CONSIDERATION

Q1)
Ruth is a metal worker involved in the following events:
(a) She contracts to repair the local church bells for £10,000. When she begins repairing them she
discovers that there are voids in the bells that were not previously discoverable. She tells the vicar
that the extra work involved will cost her an extra £5,000. The vicar reluctantly agrees to pay this
and holds a sponsored hymn singing to raise the extra money.
Having completed all the work above, the Vicar refuses to pay the extra £5,000 when his sponsored
hymn singing only raises £5.
(b) The fence around the local Dog Rescue Kennels has blown down and needs £500 worth of repair
work. Ruth agrees to do the work for the cost of the materials only which is £50.
Ruth regrets her generosity towards the local Dog Rescue Kennels and demands that they pay the
“proper” price for the job and not just £50.
(c) Ruth contracts with Lady Godiva to make a new set of gates for her Manor House. The design
and price of £5,000 are agreed. Ruth likes Lady Godiva and so adds Lady Godiva’s family crest to
the design. Before the gates are delivered Lady Godiva pays Ruth £5,000. However, when she sees
the gates she is very pleased with the crest and rings Ruth to promise her an extra £500.
Lady Godiva also now regrets promising to pay extra to Ruth and declines to do so. Advise Ruth.

Summary of Facts
We understand from the facts of the case, that Ruth has had certain communication with multiple parties.
The core issue in the question is to determine whether these communications consists a promise or not
and whether that promise will amount to a valid consideration or not. The same is discussed below with
relevant case-laws and legal analysis. Whereby, we shall advice the parties regarding their contractual
liabilities accordingly. We shall discuss each case separately
Issue 1: insert the general rule of consideration and state that we shall discuss each case separately
in respect of whether the promises given are binding or not?
Consideration is based on the concept of give and take and reciprocity and it was defined in the case of
Curie v Misa where both the parties must accrue a benefit and suffer a detriment. Moreover, the promise
must be equivalent to economic value White v Bluett. Pursuant to the principle stipulated in the case of
Thomas v Thomas and Chapple v Nestle consideration must be sufficient need not be adequate i.e. there
is no requirement to meet the market value .
Issue 2: discuss each case based on the relevant box / rule within the topic of consideration i.e.
RUTH V VICAR
We understand that Ruth was obligated to fix the bells for $10,000 however she is asking for an extra
$5000 for the same job she is already obligated to do under the contract. This scenario is classified as
existing duty under the contract. The relevant case in this regard is Stilk v Myrick and Hartley v
Ponsonby which sets out a principle that unless done something considerably extra consideration will not
be valid. Applying this principle in our case we can clearly see that Ruth is doing nothing extra and is
only fixing the bell. Therefore, according to this general rule consideration will not be valid
However, there is an exception of the general rule which is set out in the case of William v Roffey Bros
wherein if 2 requirements are met the consideration will become valid. The first requirement is that there
must be a practical benefit (a practical benefit is any additional benefit accrued to the promisor by the
completion of the promise). In our case we see that if the bells are fixed the church can carry out their
everyday activities smoothly therefore the first point is being met. The second point is that there must be
no economic duress (this is where the promisee uses their superior economic position to put unfair
economic pressure on the promisor). U in our case it is evident that Vikar had agreed to pay the extra
amount upon his own discretion and was not forced or pressurized hence this point is also being met.
Since both the points have been met the exception will apply and the general rule will not apply.
Accordingly, consideration will become valid and Vikar will be obligated to pay the additional $5000.
RUTH V DOG RESCUE KENNELS
We note that a promise to pay $50 was made in exchange of the services provided by Ruth. Although, it
is far below the market value consideration will be valid as reliance can be placed on the case of White v
Bluett which sets out a principle that a promise must be equivalent to economic value and $50 will
amount to some economic value. Moreover, pursuant to the case of Thomas v Thomas and Chapple v
Nestle there is no requirement of that economic value to meet market value. Conclusively $50 is a valid
consideration
RUTH V LADY GODIVA

