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World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures
Bohumil Doboš
New Middle
Ages
Geopolitics of Post-Westphalian World
World-Systems Evolution and Global
Futures
Series Editors
Christopher Chase-Dunn, University of California, Riverside, CA, USA
Barry K. Gills, Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki, Helsinki,
Finland
Leonid E. Grinin, National Research University Higher School of Economics,
Moscow, Russia
Andrey V. Korotayev, National Research University Higher School of Economics,
Moscow, Russia
This series seeks to promote understanding of large-scale and long-term processes
of social change, in particular the many facets and implications of globalization. It
critically explores the factors that affect the historical formation and current
evolution of social systems, on both the regional and global level. Processes and
factors that are examined include economies, technologies, geopolitics, institutions,
conflicts, demographic trends, climate change, global culture, social movements,
global inequalities, etc.
Building on world-systems analysis, the series addresses topics such as
globalization from historical and comparative perspectives, trends in global
inequalities, core-periphery relations and the rise and fall of hegemonic core states,
transnational institutions, and the long-term energy transition. This ambitious
interdisciplinary and international series presents cutting-edge research by social
scientists who study whole human systems and is relevant for all readers interested
in systems approaches to the emerging world society, especially historians, political
scientists, economists, sociologists, geographers and anthropologists.
All titles in this series are peer-reviewed.
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Contents
1 Introduction���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1
2 Conceptual Framework�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7
2.1 Geopolitics and Neomedieval Theory���������������������������������������������� 7
2.2 Concepts�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10
2.2.1 State�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10
2.2.2 Unrecognized State �������������������������������������������������������������� 12
2.2.3 Non-State Actor�������������������������������������������������������������������� 13
2.2.4 Sovereignty �������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13
2.2.5 Terra Nullius and Black Spots���������������������������������������������� 15
2.3 Systemic Development �������������������������������������������������������������������� 16
2.3.1 Medieval System������������������������������������������������������������������ 16
2.3.2 Westphalian System�������������������������������������������������������������� 20
2.3.3 Globalization������������������������������������������������������������������������ 22
3 New Middle Ages�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23
3.1 Hedley Bull and the Birth of Neomedievalism �������������������������������� 23
3.1.1 Regional Integration of States���������������������������������������������� 24
3.1.2 Disintegration of States�������������������������������������������������������� 24
3.1.3 Restoration of Private Violence�������������������������������������������� 25
3.1.4 Transnational Organizations ������������������������������������������������ 25
3.1.5 Technological Unification of the World�������������������������������� 26
3.2 Post-Cold War Reincarnation������������������������������������������������������������ 26
3.2.1 Jörg Friedrichs���������������������������������������������������������������������� 26
3.2.2 Philip Cerny�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 28
3.2.3 Stephen Kobrin �������������������������������������������������������������������� 29
3.2.4 Jan Zielonka�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30
3.2.5 Barry Buzan and Richard Little�������������������������������������������� 32
3.2.6 Neil Winn������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 33
3.2.7 John Rapley�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 33
3.2.8 Phil Williams������������������������������������������������������������������������ 34
3.3 End of State System?������������������������������������������������������������������������ 35
3.3.1 Crumbling of State System �������������������������������������������������� 35
3.3.2 Alternative Actors ���������������������������������������������������������������� 38
v
vi Contents
ix
Introduction
1
The end of the Cold War introduced significant shifts and changes to the world’s
geopolitics (end of bipolarism and establishment of the new-world order), nature of
the international system, and domestic political setting of many countries all over
the globe. Bipolar competition disappeared, the world became dominated (at least
for some time) by a single superpower – the United States (USA) – and many coun-
tries fell into the abyss of civil war that was this time not fumed by the competing
superpowers. Other states failed due to the end of financing from former superpow-
ers and lack of balancing between these behemoths inside the civil conflicts taking
place in the third world context. The world became globalized and interconnected
via the emerging cyberspace and effects of the new regionalism as in the case of the
establishment of the European Union (EU) that spread across most of the European
continent or an appearance of the free trade areas (FTAs). New non-state actors that
appeared in the new environment (violent non-state actors or nongovernmental
organizations) often utilized the caveats in the states’ territoriality and functioning
and gained prominence. From these examples, it is clear that the changes in the
international structure are systemic and profound. Consequently, a large amount of
debates regarding the nature of the post-Cold War world took place. From Fukuyama
(1992) to Huntington (1997) to Giddens (1998), many authors attempted to portray
the nature of the international system following the fall of bipolarism. This work,
however, goes even further and claims that the changes not only disrupted the bipo-
lar balance of power but that they challenge the Westphalian system as we know it.
It might even seem that the structural limits that empowered the state to become the
dominant and mutually reinforcing unit in the international system that established
itself since the end of Middle Ages (Spruyt 1994, 180) might shift toward a new
equilibrium that might not favor a global dominance of the sovereign state anymore.
This development is following the process of power diffusion (Nye Jr. 2011, 113).
It is claimed that the world is slowly turning to a new geopolitical setting – the
neomedievalism. Nonetheless, as the grand theories mentioned above all failed to
grasp the global landscape in totality, this work is not claiming that we can use a
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license 1
to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
B. Doboš, New Middle Ages, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_1
2 1 Introduction
single concept worldwide. Instead it helps the reader understand that the global
distribution of power and organization of political space is uneven and the mutual
interactions are key for the full understanding of the contemporary geopolitics.
As noted by M. van Creveld (2000), the introduction of nuclear weapons at the
end of the Second World War dramatically changed the nature of the international
system which was for previous few centuries dominated by the integrating tenden-
cies that began in the consolidation process on the European continent1 and culmi-
nated in the establishment of the bipolar order. These trends to consolidate territory
via war effort were, however, ended by the emerging possibility of nuclear annihila-
tion and since the fall of the Soviet Empire disintegration began to lead the way –
the way that shifts the system into the neomedieval future. In this line of thought,
the following text is based on the evolutionary theory of state development.
The possible transformation into the New Middle Ages was, however, for the
first time mentioned by a different author – A. Wolfers (1962). Despite leaving just
a short comment on the topic, he scratched the possibility of a return of a system of
the new medievalism where a distinction between domestic and foreign affairs blurs
as a result of the struggle of communism against national state and transnational
movements against nationalism (Wolfers 1962, 242). As noted in the title, the book
argues that world is entering the post-Westphalian phase of its political development
and states are playing still decreasing role in the international and domestic politics.
The system is characterized by tensions and contradictions (Cerny and Prichard
2017, 3). This, however, does not mean that a state is about to disappear. The institu-
tion of state is so far prominent political actor and will in some territories and func-
tions remain dominant or at least important for the times to come.2 The end of the
Westphalian system and increased levels of instability, furthermore, do not neces-
sarily mean that the world will become a less pleasant place to live – as M. van
Creveld argues, the state-based system brought horrors of Hiroshima and Auschwitz
which are hardly perceivable in the neomedieval setting (van Creveld 2000).
The first scholar to adequately describe the possible global neomedieval setting
was H. Bull in his The Anarchical Society which was initially published in 1977. In
this work, he delimits New Middle Ages as an alternative stream of thought regard-
ing international politics in a post-bipolar era (Bull 1977, 254–255). The foundation
of the stream of thought and the consequent analysis are thus rooted in the realist
school of international relations. The neomedieval thinking was, however, aban-
doned as improbable until the beginning of the 1990s where it was reintroduced
either explicitly (e.g., works of J. Friedrichs (2001), P. Cerny (1998), J. Rapley
(2006)) or implicitly (e.g., by R. Kaplan (1994)). The stream thus gained some
prominence despite remaining on the side of the mainstream academic debate. At
this point, it is necessary to stress that the systemic changes presented in this work
do not portray the nature of the political activity inside the global system in its
entirety. There was no clear dramatic short-term switch from the medieval to mod-
ern system. Inside the Westphalian system, non-state actors used to play some or
1
See Tilly (1975).
2
See the discussion in 1999’s special issue of Political Studies 47 (3).
1 Introduction 3
even crucial role (e.g., the East India Company), and some, at least formally, alter-
native political units appeared (e.g., Libyan Jamahiriya). The prevalent logic of the
political conduct, however, laid in the forces that are described in relation to the
medieval, modern, and neomedieval systems as argued in the following text.
The fact that the theory is a little bit too extravagant for the mainstream debate3
is not a fault in itself. What is more problematic is the fact that the stream remained
to some extent shattered in different approaches toward the new nature of the inter-
national politics. Just by comparison of J. Friedrichs’ historical neomedievalism
and P. Williams’ New Dark Ages, we can find directly opposing ideas which, how-
ever, fall under the same basic framework. The first goal of this book is thus clear – a
proper description of neomedievalism as a stream of thought. Given the fact that the
specific authors usually dedicated only limited space to the development of their
outlooks on the theory or its application, it is necessary to carefully describe large
number of these divergent views as to find some common ground that is not rooted
only in a one-time opposition of the selected author to the Westphalian reading of
the international system. After this goal is achieved, the delimitation of the ideal
types that can be extrapolated from the theoretical analysis of the international (geo)
politics will be presented. Proper demarcation of these ideal types is essential as it
will become the basis for the whole remaining work. The work will thus devote
quite an ample space to a proper definition of basic terminology and overview of the
literature dealing with the New Middle Ages. The first research question is thus
stated as, what is the definition of neomedievalism?
