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Philosophy
|
The Quest for Truth
Tenth Edition
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Philosophy
|
The Quest for Truth
Tenth Edition
Louis P. Pojm a n
Lew is Vaughn
New York Oxford
OX F OR D UNI V E R SI T Y PR E SS
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Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Pojman, Louis P., editor. | Vaughn, Lewis, editor.

Title: Philosophy : the quest for truth / [edited by] Louis P. Pojman, Lewis Vaughn.
Other titles: Philosophy (Oxford University Press)
Description: Tenth Edition. | New York : Oxford University Press, 2016. |
Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by
publisher; resource not viewed.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016033600 (print) | LCCN 2016033063 (ebook) | ISBN
9780190254810 (Ebook) | ISBN 9780190254773 (pbk.)
Subjects: LCSH: Philosophy--Introductions.
Classification: LCC BD21 (print) | LCC BD21 .P48 2016 (ebook) | DDC 100--dc23 LC
record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016033600
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by R.R. Donnelley, United States of America
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Dedicated to Teachers
who themselves are dedicated
to opening the hearts of the young
to the love of wisdom and
the quest for truth
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Contents
|
Preface xiii
Time Line xv
I. What Is Philosophy? 1
The Good of Philosophy 2
Philosophical Terrain 3
Thinking Philosophically 5
Reasons and Arguments 5
Fallacious Reasoning 14
Identifying Arguments 19
Some Applications 21
Exercises in Critical Reasoning 22
Study and Discussion Questions 25
1. Plato: Socratic Wisdom 27
2. Plato: The Allegory of the Cave 39
3. John Locke: Of Enthusiasm and the Quest for Truth 42
4. Bertrand Russell: The Value of Philosophy 49
Key Terms 53
Suggestions for Further Reasoning 53
II. Philosophy of Religion 55

Introduction
II.A. Is Belief in God Rationally Justified?
Arguments for the Existence of God 56
The Cosmological Argument
Pro
5. Thomas Aquinas: The Five Ways 60
6. William Lane Craig: The Kalam Cosmological Argument
and the Anthropic Principle 64
Contra
7. Paul Edwards: A Critique of the Cosmological Argument 82
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viii c on t e n t s
The Teleological Argument

Pro
8. William Paley: The Watch and the Watchmaker 92
Contra
9. David Hume: A Critique of the Teleological Argument 95
The Ontological Argument
Pro et Contra
10. St. Anselm and Gaunilo: The Ontological Argument 102
11. William Rowe: An Analysis of the Ontological Argument 105
II.B. Why Is There Evil? 117
12. Fyodor Dostoevsky: Why Is There Evil? 118
13. B. C. Johnson: Why Doesn’t God Intervene to Prevent Evil? 122
14. John Hick: There Is a Reason Why God Allows Evil 128
15. William L. Rowe: The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties
of Atheism 133
II.C. Is Faith Compatible with Reason? 142
16. Blaise Pascal: Yes, Faith Is a Logical Bet 142
17. W. K. Clifford: The Ethics of Belief 146
18. William James: The Will to Believe 151
19. Antony Flew, R. M. Hare, and Basil Mitchell: A Debate
on the Rationality of Religious Belief 160
20. Alvin Plantinga: Religious Belief Without Evidence 166
21. Søren Kierkegaard: Faith and Truth 178
22. Bertrand Russell: Can Religion Cure Our Troubles? 182
Key Terms 188
Suggestions for Further Reading 189
III. Knowledge 191

Introduction
III.A. What Can We Know? Classical Theories of Knowledge 192
23. René Descartes: Cartesian Doubt and the Search for
Foundational Knowledge 194
24. John Locke: The Empiricist Theory of Knowledge 200
25. George Berkeley: An Idealist Theory of Knowledge 212
26. David Hume: The Origin of Our Ideas 222
27. G. E. Moore: Proof of an External World 224
III.B. Truth, Rationality, and Cognitive Relativism 228
28. Bertrand Russell: The Correspondence Theory of Truth 230
29. William James: The Pragmatic Theory of Truth 235
30. Richard Rorty: Dismantling Truth: Solidarity Versus
Objectivity 244
31. Daniel Dennett: Postmodernism and Truth 252
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Contents ix
III.C. Feminist Perspectives on Knowledge 259

32. Eve Browning Cole: Philosophy and Feminist Criticism 259
33. Alison Ainley: Feminist Philosophy 263
III.D. Induction 265
34. David Hume: Skeptical Doubts Concerning the
Operations of the Understanding 266
35. Wesley C. Salmon: The Problem of Induction 277
Key Terms 285
IV. Philosophy of Mind: The Mind-Body Problem 287

Introduction
IV.A. What Am I? A Mind or a Body? 288
36. René Descartes: Substance Dualism 291
37. Gilbert Ryle: Exorcising Descartes’ “Ghost in the Machine” 298
38. J. P. Moreland: A Contemporary Defense of Dualism 305
39. Paul Churchland: On Functionalism and Materialism 316
40. J. J. C. Smart: Sensations and Brain Processes 331
41. Thomas Nagel: What Is It Like to Be a Bat? 341
42. Jerry A. Fodor: The Mind-Body Problem 349
43. David Chalmers: Property Dualism 360
44. John Searle: Minds, Brains, and Computers 362
45. Ned Block: Troubles with Functionalism 370
IV.B. Who Am I? Do We Have Personal Identity? 376
46. John Locke: Our Psychological Properties Define the Self 380
47. David Hume: We Have No Substantial Self with Which
We Are Identical 383
Key Terms 386
V. Freedom of the Will and Determinism 389

Introduction
Contra
48. Baron d’Holbach: We Are Completely Determined 395
Pro
49. William James: The Dilemma of Determinism 400
50. Roderick M. Chisholm: Human Freedom and the Self 411
Pro et Contra
51. Harry Frankfurt: Freedom of the Will and the
Concept of a Person 419
52. David Hume: Liberty and Necessity 429
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x c on t e n t s
Key Terms 432

VI. Ethics 435

Introduction
VI.A. Are There Any Moral Absolutes or Is Morality
Completely Relative? 439
53. Ruth Benedict: Morality Is Relative 440
54. James Rachels: Morality Is Not Relative 445
VI.B. Ethics and Egoism: Why Should We Be Moral? 454
55. Plato: Why Should I Be Moral? Gyges’ Ring and
Socrates’ Dilemma 455
56. Louis P. Pojman: Egoism and Altruism:
A Critique of Ayn Rand 461
57. Joel Feinberg: Psychological Egoism 466
VI.C. Which Is the Correct Ethical Theory? 480
58. Immanuel Kant: The Moral Law 480
59. John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism 493
60. Bernard Williams: Against Utilitarianism 500
61. Aristotle: The Ethics of Virtue 508
62. Virginia Held: The Ethics of Care 518
63. Alison M. Jaggar: Feminist Ethics 528
64. Annette C. Baier: The Need for More
Than Justice 539
65. Jean-Paul Sartre: Existentialist Ethics 548
66. James Rachels: The Divine Command Theory 555
67. Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck 558
Key Terms 566
VII. Political Philosophy and Justice 569

Introduction
VII.A. What Is the Most Just Form of Government? 570
68. Robert Paul Wolff: In Defense of Anarchism 571
69. Thomas Hobbes: The Absolutist Answer:
The Justification of the State Is the Security It Affords 576
70. John Locke: The Democratic Answer: The Justification of the
State Is Its Promotion of Security and Natural Human Rights 586
71. John Stuart Mill: A Classical Liberal Answer:
Government Must Promote Freedom 591
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Contents xi
72. John Rawls: The Contemporary Liberal Answer 598

73. Robert Nozick: Against Liberalism 608
VII.B. What Is Social Justice? 618
74. Martin Luther King, Jr.: Nonviolence and Racial Justice 619
75. Susan Moller Okin: Justice, Gender, and the Family 621
76. Mary Wollstonecraft: A Vindication of the Rights
of Women 624
Key Terms 627
VIII. What Is the Meaning of Life? 629

Introduction
77. Epicurus: Moderate Hedonism 631
78. Epictetus: Stoicism: Enchiridion 637
79. Albert Camus: Life Is Absurd 646
80. Julian Baggini: Living Life Forwards 651
81. Louis P. Pojman: Religion Gives Meaning to Life 659
82. Thomas Nagel: The Absurd 663
83. Bertrand Russell: Reflections on Suffering 671
IX. Contemporary Moral Problems 675

Introduction
IX.A. Is Abortion Morally Permissible? 676
Contra
84. Don Marquis: Why Abortion Is Immoral 677
85. Francis J. Beckwith: Arguments from Bodily Rights 691
Pro
86. Mary Anne Warren: On the Moral and Legal Status
of Abortion 704
87. Judith Jarvis Thomson: A Defense of Abortion 711
Pro et Contra
88. Jane English: The Moderate Position:
Beyond the Personhood Argument 723
IX.B. Is the Death Penalty Morally Permissible? 730
Pro
89. Burton Leiser: The Death Penalty Is Permissible 731
Contra
90. Hugo Adam Bedau: No, the Death Penalty Is Not
Morally Permissible 737
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xii c on t e n t s
IX.C. Should Society Permit Same-Sex Marriage? 747

Contra
91. Maggie Gallagher: What Marriage Is For:
Children Need Mothers and Fathers 747
Pro
92. Jonathan Rauch: For Better or Worse? 752
IX.D. Do We Have Obligations to the Poor and Hungry? 759
Pro
93. Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality 761
Contra
94. Garrett Hardin: Living on a Lifeboat 770
Appendix: How to Read and Write Philosophy Papers 785

