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Spinoza on Reason, Passions,

and the Supreme Good
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 26/11/2019, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 26/11/2019, SPi

Spinoza on Reason,
Passions, and the
Supreme Good

Andrea Sangiacomo

1
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 26/11/2019, SPi

3
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Contents

Acknowledgements vii
List of Abbreviations ix

Introduction l
Li Theme 1
1.2 Approach 3
l.3 Contents 11

1 The Path Towards the Supreme Good in the

Treatise on the Emendation 15
1.1Introduction 15
1.2The Supreme Good 17
1.3Social Factors and the Supreme Good 20
1.4What Are the Passions? 30
1.5An Intellectual Virtuous Circle 33
1.6Truth and Certainty 39
1.7Conclusion 48
2 Passions and Reason in the Short Treatise 50
2.1 Intrnduction 50
2.2 Passions and Inadequate Ideas 51
2.3 The Passive Nature of the Intellect 54
2,4 The Epistemic Remedy for the Passions 60
2.5 The Problem of Superstition 65
2.6 The Limits of Spinoza's Early Ethics 69
2.7 Conclusion 73
3 A Passionate Path Towards the Supreme Good in
the Theological-Political Treatise 75
3.1 Introduction 75
3.2 Vicious and Virtuous Circles 76
3.3 The Problem of Salvation 84
3.4 Obedience as a Means of Achieving the Supreme Good 87
3.5 The Virtue of the Prophets 95
3.6 The instrumentalist Reading and the Scholarly Debate 101
3.7 Conclusion 109

4 Common Notions in the Ethics 110

4.1 Introduction 110
4.2 The Problem of the Origin of Reason 112
4.3 Mereology, Laws, and Agreement in Nature 118
4.4 Agreement in Nature and Common Notions 127
4.5 Universal and Proper Common Notions 130
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 26/11/2019, SPi

Acknowledgements

The intuition at the heart of this book came to me during the summer of . I was
finishing my PhD dissertation about the evolution of Spinoza’s conatus doctrine from
the early writings to the Ethics, and I felt that something was missing in my
discussion. I was pointing to a major change in Spinoza’s thought, but I was not
explaining why Spinoza made this change. One morning, while I was out for a run on
the hills that surround my hometown, Genoa (Italy), I realized that Spinoza must
have been aware that without the conatus doctrine he could not have explained the
phenomenon of religious superstition. Eventually, I decided not to address this issue
in my dissertation nor in the book that issued from that (L’essenza del corpo, G. Olms,
). A few months later, in April , I arrived for the first time in Spinoza’s
homeland, the Netherlands, at the University of Groningen. There, I started planning
a new book—this book. Since then, I have explored the implications of the intuition
which I had that morning.
I could not have written this book without the atmosphere of mutual respect,
esteem, and philosophical friendship with which I was welcomed at the Faculty of
Philosophy at Groningen, and at the Department of History of Philosophy in
particular. That atmosphere grew stronger over the years while our group consoli-
dated and expanded. I am particularly indebted to Martin Lenz, who had sufficient
trust in me to let me come to Groningen and who then supported me during all
subsequent stages of my career. I am also deeply grateful to all my colleagues at
Groningen, with whom I discussed parts of this book at different stages of the writing
process. I would like to thank, in particular, Han Thomas Adriaenssen, Sander de
Boer, Bianca Bosman, Eddo Evink, Laura Georgescu, Lodi Nauta, Tamer Nawar,
Detlev Pätzold, and Doina Rusu for their extremely helpful feedback and enriching
exchanges, and for all the time we spent together immerged in philosophical and
historical discussions. I am grateful to Aurelia Armstrong, Herman de Dijn, Keith
Green, Helen Hattab, Karolina Hübner, Matt Kisner, Oberto Marrama, Ohad Nacht-
omy, Michael della Rocca, Emily Thomas, and Francesco Toto for very helpful
comments on previous versions of several parts of this book. I am also grateful to a
number of anonymous referees for both pointing out the weaknesses of previous
versions of my manuscript and for providing constructive suggestions to develop its
strengths further.
In Chapter , Section ., I have rewritten some materials that originally appeared
in my paper ‘Fixing Descartes: ethical intellectualism in Spinoza’s early writings’
(Southern Journal of Philosophy,  (), , –, Wiley–Blackwell). In
Chapter , Section ., I have reworked parts of my paper ‘Before the conatus
doctrine: Spinoza’s correspondence with Willem van Blijenbergh (Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie,  (), , –, De Gruyter). Some parts of
Chapter  are derived from the last section of my paper ‘The ontology of determin-
ation: From Descartes to Spinoza’ (Science in Context,  (), –, , ©
Cambridge University Press, reproduced with permission). I would like to thank
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viii 

the editors and publishers of these journals for allowing me to rework these materials
in this book.
I wrote this book across two research projects, both based at the Faculty of
Philosophy at Groningen. I began the book when I was a postdoc in Martin Lenz’s
project ‘Naturalism and teleology in Spinoza’s philosophy’ (–), funded by the
Fritz Thyssen Stiftung. However, I wrote and rewrote the most substantial parts of it
during my own NWO veni research project ‘Occasionalism and the secularization of
early modern science: Understanding the dismissal of divine action during the
scientific revolution’ (–). I am grateful to both funding agencies for having
contributed substantially to support my research during these years.
When the book was already in the making, I stumbled upon a detail of the frescoes
‘Stories of Ulysses’ by Pellegrino Tibaldi in Palazzo Poggi (Bologna, -). In one
of his scenes, Tibaldi depicted a particularly intense Aeolus, which to me appeared as
an inspiring image of the prophets that Spinoza discussed in his Theological-Political
Treatise. I sent this picture to Thomas Colbourne, who took inspiration from it and
produced his own artistic interpretation of a Spinozistic prophet, which is now on the
cover of this book. As Thomas himself captions his painting: ‘resting and in motion, a
figure comprised of lines, planes, and bodies is arranged and rearranged, embodying
particularity and expressing divinity.’ I am very thankful to Thomas for his gener-
osity in sharing his artwork.
Finally, I would like to dedicate this book to Daniela Benvenuti. Daniela was my
philosophy teacher in high school, and it is thanks to her that I decided to devote
my life to philosophy. When I was finishing my bachelor’s degree she insisted that
I should study Spinoza and that I would like it. Although I was rather sceptical at
first, I gave Spinoza a try. Daniela followed my path all along, and she constantly
encouraged me with wit and pragmatism. I hope that this book will serve as a witness
to the gratitude I shall always have for what I learned and will continue to learn
from her.

September  Groningen

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List of Abbreviations

Spinoza’s works
TIE Tractatus de intellectus emendatione, in B. Spinoza, Oeuvres I, Premiers
écrits, texte établi par F. Mignini. Paris: Puf, , pp. –. English
translation in C.
KV Korte Verhandeling van God de Mensch en deszelvs welstand, in
B. Spinoza, Oeuvres I, Premiers écrits, texte établi par F. Mignini. Paris:
Puf, , pp. –. English translation in C.
PPC/CM Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae and Cogitata Metaphysica, in Spinoza
Opera, im Auftrag der Heidelberg Akademie des Wissenschaften, hrsg.
von C. Gebhardt,  vols. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, . English transla-
tion in C.
TTP Tractatus Theologico-Politicus/Traité Théologico-Politique, texte établi
par F. Akkerman, traduction et notes par J. Lagrée et P. F. Moreau. Paris:
Puf, . English translation in B. Spinoza, Theological-Political Trea-
tise, translated by Michael Silverthorne and Jonathan Israel, edited by
Jonathan Israel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, .
E Ethica more geometrico demonstrata, in Spinoza Opera, im Auftrag der
Heidelberg Akademie des Wissenschaften, hrsg. von C. Gebhardt,  vols.
Heidelberg: Carl Winter, . English translation in C.
TP Tractactus Politicus/Traité Politique, texte établi par O. Proietti, traduc-
tion, introduction, notes, glossaires, index et bibliographies par
C. Ramond, notice de P. F. Moreau sur la réception du TP, notes
d’A. Matheron. Paris: Puf, . English translation in C.
Ep Epistolae, in Spinoza Opera, im Auftrag der Heidelberg Akademie des
Wissenschaften, hrsg. von C. Gebhardt,  vols. Heidelberg: Carl Winter,
. English translation in C and C.
C The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. , translated and edited by Edwin
Curley. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, .
C The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. , translated and edited by Edwin
Curley. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, .