Q2)
Robble runs a fairground, Toppers, and hires a big dipper from Fred for £3,000 per sanum. Times
are tough. however, and the bad weather has affected business at the fairground. Robbie asks Fred
whether he can have a reduction in rent until he gets on his feet again. He intends to use the money,
thereby saved to advertise the fairground more widely. Fred agrees to reduce Robbie's rent by
£1,000 per annum until business improves, Delighted, Robbie immediately spends £1,000 on
advertising, in the hope that it will attract more visiters. However, Fred now regrets his promise
and demands that Robbie pay him the full amount of rent.
Spooks operates the ghost train at the fairground and receives a 50% share of the ticket sales. He
wishes to buy his wife a new car and needs some extra cash. He telephones Robbie and asks him to
increase his share of the ticket sales to 75% for a twelve-month period. Ghost train operators are
specialists and extremely hard to find. However, although Robbie does not want to lose Spooks, he
will find it a financial strain to fund the higher commission rate. Robbie asks Spooks if he can think
about this request for a few days. Spooks agrees. The next day, however, Spooks gets an offer from
another fairground, offering a 75% share of the ticket sales to run their ghost train. He goes to
Robbie's home and threatens to quit his job unless Robbie gives him the 75% share of the ticket
sales. Robble agrees. Three months later he tells Spooks that next month he will return to the 50%
share of the ticket sales.

Robbie asks his cousin, Clande, who is a carpenter, to paint the big wheel. He has often asked
Claude to do jobs around the fairground and always pays him. When Claude finishes, Robbie is
delighted and says that he will pay him £350. However, following a family argument, Robbie now
refuses to pay him. Advise Robbie.

Summary of Facts
We understand that Robbie ("R") has formed certain contracts and promises have been exchanged in them
and our primary insue is to determine whether soch promises are binding or not according to the law of
consideration defined in the case of Curie v. Misa as give and take. Since there are multiple contracts, we
shall discuss each separately.

(*) Fred's Promise of Reat Reductien

We note that Fred ("F") has promised R to give his dipper on rental basis and R has promised to pay GBP
3000 m cu annual basis. Since there is consideration from both sides, the constraints, R has requested F to
reduce rent by promises are binding. However, due to financial GBP 1000 until business improves and
our primary issue is determine whether F's rent reduction promise is binding or not.
If F sue ' R for payment of the entire rent, we note that according to the general rule of consideration,
there is no give and take since F has not received anything in return from R. for his rent reduction
promise. However, R. can raise the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel, which was introduced in Hughes
case and refined in the High Trees case and holds a promise binding without consideration if there is a
clear promise, reliance on the promise, a pre-existing contract within which the promise was given,
unfairness if promise is taken back, it is only a defense and it is suspensory doctrine meaning it only
suspends the rights for the time being and does not permanently change the contract. In our case, F has
given a clear promise of rent reduction which R has relied upon by investing in marketing, both parties
were already under a pre-existing rent contract, it is also unfair that F takes the promise back as R.
completely relied on it. R will also use this as a defense when F claims the rent money. Therefore, the
courts will suspend the right of taking full rent only until business improves thereafter R will have to pay
full rent. In view of the above, F's promise will be binding.

b) Rebbie's Additional Promise to Speeks

We understand that R has promised Spooks ("S") 50% shares in the ticket sales for ghost trains operating
at his fairground whereas S has promised to operate the trains. Since there is consideration from both
sides, the promises are binding. However, R has given an additional promise to increase S's share to 75%
of the ticket sales and our issue is to determine if this additional promise is binding or not.

