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M&A and Corporate
Consolidation
A Study of the Role
of Competitive
Government Behavior
Fengrong Wang
M&A and Corporate Consolidation
Fengrong Wang
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
Jointly published with Social Sciences Academic Press.
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
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189721, Singapore
Contents
1 Introduction 1
v
vi Contents
Bibliography489
List of Figures
vii
viii List of Figures
ix
x List of Tables
Introduction
2. Government Competition
3. Corporate M&A
centralization of capital. Karl Marx was the first to foresee the trend for
capital centralization and the irresistible mergers and acquisitions in capi-
talist enterprises when he observed that the splitting up of the total social
capital into many individual capitals or the repulsion of its fractions one
from another is counteracted by their attraction. This is centralization
proper, as distinct from accumulation and concentration.
From a micro (the enterprise) point of view, mergers and acquisitions is
a mode for the external development of an enterprise (Wang Fengrong
2002). Specifically, there are two types of corporate mergers and acquisi-
tions: merger and acquisition. Acquisition refers to the legal act where a
company exercises the control of a target company by acquiring all or part
of the shares of the target (the acquired company). Based on what is
acquired, acquisition can be classified into stock acquisition and asset
acquisition. Merger refers to any transaction through which two or more
than two entities merge to form an economic unit. The common ground
of merger and acquisitions is to from an economic unit in the end. The
difference between them lies in that merger means the formation of a new
entity by the merging of two or more units, while, through acquisition,
the acquired party is incorporated into the company system of the acquir-
ing party and rarely is the case that the acquiring company has no struc-
tural changes after the merger of the acquired company; therefore,
acquisition is often seen as a kind of merger. As the motivation and prin-
ciples are similar in merger and acquisition, and acquisition is an important
mode and means of merger, so they are often pooled together and referred
to as mergers and acquisitions, or M&A for short.
From a macro point of view, M&A is the reallocation of stock capital
and is also a micro process of capital flow in regions and industries; thus,
M&A has effects on both the regional economy and the industrial
economy.
This book, merging the macro and micro perspectives of M&A,
explores on the one hand the occurring mechanism and the influence fac-
tors of M&A from the industrial point of view, and on the other hand
studies the corporate consolidation and regional economic effects of
M&A, with the latter being the emphasis and our original idea.
4. Corporate Consolidation
The key viewpoint of the book is that the intrinsic logic of institutional
changes in China’s economic transition has decided the mechanism for
government competition and its effects on M&A and corporate consolida-
tion. Against the backdrop of China’s economic transition, the regional
governments, motivated by incentives both financial and political, bear the
many characteristics of manufacturers in the market. Their goals for maxi-
mizing self-benefit and regional benefits naturally determine their com-
petitive relations with each other. The fundamental driving force for local
government competitions is the regional segmentation of capital flow—
attracting the inflow of capital and restricting the outflow of capital. M&A
and corporate consolidation, as the mechanism for allocating inventory
resources, is determined by the joint work of market and government
conducts. Firstly, government competition, as an essential component for
the development of marketization in China, comes as the macro motiva-
tion for the occurrence of M&A and corporate consolidation. Secondly,
the regional government competition, as a key institutional factor for
1 INTRODUCTION 13
progressive reform in China, can couple with the market environment and
together determine the M&A and corporate consolidation and exert influ-
ences on the performances of M&A and corporate consolidation. The
performance of M&A under government competition will diversify for the
different modes and paths in government competitions.
In addition, the book has put forth the following viewpoints: (1) the
wave of China’s M&A has been a periodic economic phenomenon acti-
vated jointly by market, economic, and institutional factors; (2) in the
process of the privatization of SOEs, the shift of control power in regional
governments assumes binary motivations, and the motivation is oriented
from economy toward politics; (3) regional government competition has
double-edge effects on regional industry specialization and interregional
market integration; (4) the performances of corporate M&A and corpo-
rate consolidation under government intervention assumes life cycle diver-
sities. The book has also tested and verified these propositions using
theoretical analysis and empirical methods.
Bibliography
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1 INTRODUCTION 15
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CHAPTER 2
2.1.1
Government Behaviors in Economic Transition
[In preparation.
[In preparation.
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