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David Bridges
Philosophy
in Educational
Research
Epistemology, Ethics, Politics and Quality
Philosophy in Educational Research
David Bridges
Philosophy in Educational
Research
Epistemology, Ethics, Politics and Quality
123
David Bridges
Professor Emeritus
University of East Anglia
Norwich
UK
and
Emeritus Fellow
St. Edmund’s College
Cambridge
UK
and
Emeritus Fellow
Homerton College
Cambridge
UK
I have been very fortunate to have found very collegial and stimulating academic
homes over the period in which I have been working on the material in this book:
the University of East Anglia (and especially the powerhouse of ideas that was the
Centre for Applied Research in Education); the Von Hügel Institute and
St Edmund’s College Cambridge; and, most recently, the University of Cambridge
Faculty of Education, working in partnership with the University of Pennsylvania
Graduate School of Education and Nazarbayev University Graduate School of
Education in Kazakhstan. I feel very privileged to have enjoyed the collegiality and
friendship of so many people in these academic centres.
I have similarly enjoyed generous hospitality, friendship and stimulus in a
number of institutions in which I have spent shorter periods of time, including:
Addis Ababa University, Kaunas University of Technology, University of Oslo, the
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Hong Kong
University, Chung Cheng University, and the University of Illinois at Urbana
Champaign. I am most grateful to those who made these visits possible and for the
stimulus they provided.
For the last 12 years or so, I have been privileged to participate in the annual
seminars of an international Research Community focused on the Philosophy and
History of the Discipline of Education convened by Paul Smeyers and Marc
Depaepe of the Catholic University of Leuven. These have provided an annual
stimulus to writing and discussion which has issued in several of the papers
incorporated in this book, and I am most grateful to Paul, Marc, all participants, and
the Fonds voor Wetenschappellijk Onderzoek Vlaanderen for the opportunity they
provided.
Most of the chapters in this book have developed out of previous work, though
in some cases this has been substantially reworked. A core of them were published
by Kluwer/Springer in 2003 as Fiction written under oath? Essays in philosophy
and educational research, of which this book is in a sense a second edition,
although one about double the length, and, as I have said, with considerable
re-editing. Other chapters have come from other sources, which are acknowledged
vii
viii Acknowledgements
ix
x Contents
xix
Chapter 1
Educational Research and Philosophy
in ‘Interesting Times’
Abstract This chapter locates the book in the context of debates and developments
in educational research over the last twenty turbulent years, in which time it has
expanded in both scale and diversity and provoked debates about its nature and
intellectual resources, its relationship with policy and practice, its situatedness in
relation to politics, power and social justice and its claims to authority and quality.
The chapter provides a summary and commentary on the contents of the main
sections of the book which will provide a useful guide for those seeking to dip into
sections that relate most closely to their own interests.
Educational research has become the focus for mass academic attention, with some
15,000 researchers gathering each year for the annual conference of the American
Educational Research Association, rapidly rising numbers (recently around 2000) at
the annual conference of the European Education Research Association, now with
over 30 national member associations and thriving regional and national associa-
tions, as well as cross-cutting thematic conferences such as the European
Association for Research on Learning and Instruction (EARLI) and the
Comparative and International Education Society. At the same time ‘international’
educational research journals have proliferated (Taylor and Francis alone list over
200 of them) and their contents have expanded, flooding over into online publi-
cations. It is an expansion that has been driven in part by the ‘universitification’ of
teacher education across many parts of the world, and the consequent expectation
that teacher educators should not only teach but also prove themselves as
researchers, and in part by increasing subscription in many parts of the world to a
form of academic accountability that requires academics more than ever before to
justify their appointment, their tenure, and their promotion on the basis of quantity
as well as quality of research publications (see Chap. 23). So educational research is
massive.
Partly as a consequence of this growth in scale and the recruitment of university
staff from a variety of academic as well as professional backgrounds, the forms that
educational research takes have become increasingly diverse, drawing for its
methods and methodologies on every part of the academy (as well as other spheres
of social and professional practice). As in other academic fields, it has become
increasingly difficult for any individual to encompass the whole scope of the diverse
subject; the educational research community has become increasingly Balkanised;
and the terrain increasingly contested within the academic research community
itself (see Chap. 2).
