutralized any
benefits the United States could harvest from the efforts. It was more of a
“talk shop” and diplomatic maneuver than substantial foreign policy
efforts. That began to change when Joe Biden came into office and started
to make systematic efforts to reassure alliance and partners and mobilize

like-minded nations in the strategic competition with China.
In February 2021, under the initiative of Biden’s Secretary of State

Antony Blinken, the Quad held its third ministerial meeting (virtual). The
ministers emphasized “their commitment to upholding a rules-based in-
ternational order,” reiterated their “common vision for a free, open and
inclusive Indo-Pacific region, with clear support for ASEAN cohesion and
centrality,” discussed their efforts to combat the Covid-19 and expressed
“their commitment to cooperate in addressing this challenge,” and “ex-
changed views on responding to climate change and furthering cooperation
in areas such as maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief (HADR), supply chain resilience and counter-terrorism.”27 They also
agreed to hold “the Quad meeting at least annually at the Ministerial level
and on a regular basis at senior and working levels to strengthen cooper-
ation on advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific region.”28
A month later, President Biden elevated the Quad to leaders level by
hosting the inaugural Quad Summit (virtual). The four leaders issued a
joint statement to elaborate on “the spirit of the Quad”: (1) reaffirming
their commitment to Quadrilateral cooperation; (2) committing to pro-
mote a free, open, rules-based order; (3) pledging to respond to the eco-
nomic and health impacts of Covid-19, combat climate change, and
address shared challenges; (4) joining forces to expand vaccine production
and speed economic recovery; and (5) redoubling commitment to
27 “3ndIndia-Australia-Japan-USA Quad Ministerial Meeting,” Indian Ministry of Ex-

ternal Affairs, February 18, 2021, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/33540/
3rd IndiaAustraliaJapanUSA Quad Ministerial Meeting.
28 Office of the Spokesperson, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Quad Ministers,”
Department of State, February 18, 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-
Quad-ministers/.
Quad engagement.29 The four leaders also declared the establishment of

three working groups: a Vaccine Experts Group, a Climate Working
Group, and a Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group to fa-
cilitate substantial cooperation in related areas.30
By upgrading the Quad to summit level and establishing issue-specific
working groups, the Quad was gradually developed from an obscure,
marginal dialogue forum lost in the messy multilateral networks in the Asia-
Pacific to a leader-level, multi-track, institutionalized forum for facilitating
substantial cooperation between the four countries, focusing on shaping the

emerging Indo-Pacific order to their liking. In addition, in emphasizing rules-
based order, supply chain resilience, critical and emerging technologies, and
vaccine diplomacy, the Biden administration hopes to turn the Quad into a
kind of geopolitical and geo-economic platform in the growing strategic
competition with China in the Indo-Pacific.31
Regional Order: A Free and Open Indo-Pacific
For the Biden administration, as with the Trump administration, a free and
open Indo-Pacific is not just a strategy, but also a vision of regional order.
The Biden administration has made it clear that the United States is de-
termined to maintain a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Secretary of State
Blinken maintained that the U.S.-Japan Alliance “is the cornerstone of
peace, security, and prosperity for a free and open Indo-Pacific region and
across the globe,” during his first call with Japanese Foreign Minister
Toshimitsu Motegi in January 2021.32 Biden also emphasized that “a free
Room, “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: `The Spirit of the Quad,’ ” White
29 Briefing
House, March 12, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/

2021/03/12/Quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-Quad/.
Room, “Fact Sheet: Quad Summit,” White House, March 12, 2021, https://
30 Briefing
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/fact-sheet-Quad-
summit/.
Jaishankar and Tanvi Madan, “How the Quad Can Match the Hype,”Foreign
31 Dhruva
Affairs, April 15, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-04-15/

how-Quad-can-match-hype.
32 Office of the Spokesperson, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Japanese Foreign Minister
Motegi,” Department of State, January 26, 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-
call-with-japanese-foreign-minister-motegi/.
and open Indo-Pacific region is essential to all of their futures” during his
virtual summit meeting with the leaders of Australia, India, and Japan in
March 2021.33
Though the Biden administration has not yet elaborated on what a “free
and open Indo-Pacific” really means, judging from the words and writings of
the president and his cabinet officials, it basically has three dimensions.
Politically, a free and open Indo-Pacific

Washington is means Washington supports a liberal order
seeking to that values democracy and human rights.