Internal abbreviations
AD definitions of affects (E)
adn annotation
app appendix
ax axiom
c corollary
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x   

def definition
dial dialogue (KV)
dem demonstration
expl explanation
l lemma
p proposition
post postulate
pref preface
s Scholium
In references to Spinoza’s works, the first number after the title abbreviation refers
to the part or chapter of the work, and the subsequent number refers to paragraphs
or sections within that chapter or part. For example, ‘TP, ’ refers to Tractatus
Politicus, chapter , section . In the case of TIE and KV, numbers preceded by ‘§’
indicate section numbers. For example, ‘KV, , §’ refers to Korte Verhandeling,
part , chapter , section .
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 26/11/2019, SPi

Je vous voudrais encore voir définir les passions, pour les bien connaître; car ceux
qui les nomment perturbations de l’âme, me persuaderaient que leur force ne
consiste qu’à éblouir et soumettre la raison, si l’expérience ne me montrait qu’il y
en a qui nous portent aux actions raisonnables.
Elisabeth to Descartes,  September 

Nous ne cherchons à connaître que parce que nous désirons de jouir, et il n’est
pas possible de concevoir pourquoi celui qui n’aurait ni désirs ni craintes se
donnerait la peine de raisonner.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur l’origine et les fondements
des inégalités parmi les hommes, I, sect. 
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 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 26/11/2019, SPi

Introduction

I. Theme
In his Second Discourse, Jean-Jacques Rousseau claims: ‘we seek to know because we
desire to enjoy, and it is not possible to conceive why someone who had neither
desires nor fears would take the trouble to reason.’¹ This statement is particularly
provocative because, since antiquity, reason has been often conceived as somehow
contrary to desires and passions. Far from supporting reason, passions and desires
have often been presented as something that should be restrained and mastered
through the power of rational knowledge. In fact, whether and how passions could
possibly aid rationality is not obvious at all. This book deals with the way in which
Spinoza struggled with this issue. Throughout his career, Spinoza consistently iden-
tified the Supreme Good with knowledge, and more specifically with knowledge of
God. However, one of the most pressing ethical issues for Spinoza was in explaining
how individuals can reach the Supreme Good. Spinoza’s approach to this issue
changed significantly over time.
In Spinoza’s early writings (especially in the Treatise on the Emendation of the
Intellect and the Short Treatise on God, Man and his Well-Being), the epistemic self-
sufficiency of the human mind is the cornerstone of his solution to the problem of
how to achieve the Supreme Good. By ‘epistemic self-sufficiency’ I mean that the
mind is equipped by nature with the appropriate epistemic resources necessary to
reach the Supreme Good. Spinoza endorses a form of innatism, according to which
the human mind is endowed with true adequate ideas (including a true adequate idea
of God). The mind can build on this innate knowledge to resist the power of the
passions and devote itself to reach and enjoy the Supreme Good. Epistemic self-
sufficiency does not require that individuals seek the Supreme Good in isolation or
endorse some form of ascetic life. Appropriate social conditions may support the
individual’s pursuit of the Supreme Good. The fact that other individuals share the
Supreme Good somehow amplifies the happiness that results from its achievement.
However, the achievement of the Supreme Good does not necessarily or essentially
depend on these social factors, which can play only a facilitating role in the ethical
enterprise by removing or avoiding impediments on the paths towards the Supreme
Good (for example, by preventing or countering the potential disruptive and dis-
tracting force of the passions that arise from the common way of living).

¹ Rousseau , Second Discourse, part , §, .

Spinoza on Reason, Passions, and the Supreme Good. Andrea Sangiacomo, Oxford University Press ().
© Andrea Sangiacomo.
DOI: ./oso/..
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 26/11/2019, SPi

 

Despite this alleged epistemic self-sufficiency of the mind, actual human

individuals often fail to achieve the Supreme Good. For instance, human beings
do not seem capable of acquiring and directing themselves on the basis of a
knowledge of God that would count as adequate according to Spinoza’s stand-
ards. The rich phenomenology of religious superstition exemplifies the scenario
in which, despite the mind’s innate epistemic resources, individuals seem unable
to progress in the direction that Spinoza’s early writings prescribe. In this context
it becomes difficult to account for this failure, given that Spinoza’s commitment
to the mind’s epistemic self-sufficiency entails that the human mind has in itself
all that is needed to succeed in the pursuit of the Supreme Good. I maintain that
Spinoza directly confronted this problem and that his later works testify a shift
towards a different approach.
In his later writings (the Theological-Political Treatise, the Ethics, and the Political
Treatise), Spinoza emphasizes how certain forms of social cooperation are necessarily
required for the human mind to develop its power of forming adequate ideas and
progress towards the Supreme Good. In this context, Spinoza significantly refines his
account of reason or knowledge of the second kind, which received a less developed
treatment and had a less prominent role in the early writings. Starting from the
Ethics, the mind’s ability to reason is built upon a new doctrine of ‘common notions’,
which I interpret as the mental counterpart of the individual’s causal interactions
based on agreement in nature with external causes. Appropriate external condition-
ings and even certain passions can create positive causal feedback loops able to
support the individual’s striving towards the Supreme Good. I contend that this
new account of reason becomes the cornerstone of Spinoza’s mature ethical project
and of his later political science.
This book thus defends two connected claims. First, from an historical point of
view, I argue that Spinoza’s moral philosophy evolved significantly over time. In his
early writings, Spinoza’s account of the ethical progress towards the Supreme Good
relies mostly on the epistemic self-sufficiency of the mind. In his mature writings,
however, the emphasis shifts significantly towards the mind’s need to rely on
appropriate forms of social cooperation with others. If confronted with Rousseau’s
statement quoted at the beginning of this Introduction, I would expect that the early
Spinoza would have rejected it outright, while the later Spinoza would have sympa-
thized with it.
Second, from a more philosophical point of view, the reading of Spinoza’s later
philosophy which I defend outlines a new way of understanding the relationship
between reason, passions, and social embeddedness. The most common understand-
ing of Spinoza’s account of reason and activity is built on the equation between
rationality, activity, and self-sufficiency on the one hand, and inadequate knowledge,
passivity, and external determinations on the other. Rationality (which expresses the
human mind’s power of thinking adequately) is thereby seen to be a result of the
individual’s epistemic self-sufficiency. To put it bluntly: in order to be rational, one
needs to think independently. My reading of the Ethics departs from this assumption.
On this reading, the human mind could not form adequate ideas of reason if it were
not determined by causal interactions based on agreement in nature between the
individual and the external causes that determine it. I grant that being passive means
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 26/11/2019, SPi

 

being determined by external causes. And yet I deny that when one is determined by
external causes the result will necessarily be inadequate knowledge and passivity.
I label this interpretation a ‘cooperative’ account of reason. As defined in the
Ethics, reason is the mental expression of the way in which the human body interacts
with external causes on the basis of some degree of agreement in nature with them.
Since agreement in nature comes in degrees, reason also comes in degrees. The
greater the agreement, the greater the power of reason to adequately understand
universal features as well as more specific traits of the interacting things. In the case
of human beings, certain kinds of social cooperation are crucial for the development
of reason. Insofar as passions lead to support or foster cooperation, they can be truly
conducive to the improvement of rationality. This view entails that rationality does
not have to be regarded as a requisite that moral agents must possess in order to act
morally, but rather as a skill that expresses their greater or lesser success in cooper-
ating in certain ways. As I shall argue, Spinoza envisages (in his last work, the
Political Treatise) a political science aimed at designing sociopolitical institutions
able to cultivate those passionate conditionings that allow individuals to fully develop
their power of thinking adequately.
By combining a chronological reconstruction of the evolution of Spinoza’s moral
thought with a new philosophical interpretation of his account of reason, this book
aims to benefit the current scholarly debate in at least two major ways. First, my
chronological reconstruction shows that Spinoza’s thought should not be considered
as a static entity, and thus the comparison between his different writings should be
handled carefully. The fact that different writings apparently contain similar claims
does not necessarily mean that Spinoza held the same views throughout. In fact, each
case of similarity deserves its own in-depth treatment, and judgements of similarity
or difference must be finely nuanced and contextualized. While this kind of chrono-
logical reading has already enjoyed much success for other canonical figures (such as
Descartes, Hobbes, Leibniz, and Kant), it is surprising how little it has impacted
Spinoza scholarship so far, especially in the Anglophone world. One of the main
ambitions of this book is to make such a chronological reading more current among
Spinoza scholars.
Second, by historicizing Spinoza’s rationalism as an early phase in the develop-
ment of his thought, and by uncovering a more relational account of reason and the
Supreme Good developed in his later writings, this book offers new evidence and
arguments (both historical and philosophical) for the current rethinking of Spinoza
as an arch rationalist. My cooperative reading of Spinoza’s account of reason and the
Supreme Good suggests that Spinoza can be better qualified as an early modern
defender of a highly relational account of moral progress and human flourishing. For
a full appreciation these two points, I shall present the approach I have followed in
developing my interpretation and how this relates to existing scholarship.