Not only this, but education has also become a site contested between academic
researchers and educational professionals, teachers for the most part, who have been
disappointed by the lack of relevance of much research to their own situation;
frustrated by the hegemonic pretensions of academic researchers over the teachers’
own experience, understanding, and educational thinking; and in some cases
ambitious to re-possess the arena of educational research for themselves (see
Chap. 5). This has challenged researchers to think hard about the relationship
between their research and practice.
The contestability extends to relations between educational researchers and
policymakers (Chap. 6). Educational researchers have been frustrated by the failure
of policymakers to pay attention to their research; and policymakers have regarded
the products of educational research as irrelevant, unhelpful, or of poor quality. One
response by policymakers has been to reaffirm their commitment to ‘evidence-based
policy’, but at the same time to define in their own terms the kind of research they
want conducted and what they will recognise as evidence or appropriate methods,
as well as demanding fuller control over both the conduct and publication of such
research—practices with which some in the academy have been eager to collude
and which others have been equally eager to oppose (see Chap. 19).
Thus, educational research is not only a massive field, but also a hotly contested
one inside and outside the research community, to the extent that Furlong can take
the rather sombre view that ‘The discipline of education as a whole is in crisis’
(Furlong 2013: 181).
There is, then, a lot for a philosophically minded researcher to engage with. As I
have indicated by my cross-references, the themes and issues that I have outlined
provide the stimulus and the focus for the chapters that follow. These chapters are
for the most part derived from papers that I have published over the last 20 turbulent
years, though all of these papers have been updated, some have been heavily edited,
and there is substantial additional material. Through the editing I have tried to give
some coherence to the collection of papers, but I would not wish to pretend that the
book was written as a consecutive textbook for educational researchers. Rather, it is
I hope a wide-ranging resource that readers will dip into to explore issues that they
encounter in their own academic and professional lives.
The book is organised under six main parts, and I shall indicate here the scope of
each part. Each individual chapter includes a synopsis that I hope also serves both
to locate it in the wider context of the book and to provide a short introduction to
the chapter that follows.
1.1 Part I: Education Research and Its Intellectual Resources 3
In the first part of this book I try to set out two particular perspectives on educa-
tional research. First I argue that in terms of methods and methodology, or the
interpretive frameworks that can be brought to educational inquiry, there is nothing
sui generis. Rather, educational research draws on the methods, methodologies, and
conceptual framing offered by disciplined forms of inquiry found elsewhere in the
academy and these are applied to the field of education. (rather as they might be to
the fields of policing, public health or business practice). In the 1970s these dis-
ciplines were largely defined in terms of psychology, philosophy, sociology, and
history of education, but I describe in Chap. 2 how these disciplines have become
segmented, diversified, and recombined in a plethora of ‘systematic and sustained’
forms of inquiry. This ‘pluralistic’ view of the sources and multidisciplinary nature
of educational research underpins much of the thinking in other chapters in the
book. It also underpins my reluctance to give more than cursory attention to debates
that focus on the very crude and uninformative dichotomy between ‘qualitative’ and
‘quantitative’ research, though these terms are so embedded in educational research
discourse that it is almost impossible to avoid them (and I do not).
I go on to explore the ‘paradigm wars’ in slightly different terms. One of the
starting points for Chap. 3 was the 50th anniversary of a lecture by C.P. Snow with
the title ‘The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution’, in which Snow critiques
what he sees as the damaging intellectual division between the arts and humanities
on the one side and the sciences on the other. Fifty years later this problem con-
tinues to distort not only the life of the academy but also public perceptions of what
counts as real research. Today, the problem tends to be reflected in talk of ‘the crisis
in the humanities’ or ‘the hegemony of science’, or in a preoccupation with what
can be counted or measured, with metrics. This is a preoccupation that not only
pervades the education research community but also has a powerful impact on
many aspects of education and the wider academy. My suggestion is that a very
narrow view of what even counts as ‘scientific’ and what are variously referred to as
‘quasi’, ‘pseudo’, or ‘faux’ scientific approaches threaten to swamp the educational
research arena. I am not opposed to, for example, large population studies, surveys,
or even randomised controlled trials, but I want to resist the idea that all or any of
these should have privileged status. Chapters 3 and 4 challenge this supposition in
different ways.
