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Innovative Renewable Energy
Series Editor: Ali Sayigh

Ali Sayigh
David Milborrow Editors

The Age of
Wind Energy
Progress and Future Directions from a
Global Perspective
Innovative Renewable Energy

Series editor
Ali Sayigh
World Renewable Energy Congress, Brighton, UK
The primary objective of this book series is to highlight the best-implemented
worldwide policies, projects and research dealing with renewable energy and the
environment. The books are developed in partnership with the World Renewable
Energy Network (WREN). WREN is one of the most effective organizations in
supporting and enhancing the utilisation and implementation of renewable energy
sources that are both environmentally safe and economically sustainable. Contribu-
tors to books in this series come from a worldwide network of agencies, laboratories,
institutions, companies and individuals, all working together towards an interna-
tional diffusion of renewable energy technologies and applications. With contribu-
tions from most countries in the world, books in this series promote the
communication and technical education of scientists, engineers, technicians and
managers in this field and address the energy needs of both developing and devel-
oped countries.
Each book in the series contains contributions from WREN members and cover
the most-up-to-date research developments, government policies, business models,
best practices, and innovations from countries all over the globe. Additionally, the
series publishes a collection of best papers presented during the annual and bi-annual
World Renewable Energy Congress and Forum each year.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/15925


Ali Sayigh • David Milborrow
Editors

The Age of Wind Energy


Progress and Future Directions from a Global
Perspective
Editors
Ali Sayigh David Milborrow
World Renewable Energy Congress Lewes, East Sussex, UK
Brighton, UK

ISSN 2522-8927 ISSN 2522-8935 (electronic)


Innovative Renewable Energy
ISBN 978-3-030-26445-1 ISBN 978-3-030-26446-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26446-8

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020


This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the
material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,
broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information
storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or
the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Ali Sayigh
2 Wind Energy Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
David Milborrow
3 What Is the Wind Energy Progress in Greece? Prospects and
Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
J. K. Kaldellis
4 Wind Energy Programme in Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Izumi Ushiyama
5 Wind Power Generation in Jordan: Current Situation
and Future Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Ali Hamzeh and Mahmoud Awad
6 Wind Energy in Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Jonathan Whale, Craig Carter, and Ali Arefi
7 Hybrid Wind Energy Solutions Including Energy Storage . . . . . . . 103
J. K. Kaldellis
8 Risk Analysis in Wind Energy: An Alternative Approach for
Decision-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Isabel Ferraris and Mario D. de la Canal
9 Wind Energy in Argentina: Actuality and Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Carlos Labriola

v
vi Contents

10 Advancements and Challenges Affecting Wind Turbine


Implementation in the Member States of the Cooperation
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC Countries) . . . . . . . . 175
Abdul Salam Darwish
11 Wind Energy in the UK: Progress and Future Expectations . . . . . . 193
Abdul Salam Darwish
12 Urban Environment: Characterization of the Wind
in Flat Roofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
J. Lassig, U. Jara, J. J. Valle Sosa, and C. Palese
13 Wind Energy in Morocco: Resources, Potential,
and Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
Hassan Nfaoui
14 Wind Energy Program in Republic of Korea:
Present and Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Soogab Lee
15 Energy Storage on a Power System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
Donald Swift-Hook
16 Wind Energy Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
David Milborrow
17 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
Ali Sayigh

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
About the Editors

Ali Sayigh BSc, AWP, DIC, PhD is a UK Citizen who


graduated from Imperial College London in 1966. He is
Fellow of the Institute of Energy and the Institution of
Engineering and Technology, Chartered Engineer, and
Chairman of the Iraq Energy Institute.
He taught in various countries like Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, and Kuwait, and in universities like Reading
University and University of Hertfordshire from 1966
to 2004. He was Head of the Energy Department at
Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR) and
Expert in renewable energy at AOPEC, Kuwait, from
1981 to 1985.
He started working in solar energy in September
1969. In 1972, he established with some colleagues
the Journal of Engineering Sciences in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, and in 1984 the International Journal for Solar
and Wind Technology, him as an Editor in Chief. This
has changed its name in 1990 to Journal of Renewable
Energy. He is Editor of several international journal
published in Morocco, Iran, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and
India. He established the World Renewable Energy
Network (WREN) and the World Renewable Energy
Congress in 1990. Moreover, he is Member of various
societies related to climate change and renewable
energy and is Chairman of the Iraq Energy Institute
since 2010.
He was Consultant to many national and interna-
tional organizations, among them, the British Council,
ISESCO, UNESCO, UNDP, ESCWA, UNIDO, and

vii
viii About the Editors

UN. He organized conferences and seminars in 52 dif-


ferent countries and published more than 600 papers. He
has edited, authored, and associated with more than
75 books and has supervised more than 80 MSc and
35 PhD students. He is Editor in Chief of the yearly
Renewable Energy Magazine since 2000. He is the
Founder of WREN journal Renewable Energy published
by Elsevier and was the Editor in Chief for 30 years
from 1984 to 2014.
He is the Editor in Chief of Comprehensive Renew-
able Energy coordinating 154 top scientists, engineers,
and researchers’ contribution in 8 volumes published
in 2012 by Elsevier which won 2013 PROSE Award in
the USA. In 2011, he founded Med Green Buildings
and Renewable Energy Forum. In 2016, he established
peer-reviewed international open-access journal called
Renewable Energy and Environmental Sustainability
(REES), which is published in English online by EDP
Sciences publisher in Paris.
He is also Winner of the Best Clean Energy Imple-
mentation Support NPO, UK. In 2018, WREN was rated
globally as one of the best organizations in the UK
promoting renewable energy. In November 2018, he
was elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Art (FRSA).

David Milborrow is an Energy Consultant with more


than 40 years of experience in renewable energy, princi-
pally wind. He has been an Active Member of the World
Renewable Energy Network during the last 25 years.
He carries out studies on the economics of renewable
energy sources and comparisons with those of the thermal
sources of electricity generation. He is also a Specialist on
integration issues. He is, or has been, an Adviser to a
number of bodies including the European Commission,
the UK Department of Trade and Industry, the British
Wind Energy Association (now RenewableUK), and the
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council. He
is Technical Adviser to the journal Windpower Monthly
and compiles a monthly contribution on wind energy
economics. He has lectured at five universities, has con-
tributed to several books on wind energy, and has written
over 100 articles.
About the Editors ix

From 1984 to 1992, he was a Principal Engineer with


the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) in the
UK and was closely involved in the planning of the
country’s first wind farms. Prior to that, he carried out
research on interactions between wind turbines in the
laboratory and in the field. He obtained his BSc degree in
Mechanical Engineering from the University of London
(1961–1965).
Chapter 1
Introduction