According to the general rule set out in Stilk v. Myrick and Hartley v. Ponsonby, an additional promise
given under an existing contract will only be binding if the other person does something "considerably
extra". In our case, S's original duty was to operate the train and this is exactly what he has done ie, there
is nothing extra, therefore, the promise will not be binding. However, S can raise the concept of "practical
benefif" introduced in the case of William v. Roffey ie. if the promisor gets an additional benefit on
completion of the existing duty of the promisee then this additional benefit will make any additional
promise binding. In our case, as ghost train operators are difficult to find so if S would have quit R would
have had to spend time and money in finding a new operator and by promising S extra, he clearly got a
practical benefit that his operations will keep running smoothly. However, practical benefit is invalidated
if there is economic duress i.e. the additional promise was given under a threat of quitting which is clearly
the case in our context. Therefore, the additional promise of 75% will not be binding.

c)R's premise to C

We understand that R has promised C GBP 350/- after he completed the paint work and our issue is to
determine if the promise is binding or not. According to the general rule, the act has to come after the
promise, if it comes before the promise then this is past consideration which is invalid. Since, C
completed the painting before the promise, this will not be binding. However, past consideration can be
valid if there is a completed act and a clear promise, implied understanding of payment (ie. commercial
context) and the act was at the promisor's request. In our case, Chas completed the painting and R has
given a clear promise of GBP 350/-, although they are cousins, C has always gotten paid for any work
done historically therefore the context will be considered as commercial, accordingly, the act was also
done at the request of R. Since all aspects are met, past consideration will be binding.

Q3)
Dirk, who is disabled, returns to his car after work to find that someone has syphoned off the
petrol. He informs Eva, a passing police officer, who says 'Don't worry, I will get the person who
did this'. Dirk replies 'Thank you, if you do I will pay you £100'. Fiona overhears this conversation
and offers to go and get some petrol for Dirk. Dirk gives Fiona a can and £10 to pay for the petrol.
When Fiona returns Dirk says 'Thank you for your trouble. I do not have any more money with me
but I want to give you £20 for getting the petrol'. Eva caught the thief but Dirk now refuses to pay
Eva or Fiona anything.

Summary of Facts

We understand that Dirk (the "D") has promised Eva (the "E") and Fiona (the "F") money for catching the
thief who stole his petrol and bringing extra petrol of his car respectively. The primary issue is to
determine whether his promises are binding or not. We note that a valid offer, acceptance and capacity to
contract are not an issue in formulation of the contract. However, consideration and intentions to create
legal relations has to be determine whether present or not. We shall discuss each case separately.

Eva
We understand that E has caught the thief and D has promised to pay 100 pounds. According to the
general definition of consideration set out in (Curie v. Misa) there is clearly give and take i.e. E has
suffered a physical detriment in catching the thief and D has promised to pay money. However, since E
was a police officer, it was her existing duty at law to catch the thief for which she was already getting a
compensation from the relevant authorities. Reliance in this regard can be placed on the cases of (Ward v.
Byham) and (Glassbroke Brothers v. GCC) which state that if a person is under an existing legal duty to
do something then an additional promise will only be binding if such person does something "extra"
above his/her legal duty. In view of this, D's promise will only be binding if E has done something above
her legal duty in catching the thief. It is not clear from the facts that whether E was on duty or off duty at
the time of meeting D. If E was well within her jurisdiction and working duty hours then she has done
nothing extra and the promise will not be binding. However, assuming that E was off duty or in an area
which was outside her jurisdiction then she has clearly done something extra and the promise will be
binding.

Fiona
We understand that F has brought petrol for D and D has promised her money. We note that D's promise
of money which was given AFTER F bought the petrol clearly has give and take from both sides.
However, since the act of bringing the petrol has come before the promise to pay money, this is will be
considered as past consideration which is invalid in the eyes of law (Roscola v. Thomas) (Re McArdle).
However, relying on the (Pao On Lau case), if certain conditions are met, past consideration can be valid.
Firstly, there has to be a complete act and a clear promise followed by the act. In our case, the petrol was
brought and delivered to D by F i.e. a complete act and D has clearly promised money after this i.e. a
clear promise. Secondly, there has to be an implied understanding of payment between the parties i.e. the
context has to be commercial and thirdly, the act has to be carried out at the promisor's request. In our
case, it was a gesture of goodwill by F to a disabled person D to bring fuel. Therefore, there is no
understanding that such service is to be paid for if D did not even request F for this, rather F voluntarily
offered to help. Hence, whilst D may have promised the money as a gesture of goodwill, it is not legally
binding by virtue of the rules of consideration. We also note that intentions to create legal relations would
also not be proven as the situation is such that an act of good will was done to help someone not with the
subjective understanding that money will be paid. Hence, there is no contract with F.