I need to offer a very important caution before entering this territory. In this
section I get drawn into what some would present as a dichotomy, or even an
opposition, between ‘science’ and ‘the humanities’ or, in Chap. 14, ‘art’, which,
among other things, risks simply re-entering the qualitative/quantitative debate that
I earlier eschewed in different terms. I hope that all three chapters make it clear that
neither of these categories of knowledge and understanding is internally homoge-
neous. It is precisely my point that ‘science’ properly understood embraces some
4 1 Educational Research and Philosophy in ‘Interesting Times’
very diverse approaches to inquiry. Unfortunately too much of the discourse around
‘scientific’ approaches to educational research assumes a very narrow account of
what is ‘scientific’. Similarly ‘the humanities’ is a poorly defined concept but
includes (as the final section of Chap. 3 makes clear) some very different approa-
ches to inquiry and their application in the field of education. I am anxious to
reaffirm this diversity of resource. My criticism is against those who seek to impose
a more restrictive view of what might count as proper research.
Other chapters in this book also make a case for thinking of research in terms of
art and not (not just) as a science: Chap. 14 on case study; Chaps. 15 and 16 on the
presentation of research as fiction; and Chap. 25, which suggests that research
quality assessment itself is something closer to artistic connoisseurship than to
measurement.
The second feature of educational research to which I attach significance is that this
is (for the most part anyway) research that is applied to the field of education: it is
applied to educational policy (Chap. 6) and practice (Chap. 5). It can also of course
contribute to educational theory, but I acknowledge a reluctance to accept that
educational theory, any more than educational research, makes much sense if it is
not in some way connected with educational policy or practice and offers at least
some prospect of informing these. That this research is educational research and not
just psychological, sociological, or philosophical research (i.e. not just applied
social science) does however provide it with practices (such as ‘teaching’), concepts
(such as ‘schooling’ or ‘curriculum’), and theory, including the belief systems of
teachers and other professionals, that do help to distinguish it as a field from others
examined through the social sciences.
Of course, the application of research to either policy or practice is not a
straightforward one. Chapter 5 throws into question the ‘applied social science’
model of the relationship between educational research and practice and takes us
into the domain of practitioner and action research, though it resists the idea that
these can substitute entirely for what might be regarded as more ‘academic’
research. Chapter 6 focuses on research and policy, and examines what sort of
knowledge is needed for the formation of policy—and its limitations.
Unsurprisingly perhaps, the historical record of what we have come to know and
love as the ‘impact’ of research on either policy or practice (Chap. 23) is not
over-impressive, but I would want to retain the view that educational research
should in principle be applicable to policy and/or practice, even if it is beyond the
powers of the researcher to ensure that it is in fact applied.
1.3 Part III: Philosophy and Educational Research 5
In Parts I and II, I set out some perspectives on educational research in general. In
this part I look more particularly at the contributions that philosophy can make to
this field. I begin (in Chap. 7) by looking at philosophising about educational
research, philosophising as educational research, and a little later (in Chap. 10)
philosophy in educational research working alongside other genres.
This leads me to three chapters that explore in rather different ways the role of
philosophy—or ‘the philosopher’—in three different contexts: in the classroom and
in engagement with action research (Chap. 8); in the arena of policy (Chap. 9); and
as part of a multidisciplinary research team (Chap. 10) Although these chapters are
informed by philosophical work, they also take the form of reflection on practice
(my own and that of others) in these three spheres.
Finally in this part (Chap. 11), I look at the philosopher in a more narrowly
academic role, writing a paper destined initially for an educational research con-
ference. This is not a prescription about how to go about such writing; nor is it a
philosophical paper about the form or logic of such philosophical writing. Instead it
is based on a reflective log that I maintained over a period of time while going
through the process—not so much philosophising about research as researching the
process of philosophising.
