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Ronald R. Rindfuss · Minja Kim Choe
Editors
Low Fertility,
Institutions,
and their
Policies
Variations Across Industrialized
Countries
Low Fertility, Institutions, and their Policies
Ronald R. Rindfuss Minja Kim Choe
•
Editors
Low Fertility, Institutions,

and their Policies
Variations Across Industrialized Countries
123
Editors
Ronald R. Rindfuss Minja Kim Choe
Department of Sociology East-West Center
University of North Carolina Honolulu, HI
Chapel Hill, NC USA
USA
and
East-West Center
Honolulu, HI
USA
ISBN 978-3-319-32995-6 ISBN 978-3-319-32997-0 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32997-0
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016936655
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part
of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
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or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
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the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
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for any errors or omissions that may have been made.
Printed on acid-free paper
This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland
Foreword
Over the past half century, countries in many parts of the world have experienced
rapid economic growth along with far-reaching changes in social and political
conditions. In many countries, these developments have been accompanied by
fertility declines to very low levels. In 2013, the average total fertility rate
(TFR) was 1.8 children per woman in North America, 1.5 in East Asia, and 1.6 in
Europe.
Within the general trend toward lower fertility, the pace and extent of fertility
decline have been widely diverse, resulting in very different effects on population
age structure and population growth, as well as important implications for insti-
tutions and policies. As a result, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive review
of fertility levels and trends across low-fertility countries.
Early in 2013, the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA) and
the East-West Center agreed to collaborate on a project to improve understanding
of the patterns and causes of fertility decline in various social, economic, cultural,
and political settings and to consider the associated policy implications. The project
identified 18 low-fertility countries with varying fertility levels and trends, cultural
backgrounds, social patterns, and economic conditions. For each country, an expert
scholar was invited to write a country paper and participate in a series of workshops
for discussions with experts from other countries.
These papers are being published in two volumes. The first, published in
October 2015, includes revised versions of the papers presented at the first work-
shop, held at the East-West Center in December 2013 and addressing the fertility
situation in Australia, China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands,
Singapore, and the United States. The chapters in this volume discuss the factors
that are influencing fertility in Austria, Canada, the Czech Republic, France,
Hungary, Italy, Norway, Spain, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. They are revised
versions of the papers presented at the second workshop on low fertility, held at the
East-West Center in August 2014. It is hoped that the collection of papers presented
in these two volumes will serve as an important reference point for all those
interested in fertility variation across economically advanced countries.
v
vi Foreword
The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs of the Government of the Republic of
Korea provided generous funding for the project. Thanks are due to East-West
Center’s Research Program for project coordination and institutional support. On
behalf of KIHASA, I am grateful to East-West Center Senior Fellows Minja Kim
Choe, Sang-Hyop Lee, and Ronald R. Rindfuss for coordinating project activities,
to Sidney B. Westley for expert editorial management, and to Ki-Tae Park for
research assistance.
Sangho Kim
President
Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs
Contents
Diverse Paths to Low and Lower Fertility: An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Ronald R. Rindfuss and Minja Kim Choe
Not so Low Fertility in Norway—A Result of Affluence, Liberal
Values, Gender-Equality Ideals, and the Welfare State . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Øystein Kravdal
The Influence of Family Policies on Fertility in France: Lessons
from the Past and Prospects for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Olivier Thévenon
Fertility and Population Change in the United Kingdom. . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Wendy Sigle
Canadian Fertility Trends and Policies: A Story of
Regional Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Sarah R. Brauner-Otto
The European Middle Way? Low Fertility, Family Change,
and Gradual Policy Adjustments in Austria and the
Czech Republic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Tomáš Sobotka
Fertility Decline and the Persistence of Low Fertility in a Changing
Policy Environment—A Hungarian Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Zsolt Spéder
The Policy Context of Fertility in Spain: Toward a
Gender-Egalitarian Model? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Pau Baizan
Aging Italy: Low Fertility and Societal Rigidities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Maria Letizia Tanturri
vii
viii Contents
Transition from Anti-natalist to Pro-natalist Policies in Taiwan . . . . . . 259

Meilin Lee and Yu-Hsuan Lin
Governmental Support for Families and Obstacles to Fertility
in East Asia and Other Industrialized Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Anne H. Gauthier
Diverse Paths to Low and Lower Fertility:
An Overview
Ronald R. Rindfuss and Minja Kim Choe
Abstract All the countries represented in this volume have fertility below the
replacement level, with some well below. Low fertility leads to population aging
and issues of labor-force size and the provision of welfare benefits to the elderly.
This introduction previews chapters that describe the situation in Austria, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and Taiwan, all with a total fertility rate
(TFR) below 1.5 children per woman, and France, Norway, and the United
Kingdom, where fertility is close to the replacement level of 2.1. The final country
is Canada, which has a TFR between these two country groups, reflecting generous
childcare and maternity-leave policies in Québec and considerably less generous
policies in the rest of Canada. The discussion focuses on common features across
the countries as well as distinctive cultural, institutional, and policy features of each
country that might affect fertility levels, either deliberately or inadvertently. Such
features include flexibility of the labor market, the link between marriage and
childbearing, factors that help or hinder parents in balancing work and family
obligations, gender equity, education systems, the housing market, and government
subsidies for the cost of childrearing.
Keywords Fertility Work Childcare Education Housing Gender
As the number of countries with very high fertility diminishes and the number with
very low fertility increases, researchers that examine fertility, its causes, and con-
sequences, have been turning their attention to the issue of low fertility. The
countries with low fertility tend to have advanced economies and high education
levels. Within the low-fertility group, however, there is considerable variation in
R.R. Rindfuss
Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, USA
e-mail: ron_rindfuss@unc.edu
R.R. Rindfuss M.K. Choe (&)
East-West Center, Honolulu, HI USA
e-mail: mchoe@hawaii.edu
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 1

R.R. Rindfuss and M.K. Choe (eds.), Low Fertility, Institutions,
and their Policies, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32997-0_1
2 R.R. Rindfuss and M.K. Choe
fertility level—some countries have a total fertility rate (TFR) just below the
replacement level of 2.1 children per women, while others have fertility 50–75 %
below that level. That such diversity exists among developed countries on some-
thing so fundamental as how many children people have suggests that country-level
factors are operating—factors that tend to affect everyone within a country but vary
across countries. Such factors include institutions, policies, culture, and history.
This is the second volume in a project examining fertility trends and the factors
shaping fertility in 18 diverse countries. This volume includes chapters on Austria,
Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Spain, Taiwan, and
the United Kingdom (UK), plus a chapter that examines fertility levels and gov-
ernment support for families across a variety of countries. The first volume
(Rindfuss and Choe 2015) included chapters on Australia, China, Hong Kong,
Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Singapore, and the United States. Together
these two volumes cover countries with widely different geographies, histories,
political systems, institutional arrangements, and fertility regimes.
Figure 1 shows the trend in TFRs from 1981 to 2012 for the 10 countries in this
volume. France, Norway, and the UK have had the highest TFRs since 2001, with
France above 2.0 since 2008. The UK had a TFR of 1.63 in 2001, but then
recovered to TFRs approaching 2.0. Norway has had a TFR of 1.75 or higher since
1988. By contrast, six countries have had TFRs at or below 1.5 since 2001—
Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and Taiwan. Taiwan has shown
the most interesting trend during this period. In 1981, Taiwan had the highest TFR
of any of these countries—at 2.46 children per woman—as it was still completing
the demographic transition from high to low fertility. By 2010, it had reached a low
of 0.901—the lowest fertility recorded for any of these countries. Since 2001,
Canada has been between the high- and low-fertility countries. This is the result of
pro-natalist fertility policies introduced in Québec but not in the rest of Canada.
Note that none of these countries currently has a TFR above the replacement level
of 2.1. Only Taiwan was above 2.1 at any point since 1981, and it was last above
2.1 in 1983.
Below-replacement fertility, especially for the countries below a TFR of 1.5,
implies an aging population and eventually a shrinking population. The prospects of
population aging and shrinking are typically greeted with alarm, but not universally
so. Some environmentalists welcome the prospect of fewer people—in Taiwan (this
volume) this view has led environmentalists to oppose policies under consideration
to increase fertility. Feminist groups in Taiwan have also voiced objections to
proposed pro-natalist policies because they worry that such policies would work
against efforts to promote gender equality. And in Italy (this volume), the legacy of
Fascism makes it very difficult to have a policy discussion about the “problem” of
1
2010 was the Year of the Tiger in the Chinese Zodiac. Many Taiwanese believe that children born
in the Year of the Tiger will question authority and at some point cause trouble for themselves,
their family, or their employer. By contrast, 2012 was the Year of the Dragon, thought to be an
auspicious year. Note that Taiwan’s TFR jumped to 1.27 in 2012.
Diverse Paths to Low and Lower Fertility: An Overview 3
Austria Canada
Czech Republic France
2.75 Hungary Italy
Norway Spain
2.50
Taiwan United Kingdon
2.25
Total fertility rate
2.00
1.75
1.50
1.25
1.00
0.75
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
Year
Fig. 1 Trends in period total fertility rate (TFR) in 10 countries, 1981–2012 (World Bank 2013)
low fertility. Instead, public discourse has to be framed in terms of reconciling work
and family responsibilities.
Nonetheless, the majority of interest groups and decision-makers in countries
with very low levels of fertility are concerned about aging and shrinking popula-
tions. Their concerns include loss of nationalistic pride, a declining number of
consumers purchasing the country’s goods and services, and a declining number of
young adults to serve in the military. An aging population—that is, a population in
which the proportion at older ages is increasing—also has implications for various
welfare policies. Most countries have pay-as-you-go programs to support the
elderly with taxes received from those at working age. As the elderly become a
larger fraction of the population and those at working age a smaller fraction,
politically painful adjustments need to be made, such as increasing retirement ages,
decreasing benefits, and/or raising taxes. Norway is unique with a cushion of more
than US$900 billion in assets in its Sovereign Wealth Fund derived from oil rev-
enue; the other countries do not have this luxury.
This volume had its beginning at a conference where the chapters were presented
as papers. Authors were asked to identify the institutions, history, culture, and
policies of their countries that might affect fertility levels and patterns. They were
asked not only to consider institutions and policies that might be intentionally
affecting fertility, but also those that might inadvertently affect fertility, negatively
or positively. Considerable time was allocated for discussion, which allowed
questions about each country’s institutions, policies, culture, and history. The
chapters in this volume, including this introductory chapter, were revised to take
into account the rich discussion that took place.
In this introductory chapter, we begin by explaining a few technical terms that
are used in the various chapters. We then highlight some of the commonalities and
differences across the countries. Throughout this introduction, with one exception,
we use country names to refer to the chapters that follow. The exception is the
chapter by Anne Gauthier that examines governmental support across a variety of
countries; we refer to that chapter as Gauthier.
First, Some Definitions2
We begin by noting a few issues of definition that permeate the chapters. We

address these issues in non-technical language. Readers interested in technical
details are urged to consult standard demographic texts (such as Preston et al. 2001
or Wachter 2014) or journal articles on specialized topics (such as Bongaarts and
Feeney 1998 on tempo distortion in period total fertility rates).
The period total fertility rate, commonly indicated as TFR, is a measure of
fertility for a particular time period, usually a year. It has the useful property of not
being distorted by the age structure of a population in a particular year. The TFR is
the number of children a woman would have in her lifetime if she experienced the
age-specific fertility rates that existed in the year for which the TFR was calculated.
As such, it is expressed in an easily understood metric: number of children per
woman. The cohort TFR is the average number of children per woman that a cohort
of women would have in their lifetimes.
Replacement-level fertility is the TFR that would produce a population growth
rate of 0.0 if it were experienced for a long time and there were no change in
mortality and no in- or out-migration. For most purposes, 2.1 is a reasonable
approximation of replacement-level fertility. It is larger than 2.0 because some
female births do not survive to childbearing age.
Tempo distortion occurs whenever women are having children at either earlier or
later ages than they had previously. If births are occurring earlier, tempo distortion will
result in a higher TFR even if women are not having more births throughout their lives.
And conversely, if women are postponing births, the TFR will be lower even if women
are having the same number of births as previously. To intuitively see this, imagine one
year for a population where all women had twins at age 25 and no other children year
after year—the TFR in that population would be 2.0. If for some reason these women
postponed having their twins until age 26, during the postponing year the TFR would
drop to 0.0 even though the actual number of children that women in this population
were having over their lifetimes would not change.
2
This section is reproduced, with permission, from Rindfuss and Choe (2015) with some additional
material.
Although the language of causality is frequently used in these chapters, the