Glossary 795
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Preface
|
T
hanks to the many teachers of philosophy who have reviewed this text, this
tenth edition of Philosophy: The Quest for Truth is a clear improvement over
the ninth. Yet the book stays true to its original intent—to provide an anthol-
ogy focused on the classic readings in the classic philosophical problems but firmly
planted in the middle ground between texts that are rigorous but inaccessible and
accessible but thin.
Ninety-four readings are arranged as far as possible in a pro/con format around
key philosophical questions; each selection comes with explanatory headnotes plus
questions before and after it; every major section has a substantial preface; Part I in-
cludes a logic and argument tutorial and a brief introduction to philosophy; and an
appendix offers helpful guidelines for reading and writing philosophy papers. All the
traditional problems of philosophy are represented here plus some nontraditional
ones: philosophy of religion, knowledge, philosophy of mind, personal identity, free
will and determinism, ethics, political philosophy, the meaning of life, and contem-
porary moral issues.
I mproveme n t s i n the T e n th E dition
• Added eight new readings with headnotes, study questions, and discussion
questions. Five of the new readings are by women—two in the Knowledge sec-
tion, two in Justice and Political Philosophy, and one in the Same-Sex Marriage
subsection:
32. Eve Browning Cole: Philosophy and Feminist Criticism
33. Alison Ainley: Feminist Philosophy
60. Bernard Williams: Against Utilitarianism
67. Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
74. Martin Luther King, Jr.: Nonviolence and Racial Justice
75. Susan Moller Okin: Justice, Gender, and the Family
76. Mary Wollstonecraft: A Vindication of the Rights of Women
91. Maggie Gallagher: What Marriage Is For: Children Need Mothers and
Fathers
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xiv p r e fac e
• Added a new section: “What Is Social Justice?” in Part VII: Justice and Political
Philosophy.
• Revised Part I: What Is Philosophy?
• Added to Key Terms in several chapters and the Glossary; revised the Time
Line.
• Added more pages while continuing to keep the book’s price reasonable.
A ncillarie s
Along with a revised text comes updated ancillaries. These include the following:
• Online Instructor Resources on the book’s companion website, providing
• Summaries of every selection for easy reference
• Lists and definitions of Key Terms (also appearing as flashcards in the Student
Resources section of the website)
• Helpful Web Links (recommended to students for additional information)
• Sample Syllabi for planning courses
• Test Banks available to instructors in print and on CD
• Online Student Resources, offering
• Essay Questions for Review of every selection to reaffirm main ideas and
arguments
• Quizzes that test student knowledge of each selection
• Flashcards that highlight key terms and concepts
• Helpful Web Links that guide exploration of each philosophical problem
Ack nowledgme n t s
In the years since this text was first published, dozens of sharp reviewers have helped
to make it an extremely useful and a highly regarded anthology. For help with the
tenth edition, I am grateful to many more: Erik Anderson, Drew University; Sorin
Bangu, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Thad Botham, Arizona State
University; Miguel Endara, Los Angeles Pierce College; William L. Langenfus, John
Carroll University; David McElhoes, University of Maryland; Jason Miller, Florida
State University; Michael Pace, Chapman University; Mark Piper, James Madison
University; Michael H. Reed, Eastern Michigan University; Joshua Rollins, Univer-
sity of Oklahoma; David Lee Stegall, Clemson University; Jeffrey Strayer, Indiana
University Purdue University Fort Wayne; and Rebecca Traynor, CUNY Queens
College. As always, many thanks are due my talented and hard-working editors at
Oxford University Press, especially Robert Miller, the guiding light of the project,
and Kristin Maffei and Emily Krupin.
Lewis Vaughn
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Time Line
|
T H E A NC I E N T PER IOD
Philosophers Dates Major Figures and Events

Socrates* c. 470–399 b.c. Trial and death of Socrates, 399 b.c.
Democritus c. 460–370 b.c.
Plato c. 427–347 b.c. Plato founds the Academy, c. 388 b.c.
Aristotle 384–322 b.c. Aristotle founds the Lyceum, 334 b.c.
Pyrrho c. 360–270 b.c. Death of Alexander the Great, 323 b.c.
Epicurus 341–270 b.c. Epicurus opens school in Athens, 306 b.c.
Zeno the Stoic c. 336–264 b.c. Zeno opens school at the Stoa, 301 b.c.
Rome conquers the Greek world,
200–128 b.c.
Caesar is dictator of Rome, 49–44 b.c.
Jesus Christ, c. 4 b.c.– a.d. 30
Epictetus c. 50–130 Romans destroy Temple in Jerusalem, 70
Marcus Aurelius 121–180
Sextus Empiricus c. 200
T H E M E DI EVA L PER IOD

Constantine grants tolerance to
Christianity, 313
Augustine 354–430 Theodosius I makes Christianity the
state religion of Rome, 392
Boethius c. 480–524 Fall of the Roman Empire in the West, 476
Avicenna 980–1037
*Philosophers whose names apperar in boldface appear in this volume.
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xvi timeline
T H E M E DI EVA L PER IOD

Gaunilo c. 1000
Anselm 1034–1109
Averroës 1126–1198 University of Paris founded, 1160
Thomas Aquinas 1225–1274
John Duns Scotus c. 1266–1308 The Black Death ravages Europe,
1347–1351
William of Ockham c. 1285–1349
T H E MODER N PER IOD

Johann Gutenberg invents the
printing press, 1445
Leonardo da Vinci, 1452–1519
Thomas Hobbes 1588–1679
René Descartes 1596–1650 The reign of Louis XIV in France,
1643–1715
Blaise Pascal 1623–1662
Benedict (Baruch) 1632–1677 Johann Sebastian Bach, 1685–1750
Spinoza
John Locke 1632–1704 Two Treatises on Government, 1689
Gottfried Wilhelm 1646–1716
Leibniz
George Berkeley 1685–1753 Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, 1756–1791
David Hume 1711–1776 Ludwig van Beethoven, 1770–1827
Adam Smith 1723–1790 The Wealth of Nations, 1776
Immanuel Kant 1724–1804 Critique of Pure Reason, 1781
Baron D’Holbach 1732–1789
William Paley 1743–1805
Jeremy Bentham 1748–1832 Industrial Revolution in England, c. 1790
Napoleon crowns himself emperor of
France, 1804
Mary Wollstonecraft 1759–1797 Charles Darwin, 1809–1882
Richard Wagner, 1813–1883
Georg W. F. Hegel 1770–1831 Fyodor Dostoevsky, 1821–1881
Leo Tolstoy, 1828–1910
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xvii
Timeline
T H E MODER N PER IOD

Arthur Schopenhauer 1788–1860 Second French Revolution, 1830
Opium War in China, 1839
John Stuart Mill 1806–1873 On Liberty, 1859
Darwin’s Origin of Species, 1859
Søren Kierkegaard 1813–1855 Fear and Trembling, 1841
Karl Marx 1818–1883 The Communist Manifesto, 1848
Sigmund Freud, 1856–1939
Friedrich Nietzsche 1844–1900 Pablo Picasso, 1881–1973
James Joyce, 1882–1941
Virginia Woolf, 1882–1941
The Dreyfus Affair (France), 1899
T H E C ON T E M P OR A RY PER IOD

Charles S. Peirce 1839–1914 Albert Einstein presents theory of
relativity, 1905
William James 1842–1910
W. K. Clifford 1845–1879
Alfred North 1861–1947 Joseph Stalin becomes general secretary
Whitehead of the Communist party, 1922
Bertrand Russell 1872–1970 The Great Depression, 1929–1939
Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939
G. E. Moore 1873–1958
W. T. Stace 1886–1967
Ludwig Wittgenstein 1889–1951 Second World War, 1939–1945
Martin Heidegger 1889–1976 Dropping of the atomic bomb on
Hiroshima, August 6, 1945
Gilbert Ryle 1900–1976 Israel becomes a nation, 1949
Karl Popper 1902–1994 People’s Republic of China under
Mao Tse-tung established, 1949
Crick and Watson identify the
structure of DNA, 1953
Jean-Paul Sartre 1905–1980 Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
Simone de Beauvoir 1908–1986
Willard V. O. Quine 1908–2000 War in Vietnam, 1954–1975
A. J. Ayer 1910–1989 Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.,
1968
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xviii timeline
T H E C ON T E M P OR A RY PER IOD

Albert Camus 1913–1960
Roderick M. 1916–1999
Chisholm
Philippa Foot b. 1920
J. J. Smart 1920–2012
John Rawls 1921–2002 A Theory of Justice, 1971
John Hick 1922–2012
Paul Edwards 1923–2004
Antony Flew 1923–2010
Wesley C. Salmon 1925–2001
Joel Feinberg 1926–2004
Harry Frankfurt b. 1929
Judith Jarvis b. 1929
Thomson
Annette C. Baier 1929–2012
Richard Rorty 1931–2007
William Rowe 1931–2015
Alvin Plantinga b. 1932
Michael Martin 1932–2015
John Searle b. 1932
Jerry A. Fodor b. 1935
Thomas Nagel b. 1937 Islamic terrorist attacks on U.S. World
Trade Center and Pentagon,
September 11, 2001
Robert Nozick b. 1938–2002
James Rachels 1941–2003
Daniel Dennett b. 1942
Paul Churchland b. 1942
Ned Block b. 1942
Peter van Inwagen b. 1942
Peter Singer b. 1946
Mary Anne Warren 1946–2010
Jane English 1947–1978
David Chalmers b. 1966
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Part I
|
What Is Philosophy?
The unexamined life is not worth living.