Ali Sayigh

Nowadays, wind energy is at last reaching its potential as this book fully illustrates.
It has developed from humble beginnings over 80 years ago when modern turbines
were first developed to provide 10–20 kW power. These early wind turbines were
mainly used for pumping water and in small-scale, mainly domestic, electricity
production. Since then, the technology has grown exponentially and the only
obstacle to their widespread use is political and not technical. Many countries utilise
wind power as a major source of electricity generation, and with the greater
realisation of the immense danger of climate change, the importance of wind energy
to meet the growing demand for the energy with the lowest carbon footprint is now
accepted. Such is the sophistication of the current generation of wind turbines which
embody machines without gearboxes capable of producing more than 8 MW which
is enough to provide electricity to a community of over 10,000 inhabitants.
Early wind turbines had blades 10–15 m in length and a tower height of 20–30 m,
whereas current turbines can have blades of 160 m and a tower more than 300 m in
height. Cost-wise, electricity generated from wind turbine is on a par with that
generated by fossil fuels. Wind turbines have the lowest embedded carbon among
various forms of renewable energy generation, and unlike nuclear energy they
present no long-term danger to humanity and are considerably cheaper. Installation
of wind turbines whether onshore or offshore is much speedier than that of other
energy sources and the time scale of investment to production is much quicker. Their
productive life also compares favourably to other energy sources, and the cost of
decommissioning is significantly less and presents no hidden risks.
Each chapter of this volume outlines an important aspect of wind energy gener-
ation as experienced in a variety of nations and economics, taking into consideration
both technology and policy. It is envisaged that this book will be useful to readers
involved in the technological development of wind energy as well as those who are

A. Sayigh (*)
World Renewable Energy Congress, Brighton, UK
e-mail: asayigh@wrenuk.co.uk

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 1


A. Sayigh, D. Milborrow (eds.), The Age of Wind Energy, Innovative Renewable
Energy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26446-8_1
2 A. Sayigh

responsible for energy planning. During the last 80 years, wind turbines proved to be
cost-effective in generating electricity; they require smaller number of people to run
and a small space to operate. They are reliable and can sustain production of
electricity, in most cases, without storage.
Chapter 2
Wind Energy Development

David Milborrow

2.1 Introduction

At the end of the year 2000, the amount of wind energy capacity in the world was
17.7 GW. By the end of 2010, the capacity was 191 GW and by the end of 2018 the
total was around 561 GW. That represents a compound annual growth rate of 21%.
Such a high growth rate is not sustainable in the long term and the growth rate in
2018 was about 9%, but that represented an increase of 46 GW—over double the
capacity that was operational in the year 2000. There are strong indications that 2019
is likely to be a higher-growth year, with the extra installed capacity likely to be
around 50 GW. Figure 2.1 shows how wind energy has developed since 2000.
The reasons for the strong growth of wind can be explored by comparing its
attributes with those of the other renewable energy sources and this is the basis of
Table 2.1.
The fact that wind energy is now cost-competitive with gas and coal and cheaper
than most of the other renewable energy sources, clearly works in its favour. The
short build time is also an asset. The principal difficulties that have delayed or
frustrated some developments have been the visual impact, noise issues and inter-
ference with bird flight paths. Although the latter was frequently a problem with
some of the early wind farms, developers take considerable care to research the
possible environmental impacts, and there are now fewer problems reported. Now
that offshore wind is becoming increasingly competitive, this opens up a potentially
enormous resource, mostly free of environmental constraints, although ecological
issues still need to be taken into account.
The capacity of solar photovoltaics is likely to overtake that of wind in the fairly
near future, but its lower load factor means that energy generation is likely to lag
behind, at least in the short to medium term. Photovoltaic arrays require considerable
land which is effectively taken out of use, whereas in the case of wind energy, only a

D. Milborrow (*)
Consultant, Lewes, East Sussex, UK

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 3


A. Sayigh, D. Milborrow (eds.), The Age of Wind Energy, Innovative Renewable
Energy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26446-8_2
4 D. Milborrow

Fig. 2.1 Wind energy World wind capacity, GW


development since the year 600
2000. The figure for 2018 is
provisional, and the final
figure for the increase of 500
capacity is likely to be
similar to the 2017 figure
400

300

200

100

0
2000 2005 2010 2015
Year-end

Table 2.1 Summary of the principal characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages of the renew-
able energy sources
Energy,
Capacity 2017
Technology (GWe) (TWh) Attributes (drawbacks in italics) Locations
Hydro 1267 4185 Limited extra scope, due to need for Worldwide
reservoirs
Wind 540 1280 Short build time. Low-cost Worldwide
Visual issues
Solar PV 400 430 Modular, no moving parts Worldwide
Land requirements
Geothermal 14.3 86 Resource availability is limited to regions Pacific Rim,
where high temperatures can be found at USA, some
suitable depths EU states
Tidal bar- 0.6 Low load factor, technology simple, but Canada, UK
rage of tidal cost of structures high
stream
Wave <1 Despite considerable R&D, no move yet EU, Japan,
to commercial viability USA
Energy Not Costs tend to be high; land use may be an Worldwide
crops known issue
Nuclear 392 2506 For comparison

small area of land is sterilised by the tower bases and farming can continue around
them, as shown in Fig. 2.2.
Although considerable research has taken place into the potential of tidal devices,
very few have reached commercial viability. The same comments apply to wave
2 Wind Energy Development 5

Fig. 2.2 Wind farm sited


on a working farm, showing
the minimal disturbance.
(Photo: author)

energy, where research has been in progress for around 45 years, without yielding
devices that are commercially viable. A possible reason is the complexity of the
mechanical engineering required to convert the oscillatory motion of the waves into
a rotary motion that is needed for the production of electricity. The prospects for
energy crops, or bioenergy, are similarly being explored, worldwide, and the diffi-
culty here is possibly the low energy density of the fuels. However, a very diverse
range of options is being researched, which increases the likelihood of a break-
through in the future.
The very rapid growth in the development of wind energy has been accompanied
by an increase in the size of wind turbines and steadily falling generation costs. Of all
the renewable energy sources, wind is now generally the cheapest, although there are
instances where geothermal can be cheaper (where steam rises close to the surface) or
where favourable geography enables hydro schemes to be developed economically.
As noted in Table 2.1, at the end of 2018, there was around 600 GW of wind energy in
the world, hydro approximately 1267 GW, and geothermal 11 GW, while solar
photovoltaics—now developing very rapidly—accounted for 400 GW. According
to the World Nuclear Association, there are now nuclear power plants with approx-
imately 392 GW of nuclear power capacity that are operational, and so wind energy
has overtaken nuclear energy—in capacity terms but not yet in energy terms.
The average load factor of wind energy, worldwide, is about 25% and so the
energy-generating potential of the world’s wind energy is around 1280 TWh. That is
enough electricity to supply the whole of India or the Russian Federation. The
6 D. Milborrow

success of wind energy can be put down to the plentiful resources, the fact that it is a
proven technology and that it can be installed quickly. Average construction time of
an onshore wind farm is generally less than a year and even offshore wind farms can
take less than 2 years to construct.