New Middle Ages as somehow fluid environment, nevertheless, cannot be seen
as a rigid description of international system, and the thinking thus more resembles
continuum where each case’s position in relation to the ideal types differs. This is
why the next logical step in the attempt to examine the theory is to establish such
continuum to which the cases might be plotted into. This will enable us to place all
the cases into the complex model that presents the outlook of the neomedieval post-
Westphalian system. For a successful analysis, we need to deal with one other
issue – the nature of researched actors and scope of analysis. As New Middle Ages
are based on a presumption about the decline of state power, it seems unsuitable to
use state-based analysis as is usual in other geopolitical works. We will turn our
attention to different units usually connected to geopolitical thought – regions.
Regions are not, however, used as actors themselves but are researched as an envi-
ronment filled by different – both state and non-state – actors interacting with each
other. For region selection and delimitation, vast amount of literature by such prom-
inent figures such as S. Cohen, Z. Brzezinski, J. Zielonka, S. Huntington, or
R. Kaplan is available. Analysis of the position of the chosen regions inside the
neomedieval context is the second principal aim of this work. Nonetheless, if differ-
ent scope to macrolevel analysis is chosen, a more precise map of distribution of
different more fine-grained models of organization of political space might be gen-
erated. Regional distribution of the new international geopolitical setting is thus
3
Despite the fact that for some authors the suggestions made by neomedievalists do not go far
enough. See, for example, Bunker and Bunker (2016).
4 1 Introduction
only a step away. If it is found out that a vast majority of regions is dominated by the
Westphalian setting and is not leaning toward some form of neomedieval form
(meaning there is no evident shift toward non-Westphalian international setting), the
basis on which the whole book is based upon will fail. The second research question
thus states, what is the geographical distribution of the various geopolitical
(Westphalian and neomedieval) settings?
Once we know what neomedievalism is and how its different forms are distrib-
uted in different regions, we can move to the second goal of the book – analysis of
the relationship among actors inside different types of political space (Westphalian
and neomedieval) and relations among various actors inside these spaces and their
adaptation to it. The work will look at the options given to the neomedieval and
Westphalian actors in the new international setting with a focus on strategic options
such as economic cooperation, shatter-belt creation, state-building, waging war,
forms of external involvement, etc. It will be presented how different actors need to
adapt their strategies and setting according to the context of the environment they
are acting in4 and based on their capabilities and nature of their geopolitical setting.
In the end, we should be able to imagine the world as more than a simple political
map filled by territorial Westphalian states but as a complex structure with different
settings, different actors, and various relationships. This is the primary justification
for choosing the topic in the first place – presenting alternative to the classical geo-
political view on the international affairs and presenting practical advices on its
impact. Understanding of the changes in the nature of the global geopolitics and
reaction of different actors to such shifts are crucial for any subsequent analysis of
the actions of different actors. The third and fourth research questions state: How do
the political actors adapt to their geopolitical environments? How do the actors
inside different spaces react to each other?
Each of the questions will be researched using different methodological approach,
and each chapter will, if necessary, describe used methodology in more substantial
depth. At this moment, the basic summary of the major methodological points is
presented. In defining and characterizing neomedievalism, we will analyze existing
academic sources dealing with the issue – heuristic research. After adequately
explaining the theory, we will move to the description of its poles – ideal types.
Consequently, we will compare them to find main factors that distinguish them.
Once adequately described, the factors will be prepared for operationalization.
Operationalization will follow methodology that E. Berg and E. Kuusk (2010) used
in their article where they presented empirical approach toward understanding sov-
ereignty. Afterward, we will analyze the results and present geopolitical implica-
tions of state deterioration in a context of the empirical findings and the neomedieval
theoretical framework. The methodological framework itself is based on the
approach rooted in the systemic geopolitics – more consensual and liberal and lack-
ing geographical determinism compared to the classical geopolitics and more
focused on non-state actors as well. The selected school of geopolitics combines
elements of classical and critical geopolitics, taking the essential thoughts from
4
According to the Darwinist theory – see Spruyt (1994, 24).
1 Introduction 5
both of them. Systemic geopolitics presents tools to analyze space as a system. This
will help us with a proper delimitation and understanding of the spatial properties of
different regions in relation to the neomedieval theory. The book also holds clear
limitations regarding the empirical work. First, the global focus leads to necessary
simplifications. It is not a goal of the work to make a detailed analysis of every part
of the world and it cannot be. The book covers the evaluation of the systemic forces
inside the international order, and the application aims to better understand the geo-
graphical spread of the different types of geopolitical spaces. The second limitation
deals with the development on the ground. As the book works with the recent data
and evaluation of the contemporary events, it might not be capable of following all
the most recent developments taking place. This, however, once again does not dis-
qualify it from presenting the systemic evolution.
Structure of the book will follow the abovementioned research goals. The first
chapter deals with definitions and terminology; the second is dedicated to the theory
itself – description of both neomedievalism as an alternative to the Westphalian
system and its ideal types; the third chapter discusses the way how to apply theory
to empirical research – defining analyzed regions and presenting the research design
of the work; the fourth chapter deals with the empirical analysis itself; the fifth
chapter is dedicated to a study of the relations among different actors in neomedi-
eval world and the way political actors adapted to their environment; the sixth chap-
ter covers six case studies that illustrate the processes presented in the theoretical
sphere – their aim is not testing the model but better explaining the nature of rela-
tions and adaptations; finally, conclusion summarizes the whole work. This book
presents the world as being constructed of qualitatively different types of organiza-
tion of political space. This complication of the reading of the world map will hope-
fully bring more clarity into its understanding.
Conceptual Framework
2
Before the introduction of the New Middle Age theory and the neomedieval frame-
work that will be serving as a theoretical basis for the empirical part of this work, it
is essential to describe the basic definitions, terminology, and concepts used
throughout the book as some of the terms can be understood in several ways and we
need to establish a clear baseline for the development of the theoretical framework.
As the work problematizes our understanding of even basic concepts, it is essential
to have a basic definition of these. Lack of common understanding would hinder
any possible discussion over alternative geopolitical settings in non-Westphalian
organizations of the political map. In the first part, an understanding of geopolitics
and political geography and its applicability on neomedievalism as primarily inter-
national relations theory will be presented. The second part will focus on conceptu-
alization of the fundamental concepts, and the third part will describe medieval and
Westphalian systems as geopolitical settings from which the neomedieval system
might be described as well as the process of globalization that is by many seen as
major factor eroding modern state system.1
1
For the discussion over the role of globalization on the state system and sovereignty erosion, see
the special issue of Political Studies 47 (3) (1999).
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license 7
to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
B. Doboš, New Middle Ages, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_2
8 2 Conceptual Framework
from other fields (economy, demography, etc.), so the geopolitical analysis seeks to
research distinct cases as profoundly as possible (Glassner 1996, 11–12). These
other fields of expertise may include study of political and economic actors/agents/
systems, outlook of economic activity, or even role of ideas and ideology in the
international system. It is important to point out that the perception throughout the
book is not state-centric. A geopolitical actor is defined, by, for example, S. Mäkinen
(2014, 101), as any actor whose influence might be felt in at least two regions on
the globe, and so international organizations, individuals, etc. must also be includ-
ed.2 This definition is, however, insufficient for this research. For its purposes, it is
necessary to define political-geographical actor as well. While geopolitical actor is
defined by its impact on more regions or by its influence on the power projection
capabilities and the general dynamics of geopolitical development, regional actors
are comparably more static and follow the logic of political geography as a fixed
discipline. Actors that are part of the geopolitical processes are involved in
dynamic3 power projection efforts, while every actor that holds some power in a set
region is a part of the political-geographical analysis of more static power
distribution.
This distinction follows traditional division between political geography and
geopolitics. Both fields are subfields of human geography which specializes in
research of connection between human activity and geography in general. Political
geography, as mentioned earlier, focuses on political processes and is thus oriented
more on the state political system, while geopolitics is understood as a subfield of
political geography specifically dedicated to studying of great-power/global/inter-
national politics from the spatial perspective. To quote B. Hnízdo, geopolitics is
merely a “(s)cale picked at a global level, trying to overcome the limitations given
by the state as a territorial unit in researching the problems of political geogra-
phy(…) (Hnízdo 1995, 10).”4
Neomedievalism can be integrated into the geopolitical thinking in two ways.
The first is related to the nature of actors – neomedievalism stresses greater focus
on the non-state actors. The second is a mode of territorial control – the notion of
absolute territorial power of state is regarded as obsolete and unjustifiable. A justi-
fication for using neomedievalism in geopolitical framework is thus the focus on
territory and interaction among actors who can be defined as geopolitical/political-
geographical (although not all of them are necessarily territorial).
Finally, two concepts related to the issue and coming from the systemic stream
of geopolitical thought need to be tackled. The first is J. Lévy’s system of world
spaces. He points to the fact that the existence of world system is a myth and that
no global model is relevant for any scholar interested in honest description of a
2
Compare with the definition of a geopolitical agent in Flint (2006, 24–26).