papers do not represent empirical tests of causal hypotheses. Rather, the authors
were asked to describe the institutions, history, culture, and policies that might be
affecting fertility. As such, it is important to recognize that what is being presented
is a series of hypotheses rather than causal analyses.
Postponement of Childbearing
Over the past two or three decades, women in all 10 countries described here have
been postponing the start of their childbearing. The mean age at first birth in most of
these countries is now about 28. Italy (this volume) has the latest mean age at first
birth at 30.6 (excluding women who were born outside Italy). This postponement
has meant that period TFRs are lower than the underlying cohort measures. The
influence of postponement on the period TFR was most dramatic in the Czech
Republic (this volume) where the period TFR fell from 1.87 in 1990 to a low of
1.13 in 1999, then increased to just below 1.5 recently. In contrast, the TFR
adjusted for this tempo effect (specifically TFRp*, see Bongaarts and Sobotka
2012) gradually declined from 2.0 in 1990 to just below 1.8 in 2009–2012.
Postponement is related to increased educational attainment in all 10 countries,
with women having achieved higher attainment than men. Basically, it is difficult to
combine the student and mother roles, and so fertility is delayed, although the
degree of difficulty varies and appears to be lowest in Norway (this volume). Not
only does increased educational attainment take time, it also raises occupational and
career expectations, further delaying motherhood. High levels of young-adult
unemployment in Spain and Italy (this volume) also contribute to postponement, as
does the economic uncertainty that emerged after the fall of communism in the
Czech Republic and Hungary (this volume).
Postponement of childbearing is related to rising childlessness in some countries.
In Italy (this volume) childlessness is approaching 30 % among the better educated,
and childlessness among the better educated has also been increasing in the UK
(this volume). In Austria (this volume), voluntary childlessness is now considered
more acceptable than it was in the past. This may be related to seeing, evaluating,
and possibly emulating the emergence of a childless lifestyle, as Lutz et al. (2006)
have argued.
Labor-Market Factors
There are substantial structural differences in the labor markets of these 10 coun-
tries, and the differences likely affect fertility. The general expectation is that the
easier it is to combine the worker and mother roles and the easier it is to re-enter the
labor market after staying home to care for a child, the higher the fertility. In two of
the three higher-fertility countries, the labor market shows these favorable features.
Norway (this volume) has very low unemployment rates allowing easy re-entry into
the labor market, a high share of part-time jobs, and relatively short work days.
The UK (this volume) has an unregulated and fluid labor market that offers mothers
easy re-entry into the labor force and widely available part-time opportunities. This
is especially the case for those in low-skill jobs, and it has led to higher fertility
among those with lower human capital. While part-time jobs are not as available as
in some other countries and the labor market is not quite as flexible as in the UK,
France (this volume) has a stay-at-home allowance for mothers taking care of
young children, and this allowance appears to have had a positive effect on
childbearing, especially among those at the lower end of the occupational hierarchy.
Among the remaining countries, Italy (this volume) has a labor market structure
that is perhaps the least favorable to fertility. There are few part-time jobs, and
full-time employees are expected to work relatively long hours in comparison with
other European countries. Unemployment rates are high for young adults, and
entry-level salaries are low. Traditionally, the labor market was a structured
“insider-outsider” market, so that those with jobs were legally protected and diffi-
cult to fire, making employers hesitant to add new employees. This also made it
difficult for mothers who had left their jobs to re-enter the labor market later. In an
effort to make Italy more economically competitive, some of these regulations have
been relaxed, but the result has been to create precarious jobs, that is, jobs where
employees do not receive benefits and can easily be fired. In a country long used to
having job security, women may be reluctant to marry or have a child with a man
who has a precarious job. And finally, it is known that some Italian employers,
when hiring a woman of childbearing age, will force her to sign an undated letter of
resignation to be used if she becomes pregnant. Even though firing a pregnant
woman is illegal, the practice of using undated resignation letters is not.
Some of these labor-market features are also found in other countries with
relatively low fertility. Spain (this volume) has long work hours for full-time
employees, an insider-outsider labor market, high young-adult unemployment rates,
and some recent restructuring leading to an increase in precarious jobs. Taiwan (this
volume) has long work hours for full-time workers. With the transition to capitalist
systems, the Czech Republic and Hungary (this volume) have considerable
uncertainty in the labor market—something that did not exist under the communist
regime. The Czech Republic also has rigid work hours for full-time workers and
few part-time jobs.
Marriage-Childbearing Link
For most of these countries, the link between marriage and fertility has been
weakening. In France and Norway, more than one-half of all births occur outside
marriage, although frequently within long-term cohabiting relationships. In Austria,
the Czech Republic, and Hungary approximately two-fifths of all births are
non-marital. Even in Italy, the site of the Vatican, approximately one-quarter of

births are non-marital. Taiwan is an exception to this trend, with only 4 % of births
occurring outside marriage. In fact, non-marital fertility rates are low throughout
East Asia.3
It is unclear to what extent the relaxation of the link between marriage and
childbearing affects fertility. If the marriage-fertility link is weak, women (and cou-
ples) have more flexibility in their childbearing decisions. But, if there is an effect, we
expect it to be relatively small compared with other factors, such as the structure of the
labor market and the availability of high-quality, government-subsidized childcare.
Childcare and Paid Leave
The incompatibility between most jobs in modern economies and care for a child is
well known. This incompatibility is greatest in the first days, weeks, and months of
a child’s life. It is somewhat reduced if a new mother can take leave from her job
with a guarantee that she can return to the same job at the end of the leave. If the
leave is paid, the incompatibility is further reduced. And if affordable, high-quality
childcare is available when the mother wants to return to work, then the incom-
patibility is again reduced, especially if the childcare facility is open during the full
hours that the mother works and commutes.
From this perspective, Norway (this volume) likely has the lowest incompati-
bility. Parental leave, primarily taken by mothers, is available at full pay for
49 weeks or at 80 % pay for 59 weeks. After that, government-subsidized,
high-quality childcare is widely available during the usual working and commuting
hours. Eighty percent of children age 1–2 are in childcare, and this rises to 97 % for
children age 3–5. It should be noted that these policies were developed to facilitate
women’s participation in the labor force rather than to increase fertility.
France (this volume) takes quite a different approach compared with Norway. In
France, parental leave can be as long as three years after the birth of a child, with
the right to return to the same job or a similar job with the same employer. This
coupled with a stay-at-home allowance reduces the incompatibility between work
and parenthood during the child’s first three years. If both parents work, childcare
options are available, although not as readily available as in Norway, and kinder-
garten is available for children after their third birthday.
In the other countries, the situation is less favorable, and the incompatibility
between work and parenthood (most often motherhood) is higher. In the UK, the
third country with relatively high fertility, 3- and 4-year-olds have the right to
attend early-education programs, but the programs are only for 15 h a week.
Maternity (unpaid) leave is 52 weeks, but mothers retain the right to return to the
3
In Singapore, South Korea, and Japan only about 2 % of all births occur outside marriage and in
Hong Kong about 5 %. See relevant chapters in Rindfuss and Choe (2015).
same job for only 26 weeks. Private childcare is available, but since it is expensive,
it is essentially only available for those with higher-paying jobs. Some of the need
for childcare is met by welfare programs that provide financial assistance, so that
low-income mothers of young children can stay at home. Perhaps as a result,
women without the skills to obtain higher-paying jobs tend to have more children
and to have them earlier in their lives.
In Taiwan, less than 1 % of young children are in childcare, and the preference is
for mothers to stay at home to care for their children. Similar preferences are found
in Austria and the Czech Republic. Within Europe, Eastern European countries
generally have the lowest proportion of young children in childcare (Gauthier this
volume). In Italy and Spain, most 3–5-year-olds are in educational programs, but
relatively few childcare places are available for children age 0–2. In Italy, grand-
parents are expected to play an important role in providing childcare—in some
municipalities, the child is not given a place in a public childcare center if the
grandparents live nearby.
Canada presents an interesting case in that there are large differences between
Québec and the rest of the country. In the late 1990s, the Québec government was
concerned about low fertility and decided to implement more generous family
policies. Government-subsidized childcare was greatly expanded and very rea-
sonably priced. The daily fee per child now ranges from CAD7.30 (US$5.18) to
CAD20.00 (US$14.19) depending on family income. To put this in perspective, the
hourly minimum wage is CAD10.15 (US$7.20). Québec’s parental leave policy is
also more generous than that of the rest of Canada—a parent (usually a mother) can
receive up to 12 months of leave, paid at 70 % of what her earnings were before the
birth of the child, up to a maximum of CAD59,000 (US$47,890) per year.
Primary and Secondary Education Systems
While not normally considered as such, schools perform a childcare role, and
schooling costs are also a consideration in fertility decisions. In Italy (this volume),
children are in school for a relatively short time—mornings only for secondary
school. Places in after-school programs are difficult to obtain, and for
secondary-school children, parents, rather than schools, are responsible for orga-
nizing extracurricular activities. Such a situation makes it difficult for mothers to
have full-time jobs, likely reducing fertility for some. There is also limited avail-
ability of after-school programs in Austria. In Taiwan (this volume), as in other East
Asian countries, children need to prepare for important entrance exams for sec-
ondary school and university. Most parents send their children to after-school
“cram” programs designed to prepare them for these exams. Not only does this
involve considerable expense, but also mothers are generally responsible for getting
information about the best cram schools, taking children to and from classes,
providing them with meals, and helping with homework.
France and Norway (this volume) provide a contrasting structure for primary and
secondary schools—a structure that reduces the incompatibility between employ-
ment and parenthood. School hours are relatively long, lunch is provided, and
after-school programs are available. And the Norway chapter makes the point that
crime is low and parents are more willing than in many other countries to leave
children on their own after school.
Immigration
Austria, Canada, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, and the UK all have positive net
immigration. Since immigrants tend to be young adults, the inflow of immigrants
partially offsets the aging concerns associated with below-replacement fertility. This
is especially important in countries such as Austria, Italy, and Spain that have very
low fertility levels. Further, in some of these countries, the immigrants arrive from
countries with higher fertility and thus tend to have somewhat higher fertility than
the native-born population. The effect on overall fertility can be quite small,
however, as shown for Spain (this volume, Fig. 2 in chapter “The Policy Context of
Fertility in Spain: Toward a Gender-Egalitarian Model?”).
The fertility behavior of Polish migrants in the UK provides an illustration of
how institutions and policies can affect fertility. Polish women who migrate to the
UK now have higher fertility levels than Polish women who remain in Poland.
Qualitative research in London and Krakow (Marczak 2012, reported in the UK
chapter in this volume) suggests that better government support for children in the
UK and better compatibility between parenting and work are responsible for this
fertility difference. This finding is consistent with the broad arguments in this
volume: Country-level factors, including institutions and policies, have a major
effect on fertility behavior.
Housing
In most developed countries, with the exception of some in East Asia, the expec-
tation is that young couples, whether married or cohabitating, will live in their own
dwelling unit rather than with either sets of parents. Thus, other things being equal,
the easier it is to obtain a dwelling unit, owned or rented, the earlier childbearing is
likely to occur and the more children couples are likely to have.
Italy and Spain (this volume) are examples of countries where it is difficult for
young couples to obtain their own housing, and this most likely leads to lower
fertility levels. The proportion of housing units that are available for rent is low;
there is little public (social) housing; lenders require large down payments to secure
a mortgage; and lenders are also reluctant to lend to young adults, especially if they
do not have a secure job. In Taiwan, the price of dwelling units has been rising
rapidly in recent years.
A number of government policies affect the availability of housing for young
people wishing to start a family. Mortgages with relatively low down payments are
available in Canada and Norway. In France, about 20 % of the housing units are
public housing. In the UK, it is easier to obtain a public housing unit if a couple has
one or more children. In Norway, housing allowances are available for university
students. Austria provides financial support for low-income households who are
renting their dwelling unit.
Gender Considerations
A more equal division of domestic tasks between women and men is expected to be
associated with higher fertility (Esping-Anderson 2009; McDonald 2006;
Goldscheider et al. 2015). The basic logic is that women want to work outside the
home, and if they also have to do all or most of the domestic work, including caring
for children, then they are likely to be reluctant to have children, especially if they
have a job that is well remunerated and enjoyable. While comparable measures
were not available for all 10 countries, it appears that the household division of
labor (including childcare) is most equal in Norway, which also has a relatively
high level of fertility, as theory would predict. Austria, the Czech Republic, Italy,
Spain, and Taiwan all appear to have a very unequal division of domestic labor, as
well as quite low fertility. Within Canada, Québec has a more equal division of
domestic labor, and higher fertility, than the rest of the country.
Discussion
Reading across the fertility situations in 10 countries, one thing that stands out is the
diversity of factors that seem to lead to fertility either near or far below the
replacement level. One general principle is that women, and their partners, will
have children when they see a clear path in other life-course domains, including
schooling, establishment in the labor force, setting up an independent household,
and achieving reasonable compatibility between family and work roles. Women are
also more likely to have children when they feel confident about the future and
when there is a reasonable level of gender equity in domestic work. By contrast,
there are some commonalities across the countries with the lowest fertility levels:
relatively high incompatibility between work and family roles; aspects of the
education system that make it difficult for parents to work full time; and relatively
high levels of gender inequity in domestic labor including childcare. Similar
associations between very low fertility and high levels of gender inequity in
domestic labor have been observed in China, Hong Kong, Japan, and South Korea
(Rindfuss and Choe 2015). Other factors appear to affect fertility in some countries
only, such as the sudden introduction of employment insecurity that arose in
Hungary and the Czech Republic after the fall of communism.
The countries with higher fertility appear to have achieved these levels through
different routes. In recent years, Norway and the UK have had very similar fertility
levels, and yet many of their policies are quite different. This diversity of factors
that are likely to affect fertility makes it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of
various policies (see chapter on France in this volume) or to advise policymakers
who wish to increase fertility in their countries.
The chapters in this volume also suggest that inadvertent policies, that is,
policies that were instituted for some purpose other than affecting fertility, can play
a large role. Norway, for example, instituted a variety of policies with the aim of
increasing women’s labor-force participation, but many of these policies also led to
fertility levels close to replacement. Or to take another example, many countries
have policies for primary education that inadvertently make it difficult for mothers
of primary-school-age children to have a full-time job.
References
Bongaarts, J., & Feeney, G. (1998). On the quantum and tempo of fertility. Population and
Development Review, 24, 271–291.
Bongaarts, J., & Sobotka, T. (2012). A demographic explanation for the recent rise in European
fertility. Population and Development Review, 38(1), 83–120.
Esping-Andersen, G. (2009). The incomplete revolution: Adapting to women’s new roles.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Goldscheider, F., Bernhart, E., & Lappegård, T. (2015). The gender revolution: A framework for
understanding changing family and demographic behavior. Population and Development
Review, 41(2), 207–239.
Lutz, W., Skirbekk, V., & Testa, M. R. (2006). The low-fertility trap hypothesis: Forces that may
lead to further postponement and fewer births in Europe. Vienna Yearbook of Population
Research, 4, 167–192.
Marczak, J. (2012). Transnational groups of reference and intentions for the second offspring
among Poles living in Poland and the UK. Paper presented at the British Society for Population
Studies Annual Conference, Nottingham, September 10–12, 2012.
McDonald, P. (2006). Low fertility and the state. Population and Development Review, 32(3),
485–510.
Preston, S. H., Heuveline, P., & Guillot, M. (2001). Demography: Measuring and modeling
population processes. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Rindfuss, R. R., & Choe, M. K. (2015). Diversity across low-fertility countries: An overview.
In R. R. Rindfuss & M. K. Choe (Eds.), Low and lower fertility: Variations across developed
countries (pp. 1–13). Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing.
Wachter, K. W. (2014). Essential demographic methods. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
World Bank. (2013). Data: Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN.
Accessed March 21, 2014.
Not so Low Fertility in Norway—A Result
of Affluence, Liberal Values,
Gender-Equality Ideals, and the Welfare
State
Øystein Kravdal
Abstract In Norway, the total fertility rate over the years 2000–2013 averaged
1.86 births per woman. Women born in 1968, which is the youngest cohort that has
completed their reproductive period, had 2.03 children on average. Only 13 % of
that cohort remained childless, and 83 % of those who became parents had at least
two children. This chapter discusses possible reasons for this high fertility com-
pared to that of most other rich countries. Norway’s advantaged economic position
is probably one ingredient. There is little income insecurity for individual families,
and the state can afford to be generous with parents, not least with respect to
daycare and parental leave. The willingness to prioritize such spending does not
reflect concern about below-replacement fertility, but rather the social-liberal or
social-democratic ideas about public responsibility for individual well-being that
are strongly rooted in Nordic societies, accompanied by widely accepted ideals of
gender equality. It is possible that these ideals also affect fertility positively by
promoting men’s involvement with children and in housework. Another explana-
tion for Norway’s high fertility may be that, although the retreat from marriage has
been as least as pronounced as in most other rich countries, this has been coun-
teracted by widespread cohabitation and a large number of births among cohabiting
couples—probably reflecting in part their trust in the welfare state and liberal
values. The chapter ends with a discussion of whether lower fertility would, in fact,
be a problem for Norway.
Keywords Affluence Norway Fertility Gender equality Policies
Almost all “more developed countries” have a total fertility rate (TFR) below
replacement level, which is 2.08 births per woman in populations with very low
mortality. In the long run, below-replacement fertility leads to a shrinking population
Ø. Kravdal (&)
Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
e-mail: okravdal@econ.uio.no
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 13