2.2 Brief History

The Californian oil crisis of the late 1970s triggered growth in wind energy. In
California, subsidies for wind energy led to the construction of several thousand
small machines, with rotor diameters in the range 10–20 m and rated powers in the
range 20–50 kW. Other countries followed suit, particularly Denmark, with similar
results. In parallel with this activity, a number of governments initiated research and
development programmes that aimed to develop megawatt size wind turbines. The
thinking behind this approach was that it would cut down the number of machines
required to produce quantities of electricity comparable with those from conven-
tional power stations. Put another way, the aim was to produce the “jumbo jet” wind
turbine more or less straight from the drawing board. By and large, however, few
commercial machines emanated from the “large machine” research programmes,
although they yielded considerable design insights. What happened instead was that
commercial machine sizes gradually increased, so that 100 kW machines were
available by the mid-1980s, 1 MW machines by the early nineties, and by the turn
of the century, the largest machines had ratings around 3 MW and rotor diameters up
to 70 m.
Figure 2.3 shows how the average rating of machines built in each year in the
USA grew from 1980 onwards [1]. The rating reached 200 kW by 1990, 500 kW by
1997, 1 MW by 2002, and 2 MW shortly after 2010. A similar trend was followed in
most of the other states that were building wind turbines.
The growth of offshore wind—with the first commercial farm being commis-
sioned in 1991—accelerated the interest in large machines, to the point where the
largest turbine now envisaged has a rating of 12 MW and a diameter of 220 m.
Details of this and other very large machines now under development are shown in
Table 2.2.

2.3 Design Options

There has been a wide variety of design options over the past 40 years. More
recently, there has been some convergence, with the main design variations now
being in the drive train. Table 2.3 summarises the main options for horizontal axis
turbines, with an indication of the most common usage in 2018.
2 Wind Energy Development 7

Average rating for year, kW


2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year turbines commissioned

Fig. 2.3 Development of wind turbine power ratings in the USA

Table 2.2 The largest and most powerful machines in the world
Manufacturer Rating (MW) Diameter (m) Comments/status
Adwen 8 180 Geared/prototype testing
GE wind 12 220 Under development
Vestas 10 164 Geared/9.5 MW prototypes testing
Siemens 10 193 Direct drive/prototype testing
Note that the two 10 MW machines have different diameters, which illustrates difference in rating
philosophy, discussed in the text. In addition, it is reported that eight Chinese manufacturers are
developing wind turbines with outputs of 10 MW and above [2]

Table 2.3 Summary of principal design options, with an indication of the most popular option
(in bold) for new machines commissioned in 2018
Component
Number of blades 1 2 3
Rotor orientation, relative to tower Upwind Downwind
Speed Fixed Variable Multi-speed
Control method Stall Pitch Partial-span pitch
Drive train Gearbox Direct drive Hydraulics
Blade type Stiff Teetered Flexible
Tower type Lattice Tubular Mixed
Where no indication is given, there is no clear “winner”. Options in italics may have been popular in
the early days, but have now fallen out of favour
8 D. Milborrow

2.3.1 Blades

In the early days two-blade machines were quite common and some of these ran
“down wind”, that is, the rotor ran downstream of the tower. Most of the large
government-funded wind turbines that were built in the 1980s had two blades, but
this concept has slowly dropped out of favour in preference to three blades. Contrary
to what might be expected, three-blade wind turbine rotors are not necessarily 50%
heavier than two-blade wind turbines [3]. One of the problems with two-blade
machines is that the rotor shaft is subjected to large cyclic forces when the orienta-
tion of the rotor is changed—or yawed—to bring it into line with the wind direction.
Nowadays, the vast majority of large commercial wind turbines have three
blades, although some manufacturers favour two blades. One-blade turbines were
favoured by a few manufacturers. The thinking behind this was that the blades
account for a significant proportion of turbine cost. However, one-blade machines
are slightly less efficient than two-blade machines and rotor efficiency is further
degraded by the necessity of having some form of counterweight. Although a
number of machines were successfully commissioned, very few are now on the
market. An example is shown in Fig. 2.4.
As machine sizes grew larger, there was speculation that the two-blade concept
might come back into favour for offshore machines. For optimum performance,
two-blade machines rotate faster than three-blade machines, which means they

Fig. 2.4 One-blade wind


turbine at the Italian Alta
Nurra test field in Sardinia.
(Photo: author)
2 Wind Energy Development 9

generate more noise, but this is rarely a problem offshore. One research project
looked at the possibility in connection with a design study for 10 and 20 MW
machines and found that there were difficulties due to the more pronounced vibra-
tions encountered with two-blade machines. They did not rule out the concept, but
focused more on the three-blade design concept.
A Dutch and a Chinese company are currently working on megawatt-size two-
blade machines for offshore use, but examples of large machines using the concept
are rare. Given the enormous amount of development work that the major manufac-
turers have put into optimising their three-blade designs, it is probably unlikely that
there would be a significant trend back towards the use of the two-blade machines.

2.3.2 Wind Turbine Size and Weight Trends

The data shown in Fig. 2.3 suggest that the continuing upward trend in ratings is
likely to continue. There have been corresponding increases in size, and Fig. 2.5
shows the relationship between power rating and rotor diameter. There is no
universal relationship between size and rating and this is discussed later.
The weights of the rotors of current commercial machines are typically about half
those of some of the early machines of similar size, designed as part of state-funded
research and development programmes. This is a measure of how far the industry has
advanced over the last 30 years.

Rated power, kW

20000

15000
Real
10000 Concept

5000

0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300

Rotor diameter, m

Fig. 2.5 The relationship between wind turbine rotor diameter and rated power. Two data points
from design studies are included. The line linking the points comes from a regression analysis
10 D. Milborrow

Fig. 2.6 Blade set weights Blade set weights, tonnes


and rotor diameter 200

150

100

50

0
0 50 100 150 200
Rotor diameter, m

Although the blade set weight of the 164 m diameter machine is 105 tonnes, it is
not eight times the weight of an 80 m machine, as simple theory suggests. A greater
understanding of the dynamics and aerodynamics means that safety margins, which
were possibly overgenerous in the early days, can now be calculated with a greater
precision. Although weights (and sometimes costs) do sometimes increase
slightly—in $/kW terms—with size, this may be acceptable, as there are consider-
able savings to be realised by using fewer, larger machines, in installation costs and
internal cabling within a wind farm, for example.
The link between rotor diameter and rotor weight is illustrated in Fig. 2.6. It
should be noted that there is sometimes uncertainty as to precisely what elements are
included in the description of “blade set weight”, but nevertheless the line that has
been drawn based on a regression analysis has a correlation coefficient of 0.895, and
the power law is 2.2, rather than 3, as suggested by the simple theory.

2.3.3 Power Control

Methods of power control have also varied over the years. The most common
method of power control is “full span pitch control”, which is self-explanatory. In
the 1980s, passive “stall-control” machines were popular with some manufacturers.
The blades were fixed and were set at such an angle that they gradually moved into
stall as the wind speed increased. The power control was therefore passive. How-
ever, some form of aerodynamic control was still required in order to limit the rotor
speeds should the machines become disconnected from the grid. The concept is now
quite rare, except for some small machines. “Partial span pitch control” was
employed by a number of manufacturers in the 1980s, as this meant that the duty
required of the pitch control mechanism was less onerous than if the whole blade
2 Wind Energy Development 11

Fig. 2.7 60 m diameter,


3 MW wind turbine on the
island of Orkney, UK. The
machine was funded by the
UK Department of Energy
and built by a consortium—
the Wind Energy Group—
that comprised Taylor
Woodrow Construction,
British Aerospace and GEC
Energy Systems. It was
completed in 1988, operated
until 1997 and was
demolished in 2000. (Photo:
Author)

needed to be rotated. However, this concept also faded in popularity, as manufac-


turers sought the more positive control achievable with full span pitch control. The
majority of wind turbines now have pitch control, as this is needed to enable them to
meet increasingly stringent grid code requirements. Figure 2.7 illustrates a machine
with partial-span pitch control. This was the UK’s Department of Energy-funded
60 m diameter 3 MW machine, which was sited on the island of Orkney, where the
higher wind speeds justified the high rating.
The relative popularity of fixed- and variable-speed concept has also changed.
Fixed-speed operation was common in the early years, but variable speed has
gradually become more established. It confers slight benefits with higher energy
capture, but perhaps its principal advantage is that rotational speeds are low in low
winds, which is when the noise from a wind turbine is likely to be most noticeable. In
high wind speeds, the background noise of the wind itself is likely to mask the wind
turbine noise.

