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Formation of the Union Territory of Ladakh: One Year After

Article in Economic and Political Weekly · January 2021

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 Formation of the Union Territory of Ladakh: One Year After

For citation: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 56, Issue No. 2, January 9, 2021

Rekha Chowdhary (rekchowdhary@gmail.com) is former Professor of Political Science,

University of Jammu and author of Jammu and Kashmir: Politics of Identity and
Separatism (2016).

One year after being granted the status of Union Territory (UT), Ladakh has been passing
through a phase of anxiety. The first anniversary of the UT that fell on 31 October 2020, was
marked by protests in Kargil district, with leaders calling it “Black Day.” From day one,
Kargil has been protesting the reorganisation of Ladakh as a UT and the severance of its
relationship with Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The political class here has been voicing
various concerns not only about the implications of the reorganisation on the people of
Ladakh, but also about the relationship between Kargil and Leh.

Protests here on the completion of one year, were predictable. But what was not predictable
was the response of Leh, which has been demanding UT status for the last four decades now.
This district, which had witnessed massive celebrations last year, did not reflect much
enthusiasm this year. The mood of this Buddhist majority district was reflected in September
2020, as prominent political and religious leaders of Leh called for the boycott of the
scheduled polls for Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC) of Leh.
Demanding constitutional protections for Ladakh, these leaders belonging to the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP), Congress, and Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) formed the People’s Movement
for Sixth Schedule for Ladakh. It was only on the assurance of the Home Minister of India
that the concerns of Ladakh would be met by the Government of India, that the Hill Council
elections could be held, albeit on a rescheduled date.

Understanding Ladakh
Comprising the two districts of Leh and Kargil, Ladakh is complex society. Though generally
represented as a Buddhist region, it has a larger Muslim population. As per the 2011 census,
Muslims formed 48.40% of the total population of the region, Buddhists were 39.65%, and
Hindus 12%. The religious demography takes interesting turns as we further probe internal
differentiations. Muslims, for instance, do not form one homogeneous grouping. The largest
number of Muslims is that of Balti Shias of Kargil who have strong linkages with Iran. They
are quite distinct from the Sunni Muslims of Leh known as Argons or mixed race—mostly
the offspring of Ladakhi women married to non-Ladakhis, mostly Kashmiri but also Turks,
Pathans, and others. There are also Muslims of the Nurbakshi sect. The distinctions that are
important in Ladakh are not simply those between Muslims and Buddhists, but those between
Leh and Kargil, between Buddhists of Leh and Muslims of Kargil. Leh, it may be mentioned
is a Buddhist majority district (66.39% are Buddhist, 14.26% are Muslims, and 17.14% are
Hindus), while Kargil is a Muslim majority district (76.87% are Muslims, 14.21% are
Buddhists, and 7.34% are Hindus).

The Buddhist–Muslim difference that is so sharply visible in present day Ladakh, is a much
more recent development. Traditionally, there was lot of fuzziness and the distinctions were
not so clearly made, especially in Leh. Yoginder Sikand points to the blurring of religious
boundaries, despite the strong religious identities. Besides the shared language and culture,
there was practice of inter-religious marriages." Intermarriage between Argons, Baltis and
Buddhists in Ladakh,” he argues, “was fairly common until recently. Such marriages
occurred among both ‘ordinary’ people as well as among the royalty” (Sikand 2010). Till a
few decades back, it was common to have within the same family people belonging to two
different religions as a consequence of such marriages between people belonging to different
communities. Over time, the issue of inter-community marriages has been at the core of
Buddhist politicisation and, therefore, the practice does not exist anymore.

The core of Ladakh’s politics in the post-1947 period has been revolving around its
“remoteness” and its “backward” condition. Historically, it was a "busy entrepôt for Silk
Route trade between Central and South Asia” (Fewkes 2009: 40). Accession of the princely
state of J &K of which it was a part since the mid-19th century, made it land-locked and
turned it into an "inaccessible,” "remote,” "strategic,” and a "backward” border region (Bhan
2009: 73). The remoteness of the area can be gauged from the fact that the road connections
of Ladakh with rest of India get blocked during the prolonged winter period. From November
to May, the area is physically cut off from the rest of the world and is accessible only through
a single airport in Leh. On other parameters of economy, development, education, health, etc,
also, the region is quite backward.

