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REDUCING
INEQUALITIES
A Challenge for the
European Union?

Edited by
Renato Miguel Carmo,
Cédric Rio and
Márton Medgyesi
Reducing Inequalities
 Edited by
Renato Miguel Carmo • Cédric Rio
Márton Medgyesi

Reducing Inequalities
A Challenge for the European Union?
Editors
Renato Miguel Carmo Cédric Rio
University of Lisbon Centre Maurice Halbwachs
Portugal Paris, France

Márton Medgyesi
TÁRKI, Social Research Institute and
Institute for Sociology
CSS Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Budapest, Hungary

ISBN 978-3-319-65005-0    ISBN 978-3-319-65006-7 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65006-7

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017962339

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
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Printed on acid-free paper

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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
Renato Miguel Carmo, Cédric Rio, and Márton Medgyesi

Part I Inequality and Poverty in European Union 11

2 Disposable Income Inequality, Cohesion

and Crisis in Europe 13
Michael Dauderstädt

3 Drivers of Growing Income Inequalities in OECD

and European Countries 31
Guillaume Cohen and Maxime Ladaique

4 Unemployment, Precariousness and Poverty

as Drivers of Social Inequality: The Case of the
Southern European Countries 45
Renato Miguel Carmo and Ana Rita Matias

v
vi Contents

5 Distributional and Categorical Inequalities in Europe:

Structural Configurations 63
António Firmino da Costa, Rosário Mauritti, Susana da
Cruz Martins, Nuno Nunes, and Ana Lúcia Romão

6 Income Poverty in the EU: What Do We

Actually Measure? Empirical Evidence on Choices,
Underlying Assumptions and Implications
(Based on EU-SILC 2005–2014) 75
Orsolya Lelkes and Katrin Gasior

7 Poverty and Social Exclusion Indicators

in the European Union: The Role of Non-Monetary
Deprivation Indicators 97
Brian Nolan and Christopher T. Whelan

8 Inequality of Outcomes and Opportunities

Among the Young 115
Márton Medgyesi

Part II European Union against Inequality 135

9 The European Union Social Tools in Question 137

Cédric Rio

10 European Union Policy on Gender Equality:

The Scope and Limits of Equality in the Single Market 149
Gwenaëlle Perrier

11 European Union and Human Rights: Reducing

Inequalities and Asymmetries in the Context of the
Economic Crisis 161
Beatriz Tomás Mallén
 Contents
   vii

12 Normative Arguments for a European Social Union 187

Antoon Vandevelde

13 Hayek’s Trap and the European Utopia We Need 213

Philippe Van Parijs

14 Wealth, Taxation and Inequality 225

Thomas Piketty and Frederico Cantante

15 Conclusion: Back to the Future – Towards a European

Social Agenda 241
Renato Miguel Carmo, Cédric Rio, and Márton Medgyesi

Index 249
 List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Development of inequality in the EU (2005–2015).

Source: Eurostat, authors’ calculations 19
Fig. 3.1 Level of income inequality, 2013 or latest year.
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database
(http://oe.cd/idd). Note: non-OECD EU countries
are shown in light blue. *The statistical data for Israel
are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant
Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD
is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights,
East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the
West Bank under the terms of international law 33
Fig. 3.2 Trends in income inequality, Gini coefficient.
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database
(http://oe.cd/idd)34
Fig. 3.3 Employment growth 1995–2013, by type of employment.
Source: OECD (2015), In It Together: Why Less Inequality
Benefits All. Note: Working-age (15–64) workers, excluding
employers as well as students working part-time.
Non-standard workers include workers
with a temporary contract, part-timers
and own-account self-employed 37

ix
x List of Figures

Fig. 3.4 Trends in redistribution. Source: OECD Income

Distribution Database (http://oe.cd/idd).
Note: Redistribution is measured as the percentage
difference between inequality (Gini coefficient)
of gross market income (before taxes and transfers)
and inequality of disposable income (after taxes and transfers) 40
Fig. 4.1 Spatial clustering of income inequality among European
Union countries, measured by S80/S20 and the
Gini coefficient (2014). Legend: BE (Belgium);
BG (Bulgaria); CZ (Czech Republic); DK (Denmark);
DE (Germany); EE (Estonia); EL (Greece); ES (Spain);
FR (France); HR (Croatia); IT (Italy); CY (Cyprus);
LV (Latvia); LT (Lithuania); LU (Luxembourg);
HU (Hungary); MT (Malta); NL (Netherlands);
AT (Austria); PL (Poland); PT (Portugal); RO (Romania);
SI (Slovenia); SK (Slovakia); FI (Finland); SE (Sweden);
UK (United Kingdom). Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC, 2016.
Note: Data for Ireland not available 48
Fig. 4.2 People at risk of poverty or social exclusion and S80/S20
ratios, EU-28 (2014). Legend: BE (Belgium); BG (Bulgaria);
CZ (Czech Republic); DK (Denmark); DE (Germany);
EE (Estonia); EL (Greece); ES (Spain); FR (France);
HR (Croatia); IT (Italy); CY (Cyprus); LV (Latvia);
LT (Lithuania); LU (Luxembourg); HU (Hungary);
MT (Malta); NL (Netherlands); AT (Austria);
PL (Poland); PT (Portugal); RO (Romania);
SI (Slovenia); SK (Slovakia); FI (Finland);
SE (Sweden); UK (United Kingdom).
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC, 2016.
Note: Data for Ireland not available 50
Fig. 4.3 Risk of poverty or social exclusion (%), in Greece,
Spain, Portugal and EU27, between 2005 and 2015.
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC, 2016 50
Fig. 4.4 Households’ ability to make ends meet (from great
difficulty to very easily) (%), in some European
countries (2015). Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC, 2016.
Note: The values presented concerning ‘Inability to make
ends meet’ are the sum of percentage of the categories:
 List of Figures
   xi