compartmentalize its The Biden administration emphasizes that
strategic competition with China is not
approach to the merely about economic or military power,
growing China but also about values and ideological
challenge, putting appeals. In Biden’s words, it’s a kind of
the consequential competition between “liberal order” and
“authoritarian order” which the United
relationship into States cannot afford to lose. Biden says the
three silos: United States and its allies and partners
competitive, must prove to the whole world that de-
mocracy still delivers and is the trend of
cooperative, and
tomorrow. The United States must defend
confrontational. and promote human rights and democratic
values, and a liberal Indo-Pacific order with
democracy on the rise is fundamentally in the interests of the United
States.
Economically, a free and open Indo-Pacific means Washington sup-
ports market-driven economic development and private sector investment
model against the state-driven economic development and investment
model. As B3W shows, the Biden administration is determined to mobilize
private capital through development finance in order to address the tre-
mendous infrastructure gap in the low- and middle-income countries, by
providing values-driven infrastructure investment and development model
33 BriefingRoom, “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: `The Spirit of the Quad,”’ White
House, March 12, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/
2021/03/12/Quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-Quad/.
which is sustainable, transparent, climate-friendly, and market-driven.34

Having offered a Western alternative to Beijing’s BRI, the Biden adminis-
tration also hopes that B3W will effectively prevent China’s economic
dominance in the Indo-Pacific, and free the Indo-Pacific region of possible
economic coercion by China.35
Militarily, a free and open Indo-Pacific mainly means three things.
First, the United States will reaffirm its commitment to its military allies and
security partners in the Indo-Pacific, and form a democratic “united front”
against China in the region.36 Second, the United States supports “freedom
of the seas,” which basically means the United States is entitled to “freedom
of navigation” in the South China Sea and beyond and does not accept
China’s claims in the South China Sea, which the United States considers
“as having no basis in international law.”37 Third, maritime disputes should
be resolved peacefully through negotiation, consultation, or other legal
means, free of military coercion or armed conflict.
In all, the Biden administration aims to maintain and expand a liberal
regional order conducive to U.S. interests and values in the Indo-Pacific, which,
together with like-minded allies and partners, can balance and offset China’s
increasing economic and military power and governance model appeals.
China-U.S. Relations: More Competition Ahead?
Like Trump, Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy is mainly about China. For both,
China is the No. 1 strategic competitor of the United States around the
34 BriefingRoom, “Fact Sheet: President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back
Better World (B3W) Partnership,” White House, June 12, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-
launch-build-back-better-world-b3w-partnership/.
35 Tom O’Connor, “Biden Faces Tough Path to Building A Better Belt and Road Than
China,” Newsweek, June 24, 2021, https://www.newsweek.com/biden-tough-path-building-
better-belt-road-china-1603929.
36 DavidBrunnstrom et al., “Biden and Japan’s Suga Project Unity Against China’s
Assertiveness,” Reuters, April 16, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/biden-
welcome-japans-suga-first-guest-key-ally-china-strategy-2021-04-16/.
37 Office of the Spokesperson, “Fifth Anniversary of the Arbitral Tribunal Ruling on the
South China Sea,” Department of State, July 11, 2021, https://www.state.gov/fifth-anniversary-
of-the-arbitral-tribunal-ruling-on-the-south-china-sea/.
world in the long run and in the Indo-Pacific in the near term. If Trump was
mainly focused on the economic dimension of the China-U.S. relationship
and more willing to “do it alone,” Biden’s concerns over China are broader,
covering economic, political, military, and technological domains. The
Biden administration is more willing to seek help from allies and partners
to form a “united front” against China. What’s more, unlike Trump’s
transactional approach and power politics mindset, Biden brings democ-

racy and values back to U.S. foreign policy and views U.S.-China compe-
tition more from the ideological lens than in pure power struggle terms.
Biden argued that “American leadership must meet this new moment of
advancing authoritarianism, including the growing ambitions of China to
rival the United States.”38 “It is clear, absolutely clear ... that this is a battle
between the utility of democracies in the 21st century and autocracies.”39
He claimed that “We’re at an inflection point between those who argue that
... autocracy is the best way forward, they argue, and those who understand
that democracy is essential.”40 The Biden administration’s shuttle diplo-
macy in the Indo-Pacific, emphasis on Western democratic values, reaffir-
mation of commitments to Asian allies and partners, launch of alternative
infrastructure initiative B3W, and the free and open regional order vision,
all aim at competing with China “from a position of strength.”41
Looking ahead, with more measures being laid down and resources
fleshed out, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy will further
escalate China-U.S. strategic competition.
First, China-U.S. competition will take on more ideological signifi-
cance. Biden puts great emphasis on democracy and like-minded allies and
partners, which he deems as an essential strategic asset in the long-term
strategic competition with China. To showcase his administration’s