I. Approach
Two ways of reading Spinoza’s works have been common in Spinoza scholarship so
far. On the one hand, it seems possible to focus analytically on relatively small
portions of some of Spinoza’s works and treat them as almost self-standing
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 

expressions of his views on specific issues. For instance, for a long time now, the first
two parts of Spinoza’s Ethics have been considered as containing his ultimate views
about ontology, metaphysics, and epistemology, and his Theological-Political Treatise
has been considered as his main pronouncement in matters of politics and religion.
On the other hand, his whole corpus can be treated as something relatively uniform.
Passages from the early writings can be used to clarify views expressed in the later
writings, and vice versa. This approach presupposes that Spinoza would have
remained committed to the same philosophical positions across his career, although
he adjusted, deepened, and refined them along the way.
The methodology I follow in this book differs from both these approaches. My
reading is chronological, in the sense that I reconstruct Spinoza’s views following
the most plausible chronology usually accepted for his writings. In examining each
of his works in the most plausible chronological order in which they were com-
posed, I aim to uncover what Spinoza intend to show in that precise work (written
at that precise juncture), and how successful he was at that time in achieving his
philosophical goals. I grant that some portions of his writings express his con-
sidered views on certain issues. However, I qualify this claim by stressing that each
work expresses his considered views only at the time in which he wrote it. I do not
presuppose that Spinoza’s corpus is a homogeneous one. Rather, comparing dif-
ferent writings is a way of distinguishing between the conceptual elements that
remain unchanged (or have received only refinements and adjustments), from
those that have instead undergone more substantial rethinking and reshaping.
Before elaborating on the implications of my approach, I shall briefly recall the
main historical data that have been established in the last decades of scholarship
about the chronology of Spinoza’s works.
Spinoza’s early writings include the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, the
Short Treatise, the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy with the Metaphysical Thoughts,
and a number of letters. Among these works, only the Principles of Cartesian
Philosophy (with the Metaphysical Thoughts) were published by Spinoza himself,
under his own name, in . The Treatise on the Emendation was published
posthumously in his Opera Posthuma (), and the Short Treatise was discovered
only in the nineteenth century in a couple of later Dutch translations of an original
(now lost) Latin version. Arguably, Spinoza completed the Short Treatise around
 and initially circulated it among his friends, who translated it into Dutch.²
However, he seems to have abandoned it shortly after its completion. The editors of
his Opera Posthuma did not even mention the existence of the Short Treatise. This
suggests that, once the Ethics was completed in , the Short Treatise was no longer
considered a good representation of Spinoza’s thought.³ Filippo Mignini is among
the scholars who worked most extensively on the chronology of the Treatise on the

² See details in Mignini’s introduction to Spinoza .

³ According to the standard reading of the KV, this work would represent a preparatory draft of
Spinoza’s Ethics. Spinoza abandoned it because he was dissatisfied with its style and decided to expose his
philosophy more geometrico. This explanation is endorsed, for example, by Nadler . See details in
Mignini’s introduction to Spinoza 
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Emendation and the Short Treatise.⁴ In my discussion I accept the results of Mignini’s
research, and maintain that the Treatise on the Emendation was composed around
 and that the Short Treatise was completed around .
The Ethics poses a somehow more difficult case. Spinoza worked on a first draft
of the Ethics between about  and . From a letter sent to Bouwmeester in
 (Ep, C: ) it is possible to infer that this first draft of the Ethics had a
different structure from the final version, since it was divided only into three parts.⁵
Spinoza’s correspondence also testifies that, in , he began the composition of the
Theological-Political Treatise (Ep, C: –). This work occupied him until ,
when the treatise was finally published. However, the final version of the Ethics was
not ready for publication until July  (Ep, C: ); but even then, Spinoza
withdrew it from publication, and it was eventually published in the Opera Posthuma
in . There is no direct evidence of whether Spinoza continued to work on the
Ethics between  and , while he was composing the Theological-Political
Treatise. However, he considered his work on the manuscript of the Ethics to be
concluded only in ; that is, after he had already published the Theological-
Political Treatise.⁶ Since by ‘Ethics’ I refer only to the last version that Spinoza
considered finished in , I consider the Ethics to be completed after the
Theological-Political Treatise.
The Political Treatise is Spinoza’s last unfinished work, published again in the
Opera Posthuma. According to Omero Proietti, who provided the last critical edition
of the work, the Political Treatise was arguably composed between  and .⁷
For the scope of my discussion, I consider this work as the last expression of
Spinoza’s position, since the Political Treatise refers to both the Ethics and the
Theological-Political Treatise.
The overall picture of Spinoza’s moral philosophy that results from my chrono-
logical reading reveals important aspects of both continuity and discontinuity in his
moral views. My reading confirms that Spinoza never rejects the claim that the
Supreme Good consists in knowledge of God. However, Spinoza significantly
changes his mind (in his later works) regarding how human beings can foster their
knowledge and rationality. I contend that Spinoza was led to this change of perspec-
tive because of the shortcomings of the position that he endorsed in his early
writings.

⁴ Jarig Jelles, in the Preface to Spinoza’s Opera Posthuma published in  (see the text of Jelles’s
Preface in Akkerman and Hubbeling , para. ), presents the TIE as one of Spinoza’s first writings, and
today’s scholars agree that it is the first, arguably begun after his excommunication from the Amsterdam
Synagogue. On the textual history and chronology of the TIE and KV, see Mignini a, and Mignini’s
introduction in Spinoza  and Spinoza .
⁵ Akkerman  and Steenbakkers  provide crucial contributions to the study of the philological
constitution of the text of Spinoza’s Ethics, from his early draft to his printed version. Rousset 
advances the interesting hypothesis that previous drafts of the Ethics would be still recognizable in the
textual stratification of the work; for example, in the case of the fourth part.
⁶ For further details on the manuscript of the final version of the Ethics, see the Introduction in Spruit
and Totaro .
⁷ See Proietti’s Notice in Spinoza , pp. –. For present purposes I leave aside Spinoza’s unfished
Compendium of Hebrew Grammar (arguably composed between  and ). Concerning this work,
see Proietti , a, and b.
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I grant that my interpretation of Spinoza’s position will not completely erase