All the chapters in this part wrestle in different ways with issues to do with the
epistemological standing of the outcomes of educational research, what sort of
grounds or warrant they provide for belief, and in what sense (and I suggest that
there are several different senses) they can claim ‘authenticity’, ‘integrity’, ‘truth-
fulness’, or anything else that presupposes the meaningfulness of some notion of
truth as an aim or guiding principle of research. Chapter 12 addresses this question
head on. It was prompted by a recurring experience at a British Educational
Research Association (BERA) conference in which researchers made the assump-
tion (no doubt correct in many cases) that the audience would share their disavowal
of truth, ‘truth’, or ‘Truth with a big “T”’ (as they would sometimes express it) as a
meaningful consideration not only in their own research (which nevertheless made
a myriad of claims to what is or should be the case) but in any research. Yet they
seemed ignorant of the basic epistemology and of the variety of ways in which the
notion of truth is used in philosophical writing, the variety of meanings that are
attached to it, and the variety of proposals as to how the truth or falsity of a claim
might be resolved. Were they dismissing all these?
Chapter 15 was provoked by two very challenging presentations at a BERA
conference and at an invitation seminar organised by Morwenna Griffiths: a pre-
sentation by Peter Gough on how he extended research-based stories into fiction
6 1 Educational Research and Philosophy in ‘Interesting Times’
and one by Melanie Walker in which the most dramatic and compelling focus was
on an episode at a meeting of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in South
Africa. The following chapter (Chap. 16) is in a sense an extension of this. My
question becomes: what, if anything, distinguishes history from fiction, or from the
historical novel, and why or for what purposes might one prefer history to these
sources—what does history do for us that fiction or the historical novel does not?
And will the answer to this question shed light on the parallel issue in social
scientific and educational research?
Among the theories of truth I discuss briefly in Chap. 13 is philosophical
pragmatism. I link this discussion to the arguments around action research in
educational settings, the case for which, I suggest, rests largely but not exclusively
on a pragmatic theory of knowledge. The practice of action research has to address
what are, of arguably some of the weaknesses of philosophical pragmatism, or at
least of the way in which this has been interpreted in educational settings.
One of the most significant contrasts in educational research is that between
research approaches that require some form of analysis of large numbers of objects
of study and those that focus on a single case (or small number of cases) studied in
depth. Chapter 14 examines the claims of the single case to contribute to our
knowledge and understanding and, most challengingly, its capacity to contribute
not just to understanding the case studied but also to wider understanding of the set
of cases from which it is drawn (‘To see a world in a grain of sand’?).
The final chapter in this section (Chap. 17) is less directly philosophical in
character. It is drawn from a paper I wrote with colleagues from Nazarbayev
University in Kazakhstan, Assel Kambatyrova and Kairat Kurakbayev, reflecting
on our experience of analysing and interpreting evidence from our research on the
international and intranational ‘translation of educational policy and practice’. This
was a contribution to the International Handbook on the Role of Interpretation in
Educational Research (Smeyers et al. 2015), which assembled 64 cases from eight
different genres of educational research in which researchers reflected on the role
that ‘interpretation’ had played in a particular research project. The chapter illus-
trates some of the assortment of ways in which different sources enter the process of
interpretation when we try to make sense of our research data.
reference to the rights and entitlements of its indigenous peoples. So if you are
engaged with educational research, you will almost inevitably need to address the
ethical constraints and requirements that shape this research at every stage, from
research design to publication.
Ethics is of course a major branch of philosophy in which philosophers have
been extensively engaged since the earliest inception of the discipline, so it ought to
have something to contribute to the ongoing debates about educational research
ethics. Richard Peters’ seminal work in the field was published under the title Ethics
and Education (Peters 1966), and one of the leading contemporary journals in the
field of philosophy of education, the journal of the International Network of
Philosophers of Education, appears under the same title. But while philosophers
have engaged extensively with the ethics of education in general, they have in my
view rather neglected the territory of educational research ethics. Exceptions to this
generalisation include Pring’s (2001) work on intellectual virtue (a field more
widely explored in mainstream philosophy) and the special issue of the Journal of
Philosophy of Education (published by Blackwell in 2002 as The Ethics of
Educational Research edited by Mike McNamee and myself).
