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Ethical Economy. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy
Jacob Dahl Rendtorff Editor
Perspectives on
Philosophy of
Management and
Business Ethics
Including a Special Section on Business
and Human Rights
Ethical Economy. Studies in Economic Ethics
and Philosophy
Volume 51
Series Editors
Alexander Brink, University of Bayreuth
Jacob Dahl Rendtorff, Roskilde University
Editorial Board
John Boatright, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, USA
George Brenkert, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., USA
James M. Buchanan†, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, USA
Allan K.K. Chan, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong
Christopher Cowton, University of Huddersfield Business School, Huddersfield,
United Kingdom
Richard T. DeGeorge, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, USA
Thomas Donaldson, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, USA
Jon Elster, Columbia University, New York, New York, USA
Amitai Etzioni, George Washington University, Washington D.C., USA
Michaela Haase, Free University Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Carlos Hoevel, Catholic University of Argentina, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Ingo Pies, University of Halle-Wittenberg, Halle, Germany
Yuichi Shionoya, Hitotsubashi University, Kunitachi, Tokyo, Japan
Philippe Van Parijs, University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
Deon Rossouw, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa
Josef Wieland, HTWG - University of Applied Sciences, Konstanz, Germany
Ethical Economy describes the theory of the ethical preconditions of the economy
and of business as well as the theory of the ethical foundations of economic systems.
It analyzes the impact of rules, virtues, and goods or values on economic action and
management. Ethical Economy understands ethics as a means to increase trust and
to reduce transaction costs. It forms a foundational theory for business ethics and
business culture.
The Series Ethical Economy. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy is
devoted to the investigation of interdisciplinary issues concerning economics,
management, ethics, and philosophy. These issues fall in the categories of economic
ethics, business ethics, management theory, economic culture, and economic
philosophy, the latter including the epistemology and ontology of economics.
Economic culture comprises cultural and hermeneutic studies of the economy.
One goal of the series is to extend the discussion of the philosophical, ethical,
and cultural foundations of economics and economic systems. The series is intended
to serve as an international forum for scholarly publications, such as monographs,
conference proceedings, and collections of essays. Primary emphasis is placed on
originality, clarity, and interdisciplinary synthesis of elements from economics,
management theory, ethics, and philosophy.
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/2881

Jacob Dahl Rendtorff
Editor
Perspectives on Philosophy
of Management and Business
Ethics
Including a Special Section on Business
and Human Rights
Editor
Department of Social Sciences & Business
Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark
ISSN 2211-2707 ISSN 2211-2723 (electronic)

Ethical Economy
ISBN 978-3-319-46972-0 ISBN 978-3-319-46973-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46973-7
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016962633
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

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Preface
Welcome to the proceedings from the 2015 EBEN (European Business Ethics
Network) Research Conference. The EBEN conferences have been going on each
year since year 2000, and I am happy that CBS was able to host one of these confer-
ences. This conference was organized as a cooperative project between Copenhagen
Business School, Roskilde University, and EBEN Scandinavia (the Scandinavian
Chapter of the European Business Ethics Network). Inside CBS the conference is
also a result of a collective work cooperation between the Center for Corporate
Social Responsibility at the Department of Intercultural Communication and
Management and the Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy.
“Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics” is an important topic for
Copenhagen Business School and Roskilde University. CBS values research on
business ethics and philosophy of management, and we find it important to ask the
fundamental questions of the foundations of business ethics and of the ethical econ-
omy. The research at Roskilde University is based on an interdisciplinary approach
to responsibility, ethics, and legitimacy of corporations. The role of philosophy in
management and leadership is important for developing good managers and reflec-
tive leaders. Topics like philosophy of management, leadership philosophy, busi-
ness ethics, corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate governance and ethics,
business, law and human rights, and cultural conditioning of business ethics are
essential for developing good leaders in a complex society today.
Therefore, the proceedings with the papers from the conference fit very well with
the series Ethical Economy: Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy at Springer
Publishers. It is important that many people will get access to the results of the con-
ference. In this context the topic of the conference of business ethics is in close
connection with the strategy of teaching business at Roskilde University and
Copenhagen Business School. The vision of liberal education with focus on human-
ities and social sciences as foundation of knowledge of good management has been
considered as an essential part of the ethical vision of management education. The
education in business ethics is an important part of this program, and theories and
practices of ethical accounting, values-driven leadership, business ethics and vir-
tues, normative leadership philosophy, business ethics and spirituality, as well as
v
vi Preface
critical concepts of business ethics coming from critical management studies as

well as from systems theory have emerged from this research environment.
In Denmark and Scandinavia, this research and teaching in business ethics and
philosophy of management have contributed to a higher level of ethical knowledge
and ethical formulation competency among managers in private and public organi-
zations. The focus on the importance of ethics is increasing in a society where the
Protestant ethics is challenged by new societal problems, including concern for
transformation to sustainability and development of more consciousness of ethical
dilemmas of management at the national and global level.
We are therefore happy in section I with the title “Business Ethics, Philosophy of
Management, and Theory of Leadership” to present some of the contributions to the
Copenhagen Conference in this volume of proceedings from the EBEN Research
Conference, October 1–3, 2015. Indeed, we would like to express our gratitude to
members of the Scandinavian Chapter of EBEN; EBEN; the Center for Corporate
Social Responsibility at CBS; the Department of Management, Politics and
Philosophy at CBS; and Roskilde University for the help with organizing this
conference.
Also in this book in section II with the title “Business and Human Rights”, we
have in addition to three papers on business and human rights from the EBEN
Research Conference five other papers on business and human rights. The papers on
business and human rights are some of the contributions to the conference on The
Power of Human Rights in Economics and Ethics in 2013. This conference was
initiated by the German Philosophical Society’s Research Group on Philosophy,
Ethics and Economics organized together with the Scandinavian Chapter of EBEN
in Copenhagen at Copenhagen Business School and Roskilde University, November
29 and 30, 2013. These articles contribute to develop the field of business and
human rights in relation to business ethics. These contributions fit very well with the
general theme of the publication, which is business ethics and philosophy of man-
agement. The issue of business and human rights entered the global policy agenda
in the 1990s, reflecting the dramatic worldwide expansion of the private sector at the
time and a corresponding rise in transnational economic activity. These develop-
ments heightened social awareness of the impact of economic activity on human
rights and also attracted the attention of the United Nations.
The role of human rights in the world of commerce is officially being promoted
since 2008 in a framework that consists of three normative imperatives – protect,
respect, and remedy. The UN Human Rights Council has specified the role of these
normative imperatives as “guiding principles”: The first principle is the duty of
states to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business
enterprises, through appropriate policies, regulation, and adjudication. The second
is the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, which means that business
enterprises should act with due diligence to avoid infringing the rights of others and
to address negative impacts. The third is the need for greater access by victims to
effective remedy, both judicial and nonjudicial. The (1) duty to protect lies at the
very core of the international human rights regime, with states as the principal
actors, whereas the principal bearers of (2) the responsibility to respect are c orporate
Preface vii
actors, this responsibility being the basic expectation society has of business in rela-
tion to human rights, and (3) access to remedy is important because even the most
concerted efforts cannot prevent all abuse.
From the perspective of business ethics and philosophy of management, we can
mention theoretically interesting and probably also practically important shortcom-
ings in the framework at its present stage. The following are to highlight some of the
points that stand in need of philosophical discussion and elaboration: (1) The
semantics of human rights is barely connected to business ethics discourse and to
ethical discourses about the foundations of human rights in human dignity. (2) The
key notion of CSR which, according to the framework, should absorb the normative
responsibility to protect human rights lacks conceptual, and specifically business
ethical, clarification. (3) There is a tendency in the framework to collapse the con-
ception of human rights into a narrowly legal conception, omitting the poly-
normative character of human rights. (4) Not enough attention is paid to problems
of integrating recognition of human rights into the rationality constraints under
which the strategic management of corporate commercial actors has to operate in
order to adapt to the forces of competition in globally integrated capitalist markets.
(5) Too little attention is paid to the need to construct plausible narratives that would
explain the importance and justify to skeptics from within the entrepreneurial world
view the possible burdens of making human rights the business of business.
With this collection of articles from the 2015 EBEN Research Conference at
Copenhagen Business School and the meeting of the German Philosophical
Society’s Research Group on Philosophy, Ethics and Economics, organized together
with the Scandinavian Chapter of EBEN in Copenhagen at Copenhagen Business
School and Roskilde University in 2013, we hope to give a picture of the state of the
art in the fields of business ethics and philosophy of management and business and
human rights. Moreover, we also hope that this initiates future research in these
fields. We wish the reader happy reading and great joy with all these exiting
articles.
Roskilde, Denmark Jacob Dahl Rendtorff

August 2016
Contents
Part I
Business Ethics, Philosophy of Management
and Theory of Leadership
1 Business Ethics, Philosophy of Management,
and Theory of Leadership....................................................................... 3
2 Universal Ideology & Ethical Strategy.................................................. 17
Alan E. Singer
3 A Genealogy of the Gift........................................................................... 31
Germán Scalzo
4 To Be or Not to Be a Dot? Philosophy of Management
and the Subjective Body.......................................................................... 47
Ghislain Deslandes
5 A Narrative Research Design into the Moral Courage
of Professionals......................................................................................... 61
Marion Smit
6 Understanding Value Conflict to Engage SME Managers
with Business Greening........................................................................... 73
Sarah Williams, Anja Schaefer, and Richard Blundel
7 My Brother’s Keeper: A New Phase in the Debate
on Corporate Responsibility................................................................... 93
Johan Wempe and Willeke Slingerland
8 Norms for Networks: A Contractarian Approach
to Corruption............................................................................................ 105
Willeke Slingerland
ix
x Contents
9 Compliance, Global Ethos and Corporate Wisdom:

Values Strategies as an Increasingly Critical
Competitive Advantage............................................................................ 121
Friedrich Glauner
10 Dispositional Attribution of Corporate Executives:
Is Self-Interest a Conscious Decision or a State of Mind?................... 139
Julian M. Clarke
11 Honour as the (New) Foundational Virtue for Responsible
Leadership in the Banking Sector:
A Theoretico-Conceptual Analysis......................................................... 165
Johan Bouwer
12 Ethical Issues in E-Commerce: A Renewed Analysis Based
on the Multiplicity of Customer Relationships..................................... 181
Magnus Frostenson, Nina Hasche, Sven Helin, and Frans Prenkert
13 Designing Whistleblowing Policy and Regulations
for High-Context Cultures: A Case Study in Indonesia....................... 197
Bitra Suyatno, Anona Armstrong, and Keith Thomas
Part II Business and Human Rights

14 Business Responsibility for Human Rights Violations
from a Theoretical Perspective: Towards a Moral
Division of Labour................................................................................... 227
Aurora Voiculescu
15 Who Cares Whose Cars? A Philosophical Analysis
of Business and Human Rights............................................................... 247
Ana-Maria Pascal
16 How to Accomplish Corporate Social Responsibility
for Human Rights – A Case Study on the Nicaraguan
Sugarcane Industry.................................................................................. 263
Anita Aufrecht
17 Connecting Corporate Human Rights Responsibilities
and State Obligations Under the UN Guiding Principles:
Communication and Human Rights Due Diligence.............................. 281
Karin Buhmann
18 Philanthropy and Human Rights in Business Ethics............................ 297
Øjvind Larsen
Contents xi
19 The Economics of Nonsense Upon Stilts: Basic Human Rights

and Economic Analysis............................................................................ 315
Jörg Althammer
20 Enlightened International Corporate Social Responsibility,
Corporate Social Irresponsibility, and Human Rights......................... 333
Aloys Prinz
21 Power and Weaknesses of the Idea of Natural Rights.......................... 357
Giuseppe Franco
Contributors
Jörg Althammer Ingolstadt School of Management, Catholic University

Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Ingolstadt, Germany
Anona Armstrong Law and Justice College, Victoria University, Melbourne,
Australia
Anita Aufrecht German Graduate School of Management and Law (GGS),
Heilbronn, Germany
Richard Blundel The Open University Business School, The Open University,
Milton Keynes, UK
Johan Bouwer NHTV Breda International University of Applied Sciences, Breda,
The Netherlands
Karin Buhmann Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Copenhagen, Denmark
Julian M. Clarke EBENI – European Business Ethics Network Ireland, Dublin,
Ireland
Ghislain Deslandes ESCP Europe, Paris Campus, Paris, France
Giuseppe Franco Ingolstadt School of Management, Catholic University of
Germany, Eichstätt, Germany
Magnus Frostenson Örebro University School of Business, Örebro University,
Örebro, Sweden
Friedrich Glauner Weltethos Institut, University of Tübingen, Tübingen,
Germany
Nina Hasche Örebro University School of Business, Örebro University, Örebro,
Sweden
Sven Helin Örebro University School of Business, Örebro University, Örebro,
Sweden
xiii
xiv Contributors
Øjvind Larsen Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Copenhagen, Denmark

Ana-Maria Pascal Principal Lecturer, Faculty of Business and Management,
Regent’s University London, London, UK
Frans Prenkert Örebro University School of Business, Örebro University, Örebro,
Sweden
Aloys Prinz Institute of Public Economics and Center for Economic Theory,
University of Muenster, Muenster, Germany
Jacob Dahl Rendtorff Department of Social Sciences & Business, Roskilde
University, Roskilde, Denmark
Germán Scalzo Business Ethics, Universidad Panamericana, Mexico City, Mexico
Anja Schaefer Department for Public Leadership and Social Enterprise, The Open
University Business School, Milton Keynes, UK
Alan E. Singer Department of Management, Appalachian State University, Boone,
NC, USA
Willeke Slingerland School of Governance, Law & Urban Development, Saxion
University of Applied Sciences, Enschede, The Netherlands
Marion Smit Faculty of Business and Economics, Amsterdam University of
Applied Sciences, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Bitra Suyatno Law and Justice College, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia
Keith Thomas School of Business, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia
Aurora Voiculescu University of Westminster, London, UK
Johan Wempe VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Sarah Williams University of Bedfordshire Business School, Bedfordshire, UK
Part I
Business Ethics, Philosophy of
Management and Theory of Leadership
Chapter 1
Business Ethics, Philosophy of Management,
and Theory of Leadership
Abstract This article presents the background of the discussions of the relation
between business ethics and philosophy of management. The reason for the need for
rethinking business ethics and philosophy of management is the many scandals and
the crisis of business in contemporary society. The question is whether it is possible
to overcome the oxymoron between ethics and business with the point of view that
“good ethics is good business”. In order to answer this question we need to rethink
business ethics with philosophy of management. From this perspective, the paper
addresses the problem of moral blindness in organizations. The extended elements
of moral blindness in organizations represent the basis for our need for business
ethics. The state of the art of business ethics with utilitarianism, deontology, virtue
ethics, discourse ethics and recent approaches to philosophy of management within
the analytical and continental traditions need to be aware of this need to rethink
business ethics from the perspective of philosophy of management. On this basis the
paper proposes a global philosophy of management with cosmopolitan business
ethics as a foundation of the concept of the balanced company in international busi-
ness. A case-study approach based on care evaluation of ethical decision-making
and ethical dilemmas in particular companies may help to advance this approach.
The aim of this conference is to present the relation between business ethics and
philosophy of management. Since the conference has been organized by the
Scandinavian network we may say that it should have been a conference about busi-
ness ethics in Scandinavia. However, in this presentation I will rather say something
about the definition of business ethics in relation to theory or philosophy of manage-
ment than in relation to a specific concept of business ethics in Denmark or more
broadly in Scandinavia. However, we may say that there has been a lot of focus on
business ethics in Scandinavia, in particular in relation to the institutionalization of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Rendtorff 2011; Jensen et al. 2013), but
J.D. Rendtorff (*)

Department of Social Sciences & Business, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark
e-mail: jacrendt@ruc.dk
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 3

J.D. Rendtorff (ed.), Perspectives on Philosophy of Management and Business
Ethics, Ethical Economy. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy 51,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46973-7_1
4 J.D. Rendtorff
indeed also in relation to philosophy of management or in particular theory of

Leadership which has been the topic of many presentations for this conference.
1.1 Introduction
The topic of the conference can be said to be very important and urgent. We need to
be rethinking business ethics and philosophy of management in the present life-
context. It can be considered as disturbing that we face so many scandal and crisis
situation in business today (Rendtorff 2014a, b, c). Just think about the recent case
of the Volkswagen fraud with regard to CO2-emissions of diesel cars. Indeed the
problem of sustainability and protection of the environment and to cope with cli-
mate change is important (Rendtorff 2015a). And we need to rethink business ethics
after the financial crisis (Ims and Tynes Pedersen 2015). Or the accident caused by
British Petroleum in the Mexican Gulf. Or go back some years to the financial crisis
or the Enron and world.com scandals in the beginning of the twentieth Century. It is
often mentioned that all these companies had well developed programs of ethics as
a part of their risk and reputation management.
So even though we have had reflections on business ethics for many years we still
seem to be confronted with the oxymoron of the incompatibility of ethics and busi-
ness. It is a still a problem how we can overcome or face this oxymoron that busi-
ness and ethics do not seem to mix very well together.
In contrast to the oxymoron we often hear that “good ethics is good business”,
implying that there really is “no business without ethics” and that “business ethics
is the license to operate of a business firm”. But what does this really mean?
(Frederick 2002; Crane and Matten 2016) Should we still say that there is no busi-
ness ethics without profits or should we rather argue that business ethics represents
a much more fundamental reflection about the foundations of a business system?
And what is the relation between business ethics, philosophy of management or
theory of leadership?
The great American pragmatist Richard Rorty infamously argued that “there is
nothing business ethics can learn from philosophy” (Rorty 2006). What he meant by
that may be considered as an interpretation of the oxymoron saying that there can-
not be a close link between philosophy and business ethics since they present two
different spheres of life and therefore cannot be combined. This may also be what
the sociologist Niklas Luhmann thinks about when he argues that “there is business
and there is ethics, but there is no business ethics” (Luhmann 1993). With this
Luhmann also defends a kind of separation thesis where business and ethics are
basically different from each other because they belong to two different social sys-
tems. In contrast to Luhmann, however, I would like to defend a point of view of a
holistic and hermeneutic approach following the philosopher Paul Ricoeur, stating
that we should hope that they all have a “little part of the truth” (Ricoeur 1955).
But even with this charity approach to the knowledge provided by business eth-
ics, it is possible to criticize the inefficiency of the business ethics movement. The
1 Business Ethics, Philosophy of Management, and Theory of Leadership 5
problem is that there has been little progress in business ethics the last 40 years,
which is indicated by the crisis of BP and the Mexican Gulf, the Enron case and the
recent Volkswagen case. This is disturbing and a good argument for rethinking busi-
ness ethics with philosophy of management.
1.2 he Topic of the Conference: Business Ethics