R.R. Rindfuss and M.K. Choe (eds.), Low Fertility, Institutions,
and their Policies, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32997-0_2
14 Ø. Kravdal
size in the absence of immigration. Furthermore, the proportion of elderly in the

population will increase particularly rapidly when fertility is very low. The TFR is
below 1.5 births per woman in several countries, as low as 1.1–1.2 in some, and even
lower in a few countries consisting of only a large city. This very low fertility has led
to concerns, primarily about the economic and welfare consequences of an aging
population. On the other hand, among countries with below-replacement fertility,
there is also a quite large group with TFR above 1.75. Norway is in this category,
with a TFR of 1.78 in 2013—down from 1.90–1.98 in 2006–2009—and an average
of 1.86 over the years 2000–2013 (Statistics Norway 2014). Norwegian women in
the youngest birth cohort that has reached the end of the reproductive period (born in
1968) have had 2.03 children on average.
Additionally, Norway has for some years had very high net in-migration (43,700
annually as an average over the past five years, which is 0.9 % of the population
size), so the annual population growth rate is currently about 1.3 %—slightly above
the world average of 1.2 %. Immigrants from high-fertility countries and
Norwegian-born individuals with parents from such countries still constitute only
about 5 % of the country’s population, however, and thus contribute little to the
national TFR. In fact, if immigrants are excluded from the calculations, Norway’s
TFR is only 0.07 lower (Aase and Kaldager 2014). According to Statistics
Norway’s medium projection, which assumes that TFR will continue at about 1.8
and that net immigration will remain high for several years, the population size will
increase from 5.1 million today to 5.9 in 2030, 6.6 in 2050, and 7.7 in 2100. The
proportion above age 70 will increase from the current 11 % to 19 % in 2060
(Tønnessen et al. 2014).
The first part of this chapter gives a short description of Norway’s fertility trends
and patterns. Next, possible reasons for the country’s relatively high fertility are
discussed. Obviously, knowledge about the factors underlying the relatively high
fertility in Norway and some other rich countries is potentially valuable to countries
concerned about low fertility, as it may inform discussions about steps they could
take to raise fertility. More specifically, some of the policies that have probably led
to high fertility in Norway—although this was never the explicit intention—might
be adopted with some revision by other countries. Other fertility-stimulating fac-
tors, however, are rather unique and may not be “transferable” to the same extent.
The chapter ends with a discussion of whether the concern about low fertility is
actually justified—in other words whether it would have mattered if Norway’s
fertility had not been so high. While meeting the needs of an older population
clearly presents challenges, there are also advantages from having a smaller and
older population. It is also far from obvious how a small family size affects the
well-being of the family members themselves—both parents and children as well as
childless adults. These aspects of the low-fertility issue have not received much
attention in the public debate.
Not so Low Fertility in Norway—A Result of Affluence … 15
Fertility in Norway in International Perspective
The TFR in Norway fell from about 4.5 births per woman in the late 19th century to
1.7 in the 1930s, increased to 3.0 as of 1965, and then fell again. Fertility reached a
record low of 1.66 in 1984 and then increased. It has been above 1.80 every year
since 1988 except 2001, 2002, and 2013, when it was 1.75–1.78. Indeed, Norway’s
TFR exceeded 1.9 in seven of the years since 1988. The average over the period
2000–2013 was 1.86.
Over the past quarter century, the Norwegian TFR has been higher than the
Nordic average. In Denmark and Finland, TFR was about 0.1 below that of Norway
throughout the period, while the Swedish TFR was below through most of the
period, but above in the early 1990s and slightly above over the past few years
(Fig. 1). Iceland’s TFR has been consistently about 0.2 above the Norwegian level.
Sweden Denmark Finland

2.4
Iceland Norway
2.2
Total fertility rate (births per woman)
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Year
Fig. 1 Total fertility rates (TFR) in Nordic countries, 1990–2013 (Aase and Kaldager 2014)
16 Ø. Kravdal
Among other European countries, only France (TFR of 2.0), Ireland (2.0), and the
United Kingdom (1.9) were above Norway in 2013 (Population Reference Bureau
2014). Fertility was also higher in two English-speaking countries outside Europe,
New Zealand (2.0) and the United States (1.9), and in another more-developed
country, Israel (3.0), where the situation is in many ways extraordinary. In com-
parison, the TFR is very low in some countries in Central Europe (Germany 1.4,
Austria 1.4), Southern Europe (Portugal 1.2, Greece 1.3, Spain 1.3, Italy 1.4), and
Eastern Europe (Poland 1.2, Hungary 1.3, Romania 1.3). Even lower levels are seen
in East Asia (Taiwan 1.1, South Korea 1.2), and in the second-largest country in
that region, Japan, the TFR is only 1.4.
In periods during which mother’s average age at childbirth is increasing, the
average number of children born to cohorts of women (“cohort fertility”) of
reproductive age is higher than the TFR (often also referred to as “period TFR” to
avoid misunderstanding). The youngest cohort of Norwegian women that can be
observed up to age 45—those born in 1968—have had, on average, 2.03 children.
The women born in 1972 had 0.05 fewer children at age 40 than those born in 1968
(1.95 as opposed to 2.00). In comparison, Norwegian women born in the 1930s had
2.5 children.
According to figures for the 1972 cohort, based on forecasting for ages above 40,
the other Nordic countries have a completed cohort fertility similar to that of
Norway or somewhat lower. It is 1.99 in Denmark, 1.97 in Sweden, and 1.90 in
Finland (Vienna Institute of Demography 2014; for trends over time, see Max
Planck Institute for Demographic Research 2013). Only Iceland has higher cohort
fertility, at 2.31. Among the other Western European countries, Ireland is highest at
2.1, followed by France at 2.0 and the United Kingdom at 1.9. Within Eastern
Europe, where very low period fertility is a rather recent phenomenon, some
countries have cohort fertility above 1.8, but there are also some that are below 1.6.
In many of these countries, cohort fertility is on its way down. The lowest figures
are found in Germany (1.5), Italy (1.5), and Spain (1.4). Among the large
more-developed countries outside Europe, cohort fertility in the United States is
2.2, and it is also above 2.0 in New Zealand and Australia, while it is well below 2.0
in Canada and only 1.4 in Japan (see also Max Planck Institute for Demographic
Research 2013).
The decline of Norwegian cohort fertility from 2.5 for those born in the 1930s to
the current level slightly below replacement has to a great extent been the result of a
larger proportion of women stopping childbearing after having two children. The
proportion childless has only increased a few percentage points. In the 1968 cohort,
13 % were childless at age 45. Among those in that cohort who had a first child,
83 % also had a second child, and among those who had a second child, 43 %
proceeded to have a third child. Thus, 31 % ended up with at least three children.
Eight percent had at least four.
Figure 2 shows parity-specific birth rates relative to those in 1976 (see note to
Fig. 2 for a more detailed explanation). The decline in second- and higher-order
birth rates started in the mid-1960s and lasted for about one decade, after which the
rates stabilized or increased, except for a small decline in 2000–2002 and a
First-birth rate age < 30 Second-birth rate

