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Ethiopia Ethiopia PM Assures Neighbors

By the Center for He Will Not Invade
Preventive Action October 26, 2023

Updated August 28, 2023 Neighboring countries feared Prime

← → Minister Abiy Ahmed would launch a

military operation to secure access to a
Red Sea port, which he says is
Ethiopia’s right after Somalia refused
to grant such access (Reuters).

• • • • • • •
Ethiopia, China Upgrade Ties to
n abandoned tank belonging to Tigrayan forces south of the Amhara region militiamen ride on their truck as they head to face the Tigray ‘All-Weather’
Ethiopian Strategic
Muslims stand inside a damage mausoleum at th
, on December 11, 2020. Eduardo Soteras/Agence France- People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in Sanja, Amhara region, near the border with of the oldest in Africa and allegedly damaged by Eritrean fo
Tigray, Ethiopia, on November 9, 2020. Tiksa Negeri/Reuters Partnership
Ethiopia, on March 1, 2021. Eduardo Soteras/Agence France
October 17, 2023

The announcement came while

Background
Background Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed
was in Beijing for a state visit and to
Concerns
attend the Belt and Road Forum; the
Recent Developments
Ethiopia’s northernmost region of Tigray is at two countries signed twelve
cooperation agreements, Ahmed’s
the center of a civil conflict involving ethno-
office said (Addis
regional militias, the federal government, and Standard). Meanwhile, Somalia
rejected Ethiopia’s request for
the Eritrean military that has attracted the negotiations over access to a Red Sea
concern of humanitarian groups and external port (Bloomberg).

actors since November 2020.

World Food Programme
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Resumes Food Aid to Ethiopia

primary political party representing Tigray,

historically dominated leadership coalitions and
politics at the national level despite Tigrayans’
status as an ethnic minority. Between 1991 and
his death in 2012, Tigrayan soldier-
politician Meles Zenawi governed Ethiopia as an
autocracy through a period of rapid
development. With the backing of a TPLF-
dominated coalition, he secured aid from the
United States and the United Kingdom, hosted
difficult negotiations between Sudan and South
Sudan during their 2011 split, and supported
peacekeeping missions in Sudan. However, his
regime failed to curtail a brutal war [PDF] with
Eritrea, marginalized ethnic groups including
the Somali, Oromo, and Amhara—each of which
is larger than the Tigrayan population—and
solidified a centralized autocracy.

The TPLF continued to govern Ethiopia after his

passing in a similar manner. However, Tigrayan
control of the national government came to an
end in 2018 with the accession of Prime
Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali, who was heralded by
international actors and Ethiopians alike as the
country’s new hope for peace and ethnic
harmony. Abiy promised early in his
premiership to heal broken trust between
Ethiopia’s ethnic enclaves and create a sense of
community. In 2019, he received the Nobel
Peace Prize for ending violence at the Eritrean
border and quickly rolling back domestic
restrictions on freedoms.

However, within a year, ethnic relations in

Ethiopia once again began to deteriorate.
Multiple delays of long-promised national
elections and the declaration of an extension on
Abiy Ahmed’s first term as prime minister in
June 2020 drew indignation from Tigrayan
leadership. The Tigray State Council’s choice to
hold local elections in defiance of federal orders
inflamed tensions even further: in advance of
the regional elections, which ultimately
solidified the popularity of the TPLF, Tigrayan
leaders warned that they would consider
intervention by the federal government a
“declaration of war.” Following the TPLF’s
regional victory, Abiy accused Tigrayan troops of
attacking a federal military camp to loot
weapons. It soon became clear that the
combative political rhetoric in fall 2020 had
signified the first warning shots of what would
become a bloody civil war.

On November 4, 2020, Abiy

Ahmed ordered Ethiopian National Defense
Force (ENDF) troops north to begin a military
operation known as the Mekelle Offensive in
Tigray, named for the region’s capital city. The
offensive increased in severity over the next few
months as Tigrayan troops (Tigray Defense
Force, or TDF) ramped up their military
response. The conflict gradually escalated into a
civil war also known as the Tigray War.

Abiy first framed the offensive as a targeted

operation against individuals in the TPLF
leadership. A communications
blackout implemented at the outset of the
conflict shuttered coverage of ground
conditions, but media and UN officials began
sounding the alarm about improper treatment
of civilians, especially ethnic Tigrayans, by
December 2020. As accusations escalated, Abiy’s
government rejected calls for mediation from
the African Union (AU). Ethiopia’s neighbor and
former adversary, Eritrea, which fought a war
with Ethiopia during the Zenawi
regime, joined the side of the Ethiopian
government early in the conflict. After months
of denying their presence, in spring 2021, Prime
Minister Abiy Ahmed admitted that Eritrean
troops were fighting in Tigray. According to an
Amnesty International report released in
February 2021, Eritrean troops targeted and
killed over one hundred civilians and unarmed
people in the Tigrayan city of Axum in
December 2020. Eritrean troops have not
followed through on commitments
to reduce their presence in the region,
despite international pressure to do so.