3
“The geopolitical perspective is dynamic. It evolves as the international system and its operational
environment changes” (Cohen 2014, 5).
4
Translation by the author of these (the same is applicable for all the translations from Czech in
this book).
2.1 Geopolitics and Neomedieval Theory 9
2.2 Concepts
2.2.1 State
5
Sovereign state is territorially defined – there is no authority over other units (such as was the case
with Empire or Church) (Spruyt 1994, 36).
2.2 Concepts 11
kind of goods that the state provides are cast in terms of the theory of justice that
the state embodies, and the provision of just services constitute, in part, the state’s
claim to legitimacy (Miller 2013, 52).”
According to R. Cooper, three types of states are observable in the post-Cold
War world: premodern, modern, and postmodern. Premodern states are fragile and
no longer fulfill their primary functions, and this, consequently, aids the de facto
reemergence of terra nullius on maps. The existence of these states destabilizes the
world more than in the past since the areas of chaos are not only connected to the
rest of the world due to the effects of the modern transportation capabilities but
also enable a rise of potentially dangerous non-state actors.6 The modern state is a
classical state as we know it inside a Westphalian system and is intimately con-
nected to the institution of sovereignty. A postmodern system is defined by the
collapse of a modern state toward a higher order. Postmodern part of the world is
defined by a high level of openness and mutual interference. It is thus defined by
the breaking down of the distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs, mutual
interference and surveillance, rejection of the use of force,7 growing irrelevance of
borders, and security based on transparency and openness. A postmodern state is,
furthermore, oriented on individuality rather than a collective. These three kinds of
states must, however, coexist, and different territories may move from one type to
another (Cooper 2000).
Similar distinction is made by G. Sørensen. His description of a modern state
was presented above. He, furthermore, distinguishes two other forms of states –
postcolonial and postmodern. A postcolonial state is a type of state with weak
institutional basis, without proper legal system, with low societal coherence, and
without an appropriate national economy. Postmodern state is, on the other hand,
a state based on multilevel governance, connected to the supra and international
institutions, with identity of population shared between state, substate, and supra-
state levels and with developed transnational economy (Sørensen 2005,
100–107).
Another concept connected to state is the so-called state capture. Captured states
are taken over by particular groups in order to provide with some (economic) ben-
efit. We can observe this process appearing inside states that have weak institutions.
This is (was) applicable to the postcommunist part of Eurasia (Wedel 2003) or
Africa (e.g., in connection to the capture of Liberia by warlord Charles Taylor (Reno
1998)).
In our work, state is defined as an entity recognized by international community
as a state. This recognition is manifested by the acceptance of the entity into the
United Nations.8
6
For a discussion over the nature of premodern states, see also Reno (1998, 18–24).
7
Rejection of use of force is relevant only when discussing interaction between postmodern enti-
ties, not in relation to the modern and premodern entities.
8
“(…) UN membership is commonly viewed as the ‘birth certificate’ of a state” (Geldenhuys 2009,
22).
12 2 Conceptual Framework
9
Term is selected as, in the author’s view, most clearly describing the nature of these entities – to
some level undertaking state functions (indigenously or with foreign support) and not receiving
full recognition – the terminology is, as pointed out, disputed. When dealing with other authors’
description, the terminology will be unified as to follow the unrecognized state term coherently
and avoid unnecessary terminological confusion.
10
For more information on terminological confusion, see Harvey and Stansfield (2011, 14–16) and
Riegl (2010).
11
More precise definition is presented by S. Pegg who argues that unrecognized state “exists where
there is an organized political leadership which has risen to power through some degree of indig-
enous capability, receives popular support, and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide govern-
mental services to a given population in a defined territorial area, over which effective control is
maintained for an extended period of time(…)and it seeks full constitutional independence and
widespread international recognition as a sovereign state” (Pegg 1998, 1).
2.2 Concepts 13
In the light of definitions of a state and unrecognized state, we could easily leave a
definition of the non-state actor as the remaining set of actors – actors which are
neither recognized as states nor are trying to achieve such recognition on some
given and reasonably controlled territory. D. Josselin and W. Wallace (2001, 3–4)
point out the variety of the non-state actors and define those important for the world
politics as being mostly autonomous from the central government, operating as a
part of a network establishing transnational relations, and acting in a way that affects
the political outcomes.
For a better understanding of the term, let us now define distinct categories of
non-state actors and present basic terminological lines between separate groups of
these. The first distinction is between territorial and non-territorial actors. The for-
mer are trying to hold on to some concrete territory and to use it in achieving their
goals no matter what these are. On the contrary, non-territorial actors attempt to
promote their goals via mobility and global, or at least regional, focus and seek non-
territorial goals. The following is the differentiation based on the aim of non-state
actors: political, economic, ideological, societal, humanitarian, or other. Here we
understand political goals as those aiming at gaining power, economic as increasing
wealth, ideological as promoting ideology/religion, societal as attempting to change
society, and humanitarian as targeting to help people in need. These goals are often
interconnected as this brief overview is only a simplified model. Another distinction
is between primarily violent and nonviolent non-state actors or pre-state and mod-
ern non-state actors with the former forming without conceptual dependence on the
Westphalian state (e.g., nomads) (MacKay et al. 2014, 104).
2.2.4 Sovereignty
12
“…state is that kind of a human community, which holds on a defined territory (…) monopoly
for the legitimate use of violence” (Weber 2009, 244).
13
For the discussion over the notion of territoriality in its different forms, see, for example, Elden
(2013), Gottmann (1973), Kahler and Walter (2006) and Sack (1986).
14 2 Conceptual Framework
which is crucial for this sovereign status (Jackson 1999, 432–434; Sørensen 2005,
171–172). It is also important to distinguish between sovereignty as a legal principle
and independence as a political reality that might but also might not be connected –
e.g., a state might be sovereign but dependent, and non-state actor might lack sover-
eignty but be independent. Independence is a prerequisite of statehood while
sovereignty is its consequence (Crawford 2007, 4–34).
R. Jackson distinguishes between two forms of sovereignty. The first is so-
called imperial and is characterized by the rule of one state on a different state’s
territory. This type of sovereignty was disregarded and ultimately made illegiti-
mate by the notion of the immorality of the control of foreign territory and popula-
tion. This claim led to the appearance of currently prevailing form of
sovereignty – popular sovereignty, a notion that sovereignty lies in consent of the
population. The final judge deciding who is and is not a sovereign state is still,
however, the state system. The sovereignty of many states is thus not based on the
principle mentioned above of popular sovereignty but rather on a historical, politi-
cal, and economic context leading to their emergence (Jackson 1999, 438–449).
Another division of sovereignty comes from A. James. He recognizes three broad
branches of sovereignty – or rather ways how the sovereignty is understood. The
first is the sovereignty in the sense of the state doing what it wants, whereas the
second is connected to the delimitation of the decision-maker and the third to the
sovereignty as an expression of the nation’s trust in state which fulfills its duties to
the nation (James 1999, 457–459).
Another distinction might be made between negative and positive sovereignty as
presented by R. Jackson (1993). Negative sovereignty is a legal entitlement upon
which the community of formally equal states rests. It is based on judicial indepen-
dence and the principle of nonintervention. Negative sovereignty lies at the basis of
the post-Second World War international law.14 On the other hand, positive sover-
eignty is a relative concept related to the capacities of states. Positive sovereignty
enables states to use their independence. Unlike negative sovereignty, this status is
not defined legally but sociologically, economically, etc. It might be stronger in rela-
tion to some states, and it is a sign of state’s overall development (Jackson 1993,
27–29). This distinction is crucial for an evolution of the internal situation in many
weak states as the personal interest of their leaders was in many cases easier to fol-
low under the disguise of negative (judicial) sovereignty than in case these actors
acted as non-state actors (Reno 1998, 222).
Finally, it is helpful to tackle the issue of sovereignty from the political-
philosophical point of view to get fuller picture of the ideas characterizing the term.
For the needs of this work, only a few major ideas that appeared in a sphere of politi-
cal philosophy are presented. First, there is an issue of legal adoption. This is one of
the important issues discussed in the famous T. Hobbes’ Leviathan. For him “(…)
the authority of the law (…) lies only in command of the sovereign” (Hobbes 2009,
190) and “(i)n all the states, the only legislator is sovereign, be it one person like in
monarchy, or a gathering of people as in democracy or aristocracy” (Hobbes 2009,
14
See also Reno (1998, 7–9).
2.2 Concepts 15
184). But not only law adoption defines sovereign. As C. Schmitt famously pre-
sented: “Sovereign is he, who declares a state of emergency” (Schmitt 2012, 9).
Schmitt furthermore defines sovereignty as “(…)the highest, non-derived power of
the leader(…)” (Schmitt 2012, 9) and “(s)sovereign stands outside the normally
valid law order while still belonging to it by holding the power to decide, when the
constitution can be suspended in toto” (Schmitt 2012, 10). For C. Schmitt, the sov-
ereignty is thus “(…)not a monopoly of coercion or rule, but rather a monopoly of
decision(…)” with “(…)a monopoly of that last decision” (Schmitt 2012, 15). Last,
but not least, it is important to point at the observation made by H. Arendt: “Amount
of the violence disposable for a certain state does not have to be a reliable indicator
of a power of that country, neither a reliable safeguard against its destruction by a
much weaker and smaller power” (Arendt 2004, 12). Consequently, the power of
the sovereign (or in this instance any other actor) is not directly derived from the
amount of violence it uses. The more violent the actor needs to use, the less of actual
power it holds (Arendt 2004).