Third-birth rate Fourth-birth rate
3.5 Total fertility rate
3.0
2.5
Rate relative to 1976
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Fig. 2 Period effects on parity-specific birth rates, controlling for age and time since last birth,
and total fertility rate. Note Discrete-time hazard models were estimated from register data
including all Norwegian women and extracted by Astri Syse of Statistics Norway. In the analysis
of first-birth rates, childless women were followed from age 17 (but not before 1960) until they
reached age 29, emigrated, died, or had a first child, or the end of the observation period was
reached (2013), whichever occurred first. The models included age and period. In the analysis of
second-birth rates, one-child mothers were followed from first birth (but not before 1960) until
they reached age 39, emigrated, died, or had a second child, or the end of the observation period
was reached. The models included age, time since previous (i.e., first) birth, and period. Similar
models were estimated for third- and fourth-birth rates. The graph shows the period effects in these
models, using 1976 as the reference year. In other words, for each parity transition and each year,
the rate relative to the corresponding rate (i.e., for that particular transition) in 1976 is shown.
Results were very similar when the foreign-born were excluded or when individuals were left out
during periods of temporary residence outside Norway between 1986 and 2013
somewhat sharper decline after 2009. First-birth rates below age 30 started to fall in
the early 1970s, giving period TFR an extra push downward above and beyond the
effect of the lower cohort fertility (which was closely related to a stronger incli-
nation to stop after two children). The first-birth rates below age 30 were stable
during the last half of the 1980s, went down slightly in the 1990s and the first years
18 Ø. Kravdal
of the new millennium (so that cohort fertility was still higher than period TFR),
went slightly up over the years 2005–2009, followed by yet another dip downward.
First-births rates at ages above 30 (not shown in Fig. 2) have increased, which of
course accords well with the fact that there has been only a modest increase in the
proportion remaining childless.
Other Nordic countries have also seen an increase in second- and higher-order
birth rates from the mid-1970s or early 1980s, although in Sweden the rates fell
again in the first part of the 1990s (Andersson 2004). Similar measures are not
available for other countries, but according to studies of parity progression ratios
from a cohort perspective (which blurs any sharp period turning points), there were
increases across cohorts from the 1950s in the proportion of one-child mothers
having a second child in France and increases in the proportion of two-child
mothers having a third child in France, the Netherlands, and the UK (Frejka 2008).
A French analysis taking a period perspective showed that progression ratios to the
higher parities increased a little or were stable after the mid-1970s (Toulemon et al.
2008), in spite of higher average age at first birth, which means that with controls
for age as in the Nordic analyses, there would have been a sharper increase in the
progression ratios.
The overall conclusion is that a relatively large proportion of Norwegians have at
least one child, although figures are even higher in some Eastern European coun-
tries. Childlessness is more widespread in the other Nordic countries, except Iceland
(Andersson et al. 2009). In addition, it is more common for parents with one child
to have a second child in Norway than in most other rich countries (Frejka 2008).
Similarly, a larger proportion of Norwegian women move on to higher parities,
although transitions beyond the third child matter little for differences in total
fertility because so few women have this many children.
The average age at first birth is lower in Norway than in many other rich
countries, but higher than in many Eastern European countries (Thévenon 2011). In
2013, it was 28.6 years for women. This relatively low age at first birth contributes
to Norway’s relatively high cohort fertility, because at the individual level, a later
first birth reduces the likelihood of having a second or third birth (although in
Norway, there appears to be a pronounced effect only when the age at first birth
exceeds about 30 years (Kravdal 2001)). The discussion below will therefore deal
both with factors affecting quantum (completed fertility) directly and with timing
determinants of fertility.
A Theoretical Framework
This section reviews briefly the kind of factors that determine a woman’s chance of
having a child, with inspiration from the Easterlin and Crimmins (1985) framework.
In subsequent sections, the discussion will turn to similarities and differences
between Norway and other countries with respect to each of these main determi-
nants of fertility.
Obviously, in order to have a child, the woman must be sexually active and
physiologically able to conceive, as must her partner, and also be able to bring the
pregnancy to term. The chance of being sexually active depends, of course, on
whether the woman is involved in a relationship, which also—along with the type
of relationship—has implications for other main fertility determinants. The chance
of entering into and remaining in a relationship, and the type of relationship it is, in
turn, depend on individual economic potentials, other factors that make a person
attractive, values, and how easy it is to meet potential partners. Making this even
more complex, actual fertility or childbearing plans may be involved in building
and maintaining a partnership, thus producing a two-way association between
partnership and fertility.
Assuming that the woman lives in a partnership, the couple’s childbearing
desire depends partly on their purchasing power and the expected costs of child-
bearing. The latter include foregone income if a parent stays at home with the child
(still largely the mother) and more “direct” costs of, for examples, clothes and food,
plus childcare expenses if a parent does not stay at home to care for the child.
Another determinant of fertility desire is the couple’s “preferences,” i.e., their ideas
about the emotional benefits from having and rearing children compared with the
satisfaction one might derive from an alternative use of time and money. In reality,
there is, of course, more complexity involved. Recent literature deals with how
desires are formed and lead to intentions, how they change over time, and possible
discrepancies in desires and intentions between partners (e.g., Bachrach and
Morgan 2013). From the comparative perspective of this paper, however, these
issues may not be very important, and only the possibility of different desires
between partners is touched on briefly.
Arguments with respect to purchasing power and costs vary depending on
whether it is the number of children or the timing of the (first) birth that is con-
sidered. In addition, fertility desires and the way they are influenced by expected
childrearing costs and the couple’s purchasing power likely depend on whether the
partners are married or only cohabiting. Cohabiting partners are perhaps more likely
to anticipate that the relationship might be disrupted, after which there may be less
involvement and economic contribution from the father. A single woman is typi-
cally less likely to want a child than a woman who is married or cohabiting, and it
would obviously only be relevant for her to take her own resources into account in
her economic considerations.
Furthermore, people may feel some social pressure, if they are married, to have
at least one and preferably two children. Conversely, many of those who are not
married may feel subjected to expectations about avoiding childbearing, especially,
of course, if they are not even cohabitants. One may consider such norms about the
number of children—or about the appropriate timing of childbearing—to be another
determinant of childbearing desires, or they could be considered a separate addi-
tional factor. (In addition, there are normative influences on important determinants
of fertility desires, such as mothers’ work activity, and other factors of importance
for fertility.) Norms reflect to some extent current actual behavior. Thus, in coun-
tries where it is common to have few children, it may also be more accepted to
20 Ø. Kravdal
remain childless or have only one child. The low “ideal fertility” in Central Europe
has been interpreted as an indication of such a mechanism (Goldstein et al. 2003).
Other authors have described European countries as being caught in a “low-fertility
trap” (Lutz and Skirbekk 2005). Conversely, one could argue that the rather high
fertility level in Norway tends to further promote high fertility.1
Finally, another main determinant of the chance of having a child is the access to
and acceptance of abortion and various types of contraception.
Fecundity and Partnership
There is no evidence to suggest that sub- or infecundity is less common in Norway