socr ates
If God held all Truth in His right hand and in His left hand the eternal
Quest for Truth, and said to me, “Choose!” I would with courage touch His
left and say, “Father, Give me this! The pure Truth is fit for you alone.”
g. e. lessing, Werke, vol. X, p. 53; my translation.
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P
hilosophy is the name that philosophers have given to both a discipline and
a process. As a discipline, philosophy is one of the humanities, a field of study
out of which several other fields have evolved—physics, biology, political sci-
ence, and many others. As a process, philosophy is a penetrating mode of reflection
for understanding life’s most important truths. This mode is what we may call the
philosophical method—the systematic use of critical reasoning to try to find answers
to fundamental questions about reality, morality, and knowledge. The method, how-
ever, is not a master key used exclusively by professional philosophers to unlock
mysteries hidden from common folk. The philosophical method is the birthright of
every person, for we are all born with the capacity to reason, to question, to discover.
For thousands of years, great minds like Aristotle, Plato, Confucius, Descartes,
Aquinas, and Sartre have used it in their search for wisdom, and what they found has
changed countless lives. But amateur philosophers like you have also used it—and
continue to use it—to achieve life-altering understanding that would have eluded
them otherwise.
T h e G o od of Ph i lo s oph y
Philosophy is not just about ideas; it’s about fundamental ideas, those upon which
other ideas depend. A fundamental belief logically supports other beliefs, and the more
beliefs it supports the more fundamental it is. Your belief or disbelief in God, for exam-
ple, might support a host of other beliefs about morality, life after death, heaven, hell,
free will, science, evolution, prayer, abortion, miracles, homosexuality, and more.
Thanks to your upbringing, your culture, your peers, and other influences, you already
have a head full of fundamental beliefs, some of them true, some false. Whether true or
false, they constitute the framework of your whole belief system, and as such they help
you make sense of a wide range of important issues in life—issues concerning what
exists and what doesn’t, what actions are right or wrong (or neither), and what kinds of
things we can know and not know. Fundamental beliefs, therefore, make up your “phi-
losophy of life,” which informs your thinking and guides your actions.
Perhaps now you can better appreciate philosophy’s greatest practical benefit: it
gives us the intellectual wherewithal to improve our lives by improving our philoso-
phy of life. A faulty philosophy of life—that is, one that comprises a great many false
fundamental beliefs—can lead to a misspent or misdirected life, a life less meaningful
than it could be. Philosophy is the most powerful instrument we have for evaluating
the worth of our fundamental beliefs and for changing them for the better. Through
philosophy we exert control over the trajectory of our lives, making major course
corrections by reason and reflection.
The Greek philosopher Socrates (469–399 b.c.), one of Western civilization’s great
intellectual heroes, says, “An unexamined life is not worth living.” To examine your
life is to scrutinize the core ideas that shape it, and the deepest form of scrutiny is
exercised through philosophy. This search for answers goes to the heart of the tradi-
tional conception of philosophy as a search for wisdom (the term philosophy is derived
from Greek words meaning “love of wisdom”). With the attainment of wisdom, we
come to understand the true nature of reality and how to apply that understanding
to living a good life.
2

Part One: What Is Philosophy? 3
Philosophy’s chief theoretical benefit is the same one that most other fields of in-
quiry pursue: understanding for its own sake. Even if philosophy had no practical
applications at all, it would still hold great value for us. We want to know how the
world works, what truths it hides, just for the sake of knowing. And philosophy
obliges. Astronomers search the sky, physicists study subatomic particles, and archae-
ologists search for ancient ruins, all the while knowing that what they find may have
no practical implications at all. We humans wonder, and that’s often all the reason we
need to search for answers. As the great philosopher Aristotle says, “For it is owing
to their wonder that people both now begin and at first began to philosophize.”
For many people, the quest for understanding through philosophy is a spiritual,
transformative endeavor, an ennobling pursuit of truths at the core of life. Thus,
several philosophers speak of philosophy as something that enriches or nurtures the
soul or mind. Socrates, speaking to the jurors who condemned him for practicing
philosophy on the streets of Athens, asked, “Are you not ashamed that, while you
take care to acquire as much wealth as possible, with honor and glory as well, yet you
take no care or thought for understanding or truth, or for the best possible state of
your soul?” In a similar vein, the Greek philosopher Epicurus (341–270 b.c.) said,
“Let no young man delay the study of philosophy, and let no old man become weary
of it; for it is never too early nor too late to care for the well-being of the soul.” And
in our own era, the philosopher Walter Kaufmann (1921–1980) declared, “Philoso-
phy means liberation from the two dimensions of routine, soaring above the well
known, seeing it in new perspectives, arousing wonder and the wish to fly.”
Along with philosophical inquiry comes freedom. We begin our lives at a particular
place and time, steeped in the ideas and values of a particular culture, fed ready-made
beliefs that may or may not be true and that we may never think to question. If you
passively accept such beliefs, then those beliefs are not really yours. If they are not
really yours, and you let them guide your choices and actions, then they—not you—
are in charge of your life. You thus forfeit your personal freedom. But philosophy
helps us rise above this predicament, to transcend the narrow and obstructed stand-
point from which we may view everything. It helps us sift our hand-me-down beliefs
in the light of reason, look beyond the prejudices that blind us, and see what’s real
and true. By using the philosophical method, we may learn that some of our beliefs
are on solid ground and some are not. In either case, through philosophy our beliefs
become truly and authentically our own.
Ph i lo s oph ic a l T er r a i n
Philosophy’s sphere of interest is vast, encompassing fundamental beliefs drawn from

many places. Philosophical questions can arise anywhere. Part of the reason for this
is that ordinary beliefs that seem to have no connection with philosophy can become
philosophical in short order. A physiologist may want to know how our brains work,
but she ventures into the philosophical arena when she wonders whether the brain is
the same thing as the mind—a question that science alone cannot answer. A lawyer
studies how the death penalty is administered in Texas, but he does philosophy when
he considers whether capital punishment is ever morally permissible. A medical

4 pa r t on e : w h a t i s p h i l o s op h y ?
scientist wants to know how a human fetus develops, but she finds it difficult to avoid
the philosophical query of what the moral status of the fetus is. An astrophysicist
studies the Big Bang, the cataclysmic explosion thought to have brought the universe
into being—but then asks whether the Big Bang shows that God caused the universe
to exist. On CNN you see the horrors of war and famine, but then you find yourself
grappling with whether they can be squared with the existence of an all-powerful,
all-k nowing, and all-good God. Or you wonder what your moral obligations are to
the poor and hungry of the world. Or you ponder whether government should help
people in need or leave them to fend for themselves.
We can divide philosophy’s subject matter into four main divisions, each of which
is a branch of inquiry in its own right with many subcategories. Here’s a brief run-
down of these divisions and a sampling of the kinds of questions that each asks.
Metaphysics is the study of reality in the broadest sense, an inquiry into the ele-
mental nature of the universe and the things in it. Though it must take into account
the findings of science, metaphysics generally focuses on basic questions that science
cannot address. Questions of interest: Does the world consist only of matter, or is it
made up of other basic things, such as ideas or minds? Is there a spiritual, ideal realm
that exists beyond the material world? Is the mind the same thing as the body? How
are mind and body related? Do people have immortal souls? Do humans have free
will, or are our actions determined by forces beyond our control? Can they be both
free and determined? Does God exist? How can both a good God and evil exist si-
multaneously? What is the nature of causality? Can an effect ever precede its cause?
What is the nature of time? Is time travel possible?
Epistemology is the study of knowledge. Questions of interest: What is knowl-
edge? What is truth? Is knowledge possible—can we ever know anything? Does
knowledge require certainty? What are the sources of knowledge? Is experience a
source of knowledge? Is mysticism or faith a source? Can we gain knowledge of the
empirical world through reason alone? If we have knowledge, how much do we have?
When are we justified in saying that we know something? Do we have good reasons
to believe that the world exists independently of our minds? Or do our minds consti-
tute reality?
Axiology is the study of value, including both aesthetic value and moral value.
The study of moral value is known as ethics. Ethics involves inquiries into the nature
of moral judgments, virtues, values, obligations, and theories. Questions of interest:
What makes an action right (or wrong)? What things are intrinsically good? What is
the good life? What gives life meaning? What makes someone good (or bad)? What
moral principles should guide our actions and choices? Which is the best moral
theory? Is killing ever morally permissible? If so, why? Are moral standards objective
or subjective? Is an action right merely because a culture endorses it? Does morality
depend on God? What makes a society just?
Logic is the study of correct reasoning. Questions of interest: What are the rules
for drawing correct inferences? What are the nature and structure of deductive argu-
ments? How can propositional or predicate logic be used to evaluate arguments?
Upon what logical principles does reasoning depend? Does logic describe how the
world is—or just how our minds work? Can conclusions reached through inductive
logic be rationally justified?