the conceptual tensions that animate his thought. Some textual evidence can still
remain against the claims I shall advance, and some of these claims might seem
to be based on relatively small portions of Spinoza’s texts. I argue that, overall,
my reading makes sense of most of Spinoza’s texts in a ‘better’ manner than do
other readings, in the sense that current rival approaches face significant prob-
lems, which my reading aims to solve. Solving problems that are open in the
scholarly debate, while offering a reasonably charitable reading of primary texts,
is usually accepted as a way of assessing the efficacy of an interpretation of
historical positions. Nonetheless, I acknowledge that my reading remains an
interpretation of Spinoza’s texts; that is, a hermeneutic apparatus intended to
explore the conceptual connections designed by his writings. I contend that my
interpretation is sufficiently powerful to proceed further than other rival inter-
pretations (by uncovering a new way of understanding Spinoza’s account of
reason and its relationships with passions), though I do not pretend that it will
make Spinoza’s thought a smooth landscape where absolutely everything falls
in its place.
This point becomes particularly evident in my interpretation of Spinoza’s account
of common notions (provided in Chapter ) and of his distinction between universal
and proper common notions. Spinoza explicitly introduces this distinction in the
second part of the Ethics between propositions  and . I grant that he does not
explicitly invoke this distinction later in the same work or in later writings. None-
theless, I exploit this doctrine to shed light on different facets of Spinoza’s position
(such as his techniques of mastering the passions and his account of political
science). I maintain that this hermeneutic approach is justified insofar as (i) it does
not commit Spinoza to anything that he would have rejected, and (ii) it sheds light
on important aspects of Spinoza’s thought that would have otherwise remained
more problematic to interpret. It might be objected that my reading becomes
speculative, in the sense that it does not remain close enough to the letter of
Spinoza’s text. However, I think that this is the cost of any interpretation that
takes seriously the gap between the historical texts it aims at investigating (and
their different degrees of heterogeneity, or even inconsistency), and the hermeneutic
conceptual apparatus designed to explore them (by following the overall more
consistent and charitable path).
In Spinoza scholarship, the Ethics is usually presented as the most representa-
tive of Spinoza’s works. However, I aim at uncovering the tensions embedded in
the different stages of Spinoza’s thought and studying how he subsequently
attempts to solve them. For this reason, my reconstruction will consider the
Ethics only as an episode in this much greater picture. Although this episode is
crucially important to fully understand Spinoza’s later position, I contend that it
does not exhaust the meaning and implications of his philosophy. As a result, this
book is not structured around the Ethics. My reading of the Ethics aims to
understand how this work develops Spinoza’s previous positions and contributes
to their evolution. My discussion remains narrowly focused on the elements that
are immediately connected with the general narrative of this book, by leaving
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aside many other important aspects that are nonetheless somewhat connected
with the issue at stake.⁸
Three rather obvious objections can be addressed to my chronological approach,
and here I review them in turn. First, my reading might appear somehow teleological,
insofar as it portrays the later writings as offering a solution to the problems that
Spinoza was facing in his early writings. I grant that my reading can be considered
teleological in the sense that it shows that Spinoza’s later thought better addresses
problems that received less convincing treatment in the early writings. Such a
teleology can be reduced to nothing but the fact that a philosopher’s later writings
are often simply more mature and refined than his early essays. However, I deny that
my reading entails any stronger form of teleology, as if Spinoza had aimed at the
views defended in his later writings since the beginning. On the contrary, since
I argue that Spinoza’s moral philosophy is marked by a significant discontinuity
between his early and later writings, my chronological reading is at odds with any
attempt to read Spinoza’s philosophical career as a fundamentally homogeneous
teleological progress towards the deepening of certain views, which would have been
in place since the beginning. The positions that Spinoza defends in his later writings
are not the natural telos to which his philosophy would have been led naturally.
Rather, he endorses those views as a result of his appreciation of the failures of his
earlier (rather different) positions.
Second, there is another way in which my reading could be considered teleological
in a sense that would not seem to fit Spinoza’s philosophy. Throughout this book
I investigate Spinoza’s solution to the problem of how individuals can achieve the
Supreme Good and what are the best means of helping the human mind in this
enterprise. This way of framing the ethical projects in terms of goals and means is
clearly teleological, and one might wonder how legitimate it would be to use such a
terminology to frame Spinoza’s moral philosophy, since he is often considered to be
an archenemy of teleology and final causes. Elsewhere (Sangiacomo b),
I discussed in which way Spinoza’s attack on final causes should be historically
contextualized and qualified. For present purposes, I notice only that what makes
the scholarly discussion on Spinoza’s attack on final causes intriguing is not that he
dismisses final causes outright, but rather that, while denying that nature operates
according to final causes, he also licenses a number of teleological statements,
especially in the context of his psychology and moral philosophy. This book does
not deal with how consistent Spinoza’s moral philosophy is with his metaphysical
and ontological views concerning final causes, but rather seeks to clarify his own
moral views in the first place. I derive from Spinoza’s own texts his teleological
understanding of the Supreme Good as a goal to be achieved with certain means,
and I elaborate on the way in which this relationship receives further refinement
(and at some point significantly different development) across his works. In this

⁸ For instance, I shall not offer a systematic reconstruction of Spinoza’s theory of affects (concerning
which see, for example, Macherey ) or how it is connected with other themes of Spinoza’s epistem-
ology (see, for example, Malinowski-Charles , Marshall , Renz ).
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sense, my discussion in this book provides further materials to reconsider Spinoza’s

anti-teleological statements from a more systematic point of view, though here I do
not directly engage in this debate.
The third objection to my approach that I would like to consider is that my reading
might appear somehow decontextualized, since I focus almost exclusively on Spino-
za’s own thought and writings. In this book I do not discuss at length Spinoza’s
sources, his relationship with other authors, problems of reception of his ideas, or
ways in which the sociopolitical contexts in which he operated might have affected
the shaping of his works. I am fully persuaded that research on the context and
reception of an historical author is by all means vital in obtaining a richer and more
complete grasp of the meaning of his views and the relevance of his positions.⁹
However, context and sources are not a discrete entity composed of a limited and
discrete number of items that can be easily reviewed. Serious research on context and
sources must take into account not only what the historiographical tradition has
canonized as ‘big names’ or ‘big facts’ that surround a given author, but also those
works, characters, controversies, and events that are often much less apparent at first
glance, or just need new research to be uncovered. For this reason, I maintain that
research on contexts and sources needs to be guided by some preliminary under-
standing of the problems opened up by the writings of the author under examination.
Such research can reveal all its potential following clarification of the hermeneutic
difficulties in understanding why a certain author endorses or rejects certain views,
why he uses a certain terminology, or why he argues in certain ways and engages with
certain topics or audiences.
I do not claim that internalist research (based almost exclusively on the author’s
own texts) has priority over contextualist research (aimed at inscribing the author’s
texts in a complex historical network of influences and exchanges). Rather,
I maintain that these two approaches constitute a hermeneutic circle and benefit
from one another. Nonetheless, it is methodologically possible to focus on just one of
these two dimensions in order to bring to the scholarly discussion new elements able
to nourish and advance the philosophical conversation. This possibility is warranted
especially in the case of an author such as Spinoza, who is one of the key figures in
the Western canon of the history of philosophy. The sources and context of his
philosophy are far from having been understudied. Although my reading does not
extensively engage with these sources, my discussion approaches an image and
understanding of Spinoza’s philosophy that has been shaped by the contextual
research developed so far.
Nonetheless, the core business of this book remains that of reconstructing how
Spinoza’s moral views shifted between different positions. I maintain that only an
internal analysis of his writings can prove that he changed his mind; and if this
change occurred, then his writings must demonstrate it. If my reading is correct,
then it surely calls for renewed research on the sources and contexts of Spinoza’s

⁹ In my previous research I offered contributions to the contextualization of Spinoza’s views within the
late-medieval and early-modern debate. See, for example, Sangiacomo a, c, a, b, b,
and d.
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moral philosophy, in order to better place his change of mind in its historical
perspective.¹⁰
My reading greatly benefits from, and aims to develop, research already under-
taken by many other Spinoza scholars. The evolution of Spinoza’s thought and the
differences between his early writings and the later version of the Ethics remained a
rather neglected subject in Anglophone scholarship, despite the fact that the same
kind of investigation had been successfully applied to many of Spinoza’s contem-
poraries, such as Descartes and Leibniz.¹¹ The paradigmatic case is provided by the
Short Treatise. Despite the fact that major differences between the Short Treatise and
the Ethics have been pointed out,¹² the international scholarly debate acknowledged
only fairly recently that these two works put forward substantially different views that
should not be collapsed.¹³ In this book I argue that Spinoza did not have in mind his
later Ethics when he was writing his earlier works, and the Ethics resulted from how
he confronted the tensions that emerged from his early writings. In my previous
research (Sangiacomo a, Sangiacomo and Nachtomy ) I contributed to this
line of investigation by showing that Spinoza’s early writings lack the notion of
activity as it appears later in the Ethics. In this book I advance an explanation for
this transformation by arguing that Spinoza’s later ontology of activity is indeed the