than in other rich countries, thus contributing to the relatively high fertility level. In
principle, it is possible that widely accessible infertility treatment through Norway’s
public healthcare system could contribute positively to fertility. This is not likely to
matter very much, however. It has been estimated that assisted-reproduction tech-
nology was involved in 3 % of births in Norway in 2009, while the contribution
from intrauterine inseminations was very small (Ferraretti et al. 2013). More careful
estimation based on Danish data showed a similar contribution from
assisted-reproductive technology (Sobotka et al. 2008). Some figures indicate that
this technology is only one-half as commonly used in some other European
countries (Ferraretti et al. 2013), but such a difference would only correspond to
about 0.03 births per woman.
Is the high fertility in Norway a result of a relatively large proportion marrying
and remaining married? No, on the contrary, Norway has experienced a massive
retreat from marriage: There has been a sharp increase in the proportion who never
marry, those who marry do so at a later age, and divorce rates are higher than ever
—changes that probably are driven not least by women’s economic independence, a
generous welfare system, and generally liberal values (as well as a snow-ball effect
in the sense that further changes in these directions may be produced by an
increasing proportion unmarried). Crude marriage rates are not particularly high in
Norway by European standards, and crude divorce rates are not particularly low
(Eurostat 2014a). Thus, the proportion married at any given age is probably not
relatively high either. This situation is compensated for by informal cohabitation to
a larger extent than elsewhere, however, and many cohabitants have children.
Indeed, out-of-wedlock fertility is very high, as in the other Nordic countries.
1
In principle, a preference for having at least one boy will increase fertility in settings with
generally low or moderate fertility and where the alternatives to achieving such a goal—
sex-specific abortion or excess female mortality—are deemed unacceptable. However, sex pref-
erences are typically weak in rich countries outside Asia (Andersson et al. 2006). Also, the
“insurance effect,” “replacement effect,” and other effects of mortality on fertility that are important
in many parts of the world have little relevance in more-developed countries, given their very low
infant and child mortality.
In 2014, cohabiting mothers accounted for 44 % of all births in Norway, and single
mothers for 13 %.
The relatively high fertility among Norwegian cohabitants reflects, of course, the
same factors that generally stimulate fertility in the population. In addition, it is
possible that factors that tend to depress fertility among cohabitants compared to the
married are weaker in Norway than in many other countries. There is probably a
weaker normative pressure to restrict childbearing to formal marriages, given the
generally liberal values, and women may not fear to the same extent being left alone
with many of the economic and emotional burdens of childrearing. Even if a
relationship is dissolved, the father may contribute substantially through shared
custody or child-support payments (see Skevik 2004 for a discussion of the
demands placed on fathers and the rights they have). Besides, Norwegian women
have good earning potential, and there is a welfare state to rely on (NAV 2014).
In addition to the normal annual allowance of 11,600 NOK (equivalent to US
$1535 as of 16 January 2015) per child, a single parent in Norway is entitled to an
extra 11,600 NOK per year. Single parents also receive a child allowance sup-
plement for infants of 6700 NOK (US$887) per year and special tax benefits
corresponding to about 15,000 NOK (US$1985) per year. In addition, two-thirds of
childcare costs are covered, corresponding to up to 17,600 NOK (US$2329) per
year for the youngest children. At the lowest ages, this adds up to about 10 % of the
average earnings of a full-time worker age 30–34 and should cover a substantial
part of the costs of having a young child. In addition, a special allowance is given to
single parents who work or study at least half-time. It is 195,000 NOK (US$25,805)
per year, for 2–6 years, for those who have earnings below 45,000 NOK (US
$5955) per year. The amount is reduced proportionally as an individual’s income
exceeds this level. Some of these entitlements are generous even by Nordic stan-
dards (Rønsen and Skrede 2008). Finally, children with a single parent are not
likely to feel especially stigmatized—nor are their parents—in Norway’s liberal
society, particularly as the situation is so common. Some of the factors that may
affect fertility among cohabiting couples may also contribute to the relatively high
fertility of single women, of course, and they could, in principle, have a positive
impact on the fertility of married couples concerned about the quality of their
relationship and the possibility of divorce.
The issue has so far to a large extent been seen from the woman’s perspective.
Another question is why men agree to have children in relationships that they
should realize are potentially unstable, so that they run quite a high risk of having
little contact with their child. The discussion will return briefly to this issue below.
This discussion of fertility among cohabitants builds on the assumption that such
relationships are more unstable than marriages, and that those involved are con-
scious of this relative instability and take it into consideration in their
decision-making. Indeed, the lack of stability in consensual unions is well docu-
mented in Norway as in other countries (Manning et al. 2004). Cohabitants with
children have much higher disruption rates than parents who are married (Jensen
and Clausen 2003; Texmon 1999), presumably reflecting a combination of a more
tenuous relationship (Wiik et al. 2009) and lower practical and normative burdens
22 Ø. Kravdal
associated with disruption. If such disruptions or the underlying parental discord are
harmful to children—contrary to what the parents who decide to have a child in
such a relationship perhaps believe—then this aspect of Norway’s high fertility may
be seen as constituting a potential child-welfare problem. Such concerns are voiced
in, for example, the United States, where more of the out-of-wedlock births are to
single mothers and the chance of falling into poverty is high (Sigle-Rushton and
McLanahan 2002), but they are rarely heard in Norway.
Effects of Earnings and Earning Potentials
Earnings and earning potentials are not only key determinants of the (potential)
purchasing power of prospective parents, but also influence their costs of raising
children. In the discussion of these factors, a quantum perspective will be taken
first, and it will be assumed that the woman is the primary caregiver.
A reasonable starting point is that, with a high income for the man, the couple
can afford more children, given the costs of childrearing. If the man’s income is
high, however, the couple may also feel that they should spend a lot on each child,
and they may attach more value to the material luxuries that compete with the costs
of childrearing. Thus, those with a stable high income do not necessarily have more
children than those with a stable low income. However, a sharp decline in income,
for example as a result of unemployment, is likely to depress fertility, because the
couple’s material aspirations may reflect the higher income they enjoyed in earlier
years and they may need time to adjust to a lower income level (Kravdal 2002a). In
other words, the low unemployment rates among men in Norway, and the low fear
of unemployment or of an income drop for other reasons, may have contributed to
Norway’s relatively high fertility. To elaborate, Norway’s per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) is one of the highest in the world, there is low income inequality,
very few are considered poor, and the overall unemployment rate has not exceeded
4 % during most of the period since the Second World War. Oil revenues have been
used to build up a fund corresponding to three times the annual GDP, and prospects
for the future also look good for many other reasons (Olsen 2013).
If a woman’s earning potential is high, similar mechanisms may operate. There is
an additional effect, however. High wage potential for her means that more is
foregone (i.e., higher opportunity costs) for each time unit she spends at home
caring for a child. These higher costs of childrearing may prompt a woman and her
partner to want fewer children. Possibly, it is not the woman’s wage potential in an
absolute sense, but rather her wage potential relative to the man’s income that
matters in such considerations. In Norway, this type of argument has become less
relevant over time, however, as women with young children tend to spend less time
out of the labor market without payment because they are entitled to a fully paid
one-year maternity leave and because they are making greater use of childcare
outside the home (as described below). Indeed, the employment rate for Norwegian
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marchand français ou allemand ne se serait pas aussi bien
comporté, mais je doute qu’il l’eût fait de cette façon. Il y avait là une
sorte de plénitude, quelque chose de solide comme un principe et de
dominateur comme un instinct, la révélation de quelque chose de
secret, de ce quelque chose de caché, de ce don du bien et du mal
qui fait les différences de races, et qui façonne le destin des nations.
« Ce fut cette nuit-là à dix heures que pour la première fois
depuis que nous le combattions, nous vîmes le feu. La vitesse de
notre remorquage avait avivé la destruction latente. Une lueur bleue
apparut à l’avant et qui brillait sous les débris du pont. Elle vacillait
par plaques, elle semblait remuer et ramper comme la lueur d’un ver
luisant. Je fus le premier à la voir et en avertis Mahon. « — Il n’y a
plus rien à faire, — fit-il. — Mieux vaut larguer la remorque ou bien le
navire va flamber tout d’un coup de bout en bout avant que nous
n’ayons le temps de décamper. » Nous nous mîmes à hurler tous
ensemble : on sonna la cloche pour attirer l’attention des autres : ils
nous remorquaient toujours. Il nous fallut enfin, Mahon et moi,
gagner l’avant à quatre pattes, et couper la remorque à coups de
hache. On n’avait pas le temps de larguer les bridures. Nous
pouvions voir des langues rouges lécher ce chaos d’éclats de bois
sous nos pieds, tandis que nous regagnions la dunette.
« Bien entendu, à bord du vapeur, ils s’aperçurent bientôt que
nous n’avions plus de remorque. Le navire lança un coup de sifflet.
Nous vîmes ses feux décrire un grand cercle, il approcha, vint tout
près le long de nous et stoppa. Nous formions tous un groupe serré
sur la dunette et le regardions. Chaque homme avait sauvé un petit
paquet ou un sac. Soudain une flamme en forme de cône, tordue au
sommet, jaillit à l’avant et jeta sur la mer sombre un cercle de
lumière, au centre duquel les deux bâtiments côte à côte se
balançaient doucement. Le capitaine Beard était resté assis sur la
claire-voie, immobile et muet depuis des heures, mais il se leva alors
lentement et vint au-devant de nous jusqu’aux haubans d’artimon.
Le capitaine Nash hélait :
« — Arrivez. Dépêchez-vous ! J’ai le courrier à bord. Je vous
conduirai vous et vos embarcations jusqu’à Singapour.
« — Non. Merci, — dit notre capitaine. — Nous devons rester à
bord jusqu’au bout.
« — Je ne peux pas attendre plus longtemps, — cria l’autre. Le
courrier, vous comprenez !
« — Bon ! Bon ! Ça ira !
« — Bien ! Je vous signalerai à Singapour. Au revoir. »
« Il fit un geste de la main. Nos hommes tranquillement lâchèrent
leurs paquets. Le vapeur mit en avant, et franchissant le cercle de
lumière, disparut aussitôt à nos regards éblouis par le feu qui brûlait
avec rage. Et c’est alors que je sus que je verrais l’Orient pour la
première fois comme commandant d’une petite embarcation. Je
trouvais cela beau : et cette fidélité pour le vieux navire était belle.
Nous resterions avec lui jusqu’au bout. Oh ! la splendeur de la
jeunesse ! Oh ! le feu qu’elle renferme, plus éblouissant que les
flammes du navire incendié, ce feu qui jette sur la vaste terre une
clarté magique, qui s’élance audacieusement vers le ciel et qui
bientôt doit s’éteindre au contact du temps plus cruel, plus
impitoyable, plus amer que l’océan, — et qu’environneront, comme
les flammes du navire incendié, des ténèbres impénétrables.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
« De son air inflexible et doux, le vieux nous avertit que nous