In addition to these divisions, there are subdivisions of philosophy whose job is to

examine critically the assumptions and principles that underlie other fields. Thus we
have the philosophy of science, the philosophy of law, the philosophy of mathematics,
the philosophy of history, the philosophy of language, and many others. When those
laboring in a discipline begin questioning its most basic ideas—ideas that define its
subject matter and principles of inquiry—philosophy, the most elemental mode of
investigation, steps in.
T h i n k i ng Ph i lo s oph ic a lly
As we have seen, to think philosophically is to bring your powers of critical reasoning

to bear on fundamental questions. When you do this, you are usually clarifying the
meaning of concepts, constructing and evaluating philosophical theories, or devising
and evaluating logical arguments. This latter task constitutes the principal labor of
philosophy. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and other great thinkers do not
deliver their philosophical insights to us without argument, as if we are automatically
to accept their views with no questions asked. Philosophers provide reasons for think-
ing their ideas are plausible—that is, they give us arguments. And if we believe what
they say, it should be because there are good reasons for doing so. Likewise, if we
expect intelligent people to accept our philosophical views, we must argue our case.
Since the philosophy we read will most likely contain arguments, our understanding
of the text will hang on our ability to identify and understand those arguments.
Reasons and Arguments

As you might have guessed, the term argument does not refer to heated disagree-
ments or emotional squabbles. An argument is a group of statements in which one
of them is meant to be supported by the others. A statement (or claim) is an asser-
tion that something is or is not the case and is therefore the kind of utterance that is
either true or false. In an argument, the statement being supported is the conclusion,
and the statements supporting the conclusion are the premises. The premises are
meant to provide reasons for believing that the conclusion is true. A good argument
gives us good reasons for accepting a conclusion; a bad argument fails to provide
good reasons. In philosophy—and in any other kind of rational inquiry—accepting a
conclusion (statement) without good reasons is an elementary mistake in reasoning.
Believing a statement without good reasons is a recipe for error; believing a statement
for good reasons increases your chances of uncovering the truth.
When we do philosophy, then, we are likely at some point to be grappling with
arguments—we are trying to either (1) devise an argument to support a statement or
(2) evaluate an argument to see if there really are good reasons for accepting its
conclusion.
Note that argument in the sense used here is not synonymous with persuasion. An
argument provides us with reasons for accepting a claim; it is an attempted “proof”
for an assertion. But persuasion does not necessarily involve giving any reasons at all
for accepting a claim. To persuade is to influence people’s opinions, which can be
accomplished by offering a good argument but also by misleading with logical

fallacies, exploiting emotions and prejudices, dazzling with rhetorical gimmicks,

hiding or distorting the facts, threatening or coercing people—the list is long. Good
arguments prove something whether or not they persuade. Persuasive ploys can
change minds but do not necessarily prove anything.
Now consider these two simple arguments:
Argument 1
It’s wrong to take the life of an innocent person. Abortion takes the life of an
innocent person. Therefore abortion is wrong.
Argument 2
God does not exist. After all, most college students believe that that is the case.
In Argument 1, the conclusion is “abortion is wrong,” and it is backed by two prem-
ises: “It’s wrong to take the life of an innocent person” and “Abortion takes the life of
an innocent person.” In Argument 2, the conclusion is “God does not exist,” which is
supported by the premise “After all, most college students believe that that is the case.”
Despite the differences between these two passages (differences in content, the number
of premises, and the order of their parts), they are both arguments because they exem-
plify basic argument structure: a conclusion supported by at least one premise.
Though the components of an argument seem clear enough, people often fail to
distinguish between arguments and strong statements that contain no arguments at
all. Suppose we change Argument 1 into this:
Abortion is wrong. I can’t believe how many people think it’s morally okay. The
world is insane.
Now there is no argument, just an expression of exasperation or anger. There are
no statements giving us reasons to believe a conclusion. What we have are some un-
supported assertions that may merely appear to make a case. If we ignore the distinc-
tion between genuine arguments and nonargumentative material, critical reasoning
is undone.
The simplest way to locate an argument is to find its conclusion first, then its prem-
ises. Zeroing in on conclusions and premises can be a lot easier if you keep an eye out
for indicator words. Indicator words often tag along with arguments and indicate that
a conclusion or premise may be nearby.
Here are a few conclusion indicator words:
consequently as a result
thus hence
therefore so
it follows that which means that
Here are some premise indicator words:
in view of the fact assuming that

because since

due to the fact that for

inasmuch as given that
Just remember that indicator words do not guarantee the presence of conclusions
and premises. They are simply telltale signs.
Assuming we can recognize an argument when we see it, how can we tell if it is a
good one? Fortunately, the general criteria for judging the merits of an argument are
simple and clear. A good argument—one that gives us good reasons for believing a
claim—must have (1) solid logic and (2) true premises. Requirement (1) means that
the conclusion should follow logically from the premises, that there must be a proper
logical connection between the supporting statements and the statement supported.
Requirement (2) says that what the premises assert must in fact be the case. An argu-
ment that fails in either respect is a bad argument.
There are two basic kinds of arguments—deductive and inductive—and our two
requirements hold for both of them, even though the logical connections in each
type are distinct. Deductive arguments are intended to give logically conclusive sup-
port to their conclusions so that if the premises are true, the conclusion absolutely
must be true. Argument 1 is a deductive argument and is therefore supposed to be
constructed so that if the two premises are true, its conclusion cannot possibly be
false. Here it is with its structure laid bare:
Argument 1
1. It’s wrong to take the life of an innocent person.
2. Abortion takes the life of an innocent person.
3. Therefore, abortion is wrong.
Do you see that, given the form or structure of this argument, if the premises are
true, then the conclusion has to be true? It would be very strange—illogical, in fact—
to agree that the two premises are true but that the conclusion is false.
Now look at this one:
Argument 3
1. All dogs are mammals.
2. Rex is a dog.
3. Therefore, Rex is a mammal.
Again, there is no way for the premises to be true while the conclusion is false. The
deductive form of the argument guarantees this.
So a deductive argument is intended to have this sort of airtight structure. If it
actually does have this structure, it is said to be valid. Argument 1 is deductive be-
cause it is intended to provide logically conclusive support to its conclusion. It is valid
because, as a matter of fact, it does offer this kind of support. A deductive argument
that fails to provide conclusive support to its conclusion is said to be invalid. In such
an argument, it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. Argu-
ment 3 is intended to have a deductive form, and because it actually does have this
form, the argument is also valid.

An elementary fact about deductive arguments is that their validity (or lack
thereof ) is a separate issue from the truth of the premises. Validity is a structural
matter, depending on how an argument is put together. Truth concerns the nature of
the claims made in the premises and conclusion. A deductive argument is supposed
to be built so that if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true—but in a
particular case, the premises might not be true. A valid argument can have true or
false premises and a true or false conclusion. (By definition, of course, it cannot have
true premises and a false conclusion.) In any case, being invalid or having false prem-
ises dooms a deductive argument.
Inductive arguments are supposed to give probable support to their conclusions.
Unlike deductive arguments, they are not designed to support their conclusions de-
cisively. They can establish only that, if their premises are true, their conclusions are
probably true (more likely to be true than not). Argument 2 is an inductive argument
meant to demonstrate the probable truth that “God does not exist.” Like all induc-
tive arguments (and unlike deductive ones), it can have true premises and a false
conclusion. So it’s possible for the sole premise—“After all, most college students
believe that that is the case”—to be true while the conclusion is false.
If inductive arguments succeed in lending probable support to their conclusions,
they are said to be strong. Strong arguments are such that if their premises are true,
their conclusions are probably true. If they fail to provide this probable support, they
are termed weak. Argument 2 is a weak argument because its premise, even if true,
does not show that more likely than not God does not exist. What college students
(or any other group) believe about God does not constitute good evidence for or
against God’s existence.
But consider this inductive argument:
Argument 4
1. Eighty-five percent of the students at this university are Republicans.
2. Sonia is a student at this university.
3. Therefore, Sonia is probably a Republican.
This argument is strong. If its premises are true, its conclusion is likely to be true.
If 85 percent of the university’s students are Republicans, and Sonia is a university
student, she is more likely than not to be a Republican too.
When a valid (deductive) argument has true premises, it is a good argument.
A good deductive argument is said to be sound. Argument 1 is valid, but we cannot
say whether it is sound until we determine the truth of the premises. Argument 3 is
valid, and if its premises are true, it is sound. When a strong (inductive) argument has
true premises, it is also a good argument. A good inductive argument is said to be
cogent. Argument 2 is weak, so there is no way it can be cogent. Argument 4 is
strong, and if its premises are true, it is cogent.
Checking the validity or strength of an argument is often a plain, commonsense
undertaking. Using our natural reasoning ability, we can examine how the premises
are linked to the conclusion and can see quickly whether the conclusion follows from
the premises. We are most likely to make an easy job of it when the arguments are
simple. Many times, however, we need some help, and help is available in the form of
methods and guidelines for evaluating arguments.

Having a familiarity with common argument patterns, or forms, is especially

useful when assessing the validity of deductive arguments. We are likely to encounter
these forms again and again. Here is a prime example:
Argument 5
1. If the surgeon operates, then the patient will be cured.
2. The surgeon is operating.
3. Therefore, the patient will be cured.
This argument form contains a conditional premise—that is, a premise consisting
of a conditional, or if-t hen, statement (actually a compound statement composed
of two constituent statements). Premise 1 is a conditional statement. A condi-
tional statement has two parts: the part beginning with if (called the antecedent),
and the part beginning with then (known as the consequent). So the antecedent of
Premise 1 is “If the surgeon operates,” and the consequent is “then the patient
will be cured.”
The best way to appreciate the structure of such an argument (or any deductive ar-
gument, for that matter) is to translate it into traditional argument symbols in which
each statement is symbolized by a letter. Here is the symbolization for Argument 5:
1. If p, then q.
2. p.
3. Therefore, q.
We can see that p represents “the surgeon operates,” and q represents “the patient
will be cured.” But notice that we can use this same symbolized argument form to
represent countless other arguments—arguments with different statements but
having the same basic structure.
It just so happens that the underlying argument form for Argument 5 is extremely
common—common enough to have a name, modus ponens (or affirming the anteced-
ent). The truly useful fact about modus ponens is that any argument having this form
is valid. We can plug any statements we want into the formula and the result will be
a valid argument, a circumstance in which if the premises are true, the conclusion
must be true.
An equally prevalent argument form is modus tollens (or denying the consequent).
For example:
Argument 6
1. If the dose is low, then the healing is slow.
2. The healing is not slow.
3. Therefore, the dose is not low.
1. If p, then q.
2. Not q.
3. Therefore, not p.
Modus tollens is also a valid form, and any argument using this form must also be
valid.

