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Psychology PSY1011 and PSY1022


Psychology
PSY1011 and PSY1022
2nd Edition
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Psychology PSY1011 and PSY1022


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PSYCHOLOGY
FROM INQUIRY TO UNDERSTANDING
2ND EDITION
LILIENFELD, LYNN, NAMY, WOOLF,
JAMIESON, MARKS & SLAUGHTER

Copyright © Pearson Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) 2016 – 9781488613050 - Psychology PSY1011 and PSY1022 2nd edition
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Copyright © Pearson Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) 2016 – 9781488613050 - Psychology PSY1011 and PSY1022 2nd edition
Brief contents

PART ONE
PSY1011
1 Science and pseudoscience in psychology
SKILLS FOR THINKING SCIENTIFICALLY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 2

2 Research methods
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ERROR 46

14 Cross-cultural psychology
HOW CULTURE AFFECTS US 88

3 Biological psychology
THE BRAIN–BODY COMMUNICATION SUPERHIGHWAY 130

4 Sensation and perception


HOW WE SENSE AND CONCEPTUALISE THE WORLD 172

6 Learning
HOW NURTURE CHANGES US 220

10 Human development
HOW AND WHY WE CHANGE 262

15 Personality
WHO WE ARE 314

PART TWO
PSY1022
7 Memory
CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING OUR PASTS 364

13 Social psychology
HOW OTHERS AFFECT US 412

16 Psychological disorders
WHEN ADAPTATION BREAKS DOWN 464

17 Psychological and biological treatments


HELPING PEOPLE TO CHANGE 520

iii

Copyright © Pearson Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) 2016 – 9781488613050 - Psychology PSY1011 and PSY1022 2nd edition
Contents

PART ONE
PSY1011

1 Science and pseudoscience in psychology


SKILLS FOR THINKING SCIENTIFICALLY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 2
What is psychology? Science versus intuition 4 Science as critical thinking: distinguishing fact from fiction 19
Psychology and levels of analysis 5 Scientific scepticism 19
What makes psychology distinctive—and fascinating 5 A basic framework for scientific thinking 20
Why we can’t always trust our commonsense 6 evaluating CLAIMS Health benefits of fruits and vegetables 24
Psychology as a science 7
Psychology’s past and present: what a long, strange trip
psychomythology What is scientific theory? 8 it’s been 26
The boundaries of science 10 Psychology’s early history 27
Psychological pseudoscience: imposters of science 11 The great theoretical frameworks of psychology 27
The amazing growth of popular psychology 11 The multifaceted world of modern psychology 32
What is pseudoscience? 12 Great debates of psychology 34
from inquiry to understanding Why do we perceive patterns even How psychology affects our lives 36
when they don’t exist? 15 Evidence-based practice 37
Psychology and psychologists in Australia 37
The dangers of pseudoscience: why should we care? 18
Your complete review system 40

2 Research methods
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ERROR 46
The beauty and necessity of good research design 49 Ethical research in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Why we need research designs 49 communities 73
How we can be fooled: two modes of thinking 50 Ethical issues in animal research 73
The scientific method: toolbox of skills 52 Statistics: the language of psychological research 74
Naturalistic observation: studying humans ‘in the wild’ 53 Descriptive statistics: what is what? 75
Case study designs: getting to know you 54 Inferential statistics: testing hypotheses 76
Time-series design 55 How people lie with statistics 77
Correlational design 55 Evaluating psychological research 79
Experimental design 60 Becoming a peer reviewer of psychological research 79
from inquiry to understanding How do placebos work? 63 Becoming peer-reviewed: the importance of being published 80
psychomythology Laboratory research does not apply to the real Most reporters are not scientists: evaluating psychology in
world, right? 69 the media 81

Ethical issues in research design 71 evaluating CLAIMS Hair-loss remedies 82


Ethical guidelines for human research 71 Your complete review system 83

14 Cross-cultural psychology
HOW CULTURE AFFECTS US 88
What is culture and how does it influence behaviour? 90 Concepts of self 100
Definitions of culture 91 Emotion 100
What is cross-cultural psychology and how does it Personality 102
operate? 95 Crossing cultures 103
psychomythology Does ‘cross-cultural’ mean the same as ‘cultural’ Why people move from one place to another 103
in psychology? 96 Cultural syndromes 104
Models of acculturation 106
Theoretical issues 96
Changing concepts of acculturation 107
Methodology in cross-cultural psychology 97
Safeguards 98 evaluating CLAIMS Tourism adverts 111
iv

Copyright © Pearson Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) 2016 – 9781488613050 - Psychology PSY1011 and PSY1022 2nd edition
Contents v

Multiculturalism and prejudice 111 from? 116


Multicultural societies 112 Indigenous psychology 118
Identity 113 Early research 118
Psychological services 114 A new focus 119
Prejudice 115 An Indigenous psychology 121
from inquiry to understanding Where do prejudicial ideas come
Your complete review system 125

3 Biological psychology
THE BRAIN–BODY COMMUNICATION SUPERHIGHWAY 130
Nerve cells: communication portals 132 Sexual reproductive glands and sex hormones 152
Neurons: the brain’s communicators 132 Mapping the mind–brain relationship 153
Glial cells: supporting roles 133 A tour of brain-mapping methods 153
Electrical responses of neurons 135 Which parts of our brain do we use for what? 157
Chemical neurotransmission 136 Which side of our brain do we use for what? 158
Neural plasticity: how and when the brain changes 139
psychomythology Left-brained versus right-brained people 159
The brain-behaviour network 141
evaluating CLAIMS Diagnosing your brain orientation 160
The central nervous system 142
Nature and nurture: did your genes—or parents—make you
from inquiry to understanding How do we recognise faces? 145
do it? 160
The peripheral nervous system 150
How we came to be who we are 160
The endocrine system 151 Behavioural genetics: how we study heritability 162
The pituitary gland and pituitary hormones 151
The adrenal glands and adrenaline 152 Your complete review system 165

4 Sensation and perception


HOW WE SENSE AND CONCEPTUALISE THE WORLD 172
Two sides of the coin: sensation and perception 174 Our body senses: touch, body position and balance 195
Sensation: our senses as detectives 175 The somatosensory system: touch and pain 195
The role of attention 177 Proprioception and vestibular sense: body position and balance 197
The binding problem: putting the pieces together 178 Ergonomics: human engineering 198
from inquiry to understanding How does magic work? 179 Perception: when our senses meet our mind 199
Seeing: the visual system 180 Parallel processing: the way our brain multitasks 199
Light: the energy of life 180 Perceptual hypotheses: guessing what is out there 200
The eye: how we represent the visual realm 181 When perception deceives us 204
When we cannot see or perceive visually 185 Subliminal perception 206
psychomythology Delboeuf’s illusion and the dentist’s drill 187 Subliminal persuasion 206

Hearing: the auditory system 188 evaluating CLAIMS Subliminal persuasion CDs 207
Sound: mechanical vibration 188 Extrasensory perception: fact or fiction? 207
The structure and function of the ear 189 What is ESP? 207
Auditory perception 190 Beliefs about ESP 208
Smell and taste: the sensual senses 191 Scientific evidence for ESP 208
What are odours and flavours? 192 Why people believe in ESP 210
Sense receptors for smell and taste 192 Tricks of the psychics 211
Olfactory and gustatory perception 193 Your complete review system 213
When we cannot smell or taste 194

6 Learning
HOW NURTURE CHANGES US 220
Classical conditioning 223 psychomythology Are we what we eat? 229
Pavlov’s discovery of classical conditioning 224 Operant conditioning 230
The classical conditioning phenomenon 224 Distinguishing operant conditioning from classical conditioning 231
Principles of classical conditioning 225 The law of effect 231
Higher-order conditioning 226 B. F. Skinner and reinforcement 232
Applications of classical conditioning to daily life 227

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vi Contents

Terminology of operant conditioning 232 Preparedness and phobias 249


Schedules of reinforcement 236 Learning fads: do they work? 251
Applications of operant conditioning 238 Sleep-assisted learning 251
from inquiry to understanding Why are we superstitious? 239 evaluating CLAIMS Sleep-assisted learning 252
Putting classical and operant conditioning together 241 Accelerated learning 252
Cognitive models of learning 242 Discovery learning 253
S-O-R psychology: throwing thinking back into the mix 243 Learning styles 253
Latent learning 243
Your complete review system 255
Observational learning 244
Mirror neurons and observational learning 247
Insight learning 247
Biological influences on learning 248
Conditioned taste aversions 248

10 Human development
HOW AND WHY WE CHANGE 262
Special considerations in human development 265 Cognitive landmarks of early development 281
Post hoc fallacy 265 from inquiry to understanding Why is science difficult? 282
Bidirectional influences 265
psychomythology The Mozart effect, baby Einstein and creating
Keeping an eye on cohort effects 265
‘superbabies’ 283
The influence of early experience 266
Clarifying the nature–nurture debate 267 Cognitive changes in adolescence 285
Cognitive function in adulthood 287
The developing body: physical and motor development 269
Conception and prenatal development: from zygote to baby 269 The developing personality: social and moral development 287
Infant motor development: how babies get going 271 Social development in infancy and childhood 288
Growth and physical development throughout childhood 272 Social and emotional development in adolescence 297
Physical maturation in adolescence: the power of puberty 273 Life transitions in adulthood 301
Physical development in adulthood 274 Social transitions in later years 303
evaluating CLAIMS anti-ageing treatments 275 Your complete review system 305
The developing mind: cognitive development 276
Theories of cognitive development 276

15 Personality
WHO WE ARE 314
Personality: what is it and how can we study it? 316 Humanistic models evaluated scientifically 336
Studying personality: nomothetic versus idiographic approaches 317 Trait models of personality: consistencies in our behaviour 337
The causes of personality differences: how we come to be 317 Trait models: key challenges 337
from inquiry to understanding Where is the environmental The Big Five model of personality: the geography of the psyche 337
influence on personality? 320 Cultural influences on personality 339
Psychoanalytic theory: the controversial legacy of Sigmund Basic tendencies versus characteristic adaptations 340
Freud and his followers 321 Can personality traits change? 340
Psychoanalytic theory: the foundation of Freud’s thinking 321 Trait models evaluated scientifically 341
Core assumptions of psychoanalytic theory 322 Personality assessment: measuring and mis-measuring
The structure of personality: the id, the ego and the superego 324 the psyche 342
Anxiety and the defence mechanisms 325 Famous—and infamous—errors in personality assessment 343
Freud’s theory of personality development 327 Structured personality tests 344
Psychoanalytic theory evaluated scientifically 328 Projective tests 346
Freud’s followers: the neo-Freudians 329 Common pitfalls in personality assessment 349
Behavioural and social learning theories of personality 331 psychomythology Criminal profiling 350
Behavioural views of the causes of personality 332 evaluating CLAIMS Online personality tests 352
Social learning theories of personality: the causal role of
thinking resurrected 332 Your complete review system 354
Humanistic models of personality: the third force 335
Rogers and Maslow: self-actualisation realised and unrealised 335

Copyright © Pearson Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) 2016 – 9781488613050 - Psychology PSY1011 and PSY1022 2nd edition
Contents vii

PART TWO
PSY1022

7 Memory
CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING OUR PASTS 364
How memory operates 366 Where is memory stored? 390
The paradox of memory 367 The biology of memory deterioration 392
The fallibility of memory 368 The development of memory: acquiring a personal history 394
The reconstructive nature of memory 369 Memory over time 394
Three systems of memory 369 Infants’ implicit memory: talking with their feet 394
The three processes of memory 379 from inquiry to understanding Why can’t we remember the first
Encoding: the ‘call numbers’ of the mind 379 few years of our lives? 395
psychomythology Smart pills 381 When good memory goes bad: false memories 396
Storage: filing our memories away 382 False memories 396
evaluating CLAIMS Memory boosters 384 Implanting false memories in the lab 398
Generalising from lab to real world 400
Retrieval: heading for the ‘stacks’ 384
Suggestibility and child testimony 401
The biology of memory 389 Learning tips: getting the science of memory to work for us 402
The neural basis of memory storage 389
Your complete review system 404

13 Social psychology
HOW OTHERS AFFECT US 412
What is social psychology? 414 Prosocial behaviour and altruism 434
Humans as a social species 415 Aggression: why we hurt others 436
from inquiry to understanding Why are yawns contagious? 417 Attitudes and persuasion: changing minds 439
The great lesson of social psychology: the fundamental attribution Attitudes and behaviour 439
error 418 Origins of attitudes 440
Attitude change: wait, wait, I just changed my mind 441
Social influence: conformity and obedience 419
Persuasion: humans as salespeople 442
Conformity: the Asch paradigm 419
Deindividuation: losing our typical identities 421 evaluating CLAIMS Work-from-home jobs 446
Groupthink 424 Prejudice and discrimination 446
Obedience: the psychology of following orders 426 The nature of prejudice 447
Helping and harming others: prosocial behaviour Discrimination 448
and aggression 431 Stereotypes 449
Safety in numbers or danger in numbers? Bystander Roots of prejudice: a tangled web 450
non-intervention 432 Prejudice behind the scenes 451
Social loafing: with a little too much help from my friends 433 Combating prejudice: some remedies 452
psychomythology Is brainstorming in groups a good way to Your complete review system 455
generate ideas? 433