‘Households making ends meet with great difficulty’

and ‘Households making ends meet with difficulty’ 51
Fig. 4.5 Average rating of financial satisfaction (0—Very low
satisfaction; 10—Very high satisfaction) by first and
fifth income quintiles, in EU-28 countries (2013).
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC, 2013, ad hoc module well-being 52
Fig. 4.6 Evolution of the employment and unemployment rate
(15–64 years), 2000, 2008, 2015. Source: EU Labour
Force Survey (Eurostat) 53
Fig. 4.7 Evolution of the youth unemployment rate and
long-term unemployment (2000–2015).
Source: EU Labour Force Survey (Eurostat) 55
Fig. 4.8 Evolution of the percentage of employees with temporary
and involuntary temporary contracts (2000–2015).
Source: EU Labour Force Survey (Eurostat).
Note: Involuntary temporary contracts correspond
to the percentage of respondents that could not
find permanent job 56
Fig. 4.9 Involuntary part-time work (15–64 years)
and income inequality (S80/S20), EU-28.
Source: Eurostat. Note: Involuntary part-time
employment as percentage of the total part-time
employment, from ages 15 to 64 57
Fig. 4.10 Trends in involuntary part-time work, by age group,
in the southern countries and EU-28, in 2000, 2008
and 2015. Source: Eurostat. Note: Involuntary
part-time employment as percentage of the total
part-time employment 58
Fig. 6.1 Estimating poverty rates with margins of error.
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, cross
sectional EU-SILC 2014 UDB August 2016.
Note: Proportion of population at risk of poverty
across the EU, 2013 income year and confidence
intervals. 95% confidence interval for each country
(meaning that there is a 95% probability of the true
figure being within the calculated range) 79
Fig. 6.2 Poverty threshold differs substantially across the EU.
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, cross sectional
xii List of Figures

EU-SILC 2014 UDB August 2016.

Note: Monetary value of the at-risk-of-poverty threshold
for households of two adults with two children under
14, in EUR and PPS, 2013 income year 80
Fig. 6.3 Risk of poverty based on different thresholds.
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, cross
sectional EU-SILC 2014 UDB August 2016.
Note: At-risk-of-poverty rate gap and relationship
with the at-risk-of-poverty rate, 2013 income year 82
Fig. 6.4 The relationship of poverty risk and poverty gap.
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, cross sectional
EU-SILC 2014 UDB August 2016. Note: At-risk-of-poverty
gap and relationship with the at-risk-of-poverty rate,
2013 income year 83
Fig. 6.5 Comparing trends of the anchored and the standard poverty
risk. Countries with a relatively low ‘standard’ poverty risk
in 2013 (9%–15%). Source: European Commission,
Eurostat, cross sectional EU-SILC 2005–2014.
Note: Change in the at-risk-of-poverty
rate anchored in income year 2004 and the
at-risk-of-poverty rate, 2004–2013 income year.
The indicator ‘anchored in the income year 2004’
is defined as the percentage of the population
whose ­equivalised disposable income is below the
‘at-risk-of-poverty threshold’ calculated in ­relation
to the base year 2004 and then adjusted for inflation.
Data for anchored at-risk-of-poverty rates for Bulgaria,
France 2007–2009, Romania and Croatia is not available.
Break in series: Austria 2007, Spain 2008,
United Kingdom 2012 86
Fig. 6.6 At-risk-of-poverty rate among migrants, by region of origin,
2013 income year. Source: European Commission,
Eurostat, cross sectional EU-SILC 2014 UDB August
2016. Note: Grey bars show at-risk-of-poverty rates for
the total population. Estimates are based on a low number
of observations (20–49) in Bulgaria for non-EU migrants.
Estimates for Romania (EU and non-EU), Bulgaria (for EU)
and Slovakia (for non-EU) are omitted due to a very low
number of observations (<20) 91
 List of Figures
   xiii

Fig. 7.1 Elements of the EU poverty and social exclusion target

by country for EU-SILC 2014. Source: Eurostat,
2014 SILC data, ilc_pees01 extracted on 15/10/2016 105
Fig. 8.1 Young people neither in employment nor in education
and training (NEET rates), 15–29 years old (%).
Source: Eurostat database, edat_lfse_20 table,
extracted on 02/05/2016 117
Fig. 8.2 Evolution of the unemployment rate in different
age groups (percentage point change, 2008–2014).
Source: Eurostat database, lfsa_urgaed table, extracted
on 07/03/2016 118
Fig. 8.3 Change in prevalence of temporary work among those
in employment (percentage point change, 2008–2014).
Source: Eurostat database, lfsa_etpga table, extracted on
08/03/2016119
Fig. 8.4 Change in involuntary part-time work among those
working part-time (percentage point change, 2008–2014).
Source: Eurostat database, lfsa_eppgai table, extracted
on 12/09/2016 120
Fig. 8.5 Relative income poverty among the 15–29 age group.
Source: Own calculation based on EU-SILC UDB 2009,
2011, 2013. Note: poverty threshold is 60% of median
equivalised household income 122
Fig. 8.6 The association index (odds ratio) of being low educated
when having low-educated parents compared
to high-educated parents, 25–59 age group, 2011.
Source: Grundiza and Lopez Vilaplana (2013) 125
 List of Tables

Table 2.1 Level and change in per capita income at purchasing

power parities 17
Table 2.2a The poorest (dark grey) and richest (light grey)
quintiles in the EU (euros) (2015) 21
Table 2.2b The poorest (dark grey) and richest (light grey)
quintiles in the EU (PPP) (2015) 22
Table 2.3 Different measures of European-wide inequality
(quintile ratios) 23
Table 5.1 Income by European country in PPS and euros,
age group 25–64, 2012 (national averages) 66
Table 5.2 European income deciles in PPS, age group 25–64,
2012 (brackets and averages) 67
Table 5.3 European income deciles by social class and country,
age group 25–64, 2012 69
Table 5.4 Educational inequalities in Europe by social class
and country, age group 25–64, 2012
(average years of schooling completed) 70

xv
 1
Introduction
Renato Miguel Carmo, Cédric Rio,
and Márton Medgyesi

Inequality is a major issue today in public debates, especially since 2008

and the beginning of the financial, economic and social crises. In the
European Union (EU), the crisis exacerbates a tendency observed since
the 2000s: income inequality is growing in most countries, including in
Northern European states, which are recognised as the most egalitarian
societies in the world (OECD 2011, 2015).
Public and academic debates on inequality in the EU, like elsewhere in
the world, are mostly focused on national territories. This can simply be
explained by the fact that social issues have traditionally been linked to
the nation state: the development and acceptance of social solidarity

R.M. Carmo (*)

Centre for Research and Studies in Sociology (CIES), University Institute of
Lisbon (ISCTE-IUL), Lisbon, Portugal
C. Rio
Centre Maurice Halbwachs (CMH), Paris, France
M. Medgyesi
TÁRKI, Social Research Institute and Institute for Sociology,
CSS Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary

© The Author(s) 2018 1

R.M. Carmo et al. (eds.), Reducing Inequalities,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65006-7_1
2 R.M. Carmo et al.