When discussing sovereignty in the following text,15 we will understand the term
as the ability of a state to create an internal order, be independent in its decisions in
domestic and foreign policy, and maintain means of provision of security. It is
important to point out that any restrictions of the decision-making must be volun-
tary. Otherwise, it challenges the state’s sovereignty – e.g., voluntary accession to
the defense alliance is not a breach while foreign occupation is. Factors challenging
states’ sovereignty16 are thus the following: inability of a state to provide its law on
the whole territory, inability to maintain order and promote its decisions on the
entire territory, dependence on the external actors, and the constant high level of use
of violence against its population to stay in power.
Before approaching the systemic definitions, it is important to deal with two seem-
ingly interconnected geopolitical phenomena.17 The first is so-called terra nullius.
The term terra nullius can be best understood as a portion of land out of control of
any political actor. These areas were historically quite widespread, but their num-
ber significantly decreased in the nineteenth and twentieth century due to the rapid
rise of global population and technological and infrastructure developments.
Nowadays they are mostly connected to the areas defined by harsh geography
(largest terra nullius is the continent of Antarctica) and state failure. Out of
15
This is, naturally, not a case in parts where other authors’ ideas are presented.
16
J. Crawford in this respect divides formal (where power over territory of state is given to separate
authority) and actual independence (degree of actual governmental power). They differ in factors
that are (not) considered as a breach of the independence and in their impact upon the state
(Crawford 2007, 62–88).
17
This work is not dealing with definitions of other forms of anomalous geopolitical units like
states-within-states or insurgent states as these are not directly referred to throughout the text.
16 2 Conceptual Framework
Antarctica, all portions of land are claimed by some state structure18 but not all of
this land is controlled efficiently, and effective power projection is in many times
virtually impossible (deserts, high mountain ranges, etc.). Terra nullius is thus a
portion of land with no (state) power efficiently controlling it. Terra nullius is a
land without control.
On the contrary, black spots are areas which are out of the control of the state
institutions which nominally provide sovereign power over them; however, they
are not without any authority. These areas are usually “hidden,” meaning that orga-
nizations that control them are not trying to bring international attention upon
themselves. These territories are thus usually controlled by the international crimi-
nal groups or terrorist organizations, and they provide them with safe haven. These
black spots are usually hardly penetrable and constantly remain out of the reach of
the state power. Black spots are dominated by criminal and illegal activities. These
black spots might thus create an illegal challenge to a state in the form of the out-
law communities or criminal entity (Stanislawski 2008, 366, 368–9).19 Black spots
are thus areas out of state control which remain hardly accessible and try to stay
out of the international radar due to the illegality of the activities of the actor(s)
controlling them.
European medieval system came into existence as a consequence of the fall of Pax
Romana in the fifth century. European landscape was dominated by the barbaric
tribes which made political and social environment more chaotic compared to the
era of the Roman dominance. Newly established states faced instability due to their
incapability to properly settle and govern newly acquired local population – king-
doms which did not successfully integrate locals usually disintegrated and vanished.
This led to the incorporation of some basic properties of Roman law and Roman
structure which proved to be rather effective. It is important to realize that during
the Middle Ages we cannot speak about the modern state. The importance of per-
sonal contacts was much more important than an abstract idea of state/kingdom.
The medieval state and society are basically identical – there was no widespread
18
With minor exceptions like small part of the Croatian-Serbian border where the so-called
Liberland was proclaimed.
19
Stanislawski uses definition of black spots as follows: “(…) Black Spots constitute areas that are
neither recognized by the international community nor are they under the true governmental con-
trol of the host states; they remain in the grey area between formal international recognition and
semi-formal central control. On international security maps, they often are reflected as demonstrat-
ing that government control and authority are either uncertain, incomplete, or non-existent and that
the internal dynamics concerning what goes on in these areas are not entirely known to the outside
world. What is known is that some internal dynamics exist, so they are not empty or blank spaces,
which might suggest a form of vacuum in that location. Nor are they ‘ungoverned’” (Stanislawski
2008, 369).
2.3 Systemic Development 17
sense of impersonal institution, and there is a vast variety of contacts on both verti-
cal (feudal20) and horizontal level. On the lowest societal level, we can observe the
emergence of neighborhood communities primarily based on the common use of
the agricultural soil and other means of living. These units were primarily territorial
(Müller 2011a, 317–329; Contamine 2004, 15–49).
Another factor observable was the growing independence of cities,21 which was
later formally recognized as the city councils were created. Power of cities was
important and visible especially during the times of crisis.22 Moreover the higher
level of local affinity and the importance of the local environment for the people
were mirroring in the creation of different local communities or guilds (Herold
2011, 291–318; Müller 2011a, 317–325) – the local identities and interests were by
the time the most important ones (Strayer 1970, 14). Medieval Europe thus con-
sisted of many mutually interconnected societies with different competencies, aims,
and claims. Another important factor of the medieval European state is the presence
of king on the top of a hierarchy. The state was still understood as a personal belong-
ing of the king.23 The power of an individual, however, was not only important for
the secular powers but even for the Church. For example, appearance of weak popes
enabled the existence of the Church schism (Müller 2011a, 330–403).
The importance of a strong monarch was crucial for the strength of a medieval
state. We can see, for example, that after the end of the reign of Charles le Magne,
vast and robust Frank Empire simply crumbled. This era can be furthermore seen as
an example of unorganized medieval system with many small units competing with
each other, leaving no possibility for an effective rule over them. Another factor
characterizing medieval system is the feudal system which led to the establishment
of feudal dominions so interconnected and fragmented that in some periods vast
territories were, again, practically uncontrollable (Müller 2011a, 317–329). The
map of Europe during the Middle Ages was more a chaotic mixture of different
personal and collective governments territorially overlapping each other than a clear
system of territorially based units as we know it from the post-1648 maps (Jackson
1999, 435–438; Spruyt 1994, 12). The system, moreover, lacked a monopoly on
coercive force (Spruyt 1994, 12).
On the other hand, in many ways church hierarchy was able to work as a unifying
element. The Church was also based on a territorial principle of dioceses, while
state was until the beginning of the eleventh century mostly defined by its popula-
tion24 (Müller 2011a, 367–403). State and Church were on the one hand still more
resembling each other in a structure while on the other were fighting over who will
20
With feudals being under multiple loyalties (Spruyt 1994, 38–39).
21
The most important city-community was probably the Hanseatic League, while the most promi-
nent city-states laid in contemporary Italy.
22
For example, the power of cities during the Hussite Revolution in Bohemia (Herold 2011,
291–318).
23
As noted earlier when the development of the understanding of the word state was described.
24
J. Grygiel presents importance of control over population in opposition to control of land as one
of the defining factors of medieval system (Grygiel 2013, 7–9). Empire can also be understood as
a spiritual and military authority inside vaguely defined boundaries (Spruyt 1994, 51).
18 2 Conceptual Framework
receive the major power in the contemporary society. Even before the Investiture
Contest (despite larger resemblance of the two powers compared to post-Investiture
Conflict era (Spruyt 1994, 47)), there was a struggle present between religious and
secular power over the establishment of the supreme authority based on a Roman
legacy. This led to the creation of the Holy Roman Empire on one side and the uni-
versal Church structure on the other25 (Müller 2011a, 317–403; Müller 2011b, 447–
471). By 1300, the medieval state began institutionalization and centralization of its
powers – mainly in England and France and in legal and economic domains (Strayer
1970, 3–56).
Another important factor is a power of non-state and non-Church actors. As
S. Sousedlík writes: “(…)due to the weakness of the central power, war could have
been quite easily waged by persons or groups(…)called private” (Sousedlík 2011,
538). Furthermore, with the growth of the wealth and power of the cities, these cities
were able to create strong alliances which were able to oppose the central power
effectively. Popular movements challenging legitimacy of both monarchy and
Catholic Church emerged, and even the importance and power of independent uni-
versities arose (Žemla and Dostál 2011, 94–95). Actors relevant for “international”
situation of medieval Europe were multiple – both territorial and mobile – and the
means of military conduct were cheap and easily accessible (Grygiel 2013, 5–7), so
the whole situation in Europe was more volatile. The nature of the medieval system
was not primarily territorial but dominated by the existing personal ties (Taylor
1994, 152).
To sum up, the Western and Central European Middle Ages were characterized
by the struggle between the universal claims26 of the secular Empire27 and the
Catholic Church, complicated structure of the territorial control by feudal masters,
and the vast power of smaller actors. Society was strongly territorially determined
with the exception of certain parts of elite with religious, secular, and university
background. The private violence was nothing extraordinary, and during significant
periods of time, vast territories were effectively ungoverned. Furthermore, the bor-
ders of these different actors did not necessarily respect those of others, so even
those actors with some sense of territoriality overlapped each other’s claims, and
population could have been quite easily caught in a system of multiple identity and
loyalty. This was even more problematic due to the presence of the clashing territo-
rial units loyal to a kingdom and the Church. It is important to point out that despite
the fact that the state was in 1300 the comparatively strongest political form present
in Europe, it remained rather weak by today’s standards (Strayer 1970, 57).