avions le devoir de sauver pour les assureurs tout ce que l’on
pourrait emporter du matériel du navire. Nous nous mîmes donc à la
besogne à l’arrière, tandis qu’à l’avant le navire flambait pour mieux
éclairer notre ouvrage. Nous tirâmes dehors un tas de saletés. Que
n’avons-nous pas sauvé ! Un vieux baromètre fixé par un nombre
incroyable de vis faillit me coûter la vie. Je fus enveloppé d’un
brusque jet de fumée et j’eus à peine le temps de me garer. Il y avait
des réserves de toutes sortes, des pièces de toile à voiles, des
glènes de filin, la dunette ressemblait à un magasin de fournitures
pour la marine et les embarcations étaient bondées jusqu’aux plats-
bords. C’était à croire que le vieux tenait à emporter tout ce qu’il
pouvait de son premier commandement. Il était très, très calme,
mais avait évidemment un peu perdu la tête. Imaginez-vous qu’il
voulait embarquer avec lui dans le grand canot une glène de vieux
grelin et une ancre à jet. On lui disait « Oui, oui, capitaine ! » avec
déférence, et tout doucement on laissait glisser tout cela par-dessus
le bord. Le pesant coffre à médicaments prit le même chemin, avec
deux sacs de café vert, des caisses de peintures, — imaginez-vous,
de la peinture ! — un tas d’objets. Alors je reçus l’ordre de
descendre dans les canots avec deux hommes pour arrimer le tout,
et tenir les embarcations prêtes pour le moment où nous aurions à
quitter le navire.
« On mit tout en ordre, on mâta le grand canot pour notre
capitaine qui devait en prendre le commandement et je ne fus pas
fâché de m’asseoir un moment. Il me semblait avoir le visage à vif,
tous les membres me faisaient mal comme s’ils avaient été rompus,
je sentais toutes mes côtes, et j’aurais juré que j’avais la colonne
vertébrale tordue. Les embarcations, amarrées derrière, restaient
dans une ombre profonde et je pouvais voir, tout autour, le cercle de
la mer qu’éclairait l’incendie. Une flamme gigantesque montait à
l’avant, droite et claire. Elle avait un violent éclat, et il en sortait des
bruits semblables à des battements d’ailes, d’autres fois un
roulement pareil à celui du tonnerre. On entendait des craquements,
des détonations ; et, du cône de flamme, des étincelles jaillissaient,
ainsi que naît l’homme pour les misères, pour les navires qui font
eau et les navires qui brûlent.
« Ce qui me préoccupait, c’était que le navire étant à la bande en
travers à la houle et au peu de vent qu’il y avait, — un souffle à
peine, — les canots ne voulaient pas rester à l’arrière où ils étaient
en sûreté, mais s’obstinaient, avec cet entêtement stupide propre
aux embarcations, à se fourrer sous la voûte arrière et à se coller le
long du bord. Ils tossaient dangereusement et se rapprochaient de la
flamme, tandis que le navire roulait au-dessus, et, bien entendu, il y
avait toujours le risque de voir les mâts passer par-dessus bord à
tout instant. Moi et mes deux canotiers nous débordions de notre
mieux avec des avirons et des gaffes : mais cela devenait
exaspérant, d’autant plus qu’il n’y avait aucune raison de ne pas
pousser tout de suite. Nous ne pouvions voir ceux qui étaient à bord
ni imaginer ce qui les retenait. Les canotiers juraient à mi-voix, et
non seulement j’avais ma part de l’ouvrage, mais j’avais encore à y
maintenir mes deux gaillards qui avaient constamment tendance à
se laisser aller et à tout lâcher.
« A la fin, je me mis à héler. « Dites donc, là-haut ! » et quelqu’un
vint regarder par-dessus bord. « Nous sommes parés », lui dis-je. La
tête disparut et se montra de nouveau.
« — Le capitaine dit que ça va et de bien déborder les
embarcations. »
« Une demi-heure passa. J’entendis tout à coup un fracas
épouvantable, ferraillement, bruit de chaînes qui s’entrechoquent,
sifflement d’eau, et des milliers d’étincelles s’envolèrent parmi la
colonne de fumée frémissante qui, légèrement inclinée, se dressait
au-dessus du navire. Les bossoirs avaient été carbonisés et les
deux ancres chauffées au rouge étaient parties par le fond,
arrachant et entraînant avec elles deux cents brasses de chaînes
ardentes. Le navire trembla, la masse de flamme vacilla comme si
elle allait s’affaisser et le mât de petit perroquet s’affala. Comme une
flèche de feu, il tomba, plongea, puis, rebondissant à une longueur
d’aviron des canots se mit à flotter paisiblement, tout noir sur la mer
lumineuse. De nouveau, je hélai les gens du pont. Au bout d’un
moment, un homme, d’un ton enjoué, fort inattendu, mais étouffé
comme s’il s’efforçait de parler la bouche fermée, vint me dire qu’on
allait embarquer, et disparut. Longtemps je n’entendis plus rien que
le bruissement et le grondement du feu. On entendait aussi des
sifflements. Les embarcations dansaient, forçaient sur leurs bosses,
se jetaient l’une sur l’autre comme par jeu, s’entrechoquaient, ou
bien, malgré nos efforts, elles venaient, en évitant, se coller en
paquet contre le flanc du navire. Je finis par ne plus pouvoir le
supporter, et, me hissant par un filin, je grimpai à bord par l’arrière.
« Il faisait clair comme en plein jour. En arrivant ainsi, le rideau de
feu en face de moi était un spectacle terrifiant, et la chaleur au
premier abord semblait à peine supportable. Sur un coussin de
banquette qu’on avait monté du carré, le capitaine Beard, les jambes
repliées, un bras sous la tête, dormait tandis que la lumière jouait sur
lui. Et savez-vous à quoi s’occupaient les autres ? Assis sur le pont,
tous à l’arrière autour d’une caisse ouverte, ils mangeaient du pain
et du fromage et buvaient de la bière.
« Contre ce fond de flammes qui se tordaient au-dessus de leurs
têtes comme des langues féroces, ils avaient l’air d’être dans leur
élément comme des salamandres et faisaient l’effet d’une bande de
farouches pirates. Le feu étincelait dans le blanc de leurs yeux,
luisait sur la peau blanche que laissaient voir les trous de leurs
chemises déchirées. Chacun montrait comme les traces d’une
bataille, — têtes entourées de bandages, bras en écharpe, chiffon
sale enroulé autour d’un genou, et chaque homme avait une
bouteille entre les jambes et un morceau de fromage à la main.
Mahon se leva. Avec sa belle figure douteuse, son profil romain, sa
longue barbe blanche, et dans la main une bouteille ouverte, on eût
dit d’un de ces audacieux forbans de jadis, en train de festoyer au
milieu de la violence et du désastre. « — Notre dernier repas à
bord ! — expliqua-t-il avec solennité. — Nous n’avons rien mangé
depuis ce matin et ça ne servirait à rien de laisser tout cela ici. » Il se
mit à brandir la bouteille et me montra du geste le capitaine endormi.
« — Il a dit qu’il ne pouvait rien avaler, aussi je l’ai fait s’étendre, —
continua-t-il : et comme j’ouvrais de grands yeux : — Je ne sais pas
si vous vous rendez compte, jeune homme, que cet homme-là n’a
pour ainsi dire pas dormi depuis des jours, et dans les embarcations
on aura fichtrement peu de sommeil ! » « — Si vous vous amusez
encore longtemps de cette façon, il n’y en aura bientôt plus
d’embarcation ! — fis-je indigné. » J’allai jusqu’au capitaine et me
mis à le secouer par l’épaule. A la fin il ouvrit les yeux, mais ne
bougea pas. « — Il est temps de quitter le navire, capitaine, — lui
dis-je tranquillement.
« Il se leva péniblement, regarda les flammes, la mer étincelante
autour de son navire et, plus loin, noire, noire comme de l’encre : il
regarda les étoiles qui brillaient d’un éclat atténué à travers un mince
nuage de fumée, dans un ciel noir, noir comme l’Érèbe.
« — Les plus jeunes d’abord, — dit-il.
« Et le simple matelot, s’essuyant la bouche du revers de la main,
se leva, enjamba le couronnement et disparut. Les autres suivirent.
L’un d’eux, au moment de quitter le bord, s’arrêta court pour achever
sa bouteille, et l’ayant vidée, la jeta d’un grand geste dans le feu.
« — Attrape ça ! — cria-t-il.
« Le capitaine s’attardait, navré, et nous le laissâmes un moment
tout à sa communion solitaire avec son premier commandement.
Puis je remontai et finis par l’emmener. Il était temps, les ferrures du
couronnement étaient chaudes au toucher.
« Alors on coupa la bosse du grand canot et les trois
embarcations amarrées ensemble s’écartèrent du navire. Seize
heures exactement s’étaient écoulées depuis l’explosion, quand
nous l’abandonnâmes. Mahon avait la charge du second canot et
moi du plus petit, celui de quatorze pieds. Le grand canot aurait pu
nous prendre tous : mais le patron avait déclaré qu’il fallait sauver
autant de matériel qu’on le pouvait, — pour les assureurs. Et c’est
ainsi que j’obtins mon premier commandement. J’avais deux
hommes avec moi, un sac de biscuit, quelques boîtes de viande de
conserve et un baril d’eau douce. J’avais ordre de rester près du
grand canot pour qu’en cas de mauvais temps il pût nous prendre à
bord.
« Et savez-vous ce que je pensais ? Je pensais que je lui
fausserais compagnie aussi tôt que possible. Je voulais jouir tout
seul de mon premier commandement. Je n’allais pas faire de la
navigation d’escadre, si l’occasion s’offrait d’une croisière
indépendante. Je ferais mon atterrissage tout seul. Je battrais les
autres canots. Jeunesse ! Jeunesse que tout cela ! La sotte, la
charmante et la belle jeunesse !
« Mais nous ne nous mîmes pas en route tout de suite. Il fallait
rester avec le navire jusqu’au bout. Et cette nuit-là, les embarcations
flottèrent à la dérive, montant et descendant sur la houle. Les
hommes sommeillaient, se réveillaient, soupiraient, geignaient. Moi
je regardais brûler le navire.
« Au milieu des ténèbres de la terre et du ciel, il brûlait avec rage
sur un disque de mer pourpre que frappait le jeu de reflets
sanglants, sur un disque d’eau scintillante et sinistre. Une flamme
haute et claire, une flamme immense et solitaire, montait de l’océan,
et, de son sommet, la fumée noire s’épanchait continuellement vers
le ciel. Le navire brûlait avec fureur, lugubre et imposant comme un
bûcher funèbre allumé dans la nuit, entouré par la mer, sous le
regard des étoiles. Une mort magnifique était accordée comme une
grâce, comme un don, comme une récompense, à ce vieux navire
au terme d’une vie de labeur. Voir ce fantôme épuisé se remettre
ainsi à la garde des astres et de la mer était aussi émouvant que le
spectacle d’un glorieux triomphe. Les mâts s’affalèrent juste à
l’aube : un moment, une explosion, un tourbillon d’étincelles parut
emplir de feux ailés la nuit patiente et attentive, la vaste nuit
silencieuse, étendue sur la mer. Le navire n’était plus à la pointe du
jour, qu’une coque carbonisée qui flottait immobile sous un nuage de
fumée et qui portait dans ses flancs une masse incandescente de
charbon.
« Alors on arma les avirons et les canots en ligne de file
tournèrent autour de ses ruines, en procession, — le grand canot en
tête. Comme nous passions sur l’arrière, une mince flèche de feu
darda vers nous son trait, et tout à coup le navire coula l’avant le
premier, dans un grand sifflement de vapeur. L’arrière que le feu
n’avait pas encore atteint, fut le dernier à couler : mais la peinture en
était partie, s’était craquelée, pelée, et il n’y avait plus de lettres, il
n’y avait plus de mots, plus de devise résolue, pareille à l’âme du
navire, pour lancer dans un éclair au soleil qui se levait, sa foi et son
nom.
« Nous mîmes le cap au nord. La brise se leva soudain et vers
midi toutes les embarcations se rallièrent pour la dernière fois. Je
n’avais dans la mienne ni mât ni voile : mais je fis un mât avec un
aviron de rechange et je hissai comme voile une tente avec une
gaffe en guise de vergue. Le canot était assurément trop lourdement
mâté, mais j’avais la satisfaction de savoir qu’avec vent arrière,
j’étais capable de battre les deux autres. Il me fallut les attendre.
Puis tout le monde jeta un coup d’œil sur le routier du capitaine, et
après un cordial repas de biscuit et d’eau, nous reçûmes nos
dernières instructions. Elles étaient simples : faire route au nord et
garder le contact autant que possible. « Prenez garde avec ce
gréement de fortune, Marlow, me dit le capitaine ; » et comme je
dépassais fièrement son canot, Mahon me cria en fronçant son nez
recourbé : « Vous naviguerez si bien que vous collerez votre barque
par le fond, mon garçon, si vous n’y faites attention. » Ce vieux-là
était plein de malignité, mais que le vaste océan où il dort à présent
le berce avec douceur, le berce avec tendresse, jusqu’à la fin des
temps.
« Avant le coucher du soleil un gros grain passa sur les deux
canots qui se trouvaient derrière et je ne devais plus les revoir de
longtemps. Le lendemain, je tins la route sur ma coquille de noix, —
mon premier commandement, — sans rien autour de moi que la mer
et le ciel. J’aperçus bien, dans l’après-midi, les voiles hautes d’un
navire au loin, mais je me gardai bien d’en rien dire et mes hommes
ne le remarquèrent pas. C’est que, voyez-vous, je craignais qu’il ne
fît route pour l’Angleterre et je n’avais pas envie de tourner le dos
aux portes de l’Orient. Je gouvernai sur Java, — autre nom béni, —
comme celui de Bangkok, vous savez. Je gouvernai pendant des
jours.
« Je n’ai pas besoin de vous dire ce que c’est que de tosser dans
une embarcation non pontée. Je me rappelle des nuits et des jours
de calme plat, où nous souquions, nous souquions et où le canot
semblait immobile comme ensorcelé dans le cercle de l’horizon. Je
me rappelle la chaleur, le déluge des grains qui nous obligeaient à
écoper sans arrêt pour sauver notre peau (mais qui remplissaient
notre baril) et je me rappelle les seize heures d’affilée que nous
passâmes, la bouche sèche comme de la cendre, tandis qu’avec un
aviron de queue, je tenais mon premier commandement debout à la
lame. Je n’avais pas su jusque-là à quel point j’étais pour de bon un
homme. Je me rappelle les visages tirés, les silhouettes accablées
de nos deux matelots, et je me rappelle ma jeunesse, ce sentiment
qui ne reviendra plus, — le sentiment que je pouvais durer
éternellement, survivre à la mer, au ciel, à tous les hommes : ce
sentiment dont l’attrait décevant nous porte vers des joies, vers des
dangers, vers l’amour, vers l’effort illusoire, — vers la mort :
conviction triomphante de notre force, ardeur de vie brûlant dans
une poignée de poussière, flamme au cœur, qui chaque année
s’affaiblit, se refroidit, décroît et s’éteint, — et s’éteint trop tôt, trop
tôt, — avant la vie elle-même.
« Et c’est encore ainsi que l’Orient m’apparaît. J’ai connu ses
recoins secrets et j’ai pénétré jusqu’au fond même de son âme :
mais à présent, c’est toujours d’une petite embarcation que je la
vois, haute ligne de montagnes, bleues et lointaines au matin :
pareilles à une brume légère à midi : muraille de pourpre dentelée
au coucher du soleil. J’ai encore dans la main la sensation de
l’aviron, et dans les yeux la vision d’une mer d’un bleu éclatant. Et je
vois une baie, une vaste baie, lisse comme du verre, polie comme
de la glace, qui miroite dans l’ombre. Une lueur rouge brille au loin
dans le noir de la terre : la nuit est molle et chaude. De nos bras
endoloris, nous souquons sur les avirons, et tout à coup, une risée,
une risée faible et tiède, toute chargée d’étranges parfums de fleurs,
de bois aromatiques, s’exhale de la nuit paisible, — premier soupir
de l’Orient sur ma face. Cela, jamais je ne pourrai l’oublier. C’était un
souffle impalpable et enchanteur, comme un charme, comme le
chuchotement prometteur de mystérieuses délices.
« Nous avions nagé onze heures, durant cette dernière étape.
Nous étions deux aux avirons, et celui dont c’était le tour de se
reposer tenait la barre. Nous avions aperçu le feu rouge de cette
baie et nous avions mis le cap dessus, pensant bien qu’il devait
marquer quelque petit port côtier. Nous avions dépassé deux navires
d’aspect exotique, d’arrière très haut, endormis à l’ancre, et en
approchant du feu, très faible maintenant, le canot vint heurter du
nez l’extrémité d’un appontement. Nous étions morts de fatigue. Mes
hommes lâchèrent les avirons et s’affalèrent sur les bancs comme
des cadavres. Je m’amarrai à un pieu. Un courant ridait l’eau
mollement. L’obscurité parfumée du rivage formait de vastes
masses, probablement des touffes colossales de végétation, —
formes muettes et fantastiques. A leurs pieds le demi-cercle d’une
plage étincelait faiblement, comme une illusion. Pas une lumière,
pas un mouvement, pas un son. Le mystérieux Orient était devant
moi, parfumé comme une fleur, silencieux comme la mort, sombre
comme un tombeau.
« Et je restais là, exténué au delà de toute expression, exultant
comme un conquérant, incapable de dormir et extasié comme
devant une profonde, une fatale énigme.
« Un clapotis d’avirons, plongeant en cadence et qui répercuté
par la surface de l’eau et accru encore par le silence, se traduisait en
claquements sonores, me fit me dresser d’un bond. Une
embarcation, une embarcation européenne arrivait. J’invoquai le
nom de la morte, et hélai : « Judée, ohé ! » Un faible cri me répondit.
« C’était le capitaine. J’avais devancé de trois heures le
vaisseau-amiral et je fus heureux de réentendre la voix du vieux
tremblante et lasse : « — Est-ce vous, Marlow ? » « — Méfiez-vous
du bout de l’appontement, capitaine, criai-je. » Il approcha avec
précaution et vint accoster, avec la ligne de grande sonde que nous
avions sauvée, — pour les assureurs. Je mollis ma bosse et me
laissai culer. Il était assis là, à l’arrière, dans une attitude défaite, tout
trempé de rosée, les mains jointes sur les genoux. Ses hommes
étaient déjà endormis. « — J’ai passé un sacré moment, —
murmura-t-il, — Mahon est derrière, pas très loin. » Nous nous
entretenions à voix basse, comme si nous avions eu peur de
réveiller la terre. Le canon, le tonnerre, un tremblement de terre
n’auraient pas, à ce moment, éveillé ces hommes.
« Tout en parlant, je me retournai et vis un large feu brillant qui
glissait dans la nuit.
« — Voilà un vapeur qui passe en vue de la baie. — dis-je.
« Il ne passait pas, il entrait, et même il vint tout près et mouilla.
« — Je voudrais bien, — me dit le capitaine, — que vous alliez
voir si c’est un anglais. Peut-être qu’il pourrait nous donner passage
pour un endroit quelconque. » Il avait l’air inquiet et agité. A force de
bourrades et de coups de pied, je parvins à mettre un de mes
hommes en état de somnambulisme, et lui passant un aviron, j’en
pris un autre et nous nageâmes vers les feux du vapeur.
« Il nous en parvenait un bruit confus de voix, de chocs sourds et
métalliques venant de la chambre des machines, de pas sur le pont.
Ses hublots brillaient, ronds comme des yeux écarquillés. Des
formes allaient et venaient, et l’on distinguait en haut, sur la
passerelle la forme vague d’un homme. Il entendit le bruit de nos
avirons.
« Alors, avant que j’eusse pu ouvrir la bouche, j’entendis l’Orient
me parler, mais avec une voix d’Occident. Un torrent de mots se
déversa dans le silence énigmatique et fatal, des paroles étrangères,
courroucées, mêlées à des mots et même à des phrases entières de
bon anglais, moins étranges, mais plus surprenantes encore. La voix
jurait et tempêtait avec violence : elle criblait d’une bordée de jurons
la paix solennelle de la haie. Elle commença par m’appeler :
« Cochon ! » et continua crescendo à m’agonir d’une série
d’épithètes plus impossibles à redire les unes que les autres, — en
anglais. L’homme là-haut rageait à tue-tête en deux langues, et
avec, dans sa fureur, une telle sincérité qu’elle alla presque jusqu’à
me convaincre que j’avais, de façon ou d’autre, attenté à l’harmonie
de l’univers. Je le voyais à peine, mais commençais à penser qu’il
finirait par avoir une attaque.
« Il s’arrêta tout d’un coup, et je l’entendis qui reniflait et soufflait
comme un phoque.
« — Quel est ce vapeur, je vous prie, — lui criai-je.
« — Hein ? Qu’est-ce que c’est. Et vous qui êtes-vous donc ?
« — L’équipage naufragé d’un trois-mâts anglais incendié en
mer. Nous sommes arrivés cette nuit. Je suis le lieutenant. Le
capitaine est dans le grand canot et voudrait savoir si vous nous
donneriez passage pour quelque part.
« — Ah ! bon Dieu ! Dites-moi… Nous sommes le Celestial de
Singapour et nous rentrons. J’arrangerai ça avec votre capitaine
dans la matinée… et… dites-moi, vous m’avez entendu tout à
l’heure ?
« — J’imagine qu’on a pu vous entendre dans toute la baie.
« — Je vous ai pris pour un canot d’ici. Hé, vous voyez, — ce
sacré feignant de propre-à-rien de gardien s’est encore endormi, —
que le diable l’emporte ! Le feu est éteint et j’ai failli me coller sur ce
sacré appontement. C’est la troisième fois qu’il me joue ce tour-là.
Je vous le demande, est-ce qu’on peut vraiment tolérer chose
pareille. Il y a de quoi vous rendre fou. Je le signalerai… et le ferai
fiche dehors par le vice-résident, nom de…! Voyez, — il n’y a pas de
feu. Il est éteint, n’est-ce pas ? Je vous prends à témoin qu’il est
éteint. Il devrait y avoir un feu là, voyez-vous. Un feu rouge sur la…
« — Il y en avait un, — fis-je, doucement.
« — Mais il est éteint, mon garçon ! A quoi bon parler comme
cela ? Vous voyez bien vous-même qu’il est éteint… hein ? Si vous
aviez à conduire un beau vapeur le long de cette côte de malheur,
vous en voudriez aussi un, de feu. Je lui flanquerai une raclée tout
du long de son sacré appontement. Vous verrez un peu si je le
manque. Je…
« — Alors je peux dire au capitaine que vous allez nous prendre,
— interrompis-je.
« — Oui, je vous prendrai. Bonsoir, — dit-il brusquement.
« Je virai de bord et je m’amarrai de nouveau à l’appontement, et
puis je m’endormis enfin ! J’avais affronté le silence de l’Orient.
J’avais entendu un peu de son langage. Mais quand je rouvris les
yeux, le silence était aussi absolu que si rien n’était jamais venu le
rompre. Je reposais dans un flot de lumière, et jamais le ciel ne
m’avait auparavant semblé ni si loin, ni si haut. J’ouvris les yeux et
demeurai étendu sans bouger.
« C’est alors que je vis les hommes de l’Orient — ils me
regardaient. Toute la longueur de l’appontement s’était remplie de
gens. Je vis des visages bruns, bronzés, jaunes, des yeux noirs,
l’éclat, la couleur d’une foule orientale. Et tous ces êtres nous
regardaient fixement, sans un murmure, sans un soupir, sans un
geste. D’en haut, ils regardaient les canots, les hommes assoupis
qui, pendant la nuit, étaient venus vers eux de la mer. Rien ne
bougeait. Les frondaisons des palmiers se dressaient immobiles
contre le ciel. Pas une seule branche ne remuait le long de ce
rivage, et les toits bruns des maisons s’apercevaient à travers le
feuillage vert, à travers de larges feuilles qui pendaient, luisantes et
immobiles, comme si elles eussent été faites de quelque lourd métal.
C’était là l’Orient des anciens navigateurs, si vieux, si mystérieux,
resplendissant et sombre, vivant et immuable, plein de dangers et de
promesses. Et c’était là ses hommes. Je me redressai tout à coup.
Une ondulation se propagea d’un bout à l’autre de la foule, passa le
long des têtes, fit osciller les corps, courut le long de l’appontement
comme une ride sur l’eau, comme le souffle du vent sur un champ,
puis tout reprit son immobilité, Je revois tout cela, — le vaste cercle
de la baie, les sables qui scintillent, la richesse d’une verdure infinie
et variée, la mer bleue comme une mer de rêve, la foule des visages
attentifs, l’éclat des couleurs crues, — l’eau qui réfléchit tout, la
courbe du rivage, l’appontement, le navire exotique avec sa poupe
élevée, qui flotte immobile, et les trois canots, avec ses hommes
accablés, venus d’Occident, et qui dorment sans souci de la terre et
des hommes, ni de l’ardeur du soleil. Ils dormaient, en travers des
bancs, tassés en rond sur les planches du fond, dans des attitudes
abandonnées, comme des morts. La tête du vieux capitaine,
appuyée à l’arrière du grand canot, était retombée sur sa poitrine et
on aurait dit qu’il n’allait jamais se réveiller. Plus loin la figure du
vieux Mahon était tournée vers le ciel, sa longue barbe blanche
étalée, comme s’il avait été frappé d’une balle, tandis qu’il tenait la
barre ; et un homme, affalé à l’avant du canot, dormait en entourant
l’étrave de ses deux bras, et la joue collée contre le plat-bord.
L’Orient les contemplait en silence.
« Depuis lors j’ai connu sa séduction : j’ai vu des rivages
mystérieux, l’eau immobile, les terres de nations brunes, où une
Némésis furtive épie, poursuit, surprend tant d’hommes de la race
conquérante, fiers de leur sagesse, de leur savoir, de leur puissance.
Mais, pour moi, tout l’Orient tient dans cette vision de ma jeunesse. Il
tient tout entier dans cet instant où j’ouvris sur lui mes jeunes yeux.
Je l’avais abordé au sortir d’un combat avec la mer, — et j’étais
jeune, — et je le vis qui me regardait. Et voilà tout ce qui en reste !
Rien qu’un moment : un moment de force, d’aventure, de splendeur,
— de jeunesse !… Un éclair de soleil sur un rivage étrange, le temps
d’un souvenir, l’espace d’un soupir et puis, adieu ! La nuit. —
Adieu !… »
Il but.
« Ah ! le bon vieux temps, — le bon vieux temps ! La jeunesse et
la mer. L’enchantement et la mer ! La bonne, la rude mer, la mer
âcre et salée qui murmurait à votre oreille et rugissait, contre vous et
vous coupait brutalement le souffle. »
Il but de nouveau.
« Entre toutes les merveilles du monde, il y a la mer, je crois, la
mer elle-même, — ou bien est-ce seulement la jeunesse ? Qui peut
le dire ? Mais vous autres, — vous avez tous eu quelque chose de la
vie : de l’argent, de l’amour, — tout ce que l’on trouve à terre, — eh
bien ! dites-moi, n’était-ce pas le meilleur temps, ce temps où nous
étions jeunes à la mer : jeunes et sans rien à nous, sur la mer qui ne
vous donne rien, que de rudes coups, — et parfois l’occasion
d’éprouver votre force, — rien que cela, — ce que vous regrettez
tous ? »
Et tous, nous l’approuvions : l’homme de finance, l’homme de
chiffres, l’homme de loi, tous nous l’approuvions, par-dessus la table
polie qui, comme une immobile nappe d’eau brune, réfléchissait nos
visages sillonnés et ridés : nos visages marqués par le travail, par
les déceptions, par le succès, par l’amour : et nos yeux las
cherchant encore, cherchant toujours, cherchant avidement, à
arracher à la vie ce quelque chose qui, alors qu’on l’attend encore,
s’est déjà dissipé, — a passé à notre insu dans un soupir, dans un
éclair, — avec la jeunesse, avec la force, avec la séduction
romanesque des illusions.
LE CŒUR DES TÉNÈBRES
Le yacht la Nellie évita sur l’ancre, sans un battement dans ses