T
and Philosophy of Management
So this is the topic of this conference which we have tried to justify by the fact that
up to recently there has been little discussion of the relation between business ethics
and philosophy of management. In fact, we can say that despite the general interest
in corporate social responsibility and business ethics, the contemporary discussion
rarely touches upon the normative core and philosophical foundations of business
(Rendtorff 2012, 2013a, b, c, d, e). Even though the actions and activities of busi-
ness may be discussed from a moral perspective, not least in the media, the judg-
ments and opinions relating to business and management often lack deeper moral
reflection and consistency.
Partly for this reason, business ethicists are constantly challenged to provide
such moral and philosophical foundations, and also to communicate them in an
understandable manner. Such a challenge is also of scientific kind. Positions and
opinions in the academic field need to be substantiated by thorough moral and theo-
retical reflection to underpin normative approaches. Far too often, business ethicists
may agree on matters which they approach from different and sometimes irreconcil-
able philosophical standpoints, resulting in superficial agreement but deeper-lying
disagreement. In other cases, it may be of high relevance to identify philosophical
standpoints that may, despite conflicting fundamentals, arrive at conclusions accept-
able to everyone.
The EBEN Research Conference 2015 therefore decided to focus on the theoreti-
cal foundations of business ethics, and in particular on the philosophy of manage-
ment. This implied identifying and discussing conflicts as well as agreement with
regard to the philosophical and other foundations of business and management.
A number of general questions related to the theme of the conference, for exam-
ple: What is the relation between business ethics and philosophy of management?
What is the role of philosophy in management and leadership? And how does this
relate to ethics and corporate social responsibility? Do cultural differences in
approaches to business ethics and corporate social responsibility also involve philo-
sophical disagreement? Moreover, what is the role of normativity in business ethics
and how do we define normative approaches to business ethics? What does the last
decade’s specialization in normative approaches to business ethics means for man-
agement and leadership strategies? Could well-founded disagreement be a way to
cope with such a modern challenge or should modern discourses head for rational
agreement along a route of procedure and rules?
6 J.D. Rendtorff
1.3 Moral Blindness and the Need for Business Ethics
One important reason for the need for business ethics is presented by the concept of
moral blindness in institutions and organizations. But what is the concept of moral
blindness? Following Hannah Arendt’s philosophy of responsibility and judgment
proposed in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem. Essay on the Banality of Evil (1963)
we can define moral blindness as the incapacity of the administrator or manager to
integrate ethical thinking and moral imagination in decision-making (Arendt 1963).
Like the Nazi-SS-officer Adolf Eichmann the administrator and bureaucrat is just
following orders as a part of an organizational bureaucracy without questioning the
moral and ethical basis of such actions. Following Hannah Arendt’s philosophy
interpretations of moral blindness, power and domination following from the con-
cept of systemic action in, e.g. Stanley Milgram (obedience under authority),
Zygmunt Bauman (Modernity and the Holocaust), Philip Zimbardo (The Lucifer
effect) have been focusing on the lack of moral concern by individuals when they
act in conformity with systems of obedience, technological rationality or internal-
ized social roles based on group thinking. Moral blindness is the dark side of action
in organizational systems and it manifests the need to move towards ethical princi-
ples, judgment and ethical recognition in management and administration (Rendtorff
2014a).
This is the approach that we find in Frederick Bruce Bird’s book The Muted
Conscience. Moral Silence and Practice of Ethics in Business (1996). This book
provides the most comprehensive recent attempts to define the application of the
concept of moral blindness in business ethics, but it can also be applied to adminis-
tration. In fact Bird extends the concept of moral blindness to include moral mute-
ness and moral deafness. Moral muteness is defined as the inability of people to
defend their ideas and ideals (Rendtorff 2014a).
Following these different definitions of moral blindness we can emphasize the
following elements of moral blindness (Rendtorff 2014a): “(1) Moral blindness
implies that the administrator or judge has no capacity of moral thinking. (2) The
administrator or judge only follows orders and justifies his or her actions by refer-
ence to the technical goal-rationality of the organizational system. (3) The adminis-
trator or judge is strongly influenced by the ideology, principles or instrumental
values of the organization. (4) This attachment includes an abstraction from con-
crete human needs and concerns in the legal or administrative system. (5) In many
cases the moral blindness strangely enough includes collaborations from the victims
of the harm. (6) The victims follow the rationality of the system and they identify
with their roles either motivated by pure obedience or rather motivated by an attempt
to minimize a greater harm. (7) Moral blindness contains a dehumanization of the
victims and people or stakeholders implied in the process. They are considered not
as human beings but as elements, things or functions of the system. (8) Moral blind-
ness relies on total obedience by the administrators of the system. (9) Technology
and instrumental rationality is an essential element in the administration of the orga-
nization or legal system. (10) Each participant in the organization is accomplishing
a specific work function with a specific task but he or she has now general overview
of the organizational system. (11) Judges or administrators may behave opportunis-
tically to follow their own interest with regard to the main goal of the instrumental
system. (12) Judges or administrators may act irrationally beyond common human
understandings of morality in order to serve the instrumental rationality of the orga-
nizational system. (13) The administrative obedience to realize the organizational
aim becomes the central interest of the administrators of the organization. (14)
Obedience, role identification and task commitment remains the central and ulti-
mate virtue of the commitment of members of the organization to the organizational
system. (15) Each member or administrator of the organizational system commits
themselves to the values of the organizational goal of the system.”
So this definition of moral blindness contributes to understanding the need for
philosophical analysis of the foundations of business ethics (Rendtorff 2014a, b).
The danger of moral blindness challenges definitions of business ethics and in this
context philosophical reflections are important in order to understand the founda-
tions of our concepts of ethics in business.
1.4 State of the Art of Business Ethics
This importance of philosophical reflection is documented by the state of the art of

business ethics in contemporary societies. In fact, the lack of progress in business
ethics may be considered as an inefficiency of the prevailing theories of business
ethics in the tradition of business ethics research in the Anglo-Saxon countries and
mainly in the United States (Rendtorff 2009).
In business ethics the ethics of utilitarianism and consequentialism has been very
dominating (Velasquez 2011). This ethical approach is practical and utility-oriented
and therefore it corresponds well to the pragmatism of business. However, there is
often a problem of respect of humanity involved in utilitarianism since the weakest
and vulnerable are sacrificed for the greater good. Also, there is little sense of col-
lective responsibility in economic utilitarianism since it often focusses on maximi-
zation of individual economic interest. At the same time there is potential in
utilitarianism to move beyond individual maximization and focus on the collective
good as maximization of the greatest good for the greatest number. Utilitarianism
faces important problems of utility namely the problem of how to measure interests,
utility and consequences.
This is a characteristic of utilitarian business ethics, which defines the right
action as the action, which is most useful and has the best consequences for the firm.
We can say that business economics is built on the idea of the firm as a practical
utility maximizing unit dominating (Velasquez 2011). In relation to utilitarian busi-
ness ethics, we face the tension between individual utility maximization and social
welfare utility maximization. Here, we need to move beyond the individualist con-
ception of utility towards a more socially oriented conception of economic utility
for the firm.
8 J.D. Rendtorff
Even though it is important to think utility-oriented and pragmatic in business,