The shift from this medieval system to the Westphalian system presented in the
next subchapter was caused by some conditions specific to the European
25
We may observe that in an attempt to create a universal empire, both sides failed. Holy Roman
Empire reduced its claims over German “nation” only (Müller 2011a, 2011b), and Catholic Church
was in its claims held back by reformation and spread of Protestantism.
26
One of the main transformations between medieval and modern political system is in “transition
from the medieval universality founded on the unity of faith to the coexistence of a multiplicity of
sovereign states based on the diversity of geography and of religion (...)” (Gottmann 1973, 43).
27
“Secular arm of God” (Spruyt 1994, 53).
2.3 Systemic Development 19
environment. In 1500, Europe was ethnically and socially more homogenous com-
pared to the rest of the world; society was stratified among peasantry, landlords, and
nobility; urbanization levels were growing; important theories of sovereignty were
already created; ad hoc assemblies begun to emerge; and everyone had, at least
nominally, at least one king (Tilly 1975, 17–21). These conditions were important
prerequisites for creation of European nation states, but the centralizing efforts of
kings were opposed not only by rivals (noblemen, bishops) but even by local popu-
lation which was subjugated by the combination of positive incentives and ruthless
crushing of rebellions (Tilly 1975, 22–24; Mampilly 2011, 31–34). The formation
of modern state was, furthermore, not the only possibility for the political develop-
ment in Europe – challenging institutions contain political federation or empire,
theocratic federation, trading network, or feudal structure (Tilly 1975, 26) with
other possible alternatives in independent city communes or urban leagues (Curtis
2016, 90; Spruyt 1994). These entities established themselves as adaptations to the
shifts in the social, political, and economic structure of Europe and established a
basis for the growth of the sovereign state (Spruyt 1994, 61–63). They also adapted
their internal methods of controlling population that allowed them to become more
efficient (Foucault 2009) – additional necessary step toward the Westphalian mode
of organization of the political map.
During the creation of the Westphalian system (1500–1900), the majority of the
states simply died and disappeared. Survivability of a state in Europe was deter-
mined by its access to resources, protected position in time and space, availability
of political entrepreneurs, success in wars, relative homogeneity, and strong rela-
tions between state and landowners (with the possibility of one factor supplement-
ing for another) (Tilly 1975, 40–41) in relation to the, by then, unparalleled
advantage in mobilizing social resources (Spruyt 1994, 185). The transformation
toward modern state system was thus characterized by a change into an increasingly
more contiguous pattern of territories. This was marked by the establishment of the
principle of noninterference and decline of the last powers of the Church and the
Empire (Taylor 1994, 153). This development, however, was not true for the entire
globe. As a large number of states came into being after the Second World War, the
new principles of state recognition abandoning the de facto statehood prerequisite
and focusing on importance of the territorial integrity of even artificial postcolonial
states enabled foundation of many states that, unlike states in Tilly’s argument
(meaning mainly states located in Europe and Americas), were unable to control
their own territory (Fabry 2010, 12–13).
Following C. Tilly’s argument, we must mention another important transforma-
tion that took place during eighteenth and nineteenth century when states gradually
abolished the utilization of the non-state violence. Use of the non-state violence was
blurring boundaries between state and non-state authority, political and economic
domain, and domestic and international realms (Thomson 1996, 19). The transi-
tional period between the medieval and modern state system was characterized by
the utilization of private violence, hiring of foreigners to the armies, and existence
of mercantile companies, all with many powers and ability to utilize a legitimate use
of violence (Thomson 1996, 31–2). With the emergence of the modern national
20 2 Conceptual Framework
state, armed forces were becoming less dependent on mercenaries bought abroad
and more dependent on popular opinion (Thomson 1996, 59). Despite the fact that
there was no concentrated effort to forbid non-state violence, states were continu-
ally able to banish most of the practices that were present between the 1600s and
1800s as their interests were endangered. This process was both a sequence of unre-
lated actions against concrete non-state actors and progressive evolution in the state
system (Thomson 1996, 105, 145). Control of non-state violence thus became a
newly acquired function of the modern state. Since the beginning of the twentieth
century, the use of non-state violence can no longer be used openly, and the states
might use it only in secrecy as the practice is widely condemned as the state is per-
ceived as the only legitimate source of violence and it can use this right only through
its legitimate institutions (Thomson 1996, 149–53). The practice is thus mainly
present in the so-called proxy wars and utilization of these actors as proxies inside
many conflicts (Mumford 2013).
At this point, we can observe the first division that will become important for the
further text. As part of the world went through the specific process of development
that led to the Westphalian organization of political space, other parts did not. This
holds many reasons that are contextual for the specific regions. So as for the part of
the global communities, we can progress with the discussion over the Westphalian
evolution of the political institutions; others took different direction. This will be
more explained in the discussion over the Chaotic Anarchy part of the globe.
We have discussed the nature of the Middle Ages and the main events that led to its
gradual transformation into the Westphalian or modern global system. Let us con-
tinue with a description of the main factors of this newly emerged global order.
First, it is useful to read a quote from H. Bull who analyzed the basics of the mod-
ern international system: “The starting point of international relations is the exis-
tence of states, or independent political communities, each of which possesses a
government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth’s
surface and a particular segment of the human population. On the one hand, states
assert, in relation to this territory and population, what may be called internal sov-
ereignty (…) (o)n the other hand, they asset what may be called external sover-
eignty (…)” (Bull 1977, 8).
As we can see, the key features of the Westphalian system are sovereignty, ter-
ritoriality, and state. States interact with each other in the international domain and
set different goals. These goals are not necessarily political as are the actions taken
in relation to another state. States are, furthermore, internationally active in varying
degree – from active interference to isolation (Morgenthau 1993, 29–30).
Fundamental principle of the international relations under Westphalia is the balance
of power among sovereign states (Morgenthau 1993, 183). Balancing can be
achieved by several strategies (Morgenthau 1993, 194–212), but it is unnecessary to
2.3 Systemic Development 21
discuss them at this place and in context of this work. We can, furthermore, differ-
entiate states in their capabilities which enable them to equip these different strate-
gies – these capabilities are political, economic, military, etc. (Waltz 1979, 131) – and
even set up a hierarchical order of powers (Cohen 2014).
The Westphalian system is based on an existence of sovereign states which are
independent in their decision-making. The system is decentralized, and no formal
hierarchy exists. The anarchy in the relations among the states is the basic principle
of functioning of this system. Each state is responsible for its survival and other
actions on domestic or international level. Essential characteristic of every state
toward the system is its relative power which delimits the scope of its respective
area of interest. The balance of this system then lies in balancing of the power
among the individual states (Kovářová 2012, 39–41). Westphalia defined state as a
legitimate member of the European and, later of a global, international politics. The
principle of sovereignty started to be the most important attribute of an international
actor, and up to nowadays, any international organization aims primarily on the
realm of states in a definition of its membership (Philpott 1999, 578–582). For
R. Cooper, the main difference between the European medieval and Westphalian
system is its focus – medieval on universal Christendom and Westphalian on a bal-
ance of power among modern states (Cooper 2000, 10–14). The Westphalian system
destroyed the ambiguous and intermediary forms of authority (under universal
claims) and brought in the principle of sovereignty as opposed to the division of
power in the Middle Ages (Keating 2001, 11, 13).
An important feature of the modern state system is its statist and territorial nature
of the use of violence – in comparison with the previous eras, it is democratized,
demarketized, and territorialized (Thomson 1996, 4). The Westphalian system is
characterized by two major characteristics – balance of power and unification of
power which lies at the core of the system. Balancing was guided to the perfection
by the creation of bipolar system where both actors were able to destroy the oppo-
nent due to the existence of the enormous number of nuclear weapons and their
carriers. Unification of power was in effect ended by this development (van Creveld
2000). Impossibility to break the balance and to unify the power militarily led to the
economic and cultural warfare and ultimately to the decay of the Westphalian sys-
tem which now, as the argument stands, undergoes yet another transformation. The
Westphalian state system is, furthermore, challenged by stateless nationalism, glo-
balization, and transnational integration. The contemporary world is characterized
by the spread of modern means of communication, effects of globalization, and
decline of a nation-state, and we may observe that multiple territorial identities and
systems of action coexist with the alternatives that may be found in the past (Keating
2001, 1, 16, 21). “The nation state as we have known it since the nineteenth century
is merely one way of organizing the polity, and changes in the relationship among
territory, identity, political institutions, and function may open new possibilities for
the future (…). Nationality as a form of collective identity is neither more nor less
‘natural’ than others, and is constantly made and remade in the course of political
experience” (Keating 2001, 2).
Another random document with
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(From Codex Borgia, sheet 25.)
(From Codex Magliabecchiano, 3 folio, sheet 42.)
FORMS OF MIXCOATL.
Codex Vaticanus B.—Sheet 25: In this manuscript Mixcoatl’s almost nude body is striped with white, as
in the case of some of the stellar deities, and he has the half-mask stellar face-painting about the eye.