I think this gap partly reflects the gap that exists between the academically purer
or more rarefied field of philosophical ethics (sometimes referred to as meta-ethics)
and what one might think of as situated moral problems which carry direct appli-
cation to practice. Philosophical ethics is primarily concerned with questions such
as: how (in general) can we know what is right or good? How are such assessments
associated with reason, intuition, or emotion? What does it mean to describe
something as morally right or wrong—what sort of a proposition is this? What is
the relationship between the right and the good? What is the place of character or
virtue in the cultivation of the moral being? All of these are important questions, but
they are at some distance from the sort of issues that face educational researchers:
how, if at all, can I use data that I acquired off the record from a Ministry official?
Am I entitled to break my promise of confidentiality to a child I have interviewed if
the interview gave me reason to think she might be being abused? Should I boycott
fellow researchers from a regime that I judge to be seriously offending human
rights? As I illustrate below—especially in Chap. 21—such questions involve not
just reference to high-level principles, but a well-grounded understanding of the
particular circumstances surrounding the issue under consideration and, notwith-
standing my expressed reservation about consequentialist ethics, some anticipation
of the likely consequences of doing this rather than that.
However to say this is to take the ethical arguments out of the exclusive regime
of the philosopher into messier territory in which moral principles, philosophical
underpinnings, empirical data, experience, and perhaps practical wisdom (phronesis
in Aristotle’s terms) are all engaged—which is perhaps why purer philosophers
tend to avoid the specific issues of research ethics. But, as they say, ‘fools rush in
where angels fear to tread …’
This part of the book is not a general introduction to research ethics. Plenty of
these are available. It provides three examples of a philosopher/researcher wrestling
with such issues: with the use of ethical codes themselves (Chap. 18); with the
8 1 Educational Research and Philosophy in ‘Interesting Times’
Half a century ago I began my research career with a doctoral dissertation on the
role of discussion in learning, teaching, and decision-making (Bridges 1979). This
was mainly a philosophical work but included a piece I had written on the silent
student in small group discussion, reporting on some action research focused on my
own teaching, which arose out of a Nuffield sponsored project on Small Group
Teaching in Higher Education directed by Jean Rudduck. Throughout my career in
education I have benefitted enormously from discussion/conversation with aca-
demic friends and colleagues and I have been struck by the number of occasions on
which reports of ground-breaking research refer, not (or not just) to their formal
research methods and methodologies, but also to conversations with colleagues as
the source of a vital breakthrough in their thinking. Famously, the Eagle pub in
Cambridge now bears a plaque claiming that this was the real site of the discovery
of DNA, and indeed James Watson’s own account of the work he did with Francis
Crick celebrates what he refers to as ‘the conversational life’ (Watson 1968: 47).
Such accounts—and there are many of them in the literature of scientific and
other intellectual discovery—resonated both with my personal experience of aca-
demic life but also with a conception developed by Michael Oakeshott of ‘the great
conversations of mankind’: poetry, history, science, and so on. I was intrigued by
the idea of research as an ongoing conversation that people joined, participated in
for a period, and left to continue without them, perhaps a tiny bit changed by what
they had contributed, but something essentially ephemeral—and this seemed to be
good point on which to end.
I have described the contents of this book in terms which illustrate, I hope, its direct
inspiration from and engagement with many of the debates that have run through the
educational research community and those it serves over the last twenty years.
Engagement with these contemporary issues has, however, awakened a curiosity that
has led me into less predictable territory, to sources that are distant in time or place
from these contemporary debates, but which have, nevertheless, the capacity to
illuminate and inform them, or which are simply intriguing in their own right: to codes
of social obligation in contemporary Egypt and New Zealand (Chap. 18); to the South
African Truth and Reconciliation hearings (Chap. 15); to campus protest in the US in
the 1960s (Chap. 19); to experience of the ‘Soviet’ and the inspiration of the
nineteenth-century philosopher, Abai, in Kazakhstan (Chap. 17); via Isaiah Berlin to
eighteenth-century Italy, Giambattista Vico, and la scienzia nuova (Chap. 4); to
seventeenth-century France, Pascal, and the disputes between Jesuits and Jansenites
(Chap. 21); to ‘educational magic’ in traditional Ethiopia (Chap. 24); and where better
to end than at a banquet with Socrates and dinner with wine and a conversation-loving
Montaigne (Chap. 26)?1 Of the many ‘false dichotomies’ represented and challenged
1
I should acknowledge that many of these sources, and indeed some more recent ones employed
sexist language that we would today find unacceptable. I have not sought to amend this or to note
10 1 Educational Research and Philosophy in ‘Interesting Times’
in the context of educational research, perhaps one of the more distorting is that
between ‘policy relevant’ and ‘curiosity driven’ research. In my own experience,
curiosity takes me into policy, and an examination of policy provokes curiosity that
takes me into all sorts of interesting places. I hope that readers will find something in
this book to satisfy both appetites.