within a community are strongly linked to the development and the

acceptance of a national state. Today, we see significant data regarding
inequality in the richest countries, including most of Europe. Some con-
tributions provide insight as to why nation states must limit socioeco-
nomic inequalities (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Stiglitz 2012), propose
explanations of the phenomenon (Milanovic 2011; Piketty 2014) or
develop economic and political propositions to limit it (Atkinson 2015).
The aim of this book is to develop a multiscalar approach with a focus on
inequality in the EU within and between countries, and in some contribu-
tions, comparisons with other European and Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. The book is concerned
with both vertical inequality, that is, inequality between those with high
incomes and low incomes, and horizontal inequality, that is to say inequality
between groups by nationality, age, ethnicity or gender. Our objective is
twofold. Firstly, the book describes the social situation in the EU with a
focus on inequality in a multidimensional approach, which permits com-
parisons between national populations. Inequalities are discussed through
different perspectives and indicators such as income and economic inequali-
ties, poverty and social exclusion, categorical inequalities and social classes
and educational inequalities.1 Secondly, it proposes political and prospective
analyses about the role of the EU institutions in the social domain, and with
regard to social and gender inequality. In the first part of this introduction,
we explain why we decided to edit a collective book focused on inequality at
the EU level. We present the different contributions in a second part.
Since the beginning of the European project, the institutions of the
European Economic Community and then of the EU have had access to
an ever-increasing number of tools in the field of social issues. According
to Falkner (2010), European institutions play a social role through three
general dimensions. There is firstly a regulatory role through social direc-
tives concerning working conditions, especially regarding health and
safety, and equal treatment (wage equality between men and women, for
example). The Treaty of Amsterdam (1996) gave the Commission the
ability to expand this regulatory role to all European citizens, and not
only to workers. Secondly, the regional policy, with its structural
funds—European Social Fund, Cohesion Fund and European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF)—provides a distributive role to the
 Introduction 3

European Commission. Finally, this last institution has incentive tools

with the open method of coordination, and more recently the European
Semester, which, among other effects, leads Member States to pursue
common social objectives. It seemed possible at least, particularly during
Jacques Delors’ term as the president of European Commission, to apply
the idea of Social Europe in the real world, with EU institutions playing
a major role in the social field, including limiting social inequalities
among European populations, and then to observe the development of
solidarity in the EU territory.
The situation has changed at least since the beginning of the crisis.
While the EU’s prerogatives in the social domain are the same, the trend
appears negative now, to the extent that many specialists claim that the
idea, the cosmopolitan dream of Social Europe, is dead (Crespy and
Menz 2015; Lechevalier and Wielgohs 2015). This claim is based on
many signs. Firstly, after a period of socioeconomic convergence between
European countries, in part thanks to the cohesion policy, since the crisis
we can observe a stagnation of socioeconomic disparities. Secondly, and
maybe more fundamentally, the period seems quite unfavourable to the
development of strong solidarity among European people. Before the cri-
sis, Maurizio Ferrera claimed that there is ‘a tension, an uneasiness in
linking or reconciling “solidarity” with “Europe”’ (2005). The situation
may be growing worse: both the EU and a certain idea of solidarity are
currently being called into questioned like never before. With the grow-
ing importance of the European Council, we observe a return to national
interests conflicting with European interests once states are inside the EU
project: this can be illustrated not only by ‘Brexit’, but also by the persis-
tent political divergence between Member States regarding the situation
in Greece or the reception of refugees and other migrants. In parallel,
national social systems are slowly being dismantled in all European coun-
tries, especially in the name of reduction of public debts.
Why then a book focused on European inequality now? Despite the
current situation, discussing social issues at the EU level makes sense for
at least two reasons. On the one hand, the different contributions to the
book demonstrate that the EU has still a real role in the social field and
against inequality, even if this role is currently declining. On the other
hand, we strongly believe that the EU should play a more pronounced
4 R.M. Carmo et al.

role in social issues in the future. In addition to the heterogeneity of the

social situations in the different EU countries, all the national societies
face complementary difficulties, especially with the crisis: the rise of pub-
lic debt and difficulties financing and preserving social security schemes,
a rise in unemployment and precarious jobs, and then the risk of social
exclusion and poverty. The EU can help its members find an answer to
those shared social difficulties.
It is our role as social scientists to discuss these problems. We began
this work with the creation of a European network named Inequality
Watch a few years ago, by bringing together European research centres
and civil associations focused on inequality at the national level. By gath-
ering the contributions of recognised specialists of socioeconomic
inequality and European processes from distinct scientific disciplines and
several European countries, our desire with this book is to reconcile the
analysis of social processes with an accurate assessment of public policies
affecting vulnerable populations and regional discrepancies in the
EU. While the first part of the book highlights the social situation in the
EU in line with the consequences of the financial crisis, the second part
addresses the role of the EU and its institutions to cope with this chal-
lenge. Despite the social and cultural heterogeneity of EU Member States,
the first part shows that most populations and their institutions witness a
similar phenomenon of growing inequality. It could reinforce the idea of
an ambitious Social Europe able to limit inequality, or at least help its
Member States do so. The goal of the second part is specifically to discuss
the social tools already in use at the EU level and their limits, but also to
reflect on the legitimacy of such an idea. Our aim is not to describe or
explain the recent developments of Social Europe but to think theoreti-
cally and ethically about the current and future role of the EU in the
social field and more specifically in the fight against inequality. How does
the EU deal with inequality today? What should be the role of EU insti-
tutions regarding the challenge of reducing inequality?
The theoretical advances regarding inequality have been both signifi-
cant and varied and have opened up renewed forms of understanding and
explanation. The most important theories and analyses of contemporary
social inequalities adopt a multidimensional perspective (Therborn
2006). The different dimensions of inequality—income, poverty, social
 Introduction 5

exclusion, education and social mobility—are linked and interconnected.

Likewise, it is useful to compare poverty and social exclusion levels
between countries to underline the standards of living of different
national populations. This is why we propose in the first part of the book
an analysis of the different dimensions of inequality in the EU, both
among individuals and groups within countries and between European
populations.
Analyses of the change in income inequality are developed in the first
two chapters. Despite some methodological limitations, income indica-
tors are useful to measure inequality at the EU level, as Michael
Dauderstädt shows in his analysis (Chap. 2). He proves that income
inequality between countries and their populations has been stagnant
since the beginning of the economic and social crisis in 2008, after a
period of relative convergence, but still remains high, especially when
comparing the old and new Member States of the EU. Maxime Ladaique
and Guillaume Cohen (Chap. 3) highlight and explain the growth of
income inequalities observed in a large majority of European countries
since the mid-1980s: the development of non-standard work and a com-
mon policy agenda that favours diminishing income redistribution and
progressive taxation are the main drivers of the present situation.
The following two chapters take a multidimensional perspective on
inequality at the European level. Renato Miguel Carmo and Ana Rita
Matias (Chap. 4) focus their work on social vulnerability in the southern
European countries. According to them, the link between resource
inequality and social vulnerability is stronger in the Southern and Eastern
European countries, where the gap with regard to Northern countries is
increasing. António Firmino da Costa and his team (Chap. 5) analyse the
intersections between the distributional inequalities of economic and
educational resources in the EU, as well as the categorical inequalities
between nation states and between social classes. They demonstrate that
social disparities are high between different parts of Europe in terms of
income, but also educational inequalities.
Chapters 6 and 7 develop an overview of social disparities between
national populations of the EU with a focus on poverty and social
­exclusion, including social living conditions. Reading the available data
bears out similar trends analysed previously: Southern and Eastern
6 R.M. Carmo et al.

c­ ountries are more affected by income poverty and material difficulties.