There are also common argument forms that are invalid. Here are two of them:
Argument 7 (Affirming the Consequent)
1. If the mind is an immaterial substance, then ESP is real.
2. ESP is real.
3. Therefore, the mind is an immaterial substance.
1. If p, then q.
2. q.
3. Therefore, p.
Argument 8 (Denying the Antecedent)
1. If morality is relative to persons (that is, if moral rightness or wrongness de-
pends on what people believe), then moral disagreement between persons
would be nearly impossible.
2. But morality is not relative to persons.
3. Therefore, moral disagreement between persons is not nearly impossible.
1. If p, then q.
2. Not p.
3. Therefore, not q.
The advantage of being able to recognize these and other common argument
forms is that you can use that skill to readily determine the validity of many deductive
arguments. You know, for example, that any argument having the same form as
modus ponens or modus tollens must be valid, and any argument in one of the common
invalid forms must be invalid.
Inductive arguments also have distinctive forms, and being familiar with the forms
can help you evaluate the arguments. In enumerative induction, we arrive at a gener-
alization about an entire group of things after observing just some members of the
group. Consider these:
Argument 9
Every formatted disk I have bought from the computer store is defective.
Therefore, all formatted disks sold at the computer store are probably defective.
Argument 10
All the hawks in this wildlife sanctuary that I have observed have had red tails.
Therefore, all the hawks in this sanctuary probably have red tails.
Argument 11
Sixty percent of the Bostonians I have interviewed in various parts of the city are
pro-choice.
Therefore, 60 percent of all Bostonians are probably pro-choice.