In 2021, the United States characterized the

conflict as ethnic cleansing against Tigrayans,
and reports have documented the prevalence of
mass atrocities. In March 2021, the Office of the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
announced a joint probe with the Ethiopian
Human Rights Commission (EHRC) to
investigate alleged abuses and rights violations
in Tigray, although the impartiality and
accuracy of the report [PDF] were called into
question following its presentation at the United
Nations. After the events of the Axum
Massacre came to light in February 2021, the
UN admitted that its human rights investigators
were not authorized to visit Axum while
working with the EHRC. The joint report
presents evidence that the ENDF, Tigrayan
militant groups, and other militias involved in
the conflict have all committed various human
rights violations. Abuses listed in the
report include the use of rape as a weapon of
war, violence against children, and ethnically
targeted killings. A UN Security Council
proposal to condemn the parties to the conflict
in early 2021 was quickly scrapped due to
pushback from India, Russia, and China. Foreign
news sources have accused the ENDF, Eritrean
troops, and Tigrayan and other regional militias
of perpetrating further massacres and mass
death events (often bombings) since then.

Tigrayan forces retook the regional capital of

Mekelle from the ENDF in June 2021. A month
later, Addis Ababa announced the results of a
national parliamentary election—which Prime
Minister Abiy Ahmed won in a landslide. The
TPLF boycotted what was supposed to be the
country’s first free and fair election, and
opposition leadership in parliament accused the
Abiy government of banning poll observers in
some states. Later, in the summer of 2021,
Abiy called on all capable citizens to join the
war against Tigrayan forces as the conflict
began to spill over into
the Afar and Amhara regions, growing closer to
Addis Ababa. In November 2021, Tigrayan
troops and allied Oromo militants marched
within eighty-five miles of the capital but
were forced back north by ENDF forces backed
by Emirati, Turkish, and Iranian drones
purchased by the government. Human Rights
Watch later reported that Tigrayan troops killed
dozens of civilians while occupying towns in the
Amhara region as they made their way south
that fall.

Compounding Ethiopia’s internal struggles, a

border clash with Sudan has been at risk of
escalation since 2020, when Sudan used the
chaos of the Mekelle Offensive to reignite a
territorial dispute over a piece of fertile land
adjacent to Tigray. That dispute turned deadly
in 2021 and led to the dual militarization of part
of the border.

The outbreak of the conflict in Tigray triggered

a refugee and displacement crisis that persists
today. In 2021, Ethiopia reported 5.1 million
internally displaced people in twelve months,
the most people internally displaced in any
country in any single year. Millions more have
fled to Sudan as northern Ethiopia, especially
Tigray, remains cut off from food, water,
and medical aid.

Outside of Tigray, tensions continue to run high

among other ethnic groups. In April 2021, the
government declared a state of emergency in
Amhara state after a series of violent attacks
against ethnic Oromo residents. Oromia’s
regional army allied itself with the Tigrayans in
the civil war, whereas militants from Amhara
and Afar (regions bordering Tigray)
were accused of assisting federal troops, even
attacking civilians they suspected to be Tigrayan
or affiliated with the TPLF.

Concerns
In the past, the United States viewed Ethiopia as
a guarantor of security in Africa, an attitude
now heavily tempered by mistrust over the Abiy
government’s actions. The conflict in Tigray has
security implications for the entire Horn of
Africa, a region in which the United States has
stakes in countering violent extremism,
supporting democratic transitions, negotiating
resource sharing efforts, and guaranteeing
refugee flow management.

In 2019, Ethiopia took on the role of mediator

in Sudan’s political transition, but given the
Tigray War’s role in pushing refugees into Sudan
and instigating a border dispute, Abiy is not an
ideal peacemaker for Sudan’s current conflict.
Eritrea’s involvement in Tigray, led by President
Isaias Afwerki, signals its increasing influence
and represents a concerning level of
involvement in regional affairs. In Ethiopia’s
capacity as the host of the AU headquarters, and
due to its history as a demographic and military
powerhouse that avoided long-term
colonization, Ethiopia has historically been
heavily involved in diplomacy across the
continent. Over the past two years, the
Ethiopian government has used that influence
to reject attempts by other African leaders to
monitor and condemn events in Tigray.