39 BriefingRoom, “Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference,” White House,
March 25, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/03/25/
remarks-by-president-biden-in-press-conference/.
40 Briefing Room, “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security
Conference,” White House, February 19, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-2021-virtual-munich-
security-conference/.
appreciation of democratic values, he not only kept intact Trump’s eco-

nomic sanctions against Chinese entities and individuals for “violating
democracy and human rights” in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, but also ex-
panded the economic sanctions against Chinese companies, individuals,
entities, and products and even threatens to do more. The U.S Congress
initiated numerous bills and acts to “fight against” or “punish” China in the
name of “violating human rights or democracy.” In June 2021, the U.S.

Senate passed a bipartisan bill United States Innovation and Competition Act of
2021, which claims that “The policies increasingly pursued by the PRC ...
are contrary to the interests and values of the United States ... threaten the
future character of the international order and are shaping the rules, norms,
and institutions that govern relations among states.” It urges the United
States to take extensive measures to build its own economic and techno-
logical strength, and “punish” China through further economic sanctions
and technological decoupling.42 Biden also announced that he would
convene a virtual Summit for Democracy in December 2021, to be followed
in roughly a year’s time by a second, in-person summit, to defend against
authoritarianism, fight corruption, and promote respect for human rights.43
Second, the geopolitical and geoeconomic competition between China
and the United States in the Indo-Pacific will become more intense. The
Biden administration reiterated on several occasions that the United States
does not seek a new Cold War with China, nor does it ask regional coun-
tries to choose sides between Beijing and Washington. However, the Biden
administration’s updating and formalizing of the Quad forum, weaving
close and dense networks of like-minded allies and partners, and defining
China-U.S. competition as one of authoritarianism vs. democracy, is no
doubt an attempt to draw a new geopolitical fault line in the Indo-Pacific
and force regional countries to take sides. What’s more, the Biden admin-
istration’s B3W initiative aims primarily not at meeting the growing infra-
structure demands of the Indo-Pacific and beyond, but at defaming China’s
42 S.
1260, United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021, 117th Congress, 1st
Session, pp. 715, 727–746.
43 BriefingRoom, “President Biden to Convene Leaders’ Summit for Democracy,”
White House, August 11, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/08/11/president-biden-to-convene-leaders-summit-for-democracy/.
BRI, and will only escalate the “race to the bottom” geoeconomic compe-
tition in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
Third, China-U.S. technology and critical supply chain decoupling will
accelerate. The Biden administration views technology and innovation as
the core competitive advantage of the United States. Biden said “We are in a
competition to win the 21st century, ... America must maintain its position
as the most innovative and productive nation on Earth.”44 To win the

hi-tech competition, the Biden administration has taken two measures: one,
investing more domestically to reinvigorate the U.S. science and technology

edge; and the other, more vigilantly guarding against any hi-tech and
know-how “flow from the U.S. to China.” The above-mentioned U.S. In-
novation and Competition Act of 2021 is an attempt to do both at the same
time by investing around $250 billion in U.S. science and technology, while
guarding against possible U.S. hi-tech flowing into China. If approved by
the House, and signed into law by Biden, it will surely accelerate China-U.S.
high technology decoupling.
In terms of critical supply chains, the Biden administration has already
issued two executive orders to strengthen the security and resilience of U.S.
supply chains and encourage domestication of critical supply chains to
reduce U.S. dependence on Chinese products and supply chains. And after
the initial reviews of the U.S. supply chains security in critical products and
areas, the Biden administration is considering taking new measures to
further strengthen security and resilience in U.S. supply chains, preferably
with more domestication, and with like-minded allies and partners when
necessary.45
Fourth, tensions will also grow over the Taiwan Straits and the South
China Sea. As a career politician who has more than three decades of
experience in the government and who once served as Chairman of the
44 Briefing Room, “Statement of President Joe Biden on Senate Passage of the U.S.
Innovation and Competition Act,” White House, June 8, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/08/statement-of-president-joe-biden-on-senate-
passage-of-the-u-s-innovation-and-competition-act/.
45 Briefing Room, “Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Announces Supply Chains
Disruptions Task Forces to Address Short-Term Supply Chain Discontinuities,” White
House, June 8, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/
06/08/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-supply-chain-disruptions-task-
force-to-address-short-term-supply-chain-discontinuities/.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Biden knows perfectly well the