this approach cannot stand alone. The utility concept ignores human dignity and it
is blind to the complexity of the ethical dilemmas of business. Utility is an impor-
tant concern and it represents the economic perspective on ethics, focusing on eco-
nomic rationality of preference maximizing, but on its own terms this approach is
insufficient and sometimes even dangerous, leading to unintended moral blindness.
Accordingly, we need to evaluate the utility ethics in terms of other ethical theories
and approaches.
In contrast to utility ethics and consequentialism virtue ethics looks at the impor-
tance of virtue and moral character of the business man (Solomon 1992). Virtue is
about the capacity of judgment and action according to individual moral disposi-
tions by the business man. In virtue ethics the focus has been rather on individuals
and not so much on the market place or the involved organizational systems. This
may be a problem of virtue ethics since it cannot really capture the system, organi-
zation and market dimensions of ethics but rests on the level of respect for individ-
ual virtue and integrity as the most important concept of business ethics.
With this emphasis of individual virtue ethics is based on the concept of the good
and it focusses on human capacities to develop integrity and character (Solomon
1992). Virtue ethics is based on Aristotle’s concept of ethics that emphasized human
capacity of judgment and the doctrine of the mean. To find the mean in an action is
to find the right middle between extremes. Here important concepts of virtue ethics
in business ethics have been ideas of virtues and community, integrity and character,
the good life, practical reason as well as concern for wisdom of action, integrity and
decision-making (Rendtorff 2015c).
The tradition of Aristotelian Business Ethics is accordingly seeing business
ethics as a function of personal integrity. What is important is the capacity of
individuals to be honest and trustworthy when the act in business and economic
markets. The basis of economic action is the good manager who has great capacity
for leadership with integrity, as it is suggested by Robert Solomon in his develop-
ment of an Aristotelian business ethics (Solomon 1992). Even though it is very
important with the ability to act with integrity in business ethics the problem with
this approach is the lack of concern for general and universal morality. Virtue ethics
tends to be too concerned with moral character and often dismisses the rule-based
and universal dimensions of business ethics. Moreover, as suggested there is little
understanding of the organizational and institutional dimensions of business eth-
ics. In order to take these dimensions into account we would have to move
beyond virtue ethics towards a more rule-based and deontological approach.
Here Kantian business ethics has often been proposed as alternative teleological
approaches like consequentialism and virtue ethics (Arnold and Harris 2012). The
Kantian approach emphasizes the global and cosmopolitan dimensions of business
ethics. This approach defends global corporate citizenship as the aim of business
ethics. For Kantian business ethics it is essential in business to protect human dig-
nity and human rights. In this sense the Kantian approach to business ethics has a
strong focus on duty ethics (Bowie 1999).
From the point of view of duty ethics, ethics is dependent on the human capacity
of having a rational will, to be self-legislating, to be governed by the free and good
will independently to interest and pleasure. This foundation of ethics is the universal
moral law, as defined by Immanuel Kant’s categorical Imperative with its three for-
mulations going from the idea that is necessary for an action to be ethical that it can
be accepted as a universal law that everybody can follow (Bowie 1999). Human
beings should always act in a way that they consider humanity in their own person
and in every person at the same time as a goal or aim in themselves and never only
as a mean or instrument. The aim of ethics is to live the kingdom of ends where all
human beings are respected as human beings with moral responsibility and auton-
omy. In this context the basis concepts of duty ethics in business ethics involve
respect for the categorical imperative, personal responsibility and self-legislation on
the basis of foundational rules and norms, respect for absolute human dignity and
belief in humanity. In this sense duty ethics is based on a deep belief in rationality
and reason in morality as the foundation of the universal moral law.
Norman Bowie has suggested a Kantian capitalism (Bowie 1999). He has argued
that market norms for good business involve contracts based on trust and honesty
(integrity). Here it is important to focus on transparency and openness on economic
market where human freedom, universal respect for rights and fair inclusion of rel-
evant parties represent conditions for just economic action. The Kantian approach
in this sense greatly focused on the importance of just and fair economic institu-
tions, respecting human dignity and human rights as the foundation of business
ethics. However, even though this approach contributes to the understanding of the
institutions of business, it can be argued that Kantian business ethics is too formal-
istic and is not able to capture the situational and paradoxical dilemmas of business
ethics in action. It seems like we need to focus on the hermeneutic foundations of
business ethics in order really to capture the ethical dimensions of business.
In contrast to these classical theories of ethics applied to business ethics, another
approach to business ethics would be to apply the philosophical traditions of phe-
nomenology and hermeneutics from philosophers like Husserl, Heidegger and
Ricoeur to business ethics. This approach would focus on the study of business eth-
ics as a kind of critical hermeneutics based on understanding the ethical dimensions
of factual situations of sense-making in business organizations (Philips 2003;
Rendtorff 2009). Here ethics emerge as an ethical reality of meaning that we would
need to face in the real life of an organization. Critical hermeneutics of ethics in
business life looks at the situation of business life and tries to understand the ethical
dilemmas from this perspective. A major criticism of this phenomenological and
hermeneutic approach is that it does not really deal with theory, but rather focusses
on the specific issues of the business life as it is manifested in concrete reality.
Following the critical hermeneutics of Jürgen Habermas the position of Scherer
and Palazzo has been extremely influential in the present debate on business ethics
and corporate citizenship (Scherer and Palazzo 2011). This paradigm focusses on
the concept of corporate citizenship as important for business ethics research. The
corporate citizenship approach applies Habermas’ communicative ethics and repub-
lican philosophy of law to the reality of business (Habermas 1981, 1992). The
10 J.D. Rendtorff
approach by Scherer and Palazzo is inspired by Horst Steinman who proposed the
idea of social peace as the basis for his republican concept of business ethics. This
concept of corporate citizenship has a great advantage by being based on the sys-
temic and more holistic conception of business ethics that has been proposed by
Jürgen Habermas (1981, 1993). In fact, we can find similarities between this sys-
temic concept of corporate citizenship and the concept of ordoliberalism that has
been very influential in German business ethics since the corporate citizenship para-
digm also considers the systemic approach to business ethics as important. Here we
can emphasize the great importance of integrating business ethics research not only
from the point of view of individuals but seeing it in the broader framework of
social systems and interactions in society.
This focus on the importance of systemic dimensions of business ethics also
characterizes the approach to business ethics and philosophy of management from
the point of view of French philosophy and social theory. Different social philoso-
phies in the French-speaking world may contribute with important approaches to
economics (Rendtorff 2014b). We can ask for the phenomenological, existentialist,
Marxist or structuralist foundations of economics or we can apply post-structuralist
philosophy from Foucault and Derrida to the study of economics and business eth-
ics. Here these approaches would contribute with critical deconstruction of the ide-
ology of different approaches to business ethics. Moreover, there are interesting
critical potentialities in applying recent French sociology to the study of business
ethics. Here Luc Boltanski’s and Eve Chiappello’s sociology has proposed the new
spirit of capitalism, but there has also been a criticism of this approach in the sense
that Bernard Stiegler has proposed that capitalism is exhausted rather than it has
required a new spirit. Indeed, it is interesting to propose the postmodern criticism of
the contemporary approach to business ethics (Rendtorff 2014b). Here, the philoso-
phy of Gilles Lipovetsky is very enlightening. He proposes to talk about an ethics of
virtue rather than duty considering postmodern business ethics as struggle for com-
bining good ethics and good business (Rendtorff 2014b).
So we can find potentialities in new philosophical approaches to business ethics.
This is needed when we look at the problems of dominating concepts of manage-
ment in business. It may be argued that the new institutional economic approach to
business ethics remains too consequentialistic. As suggested in new institutional
economics the foundations of economics remain to be the rational utility maximiz-
ing individual and it seems there are problems with the concept of the acting indi-
vidual in new institutional economics because in the end only economic rationality
is important (Rendtorff 2009). The new institutional economics has little room for
business ethics. Like it is the case with the concept of trust business ethics is consid-
ered as a useless not very rational concept. In fact, although it is becoming more and
more popular we may also argue that stakeholder theory, as proposed by Edward
Freeman and his followers is not sufficient for founding business ethics in contem-
porary society (Philips 2011; Bonnafous-Boucher and Rendtorff 2014). Like stake-
holder theory, business ethics appears as too pragmatic and it seems that there is
really no foundation for the ethical dimensions of stakeholder theory. In fact, it is a
problem how we should justify the foundations of stakeholder theory. A similar
criticism may be put forward in relation to the position of shared value-theory as

proposed by Michael Porter (Porter and Kramer 2011). Here, it is proposed that
business ethics involves proposing shared value for society and business. This is
really to harvest the low hanging fruits in the activities of businesses so that business
also serves the value for society. This criticism of this is that it does not really
involves an ethical approach to business but rather implies a closure in relation to
ethics. This is for example the criticism of strategic CSR which seems to ignore the
ethical approach to business. As Mintzberg has said it was important that corporate
social responsibility did not end up in becoming nothing but a new abbreviation,
where the ethical dimensions of CSR are absorbed into strategic concepts of corpo-
rate social responsibility (Mintzberg 1983; Rendtorff 2009).
1.5 What Is Philosophy of Management?
With these embarrassments of the tradition of business ethics we can emphasize that
it is important to rethink that whole tradition with the help from philosophy of man-
agement (Koslowski 2010; Luetge 2013). But what is philosophy of management?
We can emphasize that philosophy of management involves philosophical reflec-
tions on the foundations of management. Here we can mention topics like interac-
tions between management and philosophy; ontology, epistemology and philosophy
of sciences in management; the political philosophy of the corporation in contem-
porary democratic societies; political, social and ethical legitimacy of corporations
in economy and society; cultural practice and aesthetics of organizations. All these
issues can be discussed within the debates about philosophy of management and
business ethics. Moreover, these different approaches to philosophy of management
must be integrated into a theory of ethical leadership (Koslowski 2010; Luetge
2013; Rendtorff 2013c, d).
This is indeed the case of many reflections about the philosophical foundations
of management. Ethics of management is about the fiduciary duty of the manager
towards the good of the firm. In the ethics of leadership, care, prudence and practi-
cal wisdom are important. Aesthetics of an organization is about management and
cultural philosophy. This approach deals with institutionalization of values and
respect for the human life-world in organizations.
Accordingly, philosophy of management needs to provide new foundations of
business ethics. New concepts of philosophy of management should be based on the
philosophical experience of thinking (Koslowski 2010; Luetge 2013). Here we can
emphasize that traditional positions in management theory and philosophy of man-
agement may also be limited. These positions include Aristotelian Leadership;
Radical normative leadership philosophy; Post-structuralism, Spiritual leadership,
Social constructivism; Theories about power, relationships and decision-making;
Theories about culture, change management and values-driven management. All
very important positions but also positions that we need to rethink by looking at the
12 J.D. Rendtorff
epistemological and ontological foundations of management by asking the deep

philosophical questions about the foundations of our theories of management.
Indeed the ontological question to begin with is whether philosophy can inspire
management? Yes! We can answer! Philosophers like Kant and Kierkegaard may
give us direct inspiration for leadership that help us to be better managers (Koslowski
2010; Luetge 2013; Rendtorff 2013a, b, c, d). Indeed, we have to look for the search
for truth in the philosophical theories. We might say that there is a basis for under-
standing the legitimacy of corporations present in the philosophical theories of lead-
ership! Here we can say that it is important in philosophy of management to ask
ontological questions? Like Plato asks the question about what is the good, the
beautiful and the just, the philosophy of management asks the question of “What
is?” and this question can be conceived as the foundation of the concept of legiti-
macy of leadership. The ontological question in management thus implies questions
like What is? What is management? What is motivation? What is justice? What is
responsibility? What are my foundational values? What is meaning? What is good
leadership? With the help of Heidegger we can therefore ask the question “What is
good management?”. Heidegger asks the question about what is important and
meaningful. This could also be seen as a Socratic approach to leadership where
philosophy of management asks the radical questions about “What is?”. So with this
philosophy of management is a Socratic philosophy about good leadership!
(Koslowski 2010; Luegte 2014).
1.6 lobal Philosophy of Management: Cosmopolitan

G
Business Ethics and the Balanced Company
With this ontological approach in philosophy of management I would like to pro-

pose a cosmopolitan and global perspective on international business ethics and
corporate citizenship (Rendtorff 2009). This approach is based on the philosophy of
Immanuel Kant that is applied as foundation for the analysis of the contemporary
European and Anglo-American debate on business ethics in order to formulate a
theory of global business ethics.
Cosmopolitan business ethics compares different concepts and schools of busi-
ness ethics and philosophy of management and apply them to the contemporary
debate on cosmopolitan and global business ethics. On this foundation we can
address contemporary problems of sustainability, business and human rights, corpo-
rate social responsibility, stakeholder management, corporate governance in order
to promote the cosmopolitan concept of business ethics and philosophy of manage-
ment (Rendtorff 2010). Moreover, it is important to contribute with case-studies and
propose a decision-making model for cosmopolitan business ethics to deal with the
complexities of globalization. With cosmopolitan business ethics a global philoso-
phy of management includes philosophical reflections about the values of integrity
and responsibility as foundations of human rights and universal guidelines for
ultinational corporations (Rendtorff 2015c). Applied to reflections about cosmo-

