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Rights Delayed
 Rights Delayed
The American State and
the Defeat of Progressive
Unions, 1935–​1950

Charles W. Romney

1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

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© Oxford University Press 2016

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
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above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Romney, Charles Waite, 1967– author.
Title: Rights delayed : the American state and the defeat of progressive unions, 1935–1950 /
Charles W. Romney.
Description: New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2015041706 (print) | LCCN 2015044608 (ebook) |
ISBN 978–0–19–025029–4 (hardcover: alk. paper) | ISBN 978–0–19–025030–0 (E-book) |
ISBN 978–0–19–025031–7 (Online Component) | ISBN 978–0–19–060888–0 (E-book)
Subjects: LCSH: Labor unions—Law and legislation—United States—History—20th century. |
Industrial relations—United States—History—20th century. | Cannery workers—Labor unions—
California—History—20th century.
Classification: LCC KF3389 .R66 2016 (print) | LCC KF3389 (ebook) |
DDC 331.880973/09044—dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015041706

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by Sheridan, USA
For Susanah
 CON T EN T S

Map  viii

Introduction  1

PART I: The Progressive Union Victory, 1935–​1945

1. Legal Procedure in the Pacific Canneries   9
2. Contesting Contracts in Northern California   33
3. The Responsive Wartime State   54
4. The Seafarer Strikes and the Postwar Progressive Victory   74

PART II: The Teamster Restoration, 1945–​1946

5. Politics, Procedure, and Paul Herzog   99
6. Blacklists and Strikes   120
7. The Blacklist Wins   144

PART III: The End of Progressive Unions, 1946–​1950

8. The Cold War in the Canneries   165
9. Paying for a Procedural State   188
Conclusion  209

Acknowledgments  213
Archival Abbreviations   215
Notes  223
Bibliography of Archives, Microfilms, and Oral Histories   257
Index  263
Map 1
The Fight for the Pacific Canneries, 1935–​1950
Rights Delayed
 Introduction

P rogressive unions flourished in the 1930s by working alongside federal

agencies created during the New Deal. Yet in 1950, few progressive
unions remained. Why? Most scholars point to domestic anticommunism
and southern conservatives in Congress as the forces that diminished the
New Deal state, eliminated progressive unions, and destroyed the radical
potential of American liberalism.1 In this book, I argue that anticommu-
nism and congressional conservatism merely intensified the main reason
for the decline of progressive unions: the New Deal state’s focus on legal
procedure.
Legal procedure shaped a fight between progressive and conservative
unions over food-​packing plants on the Pacific coast between 1935 and
1950.2 This union struggle over the Pacific canneries provides a good case
study for understanding the demise of progressive unions and the decline
of the New Deal state. The labor organizations seeking to represent can-
nery workers—​ranging from a regional branch of the Teamsters to a left-​
led union with ties to the Communist Party—​offered starkly different
political programs. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the
federal agency created in 1935 to protect the right of workers to organize,
and other federal agencies maintained a deep engagement with the Pacific
canneries from the passing of the Wagner Act (officially, the National
Labor Relations Act) in 1935 to the end of union competition in 1950. The
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit played a crucial, if enigmatic,
role in the fight between progressive and conservative unions. Workers
themselves struggled to choose a union through a complex system of legal
rules. Each group framed its claims in procedural language, jostling for
position within the administrative state.
The clash in the Pacific canneries emerged out of divisions within the
American labor movement. The American Federation of Labor (AFL)
 ( 2 )   Rights Delayed

organized its members by skilled craft after its origins in 1886, but
by the 1930s several AFL leaders and labor activists outside the AFL
wanted unions to organize the increasing number of industrial work-
ers in mass-​production plants. The debate over whether to organize
workers by craft or by industry implied a potential cultural transforma-
tion of union membership. The craft-​oriented AFL represented mostly
white Protestant men, while industrial plants employed more African
Americans, women, and recent Catholic immigrants. In 1935 several
unions broke away from the AFL to form the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) to organize workers by industry. Until the early
1950s, the two rival union federations fought bitterly over potential
members, political programs, and the involvement of the federal gov-
ernment in labor relations. 3
Unions from the AFL and the CIO both sought to represent employ-
ees in the Pacific canneries throughout the 1930s and 1940s. By 1945,
cannery workers faced a choice between the AFL’s Teamsters Union and
the CIO’s Food, Tobacco, Agricultural, and Allied Workers (FTA). The
West Coast branch of the Teamsters differed from many AFL unions by
using a “cross-​craft” strategy of organizing workers in industries beyond
transportation, but otherwise the West Coast Teamsters resembled many
AFL unions by opposing many federal programs and attacking its rivals
as communists. Several FTA leaders belonged to the Communist Party,
and the CIO union offered cannery workers a larger role in setting union
policies and stronger rhetorical support for gender and racial equity.4
Workers and organizers described the fight over the Pacific canneries
in political terms in the 1930s and 1940s that linked their local struggle
to the national contest between the AFL and the CIO. Workers and union
officials also used the words “conservative” and “progressive” to identify
themselves. In 1950, Local 78 in Watsonville, California, published a
pamphlet that defined itself as a “PROGRESSIVE union of shed work-
ers run by shed workers.”5 In 1946 a Teamster official from Los Angeles
called the union’s relationship with employers and its collective bargain-
ing agreement “a conservative order.”6 At times, union lawyers, company
counsel, and NLRB attorneys referred to unions with political labels in
their legal briefs. Lawyers for all sides also debated how legal procedure
should be applied to the Pacific canneries. In 1946 NLRB general coun-
sel Gerhard Van Arkel worried about the “the use of Board procedures
to block rather than expedite collective bargaining” in several canneries
in northern California.7 Participants in the struggle to control the Pacific
canneries often expressed their claims in the language of legal procedure,
and often defined the stakes of union competition as a victory for either
conservative or progressive unions.
 I n t r o d u c t i o n    ( 3 )

The story of workers, unions, and the state in the Pacific canneries
unfolded in three distinct phases. Initially, progressive unions thrived by
embracing the procedural culture of New Deal agencies and the wartime
American state. Between 1935 and 1945, unions mastered the complex
rules of the NLRB and other federal entities by working with government
officials. In 1946 and 1947, however, the emphasis on legal procedure
made the federal state too slow to combat potentially illegal cooperation
between employers and the Teamsters. Workers who supported progres-
sive unions rallied around procedural language to stop what they con-
sidered Teamster collusion, but they found themselves dependent on an
ineffective federal state. In the last phase, the state became even less able
to protect employees belonging to left-​led unions after the Taft-​Hartley
Act of 1947 barred union leaders from belonging to the Communist
Party. Many leaders of progressive unions refused to comply with Taft-​
Hartley’s anticommunist provisions, and those unions lost access to the
NLRB’s procedures. From 1946 until 1950, progressive unions withered
and eventually disappeared from the Pacific canneries as the unions failed
to pay the cost of legal representation before the NLRB. Workers support-
ing progressive unions had embraced procedural language to claim their
rights, but by 1950 those workers discovered that their rights had van-
ished in an endless legal discourse.
This argument connecting the decline of progressive unions to the pro-
cedural orientation of the state extends and refines several lines of scholar-
ship. The main left-​led food processing union created a culture of biracial
and ethnic solidarity and suffered from anticommunist attacks, but the
union’s relationship with the state also shaped its initial success and its
eventual decline.8 The issues that consumed the NLRB in Washington,
DC—​a hostile Congress, a debate over the reach of labor law, the con-
nection between judicial review and agency procedures—​a lso hindered
the NLRB on the ground by instilling a devotion to proper procedure in
the agency’s field offices.9 Administrative agencies like the NLRB gained
some autonomy from the courts by adopting legal procedure internally.10
The resulting legalistic culture, however, made those agencies too slow
to protect certain rights. The story of union conflict and the procedural
state also revisits some issues in the debate over the relationship between
the New Deal collective bargaining regime and the radical potential of
American workers in the 1930s.11 In the Pacific canneries, local unions of
all ideological stances creatively modified the NLRB’s rules and incorpo-
rated aspects of those rules—​such as the NLRB’s use of pledge cards to
measure support—​into organizing strategies and union bylaws. The New
Deal collective bargaining regime limited the political possibilities of can-
nery workers through the results of the NLRB’s procedural focus: long
 ( 4 )   Rights Delayed