¹⁰ The case of Spinoza’s relationship with Descartes and Cartesianism is a good example of this point.
Cristina Santinelli () and Emanuela Scribano ( and ) endeavoured to explore Spinoza’s debt
to Descartes’ epistemology, psychology, and neurophysiology. Rousset  offered an interesting study of
the relationship between Spinoza and Descartes by focusing on Spinoza’s attitude towards the objections
and replies to Descartes’ Meditations. For a systematic comparison of Descartes’ and Spinoza’s conceptions
of God, see Lachieze-Rey . For a presentation of Spinoza (and Leibniz) as heirs of Descartes’ rationalist
metaphysics, see Woolhouse ; Phemister ; Schmaltz . Concerning Spinoza’s relationship with
Dutch Cartesians, see Scribano , Verbeek  and , Nyden-Bullock , and Douglas .
Nonetheless, very little has been written about Spinoza’s relationship with Descartes’ moral philosophy.
Descartes’ moral views proved to be controversial in themselves (see, for example, Ariew ,
pp. –; Gueroult , vol. , ch. , pp. –; Shapiro  and ; Naaman-Zauderer
). I argue that Spinoza’s position is also shifting. My discussion in this book thus has the potential
to open a new field of inquiry concerning the relationship between Spinoza’s and Descartes’ moral views, as
I have suggested elsewhere (Sangiacomo b).
¹¹ Concerning the evolution of Descartes’ thought, see, for example, Rodis-Lewis a; Machamer and
McGuire ; concerning Leibniz see Mercer ; Garber .
¹² For instance, concerning the opposition between Spinoza’s definition of intellect as ‘purely passive’ in
KV, , and his definition of the intellect as active in Edef, see Cassier  (original ed. ), vol. ,
pp. –; Mignini b; Pozzi ; Renz . I shall discuss this point in more detail in Chapter . On
a different topic, Mignini  and  exemplify how one of the major differences between KV and
Ethics is the theory of imagination and fiction that Spinoza introduced in the latter work. For further
details, see the extensive commentary to the KV presented by Mignini in Spinoza . Jaquet 
discusses the evolution of Spinoza’s account of affects and passions. Nyden-Bullock  explores the
evolution of Spinoza’s thought in connection with debates among Dutch Cartesians. Sangiacomo and
Nachtomy  discuss the differences between KV and Ethics concerning Spinoza’s account of the activity
of finite modes.
¹³ Melamed , p.  clearly states: ‘the value of Spinoza’s early works is not at all limited to their being
stations on the road leading to the Ethics. A teleological attitude of such a sort would celebrate the works of
the “mature Spinoza” at the expense of the early works. However, we have no reason to assume that on all
issues the views of the Ethics are better argued, developed, and motivated than those of the early works. In
other words, we should keep our minds open to the possibility that on some issues the early works might
contain better analyses and argumentation than the Ethics.’
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ontological framework required to solve the ethical problem he faced in his early
writings.
Spinoza has often been presented as a proponent of a strong form of rationalism.
In metaphysics and epistemology, rationalism entails that every fact is rationally
explicable and no brute facts (state of affairs or events occurring without a reason) are
given in nature.¹⁴ In the ethical domain, rationalism maintains that the epistemic
means that allow the human mind to cultivate adequate knowledge are the most
important means of achieving the Supreme Good and master the passions.¹⁵ My
reading contributes to advance a more nuanced picture of Spinoza’s rationalism in
moral and political philosophy.
With respect to the early writings, my interpretation underscores a crucial
explanatory flaw in Spinoza’s approach. I contend that Spinoza invests so much
effort in securing the epistemic self-sufficiency of the human mind that his account is
unable to explain the reason why real human beings actually fail to achieve the
Supreme Good. With respect to the later writings, I maintain that Spinoza’s discus-
sion entails that the mind’s power of cultivating adequate knowledge essentially
depends on the way in which the individual interacts (and cooperates) with other
individuals. From this point of view, while adequate knowledge remains central to
Spinoza’s discussion, the material conditions in which the individual exists and
operates acquire a necessary and constitutive role for the individual’s ability to
progress towards the Supreme Good. This role was not present in Spinoza’s early
position.¹⁶
My interpretation contributes to the growing interest in Spinoza’s theory of affects
that has emerged over the last few decades, both in continental Europe¹⁷ and the
Anglophone world.¹⁸ This new trend emphasizes Spinoza’s relational approach to the
problem of the passions and their relationship to the practice of virtue by uncovering
how social interactions and cooperation with others play a pivotal role in defining an
individual’s power of acting.¹⁹ In this context, the label ‘relational’ aims to stress the
constitutive role that cooperation among individuals, social interactions, and pol-
itical institutions have in shaping and determining an individual’s striving towards
the Supreme Good. The cooperative account of reason that I propose (insofar as it
makes rationality the mental expression of an individual’s interactions with others
based on agreement in nature with them) stresses a prominent relational dimension
of Spinoza’s mature position.

¹⁴ See Alquié ; Matheron ; Bennett ; Della Rocca b, , and ; LeBuffe ;
Renz . For a criticism of the rationalist interpretation of Spinoza, see Laerke  and ; Di Poppa
.
¹⁵ See, for example, Gilead ; De Dijn  and ; LeBuffe ; Nadler b.
¹⁶ Several scholars stressed how, especially in the political writings, Spinoza devotes significant attention
to the way in which social cooperation impacts on an individual’s ability to develop a moral life. See
Matheron  and ; Balibar ; Giancotti ; Visentin ; Sharp a; Nadler ; James
a.
¹⁷ See, for example, Bodei ; Moreau ; Jaquet  and ; Malinowski-Charles ;
Scribano  and a.
¹⁸ See, for example, James ; Sharp a; Kisner ; James a; Marshal .
¹⁹ See, for example, Gatens and Lloyd ; Gatens ; Armstrong a and b; Kisner ;
Sangiacomo ; Lenz .
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Nonetheless, with respect to current relational interpretations of Spinoza, my book

is both broader in focus and sharper in its aim. My focus is broader insofar as it
covers all of Spinoza’s relevant texts devoted to the passions and their role in moral
philosophy by integrating in a single narrative his whole corpus, including his
political works and correspondence. My aim is sharper insofar as it is oriented to
argue that Spinoza’s thought underwent a specific evolution from his early writings
to his later works. Although I shall touch on several aspects of Spinoza’s more general
positions concerning ontology, epistemology, and psychology, I shall deal with these
topics only insofar as they contribute to providing a better understanding of the
moral issue with which I am concerned.
Concerning readership, beyond addressing Spinoza scholars and scholars in early
modern philosophy in general, the view about reason and passions that emerges from
my reconstruction also provides an historical background to the growing interest in
contemporary debates in political philosophy about more relational approaches to
the notions of freedom and autonomy.²⁰ In fact, Spinoza’s intellectual trajectory
opens a still quite unexplored path in the territory of ideas. Both historians of
philosophy and today’s moral and political philosophers can benefit from a deeper
investigation of Spinoza’s ethical theory.

I. Contents
The six chapters of this book chronologically track Spinoza’s developing thought on
the relationship between reason, passions, and the Supreme Good.
Chapter  discusses Spinoza’s early ethics in his Treatise on the Emendation of the
Intellect. I outline how Spinoza conceives of the ethical progress leading towards the
Supreme Good. He defines the Supreme Good as the condition in which the mind
enjoys the knowledge of God. In order to achieve the Supreme Good, the mind has to
concentrate on its innate knowledge, resist the distractive force arising from external
causes and passions, and methodically order and connect all its ideas in a deductive
system built on the idea of God. I discuss the role that Spinoza seems to attribute to
the social dimension of the ethical progress and to the need of finding appropriate
‘rules of life’ to support it. I argue that Spinoza’s position is shaped by his commit-
ment to the epistemic self-sufficiency of the mind, according to which the mind is
endowed by nature with all the epistemic resources needed to achieve the Supreme
Good. I contend that this commitment leads Spinoza to consider social dimensions
either as potential threats to the successful achievement of the ethical enterprise, or as
potential facilitating external factors. However, these social dimensions do not play a
constitutive or essential role in Spinoza’s solution to the problem of how individuals
can achieve the Supreme Good. In the Treatise on the Emendation, the successfulness
of the ethical progress towards the Supreme Good is rooted first and foremost in the
mind itself and in its internal epistemic resources.

²⁰ Armstrong a and b, and Kisner , –, were the first to draw attention to how
Spinoza’s moral thought can provide historical background to contemporary discussions of ‘relational
autonomy’. Concerning this point see also the essays collected by Armstrong, Green, and Sangiacomo
(eds.) .
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 26/11/2019, SPi

 