2.3.4 Drive Train Possibilities

The other concept that has gradually become firmly established is direct drive. This
dispenses with the gearbox, although direct drive generators tend to be quite heavy.
Approximately 50% of the machines installed in Germany in 2013 were variable
speed, and over 40% had direct drive (also variable speed) [4]. However, it may be
12 D. Milborrow

noted that there is a well-established manufacturer of direct-drive machines based


there.
The drive train is one feature of wind turbine design where the industry has not
converged on a preferred solution. The “eighties” solution of an induction generator,
driven by a step-up gearbox, is now becoming rare. Double-fed induction generators
became popular from around 1998 onwards, and are still used, but permanent
magnet generators have become more popular in the past 10 years. These are
generally lighter than wound rotors and can be used in conjunction with a gearbox,
or as part of a direct drive wind turbine. Because direct drive generators tend to be
heavy, one intermediate option that is becoming popular is to step up the rotor speed
to, say, 500 rpm (rather than 1000 or 1500 rpm). This, it is claimed, results in a
compact gearbox, with a modest step-up ratio, a compact generator, and an eco-
nomical solution [5].

2.3.5 Support Towers

Most of the early small wind turbines used lattice steel towers. A few of the large
government-funded turbines used concrete towers, but both types were gradually
superseded by tubular steel towers. This is the most common concept now in use.
However, with tower heights steadily increasing, two difficulties arose. First, the size
of the tower meant that transportation became an issue and secondly, providing
sufficient stiffness demanded substantial wall thicknesses towards the base. To
achieve the necessary rigidity at hub heights of over 100 m and to suppress
resonance frequencies caused by turbine rotation, the lower part of the tower needs
a diameter of over 4 m, according to manufacturer Nordex. By developing a
concrete/steel hybrid tower, Nordex solved the logistics and resonance frequency
problems arising with towers for turbines with a hub height of over 100 m [6].
They developed a hybrid tower comprising a concrete base structure with a height
of around 60 m, mounted directly on the foundation at the location and then
prestressed. It supports the three steel tower sections of the modular tower with a
total height of a further 60 m. The concept is being tested in the German state of
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, with a 90 m diameter, 2500 kW turbine.
The advantage of this is that the concrete tube is produced on site, thus dispensing
with the need for overland transportation, while the standard tower sections can be
carried on conventional vehicles. At the same time, the overall system has an
adequate resonance frequency as the diameter of the concrete element fitted in the
lower part of the hybrid tower is adjustable. Manufacturer Enercon uses a concrete
tower for its 7.5 MW, 126 m diameter turbine, and others are likely to follow suit as
sizes increase.
2 Wind Energy Development 13

2.4 Other Wind Turbine Concepts

2.4.1 Vertical Axis

Vertical axis wind turbines have a long history and formed part of research
programmes in the 1980s, in Canada, the UK, and the USA. There are several
types—Darrieus, with curved blades, H type, with straight blades, and V type, also
with straight blades. The first two types are compared in Fig. 2.8. The principal
advantages of the concept are twofold: firstly, it is not necessary to yaw the blade
into wind in responses to changes in direction and, secondly, it is possible to locate
the gearbox and generator at ground level or at the top of the support tower.
However, the principal disadvantage is that the rotors are heavier, because the blades
do not deliver power continuously as they rotate, but in a cyclic manner. As a
consequence of this, even in a steady wind, they generate cyclic aerodynamic forces,
both torque and thrust. These can be alleviated by using three-blade designs, but this
concept is rare and would, in any case, increase rotor weights still further.
The H type rotor was comprehensively researched in the UK, although work
terminated around 1990. It was concluded that “in production they would be
somewhat more expensive than contemporary horizontal axis wind turbines.” [7]
Research into the concept was restarted in 2009 when the Energy Technology
Institute (a research body that had government support and included power gener-
ators and industrial bodies with an interest in wind energy) initiated a feasibility
study on the technical and commercial viability of vertical axis turbines. The Nova
project delivered a feasibility study which evaluated the technical and commercial

Support stays 2 blades most common Blades may pivot to limit power
(optional) 3 or 4 sometimes used

Cross arm

Main bearing

Curved blade, "Darrieus" type Straight blade type

Fig. 2.8 Schematic impression of curved blade and straight blade—H type—vertical-axis wind
turbines. Some Darrieus type turbines are mounted on a tower, rather than having the main bearing
at or near ground level, as shown here
14 D. Milborrow

viability of a 5 and 10 MW vertical axis turbine, with a V-type rotor. It also evaluated
specific design options for the rotor, drive train and foundations. “The project
showed that the Nova concept was commercially and technically feasible. Our
further analysis suggested that horizontal axis wind turbines will evolve faster
than vertical axis wind turbines and provide lower costs of energy in the short to
medium term” [8].
Research continues in the USA on vertical axis wind turbines and Sandia
National laboratories recently published a report on a design study for a 5 MW
turbine [9]. The projected near-term cost of energy from the design was $213/MWh,
but the authors considered that this could be virtually halved by various measures,
including a reduction in the weighted average cost of capital.

2.4.2 Multirotor Concept

Space precludes a review of all the alternative design concepts that have appeared
over the years, but one recent project that was tested by a major manufacturer is
worth mentioning. Vestas recently dismantled a four-rotor assembly after 2½ years
of testing. In their words [10], “we wanted to see whether there could be another way
of increasing wind turbine size, apart from just extending the blades.” Vestas used
four 29 m diameter, 225 kW machines, mounted on a single tower, at two levels.
Vestas found that there was a 1.5% increase in energy production, compared with a
single 900 kW machine, but with no adverse effects on the loading of the structure.