In recent years, efforts have been made at the EU level to build harmon-
ised data and social indicators for the European population as a whole,
especially regarding poverty and social exclusion. According to Eurostat,
an individual is considered as poor and in a situation of social exclusion
when he or she is concerned by one of the three following situations: living
in a household with very low work intensity, earning a disposable income
below 60% of the national median income or being in a situation of severe
material deprivation. These and other indicators are discussed concerning
the methodological option of establishing a defined threshold of the risk
of income poverty (Orsolya Lelkes and Katrin Gasior, Chap. 6) or the
relevance of using the indicator of material deprivation (Brian Nolan and
Christopher T. Whelan, Chap. 7). The last authors additionally present
information regarding the social categories that are suffering from differ-
ent types of social vulnerability.
In the last chapter of this part, Márton Medgyesi examines social
reproduction mechanisms and compares the social situation of young
people in different countries of the EU in relation to their participation
in education and training and the occupations of their parents. At the
European level, social class is still a pertinent category to explain and
describe the discrepancies between social positions and their distinct pos-
sibilities and opportunities. But the possibilities offered to European
people differ strongly regarding their geographic context within the
EU. Following this multidimensional perspective, the author demon-
strates in his chapter that young people are being considerably affected.
He identifies a persistence of inequalities among the young due to social
reproduction mechanisms: family background and more precisely par-
ents’ social situation and educational level have a strong influence on the
life chances of young people.
The goal of the second part of the book is to analyse the current role
and limits of the EU and its institutions in the social domain and to ques-
tion its role in the future. In the original context of the EU, social
­prerogatives are national: social policies intended to limit socioeconomic
inequalities and guarantee sufficient accessibility for all to public goods—
education, social security schemes, healthcare and so on—are decided
by the Member States, which have the ability to propose political
 Introduction 7

responses to the social consequences of the crisis. But the institutions of

the EU, and especially the European Commission, are also engaged in
the social domain.
The first three chapters of the second part propose analyses of the
nature and limits of EU engagement in the social realm. In Chap. 9,
Cédric Rio discusses existing European social tools and elaborates a
reflection about the way an ambitious Social Europe could adapt to the
social heterogeneity of Member States. He claims that the acknowledge-
ment of common social rights for all Europeans, together with ambitious
redistribution mechanisms between European countries in order to
finance these rights, could advance European social policies without
threatening the diversity of national social systems. Chapters 10 and 11
focus on specific policies associated with inequality. Gwenaëlle Perrier
(Chap. 10) proposes a discussion about the gender equality policy led by
the EU. She recalls that gender equality policy was and still is justified
mainly by economic concerns and the specific need to develop a European
free market. According to her, such a justification has limited the scope
and impact of this policy. Beatriz Tomás Mallén (Chap. 11) focuses on
the recognition of fundamental rights at the EU level through the Charter
in the Lisbon Treaty. She mentions the need to institutionalise common
and guaranteed rights for all by harmonising the two existing normative
systems developed in parallel by the Council of Europe and the EU
institutions.
The last three chapters are more prospective. In Chap. 12, Antoon
Vandevelde contrasts different theoretical visions regarding implementa-
tion of social policies at a European level. Many normative reasons that
can be considered to legitimate ambitious social policies at the EU level,
including the cosmopolitan argument that recognises fundamental rights
to all, are based on the idea of necessary solidarity between European peo-
ple to pursue the common good. But, as Philippe Van Parijs (Chap. 13)
criticises, the facts are completely different: the current situation of the EU
is characterised by limited public transnational interventions, high
inequality levels and a general lack of solidarity among national govern-
ments. This situation is very close to the project dreamed by the neoliberal
author Friedrich Hayek: before the Second World War, he defended a
potential project of multinational federalism as a way to facilitate l­ iberation
8 R.M. Carmo et al.

of the economy from public interventionism. According to Van Parijs,

an ambitious Social Europe, illustrated by the implementation of a
Eurodividend—an unconditional basic income—could overcome this
‘Hayek’s trap’. Finally, in an interview with Frederico Cantante, Thomas
Piketty (Chap. 14) describes his vision of a Social Europe. Beyond the
statistical trends, Thomas Piketty addresses that the growth in inequality
levels over the last two decades is basically the result of political choices.
According to his analysis, national governments have to take responsibility
for limiting and stopping the rise in inequality and poverty. Moreover, the
current interdependence of national economies in the EU and the great
disparities among European populations should encourage political actors
to elaborate and develop EU social prerogatives. He then argues in favour
of European investment in universities and higher education. In the last
chapter (Chap. 15), the editors of this book address some final remarks
regarding the need to improve and develop an European Social agenda.
It was possible to publish this book thanks to the support of Ile-de-France
region through its PICRI subvention fund, the Laboratory Centre Maurice
Halbwachs (CNRS/EHESS/ENS) in France, the Fondation pour le Progrès
de l’Homme and the French association Observatoire des inégalités. We
would like to thank personnaly Michel Forsé and Caroline Guibet Lafaye,
Justin Scherer, and all persons who trusted in our project and helped to
materialize it, including the contributors and the publishers.

Note
1. In each chapter, the authors include their own precise definition and char-
acterisation regarding the inequality or poverty indicators that are used
and discussed in their analysis.