16 Psychological disorders
WHEN ADAPTATION BREAKS DOWN 464
Concepts of mental illness: yesterday and today 466 psychomythology The insanity defence: free will versus
What is mental illness? A deceptively complex question 467 determinism 476
Historical concepts of mental illness: from demons to asylums 468 Anxiety disorders: the many faces of worry and fear 478
Psychiatric diagnosis across cultures 469 Generalised anxiety disorder: perpetual worry 479
Special considerations in psychiatric classification and diagnosis 471 Panic disorder: terror that comes out of the blue 479
Psychiatric diagnosis today: the DSM-5 473 Phobias: irrational fears 480
evaluating CLAIMS Online tests for mental disorders 475 Posttraumatic stress disorder: the enduring effects of experiencing
horror 481

Copyright © Pearson Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) 2016 – 9781488613050 - Psychology PSY1011 and PSY1022 2nd edition
viii Contents

Obsessive-compulsive and related disorders: trapped in one’s thoughts Personality and dissociative disorders: the disrupted and
and behaviours 482 divided self 492
from inquiry to understanding More than a pack rat: why do Personality disorders 493
people hoard? 483 Dissociative disorders 495
The roots of pathological anxiety, fear, and repetitive thoughts and The enigma of schizophrenia 498
behaviours 484 Symptoms of schizophrenia: the shattered mind 498
Explanations for schizophrenia: the roots of a shattered mind 500
Mood disorders and suicide 485
Major depressive disorder: common, but not the common cold 485 Childhood disorders: recent controversies 503
Explanations for major depressive disorder: a tangled web 486 Autism spectrum disorders 503
Bipolar disorder: when mood goes to extremes 490 Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and early-onset bipolar
Suicide: facts and fiction 491 disorder 505
Your complete review system 507

17 Psychological and biological treatments


HELPING PEOPLE TO CHANGE 520
Psychotherapy: clients and practitioners 522 The trend towards eclecticism and integration 542
Who seeks and benefits from treatment? 522 Is psychotherapy effective? 543
Who practises psychotherapy? 523 The Dodo bird verdict: alive or extinct? 544
Professionals versus paraprofessionals: a difference that makes How different groups of people respond to psychotherapy 544
a difference? 524 Common factors 545
What does it take to be an effective psychotherapist? 524
from inquiry to understanding Why can ineffective therapies
Insight therapies: acquiring understanding 526 appear to be helpful? How we can be fooled 546
Psychoanalytic and psychodynamic therapies: Freud’s legacy 526
Empirically supported treatments 547
Humanistic therapies: achieving our potential 529
evaluating CLAIMS Psychotherapies 548
Group therapies: the more, the merrier 531
Alcoholics Anonymous 532 Evidence-based psychological practice 548
Family therapies: treating the dysfunctional family system 533 psychomythology Are self-help books always helpful? 549
Behavioural approaches: changing maladaptive actions 534 Biological treatments: drugs, physical stimulation and
Systematic desensitisation and exposure therapies: learning principles surgery 550
in action 534 Pharmacotherapy: targeting brain chemistry 550
Modelling in therapy: learning by watching 537 Electrical stimulation: conceptions and misconceptions 554
Operant and classical conditioning procedures 538 Psychosurgery: an absolute last resort 555
Cognitive-behavioural and third wave therapies: learning to think
Your complete review system 557
differently 539

Glossary 567

Name index 578


Subject index 590

Copyright © Pearson Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) 2016 – 9781488613050 - Psychology PSY1011 and PSY1022 2nd edition
A NOTE ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THIS CUSTOM BOOK

The chapters in this custom book have been chosen by your lecturer specifically to
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tailored for your course, it includes only the chapters required for your course.
There are therefore some chapter numbers from the original source title that have
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Copyright © Pearson Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) 2016 – 9781488613050 - Psychology PSY1011 and PSY1022 2nd edition
PART ONE
PSY1011

Copyright © Pearson Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) 2016 – 9781488613050 - Psychology PSY1011 and PSY1022 2nd edition
Science and
CHAPTER

1
pseudoscience
in psychology
SKILLS FOR THINKING SCIENTIFICALLY IN
EVERYDAY LIFE
LEARNING OBJECTIVES
LO 1.1 Define psychology.
LO 1.2 Explain how science can safeguard against the major fallacies of human thinking.
LO 1.3 Describe the features of psychological pseudoscience, and distinguish it from psychological
science.
LO 1.4 Identify reasons we are drawn to pseudoscience.
LO 1.5 Identify the key features of scientific scepticism.
LO 1.6 Explain the basic principles of scientific thinking.
LO 1.7 Identify and outline the major theoretical frameworks of psychology.
LO 1.8 Describe different types of psychologists and outline their roles.
LO 1.9 Describe the two great debates that have shaped the field of psychology.
LO 1.10 Describe how psychological research applies to our daily lives.
LO 1.11 Explain how evidence-based practice can help bridge the scientist–practitioner gap.

Copyright © Pearson Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) 2016 – 9781488613050 - Psychology PSY1011 and PSY1022 2nd edition
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Copyright © Pearson Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) 2016 – 9781488613050 - Psychology PSY1011 and PSY1022 2nd edition
THINK:
PREVIEW For most of you reading this book, this is your first or second psychology unit. But it is
First, think about these questions. a safe bet that you have learned an awful lot of beliefs about psychology already. Pause
Then, as you read, think again … for a moment and ask yourself these questions: Where have I learned my beliefs about
psychology? How do I know whether they are true?
• Is psychology mostly just
If you are like most beginning psychology students, you have gleaned much of
commonsense?
what you know about psychology from watching television programmes and movies,
• How should we judge what we read listening to talkback radio shows, reading self-help books and popular magazines, surfing
in self-help books? the internet and talking to friends. In short, most of your psychology knowledge probably
• Is psychology really a science? derives from the popular psychology industry: a sprawling network of everyday sources
• Are we good at evaluating evidence
of information about human behaviour.
that contradicts our views?
TEST OF POPULAR PSYCHOLOGY KNOWLEDGE
• Are claims that cannot be tested by
observation unscientific?
true false 1. Most people use only about 10 per cent of their brain capacity.
true false 2. Newborn babies are virtually blind and deaf.
• Is anecdotal evidence that a
treatment works good evidence for true false 3. Hypnosis enhances the accuracy of our memories.
its effectiveness? true false 4. All people with dyslexia see words backwards (for example, ‘tac’
instead of ‘cat’).
• Is the number of people who share
true false 5. In general, it is better to express anger than to hold it in.
a belief a dependable guide to its
accuracy? true false 6. The lie-detector (polygraph) test is 90 to 95 per cent accurate at
detecting falsehoods.
true false 7. People tend to be romantically attracted to individuals who are the
opposite to them in personality and attitudes.
true false 8. The more people present at an emergency, the more likely it is that
at least one of them will help.
true false 9. Schizophrenics have more than one personality.
true false 10. All effective psychotherapies require clients to get to the root of
their problems in childhood.

Take a moment to review the preceding 10 questions. Beginning psychology students


typically assume that they know the answers to most of them. That’s hardly surprising,
as these assertions have become part of popular psychology lore. Yet most students are
surprised to learn that all 10 of these statements are false! This little exercise illustrates
a take-home message we will emphasise throughout the text: Although commonsense
can be enormously useful for some purposes, it’s sometimes completely wrong (Chabris &
Simons, 2010). This can be especially true in psychology, a field that strikes many of us
as self-­evident, even obvious. In a sense, we are all psychologists, because we deal with
psychological phenomena such as love, friendship, anger, stress, happiness, sleep, memory
and language in our daily lives (Lilienfeld, Ammirati & Landfield, 2009). As we will
discover, everyday experience can often be helpful in allowing us to navigate the psycho-
logical world, but it doesn’t necessarily make us an expert (Kahneman & Klein, 2009).

What is psychology? Science versus intuition


LO 1.1 Define psychology. William James (1842–1910), one of the great pioneers in psychology, once described
LO 1.2 Explain how science can safeguard psychology as a ‘nasty little subject’. As James noted, psychology is difficult to study, and
against the major fallacies of human thinking. simple explanations of behaviour are few and far between. If you enrolled in this unit
expecting cut-and-dried answers to psychological questions, such as why you become
angry or fall in love, you might emerge disappointed. But if you enrolled in the hopes of
acquiring more insight into the hows and whys of human behaviour, stay tuned, because
a host of delightful surprises are in store. When reading this textbook, prepare to find
popular psychology industry
many of your preconceptions about psychology challenged; to encounter new ways of
sprawling network of everyday sources of thinking about the causes of your everyday thoughts, feelings and actions; and to apply
information about human behaviour these ways of thinking to evaluating psychological claims in everyday life.

Copyright © Pearson Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) 2016 – 9781488613050 - Psychology PSY1011 and PSY1022 2nd edition
What is psychology? Science versus intuition  5

Psychology and levels of analysis


Depression at differing
The first question often posed in introductory psychology textbooks could hardly seem levels of analysis
simpler: What is psychology? Although psychologists disagree about many things, they Social level
agree on one thing: psychology isn’t easy to define (Henriques, 2004; Lilienfeld, 2004). Loss of important
For the purposes of this text, though, we will simply refer to psychology as the scientific personal relationships, lack
of social support
study of the mind, brain and behaviour.
Psychology is a discipline that spans multiple levels of analysis. We can think of
levels of analysis as rungs on a ladder, with the lower rungs tied most closely to biological Behavioural level
influences and the higher rungs tied most closely to social influences (Ilardi & Feldman, Decrease in pleasurable activities,
moving and talking slowly,
2001; Kendler, 2005). The levels of analysis in psychology stretch all the way from withdrawing from others
molecules to brain structures on the low rungs to thoughts, feelings and emotions, and to
social and cultural influences on the high rungs, with many levels in between (Cacioppo
et al., 2000; Satel & Lilienfeld, 2013) (see Figure 1.1). The lower rungs are more closely Mental level
Depressed thoughts (‘I’m
tied to what we traditionally call ‘the brain’; the higher rungs to what we traditionally a loser’), sad feelings,
call ‘the mind’. It is crucial to understand that ‘brain’ and ‘mind’ can be complementary ideas of suicide
ways of describing and analysing the same underlying psychological processes. Although
psychologists may choose to investigate different rungs, they are united by a shared
commitment to understanding the causes of human and animal behaviour. Neurological/
physiological level
We will cover all of these levels of analysis in coming chapters. When doing so, we
Differences among people in the
will keep one crucial guideline in mind: To fully understand psychology, we must consider size and functioning of brain
multiple levels of analysis. That’s because each level tells us something different, and we structures related to mood
gain new knowledge from each vantage point. Some psychologists believe that biological
factors—like the actions of the brain and its billions of nerve cells—are most critical for
Neurochemical level
understanding the causes of behaviour. Others believe that social factors—like parenting
Differences in levels of the
practices, peer influences and culture—are most critical for understanding the causes brain’s chemical messengers
of behaviour (Meehl, 1972). In this text, we will steer away from these two extremes, that influence mood
because both biological and social factors are essential for a complete understanding of
psychology (Kendler, 2005). Molecular level
Variations in people’s genes that
predispose to depression
What makes psychology distinctive—and fascinating
A key theme of this textbook is that we can approach psychological questions scientif-
ically, with important similarities to how we approach questions in biology, chemistry FIGURE 1.1 Levels of analysis in depression.
and physics. Yet each of these sciences is also unique in its own way, and importantly, We can view psychological phenomena, in this
psychology is also unique and distinct from the other sciences. A host of challenges case the disorder of depression, at multiple
make the study of mind, brain and behaviour especially complex; yet it is precisely these levels of analysis, with lower levels being more
challenges that also make psychology fascinating, because they contribute to scientific biological and higher levels being more social.
mysteries that psychologists have yet to solve. Here, we will touch briefly on five espe- Each level provides unique information and
cially intriguing challenges that we will be revisiting throughout the text. offers a distinctive view of the phenomenon at
First, human behaviour is difficult to predict, in part because almost all actions are hand. (Source: Based on data from Ilardi, Rand
multiply determined—that is, they are produced by many factors. That is why we need to & Karwoski, 2007.)
be sceptical of single-variable explanations of behaviour, which are widespread in popular
psychology. Although it is tempting to explain complex human behaviours like violence in
terms of a single causal factor such as poverty, bad upbringing or genes, these behaviours
are almost surely due to the interplay of an enormous array of factors (Stern, 2002).
Second, psychological influences are rarely independent of each other, making
it difficult to pin down which cause or causes are operating. Imagine you are a scientist
attempting to explain why some women develop anorexia nervosa, a severe eating disorder
that we will discuss in Chapter 12. You could start by identifying several factors that might
contribute to anorexia nervosa, such as anxiety-proneness, compulsive exercise, perfec-
tionism, excessive concern with body image, and exposure to television programmes that
feature thin models. Let’s say that you want to focus on just one of these potential influ- psychology
ences, such as perfectionism. Here is the problem: women who are perfectionists also tend the study of the mind and brain
to be anxious, to exercise a lot, to be overly concerned with their body image, to watch multiply determined
television programmes that feature thin models, and so on (Egan et al., 2013). The fact that caused by many factors