Chapter  examines how Spinoza’s Short Treatise develops the ethical position
introduced in the Treatise on the Emendation. The Short Treatise offers his first
explicit account of the passions according to which passions are inadequate ideas
caused by other inadequate ideas. This entails that adequate knowledge is the key
remedy to correct inadequate ideas, thus freeing the mind from the passions.
I conclude by discussing how the limits of Spinoza’s early ethical views emerged
during his correspondence with Willem van Blijenbergh in . Van Blijenbergh’s
remarks suggest that Spinoza’s account insufficiently explains the phenomenon of
superstition in which the power of the passions and imagination seems to be stronger
than any adequate intellectual idea about God that the human mind may possess.
Spinoza is forced to admit that common people, the Prophets, and Adam himself,
cannot avoid conceiving God’s nature inadequately, despite the ‘uncorrupted intel-
lect’ granted by God. This entails that Spinoza’s early ethics cannot provide a
satisfying account of why human beings, despite their innate adequate idea of God,
fail to conceive of God adequately and thus fail to achieve the Supreme Good. I claim
that out of the need to overcome these difficulties, Spinoza had to rework and weaken
his commitment to the epistemic self-sufficiency of the mind.
Chapter  focuses on the Theological-Political Treatise. This work has been the
object of extensive controversy because, on the one hand, Spinoza seems to maintain
that virtue, salvation, and the Supreme Good can be achieved only through adequate
knowledge, while, on the other hand, he grants a form of salvation through obedience
that would allow ignorant and uneducated people to act morally and virtuously.
From the point of view of my reconstruction, I take this issue about the nature of
salvation as a case study in a further investigation of the evolution of Spinoza’s
account of the epistemic self-sufficiency of the mind. I contend that Spinoza recon-
ciles the different components of his account of salvation by conceiving of adequate
knowledge and rationality as an ultimate goal that can be achieved and fostered
through an appropriate use of certain combinations of passions. This is possible
insofar as Spinoza begins to appreciate how external conditions and bodily flourish-
ing play an essential role in fostering or hindering the development of mental skills.
From this point of view, different combinations of passions can lead people either
toward irrational behaviours or to cooperation by producing social bounds able to
improve rationality. In this respect, Spinoza begins to depart from the strong form of
epistemic self-sufficiency defended in his early writings, to make room for a more
positive role that passions can play in the pursuit of the Supreme Good. However,
I also point out that Spinoza does not offer a full-blown philosophical foundation of
this position in the Theological-Political Treatise, but only in the Ethics.
Chapter  discusses Spinoza’s new conception of reason as knowledge built upon
common notions that emerges in the Ethics. I argue that common notions express the
extent to which individuals agree in nature, operate on the basis of mutually
compatible laws, and produce mutually compatible effects. This interpretation of
reason and common notions in terms of agreement in nature is the core of my
reading of Spinoza’s later thought. The notion of agreement is key to understanding
how adequate ideas can be supported by certain kinds of causal interactions between
an individual and the external causes operating on it. In turn, this disassociates the
notions of ‘activity’ and ‘adequate knowledge’ from the fact of not being determined
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 26/11/2019, SPi

 

by external cases. In my reading, the mind can conceive of adequate ideas of reason
not only (or necessarily) when it operates in causal isolation from external causes, but
also when it cooperates to some extent with them by developing interactions based on
agreement in nature. I also contend that by connecting rationality with agreement in
nature, Spinoza’s account distinguishes between universal common notions shared
by everyone and proper common notions shared only among certain groups of
individuals. I argue that proper common notions express a higher degree of agree-
ment in nature than universal common notions. Proper common notions require
appropriate environmental conditions in order to be conceived. As a result, ration-
ality (especially insofar as it is based on proper common notions) does not depend on
innate ideas or on the mind’s isolated activity alone, but rather on appropriate ways
of interacting with external causes in general, and other human individuals in
particular.
Chapter  reconstructs how the improvement of the individual’s own rationality
is fostered insofar as the individual’s power of acting (based on agreement in
nature within a certain causal network) is improved. On this basis, cooperation
among individuals emerges as the essential element to foster an individual’s
rationality. I contend that the distinction between activity and passivity does not
lie in whether an individual operates under the determination of external causes,
because this determination is always present in both activity and passivity. Rather,
I characterize passivity as the fact of being determined on the basis of some degree
of disagreement in nature with external causes. The degree of agreement or
disagreement in nature in a causal network can change over time, depending on
the mutual interactions and adaptation among its parts. This entails that, under
appropriate conditions, certain passions (by determining individuals to cooperate
in certain ways) can begin a causal feedback loop leading to maximizing agreement
in nature (and thus rationality) within a certain community. This discussion
complements the reading introduced in Chapter  by exploring the relational
underpinnings and the conceptual ramifications of Spinoza’s account of reason
and passions. I contend that this relational and cooperative account is in fact
consistent with Spinoza’s therapy for mastering the passions (in the fifth part of
the Ethics)—which might otherwise be taken as evidence that his commitment to
the epistemic self-sufficiency of the mind still survives in the Ethics.
Chapter  examines how the account of reason and passions introduced in the
Ethics is implemented in Spinoza’s political science, as it is developed in the Political
Treatise. Spinoza’s project consists in defining how the institutional architecture of
different forms of government can foster rationality by producing the right combin-
ation of passions. He maintains that rationality should be considered as the ultimate
goal of political bodies, which must foster cooperation among individuals in order to
enhance their power of acting and thinking. I argue that Spinoza’s discussion of
rationality in the Political Treatise implements his account of universal and proper
common notions. While rationality based on universal common notions is shared
by all human beings, it has little use in establishing peaceful and harmonious forms
of cooperation, since it does not capture what is specific to certain human indi-
viduals. Universal common notions do not significantly contribute to mastering
and restraining potentially conflicting passions. On the contrary, proper common
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 26/11/2019, SPi

 

notions express a higher degree of agreement in nature among particular groups of

individuals. In this context, the State can operate as a powerful environmental
catalyst for the development of rationality based on proper common notions. To
achieve this goal, two conditions must be satisfied. First, the institutional design of
a political body must be capable of determining its individual members to interact
and cooperate on the basis of these proper common notions. Second, the same
institutional design must foster those passions that lead individuals to strive for
preserving the political setting itself. I argue that, in the Political Treatise, Spinoza
examines in great detail how different kinds of political regimes can meet these
requirements. I also argue that Spinoza’s political science shows how, and to what
extent, all political bodies have internal resources to resist the most oppressive and
threatening developments of social life and instead evolve towards higher degrees
of rationality and cooperation.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/11/2019, SPi


The Path Towards the Supreme
Good in the Treatise on
the Emendation

. Introduction
What is the Supreme Good? And how can we reach the Supreme Good? These two
questions are at the core of Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect
(TIE). Spinoza has a straightforward answer to the first question: the Supreme Good
is enjoying adequate knowledge of God. Textual evidence from Spinoza’s whole
corpus points to the fact that he consistently remained convinced of this claim. For
instance, in the Short Treatise he maintains that ‘God is the greatest good [opperste
goet] . . . and all good . . . Someone who uses his intellect properly . . . rests in that
good which is all good, and in which there is the fullness of all Joy and satisfaction’
(KV, , §). In the Theological-Political Treatise he argues that the Supreme Good is
nothing but ‘the true knowledge and love of God’ (TTP, ). In the Ethics he
demonstrates that ‘Knowledge of God is the mind’s greatest good [summum
bonum]; its greatest virtue is to know God’ (Ep). Although Spinoza’s phrasing
may vary slightly across his different works, the crucial point seems to remain
the same: the human mind reaches the Supreme Good by conceiving an adequate
idea of God.
Spinoza’s answer to the second question (how can we reach the Supreme Good?),
on the other hand, changes significantly. As I shall argue in this chapter and in
Chapter , in the early writings Spinoza maintains that epistemic means are the only
strictly necessary means of achieving the Supreme Good. He acknowledges that social
factors and material conditions may help or hinder ethical progress towards the
Supreme Good, but maintains that attaining the Supreme Good does not necessarily
depend on any particular material or social condition. In his later works, Spinoza
significantly revised his position and instead acknowledged that material conditions,
sociopolitical factors, and (more generally) causal interactions between individuals
also play a necessary and constitutive role in the pursuit of the Supreme Good.
In this chapter I focus on Spinoza’s position in the Treatise on the Emendation.
This is a particularly puzzling text. It is not only short and unfinished, but also fails to
provide any in-depth discussion of many of the key concepts it nonetheless utilizes
throughout. Important claims are often advanced in only a few lines, and various
crucial points are not accompanied by all the argumentation that a demanding reader
might expect. One may thus be tempted to move quickly through the text and discard

Spinoza on Reason, Passions, and the Supreme Good. Andrea Sangiacomo, Oxford University Press ().
© Andrea Sangiacomo.
DOI: ./oso/..
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/11/2019, SPi

      