voiles, et se trouva arrêté. La marée était étale, le vent presque
tombé ; comme nous avions à descendre le fleuve, il ne nous restait
plus qu’à mouiller en attendant le reflux.
L’estuaire de la Tamise s’ouvrait devant nous, pareil à l’entrée
d’un interminable chenal. Au large, le ciel et la mer se confondaient,
sans un joint, et dans l’espace lumineux, les voiles hâlées des
barges qui dérivaient avec la marée semblaient s’immobiliser en
rouges essaims de toile haut tendue, où les espars polis luisaient.
Une brume reposait sur les berges basses dont les lignes fuyantes
se perdaient dans la mer. L’air était sombre au-dessus de
Gravesend, et plus en arrière semblait former en s’épaississant une
sorte d’obscurité désolée qui pesait sans mouvement au-dessus de
la plus grande ville du monde, la plus illustre aussi.
L’Administrateur de Sociétés était notre capitaine et notre hôte.
Tous les quatre nous considérions affectueusement son dos, tandis
qu’il se tenait à l’avant, les yeux tournés vers la mer. Rien sur tout le
fleuve n’avait l’air plus nautique que lui. Il avait proprement l’aspect
du pilote, ce qui pour un marin est la sécurité personnifiée. Il était
malaisé d’imaginer que son métier l’appelait, non point dans
l’estuaire lumineux, mais là-bas derrière, au sein de cette obscurité
en suspens.
Il y avait entre nous, comme je l’ai déjà dit quelque part, le lien de
la mer. Outre qu’il maintenait le contact entre nos cœurs durant les
longues périodes de séparation, il avait pour effet de nous rendre
réciproquement tolérants à l’égard de nos histoires, voire de nos
convictions. L’Homme de Loi, — le meilleur d’entre tous les
camarades, — détenait en raison de ses nombreuses années et de
ses maintes qualités le seul coussin qu’il y eût sur le pont et était
étendu sur notre unique couverture. Le Comptable avait déjà sorti
une boîte de dominos et jouait à faire des constructions avec ses
morceaux d’os. Quant à Marlow, il était assis, les jambes croisées, à
l’arrière, appuyé au mât d’artimon. Il avait les joues creuses, le teint
jaune, le torse droit, un aspect ascétique, et avec ses bras pendants,
la paume des mains en dehors, il ressemblait à une idole.
L’administrateur s’étant assuré que l’ancre avait mordu, regagna
l’arrière et prit place au milieu de nous. Nous échangeâmes
quelques mots nonchalamment. Ensuite il se fit un silence à bord du
yacht. Pour je ne sais quelle raison, nous n’entamâmes point cette
partie de dominos. Nous nous sentions pensifs et disposés à rien
d’autre qu’à une placide contemplation. Le jour s’achevait dans une
sérénité d’un éclat tranquille et exquis. L’eau brillait paisiblement ; le
ciel, sans une tache, n’était que bénigne immensité de lumière pure ;
le brouillard même, sur les marais de l’Essex, était pareil à un tissu
transparent et radieux qui, accroché aux collines boisées de
l’intérieur, drapait les rives basses dans ses plis diaphanes. Seule
l’obscurité à l’Ouest, suspendue au-dessus des eaux d’amont, se
faisait d’instant en instant plus épaisse, comme irritée par l’approche
du soleil.
Et enfin, dans sa chute oblique et imperceptible, le soleil toucha
l’horizon et du blanc incandescent passa à un rouge obscur, sans
rayons et sans chaleur, comme s’il allait soudainement s’éteindre,
touché à mort au contact de cette nuée qui couvait une multitude
d’hommes.
L’aspect des eaux aussitôt s’altéra : la sérénité se fit moins
brillante mais plus profonde. Le vieux fleuve dans sa large étendue
reposait sans une ride au déclin du jour, après tant de siècles de
loyaux services à la race qui peuplait ses bords, étendu dans la
tranquille dignité d’un chenal menant aux confins les plus reculés du
monde. Nous contemplions le flot vénérable, non à la passagère
clarté d’une de ces brèves journées qui s’allument et disparaissent à
jamais, mais à la lumière auguste des souvenirs qui durent. Et de
fait, rien n’est plus aisé, pour l’homme qui selon l’expression
consacrée a « couru les mers » avec respect et ferveur, que
d’évoquer la grande âme du passé sur l’estuaire de la Tamise. Le
courant de la marée qui va et vient dans son incessant labeur est
peuplé du souvenir des hommes et des vaisseaux qu’il a portés vers
le repos du foyer ou aux batailles de l’Océan. Il a connu et servi ces
hommes dont la nation s’enorgueillit, de Sir Francis Drake à Sir John
Franklin, chevaliers tous, titrés ou non, les grands chevaliers errants
de la mer ! Il les a tous portés, ces navires dont les noms sont
pareils à des joyaux étincelant dans la nuit des temps, depuis le
Golden Hind, rentrant au port, ses flancs ronds tout emplis de
trésors, pour être visité par une Reine et disparaître aussitôt de la
glorieuse légende, jusqu’à l’Erebus et au Terror, partis pour d’autres
conquêtes — et qui ne revinrent jamais. Il a connu les navires et les
hommes, ceux partis de Deptford, de Greenwich, d’Erith, les
aventuriers et les colons, navires du Roi et navires des gens de la
Bourse, capitaines et amiraux, sombres « interlopes » du trafic du
Levant et « généraux » commissionnés aux flottes des Indes
Orientales. Ceux qui chassaient l’or et ceux qui poursuivaient la
gloire, tous avaient descendu ces eaux, portant l’épée et souvent la
torche, hérauts de la puissance de cette terre, dépositaires d’une
étincelle du feu sacré. Quelle grandeur n’avait dérivé au fil de ce
fleuve vers la promesse d’un monde inconnu !… Rêves d’hommes ;
semence de dominions ; germes d’empires !…
Le soleil s’était couché : l’ombre tomba sur les eaux, et des
lumières commencèrent d’apparaître au long du rivage. Le phare de
Chapman, hissé comme sur trois pattes, au-dessus de son banc de
vase, jetait un vif éclat. Des feux de navire glissaient dans le chenal,
faisaient un grand remuement de lueurs qui avançaient ou
s’éloignaient. Et plus à l’Ouest, au-dessus des eaux d’amont,
l’emplacement de la ville monstrueuse demeurait sinistrement
marqué dans le ciel, nuée pesante durant le jour, reflet livide sous
les étoiles.
— « Et ceci aussi, dit Marlow tout à coup, a été un des endroits
sauvages de la terre !… »
Il était le seul d’entre nous qui courût encore les mers. Le pis
qu’on eût pu dire de lui, c’est qu’il ne représentait pas son espèce.
C’était un marin, mais un vagabond aussi, alors que la plupart des
marins mènent, si l’on peut ainsi s’exprimer, une vie sédentaire. Leur
âme est casanière ; leur maison, le navire, est toujours avec eux et
pareillement leur pays, qui est la mer. Aucun navire qui ne
ressemble à un autre navire, et la mer est toujours la même. Dans
l’immuabilité de ce qui les entoure, les rivages étrangers, les visages
étrangers, la changeante immensité de la vie, tout demeure distant à
leurs yeux, voilé non pas par le sens du mystère, mais par leur
ignorance dédaigneuse : car il n’est rien de mystérieux pour un
marin en dehors de la mer elle-même, qui est maîtresse de son
existence et aussi impénétrable que la Destinée. Quant au reste,
après les heures de travail, une flânerie fortuite, ou une bordée à
terre a tôt fait de lui découvrir le secret de tout un continent et,
généralement, il estime que le secret n’en valait pas la peine. Les
histoires de marins ont une simplicité directe, dont tout le sens tient
dans la coquille d’une noix craquée. Mais Marlow n’était pas typique
(réserve faite pour son penchant à dévider des histoires) et pour lui
la portée d’un épisode, ce n’était pas à l’intérieur qu’il fallait la
chercher, comme un noyau, mais extérieurement, dans ce qui,
enveloppant le récit, n’avait fait que la manifester, comme la chaleur
suscite la brume, à la façon de ces halos de brouillard que parfois
rend visibles l’illumination spectrale du clair de lune.
Sa remarque n’avait guère paru surprenante. C’était du Marlow
tout pur. Elle fut accueillie en silence. Personne ne prit même la
peine de murmurer, et après un instant, il dit, lentement :
— « Je songeais à ces temps très anciens où les Romains, pour
la première fois, apparurent ici, il y a tantôt dix-neuf cents ans. —
Hier, après tout… Il est sorti quelque lumière de ce fleuve, depuis
lors… Les chevaliers de la Table Ronde, allez-vous dire… Sans
doute, mais c’est la flamme qui court dans la plaine, le feu de l’éclair
parmi les nuages… Pour nous — c’est dans un clignotement de
clarté que nous vivons — et puisse-t-il durer aussi longtemps que
tournera ce vieux globe !… Hier pourtant, les ténèbres étaient
encore ici… Imaginez l’état d’âme du capitaine d’une jolie…
comment appelez-vous ça ! — oui : d’une jolie trirème de la
Méditerranée, recevant brusquement l’ordre de se rendre dans le
Nord, mené par terre, en hâte, à travers les Gaules, et venant
prendre le commandement d’un de ces bâtiments que les
légionnaires, — et ce devait être d’habiles gaillards ! —
construisaient par centaines, en un mois ou deux s’il faut en croire
ce que nous lisons… Imaginez-le ici, le bout du monde, — une mer
couleur de plomb, un ciel couleur de fumée, une espèce de bateau à
peu près aussi rigide qu’un accordéon et remontant ce fleuve avec
du matériel, des ordres, ou tout ce que vous voudrez… Des bancs
de sable, des marécages, des forêts, des sauvages, bien peu de
chose à manger pour un homme civilisé, et, pour boire, rien que de
l’eau de la Tamise… Point de Falerne ici, ni de descente à terre. Çà
et là un camp militaire perdu dans la sauvagerie, comme une aiguille
dans une botte de foin ; le froid, le brouillard, les tempêtes, les
maladies, l’exil et la mort : la mort rôdant dans l’air, dans l’eau, dans
les fourrés… Ils devaient mourir comme des mouches ici !… Et
cependant il s’en tirait. Il s’en tirait même fort bien sans doute et
sans trop y songer, sinon, plus tard, peut-être pour se vanter de tout
ce qu’il lui avait fallu endurer en son temps. Oui, ils étaient hommes
à regarder les ténèbres en face. — Et peut-être se réconfortait-il à
songer à ses chances de promotion à la flotte de Ravenne — pour
peu qu’il eût de bons amis à Rome et qu’il résistât à l’affreux climat.
— Ou bien encore, imaginez un jeune citoyen de bonne famille en
toge, — trop de goût pour les dés, peut-être, vous savez où cela
mène — arrivant ici à la suite de quelque préfet, d’un percepteur
d’impôt, voire d’un marchand, pour rétablir sa fortune. Débarquer
dans une fondrière, marcher à travers bois et enfin dans quelque
poste à l’intérieur sentir que la sauvagerie, l’absolue sauvagerie s’est
refermée autour de vous, toute cette vie mystérieuse de la
sauvagerie, qui remue dans le fourré, dans la jungle, dans le cœur
même des hommes sauvages. Et il n’y a pas d’initiation possible à
ces mystères-là !… Il lui faut vivre au sein de l’incompréhensible, ce
qui en soi déjà est détestable… Et il y a là-dedans une sorte de
fascination pourtant qui se met à le travailler. La fascination de
l’abominable, voyez-vous… Imaginez les regrets grandissants, le
désir de fuir, le dégoût impuissant, les larmes et la haine. »
Il s’arrêta :
« Notez, reprit-il, en levant un avant-bras, la paume de la main en
dehors, si bien qu’avec ses jambes repliées devant lui, il avait la
pose d’un Bouddha, prêchant en habits européens et sans fleur de
lotus. Notez qu’aucun de nous ne passerait exactement par là. Ce
qui nous sauve, c’est le sens de l’utilité, le culte du rendement. Mais
ces hommes-là, au fait, n’avaient pas beaucoup de fond… Ils
n’étaient pas colonisateurs : leur administration n’était que l’art de
pressurer et rien de plus, je le crains. C’était des conquérants, et
pour cela, il ne vous faut que la force matérielle, rien dont il y ait lieu
d’être fier lorsqu’on la détient, puisque votre force n’est tout juste
qu’un accident résultant de la faiblesse des autres. Ils mettaient la
main sur tout ce qu’ils pouvaient attraper, pour le seul plaisir de tenir
ce qu’il y avait à posséder. C’était là proprement pillage avec
violence, meurtre prémédité sur une grande échelle, et les hommes
y allant à l’aveugle, comme font tous ceux qui ont à se mesurer aux
ténèbres. La conquête de la terre, qui consiste principalement à
l’arracher à ceux dont le teint est différent du nôtre ou le nez
légèrement plus aplati, n’est pas une fort jolie chose, lorsqu’on y
regarde de trop près. Ce qui rachète cela, c’est l’Idée seulement.
Une idée derrière cela, non pas un prétexte sentimental, mais une
idée et une foi désintéressée en elle, quelque chose, en un mot, à
exalter, à admirer, à quoi on puisse offrir un sacrifice… »
Il s’interrompit. Des lueurs passaient sur le fleuve, minces lueurs
vertes, rouges ou blanches, qui se poursuivaient, se rattrapaient, se