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6 Chapter 1 Science and pseudoscience in psychology

all of these factors tend to be interrelated makes it tricky to pinpoint which one actually
contributes to anorexia nervosa. The odds are high that they all play at least some role.
Third, people differ from each other in thinking, emotion, personality and
behaviour. These individual differences help to explain why each person responds in
different ways to the same objective situation, such as an insulting comment from a
boss (Harkness & Lilienfeld, 1997). Entire fields of psychology—such as the study of
intelligence, interests, personality and mental illness—focus on individual differences
(Lubinski, 2000). Individual differences make psychology challenging because they make
it difficult to come up with explanations of behaviour that apply to everyone; at the same
time, they make psychology exciting, because people we might assume we understand
well often surprise us in their reactions to life events.
Fourth, people often influence each other, often making it difficult to pin down
what causes what (Wachtel, 1973). For example, if you are an extraverted person, you are
likely to make the people around you more outgoing. In turn, their outgoing behaviour
may ‘feed back’ to make you even more extraverted, and so on. This is an example of what
Albert Bandura (1973) called reciprocal determinism—the fact that we mutually influence
each other’s behaviour (see Chapter 15). Reciprocal determinism can make it challenging
to isolate the causes of human behaviour.
Fifth, people’s behaviour is often shaped by culture. Cultural differences, such as
individual differences, place limits on the generalisations that psychologists can draw
about human nature (Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, 2010). To take one example, Richard
Nisbett and his colleagues found that European Americans and Asian Americans often
pay attention to strikingly different things in pictures (Chua, Boland & Nisbett, 2005).
In one case, the researchers showed people a photograph of a tiger walking on rocks
next to a river. Using eye-tracking technology, which allows researchers to determine
where people are moving their eyes, they found that European Americans tend to look
mostly at the tiger, whereas Asian Americans tend to look mostly at the plants and rocks
surrounding it. This finding dovetails with evidence that European Americans tend to
focus on central details, whereas Asian Americans tend to focus on peripheral or inci-
dental details (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett et al., 2001).
All five of these challenges are worth bearing in mind as we move on to later
chapters. The good news is that psychologists have made substantial progress toward
solving all of them, and that a deeper and richer appreciation of these challenges helps us
to better predict—and in some cases understand—behaviour.

Why we can’t always trust our commonsense


To understand why others act as they do, most of us trust our commonsense—our gut
intuitions about how the social world works. Yet, as we have already discovered, our
intuitive understanding of ourselves and the world is frequently mistaken (Cacioppo,
2004; van Hecke, 2007). As the quiz at the start of this chapter showed us, sometimes
our commonsensical understanding of psychology isn’t merely incorrect but entirely
back-to-front. For example, although many people believe the old adage ‘There’s safety in
numbers’ (statement 8 in the quiz above), psychological research actually shows that the
more people present at an emergency, the less likely it is that at least one of them will help
(Darley & Latané, 1968; Latané & Nida, 1981; see also Chapter 13).
Here is another illustration of why we cannot always trust our commonsense.
Read the following 10 well-known proverbs, expressing commonsense or popular beliefs
about human behaviour, and ask yourself whether you agree with them.

1. Birds of a feather flock together. 6. Opposites attract.


2. Absence makes the heart grow fonder. 7. Out of sight, out of mind.
3. Better safe than sorry. 8. Nothing ventured, nothing gained.
individual differences 4. Two heads are better than one. 9. Too many cooks spoil the broth.
variations among people in their thinking,
5. Actions speak louder than words. 10. The pen is mightier than the sword.
emotion and behaviour

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What is psychology? Science versus intuition  7

These proverbs similarly ring true, do they not? Yet each one contradicts the proverb
across from it. So our commonsense can lead us to believe two things that cannot both be
true simultaneously, or at least that are largely at odds with each other. Strangely enough,
in most cases we never notice the contradictions until other people, such as the authors
of an introductory psychology textbook, point them out to us. This example reminds
us of why scientific psychology doesn’t rely exclusively on intuition, speculation or
commonsense.

NAIVE REALISM: SEEING IS BELIEVING—OR IS IT? We trust our commonsense largely


because we are prone to naive realism: the belief that we see the world precisely as it
is (Lilienfeld, Lohr & Olatunji, 2008; Ross & Ward, 1996). We assume that ‘seeing is
believing’ and trust our intuitive perceptions of the world and ourselves. In daily life,
naive realism often serves us well. If you are driving down a one-lane road and see a
tractor-­trailer barrelling towards you at 120 kilometres per hour, it is a wise idea to get
out of the way. Much of the time, we should trust our perceptions.
Yet appearances can sometimes be deceptive. The Earth seems flat. The sun seems
to revolve around the Earth. Yet in both cases, our intuitions are wrong. Sometimes, what
appears to be obvious can trip us up when it comes to evaluating ourselves and others.
Our commonsense tells us that our memories accurately capture virtually everything
we have seen, although scientific research demonstrates otherwise (Loftus, 1997; see
Chapter 7). Our commonsense also assures us that people who do not share our political
views are biased, but that we are objective. Yet psychological research demonstrates that
we are all susceptible to evaluating political issues in a biased fashion (Pronin, Gilovich
& Ross, 2004). So our tendencies to believe appearances can lead us to draw erroneous
conclusions about human nature. In many cases, ‘believing is seeing’ rather than the
reverse: our beliefs shape our perceptions of the world (Gilovich, 1991).

WHEN OUR COMMONSENSE IS RIGHT. That is not to say that our commonsense is
always wrong. Our intuition comes in handy in many situations, and sometimes guides
us to the truth (Gigerenzer, 2007; Gladwell, 2005; Myers, 2002). For example, our snap
(five-second) judgements about whether someone we have just watched on a videotape
is trustworthy or untrustworthy tend to be right more often than would be expected
by chance (Fowler, Lilienfeld & Patrick, 2007). Commonsense can also be a helpful
guide for generating hypotheses that scientists can later test in rigorous investigations
(Redding, 1998). Moreover, some everyday psychological notions are indeed correct.
For example, most people believe that happy employees tend to be more productive on
the job than unhappy employees, and research indicates that they are right (Kluger &
Tikochinsky, 2001).
To think like scientific psychologists, we must learn to test our ‘commonsense’ Here is another case in which our naïve
beliefs before we accept them. Doing so will help us become more informed consumers realism can trick us. Take a look at these
of popular psychology and make better real-world decisions. One of our major goals in two upside-down photos. They look quite
this text is to provide you with thinking tools for making this crucial distinction. These similar, if not identical. Now turn your book
thinking tools should help you to better evaluate psychological claims in everyday life. upside-down. (Source: Warren Goldswain/
Shutterstock.)

Psychology as a science
A few years ago, one of our academic colleagues was advising a psychology major about
his career plans. Out of curiosity, our colleague asked him, ‘So why did you decide to go
into psychology?’ He responded, ‘Well, I took a lot of science courses and realised I didn’t
like science, so I picked psychology instead’.
We hope to persuade you that this student was wrong—not about selecting a
psychology major, that is, but about psychology not being a science. A central theme of
this text is that modern psychology, or at least hefty chunks of it, is scientific. But what naive realism
does the word ‘science’ really mean, anyway? belief that we see the world precisely as it is

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8 Chapter 1 Science and pseudoscience in psychology

WHAT’S SCIENCE, ANYWAY? Most students think that ‘science’ is just a word for all of
that really complicated stuff they learn in their biology, chemistry and physics classes.
But science is not a body of knowledge. Instead, it is an approach to evidence and expla-
nations of the world around and in us (Chalmers, 1999). Science is not a single method
but rather a toolbox of knowledge skills designed to prevent us from fooling ourselves.
As Nobel Prize–winning physicist Richard Feynman (1985) put it, doing science means
bending over backwards to see whether you are wrong.

SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES: AN ETHIC OF KNOWLEDGE. Science carries with it a profoundly


ethical attitude towards knowledge. Foremost is what philosopher Karl Popper (1979)
described as the public nature of scientific knowledge. The commitment to public
knowledge means a willingness by scientists to share their methods and findings with
others. The public nature of scientific knowledge underscores the point that scientists are
part of a community of scholars who work together. Without such open access, the scien-
tific enterprise grinds to a screeching halt, because research progress hinges on the ability
of the scientific community to independently evaluate other investigators’ findings.
Another crucial scientific attitude is that scientists should try their best to be
objective when evaluating evidence. That is, scientists should try not to allow personal
or financial investments in their research to influence their conclusions. Objectivity is
easier to say than to achieve, because scientists are human and therefore almost inevi-
tably biased to some degree. The ethics of knowledge on which science is founded have
always been, and continue to be, profoundly challenged by the legal, commercial and
social frameworks in which scientists, as human beings, must operate.

psychomythology
WHAT IS SCIENTIFIC THEORY?
Few terms in science have generated more confusion than the deceptively simple term theory.
Some of this confusion has contributed to serious misunderstandings about how science works.
We will first examine what a scientific theory is, and then address two misconceptions that
show what a scientific theory is not.
A scientific theory is an explanation for a large number of findings in the natural world,
including the psychological world. A scientific theory offers an account that ties multiple find-
ings together into one conceptual package.
But good scientific theories do more than account for existing data. They generate pre-
dictions regarding new data we haven’t yet observed. For a theory to be scientific, it must
generate novel predictions that researchers can test. Scientists call a testable prediction a
hypothesis. In other words, theories are general explanations, whereas hypotheses are spe-
cific predictions derived from those explanations (Bolles, 1962; Meehl, 1967). Based on their
tests of hypotheses, scientists can provisionally accept the theory that generated these hypo­
theses, reject the theory outright, or revise it (Proctor & Capaldi, 2006).

Misconception 1: A theory explains one specific event. The first misunderstanding is that
a theory is a specific explanation for an event. The popular media get this distinction
public knowledge wrong much of the time. We often hear television reporters say something such as,
willingness to share our findings with others ‘The most likely theory for the robbery at the downtown bank is that it was commit-
objectivity ted by two former bank employees who dressed up as armed guards’. But this isn’t a
attempt to set aside personal interests when ‘theory’ of the robbery. For one thing, it attempts to explain only one event rather
evaluating the evidence for a scientific claim than a variety of diverse observations and, for another, it doesn’t generate testable
scientific theory predictions.
explanation for a large number of findings in
the natural world Misconception 2: A theory is just an educated guess. A second myth is that a scientific
theory is merely a guess about how the world works. People often dismiss a theoretical
hypothesis
explanation on these grounds, arguing that it’s ‘just a theory’.
testable prediction derived from a theory

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What is psychology? Science versus intuition  9

In fact, all general scientific explanations about how the world works are theories. A few
­theories are extremely well supported by multiple lines of evidence; for example, the Big Bang
theory, which proposes that the universe we see today began in a gigantic explosion about
14 billion years ago, helps scientists to explain a diverse array of observations. They include
the findings that: (1) galaxies are rushing away from each other at remarkable speeds; (2) the
universe exhibits a background radiation suggestive of the remnants of a tremendous explosion;
and (3) powerful telescopes reveal that the oldest galaxies originated shortly after 14 billion
years ago, right around the time predicted by the Big Bang theory. Like all scientific theories,
the Big Bang theory can never be ‘proved’ because it is always conceivable that a better expla-
nation might come along one day. Nevertheless, because this theory is consistent with many
differing lines of evidence, the overwhelming majority of scientists accept it as a good explana-
tion. Darwinian evolution, the Big Bang, and other well-established theories aren’t just guesses
about how the world works, because very many of their predictions have been substantiated
over and over again by independent investigators. In contrast, many other scientific theories are
only moderately well supported, and still others are questionable or entirely discredited. Not
all theories are created equal.
So, when we hear that a scientific explanation is ‘just a theory’, we should remember that
theories aren’t just guesses. Some theories have survived repeated efforts to test them and are
well-confirmed models of how the world works (Kitcher, 2009).