Question 4:
The roof of Amelia's house was damaged in a winter storm. She contracted with Bertie who told
her it was about a week's work and would cost £10,000. Amelia accepted Bertie's price and they
further agreed that the work would be completed before 1 May so that Amelia could host a 21st
birthday party at her house on 3 May for her daughter Camilla. Bertie began the work on 1 April
but bad weather caused many delays. As a result Bertie said he would only be able to complete the
job by 1 May if he employed extra workmen and this would increase his costs. Amelia offered to
pay him £12,000 if he completed the job on time. Bertie went on to complete the repairs before 1
May and Amelia paid him £10,000 but refuses to pay any more. Advise Bertie

Summary of Facts

We understand that Amelia (the "A") has contracted with Bertie (the "B") where A will pay 10,000
pounds whereas B will fix the roof on or before May 1. We further understand that due to some
unfavorable weather conditions, B had conveyed to A that the work cannot be completed by May 1 unless
she pays extra money as he had to hire more people. A therefore gave an additional promise of 2000
pounds. The primary issue is to determine whether the additional promise is binding or not. We note that
a valid contract has an offer, acceptance, intentions to create legal relations, capacity and consideration.
Accordingly, for a promise to be supported by consideration there has to be give and take from both sides
as stated in (Curie v. Misa). However, since the issue is regarding enforceability of the additional promise
given by A to D in the existing contractual relationship. Reliance will be placed on the rules set out in the
case of (Stilk v. Myrick) and and (Hartley v. Ponsonby) that an additional promise given to the promisee
by the promisor in an existing contractual relationship will only be binding if the promisee does
something "considerably extra" above his/her existing duty. In our case,the original duty of B was to
complete the roof by May 1. This had to be achieved with the existing workers or extra workers regarding
of the environmental conditions as these risks are inherent in any commercial activity. Therefore, there is
nothing extra which was done by B. Hence, according to the general rule, the additional promise will not
be binding. However, B can raise the doctrine of practical benefit introduced in the case of (William v.
Roffey Brothers) which states that if completion of the existing duty of the promisee provides an
additional benefit to the promisor then this would be considered as valid consideration to hold such
additional promise binding provided there is no economic duress in procuring the additional promise. In
our case, A is clearly getting a practical benefit as completion of the work by B on time will lead to the
birthday party being held as per schedule and we assume that external commercial arrangements would
have already been made for this and if the work was delayed the effects of this would have led to all the
other arrangements including invitations, food, decorations etc. to be delayed. Secondly, if A would have
sued for breach of contract and told B to leave then she would have had to hire a new contractor to whom
more payments would have had to be made, she was also saved from this hassle. All this would clearly be
considered as practical benefit. However, it needs to be determined whether the promise was given under
economic duress or not. In our case, B never refused performance unless extra payment was made, he had
just communicated to her that he would work on the existing terms but the work will be delayed.
Therefore, this is commercial pressure but not economic duress. Hence, the promise will be binding and
the additional money will have to be paid.