cases, a state unable to act quickly, and unions unevenly burdened by the
cost of legal representation.
Understanding the defeat of left-​led unions helps explain the failure of
progressive politics in America at midcentury. Progressive unions in the
CIO led the fight for social and political change in the 1930s and 1940s.
Ira Katznelson writes of the “New Deal of the CIO” that produced “whole
openings for social change,” openings that closed after 1950.12 The defeat
of the radical wing of the CIO by the 1950s eliminated the leading edge of
American liberalism for a generation.13 Katznelson connects the decline
of the radical wing of the CIO to the emergence of what he calls the pro-
cedural state. Southern conservatives in Congress feared the rising influ-
ence of the CIO within the Democratic Party, helped pass legislation to
stop the growth of unions, and halted CIO activism by subordinating fed-
eral agencies to congressional oversight and judicial review. Katznelson
describes the procedural state as a broker between competing interests.
The NLRB fits this definition in a broad sense, although in the Pacific
canneries the NLRB relied on legal procedure to manage competition
between unions.14 Katznelson’s argument about the procedural state and
the decline of the CIO prompts the question, how exactly did the proce-
dural state damage left-​led unions?
The union fight over the Pacific canneries supplies an answer to this
question and provides a closer look at the operation of the procedural
state on the ground. The state hurt progressive unions by focusing on
legal procedure. The phrase “legal procedure” stands for a complicated
system at work in the state.15 Labor organizations encountered a state
much more complex than just a forum for competing private groups. The
NLRB, for example, made sure that its field offices collected a certain kind
of evidence. Unions trained their organizers to gather material that reg-
istered with the NLRB and creatively translated the agency’s rules into
union bylaws. To investigate a claim, the NLRB held hearings, drafted
reports, and issued decisions in a proscribed sequence. Employers and
unions then enjoyed the right to appeal NLRB decisions to the federal
appellate courts, adding a new round of oral arguments and briefs to the
agency’s investigation.16 The sequence of legal forums within the NLRB
and before the federal appellate courts strung out cases for years. This
encompassing system of legal procedure imposed large costs on unions,
which needed to pay lawyers at each stage of the sequence. The system
also made the NLRB dependent on unions to provide legal representa-
tion to workers and to collect evidence for the NLRB. Workers found that
the most damaging aspect of the system came from the time required to
resolve their claims. The state created a maze of legal steps before it could
act. Progressive unions initially mastered this complex system, but then
 I n t r o d u c t i o n    ( 5 )

suffered defeat when the state proved too slow to protect the rights of
workers.
The book contains three parts. The first part explains the initial success
of progressive unions working with the state from 1935 to 1945. Chapter 1
charts the spread of legal procedure from local NLRB field offices to AFL
and CIO unions in the late 1930s. Unions creatively adapted the labor
board’s rules to their own bylaws and contracts as organizers focused
on evidence that registered with the NLRB. Chapter 2 focuses on the
clash over established AFL unions in northern California between 1935
and 1941. The CIO and the NLRB fought to let workers choose their
own union, while the AFL embedded legal procedure in their contracts
to resist representation elections. Chapter 3 covers the Pacific canner-
ies during World War II. The progressive union Local 78 worked with
regional NLRB attorneys to change the agency’s rules for seasonal plants;
the resulting decisions by the NLRB unsettled several key aspects of labor
law for the Pacific canneries in ways that favored Local 78 and its CIO
allies. Chapter 4 starts with several 1945 strikes by workers in Portland
and Sacramento. The strikes radiated well beyond those cities, altered the
procedural status of the strategically important northern California can-
neries, and led to an election victory in late 1945 that promised CIO con-
trol of the Pacific canneries.
The book’s second part examines the reversal of the CIO victory
between 1945 and 1946 by the AFL Teamsters Union. Chapter 5 moves
the analysis to Washington, DC, and to the NLRB chairman, Paul Herzog,
who confronted the controversy in northern California after a long period
of congressional attacks. The Teamsters used allegations of “forgery,” dis-
charges in the AFL closed shop in northern California, and Congressional
hearings to pressure the Board to dismiss the CIO victory in northern
California. Chapter 6 explores the futile attempts by the NLRB to find a
legal basis to prevent what agency attorneys considered illegal collusion
between the Teamsters and employers. After the NLRB failed to convince
a federal appeals court to stop the operation of the AFL contract, embit-
tered CIO supporters launched strikes in Sacramento and Stockton that
shut down several canneries for weeks but that left the Teamster “blacklist”
intact. Chapter 7 explains how case law and procedural rules constrained
the NLRB’s options in the summer of 1946 and resulted in a second elec-
tion in northern California. Before the vote, the Teamsters operated the
union’s blacklist with impunity, fired many CIO supporters, and threat-
ened to resist any CIO victory with blockades. The Teamsters won a nar-
row victory in 1946 by exploiting the NLRB’s lengthy procedures.
The book’s last part narrates the end of progressive unions between
1946 and 1950. Chapter 8 measures the effect of two national trends on
 ( 6 )   Rights Delayed

the Pacific canneries in 1946 and 1947: the NLRB’s increasing empha-
sis on industrial stability, and the domestic Cold War’s damaging effects
on left-​led unions. While the FTA’s own decision not to comply with the
Taft-​Hartley Act left the union’s supporters without the protections of
labor law, the two national developments intensified the effects of the
NLRB’s procedural focus. Lengthy cases exposed CIO supporters to
shifts in the law, and long investigations allowed the Teamsters to col-
lude with employers without penalty. Chapter 9 maps the decline of the
FTA between 1947 and 1950 by illustrating the dependence of both the
NLRB and individual workers on functioning unions. The NLRB aban-
doned strong cases against employers because the FTA could not collect
evidence for the state, and workers lacked the funds to pay lawyers to pro-
tect their rights in NLRB forums. The book’s conclusion assesses the state
and the defeat of progressive unions in the 1930s and 1940s. Progressive
unions thrived between 1935 and 1945 by working through the state. By
1950, however, progressive unions and their supporters had learned that
the procedural state favored conservative unions that cooperated with
companies.
 PART I

The Progressive Union Victory,

1935–​1945
 CHAP T ER 1

Legal Procedure in
the Pacific Canneries

L ocal NLRB officials brought the Wagner Act to the Pacific canner-
ies between 1935 and 1941. The NLRB’s field offices focused on legal
procedure in each case by carefully documenting the agency’s conclu-
sions. The emphasis on proper legal procedure spread from the NLRB
field offices to local union organizers, union bylaws, and union rules.
Although Pacific cannery unions developed distinct ideologies, most
unions embedded the NLRB’s procedures in their own rules and used
internal union practices to collect evidence required by the NLRB. In
the late 1930s the NLRB used pledge cards to measure union support in
the canneries, a measure that local unions adopted as part of their own
requirements for membership.
Unions competed most intensely in the Pacific fish canneries in
the first years after the Wagner Act was passed. Unions in fish pack-
ing modified the act’s protection of the closed shop to create contracts
that policed pledge cards. In addition to shaping labor organizing, the
emphasis on legal procedure extended the time required for NLRB
investigations. The resulting long cases pressed unions to pay for
extended periods of legal representation and to support their often des-
titute members. Legal procedure appeared neutral on its face by treat-
ing all unions equally, but in local practice an emphasis on procedure
favored unions with the funds to endure investigations that often lasted
years. In the Pacific canneries in the late 1930s, legal reasoning and legal
procedure framed the NLRB’s local operations and encompassed each
union’s local organizing.
 ( 10 )   Rights Delayed