SCIENCE AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST BIAS: PROTECTING US FROM OURSELVES. Some


people assume that, because scientists strive for objective knowledge, scientists them-
selves are free of biases. Yet scientists are only human and so they have their biases, too
(Mahoney & DeMonbreun, 1977). However, the best scientists try to be aware of their
biases and try to find ways of compensating for them. This principle applies to all scien-
tists, including psychological scientists—those who study mind, brain and behaviour. In
particular, the best scientists realise that they want their pet theories to turn out to be
correct. After all, they have invested months or even years in designing and running a
study to test a theory, sometimes a theory they have developed. If the results of the study
are negative, they will often be bitterly disappointed. They also know that because of this
deep personal investment, they may bias the results unintentionally to obtain the ones Here are four cards. Each of them has a letter on one
they want (Greenwald et al., 1986). Scientists are prone to self-deception, just like the rest side and a number on the other side. Two of these
of us. There are several traps into which scientists can fall unless they are careful. We will cards are shown with the letter side up, and two with
the number side up.
discuss two of the most crucial next.
Confirmation bias. To protect themselves against bias, good scientists adopt E C 5 4
procedural safeguards against errors, especially errors that could work in their favour (see
Chapter 2). In other words, science contains powerful tools for overcoming confirmation Indicate which of these cards you have to turn over in
bias—the tendency to seek out evidence that supports our hypotheses, and neglect or order to determine whether the following claim is true:
distort evidence that contradicts them (Nickerson, 1998; Risen & Gilovich, 2007). We can If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an odd
sum up confirmation bias in five words: Seek and ye shall find. number on the other side.
Because of confirmation bias, our preconceptions often lead us to focus on evidence
that supports our beliefs, resulting in psychological tunnel vision. One of the simplest FIGURE 1.2 Diagram of Wason selection task.
demonstrations of confirmation bias comes from research on the Wason selection task In the Wason selection task, you must pick
(Wason, 1966), an example of which is shown in Figure 1.2. There you will see four cards, two cards to test the hypothesis that all cards
each of which has a number on one side and a letter on the other. Your task is to determine that have a vowel on one side have an odd
whether the following hypothesis is correct: all cards that have a vowel on one side have an number on the other. Which two will you
odd number on the other. To test this hypothesis, you need to select two cards to turn over. select?
Which two will you pick? Decide on your two cards before reading further.
Most people pick the cards showing E and 5. If you selected E, you were right, so
give yourself one point there. But if you selected 5, you have fallen prey to confirmation
confirmation bias
bias, although you would be in good company because most people make this mistake. tendency to seek out evidence that supports
Although 5 seems to be a correct choice, it can only confirm the hypothesis, not discon- our hypotheses and neglect or distort
firm it. Think of it this way: if there is a vowel on the other side of the 5 card, this does evidence that contradicts them

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10   Chapter 1 Science and pseudoscience in psychology

not rule out the possibility that the 4 card has a vowel on the other side, which
would disconfirm the hypothesis. So the 4 card is actually the other card to
turn over, as that is the only other card that could disconfirm the hypothesis.
Confirmation bias would not be especially interesting if it were
limited to cards with numbers and letters. What makes confirmation bias so
important is that it extends to many areas of daily life, including friendship,
romance and politics (Nickerson, 1998; Rassin, Eerland & Kuijpers, 2010).
For example, research shows that confirmation bias affects how we evaluate
candidates for political office—including those on both the left and right sides
of the political spectrum. Research shows that if we agree with a candidate’s
political views, we quickly forgive the candidate for contradicting himself or
herself, but if we disagree with a candidate’s views, we criticise him or her as a
‘flip-flopper’ (Tavris & Aronson, 2007; Westen et al., 2006). When it comes to
Most of us believe that we evaluate political judging right and wrong, our side almost always seems to be in the right; the other side,
information objectively. Yet psychological in the wrong.
research suggests that when our favourite Although you will be encountering a variety of biases in this text, we can think
candidates contradict themselves, we
of confirmation bias as the ‘mother of all biases’. That is because it is the bias that can
quickly forgive them and explain away the
most easily fool us into seeing what we want to see. For that reason, it is also the most
inconsistency. But when candidates we do not
crucial bias that scientists need to counteract. Incidentally, scientists are probably just as
like contradict themselves, we criticise them
prone to confirmation bias as everyone else (Meehl, 1993). For example, research shows
as being hypocritical. (Source: AAP Image/Alan
that academic psychologists are more likely to recommend an article for publication if
Porritt.)
the findings are consistent with their favourite theory of behaviour than if they are not
(Mahoney, 1977). What distinguishes scientists from non-scientists is that the former
adopt systematic safeguards to protect against confirmation bias, whereas the latter do
not. You will learn about these safeguards in Chapter 2.
Belief perseverance: it’s my story and I’m sticking to it. Confirmation bias can
predispose us to another shortcoming to which we are all prone: belief perseverance.
Belief perseverance refers to the tendency to stick to our initial beliefs even when evidence
contradicts them. In everyday parlance, belief perseverance is the ‘do not confuse me
with the facts’ effect. Because none of us wants to believe we are wrong, we are usually
reluctant to give up our cherished notions. Indeed, as evidence against our deep-seated
beliefs mounts, we often search desperately for evidence that confirms them. More often
than not, we will manage to find it.
In a striking demonstration of belief perseverance, Lee Ross and his colleagues
asked students to inspect 50 suicide notes and determine which were genuine and which
were fake (in reality, half were genuine, half fake). They then gave the students feedback
on how well they did. Unbeknownst to students, this feedback bore no relation to their
actual performance. Instead, the researchers randomly told some students that they
were good at detecting real suicide notes and others that they were bad at it. Even after
investigators told the students that their feedback was completely bogus—which it was—
the students based their estimates of ability on the feedback they had received. That is,
students told that they were good at detecting real suicide notes were convinced that they
were better at it than those students told that they were bad at it. In contrast to the second
group of students, the first group even predicted they would do well on a similar task in
the future (Ross, Lepper & Hubbard, 1975).
Beliefs endure. Even when informed we are wrong, we do not completely wipe our
mental slates clean and start from scratch.

The boundaries of science


belief perseverance
tendency to stick to our initial beliefs even It is essential to distinguish pseudoscience (claims that pretend to be science) from the
when evidence contradicts them non-scientific knowledge that comes from domains of inquiry which lie outside the scope
non-scientific knowledge of science. Disciplines such as mathematics, ethics, history, art, music, literature, poetry,
assertions about aspects of reality that are not religion, law and politics (to name some key examples) pursue vital questions that are
experimentally testable not addressed by the methods of science. These fields have developed their own critical

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Psychological pseudoscience: imposters of science  11

methods suited to pursue their particular aims. That is not to say that science has nothing to
contribute to inquiry in these domains—far from it. But it is to say that there are important
questions that are not resolvable within science. Take, for example, the question: ‘Why is
there something rather than nothing?’ Or consider this statement: The desire for hope is an
entirely legitimate human need which must be respected. Is this true or false? How will you
decide this by scientific experiments? There are many important questions that lie outside
the scope of science. However, psychology is a discipline that seeks to understand that
which can be known about the human condition through the methods of scientific inquiry.

Assess your knowledge FACT or FICTION?


1. Psychology involves studying the mind at one specific level of explanation.
(True/False)
2. Science is a body of knowledge consisting of all of the findings that scientists have
discovered. (True/False)
3. Scientific experiments work by trying to test the predictions of researchers’ theories.
(True/False)
4. In general, scientists are just as prone to confirmation bias as non-scientists.
(True/False) In most major bookstores, the self-help section
5. A scientific hypothesis is essentially the same thing as a scientific theory, only more is larger than the psychology section. Although
specific in its predictions. (True/False) studies show that many self-help books can
be helpful, only a small fraction of them have
Answers: (1) F (p. 5); (2) F (p. 8); (3) F (p. 8); (4) T (p. 9); (5) F (p. 8)
ever been tested in scientific studies.
(Source: Monkey Business Images/Dreamstime.)

Psychological pseudoscience: imposters of science


Of course, you might have enrolled in this course to understand yourself, your friends or LO 1.3 Describe the features of psychological
a boyfriend or girlfriend. If so, you might well be thinking, ‘But I don’t want to become pseudoscience, and distinguish it from
a scientist. In fact, I’m not even interested in research. I just want to understand people.’ psychological science.
Actually, we are not trying to persuade you to become a scientist. Instead, our LO 1.4 Identify reasons we are drawn to
goal is to persuade you to think scientifically: to become aware of your biases and to avail pseudoscience.
yourself of some of the methods scientists use to try to overcome them. In this way, you
will become better at making educated choices in your everyday life, like what weight loss
plan to choose, what psychotherapy to recommend to a friend, or even what potential
romantic partner is a better long-term bet. Not everyone can become a scientist, but just
about everyone can learn to think like one.

The amazing growth of popular psychology


The popular psychology industry is expanding rapidly. On the positive side, this means
that the Australian public has unprecedented access to psychological knowledge. On the
negative side, the remarkable growth of popular psychology has led not only to an infor-
mation explosion but also to a misinformation explosion because there is scant quality
control over what this industry produces.
To take just one example, about 3500 self-help books are published every year
(Arkowitz & Lilienfeld, 2006), although only a handful are written or even screened
by scientific experts. Investigators have found some of these books to be effective for
treating depression, anxiety and other psychological problems, but about 95 per cent
of them remain untested (Gould & Clum, 1993; Gregory et al., 2004; Rosen, 1993). Still
other self-help books may actually make certain psychological conditions worse (Rosen,
Glasgow & Moore, 2003). And although some self-help books contain high-quality
and scientifically supported information, others are misleading or even dangerous. For
example, some of these books encourage readers who suspect they might have been

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12   Chapter 1 Science and pseudoscience in psychology

sexually abused in childhood to try hard to ‘remember’ the abuse. Yet this procedure may
increase many readers’ risk for false memories of abuse (McConkey & Sheehan, 1995).
Coinciding with the rapid expansion of the popular psychology industry is the
enormous growth of treatments and products that purport to cure almost every imagi-
nable psychological ailment. There are more than 500 ‘brands’ of psychotherapy (Eisner,
2000), with new ones being added every year. Fortunately, as you will learn in Chapter 17,
research shows that some of these treatments are clearly helpful for depression, anxiety
disorders, eating disorders, sleep difficulties and a host of other psychological problems.
Yet the substantial majority of psychotherapies remain untested, so we do not know
whether they help. Some may even be harmful (Lilienfeld, 2007).
Some self-help books base their recommendations on solid research about
psychological problems and their treatment. We can often find excellent articles and
programmes in Australian and international media outlets that present high-quality
information regarding the science of psychology. In addition, hundreds of websites
provide remarkably helpful information and advice concerning a host of psychological
topics, like memory, personality testing, and psychological disorders and their treatment
(see Table 1.1). In contrast, many other websites contain misleading or erroneous infor-
mation, so we need to be armed with accurate knowledge to evaluate them.

TABLE 1.1 Some websites for scientific psychology and mental health
ORGANISATION/URL
Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness
http://theassc.org
Australian Association for Cognitive and Behaviour Therapy
www.aacbtwa.org.au
Australian Neuroscience Society
www.ans.org.au
Australian Psychological Society
www.psychology.org.au
Australian Psychoanalytical Society
www.psychoanalysis.asn.au
Australian Society of Hypnosis
www.ozhypnosis.com.au
Australian Society for Psychophysiology, Inc.
www.asp.org.au
Brain Foundation (Australia)
http://brainfoundation.org.au
Evidence-Based Mental Health Treatment for Children and Adolescents
www.abct.org/sccap
Koestler Parapsychology Unit
www.koestler-parapsychology.psy.ed.ac.uk
Society for Personality and Social Psychology
www.spsp.org
Society of Clinical Psychology
www.psychology.sunysb.edu/eklonsky-/division12
Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice
Subliminal self-help tapes supposedly influence www.srmhp.org
behaviour by means of messages delivered to Psychological Medicine New York University
the unconscious. But do they really work? http://psych.med.nyu.edu/patient-care/a-z-diseases-conditions

What is pseudoscience?
These facts highlight a crucial point: we need to distinguish claims that are genuinely
pseudoscience scientific from those that are merely imposters of science. An imposter of science is a
set of claims that seems scientific but is not pseudoscience: a set of claims that seems scientific but is not. In particular, pseudoscience

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Psychological pseudoscience: imposters of science  13

lacks the safeguards against confirmation bias and belief perseverance that
characterise science.
As we have discussed, popular psychology is a mix of high-quality
science and pseudoscience (as well as a great deal in between). The problem
is that unless we are careful, we can be easily duped into confusing these
two sorts of evidence and accepting impressive-sounding claims that are
devoid of scientific substance.
You will find throughout this text that some popular psychology
claims are largely or entirely pseudoscientific. That is not to say that all of
these claims are entirely false. In fact, at least a few of them possess a core
of truth. Still others might be shown to be true in future research. Yet the
proponents of these claims do not typically ‘play by the rules’ of science.
Science is a process and not a set of beliefs, so the difference between
science and pseudoscience is not always clear-cut. Some psychological
products and treatments are based mostly on science but partly on pseudoscience, and Pseudoscientific and otherwise questionable
vice versa. Still, we can pinpoint a number of helpful distinctions between science and claims have increasingly altered the landscape
pseudoscience, even if the boundaries between them become fuzzy around the edges of modern life.
(Leahey & Leahey, 1983; Lindeman, 1998).

WARNING SIGNS OF PSEUDOSCIENCE. Numerous warning signs can help us distinguish


science from pseudoscience; we have listed some of the most useful ones in Table 1.2.
They are extremely helpful rules of thumb, so useful in fact that we will draw on many
of them in later chapters to help us become more informed consumers of psychological
claims. We can—and should—also use them in everyday life. None of these signs is by
itself proof positive that a set of claims is pseudoscientific. Nevertheless, the more of these
signs we see, the more sceptical of these claims we should become. Here, we will discuss
three of the most crucial of these warning signs.

TABLE 1.2 Some warning signs that can help us recognise pseudoscience
SIGN OF PSEUDOSCIENCE EXAMPLE
Overuse of ad hoc immunising hypotheses The psychic who claimed to predict the future failed all controlled tests in the lab, but
said it was because the experimenters inhibited his extrasensory powers.
Exaggerated claims Three simple steps will change your love life forever!
Overreliance on anecdotes This woman practised yoga daily for three weeks and hasn’t had a day of depression
since.
Absence of connectivity to other research Amazing new innovations in research have shown that eye massage results in reading
speeds 10 times faster than average!
Lack of review by other scholars (called ‘peer Fifty studies conducted by the company all show overwhelming success!
review’) or replication by independent labs
Lack of self-correction when contrary evidence Although some scientists say that we use almost all our brains, we have found a way to
is published harness additional brain power previously undiscovered.
Meaningless ‘psychobabble’ that uses fancy Sine-wave filtered auditory stimulation is carefully designed to encourage maximal
scientific-sounding terms that don’t make sense orbitofrontal dendritic development.
Talk of ‘proof’ instead of ‘evidence’ Our new programme is proven to reduce social anxiety by at least 50 per cent!