References
Atkinson, A. B. (2015). Inequality. What can be done? Cambridge, London:
Harvard University Press.
Crespy, A., & Menz, G. (Eds.). (2015). Social policy and the Eurocrisis. Quo Vadis
Social Europe. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
 Introduction 9

Falkner, G. (2010). European Union. In F. Castles, S. Leibfried, H. Obinger, &

C. Pierson (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of the welfare state (pp. 292–305).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ferrera, M. (2005). The boundaries of welfare: European integration and the new
spatial politics of social protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lechevalier, A., & Wielgohs, J. (Eds.). (2015). Social Europe—A dead end: What
the Eurozone crisis is doing to Europe’s social dimension. Copenhagen: Djof
Publishing.
Milanovic, B. (2011). The haves and the have-nots. A brief and idiosyncratic history
of global inequality. New York: Basic Books.
OECD. (2011). Divided we stand: Why inequality keeps rising. Paris: OECD
Publishing.
OECD. (2015). In it together: Why less inequality benefits all. Paris: OECD
Publishing.
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century. Cambridge, MA: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Stiglitz, J. (2012). The price of inequality: How today’s divided society endangers our
future. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Therborn, G. (Ed.). (2006). Inequalities of the world. New theoretical frameworks,
multiple empirical approaches. London: Verso.
Wilkinson, R., & Pickett, K. (2009). The spirit level. Why more equal societies
almost always do better. London: Allen Lane/Penguin Books.

Renato Miguel Carmo is an assistant professor at the Department of Sociology

of University Institute of Lisbon (ISCTE-IUL) and research fellow at the Centre
for Research and Studies in Sociology (CIES-IUL), Portugal. He is Director of
the Inequality Observatory (OD) and member of the European network
Inequality Watch. Issues such as social and spatial inequalities, public policy,
mobilities and social capital have been at the core of his research projects. His
recent publications have appeared in European Societies, Sociologia Ruralis, Time
& Society, Sociological Research Online, European Planning Studies, Portuguese
Journal of Social Science and others.

Cédric Rio is a philosopher specialised in social justice and inequality and cur-
rently a researcher associated to the Centre Maurice Halbwachs (CNRS/EHESS/
ENS) in France. He is the coordinator of Inequality Watch, an independent
European network that focuses on inequality.
10 R.M. Carmo et al.

Márton Medgyesi is a senior researcher at TÁRKI Social Research Institute and

at Institute for Sociology, Centre for Social Sciences at the Hungarian Academy
of Sciences. He holds an MSc in Applied Economics from Sciences Po, Paris,
and a PhD in Sociology from Corvinus University, Budapest. His main research
areas are empirical research on income distribution, intergenerational transfers
and economic attitudes. He has been involved in various international projects
including EU FP7 projects Growing Inequalities’ Impacts (GINI) and Strategic
Labour Transitions for Youth Labour in Europe (STYLE).
 Part I
Inequality and Poverty
in European Union
 2
Disposable Income Inequality, Cohesion
and Crisis in Europe
Michael Dauderstädt

2.1 Introduction
During the present crisis beginning in 2008, people worry about rising
inequality, weaker social protection and the divergence of income levels
between the core and the periphery of the European Union (EU). The
financial crisis has been blamed on inequality (Rajan 2010; OECD 2015)
as poor strata of the population (in the United States, but also in Europe’s
periphery) borrowed funds to acquire housing or maintain consumption
levels in spite of low and stagnating wages. On the side of lenders, high
inequality contributed to an overhang of savings as the rich have a higher
propensity to save, and investment in the real economy stagnates in the
face of weak demand.
When governments increased their debt to bail out a financial sector
where bankers and investors had enjoyed astronomical revenues and
incomes, public discontent had increased (Occupy Wall Street).
Prominent economists like Piketty (Piketty 2013) and Stiglitz (Stiglitz
2012) pointed out the rising levels of wealth, debt and the related income

M. Dauderstädt (*)
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bonn, Germany

© The Author(s) 2018 13

R.M. Carmo et al. (eds.), Reducing Inequalities,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65006-7_2
14 M. Dauderstädt

inequality and warned about their consequences. Even mainstream

institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
criticised the negative impact of rising inequality (Kumhof and Rancière
2010; Gupta 2014; Ostry et al. 2014; OECD 2015).
Concerns about declining cohesion within Europe grew as southern
European countries faced shrinking economies and rising poverty and
unemployment. The following chapter discusses the dimensions of
inequality in the EU and analyses their relationship with the crisis.

2.2 The Dimensions of European Inequality

Inequality can be considered between different entities (such as coun-
tries, regions, households, individuals) with regard to different qualities
(such as income, wealth, life expectancy) using different indicators and
measures. Here, we focus on (disposable)1 income inequality within the
EU. The analysis of inequality in a multi-country context implies certain
problems, which have been discussed in depth on a global level by
Milanovic (2016) and Bourguignon (2015). They differentiate between
three types of international inequality: (1) between nations regardless of
their population; (2) between nations weighted by population; (3)
between people (households). The last measure takes into account the
distribution of income within and between countries.
To compare incomes in an international context, one can use two mea-
sures: (1) at exchange rates and (2) at purchasing power parity (PPP). The
use of these two different measures makes a lot of sense when one com-
pares income levels between countries with different currencies, as the
value (e.g. converted into Euros) might change with the (real) exchange
rate, which depends on variations in the nominal exchange rate and on
inflation, which are different from country to country. Prices might
change at different rates within countries between different regions, too.
The analysis of international inequality and its results depend on the
choice of indicator, too. First, there is an almost ethical question: Are
absolute differences between incomes more relevant than relative ones?
Are poor people content to see their income grow faster than that of the
 Disposable Income Inequality, Cohesion and Crisis in Europe 15

rich or do they want to reduce the absolute difference? In the context of

convergence between countries (see section 2.2.1 below), the first concept
is called beta convergence; the second sigma convergence, as the standard
deviation, indicated in mathematics by the Greek letter sigma, measures
absolute differences. To offer a (not unrealistic) numerical example: if at
the beginning of the comparison the average GDP/capita of the richer
country is 5 times the one of the poorer country and the rich country’s
economy grows at an annual rate of 2% and the poor at 5%, it would take
the poor country 55 years to catch up, and only after 24 years would the
absolute difference between the two average incomes begin to shrink (it
would still increase for the first 24 years in spite of the higher growth rate).
Second, an indicator of international inequality should better be
decomposable into intra- and inter-country inequality. This condition is
fulfilled by the Theil index2 and the quintile ratio (S80/S20), but not by
the Gini index. The Gini index varies between 0 in the case of perfect
equality and 1 in the case that all income goes to one entity (e.g. house-
hold). If one compares only the degree of poverty rather than the distri-
bution of income as such, the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke (FGT) index is
decomposable as well.3 The indicator we use most often is the ratio
between the average income of the richest and poorest quintiles (= 20%)
of the respective population (the so-called quintile ratio S80/S20).
If one analyses income inequality in a multi-country setting like the
EU, different dimensions are of interest.

(A) Disparities between EU Member States measured in terms of aver-

age per capita income; in this case, the inequality within the coun-
tries is neglected;
(B) Disparities between regions of the EU; in this case, the inequality
within the regions is neglected;
(C) Disparities between households within countries;
(D) Disparities between households within the EU as a whole taking
into account both inequalities, (A) and (C).