Q) Bertie is in the construction industry and asks for advice concerning the following events. He
agrees to supply his next-door neighbour. Fred, with some timber for building a shed in his garden.
Since Fred has been such a good neighbour, Bertie states that he will reduce the agreed price of the
timber from £500 to the special rate of £300. Fred, thrilled at the special rate, promises that he will
fix Bertie's garden fence which has been in need of repair for some time. Bertie delivers the timber.
Fred, however, has a particularly busy period at work and doesn't find time to do the repairs.
Bertie is extremely upset by this and demands that he do so. Bertie contracts with Liam, a
bricklayer, to work on one of his construction projects. Liam is renowned for his fast, yet precise,
bricklaying skills and so Bertie agrees to pay Liam £30 per hour, which is above the average rate
for such work. A few days after starting work, Liam is approached by a rival company to work for
them at a rate of £50 per hour. Liam informs Bertie of this offer and says that if he doesn't match
the price he will unfortunately have to resigns Since Bertie is running behind schedule on this
project and fears incurring a penalty, he agrees to the wage increase and, thanks to Liam's fast
bricklaying, the work is finished on schedule. However, Bertie regrets agreeing to increase Liam's
hourly rate and refuses to pay more than the £30 originally agreed.
Bertie has a longstanding business relationship with Harold, a supplier of paint. The recession has
created financial problems for Harold's paint business and he is having difficulty paying Bertie the
£1,000 he owes him. Since Harold has often given discounts to Bertie over the years, Bertie decides
to return the favour by accepting £600 in full payment of the monies owed. However, the recession
begins to hit Bertie too. He now wants to claim the further £400. Advise Bertie

Summarization of Facts (identify the promises given):

We understand from the facts that Bertie and Fred have given certain promises to other parties and we
need to determine whether these promises are binding or not. We note that the general rule for holding a
promise binding is that it has to be supported by consideration (defined in the case of Curie v. Misa as a
benefit and determent faced by both parties). We shall discuss each promise separately.

Fred's promise to Bertie to mend the fence

We understand that Bertie has given a discount on timber for 200 pounds to Fred due to him being a good
nieghbour and Fred has also promised to mend her fence. We further understand that Fred has not been
able to complete the fixing of the fence. We need to determine whether B can claim that F should
complete his promise. We note that B promise to give discount has valid consideration. However,
considering it was due to F beign a good neighbor, this task was already done, therefore this will be
considered as past consideration which is no consideration. Unless the Pao On Lau conditions are met
which are that there has to be complete act and a clear promise which is there, the second is that there has
to be an implied understanding of payment, this will not be met as this was a social context and even
otherwise it was not based on the request of B that he becomes a good neighbor. Therefore, his past acts
cannot form valid consideration. However, the fact that he promised to fix her fence is manual labor and
it is a service which has economic value and includes a detriment on part of F. therefore this will be valid
consideration the promise will be binding.

B additional promise to pay L. 50 pounds

We understand that B has promised B 30 pounds in return for Laying bricks for her project. Since there is
consideration from both sides, these promises are binding. However, we further understand that an
additional promise was given of increasing the hourly rate to 50 pounds. We need to determine whether
this additional promise is binding or not. Reliance can be placed on the rules of existing duty towards
promisor set out in the case of Stilk v. Myrick and Harley v. Ponsonby that additional promise will only
be binding if the other person does something considerably extra. In our case, Lhas to lay bricks and he
did that only therefore nothing extra. Hence promise will not be binding. However, L will raise the
concept of practical benefit-i.e. the additional benefit accrued to the promisor on completion of the
existing duty of the promise provided no economic duress (William v Roffey). In our case, the practical
benefit which B got was she completed her project and was saved from the penalty clause and she also
saved on the time and money she would have had to spend in hiring a new contractor. Therefore, there is
practical benefit and the promise can be binding. However, such benefit is vitiated if there are elements of
economic duress. Since L has left no choice to B except to succumb to her demands, this will be
considered as economic duress and the promise will not be binding.