m
politanism philosophy of management and leadership ask ontological questions
about the foundations of corporate citizenship as global cosmopolitan citizenship.
This involves reflections about the philosophical concept of cosmopolitanism (indi-
vidual rights to free movement and governance of the world); the concept of cosmo-
politanism as being defined as “world citizenship”; application of this concept to
business corporations: “Global and world citizenship of business and corporations”.
Accordingly, this cosmopolitan approach proposes Immanuel Kant’s philosophy as
the basis for cosmopolitan business ethics.
Indeed, another important question for philosophy of management and business
ethics is the question of the ethical economy. Here, I would like to combine business
ethics with the ethical economy. As an ethical economy business ethics is address-
ing micro-meso and macrolevels of the economy simultaneously. Accordingly an
ethical economy is the core of a European and cosmopolitan approach to business
ethics. Peter Koslowski’s definition of the ethical economy illustrates this holistic
approach to business ethics and philosophy of management:
“Economic ethics or ethical economy is, accordingly, on the one hand, an eco-
nomic theory of the ethical and of economics and of ethical institutions and rules,
and, on the other hand, the ethics of the economy. Like political economy, it has a
double meaning. It is the theory of ethics that uses economic instruments of analy-
sis, a theory of ethics oriented towards economics, just as political economy is a
political theory that uses economic instruments of analysis. But ethical economy or
economic ethics is also a theory of the ethical presuppositions of the cultural system
of the economy, a theory of the ethical rules and attitudes that presuppose market
coordination and the price system in order to function. The component of the ethical
economy, which is more strongly oriented toward application, is called here “eco-
nomic ethics” (Wirtschaftsethik), although the terms “ethical economy” and “eco-
nomic ethics” merge and the present work also attempts to deal with fundamental
and applied questions of ethical economy and economic ethics. The term “ethical
economy” (Ethische Ökonomie) goes beyond the research objectives of economic
ethics, understood as the ethics of the economy, to achieve an integration of ethical
theory and economic theory. Ethical economy must be more than simply “econom-
ics and ethics” (Koslowski 2001, p. 3).
This approach documents that business ethics function as an institutional
approach to the study of ethics in economy and society. However, in order to look
deeper at the practical reality of business corporations we can benefit from the
hermeneutics of case-studies applying different ethics approaches to particular
cases and ethical dilemmas and problems in business corporations (Rendtorff
2015b). Case-studies can be proposed as an important methodology for ethics and
philosophy in humanistic management and liberal education and social sciences
because they integrate a deeper reflective, philosophical and ethical understanding
of the organization with business and economics.
Accordingly, with philosophy of management in case-studies we combine the
Harvard method of case studies with the philosophy of critical hermeneutics
(Rendtorff 2009, 2015b). A typical case-study therefore consists of the fact the
14 J.D. Rendtorff
p articipants on the basis of well-argued choice in theory and method on the basis of
an explicit reflective choice chooses a problem field in relation to a firm or a com-
pany, that functions as concrete illustration, documentation, and dept-theme presen-
tation of as well theoretical and practical issues and problems in the case that one
attempts to analyze.
This kind of hermeneutics can with inspiration from the French philosopher Paul
Ricoeur be considered as fundamentally critical, because it combines phenomeno-
logical belonging with critical distanced analysis of the reality in organizations and
business firms. This critical hermeneutics implies a critical evaluation of the prac-
tice of decision-making and action in organizations. This is also emphasized by the
fact that the case-study has to be problem-oriented and focused on dilemmas and
critical aspects of action in the practice of the firm (Rendtorff 2015b).
Accordingly the case-study approach tries to overcome the opposition between
theory and practice and in this way build a bridge between different theoretical
approaches to the reality of the organization or business firm. When we deal with
sciences of action like in business economics we see that the case-study gives the
researcher and practitioner an improved ability for action. When dealing with ethi-
cal dilemmas of decision-making we can say that the case-study gives a better foun-
dation for decision-making in the firm. In connection with case-studies of ethical
issues we can say that in connection with this it improves the ability of the manager
to make good and right decisions (Rendtorff 2015b).
Ethical decision-making and case-studies imply the following dimensions as
basis for leadership and judgment: Interpretation and explanation of ethical dilem-
mas; Analysis in terms of ethical theory and ethical principles; Analysis in terms
Corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship obligations; Analysis in
terms of stakeholder theory; Analysis in terms of corporate compliance standards
and codes of conduct; Decision-making and evaluations.
As such case-studies improve personal integrity and the ability to do the right
action and the case-study thereby contributes to the realization of the aim of educat-
ing good managers and administrators in the business corporation (Rendtorff
2015b). With this the case-study is essential for rethinking the relation between
business ethics and philosophy of management and leadership.
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Chapter 2
Universal Ideology & Ethical Strategy
Alan E. Singer
Abstract Ideology has been described as a framework of ideas used to explain

values and purposes. Accordingly, one might consider the possibility of construct-
ing a universal ideology, that is, a framework of ideas that can be used to explain all
values and purposes, but especially those most relevant to business ethics. A con-
ceptual framework that meets that description is duly set out in this paper. It is
comprised of four partitioned sets of concepts: ethical-theories, human-goods,
market-limitations and other bi-polar components. In the spirit of philosophical
pragmatism, the framework enables its users to generate systematic explanations
and justifications of ethical strategies in business. It might also be used as a tool for
a type of moral-diplomacy, where the intention is to promote the radical center and
business strategies that compensate for selected market-limitations.
2.1 Introduction
Ideology has been described as a trap, a meta-science and as a spiritual guide (e.g.
Bauman and Bordoni 2014). Significantly, it has also been defined, as “a framework
of ideas used to explain values and purposes” (Lodge and Vogel 1987). The latter
authors then claimed that individuals “routinely deal with issues within the limited
framework of their personal ideological assumptions”. Accordingly, one might at
least consider the possibility of constructing an un-limited or universal ideology,
that is: a framework of ideas that can be used to explain all values and purposes; but
especially those relevant to business ethics. A conceptual framework that meets that
description is duly set out in this paper.
A.E. Singer (*)

Department of Management, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC, USA
e-mail: singerae@appstate.edu
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 17

J.D. Rendtorff (ed.), Perspectives on Philosophy of Management and Business
Ethics, Ethical Economy. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy 51,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46973-7_2
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Sec. 3. In the prosecution of slaves for crimes of higher grade than
petit larceny, the legislature shall have no power to deprive them of
an impartial trial by a petit jury.
Sec. 4. Any person who shall maliciously dismember, or deprive a
slave of life, shall suffer such punishment as would be inflicted in
case the like offence had been committed on a free white person, and
on the like proof, except in case of insurrection of such slave.
Free Negroes.
Bill of Rights, Sec. 23. Free negroes shall not be allowed to live in
this state under any circumstances.
Article VIII.—Elections and Rights of Suffrage.
Sec. 1. Every male citizen of the United States, above the age of
twenty-one years, having resided in this state one year, and in the
county, city, or town in which he may offer to vote, three months
next preceding any election, shall have the qualifications of an
elector, and be entitled to vote at all elections. And every male citizen
of the United States, above the age aforesaid, who may be a resident
of the state at the time this constitution shall be adopted, shall have
the right of voting as aforesaid; but no such citizen or inhabitant
shall be entitled to vote except in the county in which he shall
actually reside at the time of the election.
The Topeka Constitution.
The following are the political features of the Topeka constitution:
Slavery.
Bill of Rights, Sec. 6. There shall be no slavery in this state, nor

involuntary servitude, unless for the punishment of crime.
Amendments to the Constitution.
Sec. 1. All propositions for amendments to the constitution shall

be made by the General Assembly.
Sec. 2. A concurrence of two-thirds of the members elected to each
house shall be necessary, after which such proposed amendments
shall be again referred to the legislature elected next succeeding said
publication. If passed by the second legislature by a majority of two-
thirds of the members elected to each house, such amendments shall
be republished as aforesaid, for at least six months prior to the next
general election, at which election such proposed amendments shall
be submitted to the people for their approval or rejection; and if a
majority of the electors voting at such election shall adopt such
amendments, the same shall become a part of the constitution.
Sec. 3. When more than one amendment is submitted at the same
time, they shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote upon
each amendment separately. No convention for the formation of a
new constitution shall be called, and no amendment to the
constitution shall be, by the general assembly, made before the year
1865, nor more than once in five years thereafter.
Submission of Constitution to the People.
Schedule, Sec. 2. That this constitution shall be submitted to the

people of Kansas for ratification on the 15th day of December next.
That each qualified elector shall express his assent or dissent to the
constitution by voting a written or printed ticket, labelled
“Constitution,” or “No Constitution;” which election shall be held by
the same judges, and conducted under the same regulations and
restrictions as is hereinafter provided for the election of members of
the general assembly.
The Douglas Amendment.
The following is the Douglas amendment, which really formed the

basis of the bill for admission:
“It being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate
slavery into any state or territory, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to
leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their
domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States.”
The bill which passed on the 4th of May was known as the English
bill, and it met the approval of Buchanan. To the measure was
attached “a fundamental condition precedent,” which arose from the
fact that the ordinance of the convention accompanying the
constitution claimed for the new State a cession of the public lands
six times greater than had been granted to other States, amounting
in all to 23,500,000 acres. In lieu of this Congress proposed to
submit to a vote of the people a proposition specifying the number of
acres and the purposes for which the money arising from their sale
were to be used, and the acceptance of this was to be followed by a
proclamation that “thereafter, and without further proceedings from
Congress the admission of the State of Kansas, into the Union, upon
an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever,
shall be complete and absolute.” The condition was never fulfilled,
for the people at the election on the 2d of August, 1858, rejected it by
a majority of 9,513, and Kansas was not admitted under the
Lecompton constitution.
Finally, and after continued agitation, more peaceful, however,
than that which characterized the earlier stages of the struggle, the
territorial legislature of Kansas called an election for delegates to
meet and form a constitution. They assembled in convention at
Wyandot, in July, 1859, and reported a constitution prohibiting
slavery. This was adopted by a majority exceeding 4000, and under it
Kansas was admitted to the Union on the 29th of January, 1861.
The comparative quiet between the rejection of the English
proposition and the adoption of the Wyandot constitution, was at
one time violently disturbed by a raid made by John Brown at
Harper’s Ferry, with a view to excite the slaves to insurrection. This
failed, but not before Gov. Wise, of Virginia, had mustered his
militia, and called for the aid of United States troops. The more
radical anti-slavery men of the North were at first shocked by the
audacity of an offense which many looked upon as an act of treason,
but the anxiety oi Virginia to hang Brown and all his followers who
had been captured alive, changed a feeling of conservatism in the
North to one of sympathy for Brown and deeper hatred of slavery. It
is but fair to say that it engendered hostility to the Union in the
South. The right and wrong of slavery was thereafter more generally
discussed than ever. The talent of the South favored it; while, with at
least a large measure of truth it can be said that the talent of the
North opposed it. So bitter grew the feeling that soon the churches of
the sections began to divide, no other political question having ever
before disturbed the Union.
We have not pretended to give a complete history of the Kansas
trouble either in that State or in Congress, nor yet a full history of the
many issues raised on questions which were but subsidiary to the
main one of slavery. Our object is to show the relation of the political
parties throughout that struggle, for we are dealing with the history
of parties from a national view, and not with battles and the minor
questions or details of parliamentary struggles. The contest had
cemented the Democrats of the South as it had the Republicans of
the North; it divided both the Democrats of the North and the
Americans in all sections. John Bell, of Tennessee, and Sam Houston
of Texas, recognized leaders of the Americans, had shown their
sympathy with the new stand taken by Douglas, as early as 1854.
Bell, however, was less decided than Houston, and took his position
with many qualifications. Houston opposed even the repeal of the
Missouri Compromise, and made the last speech against it in the
Senate. He closed with these words:
“In the discharge of my duty I have acted fearlessly. The events of
the future are left in the hands of a wise Providence, and, in my
opinion, on the decision which we make upon this question must
depend union or disunion.”
These sentiments were shared by many Americans, and the great
majority of them drifted into the Republican party. The Abolitionists
from the beginning of the struggle, allied themselves with the
Republicans, a few of their leaders proclaiming, however, that this
party was not sufficiently advanced in its views.
The Charleston Convention.
Such was the condition of the parties when the Democratic