It was around the backwardness and neglect of Ladakh that the politicisation took place in the
post-1947 period. The Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA) was the major organisation that
took up the cause of Ladakh and continued to be the harbinger of its politics for the decades
to come. Mainly representing the Buddhist community, this organisation, though speaking for
whole of Ladakh, had a tilt towards the concerns of Leh, and that too from the perspective of
the Buddhist community. It was only in the1980s that Kargil leadership started asserting the
voice and concerns of the Muslims of Ladakh, particularly of Kargil. And, from the
beginning, these concerns were articulated as different to those represented by the LBA.
While the core of LBA politics was based on the demand of the severance of its relationship
with J&K, particularly Kashmir, Kargil was opposed to this demand.

Demand for UT Status

Till the demand for the severance of its relationship from Kashmir was met, the LBA insisted
on Ladakh being granted internal autonomy within the state and demanded its special
treatment. Among the demands made by this organisation included those related to a special
ministry of Ladakh affairs, increased representation in the legislature and services, more
development funds, and for local police to be staffed by local personnel. Apart from these
pan-Ladakhi demands, there were also specific Buddhist demands, like the demand for
removal of Urdu from Ladakh schools and introduction of Ladakhi in Tibetan or Bodhi script,
and also the settlement of Tibetan refugees (who happened to be Buddhist) in Ladakh.

It was in the 1980s that the demand for UT status for Ladakh was made and it was articulated
systematically during the prolonged agitation of 1989. It was after this agitation that, as a
compromise formula, the provision was made for Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development
Councils (LAHDC). The Hill Council for Leh was constituted in 1995. Kargil leadership
initially refused to have a Hill Council, but it was ultimately constituted there as well in 2002.

Despite the establishment of the hill council, the demand for UT status continued to be raised
in Leh. Though initiated by the LBA, the demand was to form the central point of Leh’s
electoral politics with almost all Leh-based parties vociferously raising this demand. Though,
more recently (during the last decade or so), it is the BJP that has been raising this demand,
earlier the demand was made by the Congress leaders of Leh. In 2002, all Leh-based parties
dissolved their local units to form the Ladakh Union Territory Front (LUTF). Though the
LUTF could not last for a long time, the demand for UT status continued to dominate the
electoral politics of Leh.

The demand for UT status for Ladakh, however, was restricted to Leh. Due to the specificity
of its own politics, Kargil district never shared Leh’s political aspiration of either separating
from J&K or becoming a separate UT. On the contrary, the idea of UT has been forcefully
opposed here mainly because of the apprehension that a separate entity of Ladakh might
accentuate the dominance of Leh over Kargil. Though Leh district has been complaining
about Ladakh’s neglect within J&K and holding Kashmir-based political parties and leaders
responsible for that, Kargil has been complaining about its neglect within the Ladakh region
and the dominance of Leh Buddhists. Of the two districts of Ladakh, Leh has seen more
development. Being the headquarters of Ladakh, it has been receiving more attention and
resources. Kargil leadership have also been complaining about the district’s invisibility as
Leh for all practical purposes is seen to be a synonym of Ladakh.

The logic of Kargil’s politics is defined by its relationship with Leh. It is the vocal dominance
of Leh’s politics that has made Kargil leadership look towards Kashmir for political support.
The religious demography of Kargil with a large Muslim population has further provided a
reason to the Kargil leaders to identify both with the Muslim majority character of the state as
well as with the Kashmiri Muslim leadership. Notwithstanding that Kargil Muslims have
never identified with the separatist politics of Kashmir, they felt secured with the special
constitutional status of the state.

The divide between Leh and Kargil, one can clearly see, is a religious divide. The pro-
Buddhist politics of Leh is confronted by a parallel Muslim politics of Kargil. While LBA’s
influence in the politics of Leh has been the most significant, Kargil’s politics is influenced
by two Islamic schools: the Islamia School and Khomeini Memorial Trust (IKMT). Ladakhi
identity politics, therefore, rather than being inclusive of all Ladakhis, has come to be
fragmented and represented as a politics of Ladakhi Buddhist identity and Ladakhi Muslim
identity. These two kinds of identity politics operate in parallel during the best of times, and
in confrontation with each other during the worst of times.

What contributed to the communal fragmentation of Ladakhi identity was the prolonged
Buddhist agitation in Leh in 1989. While this district had witnessed communal agitations
earlier also (as in 1969, when a personal conflict between a Buddhist and a Muslim resulted
in massive communal agitation), the 1989 agitation was by far the most disruptive one that
created a deep-rooted divide between Buddhists and Muslims, on the one hand, and between
Leh and Kargil, on the other.