B promise to forgive part of H's debt

We understand that H owed B 1000 pounds and B has forgiven part of the debt which she is now
claiming. We need to determine whether her promise to forgive the debt would be binding or not.
According to the rule set out in Pinnels case and affirmed in Foakes v. Beer, part payment of debt, can
never suffice to full payment unless there is extra consideration in the form of an object or earlier
payment. In our case, there is no extra consideration, therefore, the debt will be payable and B will claim
in a court of law. However, H will raise the doctrine of promisory estopple which was introduced in the
Hughes case and refined in High Trees where a promise can be binding without consideration if the
following points are met, the first being that there has to be a clear promise which B gave regarding
forgiving debt, the second is reliance on the promise, there is no evidence of reliance on the promise by H
therefore since the second point is not met, promisory estopple will fail.
Q) Rose runs an organic food shop, FreeFrom, and leases her premises from Holly for £2,000 per
month. In December, she accidentally slips over and badly breaks her ankle. She is advised by the
doctor to stay away from work for six months and needs to employ a temporary shop assistant to
work in the shop for six months. This will put her in financial difficulty and means that she will
struggle to pay the rent on her shop until she is back at work in July. Rose telephones Holly saying:
'I will not be able to pay the full rent for the next six months, can I pay a reduced amount of £1,000
per month until I return to work in July?". Rose contracts with Ivy to work in FreeFrom for a
period of six months, whilst her ankle recovers. Rose's daughter, Grace, often helps out in the shop
and always gets paid by her mother. She spends two weeks working in the shop helping Ivy to learn
about the business. Rose is delighted and at the end of the fortnight tells Grace she will give her
£500. As a result of her reduced rent, Rose is also able to spend £3,000 on refurbishment to the
shop. Holly accepts the reduced rent of £1,000 for three months and then asks Rose to start paying
the full amount of £2,000 again and to repay immediately the £3,000 that she owes for the first three
months. Rose tells Holly that she will not accept her demands. She is so worried about her financial
difficulties that she tells Grace that she cannot pay her the £500 she promised. Advise Rose.
Summary of Facts:

We understand that Rose has given certain promises to Holly and Grace in return of other promises and
the primary issue is to determine whether these promises are binding or not based on the law of
consideration. Consideration is a fundamental aspect to form a contract and holds a contract binding only
if there is give and take of promises (Currie v Misa). The promises need to be of some economic value
but need not to meet the market value (Thomas v thomas) (Chaple v Nestle). based on the general concept
we shall discuss each case separately.

(a) Holly

As regards Holly, Rose has promised to pay 2000 pounds rent and Holly has promised to give her
premises on rent. Since there is give and take of promises, the contract will be binding. However, as Rose
has broken her ankle, Holly, on her request, has given an additional promise of 50% discount on rent for 6
months until she recovers. The primary issue is if this discount promise is binding or not. As per the
general rule, clearly, this promise is not binding as there is no consideration.However, if Holly sues Rose
for balance payment of rent, Rose can raise the defense of promisory estopple. Promisory estopple was
introduced in (Hughes case) and refined in (High Trees case) and holds a promise binding even if there is
no consideration. To prove this, Rose will have bring evidence of a clear promise, reliance, pre-existing
contract under which the promise was given, unfairness if the promise is taken back, it can also only be
used as a defense and if successful will suspend Holly's right to take the full rent for six months.
In our case, Holly clearly gave a promise to accept the discounted rent and Rose relied on it and spent
3000 pounds on refurbishment, Holly and Rose were already under a contract in which the promise was
given, it would unfair if Holly takes the promise back as Rose genuinely was suffering from a fractured
ankle. Rose will also raise this as a defense if Holly sues her for balance rent. Therefore, since all
elements are being met, this promise will be binding based on promisory estopple.
(b) Grace
As regards Grace, Rose has promised her 500 pounds in return for Grace working at her shop for two
weeks. Although there are promises from both sides, the general rule for consideration is that the promise
has to come before the act and if it comes after it, it is considered as past consideration which is invalid
(Re McArdle) (Roscola v. Thomas). Clearly,Grace has completed the work (i.e. act) and Rose has given
her promise after it. Therefore, it will not be binding. Unless, Grace can prove the conditions set out
under the (Pao On Lau case) where past consideration can be valid if there is a complete act and promise
followed by it, there is an implied understanding of payment i.e. commercial context and the act was at
the request of the promisor. In our case, Grace has completed the work and Rose has given a promise,
although she is her daughter but the facts state that she always got paid for working in the shop which
shows that shop work was always commercial for her and there is an implied understanding of payment.
Assuming that Rose had requested her to work then the conditions will be met and past consideration will
be valid.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