LEGAL PROCEDURE IN THE NLRB FIELD OFFICES

NLRB regional attorneys carefully assembled their case files when faced
with employer resistance to the Wagner Act in the Pacific canneries. The
local emphasis on legal procedure came from several sources. Between
1935 and 1937 the entire agency worked to convince the Supreme Court
of the Wagner Act’s constitutionality.1 The NLRB also reacted to the
Supreme Court’s Morgan ruling on procedure in administrative agencies
and (after 1938) reacted to the Smith Committee’s attacks on its opera-
tions in Congress by ensuring the agency’s procedures could withstand
judicial and congressional scrutiny.2 Many NLRB officials did not need
external threats to justify their devotion to legal reasoning. Throughout
the 1930s, many government attorneys—​a long with many federal judges
and legal scholars—​believed that good administration required each gov-
ernment agency to practice proper legal procedure. 3 Local NLRB officials
in the Pacific field offices in Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles had
additional reasons to stress a careful, legal approach to cannery cases.
Until April 1940, some employers claimed that the canneries fell outside
the NLRB’s jurisdiction because of the agricultural nature of food pro-
cessing. This additional employer argument over the agency’s jurisdiction
forced local NLRB attorneys to collect evidence on the industrial nature
of canning. For all these reasons, NLRB regional officials focused on legal
procedure when bringing the Wagner Act to the Pacific canneries.
Canning employers had good reasons to legally resist the NLRB. Food
processing differed from other industries because of its seasonal schedule
of production, so that companies packed different fruits and vegetables
during specific times of the year. Cannery workers migrated with the sea-
sons, traveling throughout the year to canneries and sheds of peaches,
tomatoes, and lettuce. This seasonal cycle of packing food made the tim-
ing of collective bargaining very important. Workers without a contract at
the start of a packing season had a limited period to convince employers
to negotiate. The short duration of packing seasons for each fruit and veg-
etable also gave employers wary of unions an incentive to extend the reso-
lution of an NLRB investigation.4 In 1938 NLRB economist David Saposs
noted the way canning firms sought delays when faced with a NLRB
investigation: “Employers are trying to prolong hearings until the season
is over.”5 In addition to extending NLRB hearings, employers opposed
to unions also sought to delay the resolution of investigations by appeal-
ing NLRB decisions to the federal appellate courts. Usually an appeal for
judicial review pushed the resolution of an organizing drive into the fol-
lowing packing season or longer, giving canning firms at least one more
“pack” without a collective bargaining agreement. Seasonal production
 L e g a l P r o c e d u r e i n t h e Pa c i f i c C a n n e ri e s    ( 11 )

and employer incentives for delay in food processing elevated the impor-
tance of time. In most industries a series of long delays hurt workers, but
in food processing even a short delay could mean workers lacked union
representation for a year or more.
The strategy of extending investigations and appeals worked for some
firms. For example, lettuce operators resisted employees trying to create a
union (Fruit and Vegetable Workers’ Union of California, Local 18211) in
Salinas and Watsonville in 1936. The companies hired private detectives
to spy on the union, used gas against union supporters on a picket line,
and convinced local police to attack workers with clubs. In response, the
NLRB first turned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Attorneys in the
NLRB office in San Francisco asked the FBI and the Justice Department
to run criminal background checks on various security guards hired by
the companies.6 After receiving the FBI report and conducting its own
investigation, NLRB attorneys in San Francisco submitted the case to the
Board in Washington. In its decision the Board noted that the “impres-
sion of these events obtained from the record is one of inexcusable police
brutality, in many instances bordering upon sadism.” 7 In describing the
violence, the Board relied on legal language, describing its “impression”
from the legal “record.” In addition to noting the violence, the Board ruled
that the companies had engaged in a long list of unfair labor practices.
The lettuce firms appealed the NLRB’s ruling to the US Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, and in 1939—​three years after the initial organiz-
ing drive—​the court ruled that the lettuce companies had committed
unfair labor practices in attacking their employees. The Ninth Circuit did
not agree with the NLRB, however, that Local 18211 in Salinas enjoyed
enough support among employees to force the companies to recognize
the union.8 Three years after the initial organizing drive and violent
attacks, the federal courts forced union organizers in the Salinas lettuce
sheds to start over.
To combat employer resistance, NLRB officials in the Pacific field offices
took the necessary time to collect evidence for possible judicial review of
their cannery cases. The NLRB sent a memo to all its field offices in 1938,
stressing the need to prepare for potential court review: “The record taken
at the hearings before the Trial Examiners will in most instances contain all
the evidence in the case, and will be the record on which the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals will base its determination, if the case is taken
to that Court.” The memo emphasized the need for an extensive “record,”
noting that “the importance of having the record as complete as possible
can readily be seen.”9 A complex investigation of dried fruit employers in
California’s Santa Clara County in 1938 prompted the chief economist
of the Board, David Saposs, to explain the need for legal documentation
 ( 12 )   Rights Delayed

to the San Francisco field office: “Past experience has demonstrated that
when material of this sort is not introduced into the record but reserved
for brief, it is extremely difficult to get such data from sources of which
the court will take judicial notice. I therefore urge that such material, if it
is to the used, be placed in the record.”10 Saposs wanted the San Francisco
office to collect legal evidence well before any employer appeal, so that the
“record” contained information that would register with the judiciary.
The assumption of judicial review and the need for a complete record
did not stem from any reversals before the federal courts in cannery cases.
Some federal appellate circuits reversed a number of NLRB rulings, but
from 1935 to 1941 the courts did not completely overturn a Board decision
concerning food processing in the Pacific region.11 Nonetheless, despite
the absence of adverse judicial review, local NLRB attorneys prepared
each case with procedural care. The three Pacific field offices focused on
extensive documentation in cases beyond food processing. NLRB offi-
cials in the Seattle field office took just as much care over an investigation
involving the Teamsters and the International Longshore and Warehouse
Union in the late 1930s as they did over investigations involving fish pro-
cessing.12 Local agency officials assumed that they needed to prepare their
cases with extensive documentation and proper procedure for possible
judicial review.
The attention to legal detail often worked. Immediately after the
Wagner Act was passed, company lawyers argued that the NLRB had
no jurisdiction over packing fruits and vegetables, because packing food
did not involve interstate commerce. In 1937 the Ninth Circuit upheld a
Board decision that canned food crossed state lines. After their arguments
about interstate commerce failed, companies looked to the exception in
the Wagner Act for farmworkers (the law excluded agricultural employ-
ees).13 To combat these company claims, NLRB regional attorneys col-
lected evidence on the industrial nature of food processing. In 1938 the
NLRB rejected arguments by seafood employers in Alaska and defined
canning employees in seasonal industries as industrial workers involved
in nonagricultural jobs. The Board used the Alaska canning precedent in
1939 and 1940 to rule against several other companies that claimed their
employees worked on farms.14 NLRB staff worried, however, that com-
panies would continue to contest their jurisdiction over food production
until the federal courts confirmed the Board’s ruling.
NLRB attorneys focused on several companies that packed citrus in
southern California. In Pasadena, California, a group of orange pack-
ers asked its members in 1938 to “correlate our program for exemption
of agricultural labor under the National Labor Relations Act.”15 A larger
group of companies that packaged oranges in California’s North Whittier
 L e g a l P r o c e d u r e i n t h e Pa c i f i c C a n n e ri e s    ( 13 )