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With the two Greeks were associated the original works of
Constantine and his translations from Rhazes Hali-Abbas, Ysaac,
Avicenna, Johannicus, and other Arabic and Persian writers, and
finally the treatise of John of St. Amand, and of Nicholas of Salerno.
The Antidotarium, or Book of Antidotes, known also as the Book of
Medicaments, was for some centuries a work of standard reference
and of popular sale. The influence of the Arabs in the instructional
literature of medicine seems to have been almost as controlling as
that of the Greeks in philosophy and of the Romans in law.
Rabelais, who studied medicine in Montpellier between 1520 and
1530, is said to have been the first among the students who was
able to read his Greek authors in the original instead of in Latin
translations.[268] Rabelais found time while in college not only for
Greek and medicine, but for literature. The first part of the
Pantagruel was written before he had secured his final diploma.
By the middle of the thirteenth century, the number of the books
required for use in the university courses had increased to such an
extent that four catalogues were issued, one for each of the four
Faculties—Law, Medicine, Theology, and Arts. The lectures and the
instruction were given entirely in Latin, which was the only language
that could have been understood by all of the various nationalities
represented, or even by the representatives of the different Italian
dialects.
In Spain, the earliest university was that of Palencia, which was
founded in 1212. Salamanca, founded a few years later, soon
exceeded Palencia in importance, and, particularly in connection
with the work of its medical Faculty, secured for itself, before the
close of the thirteenth century, a repute throughout Europe.
Compayré is of opinion that the instruction given in Salamanca, not
only in medicine but in science generally and in philosophy, was very
largely influenced by the presence in the peninsula of Moorish
scholars. “The philosophy of Averrhoes and the medicine of
Avicenna exerted a manifest influence on the development of studies
at Salamanca.”[269] It seems probable, if this belief is well founded,
that the Arabian literature, produced and manifolded in Cordova,
found its way to Salamanca, and through Salamanca to Salerno,
Bologna, and Paris.
The formal constitution of the University of Paris dates from 1202.
Certain of its historians, however, claim for its first work as an
educational institution a much earlier date. Crévier, for instance,
says: “The University of Paris as a school goes back to Alcuin ...
Charlemagne was its founder.”[270] Charlemagne’s practical interest
in education has caused his name to be associated with the schools
of Tours, Aachen, Milan, Salerno, Bologna, and Paris. The most
recent writer on the subject, Compayré, is of opinion that this is an
exaggerated statement. He finds evidence of an unbroken
succession of Benedictine schools, such as those of Rheims, Tours,
Angers, Laon, Bec, and others, which had preserved a continuity of
educational work from the time of Charlemagne to that of Louis VIII.,
and which, under such leaders as Lanfranc (1005-1089), and S.
Anselm (1033-1109), had developed and maintained a high degree
of intellectual activity. He considers these to have constituted the
direct succession to the schools of the palace of Charlemagne, but
he fails to find in them the prototype of the university system. For
Compayré, the actual founder of the University of Paris was Abelard,
who died sixty years before the university secured its organisation. It
is his contention that it was Abelard who, by his learning, his
independence of thought, his eloquence, and his mastery over the
minds of men, is to be credited with the initiation of the great
movement from which was to proceed not only the University of
Paris, but the long series of universities for which Paris served as an
incentive and the type. It was Abelard, says Compayré, who, if not
first, at least with the most direct and far-reaching influence,
introduced dialectics into theology and reason into authority,
breaking away from the mere passive transmission of the beliefs and
timid dialectics accepted by the schools of theology, and thus making
possible the development of a true university spirit. “The method of
Abelard is the soul of scholastic philosophy,”[271] the philosophy
which, until the Renaissance, reigned supreme in the University of
Paris. Abelard’s method, says Père Denifle, is presented in the book
which during several centuries served as the text for theological
instruction, the Sentences of Peter Lombard, and its influence is also
to be noted in that other noteworthy work which became the
authority for the schools of common law, the Decretals of Gratian.
Abelard may be called the first professor of superior instruction.
His work was certainly begun with éclat, for his classes are said to
have numbered at times no less than five thousand pupils. “First of
the French philosophers ... he may justly be considered as the
precursor of Ramus and Descartes, in other words, of the
Renaissance and of the modern spirit.”[272] Apart from this more far-
reaching influence, he was able to do for the school of Paris what the
jurist Irnerius was, during nearly the same years, accomplishing for
the school of Bologna, making possible, namely, its development into
the university. It was through the work done by Abelard that “the
theological school of Paris became the seminary of Christian
Europe.”[273] This influence continued through the succeeding
centuries in which Paris still remained the centre of theological
instruction, a result which necessarily had later an important effect in
shaping the character of the earlier issues of the Paris Press.
The term University is not a synonym of the university of science,
but simply of the university of teachers and students who composed
a group and who instituted association of studies. “In the language of
the Civil Law,” says Malden, “all corporations were called
Universitates, as forming one whole out of many individuals.”[274]
The organisation of the University of Paris, while differing in
certain important details from that of Bologna, was substantially
identical with the Italian institutions in respect to the privileges
conceded to instructors and students. In successive enactments or
crown edicts, the members of the universities of Paris, Montpellier,
and Poitiers were exempted, not only from the regular national taxes
and from the town dues (octroi), but also from special war taxes. In
1295, Philip the Fair decreed that under no pretext could the goods
of the members of the universities be taken or their revenues
attached.[275] The following statute of the University of Padua
represented fairly enough the status of students in all the universities
of France and of Italy: “Students must be considered as citizens in
what concerns the advantages, but not in that which constitutes the
burdens of citizens.” Under this same principle, members of the
universities were also exempt from military service.
The authorities of the University of Paris exercised a very direct
control from the outset over all the details of the business of making,
renting, and selling books. This authority became in Paris a matter of
much more immediate importance and abiding influence than in
Bologna. In the latter, as we have seen, the business of the book-
dealers was very closely limited to the production of the texts
immediately required for the work of the class-room. In Paris,
however, in the manuscript period, two and a half centuries before
the introduction of the printing-press, the book-trade of the university
had become in great measure the book-trade of the city. During a
large part of this time, moreover, Paris shared with Florence the
position of the centre of the intellectual activities of Europe. The
scribes and their masters who were manifolding manuscripts in the
Latin quarter, were not only supplying text-books to the students of
the university, but were preparing literature for the scholarly readers
of Paris, of France, and of Europe. The book-dealers of Paris
constituted, however, for several centuries, with a few exceptions, a
guild organised within the university. The members of this guild, the
libraires jurés, were members of the university, and the operations of
the guild were under the direct control of the university authorities.
This arrangement gave to the book-dealers material advantages in
the possession of university privileges and in the control of a
practical monopoly of the business of producing books. It involved,
however, certain corresponding disadvantages. University control
meant supervision, censorship, restriction, regulation of prices,
interference with trade facilities, and various hampering conditions
which delayed very seriously, both before and after the introduction
of printing, the development of the business of making and of
circulating books, and, as a result of this, placed not a few obstacles
in the way of the literary and the intellectual development of the
community. Chevillier says: “The book-trade of Paris owes its origin
to the university, by which, under the approval of the king, it was
organised into an association of masters. This association was, from
the outset, controlled directly by the university, from the authorities of
which it received its statutes and regulations, and by which the
master libraires were licensed, jurés.”[276]
“The reproduction of a work of scholarship (to which class
belonged of necessity the text-books prescribed for the work of the
university,)” remarks Delalain, “called for on the part of the scribe a
considerable measure of scholarly knowledge and also for a detailed
and careful supervision. It was held, therefore, by the university
authorities that the responsibility properly belonged to them to
supervise the series of operations by means of which these
university texts were prepared and were circulated. It was essential
that the completeness and the correctness of each copy should be
verified, and that these copies should be confided to trustworthy
persons for their sale or their hire, in order that there should be no
risk of inaccuracies in the texts themselves or of any unnecessary
enhancement of the cost to instructors or to students of their
purchase or their hire. On this ground, the university of Paris
asserted from the beginning of its history the right to control the
book-trade of the city, a contention which was confirmed and
maintained by all the kings of France after Philip Augustus.”[277]
The “book-trade” was held to include all the dealers and artisans
who were concerned with the production and distribution of
manuscripts; that is, the copyists and their employers, the binders,
the illuminators, the sellers of parchment, and, later, the
manufacturers of paper. While the control of the university was
exercised over the entire book-trade, the interest of the authorities
was naturally much keener in regard to the divisions having to do
with the production of books than in the work of the booksellers. The
matter of chief importance, in fact, according to the accepted theory,
the sole purpose for the existence of the book-trade, was to secure
for the members of the university a sufficient supply, at a fixed and
moderate charge, of correct and complete texts of the prescribed
works; while it was also essential to protect those members from the
contamination of heretical writings or of heretical comments on
books of accepted orthodoxy.
A regulation of December, 1316, prescribes that no stationarius
shall employ a copyist until such employee shall have been duly
sworn before the university, or before the Rector and four
procureurs, to execute his functions faithfully, and, having been
accepted as a trustworthy scribe, shall have had his name inscribed
on the official register.
As a partial offset to the series of restrictions and limitations under
which was carried on the work of these early publishers, it is in order
to specify certain privileges and exemptions enjoyed by them as
members of the university. These included exemption from taxes;
exemption from service on the watch or on the city guard; and the
privilege of jurisdiction, commonly known as committimus. Under this
last, they were empowered in suits or cases, civil or personal, and
whether engaged as plaintiffs or defendants, to bring witnesses or
other principals before the Juges Conservateurs, functionaries
charged with the maintenance or protection of privileges.[278]
Issues concerning personal rights arising between the members of
the university were decided before the tribunal or court of the Rector.
Cases affecting realty, and all cases between the members and
outsiders, were tried before the Conservateurs des Priviléges, an
authority of necessity favourably disposed to the members of the
university. The ground assigned for this privilege was that instructors
and pupils, and those engaged in aiding their work (i. e. the makers
of books), should not be exposed to loss of valuable time by being
called away from their work to distant parts.[279] An edict of Philip
Augustus, in 1200, confirmed by S. Louis in 1229, and by Philip the
Fair in 1302, directed that the cases of university members be
brought before the Bishop of Paris. The university found
disadvantages in being under the jurisdiction of the Bishop (whose
censorship later proved particularly troublesome for the publishers),
and applications were made to replace the authority of the
ecclesiastical courts with that of the royal courts. In 1334, letters-
patent of Philip of Valois directed the provost of Paris, who was at
that time conservateur of the royal privileges, to take the university
under his special protection, and in 1341 the members of the
university were forbidden to enter proceedings before any other
authority. In 1361, under an edict of King John, the members of the
university were again declared exempt from taxes and assessments
of all kinds (portes, gabelles, impositions, aides, et subsides). The
repetition from reign to reign of certain edicts and regulations such
as the above does not imply that the earlier ones had been recalled,
but that they had to some extent fallen into desuetude, or that
attempts had been made to override them.
By letters-patent issued in 1369, Charles V. declared that all
dealers in books and makers of books required for the use of “our
scholars” should be exempt from all taxes, etc. The exemption
included binders, illuminators, parchment-makers, etc. It appears
that some abuses had crept in under this exemption, as in 1384 it
was ordered that no book-dealers should be freed from taxes if they
carried on for gain any other occupation.[280]
The policy of favouring the production and sale of books by freeing
the publishers and dealers from taxes and other burdens was
continued and even developed after the introduction of printing. The
kings, impressed with the possibilities of this great discovery,
recognised that it was for the interest of the realm to free books,
printed or written, not only from octroi or city duties, but from
customs or importation charges. Letters-patent of Henry II., dated
1553, read as follows: Avons ordonné et ordonnons lesdits livres,
escrits ou imprimez, reliez ou non reliez, estre et demeurer exempts
desdits droits de traicte foraine, Domaine forain et haut passage.[281]
This was a more liberal policy than at that time prevailed in Italy or in
England, or, in fact, than has as yet been accepted in the nineteenth
century by the United States. In order to obtain the advantage of
such exemption, the publishers had to secure from the Rector of the
university a passport or certificate for their packages.
One of the earlier regulations of the university affecting the book-
trade was that under which the supervision of the sale of parchment
was left in the hands of the Rector. This sale was usually authorised
only at the annual Lendit fair. The dealers, bringing their parchment,
exposed this for inspection. Before any other purchases were
permitted, the Rector selected the quantity needed for the university,
for which payment was made at a price fixed in advance. He then
received from the parchment-dealers, for the treasury of the
university, or for the special fund of the book guild, a gratuity which
amounted to from two thousand to three thousand francs.
In Paris, as in Bologna, during the whole of the thirteenth century
and the first portion of the fourteenth, the principal work of the
university book-dealers was not the selling but the renting of books.
The regulations concerning the division of manuscripts into chapters
or peciæ were, however, not carried out with the same precision in
Paris as in the Italian universities, nor was it practicable to exercise
in the larger city, or even within the confines of the Latin Quarter, as
close a supervision as in Bologna or Padua over the rates for renting
and over the stock of copies kept by the stationarii. The general
purpose of the regulations was, however, the same, and the routine
of renting prices and the general rate of commission on the books
sold were, as said, matters of university regulation. With a
community of students ranging in number from ten thousand to (in
the most prosperous days of the university) as high as thirty
thousand, the monopoly of supplying text-books, whether through
sale or through renting, must have constituted an important
business. It was not until some time after the introduction of printing
that the importance and prospect of profit of publishing done outside
of the university limits, and freed from a portion of the university
restrictions, came to be sufficient to make it worth while for certain of
the more enterprising of the printers to give up the trade in text-
books and their privileges as libraires jurés and to establish
themselves as independent dealers.
In the University of Paris we find in use in the twelfth century, in
addition to the terms librarii, stationarii, and petiarii, the term
mangones. The word mango originally designated a merchant or
dealer, but appears to have carried an implication of
untrustworthiness or slipperiness. It is satisfactory, therefore, to
understand that mangones very speedily went out of use as a name
for dealers in books.[282] The petiarii are not mentioned in the
statutes of the university, where they appear to be replaced by the
parcheminii.[283]
Guérard interprets the term stationarius as standing first for a
scribe with a fixed location (un écrivain sédentaire), as opposed to a
copyist who was prepared to accept work in any place where it could
be secured. Later, the term was understood to designate a master
scribe who directed the work of a bureau of copyists; and still later,
the stationarius, sometimes then called stationarius librorum,
possessed a complete book-making establishment, where were
employed, in addition to the copyists, the illuminators, binders, and
other artisans. At this stage of his development, the stationarius has
become the equivalent of the printer-publisher of a later generation.
Guérard is inclined to limit the earlier use in Paris of the term
librarius to the keeper of a shop in which books were kept for sale,
but in which no book-production was carried on.[284] It is evident,
however, that in France, as in Italy, there was no very definite or
consistent use of the several terms, and that before the introduction
of printing, librarius and stationarius were applied almost indifferently
to dealers having to do either with the production or with the sale of
books. Chassant is authority for the statement that at the time of the
introduction of printing into France there were in the two cities of
Paris and Orleans more than ten thousand individual scribes or
copyists who gained their living with their pens.[285] It is not
surprising that the first printers, whose diabolical invention took the
bread away from these workers, had their lives threatened and their
work interrupted.
The letters-patent of Charles V., dated November 5, 1368, specify
fourteen libraires and eleven écrivains (employing stationarii) as at
that time registered in Paris. No one was admitted to the profession
of librarius or stationarius who was not a man of approved standing
and character, and who had not also given evidence of an adequate
and scholarly knowledge of manuscript interpretation and of the
subject to which he proposed to give attention. The examination was
made before the four chief publishers (les quatre grands libraires).
Having secured the approval of the board of publishers, the applicant
was obliged to secure also acceptance from the representatives of
the Rector, and to submit certain guarantees for the satisfactory
performance of his responsibilities. He was called upon to submit, for
himself and heirs, all his property as well as his person to the control
of the court of Paris as a pledge for the execution of his trust. As late
as 1618, in the reign of Charles IX., the master printers (i. e., printer-
publishers) were obliged to hold certificates from the Rector and the
university, to the effect that they were skilled in the art of printing,
and that they possessed full knowledge of Latin and of Greek.
The libraires jurés comprised two classes, the libraires grands
(officium magni librariatus), and the libraires petits (officium parvi
librariatus).[286] The immediate responsibility for the government of
the body rested with the four chief libraires (les quatre grands
libraires). It was they who fixed the prices for the sale or hire of
manuscripts, and who supervised the examination of manuscripts
with reference, first, as to their admission into the official list of the
university texts, and, secondly, as to the completeness and accuracy
of the particular parchment submitted. They also inspected the book-
shops and the workrooms of the copyists, and verified from time to
time the accuracy and the quality of the copies prepared from these
accepted texts; they passed upon the qualifications of applicants for
the position of libraire juré; and, finally, they exercised a general
supervision over the enforcement of all the university regulations
affecting the book-trade, and gave special attention to those
prohibiting any interference with this trade by an outside dealer, one
who was not a libraire juré. These four chief libraires were each
under a bond or “caution” for the amount of 200 livres. In addition to
the exemption from general taxes and guard duty conceded to all the
libraires jurés, these four enjoyed from time to time certain special