Answer Writing
Q) Rose runs an organic food shop, Free from, and leases her premises from Holly for £2,000 per month.
In December, she accidentally slips over and badly breaks her ankle. She is advised by the doctor to stay
away from work for six months and needs to employ a temporary shop assistant to work in the shop for
six months. This will put her in financial difficulty and means that she will struggle to pay the rent on her
shop until she is back at work in July. Rose telephones Holly saying: ‘I will not be able to pay the full rent
for the next six months; can I pay a reduced amount of £1,000 per month until I return to work in July?
Rose contracts with Ivy to work in Free from for a period of six months, whilst her ankle recovers. Rose’s
daughter, Grace, often helps out in the shop and always gets paid by her mother. She spends two weeks
working in the shop helping Ivy to learn about the business. Rose is delighted and at the end of the
fortnight tells Grace she will give her £500. As a result of her reduced rent, Rose is also able to spend
£3,000 on refurbishment to the shop. Holly accepts the reduced rent of £1,000 for three months and then
asks Rose to start paying the full amount of £2,000 again and to repay immediately the £3,000 that she
owes for the first three months. Rose tells Holly that she will not accept her demands. She is so worried
about her financial difficulties that she tells Grace that she cannot pay her the £500 she promised. Advise
Rose. (2015 Zone B)
Summary of facts
We understand that Rose has given certain promises to holly and Grace in return of other promises. The
primary issue is to determine whether these promises are binding or not based on the law of
consideration. Consideration is a fundamental aspect to form a contract and holds a contract binding only
if there is give and take of promises (Currie v Misa). The promises have to have an economic value but
need not meet the market value (Thomas v Thomas) (Nestle v Chapel). Based on this concept we shall
discuss each case separately.
Holly
As regards to Holly, Rose has promised to pay $2000 and Holly has promised to give her premises on
rent. Since there is give and take of promises the contract will be binding. However, as Rose has broken
her ankle Holly on her request has given an additional promise of 50% discount on rent for six months.
The primary issue is that whether the discount promise is binding or not. As per the general rule clearly
this promise is not binding as there is no consideration. However, if Holly sues Rose for the balance
payment of rent, Rose can raise the defense of promissory estoppel. Promissory estoppel was introduced
in Hughes case and refined in High trees case and holds a promise binding even if there is no
consideration. To prove this Rose will have to bring evidence of a clear promise, reliance, pre-existing
contract under which promise was given and fairness if the promise is taken back, it can also only be used
as a defense and if successful will suspend Holly’s rights to take the full rent for six months. In our case,
Holly clearly gave a promise to accept the discounted rent and Rose relied on it and spent $3000 on
refurbishment. Holly and Rose were already in a contract when the promise was given, it will be unfair
for Holly to take back the promise as Rose was genuinely suffering from a broken ankle. Rose will also
raise this as a defense if Holly sues her for balance rent. Therefore, since all the elements have been met,
this promise will be binding based in promissory estoppel.
Grace
As regards Grace, Rose has promised her $500 in return for Grace working at her shop for two weeks.
Although, there are promises from both sides the general rule for consideration is that the promise has to
come before the act and if it comes after it, it is considered as past consideration which is invalid
(ReMacardle)(Roscola v Thomas). Clearly, Grace has completed the act and Rose has given the
promise after it therefore it will not be binding unless Grace can prove the condition set put under Pao on
v Lau where past consideration can be valid if there is a complete act and a promise followed by it. There
is an implied understanding of payment i.e. commercial context and the act was at the request of the
promisor. In our case Grace has completed the work and Rose has given a promise, although she is her
daughter but the facts state that she always got paid for working in the shop which shows that shop work
was always commercial for her and there is implied understanding of payment. Assuming that Rose had
requested her to work then the condition will be met and past consideration will be valid
Q) Harjot contracted to pay David £10,000 to build a conservatory in her garden. The terms were
very clear that the floor should be of real oak. David began to build the conservatory and when he
had nearly completed the work he discovered that due to a shortage of oak the cost had increased
by £2,000. This meant that he would not make any profit. He told Harjot that unless she paid him
an extra £2,000 he would not be able to complete the conservatory and she would have to get
another builder to do it. Harjot was furious but as she needed the conservatory ready for her
daughter's wedding she agreed. David has completed the work, and the conservatory looks lovely in
the wedding photos, just how Harjot had imagined. Harjot is now refusing to pay the extra £2,000.
David's nephew, Leon, wanted to become a carpenter and so had helped David in laying the floor.
David was so delighted with Leon's work that at the end of the job he promised to pay Leon £200.
Advise David if he is entitled to the £2,000 and if he must pay Leon £200.
Summary of Facts:

We understand that Harjot ("H") and David ("D") have made promises and entered into different
commercial arrangements. Our primary issue is to determine whether such promises are binding or not.
Generally speaking, a promise will only be binding under contract law if supported by consideration
which was defined in (Curie v. Misa) as give and take of promises. The law further developed in
(Chapple v. Nestle), (Thomas v. Thomas) and (White v. Bluett) where promises will only be recognized if
they are of economic value but the market value does not matter. In light of this general law, we shall
discuss each case separately:

(a) Harjot's Additional Promise to David

As regards H, she has promised D 10,000 pounds to build a conservatory made of oak wood and in return
D has promised to make such conservatory before her daughter's wedding. Clearly, there is a give and
take of promises and these would be binding. However, D demanded 2000 pounds extra for this work and
H clearly gave an additional promise to pay such amount. Our issue is to determine if the additional
promise will be binding or not.

Based on the cases of (Stilk v. Myrick) and (Hartley v. Ponsonby), an additional promise under a private
contract will only be binding if the other person does something "considerably extra” . In our case, the
original duties included building a conservatory made of oak wood and that is exactly what D has done
i.e. nothing extra. Therefore, the additional promise would not be binding. However, D can raise the
concept of "practical benefit" which was introduced in (Williams v. Roffey Bros) and holds an additional
promise binding even if the promisee has done nothing extra. In our case, has clearly gotten a practical
benefit since the conservatory was timely built for her daughter's wedding which was her original intent,
H also did not have to go through the hassle of finding a new contractor. Therefore, there is a practical
benefit and the additional promise should be binding. However, H will rely on vitiating practical benefit
by proving economic duress i.e. the additional promise was taken under pressure where no choice was
left. Since D clearly told H that he will quit if she does not pay extra, there will be elements of economic
duress and practical benefit will not be considered, the additional promise will not be binding.

(b) D's Promise to Leon

As regards D's promise to L, there is give and take of promises as D has promised 200 pounds and L has
promised to lay the tiles. However, as per the general rule the promise has to be come before the act
orelse it will be considered as past consideration which is invalid (Re McArdle) (Roscola v. Thomas).
Since D's promise came after L's completed the work, it will not be binding. Unless, L is able to prove the
conditions set out in the case of (Pao On Lau) then past consideration can be valid. Firstly, there has to be
complete act and a clear promise after it, there has to be implied understanding of payment i.e. the context
is commercial and the act was carried out at the promiser's request. In our case, L has completed the tile
work and D has given a clear promise, although they were relatives, L was not working for sake of family
relations but rather for his profession as he wanted to be a carpenter and as such the context will be
commercial. The facts are silent as regards D having requested him to do the work or not, assuming he
did request L to lay the floor, the promise will be binding and if not, then the promise will not be binding.