Overuse of ad hoc immunising hypotheses. Yes, we know this one is a


mouthful. But it is actually not as complicated as it appears, because an ad hoc immu-
nising hypothesis is just an escape hatch that defenders of a theory use to protect their
ad hoc immunising hypothesis
theory from being contradicted by evidence. When proponents of a theory come across escape hatch or loophole that defenders of a
negative evidence, they often try to explain it away by invoking loopholes (excuses for theory use to protect their theory from being
the negative results). Sometimes these excuses can be shown to be correct, but in other contradicted by evidence
cases excuses are simply added upon excuses until there is no longer any possibility extrasensory perception (ESP)
for evidence to contradict the theory. For example, some psychics have claimed to perception of events outside the recognised
perform remarkable feats of extrasensory perception (ESP) in the real world, such channels of sensory information

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14   Chapter 1 Science and pseudoscience in psychology

as reading others’ minds or forecasting the future. But when brought into the labora-
tory and tested under tightly controlled conditions, most have bombed, performing no
better than chance. Some of these psychics and their proponents have invoked an ad
hoc immunising hypothesis to explain away these failures: the sceptical attitudes of the
experimenters are somehow interfering with psychic powers (Carroll, 2003). Although
this hypothesis is not necessarily wrong, it makes the psychics’ claims essentially
impossible to test by sceptical experimenters. In such cases, good scientists will seek to
test the ad hoc hypothesis itself, but the continuing addition of ad hoc hypotheses can
render any theory immune to scientific tests (Lakatos, 1974).
Lack of self-correction. As you have learned, many scientific claims turn out to be
wrong. In science, incorrect claims tend to be weeded out eventually, even though it often
Factoid takes a while. By contrast, in pseudosciences incorrect claims never go away, because
their proponents cling to them stubbornly despite all contrary evidence. In the case of
Astrology, which has been around for speed-reading courses, the claims of most advocates have not been changed one bit by the
almost 5000 years, is a striking example overwhelmingly negative findings.
of the absence of self-correction found in
many pseudosciences. Some of the star Overreliance on anecdotes. There is an old saying that the ‘plural of anecdote
charts used by modern astrologers are is not data’. A mountain of numerous anecdotes may seem impressive, but it should not
virtually identical to those used thousands persuade us to put much stock in others’ claims. Anecdotes are ‘I know a person who’
of years ago (Hines, 2003). This is in spite assertions (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Stanovich, 2004). This kind of second-hand evidence—‘I
of a phenomenon known as precession, a know a person who says his self-esteem skyrocketed after receiving hypnosis’, ‘I know
gradual shift in the Earth’s axis, rendering a person who tried to commit suicide after taking an antidepressant’—is commonplace
the appearance of the stars in the night in everyday life. However, anecdotes should not be confused with testimony, which is a
sky substantially different from what it basic form of evidence in the law courts and for historians. These fields have their own
was thousands of years ago. critical standards for assessing the credibility of such testimony.
Pseudosciences tend to rely heavily on anecdotal evidence. In many cases, they
base claims on the dramatic reports of one or two individuals: ‘I lost 30 kilos in three
weeks on the Matzo Ball Soup Weight-Loss Programme.’ Compelling as this anecdote
may appear, it doesn’t constitute good scientific evidence (Davison & Lazarus, 2007;
Loftus & Guyer, 2002). For one thing, anecdotes don’t tell us anything about cause and
effect. Maybe the Matzo Ball Soup Weight-Loss Programme caused the person to lose
30 kilos, but maybe other factors were responsible. Perhaps he went on an additional
diet or started to exercise frantically during that time. Or perhaps he underwent drastic
weight-loss surgery during this time but didn’t bother to mention it. Anecdotes also don’t
tell us anything about how representative the cases are. Perhaps most people who went
on the Matzo Ball Soup Weight-Loss Programme gained weight, but we never heard from
them. Finally, anecdotes are often difficult to verify. Do we really know for sure that he
lost 30 kilos? We’re taking his word for it, which is a risky idea.
Simply put, most anecdotes are extremely difficult to interpret as evidence. As
clinical psychologist Paul Meehl (1995) put it: ‘The clear message of history is that the
anecdotal method delivers both wheat and chaff, but it does not enable us to tell which is
which’ (p. 1019).

WHY ARE WE DRAWN TO PSEUDOSCIENCE? There are a host of reasons why so many
of us are drawn to pseudoscientific beliefs. Perhaps the central reason stems from the
way our brains work. Our brains are predisposed to make order out of disorder and find
sense in nonsense. This tendency is generally adaptive, as it helps us to simplify the often
bewildering world in which we live (Alcock, 1995; Pinker, 1997; Shermer, 2011). Without
it, we would be constantly overwhelmed by endless streams of information we don’t have
the time or ability to process. Yet this adaptive tendency can sometimes lead us astray,
because it can cause us to perceive meaningful patterns even when they are not there
(Carroll, 2003; Davis, 2009).
astrology Finding comfort in our beliefs. Another reason for the popularity of pseudo­
pseudoscience that claims to predict people’s
science is motivational: we believe in part because we want to believe. As the old saying
personalities and futures from the precise
date and time of their birth goes, ‘hope springs eternal’. Many pseudoscientific claims, such as astrology, may give us

Copyright © Pearson Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) 2016 – 9781488613050 - Psychology PSY1011 and PSY1022 2nd edition
Psychological pseudoscience: imposters of science  15

from inquiry to understanding


WHY DO WE PERCEIVE PATTERNS EVEN WHEN THEY
DON’T EXIST? (a)
Our tendency to see patterns in meaningless data is so profound that one science writer,
Michael Shermer (2008), gave it a name: patternicity. Although patternicity can lead to errors, it
probably stems from an evolutionarily adaptive tendency (Reich, 2010). If we eat a specific food,
say a bacon cheeseburger, for lunch tomorrow and become violently ill soon afterward, we will
tend to avoid bacon cheeseburgers for a while (see Chapter 6). We will do so even though
there is a very good chance that the link between the cheeseburger and our becoming ill was
purely coincidental. No matter—our brains tend to seek out patterns and connections among
events, because of a basic evolutionary principle: ‘better safe than sorry’. All things being equal,
it is usually better to assume that a connection between two events exists than to assume
that it doesn’t, especially when one of the events is physically dangerous. We all fall prey to
patternicity from time to time. If we think of a friend with whom we haven’t spoken in a few
months and immediately afterward receive a phone call from him or her, we may jump to the
conclusion that this striking co-occurrence stems from ESP. Well, it might. But it is also entirely (b)
possible, if not likely, that these two events happened at about the same time by chance alone.
FIGURE 1.3 Face on Mars. The remarkable
For a moment, think of the number of times one of your old friends comes to mind and then
‘Face on Mars’ photo taken by the Mars
think of the number of phone calls you receive each month. You will realise that the laws of
Viking Orbiter in 1976. Some argued that this
probability make it likely that at least once over the next few years, you will be thinking of an
face provides conclusive proof of intelligent
old friend at about the same time he or she calls.
life away from Earth. A more detailed
Another manifestation of patternicity is our tendency to see meaningful images in mean-
photograph, taken in 2001, revealed that this
ingless visual stimuli. Any of us who has looked at a cloud and perceived the vague shape of an
‘face’ was just an illusion. (Source: NASA/
animal has experienced this version of patternicity, as has any of us who has seen the oddly mis-
courtesy of nasaimages.org.)
shapen face of a ‘man’ in the moon. A more stunning example comes from the photograph in
Figure 1.3a. In 1976, the Mars Viking Orbiter snapped an image of a set of features on the Martian
surface. As we can see, these features bear an eerie resemblance to a human face. So eerie, in
fact, that some individuals maintained that the ‘Face on Mars’ offered conclusive proof of intelli-
gent life on the Red Planet (Hoagland, 1987). In 2001, during a mission of a different spacecraft,
the Mars Global Surveyor, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) decided
to adopt a scientific approach to the face on Mars. NASA was open-minded but demanded evi-
dence. It swooped down much closer to the face and pointed the Surveyor’s cameras directly at
it. If we look at Figure 1.3b, we will see what NASA found: absolutely nothing. The patternicity
in this instance was a consequence of a peculiar configuration of rocks and shadows present at
the angle at which the photographs were taken in 1976, a camera artefact in the original pho-
tograph that just happened to place a black dot where a nostril should be, and perhaps most
importantly, of our innate tendency to perceive meaningful faces in what are basically random
visual stimuli (see Chapter 11).

comfort because they seem to offer us a sense of control over an often unpredictable world
(Shermer, 2002). Research suggests that we are especially prone to patternicity when we
experience a loss of control over our surroundings. Jennifer Whitson and Adam Galinsky FIGURE 1.4 Regaining control. Do you see an
(2008) deprived some participants of a sense of control—for example, by having them try image in either of these pictures? Participants
to solve an unsolvable puzzle or recall a life experience in which they lacked control— in Whitson and Galinsky’s (2008) study who
and found that they were more likely than other participants to perceive conspiracies, were deprived of a sense of control were more
embrace superstitious beliefs, and detect patterns in meaningless visual stimuli (see likely than other participants to see images in
Figure 1.4). These results may help to explain why so many of us believe in astrology, ESP both pictures, even though only the picture on
and other belief systems that claim to foretell the future: they lend us a sense of control the bottom contains an image (a faint drawing
over the uncontrollable (Wang, Whitson & Menon, 2012). of the planet Saturn).

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16   Chapter 1 Science and pseudoscience in psychology

According to terror management theory our awareness of our own inev-


Factoid itable death leaves many of us with an underlying sense of fear (Solomon, Greenberg
& Pyszczynski, 2000; Vail et al., 2010). We cope with these feelings of terror, advocates
‘Streaks’ of several consecutive heads (H) of this theory propose, by adopting cultural worldviews that reassure us that our lives
or tails (T) in a row when flipping a coin, possess a broader meaning and purpose—one that extends well beyond our vanishingly
like HTTTHTTTHTTHHHTHHTTHH, brief existence on this planet.
are more common than we believe. Can terror management theory help to explain the popularity of certain para-
Moreover they are inevitable, in normal beliefs, such as astrology, ESP and communication with the dead? Perhaps. Our
lengthy random sequences. Indeed, society’s widespread beliefs in life after death and reincarnation may stem in part from
the sequence above is almost perfectly the terror that stems from knowing we will eventually die (Lindeman, 1998; Noren-
random (Gilovich, 1991). Because we zayan & Hansen, 2006). Two researchers (Morier & Podlipentseva, 1997) found that
usually underestimate the likelihood of compared with other participants, participants who were asked to contemplate death
consecutive sequences, we may be prone reported higher levels of beliefs in the paranormal, such as ESP, ghosts, reincarnation and
to attributing more significance to these astrology, than did other participants. It is likely that such beliefs are comforting to many
sequences than they deserve (‘Wow … of us, especially when confronted with reminders of our demise, because they imply the
I must be on a winning streak!’). existence of a dimension beyond our own.
Terror management theory doesn’t demonstrate that paranormal claims are
false; we still need to evaluate these claims on their own merits. Instead, this theory
suggests that we are likely to hold many paranormal beliefs regardless of whether they
are correct.

THINKING CLEARLY: AN ANTIDOTE AGAINST PSEUDOSCIENCE. Both to


avoid being seduced by the charms of pseudoscience, and simply to do good
science, we must learn to avoid commonplace pitfalls in reasoning. Students
new to psychology commonly fall prey to logical fallacies: traps in thinking
that can lead to mistaken conclusions. It is easy for us to make these errors,
because they seem to make intuitive sense. We should remember that scien-
tific thinking often requires us to cast aside our beloved intuitions, although
doing so can be extremely difficult.
Here we will examine three especially important logical fallacies
that are essential to bear in mind when evaluating psychological claims.
Learning to avoid these and other logical fallacies (see Table 1.3) takes
considerable time and effort. To do so, you must unlearn deeply entrenched
habits of thinking. Nevertheless, if you bear these fallacies in mind when
According to terror management theory, evaluating scientific evidence, you will find yourself becoming a better critical thinker
reminders of our death can lead us to adopt in everyday life.
comforting worldviews—perhaps, in some
cases, belief in the paranormal. (Source: Michal Emotional reasoning fallacy. ‘The idea that daycare might have negative emotional
Bednarek/Dreamstime.) effects on children gets me really upset, so I refuse to believe it.’
The emotional reasoning fallacy is the error of using our emotions as guides for
evaluating the validity of a claim (some psychologists also refer to this error as the affect
heuristic; Kahneman, 2011; Slovic & Peters, 2006). If we are honest with ourselves, we will
terror management theory realise that findings that challenge our pre-existing beliefs often make us angry, whereas
theory proposing that our awareness of our findings that confirm these beliefs often make us happy or at least relieved. We shouldn’t
death leaves us with an underlying sense make the mistake of assuming that because a scientific claim makes us feel uncomfortable
of terror with which we cope by adopting or indignant, it must be wrong. In the case of scientific questions concerning the psycho-
reassuring cultural worldviews
logical effects of daycare, which are scientifically controversial (Belsky, 1988; Hunt, 1999),
logical fallacies we need to keep an open mind to the data, regardless of whether they confirm or discon-
traps in thinking that can lead to mistaken firm our preconceptions.
conclusions
Bandwagon fallacy. ‘A lot of people I know believe in astrology, so there’s got to
emotional reasoning fallacy
error of using our emotions as guides for be something to it.’
evaluating the validity of a claim The bandwagon fallacy is the error of assuming that a claim is correct just because
many people believe it. It is an error, because popular opinion is not a dependable guide
bandwagon fallacy
error of assuming that a claim is correct just to the accuracy of an assertion. Before 1500, almost everyone believed the sun revolved
because many people believe it around the Earth, rather than vice versa, but they were woefully mistaken.