His hair curls up above the brow, is covered with downy white feathers, and he wears a forked heron-
feather tuft on the head. On sheet 37 his effigy is accompanied by the symbolical weapons of war.
Codex Borgia.—Sheet 50; right-hand corner, lower portion: The representation in this place is almost
identical with that in Codex Vaticanus B, sheet 25. On sheet 15 the god has the implements of war and
a small hand-flag, and wears a blue metal breast-plate set in gold, from which depends a chalchihuitl
jewel.
Codex Fejérváry-Mayer.—Sheet 41: Mixcoatl is here depicted with body-colour half-blue, half-red, the
black domino-stellar painting about the eye, his hair puffed up above the brow and surmounted by the
warrior’s adornment. The body-painting in this place is merely a variant [311]of the striped colour,
perhaps indicating the twilight. As god of the hunting tribes, he is naked like the hunter, and has an ear-
plug made from a deer’s foot. He is armed with a throwing-stick (atlatl).
(From a wall-painting at Mitla, Palace I.)
FORMS OF MIXCOATL.
WALL-PAINTINGS
On the west side of the court of Palace I at Mitla are certain fragments, some of which undoubtedly
represent Mixcoatl in his different phases. In the first of these he is represented as wearing a white wig
surmounted by tufts of down in which arrows are stuck. On his face he has the familiar “domino-
painting,” he is bearded, and his nose-plug is of a peculiar character, somewhat unfamiliar and
expressing a serpentine motif. He wears a collar with sharp stellar edges. The fifth figure to the right
from this once more represents him in the same guise, only that in his left hand he holds the atlatl, or
spear-thrower. His peculiarly stellar character has not been lost upon the artist who executed these
paintings, as the stellar eye-motif decorates the top of the frieze on which they appear. Not far away is
seen the deer usually associated with him.
An interesting stone figure of Mixcoatl was discovered in the ruins of the Castillo de Teayo, to the west
of the pyramid. It is made of sandstone, and the frontal aspect shows the god wearing a high panache
of feathers, a headdress flanked by tufts or puffings of some textile material from which feathers
depend, and an elaborate necklace. The skirt, the upper part of which is V-shaped, hangs down to the
ankles, and is tied up behind in a double knot. In his left hand he carries the bag which holds obsidian
arrow-heads, his invariable symbol, and in the right the S-formed lightning symbol, with which he is often
represented, as in the Codex Magliabecchiano. Another relief from the same site shows him carrying the
same symbols. His hair is decorated with feather-balls, as in the Codex Magliabecchiano and Duran’s
[312]illustration. In a painting from Teopancaxo he wears a peculiar headdress from which falls behind a
large panache of feathers, and which seems to be decorated with down; a horizontal band crosses the
face beneath the eye and covers the whole of the nose. In one hand he carries the lightning symbol,
from which spring serpentine streaks of lightning, and in the other a small shield like a sunflower and
three arrows with blunt ends.
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Codex Fejérváry-Mayer.—Sheet 32: He has the head of a deer. He carries for a staff the neck of a long-
billed, white bird, a heron. Before him stands a dish containing an eye and a feather ornament,
reproducing in form and colour the warrior’s forked heron-feather adornment. Sheet 6: He is painted a
yellow colour, thin and with wrinkled skin, his face looking out of the open throat of a bird, which has a
feather crest curling up and a variegated rosette on its beak. In one hand he holds a bone dagger, in the
other a staff tied round with a white-fringed cloth. As hieroglyph is shown beside him the day ce eecatl,
“one wind.”
Codex Borgia.—Sheet 60: Here he is represented as having heron-feather hair and beard, and a ring-
shaped appendage below the upper lip indicative of age. He is dressed as a priest, with tobacco-
calabash on back and red patch on temple. He holds in one hand a staff bent like a heron’s neck, and in
the other a bunch of malinalli grass. Sheet 24: The representation here is almost identical, except that
the staff has a heron’s head and that a bone piercer [313]is worn behind the ear. In both pictures he
wears a curious back device, recalling that on the rattle-staff of Quetzalcoatl. In some places he wears a
helmet-mask like the head of a deer.
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AS CAMAXTLI
Face-paint.—He wears the domino face-paint, like Uitzilopochtli and Mixcoatl, and a nose-plug.
The body is striped with red and white, in which circumstance he agrees with Mixcoatl and
Tlauizcalpantecutli, the morning star. He wears a headdress seemingly of feathers, and in Duran his hair
is long and he wears a knitted loin-cloth. A dead rabbit, or its skin, is slung across his breast. In the
Humboldt MS. (Roy. Lib. of Berlin) his headdress perhaps represents the symbol of hieroglyphic
expression for the phrase atl tlachinolli (water and fire) used in the sense of “war.”
Weapons, etc.—He carries the atlatl, or spear-thrower, and net-bag of the wild hunting tribes, bow and
arrows, sometimes tipped with down, also a bag or pouch, in which he carries his arrowheads of
obsidian. Like Mixcoatl he is sometimes clothed in the device of the two-headed deer, in which he went
to war.
MYTHS
Mixcoatl has already been alluded to in the précis of the early chapters of the Historia de los Mexicanos
por sus Pinturas given in the chapter on Cosmogony, where the circumstances of his birth are touched
upon. In chapter x of the same work he is identified with Amimitl, another Chichimec deity, seemingly
without reason. The Anales de Quauhtitlan speaks of him as one of the three who “sought [314]the
hearth-stone,” and as one of the priests of the Fire-god. As Iztac Mixcoatl, according to Motolinia, 3 he
dwelt with his wife, Ilancuêyê, in Chicomoztoc, the “Land of the Seven Caves,” the primeval land of the
tribes, and from them sprang the forefathers of the natives. By a second wife, Chimamatl, he begot the
god Quetzalcoatl. In the Tlaxcaltec legend reproduced in the Historia de los Mexicanos por sus
Pinturas, 4 mention is made of a two-headed deer which fell from heaven and was honoured as a god by
the people of Cuitlauac, and it is told how, clothed in its form or disguise, Camaxtli or Mixcoatl subdued
the surrounding tribes.
Iztac Mixcoatl was, indeed, the Chichimec Adam, the father of the tribe. A hymn to the gods of the hunt,
of whom Mixcoatl was the chief, is as follows:
II
III
IV
I came down
I came down
With my net bag.
I seize him
I seize him
And I seize him, and he is seized.
[315]
FESTIVAL
The great festival of Mixcoatl was the hunt-drive in the month quecholli. Sahagun says of this
observance 5:
“Quecholli was the name of the fourteenth month, Mixcoatl being honoured with festivals. Arrows and
darts for use in war were made, and many slaves were slaughtered in honour of this god. During the five
days spent in making the arrows, everyone slit their ears and rubbed their temples with the blood thus
drawn. Penance was supposed to be thus performed before the deer-hunting commenced. Those who
did not slit themselves were deprived of their cloaks as tribute. During these days no man cohabited with
his wife, and the aged abstained from the use of pulque, as penance was being performed. The four
days employed in the making of arrows and darts being ended, smaller arrows were made and tied in
bundles of four to which were added four pine torches. These were placed as offerings upon the graves
of the dead, besides two tamalli to each bundle. These remained for a day upon the tombs and were
then burned during the night, other ceremonies being held as well in honour of the dead.
“On the tenth day of this month the Mexicans and the Tlatelulca resorted together to the mountain of
Cacatepec, which they called their mother. On reaching it they constructed thatched huts, lighted large
fires, and spent the day in absolute idleness.
Next morning they breakfasted and went out together into the country. There they spread themselves
out in a circular line, in which were enclosed a large number of animals—deer, rabbits, and others; they
gradually approached them so as to enmesh them in a small space, and the hunt then began, each one
taking what he could.
“After the hunt, captives and slaves were slaughtered in the temple called Tlamatzinco. They were
bound hand and foot and were carried up the temple stairs in the same fashion as a deer is carried by
its four legs when taken to the butcher. They were put to death with great ceremony. The man and the
woman who represented the image of [316]Mixcoatl and his companion were slain in another temple,
which was called Mixcoateopan. Several other rites were performed.”
TEMPLES
Mixcoatl’s temples in Mexico were the Mixcoapan tzompantli and the Mixcoateopan. In the first were
preserved the heads [317]of the victims sacrificed to the god. The ceremony of quecholli was
commenced in the latter.
Mixcoatl was primarily the great god of the Chichimecs and the Otomies, a god of the wild hunting tribes
of the plains to the north. Numbers of these had settled in Mexico City and elsewhere within Anahuac, to
which they had carried his worship with them. The tribal legends connected with him seem to imply that
he was regarded in one of his phases, that of Iztac Mixcoatl, as the Chichimec Adam or Abraham, and
he is even alluded to as the “father” of Quetzalcoatl and “brother” of Uitzilopochtli. The probabilities are
that he was the god of a section of the Nahua who entered Mexico proper before the advent of the
worshippers of Uitzilopochtli, and as he had similar characteristics to the latter deity, he became
connected with him in the popular imagination.