The reduction of disparities between countries (dimension A) and

between regions (dimension B) is usually called ‘convergence’ or ‘cohesion’.
The funds used by the EU to reduce regional inequalities are cohesion
16 M. Dauderstädt

funds. There are regular reports by the EU on development of regional

disparities.4 Dimension (C) refers to the well-known inequality within
countries. Let us briefly consider the three other dimensions (A, B and C)
before focussing on European-wide inequality (D).

2.2.1 Divergence and Convergence5

Greater wealth is one reason why poor countries joined the EU. For the
EU itself, convergence is an official goal. Historically, for the first two
poor countries that became Member States (Ireland in 1972 and Greece
in 1981), progress was slow. Portugal and Spain (entry in 1986) experi-
enced good catch-up growth for several years. For the post-communist
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), catching up has been
key. The biggest success story so far has been Ireland, which showed spec-
tacular growth in the 1990s (i.e. 20 years after entry), thus becoming the
second-richest country in the EU (measured at per capita GDP).
Income disparities within the EU are huge. The poorest countries
(Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic states) have per capita incomes below
€20,000, while this figure exceeds €70,000 for the richest country
(Luxemburg) (see Table 2.1). The differences become greater when one
compares incomes at exchange rates, as PPPs reflect lower price levels in
poorer countries (in particular rents and services).
Regarding different forms of convergence (beta and sigma, see above)
one can see that there has been beta convergence since 1999 as most new
Member States in CEE (top of Table 2.1) have grown much faster than
the core EU countries (bottom of Table 2.1). But there was no clear sigma
convergence in the EU. Only after 2007, income disparities between
countries have declined by approximately 5% or 10% if measured by the
standard deviation of their average per capita income at exchange rates or
at PPPs, respectively. If one calculates the S80/S20 ratio for the EU as a
whole by adding up countries until their total aggregate population
reaches a fifth of the EU (about 100 million), the ratio has declined
between 2005 and 2014 from around 5.4 to 3.7 at exchange rates and
from 2.6 to 2.0 at PPP.6 This ratio neglects income disparities within
countries.
 Disposable Income Inequality, Cohesion and Crisis in Europe 17

Table 2.1 Level and change in per capita income at purchasing power parities
2006 (in € PPP) 2015 (in € PPP) Change (in %)
EU (28 countries) 24,687 28,924 17.2
Euro area (19 countries) 26,662 30,659 15.0
Bulgaria 9381 13,305 41.8
Romania 9381 16,487 75.7
Poland 12,344 19,958 61.7
Latvia 13,578 18,511 36.3
Lithuania 13,825 21,404 54.8
Croatia 14,318 16,776 17.2
Hungary 15,306 19,668 28.5
Slovakia 15,306 22,271 45.5
Estonia 15,800 21,404 35.5
Malta 19,256 25,742 33.7
Portugal 19,503 22,271 14.2
Czech Republic 19,996 24,585 22.9
Slovenia 21,231 24,007 13.1
Greece 23,206 20,536 −11.5
Cyprus 24,440 23,428 −4.1
Spain 25,181 26,610 5.7
Italy 25,921 27,478 6.0
France 26,415 30,659 16.1
Finland 28,143 31,238 11.0
Belgium 28,637 33,841 18.2
Germany 28,884 36,155 25.2
United Kingdom 30,118 31,816 5.6
Denmark 30,365 35,866 18.1
Austria 30,859 36,733 19.0
Sweden 30,859 35,577 15.3
Netherlands 33,327 37,312 12.0
Ireland 36,043 41,940 16.4
Luxembourg 63,199 78,384 24.0
Source: Eurostat and calculations by the author

Since the beginning of the crisis, recovery in Europe has been unequal.
The resulting divergence does not appear in the general measures as most of
the poorer Member States in CEE returned to their former growth path
while the depressed, austerity-struck economies of Ireland, Greece, Spain,
Portugal and Cyprus belonged to the European top or middle ‘class’, regard-
ing income per capita. Has there been convergence after all? The answer
depends on the measure or metric. If one measures relative disparities (e.g.
by using S80/S20), countries did converge. If one considers absolute differ-
ences (e.g. by using standard deviation), countries did not converge.7
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
intended to be so,) toward the men who
were disabled in the late war, but a large
majority of the prison survivors are excluded
from a pension under these laws. This
comes partly from the unfriendly spirit in
which the pension department has been
administered for the last six years, and partly
from the peculiar circumstances surrounding
their several cases.
Many paroled prisoners, on reaching the
Union lines were at once sent home on
furlough, without receiving any medical
treatment. The most of these were
afterwards discharged under General Order
No. 77, dated War Department, Washington,
D. C., April 28th, 1865, because physically
unfit for service, and hence there is no
official record whatever as to their disease.
If one of those men applies for a pension,
he is called upon to furnish the affidavit of
some army surgeon who treated him after
his release and prior to discharge, showing
that he then had the disease on which he
now claims a pension. For reasons stated,
this is impossible. The next thing is a call to
furnish an affidavit from some doctor who
treated the man while at home on furlough,
or certainly immediately following his final
discharge, showing that he was then afflicted
with identical disease on which pension is
now claimed. This is generally impossible,
for many reasons.
In most cases the released prisoner felt it
was not medicine he wanted, but the kindly
nursing of mother or wife, and nourishing
food. So no doctor was called, at least for
some months after reaching home. In the
instances where the doctor was called, not
infrequently he cannot now be found, cannot
swear that the soldier had any particular
disease for the first six months after
reaching home, as he was a mere skeleton
from starvation, and it required months of
careful nursing before he had vitality enough
for a disease to manifest itself.
Then again in many cases the poor victim
has never suffered from any particular
disease, but rather from a combination of
numerous ills, the sequence of a wrecked
constitution commonly termed by physicians,
“General Debility.” But the commissioner
refuses to grant a pension on disease save
where the proof is clear and positive of the
contracting of a particular disease while in
the service, of its existence at date of final
discharge, and of its continuous existence
from year to year for each and every year, to
present date.
In most cases it is impossible for a prison
survivor to furnish any such proof, and
hence his application is promptly rejected.
Besides these, there are hundreds of other
obstacles in the way of the surviving prisoner
of war who applies for a pension. One thing
is, he is called upon to prove by comrades
who were in prison with him, the origin and
nature of his disease, and his condition prior
to and at the time of his release. This is
generally impossible, as he was likely to
have but few comrades in prison with whom
he was on intimate terms, and these, if not
now dead, cannot be found, they are men
without sufficient knowledge of anatomy and
physiology, and not one out of a hundred
could conscientiously swear to the origin and
diagnosis of the applicant’s disease. Is it not
ridiculous for the government to insist upon
such preposterous evidence? Which, if
produced in due form, is a rule drawn up by
the applicant’s physican, and sworn to by the
witness—“cum grano salis,”—and in most
cases amounts to perjury for charity’s sake.
Hence, it will be seen the difficulties
surrounding the prison survivor who is
disabled and compelled to apply for a
pension are so numerous and
insurmountable as to shut out a very large
majority of the most needy and deserving
cases from the benefits of the general
pension laws entirely.
We claim, therefore, that as an act of
equal justice to these men, as compared
with other soldiers, there ought to be a law
passed admitting them to pensions on record
or other proof of confinement in a
confederate prison for a prescribed length of
time—such as Bill 4495—introduced by the
Hon. J. Warren Keifer, M. C., of Ohio
provides for. And if this bill is to benefit these
poor sufferers any, it must be passed
speedily, as those who yet remain will, at
best, survive but a few years longer.
This measure is not asked as a pencuniary
compensation for the personal losses these
men sustained, as silver and gold cannot be
weighed as the price for untold sufferings,
but it is asked that they may be partly
relieved from abject want, and their
sufferings alleviated to some extent by
providing them with the necessaries of life,
for nearly all of them are extremely poor,
consequent on the wreck of their physical
and mental powers.
 LIST OF THE DEAD