privileges. In October, 1418, by a regulation of Charles VI., the four
chief libraires are exempted by name from certain special duties on
wine, etc., which had been imposed for the purpose of securing
funds pour la recouvrance de nos Villes et Chastel de Monstreau ou
Faut-Yonne.[287] It was also necessary for him to find two
responsible bondsmen for an amount of not less than 100 livres
each.[288][289] In Bologna in 1400 the bond was also fixed at 200
livres, the equivalent of 5065 francs.[290]
The special obligations imposed upon and accepted by the librarii
and stationarii, as specified in documents between the years 1250
and 1350, can be summarised as follows:
I. To accept faithfully and loyally all the regulations of the university
concerning the production and the sale of books.
II. Not to make within the term of one month any agreement, real
or nominal, transferring to themselves the ownership of books which
had been placed in their hands for sale.
III. Not to permit the loss or disappearance of any book so
consigned for the purpose later of acquiring ownership of the same.
IV. To declare conscientiously and exactly the just and proper price
of each book offered for sale, and to specify such price, together with
the name of the owner, in some conspicuous place in the work itself.
V. To make no disposition of a consigned book without having in
the first place informed the owner or his representative of the price to
be secured for the same, and to make immediate report and
accounting of such price when received.
VI. To charge as commission for the service of selling such book
not more than four deniers to a member of the university and not
more than six deniers to an outsider. This commission was to be
paid by the purchaser, who seems to have been considered the
obliged party in the transaction.[291]
VII. To place conspicuously in the windows of their shops a price
list of all works kept on sale.
The stationarii on their part were also held:
I. To employ no scribes for the production of manuscripts other
than those who had been accepted and certified before the Rector.
II. To offer for sale or for hire no manuscripts that had not been
passed upon and “taxed” by the appointed authority.
III. To refuse to no applicant who was a member of the university
the loan for hire of a manuscript, even though the applicant should
require the same for the purpose of producing copies.
It is evident that a regulation of this character would, in the case of
an original work by a contemporary author, have operated as a
denial of any author’s rights. Such original work constituted,
however, at this time the very rare exception, and their authors were
evidently obliged to content themselves with the prestige of securing
circulation. The case of a manuscript representing outlay and skilled
labour on the part of the dealer, who might have had to make a
toilsome journey to secure it, and who had later paid for the service
of one or more editors for its collation and revision, was, of course, of
much more frequent occurrence. It is difficult to understand why this
class of effort and enterprise should not have been encouraged by
the university authorities instead of being so largely nullified by
regulations which made of such a manuscript common property. This
regulation is, however, identical with that of Bologna. The penalty
there for refusing to place a manuscript at the service of a member
of the university was five livres.[292]
IV. To offer for rent no texts that were not complete and correct.
V. In the event of a work being brought to Paris by a stranger, to
give immediate information to the authorities in order that before
such work could be copied for hire or for sale it should be passed
upon by the authorities as orthodox and as suitable for the use of the
members of the university, and as being complete and correct in its
own text.
Any libraire who, having been duly sworn, should be convicted of
violation of these regulations, forfeited his office, and all the rights
and privileges thereto appertaining; and all members of the
university, instructors or students, were strictly prohibited (under
penalty of forfeiture of their own membership) from having further
dealings with such a delinquent.[293]
These various regulations, while possibly required in connection
with the general interests of the university, were certainly exacting
and must have interfered not a little with any natural development of
the book-trade. It is nevertheless the case that the makers of books
and the book-dealers in Paris occupied a more independent and a
more dignified position than had been accorded to their brethren in
Bologna. The latter appear to have risen hardly above the grade of
clerks or lower-class functionaries, while these earlier Parisian
publishers secured from the outset recognition as belonging to the
higher educational work of the university, work in the shaping of
which they themselves took an important part.
In 1316 (the year of the accession of Philip V.) the association of
libraires jurés (authorised or certified book-dealers) comprised but
thirteen members.[294] A year earlier there had been twenty-two, and
I can only assume that the war troubles had had their natural
influence in depressing and breaking up the book business. In 1323,
the list comprises twenty-nine names, including the widow of De
Peronne. In 1368, the number had again fallen to twenty-five. In
1488, the university list gives the names of twenty-four libraires, in
addition to whom were registered two illuminators, two binders, and
two écrivains.[295] The écrivains specified were undoubtedly master
scribes, the register here quoted apparently not including the names
of the copyists employed. At this date, however, the work of the
printers had been going on in Paris for fourteen years, and the
business of those concerned with the production of books in
manuscript form must have been very largely reduced. The work of
the master scribes continued, however, in the sixteenth century, but
by the close of the fifteenth had become limited to the production, for
collectors, of manuscripts as works of art.
While the majority of libraires jurés were naturally Frenchmen,
there was no regulation to prevent the holding of such a post by a
foreigner, and the list always, as a matter of fact, included several
foreign names. The presence in the university of large groups of
foreign students made it quite in order, and probably necessary, that
they should find among the book-dealers some who could speak
their home language and who could make clear to them the
requirements concerning the university texts. The presence of these
foreign book-dealers also facilitated the arrangements for the
exchange of manuscripts between Paris and foreign universities.
These foreign book-dealers, while obliged in ordinary routine to take
an oath of fealty to the university, were not called upon to become
citizens of France.
The list includes from time to time the names of women libraires,
these women being usually widows of libraires who had duly
qualified themselves. The women must themselves, however, in
order to secure such appointments, have been able to pass the
examination in Latin, in palæography, and in the technicalities of
manuscript book-making. In respect as well to the admission of
foreigners as to that of women, the Paris guild of the university book-
dealers practised a more liberal policy than that followed by the
university authorities of Bologna or the Stationers’ Hall of London.
Later, this liberal policy was restricted, and in 1686 it was ordered
that no foreigners should be admitted to the lists of the master
libraires of the university.
The purchase of a manuscript during the fourteenth century was
attended with almost as many formalities and precautions as are to-
day considered necessary for the transfer of a piece of real estate.
The dealer making the sale was obliged to give to the purchaser
guarantees to the effect, first, that he was himself the owner or the
duly authorised representative of the owner of the work; and,
secondly, that the text of this was complete and correct, and as
security for these guarantees he pledged his goods, and sometimes
even his person. As a single example of a transaction illustrating this
practice, I quote a contract cited by Du Breuil. This bears date
November, 1332, and sets forth that a certain Geoffrey de Saint
Léger, a duly qualified clerc libraire, acknowledges and confesses
that he has sold, ceded, and transferred to the noble gentleman
Messire Gérard de Montagu, Avocat du Roi au Parlement
(counsellor at the royal court), all right, title, and interest in a work
entitled Speculum Historiale in consuetudines Parisienses, contained
in four volumes bound in red leather. The consideration named is
forty livres Parisian, the equivalent, according to the tables of de
Wailly, of 1013 francs. The vendor pledges as security for the
obligation under the contract all his worldly goods, together with his
own person (tous et chacun de ses biens, et guarantie de son corps
même), and the contract is attested before two notaries.[296]
While the university assumed the strictest kind of control and
supervision over the work of the book-dealers, it conceded, as an
offset, to the association of these dealers a very substantial
monopoly of the trade of making and selling books. It was prohibited,
under severe penalties, for a person not a libraire juré to do business
in a book-shop or at any fixed stand; that is to say, he could not sell
as a stationnaire, but had to carry on his trade as a pedlar or chap-
man, from a pack or a cart. The value of the manuscript that such
pedlar was permitted to offer for sale was restricted to ten sous, the
equivalent of half a franc. At the price at which manuscripts were
held during the fourteenth century, this limitation restricted the trade
of the peripatetic vendors to single sheets, or broadsides, containing
usually a Pater, an Ave, or a Credo, or a brief calendar or
astrological table. Successive edicts were issued from reign to reign,
renewing the prohibition upon the selling of books, whether in French
or Latin (excepting only of such maximum value), by any drapers,
grocers, pedlars, or dealers of any kind.[297]
In all the official references of the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries to the book-dealers, the ground is taken that they formed a
class apart from mechanics or from traders in ordinary merchandise.
They were considered to be engaged in an intellectual pursuit, and
were treated as members of a profession upon whose service the
work of the university and that of the Church were largely dependent.
Thus in 1649 the Recueil makes use of these words:
Les Marchands-Libraires, Imprimeurs et Relieurs seront toujours
censés du corps de nostre bien aymée fille aisnée l’Université; du
tout séparés des arts méchaniques, et autres Corps de Mestiers ou
marchandises; et come tels, conservés en la jouissance de tous les
droicts; priviléges, franchises, libertez, préséances et prérogatives
attribuées à ladite université et à eux par les Royes nos
prédécesseux et par nous.[298]
It was, therefore, not permitted to the libraire to bring discredit
upon his profession by also engaging in any “sordid pursuits” (viles
occupations), and in so doing he rendered himself liable to being
deposed from his high post (declaré déchu de son noble office). He
could, however, unite with his work as libraire that of a notary, or that
of a royal counsellor or practitioner in the higher court (avocat du roi
au Parlement).
Notwithstanding the personal prestige and the substantial
advantages which were thus enjoyed by the book-dealers of the
university, there were from time to time instances of protest,
amounting occasionally to insubordination, on the part of the
libraires, who, as their business aims and possibilities developed,
became restive under the long series of trammels and restrictions,
and particularly in connection with those imposed by the
ecclesiastical division of the university authorities. The dread,
however, of losing any portion of their privileges, and particularly the
risk of any impairment of their monopoly of the book-trade of the
university and of Paris, operated always as a sufficient consideration
to prevent the insubordination from going to extremes. Throughout
the entire period of the Middle Ages the control of the university
continued, therefore, practically absolute over the book-trade of
Paris, the influence of the Church and the (more or less spasmodic)
authority of the Crown being exercised by means of the university
machinery.
This state of affairs continued for some period of years after the
introduction of printing. The university still insisted upon its
responsibility for the correctness and the completeness of the texts
issued from the Paris press, although it gave up of necessity the
routine of examining individual copies of the printed editions. On the
other hand, the censorship control on the part of the theological
Faculty over the moral character and orthodoxy of the works printed
was insisted upon more strenuously than ever as the Church began
to recognise the enormous importance of the influence upon public
opinion of the widely distributed printed volumes. The effect of this
ecclesiastical control upon the business of printing books is set forth
with some detail in the chapter on the early printers of Paris. It is
sufficient to say here that the contention on the part of the university
to control, as a portion of the work of higher education, the business
of the makers and sellers of books, while sharply attacked and
materially undermined after the middle of the seventeenth century,
was not formally abandoned until the beginning of the eighteenth. At
this time the Crown took over to itself all authority to regulate the
press, an authority which disappeared only with the revolution of
1789.
For six centuries the book-trade of Paris and of France, whether it
consisted in the production of manuscripts for the exclusive use of
members of the university, or of printed books for the enlightenment
of the general public, had been obliged to do its work under the
hampering and burdensome regulations and restrictions of a varying
series of authorities. The rectors of the university, the theologians of
the Sorbonne, the lawyers of the Parliament of Paris, the chancellors
of the Crown, the kings themselves, had all taken a hand, sometimes
in turn, not infrequently in conflict with each other, in the task of
“regulating” the trade in books. The burden of the restrictions was, in
pretence at least, offset by various privileges and exemptions, but
they remained burdens notwithstanding. It may well be a cause of
surprise that in the face of such a long series of hampering
difficulties, difficulties more serious than those with which any
publishers in the world, outside of Rome, had to contend, the
manuscript publishers and the later printer-publishers of Paris should
have been able to do so much to make Paris a literary and a
publishing centre. As has been already indicated, it was certainly the
case that during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries Paris shared
with Florence the position of being the centre of the manuscript trade
of Europe. It was also the case, as will be set forth in a later chapter,
that the first printer-publishers of Paris did most noteworthy work in
furthering the development of scholarly publishing and the
production of scholarly books. It required, however, the revolution of
1789 to establish the principle that the business of producing and
distributing books could secure its legitimate development only when
freed from censorship restrictions and regulations, and that it was a
business the control of which belonged properly not to the university,
the Courts of Parliament, or the Crown, but to the people
themselves.
Considering the scarcity and the costliness of books in the Middle
Ages, it is somewhat surprising that the work of instruction rested so
directly upon books, that is, depended upon the mastery of a text.
Thurot says: “It is the distinctive character of instruction in the Middle
Ages that the science was not taught directly and in itself, but by the
explanation of books which derived their authority solely from their
writers.”[299] Roger Bacon formulates it: “When one knows the text,
one knows all that concerns the science which is the object of the
text.”[300] Instead of taking a course of logic or of ethics, says
Compayré, the phrase was reading a book on logic or ethics, legere
or audire librum. This close adherence to the text secured, of course,
an assured demand in the university towns first for the hired pecias
and later for the purchased manuscripts.
The foundation of the College of the Sorbonne dates from 1257. It
was organised by Robert de Sorbon, chaplain to Louis IX. The
college was at once affiliated with the University of Paris, of which it
became the theological Faculty, and in the general direction of which
it exercised at times a controlling influence. The college is connected
with my subject on the ground of its assumption of the theological
censorship of the Paris book-trade and of its frequent attempts to
exercise a general censorship over all the productions of the Paris
printing-press.
As we shall note later in the history of the Paris book-trade,
various complications arose between the publishers and booksellers
possessing a university license (the libraires jurés) and certain
unlicensed dealers who undertook to come into competition with
them. The locality occupied by these unlicensed booksellers was on
the Island of the Cité, immediately by the precincts of Notre Dame. In
fact it was the case with the book-trade generally north of the Alps
that its business was very largely carried on in the portals of a
church if not under the immediate shadow of the cathedral.
While in Italy the Church furthered but slightly the early production
of books and, later, did not a little to hamper the undertakings of the
publishers, it was the case in France and quite largely also in South
Germany, that the publishers found themselves very largely
dependent upon the scholarly interests and the scholarly co-
operation of the clerics, and the association of the Church with the
book-trade was, for a large proportion at least of the fifteenth
century, an important one.
In Paris, the booksellers licensed by the university were all in the
Latin Quarter, and in the same region were to be found the sellers of
parchment, the illuminators, the scribes, binders, etc., who also
carried university licenses and were under university supervision. It
is probable that the specification in the Tax Roll of 1292 of eight
librarii in Paris refers only to the booksellers licensed by the
university and carrying on their business in the Latin Quarter.
In Bayeux, in 1250, certain clerics were exempted from taxation if
they dealt in parchment or if they were engaged in the copying of
manuscripts, and the book-shops along the walls of the cathedral
were also exempt from taxation. It is not clear to me in looking up
this record, whether the tax mentioned was a town tax or a general
tax, or whether it was one of the ecclesiastical levies.[301]
Roger Bacon’s reference to the scribes of Paris has already been
mentioned. He could not secure from the Brothers of his Order a
transcript of his work which he desired to present to Pope Clement,
because they were too ignorant to write the same out intelligently,
while he was afraid to confide the work to the public scribes of
France lest they might make improper use of the material.[302] It is
Wattenbach’s opinion that the wrongful use of his production
dreaded by Bacon was the sale of unauthorised copies of it by the
scribes to whom the preparation of the authorised copies should be
confided.
In 1292, Wenzel, King of Bohemia, presented to the monastery of
Königsaal, 200 marks in silver for the purchase of books, and the
purchases were made from the book-sellers in Paris. Richard de
Bury extols Paris as the great centre of the book-trade. Of the value
of the book collections in Rome and the possibility there of securing
literary treasures, he had already spoken, but the treasures of Paris
appear to have impressed him still more keenly. There he found
occasion to open his purse freely and took in exchange for base
gold, books of inestimable value. Joh. Gerson, in his treatise De
Laude Scriptorum expresses the dread lest the persistent carrying
away from Florence of his books by wealthy visitors may not too
seriously diminish its literary treasures.
The Paris publishers appear to have sent out travelling salesmen
or representatives to take orders for their wares. As early as 1480, a
publisher named Guillaume Tousé, of Paris, made complaint to the
chancellor of Brittany to the effect that he had entrusted a
commission to a certain Guillaume de l’Espine to carry books into
Lower Brittany and to make sale of the same during a period of six
months. He had taken with him books to the value of five hundred
livres and was to have a salary of ten crowns for the six months’
work. He had, however, failed to return or to make report of his
commission. Tousé secured a judgment against his delinquent
traveller, but the record does not show whether he ever succeeded
in getting hold of him again.[303]
In the universities of Oxford and of Cambridge, the stationarii
began their work some years later than in Paris or Bologna. They
had the advantage, however, of freedom from the greater portion of
the restrictions and special supervision which hampered the work of
the scribes in the Italian and French universities, and as a result their
business developed more promptly and more actively, and in the
course of a few years, they became the booksellers of the university
towns. It was, of course, from this university term stationarii that the
name of stationers came at the outset to be applied to the organised
book-dealers of Great Britain. The Guild of the British book-dealers
completed its organisation in 1403, nearly sixty years before the
introduction into England of the printing-press.[304]
The art work put into the manuscripts produced in the Low
Countries, particularly in Belgium, was more highly developed and
was a more important part of the industry than was the case in any
other portion of the world.
In the earlier German universities, the stationarii also found place
and found work, but this work seems to have been of less
importance and the scribes appear to have secured for themselves a
less definite university recognition than in Italy or in France. The
explanation given by Wattenbach is that the German students, being