national convention met at Charleston, S. C., on the 23d of April,
1860, it being then the custom of the Democratic party, as it is of all
majority parties, to call its convention first. It was composed of
delegates from all the thirty-three States of the Union, the whole
number of votes being 303. After the example of former Democratic
conventions it adopted the two-third rule, and 202 votes were
required to make nominations for President and Vice-President.
Caleb Cushing, of Mass., presided. From the first a radical difference
of opinion was exhibited among the members on the question of
slavery in the Territories. Almost the entire Southern and a minority
of the Northern portion believed in the Dred Scott decision, and held
that slave property was as valid under the constitution as any other
class of property. The Douglas delegates stood firmly by the theory of
popular sovereignty, and avowed their indifference to the fact
whether it would lead to the protection of slave property in the
territories or not. On the second day a committee on resolutions
consisting of one member from each State, selected by the State
delegates, was named, and then a resolution was resolved
unanimously “that this convention will not proceed to ballot for a
candidate for the Presidency until the platform shall have been
adopted.” On the fifth day the committee on resolutions presented
majority and minority reports.
After a long discussion on the respective merits of the two reports,
they were both, on motion of Mr. Bigler, of Pennsylvania,
recommitted to the Committee on Resolutions, with a view, if
possible, to promote harmony; but this proved to be impracticable.
On the sixth day of the Convention (Saturday, April 28th,) at an
evening session, Mr. Avery, of North Carolina, and Mr. Samuels, of
Iowa, from the majority and minority of the committee, again made
opposite and conflicting report on the question of slavery in the
Territories. On this question the committee had divided from the
beginning, the one portion embracing the fifteen members from the
slaveholding States, with those from California and Oregon, and the
other consisting of the members from all the free States east of the
Rocky Mountains. On all other questions both reports substantially
agreed.
The following is the report of the majority made on this subject by
Mr. Avery, of North Carolina, the chairman of the committee:
“Resolved, That the platform adopted by the Democratic party at
Cincinnati be affirmed with the following explanatory resolutions:
1st. That the Government of a Territory, organized by an act of
Congress, is provisional and temporary, and during its existence all
citizens of the United States have an equal right to settle with their
property in the Territory, without their rights, either of person or
property, being destroyed or impaired by Congressional or
Territorial legislation. 2d. That it is the duty of the Federal
Government, in all its departments, to protect, when necessary, the
rights of persons and property in the Territories, and wherever else
its constitutional authority extends. 3d. That when the settlers in a
Territory having an adequate population form a State Constitution,
the right of sovereignty commences, and being consummated by
admission into the Union, they stand on an equal footing with the
people of other States, and the State thus organized ought to be
admitted into the Federal Union whether its constitution prohibits or
recognizes the institution of slavery.”
The following is the report of the minority, made by Mr. Samuels,
of Iowa. After reaffirming the Cincinnati platform by the first
resolution, it proceeds: “Inasmuch as differences of opinion exist in
the Democratic party, as to the nature and extent of the powers of a
Territorial Legislature, and as to the powers and duties of Congress,
under the Constitution of the United States, over the institution of
slavery within the Territories, Resolved, That the Democratic party
will abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
upon questions of constitutional law.”
After some preliminary remarks, Mr. Samuels moved the adoption
of the minority report as a substitute for that of the majority. This
gave rise to an earnest and excited debate. The difference between
the parties was radical and irreconcilable. The South insisted that the
Cincinnati platform, whose true construction in regard to slavery in
the Territories had always been denied by a portion of the
Democratic party, should be explained and settled by an express
recognition of the principles decided by the Supreme Court. The
North, on the other hand, refused to recognize this decision, and still
maintained the power to be inherent in the people of a Territory to
deal with the question of slavery according to their own discretion.
The vote was then taken, and the minority report was substituted for
that of the majority by a vote of one hundred and sixty-five to one
hundred and thirty-eight. The delegates from the six New England
States, as well as from New York, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan,
Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota, fourteen free States, cast their
entire vote in favor of the minority report. New Jersey and
Pennsylvania alone among the free States east of the Rocky
Mountains, refused to vote as States, but their delegates voted as
individuals.
The means employed to attain this end were skillfully devised by
the minority of the Pennsylvania delegation in favor of nominating
Mr. Douglas. The entire delegation had, strangely enough, placed
this power in their hands, by selecting two of their number, Messrs.
Cessna and Wright, to represent the whole on the two most
important committees of the Convention—that of organization and
that of resolutions. These gentlemen, by adroitness and
parliamentary tact, succeeded in abrogating the former practice of
casting the vote of the State as a unit. In this manner, whilst New
York indorsed with her entire thirty-five votes the peculiar views of
Mr. Douglas, notwithstanding there was in her delegation a majority
of only five votes in their favor on the question of Territorial
sovereignty, the effective strength of Pennsylvania recognizing the
judgment of the Supreme Court, was reduced to three votes, this
being the majority of fifteen on the one side over twelve on the other.
The question next in order before the Convention was upon the
adoption of the second resolution of the minority of the committee,
which had been substituted for the report of the majority. On this
question Georgia, Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Texas, Florida, and
Mississippi refused to vote. Indeed, it soon appeared that on the
question of the final adoption of this second resolution, which in fact
amounted to nothing, it had scarcely any friends of either party in
the Convention. The Douglas party, without explanation or addition,
voted against it. On the other hand, the old Democracy could not
vote for it without admitting that the Supreme Court had not already
placed the right over slave property in the Territories on the same
footing with all other property, and therefore they also voted against
it. In consequence the resolution was negatived by a vote of only
twenty-one in its favor to two hundred and thirty-eight. Had the
seven Southern States just mentioned voted, the negatives would
have amounted to two hundred and eighty-two, or more than
thirteen to one. Thus both the majority and the minority resolutions
on the Territorial question were rejected, and nothing remained
before the Convention except the Cincinnati platform.
At this stage of the proceedings (April 30th), the States of
Louisiana, Alabama, South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and
Arkansas, having assigned their reasons for the act, withdrew in
succession from the Convention. After these seven States had retired,
the delegation from Virginia made an effort to restore harmony. Mr.
Russell, their chairman, addressed the Convention and portrayed the
alarming nature of the crisis. He expressed his fears that we were on
the eve of a revolution, and if this Convention should prove a failure
it would be the last National Convention of any party which would
ever assemble in the United States. “Virginia,” said he, “stands in the
midst of her sister States, in garments red with the blood of her
children slain in the first outbreak of the ‘irrepressible conflict.’ But,
sir, not when her children fell at midnight beneath the weapon of the
assassin, was her heart penetrated with so profound a grief as that
which will wring it when she is obliged to choose between a separate
destiny with the South, and her common destiny with the entire
Republic.”
Mr. Russell was not then prepared to answer, in behalf of his
delegation, whether the events of the day (the defeat of the majority
report, and the withdrawal of the seven States) were sufficient to
justify her in taking the irrevocable step in question. In order,
therefore, that they might have time to deliberate, and if they
thought proper make an effort to restore harmony in the Convention,
he expressed a desire that it might adjourn and afford them an
opportunity for consultation. The Convention accordingly adjourned
until the next day, Tuesday, May 1st; and immediately after its
reassembling the delegation from Georgia, making the eighth State,
also withdrew.
In the mean time the Virginia delegation had consulted among
themselves, and had conferred with the delegation of the other
Southern States which still remained in the Convention, as to the
best mode of restoring harmony. In consequence Mr. Howard, of
Tennessee, stated to the Convention that “he had a proposition to
present in behalf of the delegation from Tennessee, whenever, under
parliamentary rules, it would be proper to present it.” In this
Tennessee was joined by Kentucky and Virginia. He should propose
the following resolution whenever it would be in order: ‘Resolved,
That the citizens of the United States have an equal right to settle
with their property in the Territories of the United States; and that,
under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, which
we recognize as the correct exposition of the Constitution of the
United States, neither the rights of person nor property can be
destroyed or impaired by Congressional or Territorial legislation.’
On a subsequent day (May 3d), Mr. Russell informed the
Convention that this resolution had, “he believed, received the
approbation of all the delegations from the Southern States which
remained in the Convention, and also received the approbation of the
delegation from New York. He was informed there was strength
enough to pass it when in order.”
Mr. Howard, however, in vain attempted to obtain a vote on his
resolution. When he moved to take it up on the evening of the day it
had been offered, he was met by cries of “Not in order,” “Not in
order.” The manifest purpose was to postpone its consideration until
the hour should arrive which had been fixed by a previous order of
the Convention, in opposition to its first order on the same subject,
for the balloting to commence for a Presidential candidate, when it
would be too late. This the friends of Mr. Douglas accomplished, and
no vote was ever taken upon it either at Charleston or Baltimore.
Before the balloting commenced Mr. Howard succeeded, in the
face of strong opposition, with the aid of the thirty-five votes from
New York, in obtaining a vote of the Convention in re-affirmance of
the two-thirds rule. On his motion they resolved, by 141, to 112 votes,
“that the President of the Convention be and he is hereby directed
not to declare any person nominated for the office of President or
Vice-President, unless he shall have received a number of votes equal
to two-thirds of the votes of all the electoral colleges.” It was well
known at the time that this resolution rendered the regular
nomination of Mr. Douglas impossible.
The balloting then commenced (Tuesday evening, May 1st), on the
eighth day of the session. Necessary to a nomination, under the two-
thirds rule, 202 votes. On the first ballot Mr. Douglas received 145½
votes; Mr. Hunter, of Virginia, 42; Mr. Guthrie, of Kentucky, 35½;
Mr. Johnson, of Tennessee, 12; Mr. Dickinson, of New York, 7; Mr.
Lane, of Oregon, 6; Mr. Toucey, of Connecticut, 2½; Mr. Davis, of
Mississippi, 1½; and Mr. Pearce, of Maryland, 1 vote.
The voting continued until May 3d, during which there were fifty-
four additional ballotings. Mr. Douglas never rose to more than
152½, and ended in 151½ votes, 202 votes being necessary to a
nomination.
Until 1824 nominations had been made by Congressional caucus.
In these none participated except Senators and Democratic States,
and Representatives from Democratic Congressional districts. The
simple majority rule governed in these caucuses, because it was
morally certain that, composed as they were, no candidate could be
selected against the will of the Democratic States on whom his
election depended. But when a change was made to National
Conventions, it was at once perceived that if a mere majority could
nominate, then the delegates from Anti-Democratic States might be
mainly instrumental in nominating a candidate for whom they could
not give a single electoral vote. Whilst it would have been harsh and
inexpedient to exclude these States from the Convention altogether,
it would have been unjust to confer on them a controlling power over
the nomination. To compromise this difficulty, the two-thirds rule
was adopted. Under its operation it would be almost impossible that
a candidate could be selected, without the votes of a simple majority
of delegates from the Democratic States. This was the argument of its
friends.
It had now become manifest that it was impossible to make a
nomination at Charleston. The friends of Mr. Douglas adhered to
him and would vote for him and him alone, whilst his opponents,
apprehending the effect of his principles should he be elected
President, were equally determined to vote against his nomination.
In the hope that some compromise might yet be effected, the
Convention, on the motion of Mr. Russell, of Virginia, resolved to
adjourn to meet at Baltimore on Monday, the 18th June; and it was
“respectfully recommended to the Democratic party of the several
States, to make provision for supplying all vacancies in their
respective delegations to this Convention when it shall reassemble.”
The Convention reassembled at Baltimore on the 18th June, 1860,
according to its adjournment, and Mr. Cushing, the President, took
the chair.
Immediately after the reorganization of the Convention, Mr.
Howard, of Tennessee, offered a resolution, “that the President of
this Convention direct the sergeant-at-arms to issue tickets of
admission to the delegates of the Convention, as originally
constituted and organized at Charleston.” Thus the vitally important
question was distinctly presented. It soon, however, became manifest
that no such resolution could prevail. In the absence of the delegates
who had withdrawn at Charleston, the friends of Mr. Douglas
constituted a controlling majority. At the threshold they resisted the
admission of the original delegates, and contended that by
withdrawing they had irrevocably resigned their seats. In support of
this position, they relied upon the language of the resolution
adjourning the Convention to Baltimore, which, as we have seen,
“recommended to the Democratic party of the several States to make
provision for supplying all vacancies in their respective delegations
to this Convention, when it shall reassemble.” On the other hand, the
advocates of their readmission contended that a simple withdrawal
of the delegates was not a final renunciation of their seats, but they
were still entitled to reoccupy them, whenever, in their judgment,