2.5 Offshore Wind

Except in remote regions, the resource potential of onshore wind is likely to be


constrained. This is particularly the case in Europe. The need to investigate offshore
wind was therefore recognised at an early stage. Apart from the fact that it has less
visual impact, another attraction of offshore wind is that wind speeds are generally
higher than on land, and less turbulent. A number of desk studies were carried out in
the 1980s and in 1991 the first offshore wind farm was commissioned in Denmark. It
was modest in size—ten 450 kW wind turbines—and it operated for 25 years.
Worldwide progress was initially slow, but accelerated during the late 1990s and
now (late 2018) 21.8 GW are operational, spread across eight countries [11]. How-
ever, projects with a total capacity of 300 GW are in operation, under construction,
or planned [12].
2 Wind Energy Development 15

2.5.1 Floating Wind Turbines

It was recognised some time ago that the potential of floating wind turbines would
need to be investigated. These would enable offshore wind to be exploited in regions
where the depths increase rapidly close to land and, in addition, it may facilitate
access to deep water zones far offshore, where wind speeds are generally higher. In
the latter case, however, the increased costs associated with higher cabling and
maintenance costs far offshore, plus the cost of a floating foundation, would need
to be offset by the higher energy yield that would be realised. The depth at which
floating wind turbines become economically preferable cannot be quantified with
any precision but appears to be between 30 and 50 m. Potentially attractive deep-
water areas close to the shore are found off California, New England, the Pacific
Northwest, the Gulf of Mexico, the southwest tip of England, the Atlantic coast of
Spain, and several areas in the Mediterranean (Fig. 2.9).
In September 2011 Japan’s trade ministry announced a ¥10–20 billion ($130–260
million) project to install a 1 GW floating wind development in deep waters off its
northern coast by 2020. In the same month the US Department of Energy announced
offshore wind Power R&D Projects with funding totalling $43M. The funding
allocated to floating wind turbines is $6.44M.
Statoil (now Equinor) commissioned a pilot project off Stavanger, in Norway, in
2009. It comprised one 82 m diameter 2.3 MW wind turbine. The same company

Fig. 2.9 Rampion wind farm, 13–20 km off the south coast of England, was completed in 2018. It
comprises 116 wind turbines, each with a rated output of 3.45 MW, a rotor diameter of 110 m, and a
hub height of 80 m. The projected output is 1.4 TWh/year. The photograph shows the substation
where the power is marshalled. (Photo courtesy of Rampion Offshore Wind)
16 D. Milborrow

completed the first commercial wind farm off the coast of Scotland in 2017. The
farm consists of five 6 MW turbines with a total installed capacity of 30 MW, and a
rotor diameter of 154 m; the overall height is 253 m. Water depths vary between
95 and 129 m. The average wind speed in this area of the North Sea is around 10 m/s
and the average wave height is 1.8 m. The export cable length to shore is 30 km. The
total cost of the project was NOK 2 billion, which corresponds to around $8000/kW.
The company has other offshore wind projects under development and expects the
total market to reach over 3000 MW by 2025 and 13,000 MW by 2030. The total
resource has been estimated to be around 7000 GW [13].

2.5.1.1 Performance Issues

It was noted in the caption to Table 2.2, that there is quite a large difference between
the rotor diameters of the two 10 MW machines. Machines that are designed
primarily for low wind speed sites tend to have low power ratings, simply because
full power output would only be achieved for limited periods if the rating was too
high. In this case the specific rating (rated power per unit rotor area) is typically
around 300 W/m2 or less. Machines designed for higher wind speed sites, where the
maximum power can be utilised more often, may have ratings up to 600 W/m [2]. All
wind turbine designers face the same dilemma—whether to have a high rating,
which will extract as much energy as possible out of the air stream, but which will
come with higher costs for the generator, gearbox and other drivetrain components,
or to use a lower rating that will result in better utilisation of the equipment.
The data underlying the dilemma is illustrated in Fig. 2.10.
Up until the turn of the century, the tendency for many machines was to have
ratings around 400–500 W/sq m [2], which usually corresponded to rated wind

Hours at rated output


2000

1500

11 m/s rated wind

1000 13
15

500

0
6 7 8 9
Annual mean wind speed, m/s

Fig. 2.10 The relationship between time spent at full rated output and annual mean wind speed, for
different levels of rated wind speed
2 Wind Energy Development 17

Fig. 2.11 Specific ratings Turbine ratings, W/sq m of rotor


of new machines installed in 400
the USA from 2000 to 2015.
(Source of data: Lawrence
Berkeley National
Laboratory, wind reports) 350

300

250

200
2000 2005 2010 2015
Year

speeds around 13 m/s. However, several manufacturers did offer machines with
different ratings for high or low wind speed sites. From around the turn of the
century, however, there was a general trend towards using lower specific ratings and
this is illustrated using data from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory wind
reports [14] in Fig. 2.11.
This change in rating philosophy has two “side-effects” both of which tend to
mask the actual trends in cost and performance. As wind turbine and wind farm costs
are traditionally quoted in this $/kW terms, machines with lower ratings will appear
to be more expensive than those with high ratings. So the decline in costs has
actually been more rapid than the headline figures suggest. The other “side-effect”
of the lower specific ratings is that the performance of wind plant—measured by
capacity factor—appears to have increased significantly. The effect is illustrated in
Fig. 2.12.
The high capacity factors are sometimes cited in sales literature to imply that
particular wind turbines are especially productive, whereas capacity factors have
never been a valid parameter upon which to base comparisons between wind
turbines. Notwithstanding despite the erroneous impression given by the recent
trend towards lower specific ratings, overall energy productivity—measured in
terms of kWh/m2 of rotor area per year—has been increasing, driven partly by the
use of taller turbine towers and partly by small improvements in blade efficiency.

2.5.2 Changes in Performance with Age

Offshore wind turbines operate in a hostile environment and hence some loss of
output over a period of time may be expected, partly due to degraded aerodynamic
18 D. Milborrow

Capacity factor
0.6

0.5
Rating 281 W/sq m
0.4 Rating 433 W/sq m
Rating 585 W/sq m
0.3
Rating 340 W/sq m
0.2 Rating 497 W/sq m

0.1

0
5 6 7 8 9 10
Mean wind speed, hub height, m/s

Fig. 2.12 The link between capacity factors and site mean wind speeds, for a range of specific
ratings from 281 to 585 W/m2, illustrating the higher capacity factors that are realised by the use of
low specific ratings

performance associated with loss of finish on the blades and partly due to downtime
to enable faults to be fixed. A number of studies have examined this topic and the
latest concluded [15], “WTs constructed before 2007 lose around 0.15 capacity
factor percentage points per year in absolute terms, corresponding to a life-time
energy loss of 6%. A gradual increase of downtime accounts for around 1/3 of the
decline and worsened efficiency for the rest.” Other studies had suggested that the
decline was more severe.
As Denmark has led the world in offshore wind, a scrutiny of data from there may
shed light on this discrepancy. The first wind farm comprised ten 450 kW wind
turbines, was commissioned in 1991 and taken out of service in 2017. During
27 years of operation it generated 22.1 GWh of electricity and so the average
capacity factor was 20.8%. However, if the generation during the first and last
2 years was excluded, the generation was 21.6 GWh, giving a capacity factor of
22.8%. The projected capacity factor was 23.9%. This suggests there was a measur-
able decline. However, if the performance of the second wind farm, at Tuno Knob, is
examined, the picture is somewhat different. This was commissioned in 1996 and is
still operating. The average capacity factor over 23 years of operation, from 1996 to
2018, is 31%, which compares favourably with the projected value of 30.8%.
However, when corrections are made to allow for the fact that some years are
“good wind” years and other years have “bad wind” (relative to the long-term
average), the Tuno capacity factor is 32.3–1.5% better than the projected value.
Denmark’s third wind farm was commissioned in 2002 and comprised 80 m
diameter, 2 MW machines. This had problems with the gearboxes during the first
2 years of operation and there was a significant loss of output as a result. Neverthe-
less the average capacity factor during the 16 years of operation from 2003 to 2018
2 Wind Energy Development 19

Capacity factor, %
50

45
Tuno
40 Horns Rev
HR projection
35 Tuno projection

30

25
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year

Fig. 2.13 Performance of the Tuno Knob and Horns Rev wind farms from the date of their
commissioning until 2018. The data have been corrected to allow for the variability of the yearly
winds using the Danish Wind Index calculated by EMD International [16]

was 41.5%, which compares with the projected value of 42.8%. When the data are
corrected to allow for the variability of the wind, however, the deficit disappears and
performance was slightly better than anticipated.
Figure 2.13 shows the performance of the Tuno Knob and Horns Rev wind farms
from the time of their commissioning until 2018. The performance of the latter was
significantly below the projected figure in 2018, possibly indicating that there were
problems that needed rectifying which caused significant downtime.