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Psychological pseudoscience: imposters of science  17

TABLE 1.3 Other logical fallacies to remember when evaluating psychological claims
NAME DEFINITION EXAMPLE OF THE FALLACY Factoid
Appeal to Error of accepting a claim ‘My professor says that psychotherapy Nobel Prize–winning physicist Luis
authority fallacy merely because an authority is worthless; because I trust my
Alvarez once had an eerie experience:
figure endorses it professor, she must be right.’
while reading the newspaper, he came
Genetic fallacy Error of confusing the ‘Freud’s views about personality
across a phrase that reminded him of an
correctness of a belief with development can’t be right, because
its origins (genesis) Freud’s thinking was shaped by sexist old childhood friend he had not thought
views popular at the time.’ about for decades. A few pages later, he
came upon his friend’s obituary! Initially
Argument from Error of assuming that a ‘There must be something to the
antiquity fallacy belief must be valid just Rorschach Inkblot Test, because stunned, Alvarez (1965) performed some
because it has been around a psychologists have been using it for calculations and determined that given the
long time decades.’ number of people on Earth and the number
Argument Error of confusing the validity ‘IQ can’t be influenced by genetic of people who die every day, this kind of
from adverse of an idea with its potential factors, because if that were true it strange coincidence probably occurs about
consequences real-world consequences would give the government an excuse 3000 times across the world each year.
fallacy to prevent low-IQ individuals from
reproducing.’
Appeal to Error of assuming that a claim ‘No scientist has been able to explain
ignorance fallacy must be true because no one away every reported case of ESP,
has shown it to be false so ESP probably exists.’
Naturalistic Error of inferring a moral ‘Evolutionary psychologists say that
fallacy judgement from a scientific sexual infidelity is a product of natural
fact selection. Therefore, sexual infidelity is
ethically justifiable.’
Hasty Error of drawing a conclusion ‘All three people I know who are
generalisation on the basis of insufficient severely depressed had strict fathers,
fallacy evidence so severe depression is clearly
associated with having a strict father.’
Circular Error of basing a claim on ‘Dr Smith’s theory of personality is the
reasoning fallacy the same claim reworded in best, because it seems to have the most
slightly different terms evidence supporting it.’

Not me fallacy. ‘My psychology professor keeps talking about how the
scientific method is important for overcoming biases. But these biases do not
apply to me, because I’m objective.’
The not me fallacy may be the most widespread and dangerous of all
logical fallacies. It is the error of believing we are immune from errors in
thinking that afflict other people. This fallacy can get us into deep trouble,
because it can lead us to conclude mistakenly that we do not require the
safeguards of the scientific method. When scientists fall into this trap (as
proponents on both sides of the global warming debate have claimed about
each other), they join the ranks of the pseudoscientists. They become so
certain that their claims are right—and uncontaminated by mistakes in their
thinking—that they do not bother to conduct scientific studies to back up
their claims. The bandwagon fallacy reminds us that the
Bias blind spot. Social psychologists have recently uncovered a fascinating number of people who hold a belief is not a
phenomenon called the bias blind spot, which means that most people are unaware of dependable barometer of its accuracy. (Source:
their biases but are keenly aware of them in others (Pronin, Gilovich & Ross, 2004; van Paul Kane/Getty Images.)
Hecke, 2007). None of us believes we have an accent because we live with our accent all of
the time. Similarly, few of us believe we have biases, because we have grown accustomed not me fallacy
to seeing the world through our own psychological lenses. To see the not me fallacy at error of believing we are immune from
work, watch a debate between two intelligent people who hold extremely polarised views thinking errors that afflict others
on a political issue. More likely than not, you will see that the debate participants are bias blind spot
quite adept at pointing out biases in their opponents, but are often oblivious of their own lack of awareness of our biases, coupled with
equally glaring biases. an awareness of others’ biases

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18   Chapter 1 Science and pseudoscience in psychology

The dangers of pseudoscience: why should we care?


Up to this point, we have been making a big deal about pseudoscience. But why should we
care about it? After all, isn’t a great deal of pseudoscience, like astrology, pretty harmless?
In fact, pseudoscience can be dangerous, even deadly. There are three major reasons why
we should all be concerned about pseudoscience.
• Opportunity cost: what we give up. Pseudoscientific treatments for mental
disorders can lead people to forgo effective treatments. As a consequence,
even treatments that are themselves harmless can cause harm indirectly. This
phenomenon is called opportunity cost: people who invest time, effort and
energy in obtaining a questionable treatment may forfeit the chance to obtain
a treatment that works. For example, a major community survey (Kessler et al.,
2001) revealed that people with histories of severe depression or anxiety attacks
more often received scientifically unsupported treatments than scientifically
supported treatments, like cognitive-behavioural therapy (see Chapter 17). The
unsupported treatments included: acupuncture, which has never been shown to
work for depression despite a few scattered positive findings; laughter therapy,
which is based on the untested notion that laughing can cure depression; and
energy therapy, which is based on the untested notion that all people possess
Candace Newmaker was a tragic victim of invisible energy fields that influence their moods (see Chapter 17). Although
what science writer Michael Shermer (2002) some of these treatments may be shown to be helpful in future studies (and all
aptly called ‘death by theory’. The rebirthing new approaches must begin as untested ideas), consumers who seek them out
therapists who smothered her to death were should be aware that there are empirically supported alternatives.
convinced that she needed to re-enact the • Direct harm. Pseudoscientific treatments occasionally do dreadful harm to
birth trauma to eliminate her psychological those who receive them. Take the tragic case of Candace Newmaker, a 10-year-
problems. (Source: AP Photo.) old girl who in 2000 underwent pseudoscientific treatment for behavioural
problems (Mercer, Sarner & Rosa, 2003). Candace received a treatment called
rebirthing therapy, which is premised on the scientifically doubtful notion
that children’s behavioural problems are attributable to difficulties in forming
attachments to their parents stemming from birth—in some cases, even
before birth (see Chapter 17). Despite the confusingly similar terminology
(and appeals to genuine scientific work in promotional material), this therapy
should not be confused with the attachment theory findings of developmental
psychologists. During rebirthing, children or adolescents re-enact the trauma
of birth with the ‘assistance’ of one or more therapists. Hundreds of thera-
pists practise this treatment even though there is no evidence that it works
(Mercer, 2002). During Candace’s rebirthing session, two therapists wrapped
her in a flannel blanket, sat on her and squeezed her repeatedly in an effort to
simulate birth contractions. During the 40-minute session, Candace vomited
several times and begged the therapists for air, complaining desperately that
she could not breathe and felt as though she were going to die. When Candace
was unwrapped from her symbolic ‘birth canal’, she was dead (Mercer, Sarner
& Rosa, 2003).
Stem cell research is controversial on both • An inability to think critically as citizens. We may be tempted to pass off
scientific and ethical grounds. To evaluate this beliefs in astrology, unidentified flying saucers, crystal healing and unknown
and other controversies properly, we need to energy fields as innocuous. But in our increasingly complex scientific and tech-
be able to think critically about the potential nological society, we all need critical thinking skills to reach educated decisions
costs and benefits of such research. about global warming, toxic waste dumps, cloning, genetic engineering, stem
(Source: Australian Associated Press Pty Ltd.) cell research, novel medical treatments, and parenting and teaching practices.
Some of these decisions will take place in the voting booth, and others will take
place in our communities, homes and schools. If we are not careful, an inability
opportunity cost to think critically about a seemingly unimportant domain, like astrology,
investment of time, energy and effort in a
questionable treatment that can lead people can easily spill over into an inability to think critically about issues that can
to forfeit the chance to obtain an effective crucially affect our planet’s future, not to mention our own futures and those of
treatment our children.

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Another random document with
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with us than we actually had brought, for a heavier load might have
demanded more revolutions from the engine.

JUST BEFORE THE TAKE-OFF

OUR FOOTGEAR
The fact that the “Wal” had twin-engines gave us greater
confidence in it. In view of the situation of each engine it is possible
with a “Wal” to fly with one engine alone, with a heavy load on board,
much more easily than if the engines had been placed by each wing,
as they are in many other twin-motor machines. With a light load on
board a “Wal” can rise quite easily from the water with one engine
alone.
Our machine was built by “S. A. I. di Construzioni Mecchaniche i
Marina di Pisa” with only a few unimportant differences from the usual
Dornier-Wal. We owe a deep debt of gratitude to the factory’s technical
director, Herr Schulte-Frohlinde, for the great interest he showed in our
expedition. The director accompanied us to Spitzbergen and
superintended the setting up of the machines. In all he spent three
months of his valuable time on us. We, who otherwise would have
been taken up with this work, could now (while the work of mounting
was proceeding) give ourselves up to the completion of other tasks.
We also owe much gratitude to the Rolls-Royce factory. They sent
five men to Marina di Pisa to introduce certain new improvements and
inventions which they had hardly had time to “try out,” and they also
sent Mr. Green with us to Spitzbergen. Mr. Green superintended all the
trial flights and cared for the engines as though they were his
“darlings.” As he (after his final inspection on the 21st of May) smiled
and nodded in answer to my request to be told if all was in order, I set
off at full speed feeling just as safe as if I were only going to cross the
waters of the fjord.