The following are those who died and were buried

at Andersonville, with full name, Co., Regt., date of
death and No. of grave in the Cemetery at that place,
alphabetically arranged by States. The No. before
each name is the same as marked at the head of the
graves. The list will be found to be very accurate.
ALABAMA.
Sept
7524 Barton Wm Cav 1L 64
1
Berry J M, S’t 1 May
2111 “
A 17
1 Aug
4622 Belle Robert “
A 3
1 Aug
5505 Boobur Wm “
E 13
Sept
8425 Brice J C “ 1L
11
Sept
8147 Guthrie J “ 1 I
8
1 June
2514 Henry P “
F 26
 996 Jones Jno F “ 1 Mar
K 15
1
4715 Mitchell Jno D Aug 4
A
1 Aug
5077 Ponders J Cav
H 8
Aug
5763 Panter R 1L
15
1 Aug
6886 Patterson W D
K 25
1 June
2504 Prett J R
F 3
1
10900 Redman W R Cav Oct 14
G
Aug
4731 Stubbs W 1 I
4
Total 15.

CONNECTICUT.
14 June
2380 Anderson A 64
K 23
16 July
3461 Batchelder Benj
C 17
16 July
3664 Baty John
C 19
14 Aug
7306 Brunkissell H
D 30
14 July
2833 Brennon M
B 3
7 July
3224 Burns Jno
I 12
10414 Blumly E 8 Oct
D 6
Apr
545 Bigelow Wm 7B
14
Nov
11965 Ball H A 3B
11
8 Nov
12089 Brookmeyer T W
H 18
16 Nov
12152 Burke H
D 24
Dec
12209 Bone A 1E
1
14 Oct
10682 Burnham F, Cor
I 11
16 Oct
10690 Barlow O L
E 11
18 Oct
10876 Bennett N
H 13
1 Aug
5806 Brown C H
H 15
Aug
5919 Boyce Wm 7B
17
Aug
6083 Bishop B H Cav 1 I
18
14 Aug
6184 Bushnell Wm
D 19
16 Sept
1763 Bailey F
E 4
21 June
2054 Brewer G E
A 16
6 Aug
5596 Burns B
G 14
5632 Balcomb 11 Aug 64
 B 14
16 Aug
5754 Beers James C
A 15
16 Oct
11636 Birdsell D
D 28
July
4296 Blakeslee H Cav 1L
30
18 July
3900 Bishop A
A 24
14 June
1493 Besannon Peter
B 2
30 July
2720 Babcock R
A 1
July
2818 Baldwin Thos Cav 1L
3
16 June
2256 Bosworth A M
D 21
11 Aug
5132 Bougin John
C 8
Brooks Wm D, 16 Aug
5152
Cor F 9
16 Aug
5308 Bower John
E 11
6 Aug
5452 Bently F
H 12
Aug
5464 Bently James Cav 1 I
12
2 Aug
4830 Blackman A, Cor Art
C 6
16 Sept
7742 Banning J F
E 3
Ballentine 16 Sept
8018
Robert A 6
12408 Bassett J B 11 Jan 65
B 6
Jan
12540 Bohine C 2E
27
Feb
12620 Bennis Charles 7K
8
16 July
3707 Chapin J L 64
A 21
7 July
3949 Cottrell P
C 25
11 July
3941 Clarkson
H 25
July
4367 Culler M 7E
31
18 Aug
4449 Connor D
F 1
16 Aug
4848 Carrier D B
D 6
1 Aug
6060 Cook W H Cav
G 18
16 Aug
6153 Clark H H
F 15
Aug
6846 Clark W 6A
25
10 Aug
5799 Champlain H
F 15
9 Apr
336 Cane John
H 2
Apr
620 Christian A M 1A
19
14 Apr
775 Crawford James
A 28
7316 Chapman M 16 Aug
 E 30
Aug
7348 Cleary P Cav 1B
31
Aug
7395 Campbell Robert 7E
31
16 Aug
7418 Culler M
K 31
16 Sept
7685 Carver John G
B 3
14 Sept
7780 Cain Thomas
G 4
8 Sept
9984 Crossley B
G 29
16 Oct
10272 Coltier W
B 3
11 Oct
11175 Callahan J
I 19
Oct
11361 Candee D M Art 2A 64
23
Mar
25 Dowd F 7 I
8
Aug
7325 Davis W Cav 1L
30
10 July
2813 Davis W
E 3
July
3614 Damery John 6A
20
11 Sept
7597 Diebenthal H
C 2
Sept
8568 Donoway J Cav 1A
12
16 Sept
8769 Dutton W H
K 14
5446 Dugan Charles 16 Aug
K 12
16 Oct
11339 Dean R
H 23
16 Oct
11481 Demmings G A
I 24
18 Nov
11889 Downer S
C 7
16 Nov
11991 Demming B J
G 13
16 July
3482 Emmonds A
K 17
14 July
4437 Easterly Thomas
G 31
Aug
4558 Earnest H C 6 I
2
16 Aug
7346 Ensworth John
C 31
Edwards O J, 8 Sept
7603
Cor G 2
16 Sept
8368 Evans N L
I 10
16 Oct
11608 Emmett W
K 28
Jan
12442 Eaton W 6F 65
12
14 Mar
186 Fluit C W 64
G 27
6 May
1277 Francell Otto
C 22
7 June
2612 Fry S
D 28
4444 Fibbles H 16 Aug
 G 1
Aug
4465 Fisher H 1E
1
Florence J J, 16 Aug
5123
Cor C 8
24 Aug
5382 Fuller H S
H 11
1 Aug
5913 Frisbie Levi Cav
G 17
Aug
5556 Fogg C S’t 7K
13
Sept
8028 Feely M 7 I
6
14 Sept
9089 Filby A
C 18
Oct
10255 Frederick John 7A