The potential for internal conflict in Ethiopia to

derail discussions regarding the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is of
concern to the United States and other external
actors. A well-negotiated plan for the flooding
of the GERD in coming years is vital to the
survival of all drought-prone states in East
Africa and for the goal of inter-state peace. The
United States has repeatedly attempted to
mediate talks between Egypt and Ethiopia on
the issue of the GERD to prevent armed conflict
between the two riparian states.

Recent Developments
After a series of failed ceasefires, Tigrayan
leadership committed in September 2022 to
hold fire in order to participate in negotiations
led by the AU. The TPLF and the Ethiopian
central government then signed a cessation of
hostilities agreement on November 2 in
Pretoria, South Africa. Followed by
implementation negotiations in Nairobi, the
agreement promised to disarm Tigrayan troops,
return control of the Tigray region to the
Ethiopian government, end the Mekelle
Offensive, and permit full humanitarian access
to Tigray. Olusegun Obasanjo, the African
Union’s appointed envoy and former President
of Nigeria, and Uhuru Kenyatta, the former
president of Kenya, facilitated the Pretoria and
Nairobi agreements.

Notably, neither agreement

explicitly mentions Eritrea, nor were Eritrean
diplomats present at either summit. This
omission raised significant concern that Eritrean
troops would continue operations within
Ethiopia in spite of the agreement between the
Ethiopian government and TPLF. Rights groups,
intergovernmental organizations, and foreign
governments, including the United States,
continue to monitor the presence of Eritrean
troops and call for the withdrawal of all foreign
troops.

Despite the drawdown of the war in Tigray,

tensions between regions, armed groups, and the
federal government exacerbated by the civil war
have persisted and present a challenge to Abiy’s
efforts to centralize power and unify the
country. In May 2022, Ethiopia arrested over
four thousand people in Amhara to weaken a
nationalist militia that helped the government
repel the TPLF, fearing its growing power could
challenge the state. The next month,
government forces did little to prevent the
killing of hundreds of Amhara people by an
armed group in Oromia. Meanwhile, security
forces in Afar detained and relocated around
9,500 residents from a town on its border with
Tigray.

The frequency of violent incidents has fallen in

2023, but peace deal implementation challenges
remain, particularly with regard to transitional
justice and the withdrawal of foreign troops. In
April, Abiy announced that all regional forces
would be integrated into the national police and
army. The decision sparked protests in Amhara,
and militias have resisted the effort, prompting
Abiy to turn to both negotiations and force to
achieve his goal. In April, Ethiopia began peace
talks with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), a
rebel group that has long opposed the
government and that allied with the TPLF
during its advance toward Addis Ababa.
However, in June, Abiy said that paramilitaries
posed a “significant risk to national unity” and
vowed to continue operations until only the
national security forces remained.

Despite the peace agreement allowing access to

Tigray, the humanitarian crisis has not abated.
In 2023, the UN requested four billion dollars to
provide aid to twenty million people affected by
conflict, including more than four million
internally displaced people. In June, USAID and
the World Food Programme (WFP) suspended
aid after discovering that Ethiopian soldiers and
officials were stealing massive amounts of food.
The pause led to hundreds of deaths due to
hunger while aid workers worked to reorient aid
distribution strategies.

Fighting broke out again when the federal

government clashed with the Fano militia group
in the Amhara region. The group, which
previously allied with the government against
Tigrayan forces, alleges Addis Ababa has
neglected the region’s security amid efforts to
assert federal authority and integrate regional
forces into the military. A senior official accused
Fano of trying to overthrow the government
after Ethiopia’s intelligence chief acknowledged
that the government had lost control of some
areas. Ethiopia declared a six-month state of
emergency in Amhara to combat the threat, and
residents reported hearing heavy gunfire and
seeing military aircraft.

More on The Conflict in Ethiopia

Peace Talks for Tigray The Conflict in Ethiopia's

Delayed Tigray Region: What to
Know
Africa in Transition
CFR.org In Brief
October 11, 2022 February 10, 2021

Progress Towards Peace Ethiopia's Transition and

for Ethiopia’s Tigray the Tigray Conflict
Conflict Congressional Research
Africa in Transition Service
November 14, 2022 September 9, 2021

Ethiopia's Civil War, With Climate Change &

Michelle Gavin Regional Instability in the
Horn of Africa
The President's Inbox
Center for Preventive Action
August 24, 2021 November 2022

Continuing Atrocities in Ethiopia's War Leads to

Ethiopia's Tigray Region Ethnic Cleansing in Tigray
Region
U.S. Department of State
New York Times
May 15, 2021 February 26, 2021

Ethiopia's Tigray War: A UN Special

Deadly, Dangerous Representative on Sexual
Stalemate Violence in Conflict
International Crisis Group UN
April 2, 2021 January 21, 2021

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