Measures Against the Cold


The oil-tank on a Dornier-Wal stands with one of its sides outside
the engine-gondola’s wall. This side is furnished with cooling-ribs for
cooling off the oil. On our machine the tank was designed right into the
engine’s gondola and therefore any cooling off was unnecessary. In
addition to this capsules were built over the motors so that the heat
from the engines could be kept in the gondolas without cooling down
like the temperature outside. All the pipes were bound many times
round with linen strappings. Certain pipes had the inner layer of
bindings of felt. This provision was made both as a means of isolation
from the cold and to prevent “burst pipes.” Experience here in Norway
and in other lands shows us that most motor trouble on a long flight
originates in one or other of the pipes. The motor conducts itself well
generally. Truly I have seldom, if ever, seen a motor-construction so
free from vibration as on our machines and therefore there was little
possibility of burst pipes. As a safety measure, all the same, I regard
such binding as necessary. To the cooling water we added 4% pure
glycerine and thus had a mixture which would not have frozen before
we had -17° c. and we did not have such a low temperature up in the
ice regions. All the same we took the precaution of tapping the water
down on to one of the petrol tanks whenever it was not necessary to
be ready to start at a moment’s notice. By a special contrivance we
could pump the water direct from the tank into the radiator again. We
generally started the engine first, then pumped the water up. I should
like to explain why. The lower part of the intake-pipe was
encompassed by a water-cap through which a smaller quantity of the
cooling water is led for the purpose of warming the pipe. When the
propeller starts to turn, petrol begins to flow, lowering the temperature
in the petrol pipe considerably below atmospheric temperature. The
walls of the water-cap take on the same low temperature immediately.
If the cooling mixture at this time stands at a temperature which is
barely a few degrees above water’s freezing point, one runs the great
risk of there being so much freezing that the exhaust of the cap will be
blocked. If this occurs the cap will in one moment become a solid block
of ice, causing the sides to burst in consequence. Should one, on the
contrary, start the engine first and fill up, the cooling water will thus, in
its passage through the cylinders, be so warmed when it reaches the
cap that this calamity will be avoided.
As indicated above, we do not tap the water when we must be
ready for an immediate start. In order to keep the temperature in the
motor gondola so high that nothing should freeze, and the engines at
the same time should be absolutely ready for a start, we used the
Therm-X apparatus. This is the first time I have learned that this
apparatus bears this amusing name; hitherto I believed it was called
“Thermix.” (That is what we called it up in the ice and that is what we
are going to call it henceforth!) This apparatus was constructed
specially for us by the Société Lyonnaise des Chauds Catalytiques,
and was made in a size and form suitable for placing under the
engines or under the oil-tanks. Their manner of action was, otherwise,
exactly the same as the ordinary Thermix apparatus. We had six
apparatus in each gondola and could thus, in a short time, raise the
temperature to 35° above atmospheric temperature.
In the early days “up in the ice” we took the Thermix apparatus
down in the mess when the cooling water was tapped off. They
warmed the place up so well that we found it really pleasant and
comfortable. In the evening when we separated to go to bed, we
divided the apparatus amongst us in the three sleeping compartments,
and there we slept in a little Paradise (as compared with the later
times) when of necessity we had to economize, even in the small
quantity of petrol which they used. There we hung our frequently
soaking-wet socks, goat’s-hair socks and shoes, directly over the
apparatus to dry. I remember still how comfortable it was to put on the
warm dry footwear in the morning. During the time that we were not
able to use the Thermix apparatus we had to lay our stockings on our
chests when we went to bed in the evening—a not too comfortable
proceeding. The high temperature we were able to keep up in the body
of the plane when we had the apparatus going prevented the machine
from freezing fast in the ice. There was always a tiny little puddle
outside the body of the machine.
In order to be able to warm up the motor and the oil with the help
of this apparatus, it was necessary that we should start the engine,
screw out the sparking plugs in each cylinder, warm it up well, and set
it ready for starting again. This prevented moisture gathering on the
plugs. To help to get the petrol warm we ran along the petrol pipes with
a large soldering-lamp to help to make the petrol flow easily. On
account of these preparations we never had starting difficulties; the
engines started at once.
In case the petrol might be thick and slow in flowing we had
brought with us a quantity of naphtha with which to spray the cylinders.
We never needed, however, to make use of it.
The radiator was equipped with blinds, with which we could
regulate the radiation. They were of untold benefit to us. When the
blinds were fully barred, it took much less time to warm up the motors
before attempting to start. We used thus less petrol for warming up. To
get the greatest possible power out of the engines we could, by
regulation of the blinds, keep the temperature almost at boiling point at
the start, damping down later by opening the blinds wider.
That the compasses were filled with pure spirit, and not with the
spirit mixture, was of course a necessity. The same referred to the
levels and the water levels. Even though oil might not have frozen in
the event of our having had an oil level, it would in any case have
acted too slowly in the cold atmosphere. Moreover all the movable
parts of our instruments, which were designated for use in the cold
regions, were smeared with a special kind of oil which had been tested
in a temperature of -40° c.
In my portion of the book I must make special mention of the pilot’s
rig-out. For flying in a cold temperature it is of the greatest importance
that the pilot, who must sit still the whole time, should be warm and
appropriately clad. It is easy to find the most beautiful heavy leather
suits which can withstand every attack of cold and frost, but it is not so
easy to find garments which are appropriate for all circumstances.
Even though the pilot has to sit still he must have freedom to move
about without his clothes handicapping him. They must in all respects
be easy and pliable. What is most important is that they should be
absolutely suitable for any work which may be needed before the start.
I shall try to explain why a little more intimately. There will always be
one thing or another to be done immediately before a start is made,
and as far as we were concerned we might have to land to take
observations at any time, and start off again immediately afterwards. If
during such a landing we kept on all our flying clothes as we moved
about the ice, we should quickly become much too warm; our
underclothes would become clammy, causing us to shiver when we
should once again rise in the air. Had we only one heavy outer set of
clothes, and we took it off for any reason, we should risk taking severe
cold, and would start flying again thoroughly chilled. Our outer clothes
were therefore arranged in several plies so that without waste of time
we could take them off or put them on again to suit the temperature,
according to whether our work was strenuous or not. Our
undergarments were presented to us by the Norske
Tricotagefabrikanters Forening. They were made after we had had a
conference with one of the manufacturers, H. Meyer Jun. Next the skin
we wore a quite thin woolen vest and a pair of pants of the same
material. On the top of these we had a pair of heavy pants and a vest
of Iceland wool. Then long trousers, and a jumper, with a woolen
helmet to pull over the head. Rönne had made these suits which were
of a thin comfortable wind-proof cloth (a present from A/S William
Schmidt, Oslo). This was our working kit and also our skiing rig-out
intended to be worn should we eventually have to set out on a march
to reach land.
The flying suits were composed of a roomy jacket and long
trousers of thin pliable leather with camel hair outside. The leather
suits were presented to us by the Sporting Outfitters, S. Adam, Berlin.
On the top of these we wore a sealskin “anorak” (Eskimo jacket with
peaked hood). This outfit was made absolutely to accord with the
demand of the aforedescribed conditions.
On our heads we had a leather-lined flying-helmet. Should this not
afford sufficient warmth, we could draw the anorak’s hood over our
heads. In order to have glasses which would be suitable for any
possible condition we had taken with us a pair of ordinary spectacles
with clear glass. At the side of the pilot’s seat hung a pair of goggles
and a pair of sun-glasses; also a mask with which one could cover the
greater part of the face. However, as we sat well protected behind the
wind-screen, we were never required to use the mask. I might mention
in conjunction with all this that we took advantage of the opportunity to
discard shaving from the first day.
Round our necks we wore a big woolen scarf, and on our hands a
pair of specially made gloves of double pig-skin, with wool both inside
and out. Over these we drew a pair of gloves of thin wind-proof
material, which went right up to the elbow, where they could be drawn
up and tied. Roald Amundsen will have told you all about the footwear,
but in conclusion I should like to point out that any one could fly in this
kit daily in the most severe cold.
Progress is distressingly slow in this account of mine. To-day is the
3rd of August and up till now I have only written 4,000 words. That is
scarcely 1,000 words per day. I shall have to triple my speed and push
forward if I am to finish with my task in time.
As I sit and fag over the work of writing, and get irritated over the
difficulties which present themselves, I comfort myself by repeating the
words of an English admiral: “Good writers are generally rotten
officers.”
I see moreover from to-day’s newspapers that they wish me to be
a member of a new North Pole expedition next summer. In view of
what I am going through at the present moment I almost believe I shall
“decline with thanks.”

Spare Parts
Spare parts for the machines and engines presented an important
consideration. Spitzbergen lay so far away from the factories which
had made the material that we could not have any missing parts sent
after us. So, as far as the engines were concerned, we decided to
draw up a list of the spare parts which we should most likely need. As
an engine is made up of so many different parts the best things to do
seemed to me to order one complete reserve engine. We should
thereby have the certainty that in every event we should have at hand
one reserve part for the complete engine no matter which part should
suddenly be required. (By chance we came to need a reserve part
which we never had thought about!)
“Rolls-Royce” also made up a list of the parts which they thought
we might need more than one of, and thus we got an extraordinarily
fine equipment. We had in all engine spare parts to a value of 38,000
kronen. We should not have been able to get this equipment had not
the Rolls-Royce people shown us the great consideration of agreeing
to take back everything which we had no use for. We were in a position
similar to most expeditions, and had great financial difficulties to cope
with. I mention this as every one here at home seemed to think that
Ellsworth’s gift of 85,000 kronen would suffice for our needs. But that
was not the case. The two flying machines together cost $82,000, and
on these alone the money was almost all spent. When the expedition’s
accounts are toted up I believed that they will show a sum of at least
$100,000 in excess of Ellsworth’s gift—and that, even after we had
pinched and spared on every side. Against this we can reckon with a
certain income from stamps (this cannot at present be estimated), and
the expedition will also have an income from newspapers, films,
lectures and this book, all of which combined should cover the debt of
this necessary $100,000. The essential part of the expenses all came
before the start, but any income only accrued some time after our
return. The position at Christmas time last year appeared very
unpromising, and the outlook seemed hopeless. The till had long been
empty. Yet orders must be placed if everything was to be ready in good
time, and everything had to be paid in ready cash. Bills streamed in,
followed by demands for payment whenever they were not settled at
once. But where were we to get the money? It is satisfactory to look
back, now that everything has been accomplished, but it was far from
pleasant at the time. Our private household bills got very, very old,—so
hard-up were we!
Dr. Ræstad, who had the financial management of the undertaking,
worked on through these conditions quietly and calmly, and he was
lucky in being able to carry through a task which probably no one else
could have accomplished. Thanks to him we were able in April this
year to have everything collected in Tromsö, ready for our departure
for Spitzbergen, so that after looking through our equipment we were
able to say, “There isn’t one thing missing.”
Up till now only the returns from the newspapers have come in. We
have therefore an alarmingly large overdraft at the bank. As the
account is so overdrawn we have still difficulties to face, and must
therefore set about the fulfillment of our many obligations. We can now
look forward to a time when our income will be sufficient to pay off our
overdraft, and leave a balance, which will be used for the realization of
Roald Amundsen’s old plans.
It is on that account that I have taken this opportunity to write about
the financial side of the expedition. There are a number of people who
think that we have become rich folk. How often have I not been
congratulated—not only because I have come back with my life, but
also because I have returned as a millionaire. Probably the films
shown in this connection have given this impression. But people
should realize that we are at the mercy of the big film companies who
fix the price. If we ourselves had cinema theaters stretching through
the world’s towns, then could Roald Amundsen set out to-day on the
realization of his wonderful plan: the exploration of the sea between
the Pole and Alaska.

* * * * *
Back to the matter which I am really discussing. The same goodwill
met us in Marina di Pisa when Director Schulte-Frohlinde himself
made out the list of spare parts, assuring us (by giving the matter his
own personal attention) that we should have with us every article
necessary for the flying boats’ requirements. The bill for these spare
parts ran up to about 28,000 kronen.

Instruments
During his preparations for his earlier flight Roald Amundsen was
struck with the idea of using a sun-compass, and arranged with “Goerz
Optische Werke” to construct such an instrument. The firm met his
suggestions in the most friendly manner, and the result was our
invaluable solar-compasses. The principle of these is as follows:
The sun’s reflection is cast through a periscope down onto a dull
disc directly in front of the pilot. By the side of the instrument there is a
clock which can be coupled to a cogwheel on the periscope. The clock
is constructed so that it can swing the periscope round 360° in the
average time that it takes the sun to perform a similar movement. By
the aid of a graduated scale on the periscope, which can be placed at
a certain angle, one can set it in agreement with the flying-boat’s nose.
Should I, for example, start exactly at midday, I should set the
periscope so that it points direct astern. Exactly at twelve o’clock I
attach the clock to the instrument. Should the seaplane now by chance
face the north, I would see a little reflection of the sun in the center of
the dull disc which is marked by a cross. The periscope will now follow
the sun’s course so that the reflection will always be in the center of
the disc as long as the seaplane continues the same course.
Should it be set working at another time, it would be calculated
from the angle of the sun, at that moment when the clock is set going.
The clock is always regulated according to Greenwich time (or any
other recognized time), but the longitudinal distance must be taken into
account, and in the same manner the angle must deviate away from
the meridian beneath if one does not desire to steer parallel with it. On
the top of the periscope there is a screw with an inner part, where an
adjustment can be made according to the declination on that day. The
solar-compass is mounted on a base on which can be made
corrections for eventual latitudinal changes. The periscope’s axis must
always stand parallel with the earth’s axis. A change in the upward tilt
of the machine must also be reckoned with.
The lenses in the periscope are constructed to give a radius of 10°;
that is to say, if the sun’s reflection appears in the disc’s outer edge,
one can allow 10° before it disappears in the other outer edge. If one
has set the solar-compass for a flight directly north, one will continue in
the right direction so long as the flying machine has no deflection. In
order to detect such deflections we had a combined speedometer and
deviation measure which was also given to us free of charge by Goerz.
Amundsen attended to these on the northward journey—Dietrichson
on the southward. They both speak of them with high praise. Their
uses are shortly as follows: Inside the instrument, on a move-able ring,
is fastened a diametrical wire. One looks through the instrument down
to the ground below or to the ice, and adjusts the wire the longitudinal
way of the ship, then pays attention to the objects passing aftwards
under the plane (icebergs, for example), noting whether they follow the
direct line of the wire or deviate to the side. Should there be a
deviation, one knows that they are not following the direct course in
which the nose is pointing, so it has to be set at an angle allowing for
the deviation. The wire must be drawn to the side quite slowly until one
finds that the objects which one can notice now follow the line of the
wire exactly. This points now in the direction one comes from, and the
wire’s angle, compared with the boat’s nose, can be read directly in the
instrument. That gives the angle of deviation.
TAKING THE WINGS OUT OF THEIR BOXES

SETTING UP THE WINGS


One can also leave the wire as it is, and turn the whole instrument
instead. The angle of deviation is to be read on the instrument’s base.
This is the easiest way, as it allows one to get on quickly with
measuring the speed. Having calculated the deviation, it is not correct
to steer against the wind allowing only a corresponding number of
degrees, or it will be found that there is still a deviation, though not so
great as before. To correct it it would have to be measured, then some
steering would have to be done, then it would have to be measured
again and so on, before it could be regulated. It is, therefore, better to
come to a quick and exact result by quickly taking the speed measure.
This is done with the same instrument, by watching an object pass
between four points of the scale, as the machine goes over it. The pilot
continues to fly in a steady course during the entire observations. The
navigator sets a stop clock going when an object passes the scale at
an angle of 45°, and he stops the clock when the object passes zero,
as it will then be centrally under the machine. The altitude above the
under-lying territory is read on the altimeter, and by aid of this and the
stop clock’s indications it is possible to calculate correctly the speed
over the ground-distance covered. We have now got the following
particulars: The speed through the air which the speedometer shows
and which is called the air-speed,—the steering course through the air
which we will call the air-course,—the speed over the ground which we
will call the ground-speed and last the deviation’s angle. These
calculations have to be worked out in conjunction with each other on a
calculating machine, showing in a second what steering-course shall
be adopted under the existing wind conditions, to carry the plane in the
desired direction. In addition to this there is a gratis enlightenment,
showing the exact direction and strength of the wind at that altitude.