2.5.3 Towards 20 MW and Beyond

Largely driven by offshore considerations, a number of feasibility studies for


machines in the 10–20 MW range have been completed or are in progress. The
“Up Wind” Project, supported by the European Commission, showed that a 20 MW,
152 m diameter wind turbine was a feasible proposition [17]. This was followed by
the INNWIND project [18], which built on the success of UpWind, “to accelerate
the development of innovations that help realize the 20MW wind turbine. . . . The
overall objectives of the project are the high performance innovative design of a
beyond-state-of-the-art 10–20 MW offshore wind turbine and hardware demonstra-
tors of some of the critical components.”
Another random document with
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the way of reform. The Poles and the Hungarians
1830 and 184
8 experienced his relentless severity in a manner which,
while filling Europe with horror, inspired little inclination
for interference. In perfect consonance with the character and the
principles of Nicholas was his treatment of the Jews, who, under
him, lost all the poor privileges conferred upon them by his father,
and were not only condemned again to the old sorrows of servitude,
but by a special ukase, published in the beginning of September,
1828, they were for the first time subjected to the military
conscription.
Under Alexander II., the Czar Liberator, some of those
oppressive measures were mitigated, and permission was granted
for three Jews to settle at each railway station. But the improvement,
limited as it was, did not last long. Like some of his ancestors,
Alexander II. vacillated between the two antagonistic forces which
wrestle for mastery in Russia: the party of progress and freedom and
the party of reaction and despotism. Devoid of initiative and strength
of purpose himself, this amiable ruler was led now to right, now to
left. The disasters of the Crimean War had already shown that
absolutism had failed in the one thing which justified its existence—
military efficiency. If Russia could not achieve foreign supremacy,
she ought at least to secure domestic prosperity. The
1855
party of progress carried the day, and the Emperor
Nicholas with it, who, however, did not live to work out his
repentance, but left the task to his son. As early as 1856 Alexander
II. had a plan of a Constitution drawn up; but the design was
postponed owing to more pressing needs. The years 1861–1864,
however, witnessed the emancipation of the serfs, the abolition of
the terrible corporal punishment by the knout, the institution of the
zemstvos, or provincial assemblies, and other measures of reform
which awakened the hopes and the enthusiasm of the Russian
people. Svobodnaya Rossia—Free Russia—was on every man’s
lips. A new era had dawned for the cowering masses of the Empire.
The Polish rebellion diverted this enthusiasm from
1863
internal reform to the defence of the Fatherland against
its hereditary enemy, who, it was suspected, was aided by some
foreign powers.
Military success abroad presupposes union at home, and union
often means the sacrifice of the individual and his interests and
rights. This common historical phenomenon now received a fresh
illustration. Victory took away all the blessings conferred by defeat.
The Poles were crushed, and with them the budding liberty of the
Russians. The people and the press, in calling for the utter
annihilation of the supposed enemy of their country, were unwittingly
advocating their own doom—in extinguishing Poland, they
extinguished the last hope of their country’s happiness. For the
defeat of the Poles decided the struggle in favour of despotism, all
schemes of constitutional reform were abandoned, and Alexander
II.’s reign closed as Alexander I.’s had done: in a craven recantation
of the principles which had distinguished its beginning. This
backsliding created bitter disappointment in the hearts of all Russian
friends of liberty, and drove the more desperate among them to the
declaration of a war which culminated in the unfortunate monarch’s
murder. The crime of the Nihilists, however, defeated
1881 March 1
3 its own object and ruined the cause it was meant to
serve. At the very moment of his death the Czar was
actually meditating a plan for some form of representative
government, to begin with the convocation of an Assembly of
Notables. The intention died with him. Henceforth the relations
between the Government and the governed are more than ever
154
marked by mutual distrust. The assassination of the humane
Emperor, far from weakening, strengthened the hands of the
champions of autocracy and intolerance, and these champions were
reinforced by the advocates of Nationalism or Panslavism—a
movement which, like Nihilism, derives its theories from modern
Teutonic speculation, but applies them after a primitive fashion
purely Russian.
Russian national consciousness is a recent growth. It sprang up
at the beginning of the nineteenth century under the stimulus of
Napoleon’s invasion. Hatred of the foreign invader brought patriotism
into being, and the exultation of victory forced it to precocious
maturity. The Polish rebellions of 1830 and 1863 assisted its
development, which was also accelerated by the spread of education
and the growth of the press. The extreme partisans of the Nationalist
idea, henceforth the ruling body in the Empire, were imbued with the
conviction that the preservation of the Russian nation required the
forcible assimilation or, failing that, the utter extermination of all that
is not Russian. Under the fell influence of that conviction a
systematic campaign was entered upon for the Russification of all
the alien races which had been incorporated in the Empire during the
preceding century. After the complete subjugation of the Poles—
brought about by Muravieff in a manner which earned him the title of
“Hangman of Warsaw”—came the turn of the inhabitants of the Baltic
provinces, who, partly German by blood, had long adopted the
German tongue, German culture, and German ideals, and who since
their conquest by the Russians, in the eighteenth century, had
furnished the Empire with some of its best statesmen, warriors, and
scientists. The Panslavic zeal for assimilation was intensified by the
fear of German expansion. Prussia by her brilliant war against
Austria in 1866 laid the foundations of that national edifice which was
completed by the war, even more brilliant, against France in 1870,
thus realising the national dream of German unity. It was feared by
the Russians that the absorption of the Germanised provinces of the
Baltic would be the next step of Pan-germanic ambition. Impelled by
those motives, Russia inaugurated the amalgamation of these
regions in 1867. Alexander II., notwithstanding his personal
sympathies and his public assurances to the natives of the Baltic
provinces, was carried away by the Panslavic current, which gained
further strength from the national conflict with Turkey in 1877.
1881–1894 Under Alexander III. the period of partial reform,
thanks to the industry of MM. Pobiedonostseff, Katkoff,
and Count Ignatieff, and the indecision of their Liberal opponents,
gave way to one of reaction in all directions. In administrative
matters Alexander III., despite the advice of so firm a believer in the
divine origin of kingship as the German Emperor William I., reverted
to the methods of his own grandfather, Nicholas I.: the press
censorship was revived, the village communes were placed under
the absolute power of the police, flogging was restored as an
instrument of “educating” the peasants; and the very mention of the
Czar Liberator’s name became a punishable offence. At the same
time the work of Russification proceeded, and side by side with the
policy of racial uniformity was carried on a crusade for religious
conformity. Panslavism rooted out the national
1880–1890
institutions and language of the Baltic provinces;
Panorthodoxy stamped out their heretical and schismatic doctrines.
The Holy Synod in 1893, inspired by the Imperial Procurator, M.
Pobiedonostseff—who, though a layman, wielded an absolute
control over the Russian Church and was by his opponents
nicknamed “Lay Pope”—demanded the suppression of Protestants,
Roman Catholics, Mohammedans, Buddhists, and other dissenters
throughout the Empire. The thirteen years of Alexander III.’s reign
form one of the gloomiest pages in a history not remarkable for
brightness.
1894 Comparative tolerance followed upon the Czar’s
death, and high hopes were built on the reputed