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Philosophy: the quest for truth Tenth

Moral Philosophy Fourth Edition Pojman

An Unnatural History Of Religions Academia Post Truth

Westworld and philosophy if you go looking for the

Westworld and Philosophy If You Go Looking for the

The Quest for Artificial Intelligence Nils Nilsson

Consilience Truth and the Mind of God Science

The Scientific Truth, the Whole Truth and Nothing But

Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong Louis P. Pojman

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Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© 2017, 2014, 2012, 2009, 2006, 2003 by Oxford University Press

For titles covered by Section 112 of the US Higher Education

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Pojman, Louis P., editor. | Vaughn, Lewis, editor.

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II. Philosophy of Religion 55

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The Teleological Argument

III. Knowledge 191

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III.C. Feminist Perspectives on Knowledge 259

IV. Philosophy of Mind: The Mind-Body Problem 287

V. Freedom of the Will and Determinism 389

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Key Terms 432

VI. Ethics 435

VII. Political Philosophy and Justice 569

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72. John Rawls: The Contemporary Liberal Answer 598

VIII. What Is the Meaning of Life? 629

IX. Contemporary Moral Problems 675

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IX.C. Should Society Permit Same-Sex Marriage? 747

Appendix: How to Read and Write Philosophy Papers 785

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I mproveme n t s i n the T e n th E dition

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Philosophers Dates Major Figures and Events

T H E M E DI EVA L PER IOD

Philosophers Dates Major Figures and Events

*Philosophers whose names apperar in boldface appear in this volume.

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T H E M E DI EVA L PER IOD

Philosophers Dates Major Figures and Events

T H E MODER N PER IOD

Philosophers Dates Major Figures and Events

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T H E MODER N PER IOD

Philosophers Dates Major Figures and Events

Philosophers Dates Major Figures and Events

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Philosophers Dates Major Figures and Events

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The unexamined life is not worth living.

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Philosophy’s sphere of interest is vast, encompassing fundamental beliefs drawn from

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