3
11 Nov
12188 Fagan P D
A 28
14 July
3028 Gordon John
G 7
9 July
4096 Gray Pat
H 27
July
4974 Grammon Jas Cav 1K
7
Gulterman J, July
4005 1E
Mus 26
16 Aug
5173 Gilmore J
C 9
16 Aug
7057 Gallagher P
D 28
18 Aug
7337 Gott G, Mus
- 30
7592 Goodrich J W 16 Sept
C 2
16 Sept
7646 Graigg W
B 3
11 Sept
9423 Guina H M
G 21
11 Oct
10300 Grady M
B 4
Oct
10397 Gladstone Wm 6K
6
Mar
49 Holt Thomas Cav 1A
15
14 June
2336 Hughes Ed
D 22
16 July
3195 Hitchcock Wm A
C 12
July
3448 Hall Wm G 1K
17
14 July
3559 Holcomb D
D 18
14 May
1350 Hilenthal Jas
C 25
16 July
3033 Haskins Jas
D 8
Aug
5029 Hollister A Cav 1L
8
16 Aug
5162 Hally Thomas
F 9
15 Aug
5352 Hanson F A
I 11
1 Aug
6695 Hodges Geo Cav
H 24
4937 Harwood G 15 Aug
 A 7
17 Aug
6964 Hoyt E S
B 27
16 Aug
7012 Hull M
E 27
16 Aug
7380 Holcomb A A
E 31
16 Sept
7642 Haley W
D 3
16 Sept
7757 Hubbard H D
D 4
18 Sept
8043 Haywood
E 11
16 Sept
8613 Heath I, S’t
K 13
16 Sept
9129 Hall B
G 18
11 Sept
9369 Heart W
F 20
16 Sept
9981 Hurley R A 64
I 29
18 Nov
12086 Hibbard A
D 18
14 Nov
12117 Hancock W
G 22
11 Nov
12163 Hudson Chas
C 26
16 Nov
8148 Hubbard B
A 8
11 Sept
9340 Islay H
- 4
Jamieson 7 April
737
Charles D 26
5221 Johnson John 16 Aug
E 10
11 Aug
7083 Johnson G W
G 28
Jamison J S, Q 1 Aug
7365 Cav
MS - 31
16 Sept
7570 Jones Jno J
B 2
6 Sept
7961 Jones James R
G 6
1 Sept
8502 Johnson F
D 12
16 Nov
11970 Johnson C S
E 12
16 Dec
12340 Johnson W
E 26
14 June
1590 Kingsbury C
K 3
11 Aug
5186 Klineland L
C 9
8 Aug
6374 Kempton B F
G 21
6 Aug
6705 Kershoff B
H 25
14 Aug
6748 Kelley F
I 25
Sept
7749 Kaltry J Cav 1L
3
7 Sept
8065 Kimball H H
H 7
7 Sept
8866 Kohlenburg C
D 15
10233 Kearn T 16 Oct
 A 2
16 July
3401 Lenden H
D 16
10 Aug
5893 Lastry J
I 16
Aug
5499 Lewis J 8E
12
14 Aug
6124 Leonard W
H 19
Lavanaugh W O, 16 Sept
7912
S’t C 5
8 Sept
7956 Linker C
G 6
7 Sept
9219 Lewis G H
G 19
Oct
10228 Lee, farrier Cav 1F
2
6 Mar
74 Mills W J
D 20
14 Mar
119 McCaulley Jas
D 20
14 June
2295 Miller Charles
I 21
16 July
3516 McCord P
G 18
14 July
3644 Miller A
D 19
11 July
3410 Mould James
E 16
15 Aug
3933 McGinnis J W
E 17
July
4079 Miller D Cav 1E
27
4417 Messenger A 16 July
G 31
11 Aug
4492 McLean Wm
F 1
8 Aug
4595 Marshalls B
H 3
16 Aug
5238 Mickallis F
F 10
16 Sept
7852 Miller F D
B
10 Sept
8150 Modger A
I 8
11 Aug
6902 Mape George
B 25
8 July
6240 Marshal L
H 20
1 Sept
7547 Moore A P, S’t Cav
H 2
16 Sept
8446 Mathews S J
K 11
1 Sept
8501 Myers L Cav
- 12
11 Sept
9170 Mertis C
C 18
14 Sept
9321 Milor W, S’t
F 20
16 Aug
5328 Miller H
A 11
16 Aug
6342 Malone John
B 22
Aug
6426 Messey M 7E
22
6451 McGee Thomas 11 Aug
 D 22
Aug
6570 McDavid James 1K
23
11 Aug
6800 Meal John
D 25
14 Oct
10595 McCreieth A
H 10
7 Oct
10914 McKeon J
H 14
16 Oct
11487 Murphy W
C 26
11 Oct
11538 McDowell J
D 27
5 Nov
12134 Montjoy T
C 23
16 Aug
5044 Nichols C
G 8
7 Aug
6222 Northrop John
D 20
1 Aug
7331 North S S, S’t Cav
D 30
Oct
10895 Nichols M 7 I 64
14
Aug
4565 Orton H C 6 I
9
Sept
7511 Olena R Cav 1E
1
14 Sept
8276 Orr A
H 14
14 July
2960 Pendalton W
C 6
14 July
3808 Pompey C
B 24
4356 Parker S B 10 July
B 31
1 July
3803 Phelps S G
H 22
16 Aug
4934 Pimble A
I 7
11 Aug
5002 Plum James
G 8
Aug
5386 Patchey J Cav 1 I
12
16 Sept
7487 Post C, S’t
K 1
7 Sept
7688 Potache A
G 3
Sept
9248 Phillips J I 8B
19
Padfrey 8 Sept
9444
Sylvanus H 21
7 Sept
9533 Painter N P
C 22
Oct
10676 Puritan O Cav 1L
11
7 Oct
11616 Peir A
D 28
July
2804 Ruther J, S’t Cav 1E
3
2 July
2871 Reed H H Art
H 4
10 July
3674 Risley E, S’t
B 20
11 Aug
4636 Reins Wm
I 3
5902 Ross D 10 Aug