liberality of his successor, Nicholas II. But these hopes have never
been fulfilled. On the contrary, obscurantism continued to reign
supreme, and of late years the Panslavist and Panorthodox
programme has been vigorously pursued in the Caucasus, in
Poland, and in Finland, as well as among the Buddhists of the trans-
Baikalian district. In all these provinces national institutions have
been attacked with a remorseless fury and a brutal thoroughness
worthy of the Inquisition in its worst days. The Armenian Church was
155
plundered, and Russian bishops were inflicted upon a population
whose language they did not understand. The Tartars, once loyal
and contented, were roused to appeal to the Sultan of Turkey and
the Western Powers for relief from the tyranny of the Czar. In their
petition these Russian Mohammedans describe how their religious
tribunals have been suppressed, how their children are forced into
Russian schools, how when serving in the army they are made to eat
food condemned by the law of Islam, and how they are compelled to
156
observe Christian festivals and to abandon their faith. But in no
part of the Empire was more systematically repeated the process
which, under Alexander III., had achieved the Russification of the
Baltic provinces than in Finland. Nothing more inhuman or more
insane than Russia’s treatment of that country has been known in
Europe since the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV. The
constitution of Finland, which Alexander I. on annexing the country in
1809 had solemnly pledged himself to respect, was abolished; its
press was silenced; its University degraded; its religion trampled
under foot; its best men were banished; and all means
1899–1903
were employed in the patriotic endeavour to grind
down this highly cultured, but non-Slavonic and non-Orthodox,
province of the north to the level of the rest of the Empire; with the
result that the most loyal and prosperous section of the Czar’s
subjects has been turned into the most disloyal and miserable. Thus
Germans, Esthonians, Poles, Finns, Circassians, Georgians,
Armenians, Mongols, Tartars—all have experienced the Russian
rage for uniformity national and religious; and so have even
dissenters of Russian blood, like the Old Believers and the
Dukhobors, not to mention the Polish and Lithuanian Uniates, whose
churches have been confiscated and converted to other uses, whose
clergy has been suppressed, and who are forced, under severe
penalties, to worship, to be married and buried, and to have their
157
children christened according to the rites of the Orthodox Church.
Tyranny is a plant that can only flourish in darkness. The press
is, therefore, gagged, public meetings are severely prohibited, and
both Church and State assiduously discourage the education of the
masses. Elementary schools are insufficient and inefficient, while
private initiative is jealously forbidden to supplement the
shortcomings of public instruction. The Government does not provide
for the people, and will not allow it to provide for itself. The
authorities at Moscow have been known to prohibit even factory
owners from keeping elementary schools for the improvement of
their working people. When such is the state of things in the greatest
industrial centre of the Empire, it is not hard to imagine the
conditions which prevail in the remote country districts with their dull
158
agricultural population. Hence the necessity for employing
foreigners in every department of commercial and industrial life. The
success of the foreigner, however, arouses the jealousy of the
native, and Russian economists are apt to attribute to the
predominance of the former that wretchedness of the Russian
masses, which is mainly due to their defective education. Under the
circumstances, it is not surprising to find that the Jews suffer as
grievously as they did in the Middle Ages. The hostility of a people
still barbarous in all essentials has always succeeded in defeating
the good intentions of the best Czars, and in heightening the horrors
consequent on the despotic temper of the worst. If the treatment of
Israel in various countries may be taken as an index to their
respective progress on the road to civilisation, Russia must be
pronounced as standing at this hour where England stood in the
thirteenth century.
In 1881 a violent outbreak of anti-Jewish feeling, encouraged by
the Nationalist newspapers, on one hand, and by the Nihilists on the
other, led to much bloodshed and to the destruction of Jewish
property and life in the southern and western provinces of Russia,
especially in Russian Poland. Many causes contributed to the
explosion. For years past, indeed since the abolition of serfdom, the
peasantry, especially in South Russia, had been deteriorating both
materially and morally. A contemporary observer thus describes the
state of things on the eve of the event: “The bad harvests in the
succession of years immediately preceding 1881, and the
accompanying ravages of a virulent and widespread cattle plague,
have completed the misery which idleness and improvidence were
steadily producing; and the removal of restraint, the separation of
families, and the assemblage of large numbers of the most ignorant
classes amid the strange scenes of town and camp life, have
unsettled their minds and degraded their morals.” After relating the
effect of these conditions on the relations between peasant and
landlord, the writer proceeds to explain some of the causes of the
peasant’s ill-feeling towards the Jew. “Besides the landlord, there is
another class in the south and west by whom the peasant thinks that
he has been defrauded. The Jews, whom Government restrictions
prevent from becoming agriculturists, and who are debarred from
accepting employment in any ordinary industrial establishment, by
the fact of their Sabbath limiting them to four and a half days of
labour during the Christian week, have from necessity turned their
attention almost exclusively to trade. The improvidence of the
agriculturist and his want of capital have rendered the assistance of
a money-lender and middleman an absolute necessity to him, and
this requirement has been naturally supplied by the presence of the
Jew, whose sobriety, thrift, energy, and commercial instincts render
him especially fit for the vocation. The more improvident the
peasantry, the greater are the immediate profits of the Jews, and
whilst the former have become steadily impoverished, many of the
latter have acquired comparative wealth. There is nothing
astonishing, therefore, in the ill-feeling which has arisen towards the
Jews, and that ill-feeling has been accompanied by the persuasion
that there must be a special injustice in the superior material
prosperity of a race whom the Government, by penal legislation, had
emphatically marked out as inferior to the Christians. Religious
fanaticism is almost unknown in Russia, and indifferentism is rather
the rule among a peasantry which lives in amity with Mahommedans,
Roman Catholics, and Lutherans alike; but it requires a strong hand
to restrain a semi-civilized and poverty-stricken people from
attacking and plundering their richer and defenceless neighbours.
The Government did not show this strong hand in defence of the
Jews, and political agitators eagerly fanned the flame of animosity
against the alien race, and saw with pleasure the spread of
disturbances which would either lead to a collision between the
people and the authorities, or open the eyes of the masses to the
159
weakness of the latter, and to their own strength.”
The venerable charge of ritual murder was once more brought
against the Jews, and within a few weeks all the provinces from the
Baltic to the Black Sea were a theatre of arson, rapine, and
slaughter, such as Europe had not witnessed since the tragedy of
the Black Death in the fourteenth century. The civilised world
shuddered at the appalling spectacle; but the local authorities, both
civil and military, looked, for the most part, complacently on. The
peasantry, having slaked their thirst for vengeance, plunder, rape,
and gin, by sacking the Jewish houses, drinking shops, and brothels,
proceeded to embody their grievances against the Jew in the
following series of demands:
1. “That Jews, members of town councils and provincial
assemblies, vice-directors of town banks, members of different
institutions and committees, should voluntarily give up their present
posts, casting off the cloak of pride and braggadocio; as persons not
