Technical Bulletin

No. 060 11 Nov 2023

Machinery/ Equipment Failure
Engine room flooding (Page 1/4)
Incident:
The vessel was on a laden voyage from Jubail, Saudi Arabia to
Ningbo, China, carrying seven grades of chemicals. Low sea
chest (starboard side) was in use, and the main sea water pump
(MSWP) No. 2 was running. She was proceeding to Ningbo an-
chorage area and during maneuvering engine room bilge well
alarm activated. Heavy sea water spray from no. 1 main cooling
sea water (MCSW) pump discharge valve body was observed.

To isolate the leak, sea chest valves were closed. Emergency

bilge suction, fire pump crossovers with bilge line were used to
pump out engine room bilges, and the vessel was anchored off
Ningbo.

Despite the use of the emergency bilge arrangements, the water

level in the engine room continued increasing. Once the water
level was about to reach the running electric motor level, gener-
ators were stopped, and the vessel came on emergency power.

After all failed attempts to control the water ingress, engine

room was evacuated, and all crew safely mustered at muster
station.

Distress alerts were sent. In consultation with class, the vessel’s

damage stability was confirmed to be in order and there was no
risk to the vessel’s safety in the continued flooded condition.
Distress alerts were cancelled.

A diving company was arranged to blank the sea chests, but the
blanking attempt was unsuccessful due to high currents and en-
gine room flooding continued. After around 31 hours the vessel
settled at fwd draft of 10.0 meter and aft draft of 15.6 meter.

Eventually, the sea openings were blanked by diving company and the water from machinery com-
partment was removed. The cargo was transferred via STS and after tank cleaning and gas freeing,
the vessel was towed to nearby dry dock for restoration of the main engine and other machinery.
 Technical Bulletin
No. 060 11 Nov 2023
Machinery/ Equipment Failure
Engine room flooding (Page 2/4)
What went wrong?
Material failure of Main sea water pump discharge
valve
There was a material failure of the no.1 MCSW pump dis-
charge valve (9V) due to unknown reasons which is under
investigation. Excessive leakage from the compromised
valve led to progressive flooding of the engine room which
could not be controlled despite the efforts of ship staff.

Isolation of leak and Pumping out arrangements not effective

The vessel is provided with two independent emergency pumping out arrangements for the engine room
(1) Emergency bilge suction – through No.1 MCSW pump, and (2) Direct Bilge suction and E/R Bilge Cross-
over through Bilge fire & GS pump No.1 and No.2
 The main emergency bilge suction is connected to
MSWP No.1 pump, where the discharge valve (9V)
was damaged. So, the staff tried to route the emer-
gency bilge suction using the MSWP No.2 pump
through valves 8V, 10V, 11V. As there was no isolation
valve between valve discharge valve of no. 1 and no.
2 MSWP (9V and 11V), the water continue to leak
through the damaged discharge valve (9V) of no. 1
MSWP.
 The ship-staff then tried to blank MSWP No1 discharge valve (outboard side flange, 300A), damaged
valve, and this attempt was not successful. With the force of water, the ship-staff could not place a
blank between overboard valve and MSWP No.1 discharge valve. The ship-staff momentarily tried to
shut MSWP No.2 pump but no reduction in water force was noticed with the sea chest valves closed,
as the overboard side valves were still open.
 The ship staff simultaneously started the 2nd pumping out arrangement using the ‘Bilge, Fire & GS’
pump and through Direct Bilge suction and E/R Bilge Crossover. However, the flooding continued pro-
gressively due to water leaking from damaged valve / open flange.
 The generators had to be stopped when the water level reached electric motor level at the bottom plat-
form, to avoid electric shock and risk of short-circuiting on running motors.
 There is no emergency generator connection to the bilge and fire pump. So, after the generators were
stopped, the ability to pump-out any water from machinery compartment bilges was compromised.
 The staff while evacuating the engine room did not cross check that all sea chest and overboard valves
have been shut.
 Technical Bulletin
No. 060 11 Nov 2023
Machinery/ Equipment Failure
Engine room flooding (Page 3/4)
Learning from the incident (LFI):

Hardware factors:

Material analysis -
 The damaged valve or a sample will be sent to metallurgic lab to identify the root cause behind such
failure.
 Vessels with similar maker valves were identified and detailed examination has been commenced to en-
sure a similar defect does not exist.

Review of PMS:

Sea Water Line inspection (Sea Water valves- inspection):

Sea Water valves (Monthly):
 Check for leaks.
 Look for signs of corrosion, rust or mineral build-up.
 Replace the valve if there are extensive leaks or worn/broken pieces.
 Open & close the valves to make sure they aren't seizing.
 Inspect pressure & temperature of fluid flowing through.

Overhaul sea water suction and discharge valve of Main sea water pumps (5 yearly):
 Valve to be dismantled.
 Internal checks for corrosion/ erosion and damage to be carried.
 Valve and valve seat to be checked for proper sealing.
 Gland packing to be renewed.
 Valve stem, holding bolts and nuts to be checked for erosion, cracks, defects etc.
 Examination and pressure testing after overhaul as per API 598 to be carried out.

Sea Chest and Overboard Valves ( 10 years):

All sea chest and overboard valves which are butterfly valves with renewable seat rings will be renewed at
second special survey.

Isolation and Pumping out arrangements in Engine room: Vessels to review the Isolation and
pumping out arrangements and post a copy of the procedure in the Engine room and train all staff.
 Technical Bulletin
No. 060 11 Nov 2023
Machinery/ Equipment Failure
Engine room flooding (Page 3/4)
Learning from the incident (LFI):

People (Human) factors:

Role and Responsibility of Chief Engineer for contingency:

It is important that the Chief Engineer recognizes the following when faced with contingency situa-
tion in Engine Room.
 He should retain the overview function of the contingency.
 He is able to delegate and deploy the resources available to him in engine room or ask for addi-
tional assistance from the Master.
 He should ensure prompt communication with available means with Master / Office to get addi-
tional assistance or guidance.
 He may consider deploying an additional person for communication subject to available re-
sources.
 Any challenges or difficulties being faced should be promptly communicated to the Master.

Process factors:

Guidance on Emergency response related to Flooding:

 Guidelines on emergency response related to Engine room flooding and on isolation and pump-
ing out arrangements for Engine room under different flooding scenario was reviewed and SMS
will be enhanced as per the attached memo.
 The role and responsibility of the Chief Engineer / Team leader in an emergency response was
reviewed to include the leadership role in an emergency. The Chief Engineer / team leader is
required to have an overview of the situation so as to have better management of the contin-
gency, as per the attached memo.
 Flooding drills - The flooding drills shall be done with a realistic scenario for various areas/
compartments on the vessel. This should include Engine room flooding scenario where the staff
shall practice effective isolation of leak and use of emergency pumping out arrangements in the
engine room and other compartments.