The agitation that was started to express Leh’s resentment against the domination of its
economy by Kashmiri traders, with a call for the boycott of these traders, was later extended
to Kashmiri Muslims. As Kargil Muslims refused to participate in this boycott, the call was
given for boycotting all Muslims, including Muslims of Ladakh. This boycott was strictly
followed and remained in force for a number of years. “Although there was some opposition
against the communal nature of the agitation from within the Buddhist community, this
resistance was stifled effectively through persuasion, threats, and indeed physical force” (van
Beek and Bertelsen 1995: 44).

The 1989 agitation had long-term implications not only for the Buddhist–Muslim relationship
but also for the Leh–Kargil relationship. Although the Buddhist call for boycott of Muslims
was formally withdrawn in late 1992, and there was a formal reconciliation between the
leadership of both the districts, the prolonged boycott had already widened the gap between
the communities and a number of socio-cultural and economic practices that were
intrinsically linked with Ladakhi culture and helped create the bond between Muslims and
Buddhists, were discontinued. Meanwhile, the politics of Leh and Kargil followed altogether
different directions. While Leh remained firm on the demand of UT status, notwithstanding
the constitution of the Autonomous Hill Development Council, Kargil consistently opposed
it.

Formation of UT
Though the decision of bifurcation of the state of J&K and the separation of Ladakh and its
conversion into a UT was rather abrupt and without any immediate demand or expectation, it
was met with much satisfaction in Leh. As the long-standing demand for separation from
Kashmir was fulfilled, there were celebrations which lasted for many days. Protests however
formed the major response of Kargil. The overall mood was that of despondency as it was felt
that this district had lost its safety cover against Leh’s domination. Soon, the protests took a
more organised form and various religious and political leaders of Kargil formed a joint
action committee which came out with 14 demands. Though the major demand of this
Committee was reversal of the decision of formation of a UT for Ladakh, it made other
demands such as: a separate UT for Kargil; in case reversal may not be possible, renaming
the UT as the UT of Leh and Kargil; and equal development and equal representation of
Kargil at par with Leh. More than a year after the formation of the UT, the issues raised by
the Kargil leadership are still to be resolved. The feeling persists that Leh continues to remain
the focus of all development and Kargil is neglected. The establishment of University of
Ladakh and the medical college in Leh after the formation of the UT, has reinforced this
feeling.

Other than these anxieties related to the relationship with Leh, Kargil leadership voiced
various concerns about separation of Ladakh from J&K. These concerns mostly related to
issues such as representation, land, and employment. These concerns were later to become
the major concerns of Leh district as well. Its initial celebration notwithstanding, Leh district,
faced with the reality of Ladakh’s UT status and the implications of the severance of its
relationship with J&K, was soon to feel disconcerted about the vulnerability of Ladakh,
especially after the withdrawal of the protections provided by Article 370 and Article 35A.
The demand therefore was made for constitutional protection under the provisions of Article
371 and Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.

Common Concerns
Seen from this perspective, there are lot of common concerns now in Ladakh. Though the
two districts are still to come together on a common platform to articulate these concerns,
there is yet a strong feeling of discomfort in both the districts following the formation of the
UT.

Of the many concerns, the most important one is related to the political representation of
Ladakh. Unlike J&K, which is a UT with a legislature, the UT of Ladakh is without one. As
part of the erstwhile state of J&K, Ladakh was fairly represented in the state government.
Apart from one MP, there were four MLAs and two MLCs and invariably a minister in the
state government. And, as party members, they were also represented in various other bodies
of the state. After the formation of the UT, it is only a single Member of Parliament through
whom people are connected for political decision-making. The new system provides
centralised and remote administration. Other than the Lieutenant Governor (LG), the
decision-making related to Ladakh is directly at the level of the Home Minister of India.

It is in this context that, rather than empowering the people of Ladakh, the creation of the UT
has created a sense of disempowerment. Autonomous hill councils do exist, but in the scheme
of things, these councils also seem to be reduced to powerless bodies. In fact, there is lack of
clarification about the role of these councils. In the context of the present system, the powers
of the councils have not been notified. Even prior to the formation of the UT, the hill councils
had mainly planning and executive powers and there was often tension between the executive
councillors and the local bureaucracy. The tension has further increased in the new
centralised administrative system where all powers lie with the LG. Without a legislature, and
without its autonomy vis-à-vis the administrative structure, the hill councils, in the words of
Rigzin Spalbar, former Chief Executive Councillor (LAHDC, Leh), are “toothless” and
“irrelevant” (Ganai 2020). In the one year since it was given UT status, there has been more
than one occasion when the members of the hill councils both in Leh and Kargil have
expressed their disappointment with the existing system and have threatened to resign.