this course would be best calculated to restore the harmony and
promote the success of the Democratic party; that the Convention
had no right to interpose between them and the Democracy of their
respective States; that being directly responsible to this Democracy,
it alone could accept their resignation; that no such resignation had
ever been made, and their authority therefore continued in full force,
and this, too, with the approbation of their constituents.
In the mean time, after the adjournment from Charleston to
Baltimore, the friends of Mr. Douglas, in several of these States, had
proceeded to elect delegates to take the place of those who had
withdrawn from the Convention. Indeed, it was manifest at the time,
and has since been clearly proved by the event, that these delegates
represented but a small minority of the party in their respective
States. These new delegates, nevertheless, appeared and demanded
seats.[7]
After a long and ardent debate, the Convention adopted a
resolution, offered by Mr. Church, of New York, and modified on
motion of Mr. Gilmore, of Pennsylvania, as a substitute for that of
Mr. Howard, to refer “the credentials of all persons claiming seats in
this Convention, made vacant by the secession of delegates at
Charleston, to the Committee on Credentials.” They thus prejudged
the question, by deciding that the seats of these delegates had been
made and were still vacant. The Committee on Credentials had been
originally composed of one delegate from each of the thirty-three
States, but the number was now reduced to twenty-five, in
consequence of the exclusion of eight of its members from the States
of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, Louisiana,
Arkansas, and Florida. The committee, therefore, now stood 16 to 9
in favor of the nomination of Mr. Douglas, instead of 17 to 16 against
it, according to its original organization.
The committee, through their chairman, Mr. Krum, of Missouri,
made their report on the 21st June, and Governor Stevens, of
Oregon, at the same time presented a minority report, signed by
himself and eight other members.
It is unnecessary to give in detail these conflicting reports. It is
sufficient to state that whilst the report of the majority maintained
that the delegates, by withdrawing at Charleston, had resigned their
seats, and these were still vacant; that of the minority, on the
contrary, asserted the right of these delegates to resume their seats in
the Convention, by virtue of their original appointment.
On the next day (June 22), the important decision was made
between the conflicting reports. Mr. Stevens moved to substitute the
minority report for that of the majority, and his motion was rejected
by a vote of 100½ to 150. Of course no vote was given from any of
the excluded States, except one-half vote from each of the parties in
Arkansas.
The resolutions of the majority were then adopted in succession.
Among other motions of similar character, a motion had been made
by a delegate in the majority to reconsider the vote by which the
Convention had adopted the minority report, as a substitute for that
of the majority, and to lay his own motion on the table. This is a
common mode resorted to, according to parliamentary tactics, of
defeating every hope of a reconsideration of the pending question,
and rendering the first decision final.
Mr. Cessna with this view called for a vote on laying the motion to
reconsider on the table. Should this be negatived, then the question
of reconsideration would be open. The President stated the question
to be first “on laying on the table the motion to reconsider the vote by
which the Convention refused to amend the majority report of the
Committee on Credentials by substituting the report of the
minority.” On this question New York, for the first time since the
meeting at Baltimore, voted with the minority and changed it into a
majority. “When New York was called,” says the report of the
proceedings, “and responded thirty-five votes” (in the negative) “the
response was greeted with loud cheers and applause.” The result of
the vote was 113½ to 138½—“so the Convention refused to lay on
the table the motion to reconsider the minority report.” The
Convention then adjourned until evening, on motion of Mr.
Cochrane, of New York, amidst great excitement and confusion.
This vote of New York, appearing to indicate a purpose to
harmonize the party by admitting the original delegates from the
eight absent States, was not altogether unexpected. Although voting
as a unit, it was known that her delegation were greatly divided
among themselves. The exact strength of the minority was
afterwards stated by Mr. Bartlett, one of its members, in the
Breckinridge Convention. He said: “Upon all questions and
especially upon the adoption of the majority report on credentials, in
which we had a long contest, the line was strictly drawn, and there
were thirty on one side and forty on the other.”
The position of New York casting an undivided vote of thirty-five,
with Dean Richmond at their head, had been a controlling power
from the commencement.
Strong expectations were, therefore, now entertained that after the
New York delegation had recorded their vote against a motion which
would have killed the minority report beyond hope of revival, they
would now follow this up by taking the next step in advance and
voting for its reconsideration and adoption. On the evening of the
very same day, however, they reversed their course and voted against
its reconsideration. They were then cheered by the opposite party
from that which had cheered them in the morning. Thus the action of
the Convention in favor of the majority report became final and
conclusive.
Mr. Cessna, of Pennsylvania, at once moved “that the Convention
do now proceed to nominate candidates for President and Vice-
President of the United States.”
Mr. Russell rose and stated, “It has become my duty now, by
direction of a large majority of the delegation from Virginia,
respectfully to inform you and this body, that it is not consistent with
their convictions of duty to participate longer in its deliberations.”
Mr. Lander next stated “that it became his duty, as one of the
delegates from North Carolina, to say that a very large majority of the
delegation from that State were compelled to retire permanently
from this Convention, on account, as he conceived, of the unjust
course that had been pursued toward some of their fellow-citizens of
the South. The South had heretofore relied upon the Northern
Democracy to give them the rights which were justly due them; but
the vote to-day had satisfied the majority of the North Carolina
delegation that these rights were now refused them, and, this being
the case, they could no longer remain in the Convention.”
Then followed in succession the withdrawal of the delegations
from Tennessee, Kentucky, Maryland, California, Oregon, and
Arkansas. The Convention now adjourned at half-past-ten o’clock
until the next morning at ten.
Soon after the assembling of the Convention, the President, Mr.
Cushing, whilst tendering his thanks to its members for their candid
and honorable support in the performance of his duties, stated that
notwithstanding the retirement of the delegations of several of the
States at Charleston, in his solicitude to maintain the harmony and
union of the Democratic party, he had continued in his post of labor.
“To that end and in that sense,” said he, “I had the honor to meet
you, gentlemen, here at Baltimore. But circumstances have since
transpired which compel me to pause. The delegations of a majority
of the States have, either in whole or in part, in one form or another,
ceased to participate in the deliberations of the Convention. * * * In
the present circumstances, I deem it a duty of self-respect, and I
deem it still more a duty to this Convention, as at present
organized, * * * to resign my seat as President of this Convention, in
order to take my place on the floor as a member of the delegation
from Massachusetts. * * * I deem this above all a duty which I owe to
the members of this Convention, as to whom no longer would my
action represent the will of a majority of the Convention.”
Governor Tod, of Ohio, one of the Vice-Presidents, then took the
vacant chair, and was greeted with hearty and long-continued cheers
and applause from members of the Convention.
Mr. Butler, of Massachusetts, now announced that a portion of the
Massachusetts delegation desired to retire, but was interrupted by
cries of “No,” “No,” “Call the roll.” Mr. Cessna called for the original
question, to wit, that the Convention now proceed to a nomination
for President and Vice-President.
The President here ordered the Secretary to call the States. Maine,
New Hampshire, and Vermont were called, and they gave an
unbroken vote for Stephen A. Douglas. When Massachusetts was
called, Mr. Butler rose and said he had a respectful paper in his hand
which he would desire the President to have read. A scene of great
confusion thereupon ensued, cries of “I object” being heard upon all
sides. Mr. Butler, not to be baffled, contended for his right at this
stage to make remarks pertinent to the matter, and cited in his
support the practice of the Conventions at Baltimore in 1848 and
1852, and at Cincinnati in 1856. He finally prevailed, and was
permitted to proceed. He then said he “would now withdraw from
the Convention, upon the ground that there had been a withdrawal,
in whole or in part, of a majority of the States; and further, which
was a matter more personal to himself, he could not sit in a
convention where the African slave trade, which was piracy
according to the laws of his country, was openly advocated.”
Mr. Butler then retired, followed by General Cushing and four
others of the Massachusetts delegation. All of these had voted with
the South and against Douglas.
The balloting now proceeded. Mr. Douglas received 173½ votes;
Mr. Guthrie 9; Mr. Breckinridge 6½; Mr. Bocock and Mr. Seymour
each 1; and Mr. Dickerson and Mr. Wise each half a vote. On the next
and last ballot Mr. Douglas received 181½ votes, eight of those in the
minority having changed their votes in his favor.
To account for this number, it is proper to state that a few
delegates from five of the eight States which had withdrawn still
remained in the Convention. On the last ballot Mr. Douglas received
all of their votes, to wit: 3 of the 15 votes of Virginia, 1 of the 10 votes
of North Carolina, 1½ of the 3 votes of Arkansas, 3 of the 12 votes of
Tennessee, 3 of the 12 votes of Kentucky, and 2½ of the 8 votes of
Maryland, making in the aggregate 14 votes. To this number may be
added the 9 votes of the new delegates from Alabama and the 6 from
Louisiana, which had been admitted to the exclusion of the original
delegates.
Mr. Douglas was accordingly declared to be the regular nominee of
the Democratic party of the Union, upon the motion of Mr. Church,
of New York, when, according to the report of the proceedings, “The
whole body rose to its feet, hats were waved in the air, and many
tossed aloft; shouts, screams, and yells, and every boisterous mode of
expressing approbation and unanimity, were resorted to.”
Senator Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, was then unanimously nominated
as the candidate for Vice-President; and the Convention adjourned
sine die on the 23d June, the sixth and last day of its session. On the
same day, but after the adjournment, Mr. Fitzpatrick declined the
nomination, and it was immediately conferred on Mr. Herschel V.
Johnson, of Georgia, by the Executive Committee. Thus ended the
Douglas Convention.
But another Convention assembled at Baltimore on the same 23d
June, styling itself the “National Democratic Convention.” It was
composed chiefly of the delegates who had just withdrawn from the
Douglas Convention, and the original delegates from Alabama and
Louisiana. One of their first acts was to abrogate the two-third rule,
as had been done by the Douglas Convention. Both acted under the
same necessity, because the preservation of this rule would have
prevented a nomination by either.
Mr. Cushing was elected and took the chair as President. In his
opening address he said: “Gentlemen of the Convention, we
assemble here, delegates to the National Democratic Convention,
duly accredited thereto from more than twenty States of the Union,
for the purpose of nominating candidates of the Democratic party for
the offices of President and Vice-President of the United States, for
the purpose of announcing the principles of the party, and for the
purpose of continuing and re-establishing that party upon the firm
foundations of the Constitution, the Union, and the co-equal rights
of the several States.”
Mr. Avery, of North Carolina, who had reported the majority
resolutions at Charleston, now reported the same from the
committee of this body, and they “were adopted unanimously, amid
great applause.”
The Convention then proceeded to select their candidates. Mr.
Loring, on behalf of the delegates from Massachusetts, who with Mr.
Butler had retired from the Douglas Convention, nominated John C.
Breckinridge, of Kentucky, which Mr. Dent, representing the
Pennsylvania delegation present, “most heartily seconded.” Mr.
Ward, from the Alabama delegation, nominated R. M. T. Hunter, of
Virginia; Mr. Ewing, from that of Tennessee, nominated Mr.
Dickinson, of New York; and Mr. Stevens, from Oregon, nominated
General Joseph Lane. Eventually all these names were withdrawn
except that of Mr. Breckinridge, and he received the nomination by a
unanimous vote. The whole number of votes cast in his favor from
twenty States was 103½.
General Lane was unanimously nominated as the candidate for
Vice-President. Thus terminated the Breckinridge Convention.
The Chicago Republican Convention.
The Republicans had named May 16th, 1860, as the date and
Chicago as the place for holding their second National Convention.
They had been greatly encouraged by the vote for Fremont and
Dayton, and, what had now become apparent as an irreconcilable
division of the Democracy, encouraged them in the belief that they
could elect their candidates. Those of the great West were especially
enthusiastic, and had contributed freely to the erection of an
immense “Wigwam,” capable of holding ten thousand people, at
Chicago. All the Northern States were fully represented, and there
were besides partial delegations from Delaware, Maryland,
Kentucky, Missouri and Virginia, with occasional delegates from
other Slave States, there being none, however, from the Gulf States.
David Wilmot, of Penna., author of the Wilmot proviso, was made
temporary chairman, and George Ashmun, of Mass., permanent
President. No differences were excited by the report of the committee
on platform, and the proceedings throughout were characterized by
great harmony, though there was a somewhat sharp contest for the
Presidential nomination. The prominent candidates were Wm. H.
Seward, of New York; Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois; Salmon P. Chase,
of Ohio; Simon Cameron, of Pennsylvania, and Edward Bates, of
Missouri. There were three ballots, Mr. Lincoln receiving in the last
354 out of 446 votes. Mr. Seward led the vote at the beginning, but
he was strongly opposed by gentlemen in his own State as prominent
as Horace Greeley and Thurlow Weed, and his nomination was
thought to be inexpedient. Lincoln’s successful debate with Douglas
was still fresh in the minds of the delegates, and every addition to his
vote so heightened the enthusiasm that the convention was finally
carried “off its feet,” the delegations rapidly changing on the last
ballot. Lincoln had been a known candidate but a month or two
before, while Seward’s name had been everywhere canvassed, and
where opposed in the Eastern and Middle States, it was mainly