importance of Taiwan in China-U.S. relations. However, given the changing
U.S. domestic political atmosphere and polarized partisan struggle, the
Biden administration on the one hand accepts publicly that the United
States adheres to “One China” policy, but on the other hand seeks to loosen
U.S. senior officials and military officers’ interaction with Taiwan counter-
parts according to the Taiwan Relations Act and Six Assurances.46 In addi-
tion, the Biden administration continues to sell advanced and sensitive
weapons to Taiwan to bolster its defense or even offensive capabilities and

works hard to expand Taiwan’s “international space” by advocating
Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Assembly as observer.47 The
Biden administration also expressed its “concerns” over peace and security
in the Taiwan Strait at the G-7, U.S.-Japan, U.S.-South Korea, and the Quad
Summit, indicating that it considers Taiwan as “an integrated part” of the
America’s Indo-Pacific strategy. On August 19, 2021, when interviewed by
ABC News, Biden even said that the United States will honor its “sacred
commitment” to defend Taiwan, which a senior Biden administration of-
ficial corrected later that U.S. “policy with regard to Taiwan has not
changed” and analysts said Biden had misspoken.48
On the issue of the South China Sea, the Biden administration inherited
much of the Trump administration’s hardline position. On July 11, 2021, the
U.S. Department of State issued a statement on the South China Sea, reaf-
firming “its July 13, 2020, policy regarding maritime claims in the South
China Sea,” which claimed that “Beijing’s claims to offshore resources
46 Office of the Spokesperson, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Roula Khalaf of the
Financial Times,” Department of State, May 3, 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-ant-
ony-j-blinken-with-roula-khalaf-of-the-financial-times/.
Hansler, “Biden Administration Proposes $750 Million Arms Sales to Taiwan
47 Jennifer
in A Move Likely to Anger Beijing,” CNN, August 5, 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/

04/politics/biden-administration-taiwan-arms-sales/index.html; and Office of the Spokes-
person, “Restoring Taiwan’s Appropriate Place at the World Health Assembly,” Department
of State, May 7, 2021, https://www.state.gov/restoring-taiwans-appropriate-place-at-the-
world-health-assembly/.
48 David Brunnstrom, “U.S. Position on Taiwan Unchanged Despite Biden
Comment Official,” Reuters, August 20, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-
pacific/us-position-taiwan-unchanged-despite-biden-comment-official-2021-08-19/.
across most of the South China Sea are completely unlawful.”49 In addition,
it “also reaffirms that an armed attack on Philippine armed forces, public
vessels, or aircraft in the South China Sea would invoke U.S. mutual de-
fense commitments under Article IV of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual
Defense Treaty.”50 Besides refuting China’s claims in the South China Sea,
the Biden administration continues its “Freedom of Navigation Opera-
tions” in the South China Sea. As of August 25, 2021, the Biden adminis-
tration had conducted four rounds of freedom of navigation operations in
the South China Sea to challenge China’s claims in the South China Sea and
defend its version of “freedom of the seas.”
The Biden administration also seeks support from allies and partners
to form a united front on the issue of the South China Sea. In numerous
bilateral and multilateral dialogues and meetings, including the G-7,
U.S.-NATO, U.S.-EU, U.S.-ASEAN, Quad, U.S.-Japan, U.S.-South Korea,
U.S.-Australia summit meetings, the Biden administration expressed “its
concerns about the situation” in the South China Sea, criticized China’s
behavior and sovereignty claims, and defended the U.S. version of freedom
of the seas. This more “active” U.S. presence in the South China Sea and
more aggressive diplomatic maneuver is likely to backfire and escalate
China-U.S. tensions and confrontation in the South China Sea.
Conclusion
Though the Biden administration has yet to formally announce its Indo-
Pacific strategy, the contours of its vision of and approach to the region
where “much of the history of the 21st century will be written” are all clear.
Unlike President Trump who launched a maximum pressure campaign on
day one of his administration in an attempt to contain China’ growing
power, the Biden White House tries to handle this consequential bilateral
relationship in a logical and sophisticated manner, putting it into three silos:
49 Office of the Spokesperson, “U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China
Sea,” Department of State, July 13, 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-position-on-
maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/index.html.
50 Office of the Spokesperson, “Fifth Anniversary of the Arbitral Tribunal Ruling on the
South China Sea,” Department of State, July 11, 2021, https://www.state.gov/fifth-anniversary-
of-the-arbitral-tribunal-ruling-on-the-south-china-sea/.
competitive, cooperative, and confrontational. Beijing’s dismissal of

Washington’s characterization of China-U.S. relations as competitive and
continued emphasis on cooperation are unlikely to change President
Biden’s perception and approach, given the strong bipartisan consensus
regarding China’s capabilities and intentions.