MOUNTING THE WINGS


THE LAST MEETING BEFORE THE FLIGHT
The pilot announces if a new course shall be steered. If he steers
according to the solar-compass, the navigator adjusts the solar-
compass by turning the periscope a corresponding number of degrees.
So long as one need not fly over clouds or fog all goes well. With
steadiness it is possible to control the course over the ground and
steer the plane straight to the Pole by territorial navigation. During the
two first hours, after we had passed Spitzbergen’s north coast, we had
thick fog under us and got no drift observations. As soon as we could
get these the solar-compass was corrected. We had, however, in the
meantime deviated so far westwards that the indicator pointed well
over to the west side of the Pole. One must pay particular attention to
the fact that the solar-compass only indicates a northward direction so
long as one is on the same meridian which the compass was adjusted
to. If one has deviated to the side and continues to steer according to
the solar-compass, one will set a course directly parallel with the
meridian for which the compass was adjusted when starting. For a new
adjustment of the compass, so that it points towards the Pole, one
must in every case take the bearings. Both during the northward
journey, and during the homeward flight, the solar-compasses were of
the utmost benefit to us. Without these and depending only on the
magnetic compasses we should have been very much less confident.
The selection of our magnetic compasses was only settled after we
had studied the various types most analytically, paying particular
attention to the conditions which they would have to answer to in the
Arctic Ocean.
I should like here to mention a common mistake founded on a
popular idea, that the Magnetic Pole lies at the North Pole. The globe
is a great magnet which has two magnetic points, a North Pole and a
South Pole, and fortunately the Magnetic Poles do not lie in the same
places as the geographical poles. The earth’s magnetic North Pole,
which draws towards itself the compasses’ North, lies on the north
coast of Canada about 70° N. and 95° W. long. In general this is called
for convenience the magnetic North Pole. Its position, as is well
known, was verified by Roald Amundsen during the Gjoa expedition.
Looking at the map, it will be discovered that the magnetic pole lies
about an equal length from the geographical North Pole as from
Spitzbergen. Therefore it stands to reason that the compass which can
be used in Spitzbergen can therefore be used in the fairway from there
to the Pole. The one thing which might cause us moments of misgiving
was the magnitude of the compass’s variations in the district we
wished to reach. (There is little data resulting from exact observation to
give us the reason of these variations.)
During a visit to Bedford, Dietrichson and I discussed this part of
the enterprise with one of my English airman friends, Captain
Johnstone, and we are most grateful for the assistance he gave us.
The result of the discussion was that we chose a steering compass as
well as a standard compass of an up-to-date type made by the firm of
Hughes & Son, London. These compasses are made to repel
movement, and to bring the needle slowly back to its correct position
without the slightest oscillation either to the right or left. In the Arctic
Sea, where the horizontal component of the earth’s magnetism is
proportionately weak, it must always take time for the needle to swing
back into position as it is so strongly repelled by existing conditions.
But we preferred this to one with a lengthy oscillation and a big swing
backwards and forwards. Steering compasses of the above kind are
eminently suitable on account of a special construction which it will
take too long to describe here. The standard compass was excellent.
The magnetic condition in the navigation compartment was also ideal.
The deviation’s coefficiency was shown by the readings we took to be
so trifling that we could consider our compasses free from deviation.
Just before leaving Spitzbergen we had one of the German Ludoph-
compasses sent to us, with a request for us to give it a trial. I placed it
in the pilot’s compartment of N 25, where it proved itself to be an
excellent compass. If the machine heeled over the dial also took a
certain tilt and the vertical component of the earth’s magnetism caused
considerable oscillation as the natural result of its great attraction.
Whilst the Ludoph-compass oscillated somewhat, the other took some
time to swing back, making it impossible for me to say which I
preferred. I steered with both of them, controlling the one by the other.
During the homeward flight I continually steered by the magnetic
compasses, and had no difficulty so long as I could have a “Landmark”
ahead. During the fog it was not such an easy matter.
A/G Gyrorector, Berlin, kindly placed at our disposal a gyroscopic
apparatus for each machine—as a loan. This instrument commended
itself to me and is the best I have seen hitherto for flying in fog or
darkness. The rising and tilting indicator was of use to me during the
whole flight. The conditions, however, were such that I did not have to
make great use of the direction indicator, beyond the fact that on the
northward flight I experimented with it in case we should find it
necessary at some time to make a forced landing in the fog. The
arrangement between the two planes was that at all costs, if we should
pass through fog, not to get separated from each other. At the close of
the homeward journey, as mentioned elsewhere, we flew into such
thick fog that I could have made use of the direction indicator. We flew,
however, so low there that the whole time I had to keep my eye glued
to the ice beneath and in front of us.
We had ordered a wireless installation for N 24, but went without it
as it was not ready in time. It was the only thing we went off without.
We never missed it. I might mention here that we had laid down a
principle not to wait at all for any belated goods.
After seeing that many different suppliers, at home as well as
abroad, should despatch the goods in time to reach Tromsö, to be
loaded by a certain date, I got endless notices to say the goods would
be belated and that we must put off our flight some days. The answer
was always the same: “We shall go without goods if they have not
arrived.” The result was, except in the case of the wireless, that
everything was delivered in good time. Had we once started to put off
our departure we should have had constant delays.

Navigation
It will perhaps interest those readers who have a knowledge of
navigation to hear a little more about Sverdrup of the “Maud’s” cleverly
calculated but simple methods of navigation in the Arctic Sea. I repeat
word by word Sverdrup’s own well-known description:
“One single measuring of the sun’s altitude shows that one stands
on one particular spot, in a small circle whose center is the point,
where at that moment the sun has reached its zenith, the radius of
which is 90° h. (h. indicates the measured height of the sun). This
circle shall be called a local circle.”
In order to find the meridian the sun would be in at the exact
moment of observation one must read a clock, the agreement of which
with Greenwich mean time (G.M.T.) is known. An almanac gives the
time level to be added to, or subtracted from, G.M.T.—giving
Greenwich true time (G.T.T.). The sun would then be over that
meridian, the latitudinal difference of which from Greenwich is equal to
the time taken for a clock to strike, according to G.T.T., and would be in
its zenith over the point, the breadth of which is equal to the sun’s
declination.
Taking an observation of the sun’s altitude, with a simultaneous
noting of the clock’s striking, can be done most rationally by describing
a tangent from a local circle in the neighborhood of the place where
one believes oneself to be. Such a tangent should be called a local
line. In the neighborhood of the Pole it is easy to find local lines without
scientific calculations. The meridian the sun is in can be found directly
one has calculated the clock’s stroke by G.T.T. The local circle cuts the
meridian in the distance h—d from the Pole, where d signifies the
sun’s declination. This cutting-point we will call the local circle’s Pole
point. If the difference h—d is positive, this point will be on the same
side of the Pole as the sun, should it be negative it will be on the
opposite side. A line dropped on the meridian which the sun is in,
through the local circle’s Pole point, describes a tangent from the local
circle. We will call this tangent the “Pole tangent.” At a distance from
the Pole point equal to 5° of latitude, the Pole point will represent the
local circle with sufficient exactitude, and can be considered as a local
line. But if the distance increases, the tangent’s divergence from the
circle will be noticeable. Sverdrup explains how, by an easy method,
one can calculate the corrections which have to be made, should one
find oneself within the above-mentioned limits from the Pole. During
our observations in the ice region we were always within the limit, and
had therefore no need for corrections. The method is of course
particularly simple and sufficiently exact because there is so little
difference between the hour-angle and azimuth. I here give a table of
our observations on the night of the 22nd immediately after landing:

Clock readings: 3 h 23′ 3″


Error -1 h 0′ 19″
G.M.T. 2 h 22′ 44″
Time level + 3′ 33″
G.T.T. 2 h 25′ 17″
Converted into degrees: 36° 3′
Sun’s lower rim from the 35° 58′ 2″
imaginary horizon
measured
Half of this 17° 59′
Mistakes: 0
Corrections + 13′
Sun’s center correct altitude 18° 12′
Sun’s declination 20° 15′ 4″
h—d: - 2° 3′ 4″
Converted into nautical miles 123.4

On a chart we drew a line representing Greenwich meridian, and a


point on that was selected as the North Pole. The angle 36° 3′ was set
from north to east and the sun’s meridian drawn through the North
Pole. From the last named point towards the southwest we marked out
123.4 nautical miles, as the h—d was negative we drew the local line
straight up to the sun’s meridian.
Hereby we had the line on which we stood, and must wait until the
sun had changed its position to complete our calculations. The cutting
point between the local lines would give our position.
According to G.T.T. 5 h 47′ we took an observation in the morning
which gave h—d by -33 nautical miles. These observation lines were
constructed on the same chart, and the cutting point gave us our
position 87° 47′ N. lat. and 13° W. long.
Some days later we used these data as examples and re-
calculated the same observations according to the method of St.
Hilaire, and thereby found that our landing point lay on N. lat. 87° 43′
2″ and W. long. 10° 19′ 5″.
After our return our observations were again re-calculated
according to absolutely exact astronomical formula by Cand. mag. R.
Wesöe, under the guidance of Professor Schroeter. According to their
calculations the most northerly point turned out to be N. lat. 87° 43′
and W. long. 10° 37′, the very spot where we had our first camp.
During reconnoitering we went further north, but without taking
observations. In addition to this Cand. mag. Wesöe calculated the
positions as follows. I herewith give four:

1925. 22/5 N. lat. 87° 43′ Long. W. 10° 37′


28/5 „ 87° 32′ „ „ 10° 54′ 6
29/5 „ 87° 31′ 8 „ „ 8° 3′ 9
12/6 „ 87° 33′ 3 „ „ 8° 32′ 6

These positions give an idea of the drift of the ice easterly and
southerly.

Soundings
We could see that it would be a matter of great and special interest
if we could take soundings where we landed, and, discussing it fully,
we came to the conclusion that we ought to be able to get sounding
materials with a reasonable weight. We got into communication with
the Behm Echolot Factory in Kiel, and all our difficulties were
immediately brushed aside. After I had been to Kiel and talked over the
matter with Herr Behm an excellent apparatus was made and placed
gratis at our disposal. (As there were great depths in the district where
we were to land, it was not necessary to take the depth to the nearest
meter, but we could make an approximate registration. The weight of
the whole sounding equipment, with cartridges for a number of
charges, was cut down to a few kilograms. There was therefore no
obstacle in the way of our taking it with us in the flying machine—and
we could also have taken it with us even had we had to make a march
towards land.)
The principle was simply as follows. A watertight microphone was
sunk about four meters down in the water of a crack in the ice. The
microphone was attached by a line to an ordinary head-microphone,
which the observer wore. At a distance of twenty-five to fifty meters
from the observer a little charge was sunk under the surface which
contained ten grams of trinol and was provided with a detonator. The
charge was exploded by an electric spark. The observer set a stop-
clock going when he heard the explosion, stopping it as soon as he
heard the echo from the sea bottom.
On May 28th we took two soundings immediately after each other,
and in both cases the stop-clock’s time proved to be five seconds. As
sound travels in sea-water at the rate of 1,500 meters per second, the
distance from the surface down to the bottom and up to the surface
again is equal to 7,500 meters, and thus the sea’s depth is at this
place half the amount, namely, 3,750 meters. The echo was quite
sharp and not to be misunderstood. Therefore during a later drift, as
we did not move far from the place where we had taken the first
sounding, we took no more. We wished to reserve the spare charges
for a possible march.

Variations
For the exact “taking of the sun” the standard compass was
equipped with a special finder, in the same way, as there were water-
levels on the compasses. The compass was placed in the best
position, where it would be as far away as possible from every object
likely to influence it. Observations were taken on the 23rd and 29th of
May, with the results respectively, 39° 5′ and 30° westerly variation.
This is about 5° more variation than the chart allows. These
observations proved to be of great use to us when we started the
homeward flight. By calculating with these variations in arranging our
starting course we found we had achieved an important measure.

* * * * *
I will now briefly give particulars of our further equipment.
Photographic materials and binoculars, etc., were given to us by
Goerz, the cinematograph appartus was a gift from the “Hahn
Aktiengesellschaft für Optik & Mechanik,” Berlin. The films and plates
for the camera, also the cinema films, were given to us in generous
numbers by the “Goerz Photochemische Werke,” Berlin. It is quite
unnecessary to mention that all the things given to us by these firms
were of first class material and everything functioned to our greatest
satisfaction, giving excellent results in spite of the difficult conditions.
Our snow glasses were a present from the firm, Optikus, Oslo, and
were specially made for us. They could not have been better. When I
count them as amongst the most important part of our outfit, I have
good grounds for doing so. Any one wishing to choose glasses, and
looking through the different types, will find that there is a tremendous
difference between them both as regards suitability of color and other
things.
There is a small detail which I should like to mention in this
connection. Many flying-men will have gone through the same
experience as I and realized how unpleasant it is to fly towards the sun
when it is at a low altitude, for, blinded by the sharp light, it is difficult to
see the instruments, and in many ways it causes a continuous strain.
As a deterrent we had small aluminium screens, made in the same
shape as the wind screen. These could be fixed as desired. At 10 p.m.
on the northward journey the sun was so dazzling that I placed the
screen in position, leaving it there until at 1 a.m. I began to look out for
a landing place, when I pushed the screen back, feeling satisfied with
its utility.

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