Spinoza’s discussion as immature, inconsistent, or simply underdeveloped. While

I do not deny the presence of these textual issues, my approach aims at distilling the
conceptual machinery that underpins Spinoza’s discussion. In doing so, my goal is to
show that part of the difficulty of the Treatise (and of the moral doctrine it defends)
stems from Spinoza’s radical take on topics and discussion that may otherwise seem
familiar.
The Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect arguably falls within the broad and
widespread tradition of the cultura animi.¹ The common theme within this tradition
is that the human mind, in its present state, is not capable of fully performing its
functions and achieving its goal; namely, knowledge. To remedy this condition, some
kind of therapy or cure is needed. The cultura animi tradition often has strong
religious connotations, insofar as the present condition of the mind is connected with
the decayed conditions of human beings after Adam’s fall. In this context, a number
of disciplines and practices (including natural philosophy) may be invoked to help
the mind to remedy to its current deficits and restore (at least in part) its faculties.
While Spinoza’s Treatise may fit the genre defined by the cultura animi tradition,
the way in which he develops this theme is highly idiosyncratic. He is far from even
hinting at the possibility that the mind’s difficulties in reaching knowledge depend on
some decayed condition that is consequent upon Adam’s fall. The religious overtones
of the cultura animi tradition are completely absent in Spinoza’s discussion. More
importantly, his account builds on a strong commitment to what I shall call the
‘epistemic self-sufficiency’ of the human mind. The human mind is naturally
equipped with all the internal resources that it needs to progress towards the
Supreme Good. External causes and social factors do not play an essential or
necessary role in the ethical project. Spinoza maintains that improving the mind’s
ability to form adequate ideas is the necessary and essential way in which an
individual can achieve the Supreme Good. In this sense, he endorses a radical form
of ethical intellectualism. In Chapter  I shall discuss why, as it turns out, Spinoza’s
intellectualism comes at too high a cost to be maintained.
In Section . I present the central tenets of Spinoza’s ethical view in the TIE: his
account of the Supreme Good and of the true goods (the means of achieving the
Supreme Good). In Section . I discuss the role that Spinoza attributes to social
factors and why they are ultimately inessential for attaining the Supreme Good. In
Section . I introduce a reconstruction of Spinoza’s account of the passions in the
TIE and argue that Spinoza treats passions as inadequate ideas. In Section .
I discuss some interpretative issues entailed by Spinoza’s account of ethical progress
towards the Supreme Good. I contend that ethical progress works as a sort of
intellectual virtuous circle, in which the human mind is capable of building on its
own innate knowledge in order to progressively emancipate itself from the influence
of external forces. This virtuous circle leads the human mind to resist the force of
the passions that will otherwise distract it from contemplating the Supreme Good.
In Section . I investigate the epistemological underpinnings of Spinoza’s position

¹ For a detailed reconstruction of the development of the seventeenth-century cultura animi tradition in
the British context, see Corneanu .
Another random document with
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of Frankie's
dog Tony
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.

Title: Frankie's dog Tony

Author: Madeline Leslie

Release date: November 4, 2023 [eBook #72019]

Language: English

Original publication: Chicago: Henry A. Sumner and Company, 1867

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK FRANKIE'S

DOG TONY ***
Transcriber's note: Unusual and inconsistent spelling is as
printed.

AUNT HATTIE'S LIBRARY

FRANKIE'S DOG TONY.

 BY

AUNT HATTIE

[MADELINE LESLIE]

AUTHOR OF THE "BROOKSIDE SERIES," ETC., ETC.

"GO TO THE ANT, THOU SLUGGARD; CONSIDER HER

WAYS AND BE WISE."—Solomon.

CHICAGO:
HENRY A. SUMNER & COMPANY.
1880.

Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1867, by

REV. A. R. BAKER,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the District of
Massachusetts.
 AUNT HATTIE'S LIBRARY
for Boys.

SERIES II.

VOL. I. THE APPLE BOYS.

VOL. II. THE CHEST OF TOOLS.

VOL. III. THE FACTORY BOY.

VOL. IV. FRANKIE'S DOG TONY.

VOL. V. THE GOLDEN RULE.

VOL. VI. LYING JIM.

AUNT HATTIE'S LIBRARY

for her Little Friends.

SERIES I.

VOL. I. THE SHEEP AND LAMBS.

VOL. II. LILY'S BIRTHDAY.

VOL. III. THE CHEST OF TOOLS.

VOL. IV. MAGGIE AND THE MICE.

VOL. V. THE LOST KITTY.

VOL. VI. IDA'S NEW SHOES.

To

NELLIE, ROLAND COTTON, ANNIE, AND FULLER

APPLETON,

CHILDREN OF MY BELOVED NEPHEW,

THE REV. JOHN COTTON SMITH, D.D.,

THESE SMALL VOLUMES ARE AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED,

WITH THE EARNEST PRAYER

THAT THEIR LIVES MAY PROVE THEM TO BE LAMBS IN THE FOLD

OF THE GREAT AND GOOD

Shepherd of Israel.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I. THE SOLDIER'S DOG

CHAPTER II. FRANK AND TONY

CHAPTER III. FRANKIE'S MUSIC LESSON

CHAPTER IV. FRANKIE'S NEW LESSON

CHAPTER V. THE STOLEN DOG

CHAPTER VI. TONY'S LOVE FOR HER MASTER

CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION

FRANKIE'S DOG TONY.

CHAPTER I.
THE SOLDIER'S DOG.

DID you ever see a dog with a coat on? I am going to tell
you about one who was a great traveller. I think you will say
it was a remarkable dog, and will not be surprised that
Frank was very proud of her.

But first I must tell you who Frank was, and where he lived.

In the beautiful village of W—, a few miles from the city of

Boston, there was a lovely cottage almost covered with
woodbine, which had been trained over the walls. In this
cottage lived Mr. and Mrs. Colvin, with their two sons,
Edward and Frank.

Mr. Colvin had been a sea-captain, and in one of his

voyages, he brought home an English officer, who had been
wounded in the battle before Sebastopol. This gentleman,
whose name was Jameson, had a little dog Tony, who was
greatly attached to him. They ate together and slept
together, and wherever Colonel Jameson was, whether
walking the deck or sitting near the helmsman, or standing
in the door of the captain's office, there you would see Tony,
also.

One day the captain said,—

"Colonel Jameson, you seem very fond of your dog."

"Yes, sir," the gentleman answered, "and if you have time, I

will tell you where I found her."

"I should like to hear it," Captain Colvin answered.

"Well, sir. It was one day, just after a terrible battle; I was
making my way over the bloody field to see whether I could
find any of my comrades, when I heard a low moan, coming
from a tent. I went in and found a poor fellow with his arm
shot off. Some injury he had received on his head had made
him quite delirious. I tried to bathe the wound, but a little
puppy lying close to his side would not let me touch him."

"To make a long story short, the brave boy died a few days
later; but not until he had sent messages by me to his
widowed mother and sister at home, and had given me his
only treasure, his faithful friend Tony."

"I took her to my tent, and she has been true to me ever
since. In all the battles in which I afterwards engaged, Tony
was in my pocket. When I was wounded, she moaned until
she grew sick."

"We understand each other very well, don't we, Tony?" he

asked, turning to the dog.

"Bow! Wow!" barked Tony, in a joyful tone.

"She knows I have been talking about her. See how intently
she watches my every movement. Here, Tony, stand up and
shake hands with me."

The creature instantly raised herself on her hind feet, and

held out her right paw.

"Is that the hand you offer to a gentleman? Give me the

other," said the colonel.

But Tony knew she was right; and she continued holding out
her paw, till he said, laughing,—

"You think it's my mistake, then; excuse me, Tony."

Then the dog jumped on her master, and wagged her tail as
if she were very much pleased.

Before the voyage was over, Captain Colvin and Colonel

Jameson had become such good friends that the captain
insisted the other should go home with him.

At first, Frank was afraid of Tony, but in a day or two, he

grew to like her so much, that he was not content unless he
could have her to play with him.

It was surprising how quickly the dog learned to like her

new home. Her master could not now, as when he was on
shipboard, feed her from his plate at dinner; but after one
or two meals, she submitted very quietly and allowed
Frankie to feed her from a plate in the kitchen.

When company came in, Tony had to be dressed up as well

as anybody. I forgot to tell you that every morning her
master gave her a bath; and then she lay in the sun, and
licked herself dry.

Colonel Jameson was not an officer now; but he had saved

a piece of his uniform, which was bright-red broadcloth, and
a lady friend of his had made it into a coat for Tony, and
trimmed it with the gold cord of which the epaulets were
made.

Frankie laughed merrily when he first saw Tony sitting in a

chair with her coat on. She looked so prim and funny, as if
she thought herself very fine indeed.

The next day, he begged his mother to give him a collar,

which made the dog look funnier than ever.

I don't think Tony liked the linen collar, which was starched
very stiff; for she kept turning her head from one side to
another, and uttering a low kind of a growl. I think she
wanted to say,—

"Please, Frank, take off my collar. I'm a soldier's dog, and

not used to such things, you know."

But Frank thought the collar a great improvement, and told

Tony she must get used to it, if she expected to live in
genteel society.

By and by, Mrs. Colvin basted into the neck of the coat a
white frill, which had no starch in it. Tony was so much
pleased at this, that she began at once to lick the lady's
hand, and ever after considered her a good friend.
 CHAPTER II.
FRANK AND TONY.

AFTER Colonel Jameson had stayed a month or so at the

cottage, and told his new friends all about the great battles
in which he had fought, he went to the city to find
employment. Tony, of course, went with him; and then poor
Frankie was so lonesome that he had two or three hearty
cries for his pet.