Mixcoatl seems to me one of that large class of conceptions which recur so frequently in all mythologies
—the rain- and lightning-bearing cloud, which in the mind of the savage takes the form of a great
monster, a dragon or serpent, vomiting fire and discharging water. The name Mixcoatl means “Cloud-
serpent” and serves to substantiate this conception of him. But in the eyes of a hunting people he came,
like other deities of the kind, to be regarded as the great hunter who casts the thunderbolt, the lightning-
arrow, and therefore as the god-like prototype of the savage sportsman. Mixcoatl’s possession of the
obsidian arrow-head, which became personified in Itzpapalotl, gives further weight to this idea.
Because he partook of the attributes of a sky-god, Mixcoatl almost inevitably became identified with the
stellar deities dwelling in the heavens above. He is, indeed, Chief of the Centzon Mimixcoa, which has
been translated “The Four Hundred Northerners,” the host of stars to the north of the Equator, in
contradistinction to the Centzon Uitznaua, or “Four Hundred Southerners,” who were scattered by
Uitzilopochtli immediately after his birth. But here a question of some difficulty arises. Uitznaua may
correctly [318]be translated “southerners,” whereas Mimixcoa can scarcely be rendered otherwise than
as the plural of “cloud-serpent.” The insignia of these latter deities, however, are certainly stellar. They
wear the stellar face-mask and are in every way to be connected with the stars. It is clear, too, that
Mixcoatl in one of his manifestations must be connected with the morning star. But I take this
connection, as in the case of Quetzalcoatl, to have arisen at a period comparatively late. Again, we
frequently find in Mexican myth that the stars are regarded as serpentine in character, and indeed, as in
the case of the Tzitzimimê, partake of insect characteristics.
“Mixcoatl” is the expression in use at the present time among the natives of Mexico for the tropical
whirlwind 6—obviously a much later conception of his nature, and one more intimately connected with
that of Tezcatlipocâ, as I have attempted to show in the passages relating to that god, and to
Quetzalcoatl. There is, indeed, a strong resemblance between Mixcoatl and Tezcatlipocâ, both of whom
are connected with obsidian, and carry the hunter’s bag of obsidian darts.
Because of his connection with the lightning Mixcoatl was also god of the fire-twirler, the apparatus with
which fire was made, and he appears in this character during the fire festival.
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FORMS OF TLAUIZCALPANTECUTLI.
On the five sheets of Codex Vaticanus B which indicate the periods of the planet Venus we observe
Tlauizcalpantecutli depicted five times, and have thus a most favourable opportunity for studying his
various attributes. All of these pictures represent him in the form of the evening star, with the quincunx of
white spots on the dark background of his face. He is depicted as half-black, half-white, the body, upper
arms, and knees being black, but the forearms, thighs, and lower part of the legs white and striped with
yellow longitudinal lines, like the striping on Uitzilopochtli’s body. Under the eye is a motif which recalls
the blue snake-band round the mouth of Tlaloc, but it is yellow in colour, and forms a kind of coil in the
middle of the face over the nose. A tassel or other ornament falls from it, the whole recalling certain
Maya types. The hair is flame-coloured, curls upward, and is bound with the usual fillet studded with
white slicings from mussel-shells, and the black, white-tipped feathers, previously alluded to, and
intermingled with eagle-plumes, crown the head. The breast is covered with the white eye-ring, also
described above, and which is characteristic [321]of Tezcatlipocâ. Accompanying the picture is the
emblem of the stellar eye, which in this place is almost certainly intended to depict the planet Venus.
The god holds in one hand the atlatl, or spear-thrower, and in the other a bundle of darts, to symbolize
his nature as a shooting god.
In Codex Telleriano-Remensis the hair is plastered with white downy feathers, and round the neck is
slung the aztemacatl, the heron-feather cord, the whole indicating the insignia of the victim about to be
sacrificed after ceremonial combat. He wears a skull as helmet-mask in this MS. In the Aubin-Goupil
tonalamatl Tlauizcalpantecutli wears a rod-shaped nose-plug and the blue breast-plate of the Fire-god.
This god, as Seler indicates, 7 is a variant of the planet Venus, the morning star, who was regarded as
the shooting god and who was perhaps identical with Mixcoatl. The Anales de Quauhtitlan says that:
“When he appears he strikes various classes of people with his rays, shoots them, sheds his light on
them,” and these several types of people thus shot are clearly to be seen in Codex Borgia, and in the
corresponding places of the other manuscripts, where their sequence is, however, varied. That they
stand in relation to the quarters of the heavens there can be no doubt, but these quarters vary with the
several codices. Thus in Codex Borgia we find the jaguar occupying the north, while in Vaticanus B and
Bologna we find it occupying the fifth or downward direction, and in this varying arrangement we
probably see differences [323]of local conception. The deities or figures at which the god hurled his spear
are the jaguar, or Tezcatlipocâ, Chalchihuitlicue, the black Tezcatlipocâ (probably as Tepeyollotl),
Cinteotl, the Tlatouani, or King, and the Yayotl, or the symbol of war; but these do not agree with the
“classes of people” shot by the god as given by the Anales de Quauhtitlan, which states “that in the sign
cipactli he shoots old men and women, in the sign coatl he shoots the rain, for it will not rain, in the sign
atl, the universal drought, in the sign acatl, kings and rulers, and in the sign olin, youths and maidens.”
This seems to me to indicate not so much that the god was identical with Mixcoatl, as Seler states,
although he may have had connections with this deity, but that he typifies in some manner the evil
influences of the rays of the planet Venus at certain times of the year. We know that the Mexicans, like
many other peoples, believed that the stars emanated influences good and bad, and as Seler himself
states in his essay on “The Venus Period in Picture-Writing,” 8 “it is possible that we have on these
pages simply an astrological speculation arising from superstitious fear of the influence of the light of
this powerful planet. By natural association of ideas the rays of light emitted by the sun or other
luminous bodies are imagined to be darts or arrows which are shot in all directions by the luminous
body. The more the rays are perceived to be productive of discomfort or injury, so much the more
fittingly does this apply. In this way the abstract noun miotl or meyotli with the meaning ‘ray of light’ is
derived from the Mexican word mitl, ‘arrow’ … thus miotli is the arrow which belongs by nature to a body
sending forth arrows, a luminous body.… When the planet appeared anew in the heavens, smoke-vents
and chimneys were stopped up lest the light should penetrate into the house.… It is hardly possible to
see anything else in these figures struck by the spear than augural speculations regarding the influence
of the light from the planet suggested by the initial signs of the period.” Seler also points out that we
possess the analogy of the periods in which [324]the Ciuateteô, or “spectre women,” send down similar
baleful influences from above.
[Contents]
Stone-head from Great Temple of Mexico.—This represents her as having on both cheeks the sign for
“gold” and “bells,” hence the face of this head is really painted (xauhqui) with bells (coyolli). As a nose-
ornament she has a peculiar pendant, consisting of a trapezoidal figure and a ray, the motif of which is
partially repeated in her earrings. Her headdress is a small, close-fitting cap, the front of which is
embroidered in a downy feather-ball pattern.
MYTHS
The myth which describes her enmity to her mother, Coatlicue, and her slaughter by her brother
Uitzilopochtli, has already been recounted in the section dealing with the latter god.
Coyolxauhqui’s insignia, as seen in the stone head of her from the great Temple of Mexico, is
unquestionably that of a lunar goddess. Moreover, the terms of the myth referred to above make it plain
that she represented the moon, who is “slain” by the first blow of the xiuhcoatl, or fire-snake (the dawn).
The fact that she was the only sister of the four hundred stars, Centzonuitznaua, probably implies her
lunar significance.
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[325]
Certain wall-paintings at Mitla afford a good representation of the Tzitzimimê, who are represented as
pulling the sun out of his cave by a rope. In this case their character as stellar deities or demons is well
exemplified. The face often resembles that of a death’s-head and the hair is puffed up in wig fashion. In
Codex Borgia the Tzitzimimê are represented as female figures with death’s-heads and jaguar-claws.
The insects pictured in the Codex Borbonicus are unquestionably representations of the Tzitzimimê
gods in their demon forms.
MYTHS
The interpreter of the Codex Vaticanus A equates them with the gods of Mictlampa, or Hades, but his
contemporary who edited the Codex Telleriano-Remensis says of them:
“The proper signification of this name is the fall of the demons, who, they say, were stars; and even still
there are stars in heaven called after their names, which are the following: Yzcatecaztli, Tlahvezcal
pantecuvtli, Ceyacatl, Achitumetl, Xacupancalqui, Mixauhmatl, Tezcatlipocâ, and Contemoctli. These
were their appellations as gods before they fell from heaven, but they are now named Tzitzimitli, which
means something monstrous or dangerous.”
Tezozomoc mentions them in his Cronica Mexicana in connection with the building of the great temple
at Mexico. He states that their images were at one period still necessary for the completion of the
building, and alludes to them as “angels of the air, holding up the sky,” and “the gods of the air who draw
down the rains, waters, clouds, thunders and lightnings, and who are placed round Uitzilopochtli.” He
further says that these “gods of the signs and planets” were brought to the sacred edifice and placed
round the idol of Uitzilopochtli.