The narrative of UT was popular in Leh because it was based on the discourse of “freedom
from clutches of Kashmir-based politicians” and Ladakhi control over resources. However, in
the new system, rather than the Ladakhi political class, it is the bureaucrats who are calling
the shots. The disappointment, therefore, is deep-rooted that BJP leaders are facing the brunt.
This also ostensibly became the cause of the resignation of BJP president of Ladakh, Chering
Dorjay Lakrook, not only from the position of president, but also from the very membership
of the BJP. While submitting his resignation, he referred to the concentration of powers in the
hands of the bureaucrats who are from outside Ladakh.

The issue of political representation apart, the separation of Ladakh from J&K and the
removal of the protection provided by Article 370 and Article 35 A have suddenly led to the
anxieties related to land, ecology and environment, and jobs. The demand for protection
under the Sixth Schedule of Indian Constitution comes from these anxieties. The land
situation of Ladakh is precarious and there is apprehension that with the opening of Ladakh
for all Indians, there may be exploitation of land by the land mafia and there may be overflow
of outsiders endangering the Ladakhi culture and environment.

Similarly, there is lot of unease of about jobs. With only two districts, there are not many job
opportunities in Ladakh. As part of J&K state, they had the advantage of being part of the
larger system and could compete for any job in the 22 districts of the state. With most of the
Ladakhis enjoying the ST status, they were able to take advantage of reservation and had only
to compete with the Gujjars and Bakerwals, the only other ST group of the erstwhile state.
Now, even with this benefit of reservation, they have to compete at the national level; more
so, because there is no local public service commission and, for higher levels of jobs, their
recruitment will be regulated by the Union Public Service Commission. Resentment has been
brewing as the job situation is becoming complex. In 2020, there was the case of recruitment
of doctors under the National Health Mission. While not many Ladakhis could make it, the
selected list included people from all over the country. However, not many of those selected
joined. Understanding the sensitivities of Ladakhis, the whole process of recruitment has
been stalled for the moment. There are about 5,000 jobs that need to be filled, but there is no
clarity about filling these.

Severing the relationship with J&K has impacted the educational scenario as well. Much of
Ladakhi education, especially higher education, including university and college education,
and professional and technical training were taking place in various parts of this former state.
The Ladakhis were not only eligible for admission as permanent residents of the state but also
had the privilege of ST reservation. While some arrangement has been made for continuation
of their education in the former state, however, they feel deprived of the benefits of being part
of the state. Ladakh does not have the educational infrastructure at par with J&K. The newly
opened institutions like University of Ladakh and medical college in Leh are still in the
fledgling stage.

On the whole, there are lot of anxieties, both in Kargil and Leh. Ladakhis, even those who
had vociferously made this demand, feel that the idea of UT that was popularised as a magic
resolution of all their problems of backwardness and underdevelopment has not worked in
that direction. On the contrary, it has exposed them to newer and additional problems.

References
Bhan, Mona (2009): "Refiguring Rights, Redefining Culture: Hill-Councils in Kargil, Jammu
and Kashmir,” Sociological Bulletin, Vol 58, No 1, pp 71–93.

Fewkes, Jacqueline H (2009): Trade and Contemporary Society along the Silk Road: An
Ethno-history of Ladakh, Routledge Contemporary Asia Series, Oxon: Routledge.

Ganai, Naseer (2020): "A Rare Poll Boycott Call from Ladakh Amid Demand for Inclusion
under Sixth Schedule,” Outlook, 20 September.
 Sikand, Yoginder (2010): “Buddhist-Muslim Relations in Ladakh – Part 1,” TwoCircles.net,
30 April, http://twocircles.net/2010apr30/buddhist_muslim_relations_ladakh_part_1.html.

Van Beek, Martijn and Kristoffer Brix Bertelsen (1995): "No Present without Past: The 1989
Agitation in Ladakh,” Recent Research on Ladakh 7, Proceedings of the Seventh Colloquium
of the International Association for Ladakh Studies Held at Bonn/St Augustin, 12-15 June
1995, T Dodin and H Rather (eds), Ulmer Kulturantropologische Schriften Band 9, Ulm:
Universität Ulm, pp 43–65.

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