Mrs. Colvin told her husband she would try and find a dog
for Frank, he took so much comfort with Tony.

One day they went to the city, when, on calling at a friend's

house, there sat Colonel Jameson with his favorite in his
lap.

Every one could see that the love was not all on Frankie's
side, for Tony seemed almost out of her wits with joy. She
jumped up and down, giving short, joyful barks, and then
stopping a moment to lick his hands and kiss his face.

Frankie was delighted, and mother had to remind him twice

that he had not spoken to the lady of the house, before he
noticed that any one else was present.

Colonel Jameson laughed heartily when he saw what a

pleasant meeting it was. By and by he asked,—
"How would you like to take Tony home and keep her for
me?"

"O sir! I should like it very much, indeed. I would take nice
care of her, and let her go to school with me every day."

"I rather think the teacher would object to such a scholar,"

answered the gentleman, laughing.

He then told Mrs. Colvin that he had found some business,

and had a very good boarding-place; but they would not
consent to keep Tony. He felt very sad to part from the dog,
but as he found there were few boarding-houses, where a
dog was not considered a nuisance, he was willing Frankie
should take her, if his mother would consent.

It was some time before Tony could be made to understand

that she was to be separated from her master. When
Frankie called, she ran to him, but would instantly run back,
and catch hold of the Colonel's coat for him to come, too.

You may be sure that Mrs. Colvin did not like the officer any
the less because she saw a tear in his eye when he was
caressing the dog. She knew that he was thinking of all the
dangers they had encountered together, and also, how
desolate he should feel on going to his room at night, to
have no little friend there to welcome him.

At last, the lady where they were visiting proposed that the
Colonel should take advantage of the time when Frankie
was playing with the dog, and slip into another room, when
she would go with the boy more readily.

This he did; but Tony barked and ran to the door, scratching
with all her might to get it open. But when she found she
could not, she allowed her next loved friend to take her in
his arms and carry her away.
When they reached the cottage, she was delighted. She
would jump up into a chair by Frankie, or down again, just
as he bid her; but whenever the door opened, or she heard
a step on the walk, her ears would be cocked up, and she
would listen with all her might for her old master.

Frankie was very proud of his power over the dog, and was
continually showing his father, mother, and Edward how
quickly she understood and obeyed him.

At last it came time for the boy to go to bed.

He brought a shawl to wrap his baby in, and said he should

take her to bed with him as Colonel Jameson did. But Eddy
objected at once.

"I know just how it will be," he said; "Tony will bark and
wake us, and Frankie is such a sleepy head that he will not
get up to attend to her, and I shall have all the trouble with
her."

"No, no!" exclaimed Frankie; "I'll promise to keep her my

side, and take all the care of her."

Mrs. Colvin, however, thought it best to have a bed made

for Tony in the corner of the room, where she lay, wrapped
in the shawl, very quietly till morning.

The next day, when Frankie was getting ready for school, he
told his mother he was going to take Tony into the seat with
him.

"I am afraid your teacher will object, my dear," she said,

"and the dog will take your mind from your studies."

But the boy pleaded very earnestly that he might take her
once. "I want to show Willie Miles and George Holmes how
she obeys me," he exclaimed.

He came home at noon, just as his mother expected, very

indignant because the boys had tried to stone his pet.

"The teacher wouldn't let her stay in the school-room," he

exclaimed, his face growing very red, "though I told her
Tony would be perfectly quiet; and so I had to put her in the
entry, and when the boys went out at recess they teased
her dreadfully."

His mother comforted her boy by reminding him how

pleasant it would be for him to come home and have Tony
bark out her welcome. So that was the last of Tony's school
education.

Every day, though, she learned something new at home.

Even Captain Colvin took pains to teach her new and
cunning tricks. Whenever she wanted anything to eat, she
always stood up on her hind feet and asked for it, and then
she would bark out her thank you in the funniest manner
imaginable.

CHAPTER III.
FRANKIE'S MUSIC LESSON.

FRANKIE was generally a good boy; but sometimes, he did

not like to obey his mother, and tried to argue with her. This
is very naughty; for God has commanded children to obey
their parents promptly and cheerfully.

One morning, Frankie ran into the sitting-room, where his

mother was writing a letter, and said,—

"Ma, the boys are going to the woods for nuts,—may I go?"

"What time do they start, my dear?" she asked.

"Oh, we're going to get an early dinner! Ann can give me a

piece of pie, and I'll be off by one o'clock. Say, ma, may I
go?"

"But, Frankie, don't you remember you promised to carry

some yarn to poor Nancy? That must be done first."

"But, ma, I didn't know then that the boys were going to
the woods. I'll carry the yarn some other day."

"Poor Nancy is dependent on her knitting for her daily

bread, my son."

"Can't Edward carry it to her, then?"

"Edward has his drawing lesson."

Frankie began to look red and angry; but presently

brightened with the words,—"I'll run to Nancy's right away,
if you'll let me. Tony may go with me."

"Have you practised your music, my dear?"

The boy's face grew dark.

"No, ma, I haven't. I hate music, and I wish I never need

take another lesson, Mr. Lenox is so cross."
The lady looked grieved. "I can remember," she said, "when
a little boy begged his father to allow him to take lessons on
the piano; and, when his mother objected on account of the
time it would be necessary for him to practise, he
exclaimed,—"

"'Oh, you never need fear for me! I had rather learn music
than to play. I will promise to practise the lessons as much
as you wish me to.'"

"I didn't know then how hateful music was. I wish now I
need never see a piano again."

Mrs. Colvin was displeased to hear her son talk in this way,
and to see him look so angry. She raised her heart in prayer
to God that she might rightly train this darling child.

Presently she said, in a firm voice,—

"Frankie, go to the parlor and practise one hour by the

clock. Then, if you can run to Nancy's before dinner with the
yarn, I am willing you should join your companions in the
woods. But remember all depends on your prompt attention
to your music."

"It's lonesome in the parlor, ma."

"Your aunt is there sewing, and she will help you count the
time."

Frank went through the hall slowly, as if to an unpleasant

task; for every day he grew more neglectful of his practice,
and gave greater offence to his teacher. The piano was
already open; so, after spending four or five minutes in
finding the place in his book and pushing the music-stool
back and forth, he took his seat.
"How long are you going to practise," inquired his aunt, in a
cheerful voice.

"An hour," answered Frank, gloomily.

"Well, it's exactly ten now."

"But I've been here five minutes. I looked when I came in."

"Come, now, Frankie," urged the lady, "be a good boy, and
I'll help you. If you give your whole attention to it, you will
learn the lesson well in an hour."

Frankie's lingers Cell upon the keys; but his eyes had a
vacant look, and Aunt Sarah knew then, just as well as she
did at the end of the hour, that the time would be wasted.
She took up her book again, and the boy began to play over
and over one of his first lessons, which he could do without
any effort.

Five minutes more passed in this manner, when Tony poked

her nose through the crack of the door, which stood ajar,
and then made her way into the room, barking joyfully that
she had found her young master. This was a very good
excuse, the boy thought, for taking a recess; so down he
got from the stool, and had a fine romp with the dog on the
floor.

"Do you call that practising your lesson?" asked his aunt,
laughing.

"My fingers ache so," he began; but she interrupted him.

"I'll keep the time for you. Five minutes lost already."

Frankie suddenly recollected the nutting, and, seating

himself quickly, began to thumb over the same lesson
again.

"Now, Frankie, that's too bad!" she said, reprovingly. "Begin

on the new lesson. You have diddled that over and over till
I'm tired of it."

A merry laugh from behind the door made them both turn
in a hurry.

"Yes, Frankie, that's just it. You do nothing but diddle over
that one strain. I should think you would be ashamed of
yourself when pa's paying so much money for your
lessons."

"Now, Frank, I'm going to lay by my book, and attend to

you," said Aunt Sarah; "you must give your mind to it."

She drew a chair close to his side, and, pointing out the
notes, said, firmly, "Begin there!"

He did so, and for a short time picked out the notes quite
correctly, his aunt counting the time for him; but a slight
movement of Tony from the floor to the sofa, which she
thought would be an easier resting-place, upset him again.

"My head aches terribly," he exclaimed.

"You always say so," muttered Edward. "I wouldn't be such

a baby."

After this, it was quite in vain that Aunt Sarah tried to fix
his attention. He did indeed touch a few chords; but nothing
was accomplished. He complained continually that his head
ached.

It wanted fifteen minutes of eleven when his mother came

in.