Wei Zhang 2022 The Biden Administration S Indo Pacific Strategy and China U S Strategic Competition

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Wei Zhang 2022 The Biden Administration S Indo Pacific Strategy and China U S Strategic Competition

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The Biden

Wei Zongyou and

Abstract: The Biden administration has yet to announce its Indo-Paciﬁc

regional institutional architectures, and tried to shape the regional order to

Keywords: Biden administration; Indo-Paciﬁc; strategic competition;

Washington Post, January 13, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/13/

strategy around Washington’s strategic posture toward Beijing. The Biden

by the Trump and Obama administrations and put a premium on shoring

China: A Near-Peer Strategic Competitor

While Mr. Biden vowed to jettison Trump’s “America First” foreign

expanded the entity list of Chinese military-related companies whose

action; to push back on China’s attack on human rights, intellectual prop-

American people.”7 In other words, no other country than China can

The 117th Congress also shares the executive branch’s perception of

tration to “adopt a policy of strategic competition with the PRC” and

and the world.”10

U.S. Allies and Partners: Strategic Assets

allies and partners to reaﬃrm U.S. commitments. In March, Secretary of

12 Antony Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People.”

Even as he dispatched top administration oﬃcials on overseas trips

U.S.-EU Summit, G-20 meeting, and the UN Climate Conference. He

16 BrieﬁngRoom, “U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement: `U.S.-Japan Global Partnership

competition with China is gaining wide support and therefore more

B3W: An Alternative to China’s BRI

The Trump administration put forward an “Indo-Paciﬁc Economic Vision”

to revamp its development ﬁnance institution, and launched a Blue Dot

BRI. However, compared with China’s multi-trillion dollar infrastructure

17 “Sec.Pompeo Remarks on `America’s Indo-Paciﬁc Economic Vision,”’ U.S. Mission to

In March 2021, in a phone call with British Prime Minister Boris

version of infrastructure initiative to compete with the BRI, and to do it

Renshaw, “Biden Says He Suggested to UK’s Johnson A Plan to Rival China’s

Belt and Road,” Reuters, March 27, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-britain-

for A New Era,” White House, April 16, 2021.

own, or in concert with like-minded nations, a compelling alternative

standard, climate-friendly, and transparent infrastructure initiative. It will

mobilize private-sector capital in four areas of focus climate, health and

QUAD: Strategic Platform to Counterbalance China

and cooperation among the democratic nations in the Asia-Paciﬁc against a

Panda, “U.S., Japan, India, and Australia Hold Working-Level Quadrilateral

to make systematic eﬀorts to reassure alliance and partners and mobilize

In February 2021, under the initiative of Biden’s Secretary of State

27 “3ndIndia-Australia-Japan-USA Quad Ministerial Meeting,” Indian Ministry of Ex-

Quad engagement.29 The four leaders also declared the establishment of

substantial cooperation between the four countries, focusing on shaping the

Regional Order: A Free and Open Indo-Paciﬁc

House, March 12, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁng-room/statements-releases/

Aﬀairs, April 15, 2021, https://www.foreignaﬀairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-04-15/

Politically, a free and open Indo-Paciﬁc

seeking to that values democracy and human rights.

which is sustainable, transparent, climate-friendly, and market-driven.34

China-U.S. Relations: More Competition Ahead?

transactional approach and power politics mindset, Biden brings democ-

38 Brieﬁng Room, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World.”

appreciation of democratic values, he not only kept intact Trump’s eco-

name of “violating human rights or democracy.” In June 2021, the U.S.

as the most innovative and productive nation on Earth.”44 To win the

investing more domestically to reinvigorate the U.S. science and technology

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Biden knows perfectly well the

weapons to Taiwan to bolster its defense or even oﬀensive capabilities and

in A Move Likely to Anger Beijing,” CNN, August 5, 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/

competitive, cooperative, and confrontational. Beijing’s dismissal of

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