Heights resisted the NLRB’s jurisdiction and appealed a Board rul-

ing that applied the Wagner Act to the association’s plants. In response,
NLRB economist David Saposs prepared a memo on the “Logical Point
of Separation of Industry from Agriculture” to guide NLRB investigators
collecting evidence on the process of packing oranges. That evidence let
NLRB attorneys claim that the plants in North Whittier Heights con-
tained “specialized machinery for the mass-​production handling and
processing of citrus.”16 In January 1940 the Ninth Circuit accepted the
NLRB’s arguments. When the Supreme Court declined to review the
decision in April, the NLRB’s careful documentation of industrial food
production succeeded. This victory, however, illustrates the problem of
lengthy cases. The Whittier citrus employees had first filed a petition
with the NLRB in the summer of 1937 to protest the firing of one of their
coworkers, O. W. Rudick. The NLRB did not succeed in getting Rudick
reinstated in his job until the summer of 1940, three years later.17
At times, extensive documentation by the Pacific NLRB field offices
persuaded companies to accept a ruling by the NLRB without appeal. In a
case against a tomato-​packing firm in Seattle in 1939, for example, regional
NLRB officials succeeded in stopping the intimidation of CIO organizers
and persuaded companies to rehire discharged union organizers in their
former jobs.18 NLRB regional attorneys also convinced a grape-​packing
company in northern California in 1940 to reinstate a group of AFL sup-
porters.19 Initially, the tomato and grape firms resisted the NLRB, filing
exceptions to the agency’s “Intermediate Reports” and challenging the
findings of the agency’s regional attorneys. Yet the employers did not
appeal the NLRB’s final decisions. These cases of employer respect for
the NLRB highlight the importance of gathering evidence in the Pacific
NLRB offices. The tomato and grape companies declined to challenge
Board decisions after NLRB attorneys in Seattle and San Francisco wrote
reports, held hearings, filed briefs, and prepared for an assumed appeal to
the courts. Employers complied with NLRB rulings in those two cases
because of the legal case prepared by the NLRB field office. Behind even
routine success in letting cannery workers choose a union stood exten-
sive effort by NLRB attorneys to document the claims of workers and the
NLRB’s conclusions.
Local NLRB officials worried about legal procedure just as much as
attorneys in the NLRB’s legal division in Washington, DC. Regional attor-
neys in Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles carefully documented
their investigations of canneries. The focus on legal procedure and exten-
sive documentation increased the time needed for the investigations of
the NLRB field offices. The NLRB had other reasons besides a focus on
legal procedure for the slow pace of cases—​in the late 1930s the agency
 ( 14 )   Rights Delayed

struggled to handle a large number of investigations with limited staff

and with little autonomy for the regional offices.20 The long time needed
for investigations hurt some cannery workers and aided some cannery
employers who resisted unions. The short packing seasons for many fruits
and vegetables favored the companies, who could use NLRB procedures,
petitions for judicial review, and procedural delays to avoid collective bar-
gaining until the following year. In addition to the potential advantage
for employers, the emphasis on legal procedure by the Pacific field offices
had a wide range of consequences for workers and for the operation of
the federal state in the canneries. One effect appeared immediately: legal
procedure quickly spread from the regional NLRB field offices to local
cannery unions.

UNION ORGANIZING IN THE PACIFIC CANNERIES

Union organizers in the Pacific canneries depended for their success on

much more than proper legal procedure. Unions emerged out of other
collective experiences—​the work culture of food production, the social
world of cannery workers, and the common bond (for many) of gender.
Unions also faced many barriers to organizing the canneries that had
little to do with the NLRB or labor law, including a fragmented group
of employers spread over a wide geographic area. Unions organizing in
the canneries also espoused widely different goals that went well beyond
winning another case before the NLRB. The 1937 split between the AFL
and the CIO intensified these ideological divisions over representing the
Pacific canneries. The AFL and CIO designed different models of union
structure and promoted rival political programs. Yet to achieve their
political goals and to represent cannery workers, unions needed to gain
collective bargaining agreements with employers through the National
Labor Relations Board. When a union organized a particular cannery,
that union needed to conform to the expectations of the NLRB. Union
organizers might worry slightly less than NLRB attorneys about an
appeal to the federal courts, but union organizers still needed to docu-
ment their support among workers in ways that registered with the NLRB
and with the courts. Although different Pacific cannery unions developed
separate models of local autonomy and distinct political programs, most
unions incorporated the NLRB’s legal procedures into their organizing
strategies.
Before filing any legal petitions with the NLRB, labor organizers first
needed to overcome several barriers to building support among workers
in the Pacific canneries. Organizers found canneries spread over a wide
 L e g a l P r o c e d u r e i n t h e Pa c i f i c C a n n e ri e s    ( 15 )

area. Organizers also faced employers ranging from large corporations to

a single family or an individual. Even within a small region the type and
scale of owners varied greatly. In the late 1930s, for example, 1,500 work-
ers packed lettuce in 30 sheds spread over 20 miles of the Salt River area
in Arizona. The smallest packing shed employed 15 workers, while the
largest had just over 100 employees. Twenty-​six different companies and
4 individuals owned the 30 packing sheds. Sixteen of the owners oper-
ated only in Arizona, and 10 owned canneries outside the state, including
3 or 4 large corporations.21 Each of these owners in Arizona and else-
where employed a diverse group of workers. A 1937 report by AFL presi-
dent William Green estimated that women comprised 60 to 75 percent
of cannery workers nationally, and that nonwhite workers constituted
over 50 percent of employees in the canneries. Green believed the great
diversity of cannery workers presented an obstacle to building stable local
unions.22 Labor organizers needed to overcome geographic distance,
fragmented employers, and the diversity of cannery workers.
Despite these common obstacles, individual unions developed a vari-
ety of union cultures. Before 1937 all cannery locals belonged to the
American Federation of Labor (AFL) as federal unions (also called “direct
affiliates”). These federal unions received a charter from the AFL and
communicated with the AFL’s office in Washington and with a regional
representative who reported to AFL president William Green.23 The
lack of an international AFL cannery union both aided and hindered the
autonomy of local unions. Federal cannery unions did not meet together.
Instead, each federal local developed individual organizing strategies and
contrasting political views.24 The ideological diversity masked a general
problem: local leaders lacked autonomy. Federal unions depended on
the AFL office in Washington for funds and needed permission for many
union activities, such as strikes. After the creation of the CIO in 1937,
those unions that remained within the AFL retained their status as fed-
eral locals and continued to report to AFL leaders. Within the CIO, sev-
eral unions organized cannery workers, including the fishing unions and
the International Longshore and Warehouse Union on the Pacific Coast.
Most former AFL federal locals that joined the CIO, however, went with
the United Cannery, Agriculture, Packing, and Allied Workers of America
(UCAPAWA), a union the NLRB called “the United.” After 1937 the two
main groups of cannery union locals—​the AFL federal locals and the
local unions in the United—​developed two separate cultures and two
distinct political ideologies.25
The AFL and the CIO approached the issue of gender differently.
A female organizer could make appeals that would be difficult for a male
organizer to make. In Olympia, Washington, in 1939, a United local
 ( 16 )   Rights Delayed