There is one final dichotomy that I would like to help dissolve, as I hope that the
contents of this book will confirm—the dichotomy between philosophy and edu-
cational research. The original title that I gave to this book was Philosophy of
Educational Research, but I became aware as I wrote that a significant proportion
of the references that I have provided are to ‘mainstream’ educational research
literature and not just philosophy. Several of the chapters are reflective rather than
more narrowly philosophical thoughts on my own empirical research experience.
More importantly, perhaps, I kept envisaging a readership that was not just made up
of philosophers (though it included them) but also of researchers working across a
wide range of research traditions and engaged with education in a wide variety of
roles. I hope it reflects a picture not just of philosophy taking a spectatorial gaze
over the educational research community but of philosophy as thoroughly and
intimately engaged in and with that community—hence, Philosophy in Educational
Research.
References
Bridges, D. (1979). Education, democracy and discussion. Slough: NFER/Nelson (reissued 1988
by University Press of America).
Furlong, J. (2013). Education: The anatomy of a discipline. London: Routledge.
Peters, R. S. (1966). Ethics and education. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Pring, R. (2001). The virtues and vices of an educational researcher. Journal of Philosophy of
Education, 35(3), 407–422.
Smeyers, P., Bridges, D., Burbules, N., & Griffiths, M. (Eds.). (2015). International handbook on
the role of interpretation in educational research. Dordrecht: Springer.
Watson, J. (1968). The double helix. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
(Footnote 1 continued)
every occasion on which it happens, but hope that this note will serve as a general apology and that
the references will not give offence.
Part I
Educational Research and Its
Intellectual Resources
Chapter 2
The Disciplines and Discipline
of Educational Research
Abstract It is, I think, important to clarify from the beginning of this book my
understanding of the nature of educational research and educational theory, for this
carries implications for many of the chapters that follow. This chapter begins by
reviewing the development of educational theory and research from a time (in the
1960s and 1970s) when it was still possible to talk of four ‘foundation disciplines’,
to one characterised by the diversity, fragmentation, and hybridisation of the
intellectual sources of educational research—one in which this research is described
in terms of multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity, and, as some would have it,
postdisciplinarity. The chapter welcomes the greater diversity and enrichment of the
resources available to contemporary educational researchers and acknowledges the
importance of being able to combine different disciplinary approaches in the
exploration of educational theory, policy, and practice. It argues, however, that this
should not be at the expense of discipline in educational inquiry, i.e. of the sys-
tematic procedures that provide a better warrant for the beliefs that are put forward,
rather than inquiry that lacks such ‘systematics’ and in the sense of shared
rule-governed procedures, ‘which make a community of arguers possible’ (Hunt in
Consequences of theory. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1991: 104). In
a final section, the chapter acknowledges and examines the perennial wrestling
between, on the one hand, rules that operate to maintain particular hierarchies of
power and control over what might count as credible belief and, on the other hand,
rules that serve more narrowly epistemic functions related to the development of
knowledge and understanding.
This book is about research and its relationship with educational theory, practice,
and policy. I need to make it clear from the beginning that I do not regard research
as the only source of knowledge and understanding about education. Much of our
The original version of this chapter was published in Bridges, D. (2003) Fiction written under
oath: Essays in philosophy and educational research, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
WILLIAM McKINLEY."