The Tzitzimimê are obviously stellar deities. A myth [326]seems to have existed that they had been cast
out of heaven, and may perhaps be equated with that relating to Xochiquetzal. I think, too, that it had a
connection with the myth which told how Uitzilopochtli routed the Centzonuitznaua, his brothers, who
were also stellar deities or demons of darkness. That the Tzitzimimê were so regarded was probably
because they were seen during the night, or perhaps during eclipses. The list of them includes many of
the great gods, especially those who had an uncanny significance, as Tepeyollotl, Mictlantecutli,
Tlazolteotl, Tezcatlipocâ, and Itzpapalotl. The Tzitzimimê are equated by Seler with the Sky Supporters. 9
[327]
1 See Sahagun, bk. vii, cs. x–xiii, for a much more detailed description. ↑
2 See Sahagun, bk. iii, Appendix, c. iv. ↑
3 Historia de los Indios de la Nueva España, Preface, in Izcazbalceta, vol. i, 1858, pp. 7, 10. ↑
4 Izcazbalceta, vol. iii, 1891, p. 237. ↑
5 Appendix to bk. i, c. xiv. ↑
6 Brinton, Myths of the New World, p. 190. ↑
7 Commentary on Codex Vaticanus B, p. 287. ↑
8 Bulletin 28 of U.S. Bureau of Ethnology, pp. 355 ff. ↑
9 See Commentary on the Codex Vaticanus B, p. 90. It seems to me that, as Tezozomoc says, these were gods of the
“signs and planets,” i.e. of the tonalamatl in its augural or astrological sense. If so, the definitely astrological nature of the
tonalamatl might be argued therefrom. ↑
[Contents]
CHAPTER X
GODS OF DEATH, EARTH, AND THE UNDERWORLD
[Contents]
Codex Borgia.—Sheet 14: This is one of the most striking representations of the
Death-god which has come down to us. Here he is depicted as a skeleton with a
skeleton’s thorax and a skull for head, the arms and legs painted white with yellow
spots picked with red, to symbolize the bones of a newly flayed person. He has a large
rosette at the occiput and a flag, both painted in alternate white and red cross-bands,
and this motif is carried out in the ends of the loin-cloth, and in the extremities of other
bands and stripes. He presents a burnt-offering. The symbolic crossways and the owl
are figured before him, the death-bird being surrounded with paper flags, the
decoration of corpses prepared for cremation. Sheet 15: On this sheet he wears the
death-symbols. At the nape of the neck he has a paper rosette, decorated with red
and white cross-bands, the paper flag painted in the same way, broken in the middle
and bent, and an ear-plug consisting of a human hand. His symbol in this place [328]is
a bunch of malinalli grass. Sheet 79: In this representation of the Death-god we find
the invariable skeleton head, but the body is painted, like that of the priests, in black.
The nape-ornament is of paper, and the ear-plug is a human hand. The screech owl’s
wing also appears. Opposite him is a corpse wrapped up in a cloth and corded with
strings, a paper flag, used in the decoration of corpses prepared for cremation, and a
cross, apparently made of knotted sheets of cloth or paper. His hair or wig is black and
curly, some of the curls ending in eye-like circles with red centres. In this picture he
sits opposite Tonatiuh, the Sun-god, and thus, perhaps, represents night in its black
aspect, the eyes in his wig, as elsewhere, symbolizing the stars. Sheet 57: Here he is
placed opposite the Death-goddess and wears the usual insignia. The ground on
which their seats are placed is not simply yellow, as in the other sections, but consists
of alternate fields of malinalli grass and fragments of skulls in the style of the
hieroglyph of arable land. Both present each other with a naked human figure,
symbolic of human sacrifice. Between them stands a receptacle painted black and
studded with eyes, with red bands in the middle and yellow border. On the left of this
stands a dish filled with blood and smoking hearts, on which the goddess is pouring
fire from a vessel. On the right projects the body and tail of a dragon, which is seized
by the god. In the centre is seen a skull swallowing a man who is falling headforemost
into its throat, and above all is pictured the moon, without, however, the usual rabbit
appearing in its circumference.
MICTLANTECUTLI.
Codex Vaticanus B.—Sheet 21: He has the usual skeleton head, but in the arms and
legs the bony structure is merely [329]indicated by a yellow colour and a black design.
He is clothed with a jacket of green malinalli blades and wears in his ear a strip of
unspun cotton. He has as back-device a pot, in which three flags are stuck. Sheet 34:
In this sheet he is represented much as in Codex Borgia, sheet 15. Sheet 58: Here he
is pictured as a black god, with a skull for head and seated on a chair made of blood,
bones, and malinalli grass. He has the nape-shield and the flag inclining forward, and
a nose like a sacrificial stone knife.
MYTHS
The interpreter of Codex Vaticanus A says of Mictlantecutli: “He descends for souls as
a spider lowers itself with its head downwards from the web.” Later on he states that
“he is the great lord of the dead below in hell, who alone after Tonacatecutli was
painted with a crown.… They painted this demon near the sun, for in the same way as
they believed that the one conducted souls to heaven, so they supposed that the other
carried them to hell. He is here represented [that is in the codex] with his hands open
and stretched towards the sun to seize on any soul that might escape from him.” Later
he states that Ixcuina, “the goddess of salt, dirt, and immodesty,” was the wife of
Mictlantecutli. The commentator of Codex Telleriano-Remensis seems to regard
Mictlantecutli as rescuing souls from the realm of the dead. He says: “They place him
opposite to the sun to see if he can rescue any of those seized upon by the lord of the
dead.” The two interpretative codices were almost certainly edited, if not copied one
from the other, by the same hand, and it is such passages as this which show the
great dubiety existing in the minds of the priestly commentators regarding the precise
nature of the Mexican deities.
Sahagun in the Appendix to his third book, the first chapter of which treats of burial,
gives a prayer or address to the dead which mentions Mictlantecutli, and which states
that he and his wife Mictecaciuatl await the deceased, who goes to dwell among the
shadows, “where there is no light or window.” It is further explained that when he
arrived in the realm of the god of the dead (which has already been described in the
chapter on Cosmogony), he makes him an offering of the papers which he carries, of
faggots or torches [331]of pinewood, and of perfumed reeds, cotton, mantles, and
costly apparel.
Boturini and Brasseur give a great deal of matter regarding this god which is
absolutely worthless, as does Leon y Gama, and the deity has been in some manner
confounded with a god Teoyaomiqui, who seems to be quite supposititious in
character and never to have had no other existence in the minds of Gama and his
copyists.
Mictlantecutli, it would seem, is neither more nor less than a god of the dead, that is,
his original conception was probably that of a prince of Hades, a ruler of the realm of
the departed, who in time came to possess the terrific aspect and the punitive
attributes of a deity whose office it was to torment the souls of the erring. The fact that
he presides over the eleventh hour—the hour of sunset—shows that he was in a
measure identified with the night, as certain aspects of his insignia would appear to
show. In a manner he must be regarded as the earth, which in its form of the grave,
yawns or gapes insatiably for the bodies of the dead. (See Mictecaciuatl.) He appears
to have analogies with the Lords of Xibalba, or the Place of the Dead, alluded to in the
Popol Vuh, of the Quiches of Guatemala. 1
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Codex Bologna (Cospi).—Sheet 27: The date “nine earth-monster” (chicunaui cipactli)
stands here beside Mictecaciuatl as her hieroglyphic name.
Codex Borgia.—Sheet 57: Here she is represented opposite Mictlantecutli. She has a
wig decorated with stars. The face is human, but the fleshless lower jaw resembles
the sign malinalli. Her nape ornament of paper is painted red and white, and her
costume is red with white cotton borders and an upper border of variegated white and
yellow.
See Mictlantecutli.
[Contents]
MYTHS
“They considered Tepeyolotli the lord of these thirteen signs in which they celebrated
his festival, during the four last of which they fasted, out of reverence, on account of
the earth’s having remained after the deluge. But as its conditions were disordered or
filthy, they did not consider the sacrifices of these signs as good or clean, but, on the
contrary, as unclean, and they applied to them an appellation which in common
phraseology we might explain by the term ‘sacrifices of filth.’ These last four signs in
which they fasted were likewise out of reverence and in honour of Suguequezal
(Xochiquetzal), the wife of Tonacatecotle, whose name signifies the lifting up or raising
up of the Roses, for they say that goddess caused the earth to flourish. This proper
name might be written Tiscuelutli, which is the Heart of the Mountain, which means the
echo.”
“The name refers to the manner in which the earth was preserved after the deluge.
The sacrifices of these thirteen days were not deemed good; they might be interpreted
in Spanish ‘sacrifices of dung.’
“The sign under which number one is written caused paralysis and evil humours. Two
was appropriated to drunkards; and three was applied to the earth. Tepeolotlec
presided over those thirteen days in which they celebrated a festival; and during the
last four days of which (where the hands are marked) they fasted. Tepeolotlec means
Lord of Animals.
“The four days of the fast were in honour of Suciquecal, who was the man who
remained in the earth which we now inhabit. Tepeolotlec is the same as the echo of
the voice when it reverberates in a valley from one mountain to another. They
bestowed the appellation of the tiger on the earth because the tiger is a very
courageous animal, and they say that the deluge ceased at the reverberation caused
by the echo in the mountains.”
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A tepitoton or model of
Tlazolteotl.
Yacatecutli.