union sought to organize workers who already belonged to a federal AFL

union. Organizer Grace Brown of the United called a meeting in Olympia
to “discuss candidates, who we know will carry on the union to the bet-
terment of the workers, and especially the women.” Brown urged work-
ers to elect local officials “who will do a little something for us.” Brown
accused the AFL of not working for the interests of women. “There seems
to be a prevailing opinion among the women that the union should have
done better by us this season,” she noted. She also sought to connect the
lower wages of women with the lack of women in the union leadership.
She asked, “Do you know why the men in the Olympia Cannery have
better wages and better working conditions than the women? Why don’t
we howl for the women’s business agent? Or at least turn and tell our he-​
business agent how we feel after a shift is over.” Brown suggested that she
was one of “them,” one of the women working in the canneries, and called
for a female business agent who would work for the interests of women.
This appeal based on gender could only come from the local CIO union—​
the AFL in Olympia had a male business agent and a man overseeing the
AFL in the state.26 With the large number of women in the Pacific can-
neries, unions with female organizers could design different campaigns
than unions who employed only men. Brown made gender the basis of her
appeal to Olympia’s cannery workers.
The main AFL and CIO cannery unions also created different mod-
els for the relationship between local union officials and the leadership
of the union in Washington, DC. At times the degree of local autonomy
distinguished the AFL from the CIO even more than their differences on
gender. In some places the AFL and the CIO both employed women as
organizers. For example, the United and the AFL both sought to orga-
nize fish-​packing workers in Anacortes, Washington. Betty Anderson led
the fight for the CIO, and Josephine Sklenar headed the campaign for the
AFL. The employer resisted both unions. The National Labor Relations
Board held an election between the two unions in 1939, and workers at
all three canneries voted for the AFL.27 Anderson and Sklenar worked
for union federations with different structures. The AFL limited the
autonomy of its local unions. In 1941 Peggy Urbick, the leader of AFL
Cannery Workers Union Local 20296 in Bellingham, Washington, wrote
to AFL president William Green with an update on her organizing activi-
ties. Green wrote back: “Urge no action be taken by your local union
until Mr. Hughes has had opportunity to make customary investigation
of matter.”28 Urbick could only act after consulting with Charles Hughes,
the AFL representative for the Pacific Northwest. The AFL also limited
the ability of male organizers to act—​Green’s many letters to various
AFL regional representatives (Daniel Flanagan, Charles Hughes, Meyer
 L e g a l P r o c e d u r e i n t h e Pa c i f i c C a n n e ri e s    ( 17 )

Lewis, and Edward Vandeleur), stressed their oversight of the activities of

local cannery leaders.29 Local AFL organizers could do little without the
approval of AFL leaders.
Unlike the AFL, the CIO placed fewer constraints on its local orga-
nizers. Vicki Ruiz has shown that Dorothy Ray (later Healey) and Luisa
Moreno of the United led several successful organizing drives for can-
neries in southern California largely on their own. The United campaign
for California Walnut provides a good example of how Ray and Moreno
designed an organizing campaign that stressed gender without much aid
from the national union. 30 California Walnut operated two large walnut-​
processing plants in southern California, and women made up nearly all
of the 1,300 California Walnut employees (the company employed only
65 men in the processing plants). Both the AFL and the CIO held initial
meetings with California Walnut employees in September 1937. While
a handful of workers attended the AFL meeting, the United meeting
drew 300 to 400 women working at the two plants. The CIO newspaper
emphasized the female leadership at California Walnut with articles such
as “Women Walnut Leaders.” In response to employee support for the
CIO, California Walnut organized a company union with a closed-​shop
contract and fired eight supporters of the CIO. Finally, in March 1940, the
United won a close vote of 629 to 611 in an NLRB representation election
at the two California Walnut plants.31 Dorothy Ray and Luisa Moreno
led the fight at California Walnut without needing to receive authoriza-
tion of their actions from CIO officials, and the two organizers focused
on the importance of women leaders at the two plants in their appeal to
California Walnut’s employees.
In addition to autonomy and gender, the organizing campaign at
California Walnut also depended on the NLRB’s legal procedures. In an
oral history many years later, Dorothy Healey remembered the length of
time required by the NLRB and the courts, saying, “It was a very tedious
process because of the big change that the employers had been able to
win was that every decision could be judicially reviewed.”32 Lawyers for
California Walnut challenged every fact in the case. Much of the fight
focused on pledge cards or authorization cards. Workers who supported
a particular union would sign a card for that union. At one point in May
1938, California Walnut’s lawyers convinced the NLRB trial examiner
to summon each employee who had signed a CIO pledge card—​a ll 700
workers. “Now over David Sokol’s objections, the respondent is calling
each and every one of 700 odd persons to the stand on the 8(5) charge,”
NLRB lawyer William Walsh reported to the NLRB staff in Washington,
DC. Walsh noted the ruling would cause long delays: “The Trial Examiner
has permitted the testimony and if persisted in, it will prolong the case
 ( 18 )   Rights Delayed

indefinitely.” Two months earlier the director of the Los Angeles NLRB
office, Towne Nylander, explained how any delays would hurt the CIO
organizing drive: “The union feels that if the matter is delayed six months
or so, their organization will be completely wiped out.”33 Both Walsh and
Nylander complained that California Walnut’s lawyers used the NLRB’s
legal procedures to prolong the case. CIO organizers had evidence of
employee support (pledge cards), they had labor law on their side, and
they had NLRB attorneys as allies. But CIO organizers and NLRB attor-
neys alike feared a long legal process.
Despite these fears of procedural delay, the CIO persisted in organiz-
ing California Walnut for twenty more months. By January 1940 the
NLRB and the company had worked out an agreement to hold elec-
tions. California Walnut had fired eight CIO supporters and refused
to rehire the eight workers (the CIO and the NLRB field office in Los
Angeles called this refusal to rehire a “blacklist”). 34 The proposed agree-
ment did not award back pay to those CIO supporters on the California
Walnut blacklist, and the CIO opposed it. William Walsh of the NLRB
office in Los Angeles described the CIO stance to the NLRB staff in
Washington: “The Union feels that because of the reduced circumstances
of the individuals involved, because, as they contend, by black-​listing
activities of the Company, that, as a matter of principle, there should be
some provision for back pay.” The fired CIO supporters faced destitution.
Estelle Frankfurter at the NLRB headquarters in Washington echoed
Walsh in describing the financial plight of the discharged employees as
being “based on the reduced circumstances of the workers growing out of
blacklisting by the company.”35 The CIO refusal to accept the agreement
points out how the NLRB’s lengthy legal procedures assumed unions had
resources. California Walnut could afford the lawyers needed to operate
in the NLRB’s legal process. The CIO paid for their own lawyers, yet the
CIO also needed to provide for its members, who had been without work
for twenty months. Delays in deciding the case drained the resources
of the CIO and favored the company. At California Walnut the CIO
demands paid off, however, as the NLRB convinced California Walnut to
include back pay in the settlement. 36 Yet the costs of complying with the
NLRB’s legal procedures would continue to limit both the ability of the
CIO to organize unions and the ability of cannery workers to choose their
own representatives.
Moreno and Ray won a victory in an NLRB certification election
at California Walnut, but at other times their CIO union struggled to
conform to the NLRB’s legal procedures. The NLRB required unions
to observe fixed deadlines for the submission of briefs and evidence,
and the NLRB required union representatives to appear at various
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Ainoa säälinilmaus, minkä tämä surullinen näytelmä aiheutti, tuli
erään kreikkalaisen taholta, joka vuoteella loikoen huudahti:

»Ah, ukkelini! Sinunko on poika? Käypää tavaraa tällaisessa

paikassa!
Oikea makupala! Sinä vain olet kuorinut kerman!»