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The Roots of American Exceptionalism Institutions

City and Society in the Low Countries 1100 1600 1st

Homa variations : the study of ritual change across the

Low Fertility, Institutions,

ISBN 978-3-319-32995-6 ISBN 978-3-319-32997-0 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016936655

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature

Diverse Paths to Low and Lower Fertility: An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Transition from Anti-natalist to Pro-natalist Policies in Taiwan . . . . . . 259

Ronald R. Rindfuss and Minja Kim Choe

Keywords Fertility Work Childcare Education Housing Gender

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 1

First, Some Deﬁnitions2

We begin by noting a few issues of deﬁnition that permeate the chapters. We

Although the language of causality is frequently used in these chapters, the

non-marital. Even in Italy, the site of the Vatican, approximately one-quarter of

Childcare and Paid Leave

Primary and Secondary Education Systems

Keywords Affluence Norway Fertility Gender equality Policies

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 13

size in the absence of immigration. Furthermore, the proportion of elderly in the

Fertility in Norway in International Perspective

Sweden Denmark Finland

First-birth rate age < 30 Second-birth rate

3.5 Total fertility rate

Fecundity and Partnership

There is no evidence to suggest that sub- or infecundity is less common in Norway

Effects of Earnings and Earning Potentials

« De son air inflexible et doux, le vieux nous avertit que nous

Le yacht la Nellie évita sur l’ancre, sans un battement dans ses

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