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Perspectives on Philosophy of

Management and Business Ethics

Art and Business: Perspectives on Art-based Management

Interdisciplinary Perspectives On Human Dignity And

Business Ethics and Leadership from an Eastern European

Advances in Human Factors, Business Management and

International Business Ethics Focus on China 1st

Digital Business Models: Perspectives on Monetisation

The Value Orientations of Buddhist and Christian

Human Rights On Trial A Genealogy Of The Critique Of

Jacob Dahl Rendtorff Editor

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/2881

ISSN 2211-2707 ISSN 2211-2723 (electronic)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016962633

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature

critical concepts of business ethics coming from critical management studies as

Roskilde, Denmark Jacob Dahl Rendtorff

9 Compliance, Global Ethos and Corporate Wisdom:

Part II Business and Human Rights

19 The Economics of Nonsense Upon Stilts: Basic Human Rights

Jörg Althammer Ingolstadt School of Management, Catholic University

Øjvind Larsen Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Copenhagen, Denmark

Jacob Dahl Rendtorff

J.D. Rendtorff (*)

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 3

indeed also in relation to philosophy of management or in particular theory of

1.2  he Topic of the Conference: Business Ethics

1.3 Moral Blindness and the Need for Business Ethics

1.4 State of the Art of Business Ethics

This importance of philosophical reflection is documented by the state of the art of

Even though it is important to think utility-oriented and pragmatic in business,

criticism may be put forward in relation to the position of shared value-theory as

1.5 What Is Philosophy of Management?

epistemological and ontological foundations of management by asking the deep

1.6  lobal Philosophy of Management: Cosmopolitan

With this ontological approach in philosophy of management I would like to pro-

­ ultinational corporations (Rendtorff 2015c). Applied to reflections about cosmo-

Abstract Ideology has been described as a framework of ideas used to explain

A.E. Singer (*)

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 17

Article VIII.—Elections and Rights of Suffrage.

The following are the political features of the Topeka constitution:

Bill of Rights, Sec. 6. There shall be no slavery in this state, nor

Amendments to the Constitution.

Sec. 1. All propositions for amendments to the constitution shall

Schedule, Sec. 2. That this constitution shall be submitted to the

The following is the Douglas amendment, which really formed the

Such was the condition of the parties when the Democratic

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Roskilde, Denmark Jacob Dahl Rendtorff

9 Compliance, Global Ethos and Corporate Wisdom:

19 The Economics of Nonsense Upon Stilts: Basic Human Rights

1.2 he Topic of the Conference: Business Ethics

1.3 Moral Blindness and the Need for Business Ethics

1.4 State of the Art of Business Ethics

1.5 What Is Philosophy of Management?

1.6 lobal Philosophy of Management: Cosmopolitan

ultinational corporations (Rendtorff 2015c). Applied to reflections about cosmo-