Valkeana kuin vaha, Barba Yani painoi minua rintaansa vasten ja

sanoi väräjävällä ja tukahtuneella äänellä:

»Rohkeutta! Rohkeutta!… Huomenna pääset täältä ja saat

karkoituskäskyn!»

»Karkoituskäskyn!» huudahdin minä. »Minun on siis erottava

sinusta?»

»Se on lievin rangaistus, minkä olen voinut sinulle saada.

Rikoksesi on raskas: tahdoit yölliseen aikaan tunkeutua haaremiin.
Mutta lohduttaudu, minä tulen kanssasi. Maailma on suuri, olemme
vapaita, ja jos vain tottelet minua vast'edes, elät onnellisena Turkin
kamaralla… Siis näkemiin. Ole valmiina huomenna
aamunkoitteessa».

En voinut nukkua koko yönä. Päivän sarastaessa minut noudettiin

vankilasta. Portilla odottivat rattaat ja kaksi pyssyillä ja turkkilaisilla
miekoilla varustettua ratsusantarmia. Silloin näin, että meitä oli
kolme karkoitettavaksi tuomittua. Barba Yani oli siinä myöskin
tavaroinemme. Kaikki sälytettiin rattaille ja seurue lähti Diarbekiria
kohti.

*****
 Ihmisen elämä ei ole kerrottavissa eikä kirjoitettavissa. Sitäkin
vähemmän soveltuu kerrottavaksi sellaisen ihmisen elämä, joka on
rakastanut maata ja samoillut sen ristiin rastiin. Mutta on melkein
mahdotonta antaa elävää kuvaa hänen elämästään, jos hän on ollut
tulisielu, joka on taipaleellaan tuntenut onnen ja kurjuuden kaikki
asteet. Mahdotonta ensiksikin hänelle itselleen, ja mahdotonta niille,
jotka häntä kuuntelevat.

Se mikä on viehättävää, maalauksellisen kaunista ja

mielenkiintoista sielultaan voimakkaan, myrskyävän ja samalla
seikkailunhaluisen miehen elämässä, ei aina ilmene tämän elämän
huomattavissa tapauksissa. Kauneus piilee usein pikkuseikoissa.
Mutta kukapa kuuntelisi pikkuseikkoja? Kukapa nauttisi niistä? Ja
ennenkaikkea, kuka niitä ymmärtäisi?…

Siksipä olenkin aina suhtautunut ynseästi huudahdukseen:

Kertokaa meille jotakin elämästänne!…

Ja sitten vielä eräs vaikeus: ken rakastaa, hän ei ole yksin. Hän ei
ole yksin silloinkaan, kun hän ei enää halaja rakkautta, kuten on
minun laitani nyt. Tämä pitää paikkansa niihinkin ihmisiin nähden,
jotka elävät muistoista, sillä nykyhetkellä on osansa näihin
muistoihin. Ei hyödytä toivoa kuolemaa. Minä olen usein elämässäni
vilpittömästi toivonut sitä. Mutta silloin ovat menneisyyden kauniit
kuvat nousseet ilmielävinä eteeni, ne ovat hellyttäneet sydämeni,
vaihtaneet katkeruuden iloksi ja pakoittaneet minut yhä uudelleen ja
uudelleen etsimään ikuista lohtua ihmisten kasvoista. Yksi näistä
kauniista kuvista oli Barba Yani.

En voi kertoa hänestä mitään, tuskinpa mitään: kahdeksan vuotta

elämästäni kasvoi kiinni hänen elämäänsä… Diarbekir, Alep,
Angora, Sivas, Erzerum ja sadat muut pikku kaupungit ja kylät
näkivät vaeltavat haamumme. Emme myyneet vain yksinomaan
salepia. Kättemme kautta kulki mattoja, liinoja, ihovoiteita, hajuvesiä,
hevosia, koiria ja kissoja, mutta oiva salep auttoi meidät aina
hädästä. Milloin epäonnistunut yritys heitti meidät oljille, etsittiin
kiireesti esille ibrikit, nuo ruostuneet ibrik-pahaset. Ja taas huudeltiin:
»Salepia! Salepia! Kas tässä ovat salepinmyyjät!» Katsoimme
toisiimme ja nauroimme…

Niin, nauroimme, sillä Barba Yani oli verraton ystävä.

Onnettomuuden aiheuttaja olin aina minä, minä parantumaton
hutilus. Muistan eräänkin tapahtuman, joka oli kaikkein tuhoisimpia.

Olimme juuri panneet kaikki rahamme likoon ja ostaneet kaksi

kaunista hevosta suurilta markkinoilta noin viidentoista kilometrin
päässä Angorasta. Olimme tyytyväisiä, sillä kauppa oli ollut hyvä.
Tyytyväisyyskö vai väsymys lienee minussa kotimatkalla herättänyt
halun poiketa hetkiseksi yksinäiseen kapakkaan. Oli pimeä. Barba
Yani vastusti tuumaani.

»Annahan olla, Stavraki! Jatkakaamme kotiin saakka. Siellä

suomme itsellemme lasin».

»Ei, Barba Yani, vaan juuri nyt!… Vain hetkinen. Hyvän kaupan
kunniaksi».

Mies-poloinen suostui. Sidoimme hevoset pylvääseen kapakan

ulkopuolelle. Ja ikkunaan päin kääntyneinä me joimme
kunniaksemme lasin. Sitten toisen. Nälkä nipisteli vatsaa. Söimme
seisovilla jaloin. Sitten tuli taas juoman vuoro, sillä Barba Yanikaan ei
halveksinut elämän antimia. Sydämet alkoivat liikehtiä. Me
lauloimme:
 De nouveau tu t'es saoûlé!…
De nouveau tu casses les verres!…
O, vilaine bête que tu fais!…

[Taasen olet hankkinut itsellesi humalan;

taasen rikot lasisi.
Voi sinua narria!]

Mutta Barba Yanilta katkesi laulu kesken. Katsellen pimeisiin

ruutuihin hän sanoi rauhallisesti:

»Niin, Stavraki, olen totisesti sitä mieltä, että olet 'kurja narri', sillä
kauniit eläimet, jotka jäivät tuonne ulos, ovat nyt poissa, tai on
näköni huono!»

Yhdellä hyppäyksellä olin ulkona, mutta en erottanut muuta kuin

kavioiden kiivaan kapseen pimeässä yössä.

Hapuillessamme tuntia myöhemmin eteenpäin pimeässä ja

kompastellessamme joka kuoppaan, Barba Yani huusi minulle kuin
varoitukseksi ikään:

»Sinä tahdoit 'kunnioittaa hyvää onneamme'! No niin, kulje nyt

jalkaisin, sinä siunattu aasi! Ja laula lohdutukseksesi: 'Taasen olet
hankkinut itsellesi humalan!'»

Mikä onni onkaan tuntea sydämensä sykkivän hyvässä

inhimillisessä maaperässä, tässä mainiossa mullassa, joka välittää
meihin elävöittävää nestettään!

Onneton se, joka ei tästä mitään tiedä!

 Niinä vuosina, jolloin minun ja Barba Yanin elämä oli yhtä, oli itse
luontokin hellivä, veljellinen, runollinen. Kaikki oli mielestäni kaunista
ja elämisen arvoista. Rumuus kadotti vastenmielisyytensä, typeryys
kilpistyi pilantekoomme, kavaluus paljastui, suurten väkivaltakin
tuntui minusta siedettävältä. Kun kosketus karheaan ulkomaailmaan
oli tukehduttaa meidät, pakenimme äänettömään maailmaamme,
tuohon maailmaan, missä luonto yksin haastaa silmille ja sydämelle.