{379}
"No definite date had been set for the attack [by the hostile
Tagalos], but a signal by means of rockets had been agreed
upon, and it was universally understood that it would come
upon the occurrence of the first act on the part of the
American forces which would afford a pretext; and in the lack
of such act, in the near future at all events. Persistent
attempts were made to provoke our soldiers to fire. The
insurgents were insolent to our guards and made persistent and
continuous efforts to push them back and advance the insurgent
lines farther into the city of Manila. … With great tact and
patience the commanding general had held his forces in check,
and he now made a final effort to preserve the peace by
appointing a commission to meet a similar body appointed by
Aguinaldo and to 'confer with regard to the situation of
affairs and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent,
purposes, aims, and desires of the Filipino people and of the
people of the United States.' Six sessions were held, the last
occurring on January 29, six days before the outbreak of
hostilities. No substantial results were obtained, the
Filipino commissioners being either unable or unwilling to
give any definite statements of the 'intent, purposes, and
aims of their people.' At the close of the last session they
were given full assurances that no hostile act would be
inaugurated by the United States troops. The critical moment
had now arrived. Aguinaldo secretly ordered the Filipinos who
were friendly to him to seek refuge outside the city. The
Nebraska regiment at that time was in camp on the east line at
Santa Mesa, and was guarding its front. For days before the
memorable 4th of February, 1899, the outposts in front of the
regiment had been openly menaced and assaulted by insurgent
soldiers; they were attempting to push our outposts back and
advance their line. They made light of our sentinels and
persistently ignored their orders. On the evening of the 4th
of February, an insurgent officer came to the front with a
detail of men and attempted to pass the guard on the San Juan
Bridge, our guard being stationed at the west end of the
bridge. The Nebraska sentinel drove them back without firing,
but a few minutes before 9 o'clock that evening a large body
of insurgent troops made an advance on the South Dakota
outposts, which fell back rather than fire. About the same
time the insurgents came in force to the east end of the San
Juan Bridge, in front of the Nebraska regiment. For several
nights prior thereto a lieutenant in the insurgent army had
been coming regularly to our outpost No. 2, of the Nebraska
regiment, and attempting to force the outpost back and
insisting on posting his guard within the Nebraska lines; and
at this time and in the darkness he again appeared with a
detail of about six men and approached Private Grayson, of
Company D, First Nebraska Volunteers, the sentinel on duty at
outpost No. 2. He, after halting them three times without
effect, fired, killing the lieutenant, whose men returned the
fire and then retreated. Immediately rockets were sent up by
the Filipinos, and they commenced firing all along the line, …
and continued to fire until about midnight; and about 4
o'clock on the morning of February 5 the insurgents again
opened fire all around the city and kept it up until the
Americans charged them and drove them with great slaughter out
of their trenches."
{381}
"By the 10th of October the process of changing armies and the
approach of the dry season had reached a point where an
advance toward the general occupation of the country was
justified. At that time the American lines extended from the
Bay of Manila to Laguna de Bay, and included considerable
parts of the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, and Morong to the
south and east of Manila, substantially all of the province of
Manila and the southern parts of Bulacan and Pampanga,
dividing the insurgent forces into two widely separated parts.
To the south and east of our lines in Cavite and Morong were
numerous bands occasionally concentrating for attack on our
lines, and as frequently dispersed and driven back toward the
mountains. On the 8th or October, the insurgents in this
region having again gathered and attacked our lines of
communication, General Schwan with a column of 1,726 men
commenced a movement from Bacoor, in the province of Cavite,
driving the enemy through Old Cavite, Noveleta, Santa Cruz,
San Francisco de Malabon, Saban, and Perez das Marinas,
punishing them severely, scattering them and destroying them
as organized forces, and returning on the 13th to Bacoor. On
the north of our lines stretched the great plain of central
Luzon extending north from Manila about 120 miles. This plain
comprises parts of the provinces of Manila, Pampanga, Bulacan,
Tarlac, Nueva, Ecija, and Pangasinan. It is, roughly speaking,
bounded on the south by the Bay of Manila: on the east and
west by high mountain ranges separating it from the seacoasts,
and on the north by mountains and the Gulf of Lingayen.
Through the northeast and central portion flows the Rio Grande
from the northern mountains southwesterly to the Bay of Manila,
and near the western edge runs the only railroad on the island
of Luzon, in a general southeasterly direction from Dagupan,
on the Bay of Lingayen, to Manila. In this territory Aguinaldo
exercised a military dictatorship, and with a so-called
cabinet imitated the forms of civil government, having his
headquarters at Tarlac, which he called his capital, and which
is situated near the center of the western boundary of the
plain.
{382}