Barba Yani saattoi kulkea päiväkauden sanaa sanomatta.

Katseellaan hän vain osoitti minulle, mikä oli huomion arvoista. Tätä
hän sanoi »terveyskylvyn ottamiseksi». Sitä se todella olikin.
Äänetön luonto puhdistaa ja antaa mielenrauhan elämän
alhaisuuden nöyryyttämälle ihmiselle, sillä voimakkainkaan ei voi
liikkua roskaväen keskellä tuntematta itseään saastutetuksi.

Mutta tämä nuoruusvuosieni suuri seuralainen oli lisäksi

muinaisajan ja sen viisaustieteen tuntija. Keskustelujaan elämästä —
mikä oli hänen joutohetkiensä lempihuvia — hän valaisi
viisaustieteestä ottamillaan esimerkeillä. Itse hän ei aina osannut
elää viisaasti, mutta hän rakasti sydämen hiljaista rauhaa.

»Ennemmin tai myöhemmin älykäs mies ymmärtää, kuinka turhaa

on tunteitten myllerrys, joka turmelee rauhan ja polttaa poroksi
elämän», hän sanoi minulle. »Onnellinen se, ken ymmärtää tämän
varhain, sillä sitä enemmän hän nauttii olemassaolosta».

Eräänä kylmänä syyspäivänä olimme manööverikentällä lähellä

Alepia. Sotilaat vakasivat lämpimän juoman väkirynnäköllä (kuten
sotilaallinen sanontatapa kuuluu). Upseeritkin tulivat maistelemaan
sitä, ja kun meillä oli hehkuvia kivihiiliä ibrikiemme alla, jäivät he
lämmittelemään käsiään ja juttelemaan. Eräs korkea-arvoinen
upseeri kertoi alaiselleen kaskua, jonka mukaan muuan kenraali,
Aleksanteri Suuren ystävä, kehoitti tätä suostumaan Dariuksen
tarjoamaan rauhaan, sanoen:

»Jos olisin Aleksanteri, suostuisin minä rauhaan». Mihin suuri

valloittaja oli vastannut:

»Niin tekisin minäkin, jos olisin… jos olisin…»

Turkkilainen upseeri hämmentyi ja huudahti:

»Ah, mikä olikaan tuon Aleksanterin ystävän nimi?»

»Parmenion!» vastasi Barba Yani, joka kuunteli heidän

keskusteluaan.

»Hyvä, ukkoseni!» huudahti upseeri. »Kuinka sen tiedät?

Salepinmyyjä tuskin tapaa Aleksanteri Suurta!»

»Tapaapa niinkin!» vastasi ystäväni. Kaikkihan tarvitsevat

lämmintä, kuten näette!»

Vastauksen kaksimielisyys huvitti upseeria. Hän alentui

puhelemaan kanssamme, ja nyt sattuivat katseemme yhteen.

»Olen nähnyt sinut jossakin, kasvosi ovat minulle tutut», hän

sanoi.

»Niin», vastasin minä punastuen. »Ajoimme viisi vuotta sitten

Konstantinopolissa samoissa vaunuissa Mustafa-beyn kanssa».

»Kautta Allahin, se on totta? Sinä olet siis tuo poika, joka etsi
silmäpuolta äitiään. Sait varmaankin kokea monta kovaa tuon
satyyrin luona!»
 »Niin… En tuntenut häntä!»

»Kuinka saatoit luottaa ensimäiseen vastaantulijaan, joka silitteli

hyväillen lapsekkaita kasvojasi?» Upseeri puheli kauan kanssamme,
kertoillen Mustafa beyn suurista konnantöistä. Sitten hän alkoi
keskustella innokkaasti Barba Yanin kanssa, jonka tiedot
hämmästyttivät häntä. Ja lähtiessään hän puristi sydämellisesti
käsiämme, ja antoi meille kummallekin turkkilaisen kultarahan.

»Se ei ole juomarahaa», sanoi hän. »Tahdon vain osoittaa pitäväni

arvossa vanhuksen viisautta ja nuorukaisen kärsimystä».

Kotimatkalla Barba Yani päätteli:

»Näetkös, Stavro? Erhettä on paljon, mutta älykkäisyys poistaa

raja-aidat, vaikkapa asianomainen olisi puettu
sotilasunivormuunkin!»

Tällävälin Barba Yani vanheni. Sydäntauti teki hänet vuosi

vuodelta yhä kykenemättömämmäksi ansaitsemaan leipäänsä.
Väsymys valtasi hänet usein. Hän vaipui tuon tuostakin
raskasmielisyyteen. Minä olin kaksikolmattavuotias, vahva, rohkea ja
neuvokas. Meillä oli hiukan säästöjä ja päätin kehoittaa häntä
lepäämään. Jotta tämä lepo olisi ollut hänelle mieluisa, valitsin
oleskelupaikaksemme meille vielä oudon maan: Libanonin vuoriston.

Oi sinä kaunis ja suruisa Libanon! Jo ajatellessanikin siellä

vietettyä vuotta päihtyy sydämeni riemusta ja vuotaa samalla
verta!… Ghazir!… Ghazir!… Ghazir!… Ja sinä Dlepta!… Ja sinä
Hermon!… Ja sinä Malmetein!… Ja te setrit pitkine ystävällisine
oksinenne, jotka näyttävät tahtovan syleillä koko maata!… Ja te
granaattiomenapuut, joille riittää pari kahmaloa multaa
kallionhalkeamassa, tarjotaksenne kulkijalle mehukkaita
hedelmiänne!… Ja sinä Välimeri, joka antaudut hekumallisena
jumalasi polttaville hyväilyille ja levität tahrattoman ja
mittaamattoman ulappasi Libanonin majojen vähäisten ikkunain
eteen, jotka rinteiltä katselevat kasvoihin äärettömyyttä!… Kaikille ja
kaikelle sanon jäähyväiset!… En enää koskaan näe teitä, mutta
ainutlaatuinen ja lempeä hohteenne säilyy iäti silmissäni!… Tuo
hohde on himmennyt muistissani… Elämä ei ole sallinut, että iloni
olisi jakamaton… Mutta, Jumalani, milloin suo elämä meille
täydellistä iloa?…

Asetuimme asumaan Ghazirin kylään, joka on maalauksellisen

kaunis, kuten melkein koko Libanon, ja sijaitsee suojaisella
kukkulalla. Olimme vanhan nivelsärkyä potevan, Set Amra-nimisen
vaimon ainoat vuokralaiset. Hän eli yksinäisyydessä ja oli kristitty
arabialainen niinkuin kaikki libanonilaiset. Kristittynä hän otti meidät
ystävällisesti vastaan, vaikka olimmekin oikeauskoisia ja hän itse
katolilainen. Ja nyt saatte jälleen kuulla tarinan, sillä elämäni taival
on rikas tarinoista.

Sillävälin kun minä kuljin ansioilla ja Barba Yani retkeili keppineen

granaattiomenoita etsiskellen ja käärmeitä tappaen, saimme kuulla,
että Set Amralla, jonka kanssa pakinoimme vesipiippua
poltellessamme, saimme kuulla, sanon minä, että hänelläkin oli
surunsa. Hän oli liian yksin, ja tämä yksinäisyys jäyti hänen
sydäntään. Hänen ainoa lapsensa, kaksikymmenvuotias tyttö, oli
Venezuelassa, mihin oli matkustanut isänsä kanssa rahaa
ansaitsemaan, kuten Libanonin asukkaitten on tapana. Mutta isä oli
kuollut vuosi sitten, ja senjälkeen olivat kirjeet Amerikasta
harvenneet. Selina-tyttönen ei ollut köyhä. Hän johti sievoista
korukauppaa. Mutta äidille hänen sydämensä ei paljoakaan säteillyt
hellyyttä. Hän unohti hänet, ja Set Amran täytyi usein elää pelkällä
leivällä päivät pääksytysten.

Meidän kävi häntä sääli. Täst'edes aterioimme yhdessä. Set Amra

oli meille sisar ja äiti. Hän sai parhaat palat lampaanpaistista ja
hänen vesipiippunsa täytettiin tumbakilla. Enempää ei tarvittu. Hän
kiitti Jumalaa siitä, että hän oli lähettänyt meidät, ja kirjoitti
tyttärelleen liikuttavan kiitollisia kirjeitä. Selina kiitti vastauksessaan
molempia tuntemattomia, joilla oli niin veljellinen sydän.

Ja aika kului autuudessa.

Mutta kun ansiot olivat vähäiset, hupenivat säästömme

silminnähden. Tuli syksy, ja Barba Yani vilustui. Noudin lääkärin
Beirutista ja sitten lääkkeitä. Rakkaan ystävän tila parani hyvässä
hoidossa, mutta rahat luistivat käsistä. Tuo talvi oli ankara
Libanonissa. Sain vaivoin ansaituksi sen verran, ettemme aivan
nääntyneet nälkään. Luovuimme lihan syönnistä ja elimme kolmena
viikon päivänä kuivalla leivällä. Olimme niin säästäväisiä, että
poltimme vain yhtä vesipiippua kerrallaan, antaen tshibukin kulkea
kädestä käteen, suusta suuhun. Tämä oli kovaa, mutta näin päästiin
kuitenkin maaliskuuhun, jolloin saimme iloisen uutisen: Selina ilmoitti
lähtevänsä Venezuelasta ja saapuvansa kotiin kolmen tai neljän
viikon kuluttua.

Mitä huudahduksia!… Mitä ylitsevuotavaa riemua!…

»Tiedättekös?» sanoi Set Amra eräänä päivänä salaperäisesti.

»Stavro on kaunis poika. Aivan varmaan Selina rakastuu häneen, ja
silloin tulee anteliaisuutenne minua kohtaan runsaasti palkituksi. Mitä
siitä sanot, Stavro?»
 Mitäkö Stavro sanoi? No niin, hänen päänsä meni pyörälle, kuten
tavallista. Se meni pyörälle siinä määrin, että hän alkoi pyörittää
ympäri Barba Yaniakin, ja lopulta me kaikki, leinin vaivaama vanha
nainen mukaanluettuna, aloimme tanssia piirissä minun ja Selinan
pikaisen avioliiton julkaisemiseksi, josta viimemainitulla ei ollut
pienintäkään aavistusta.

Kuljin suoraan eteenpäin kuin kuuro hevonen. Aloin katsella taloa

kuin ainakin tulevaa omaisuuttani, ja nyt huomasin sadeveden
tunkeutuvan huoneisiin kattoa peittävän soran läpi. Noudattaen
libanonilaisten esimerkkiä minä kiipesin katolle jyrä mukanani ja
aloin asukkaitten ylitsevuotavaksi riemuksi juoksennella pitkin ja
poikin katolla vetäen perässäni raskasta jyrää, joka kävi
kantapäihin!, niin että kaaduin suulleni.

Ah, sydän poloinen, kuinka paljon murhetta oletkaan minulle

tuottanut!

Menin vieläkin pitemmälle. Eräänä päivänä osoitin Barba Yanille

Set Amran vielä punaisia ja täyteläisiä huulia, hänen siinä kiihkeästi
imiessään tshibukia, ja sanoin:

»Barba Yani, katsohan noita huulia! Kenties ne osaavat vielä

suudella muutakin kuin vesipiipun ambraa! Ja ehkäpä saamme
kahdet häät yht'aikaa».

»Niin, kahdet häät, tiedättekös! Sillä minun ja Selinan avioliitto oli

yhtä varma ja tosi kuin köyhyytemme…

»Voi sinua, Stavraki!» huudahti ystävä-parkani. »Saat ottaa vielä

monta askelta, ennenkuin opit tuntemaan elämää!»
 Hän oli hyvä ennustaja. Selina saapui. Hän oli tumma, komea,
tuuheatukkainen kaunotar, jonka silmänurkassa piili paholainen. Hän
oli vilkas kuin elohopea, mutta sielultaan kauppasaksa ja älyltään
vain naikkonen. Ensi päivästä alkaen hän herätti meissä pelkoa.
Hänen kiitoksensa kuivuivat lyhyeen. Meidän elämämme oli hänen
mielestään inhoittavaa, ja hän melkein moitti meitä äitinsä
kurjuudesta. Ylenkatseensa hän toi ilmi vuokraamalla asunnon
itselleen, vieraili päivittäin neljännestunnin luonamme ja antoi Set
Amralle naurettavan pienen rahasumman, joka oli tarkoitettu meille
»korvaukseksi». Puettuna vierasmaalaisiin pukuihin ja jalokiviin hän
levittäytyi kuin kauppatavara kateellisten kyläläisten katseltavaksi.

Eräänä päivänä eräs naapurivaimo riensi kertomaan meille, että

komea herra oli tullut vaunuilla Beirutista Selinaa tervehtimään.
Selinaa, minun luvattuani, minun morsiantani!…

»Ah, Barba Yani, kuinka elämä onkaan täynnä pettymyksiä!»

vaikeroin minä painaen pääni ainoan vilpittömän ystäväni olkaa
vasten.

»Etkö tietänyt sitä, Stavraki?… No niin, opi se uudelleen. Ja ota

sillävälin ibrikisi, hae esille minun kojeeni ja lähtekäämme!
Lähtekäämme: onhan maa vielä kaunis!»

Me lähdimme, jättäen Set Amra-paran kyyneliin. Ja kolme

kuukautta pääksytysten me kiertelimme Libanonin mainioita seutuja,
juoden sen kirkkaista lähteistä ja juottaen libanonilaisille ikuista
salepiamme.

»Salepia! Salepia! Kas tässä ovat salepinmyyjät!» »Stavraki, eikö

maa ole kaunis?»
 »Voi, Barba Yani! Olet oikeassa!…»

*****

Maako kaunis?… Ei, se on valhetta!… Kaikki kauneus tulee

sydämestämme, mikäli ilo siellä asustaa. Sinä päivänä, jolloin ilo
katoaa, on maa vain kalmisto. Ja Libanonin kauniista maasta tuli
kalmisto minun sydämelleni ja Barba Yanin ruumiille. Eräänä
päivänä lähellä Dleptaa kaatoi äkkinäinen ja odottamaton
sydänkohtaus hänet kasvoilleen maahan. Hän löi päänsä kallioon ja
haavoittui.

»Barba Yani! Ystäväni! Mikä sinun on? Oletko sairas?»

Ei, Barba Yani ei enää ollut sairas. Nyt oli minun vuoroni
sairastaa…

Siitä lähtien on mato jäytänyt elämääni. Kadotetun ystävän kaipuu

ja halu etsiä kaikesta huolimatta rakkautta, sai minut muutamia
vuosia myöhemmin palaamaan kotimaahani, lähestymään
inhimillistä olentoa, rakastamaan häntä, niinkuin olin rakastanut
Kiraa ja äitiäni — niin kuin olin rakastanut Barba Yania.

Tällainen on Markkina-Stavron tarina…

*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KIRA KIRALINA
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