possessing civic honesty, they are unfit to hold such places.
2. “That the Jews should impress on their wives and daughters
not to deck themselves out in silk, velvet, gold, etc., as such attire is
neither in keeping with their education nor the position they hold in
society.
3. “That the Jews should dismiss from their service all Russian
female servants, who, after living in Jewish houses, certainly
become prostitutes, forget their religion, and who are intentionally
depraved by the Jews.
4. “To banish, without delay, all Jews belonging to other places
who do not possess any real property in town.
5. “To close all drinking shops.
6. “To forbid Jews to abuse the Christians, and, in general, to
scoff at them.
7. “To prohibit Jews from buying up in the markets the first
necessaries of life with the intention of selling them to the Russians.
8. “To impress on wholesale dealers in spirits not to mix with
vodka any foreign element which is sometimes injurious to health.
9. “Not to trade on the Sabbath before noon, and at Christmas
and Easter not to trade for three days, and not to work on our
holidays.
10. “To prohibit Jews buying wheat for trading purposes within
thirty versts of the town of Pereyaslav, and therefore to remove all
existing grain and flour stores.
11. “To prohibit Jews from buying up uncut wheat; also to lease
land from private individuals.
12. “The Town Council is begged not to let, and the Jews not to
hire, the grounds at fairs and at marketplaces, with the object of
160
farming them out.”
No better proof of the mediaeval character of the Russian
peasant’s mind could be desired than that furnished by the above
document. Even so hearty an apologist of that peasant as Mr.
Goldwin Smith finds himself compelled to remark that these
demands “by their grotesque mixture of real and fancied grievances,
remind us of the demands made by the ignorant, but suffering,
peasants of the Middle Ages.” Their demand that the Jews should be
forced “to cast off the cloak of pride and braggadocio,” has its exact
parallel in the complaints of the Spanish bigots laid before Don
161
Henry in 1371.
But the feeling which found so terrible an expression was by no
means confined to the lower and illiterate classes of the community.
The crime itself was attributed to the deliberate policy of Count
Ignatieff. A high-bred and accomplished Russian lady, a few months
after the massacres, described the general attitude of her
compatriots towards the Jews in very fluent English, as follows:
—“Well, we do not like the Jews, that is a fact; and the dislike is
reciprocal. But the reason we do not like them is not because of their
speculative monotheism, but because of their practical heathenism.
To us they are what the relics of the Amorites and Canaanites were
to the Hebrews in old times—a debased and demoralized element
which is alien to our national life, and a source of indescribable evils
to our people. It is not to the Jew as a rejecter of Christianity that we
object; it is to the Jew as a bitter enemy of Christian emancipation,
the vampire of our rural communes, the tempter of our youth, and
the centre of the demoralizing, corrupting agencies which impair our
162
civilization.”
The modern Russian lady’s denunciation of the Jew, in tone as
well as in substance, is a significant, though, of course, quite
unconscious, echo of Ivan the Terrible’s cruder statement of more
163
than three centuries ago. The sole difference consists in form—
the religious objection is minimised and the social emphasised in
accordance with Western modes of expression; but fundamentally
the two utterances are identical.
The Minister of the Interior, in less emotional language,
explained the outbreak as due to causes of a purely economic
character. “During the last twenty years,” he said, “the Jews have not
only gradually got into their hands the trade and industry, but have
also acquired by deed of purchase and leases considerable landed
estates, and, owing to their numbers and solidarity, they have, with
few exceptions, directed all their efforts, not towards increasing the
productiveness of the country, but to the spoliation of the native
population, chiefly the poorer classes, by which means they called
forth a protest from the latter, which unfortunately expressed itself in
164
a violent form.”
Vice-Consul Wagstaff in an official despatch, while giving the
Jews full credit for their remarkable intelligence, thrift, and business
qualities, enumerates the complaints made against them by the
Russians—namely, that “the Jews are the principal keepers of
drinking shops and houses of ill-fame, receivers of stolen goods,
illegal pawnbrokers and usurers. As Government contractors they
frequently collude with unscrupulous officials in defrauding the State
to vast amounts. They use their religion for business purposes,
‘boycott’ outsiders, play into each other’s hands at land sales, and
thus despoil the peasantry. Often the harvest of a peasant who has
been entangled in their toils passes into their grasp, as it stands in
the field, on their own terms. They themselves do not raise
agricultural products, but they reap the benefit of others’ labour, and
steadily become rich while proprietors are gradually getting ruined. In
their relation to Russia they are compared to parasites that have
settled on a plant not vigorous enough to throw them off, and which
165
is being gradually sapped of its vitality.”
Another witness describes the gradual subjection of the
impoverished peasant to the Jewish money-lender and adds, “The
Jews’ two great factors in dealing with the Russian peasant are
vodka (native gin) and a few roubles at a pinch, and with these
powers he enslaves and uses him for his own ends. Many large
properties, belonging to influential and hereditary Russian noblemen,
are rented out to Jews, because the proprietors find that they pay
higher rents than the Russian tenants.” He concludes, however, with
the reflection: “The real source of the evil lies in the mental and
moral condition of the masses, and it is there the remedy must be
166
applied.”
These are the reasons alleged for the persecution of the Russian
Jews. First as to “productiveness,” the neglect of which is brought
forward as a criminal charge against the Jew. It is an old complaint.
The Andalusian monk of yore inveighed against the Jews of Spain
because “they preferred to gain their livelihood by traffic rather than
167
by manual labour or mechanical arts.” Modern economic science
teaches us that a country can dispense as little with the distributors
as with the producers of wealth. Productiveness, however, is well
known to be the pet idea of Russian economists. The last two
Ministers of Finance have for close on a quarter of a century been
fostering production with a reckless energy which by many
unbiassed students is regarded as fatal. Everything is done to
encourage production and exportation, with the result that the soil
gets exhausted, and the reserves of corn, on which the Russian
farmer once relied in time of famine, have disappeared from the
168
country. Like all measures carried to excess and without due
regard to local conditions, the fever of productiveness is not an
unmixed blessing, and the neglect of it will not be laid, by the
impartial outsider, as a crime at the door of the Jew, especially when
he remembers that the Jew is not a free agent in the choice of his
profession. For, even if the law permitted and the Jew wished to
devote himself to agriculture, he would be prevented from doing so
by the Russian system of village communes—an intrusion into which
on the part of non-Christians would be resented by none more
bitterly than by the Russian peasant himself. It is thus seen that the
Jew could not in any case become a “producer,” but was irresistibly
compelled to turn to handicrafts, retail commerce and money-
lending.
As to Jewish extortion. The manumission of the serfs opened up
fields for money-lending which it would have been impossible to
resist the temptation of exploiting even to capitalists whose
opportunities for investment are less circumscribed than are those of
the Russian Jew. That reform, though undoubtedly beneficial in the
long run, was meanwhile bound to upset the social fabric, especially
in Little Russia, and to produce the evils which generally accompany
a radical change brought about in a country unprepared for it. By the
Ukase of 1864 there was created a state of transition. The old was
pronounced out of date; the new was not yet born. While ruining
many noble landlords, the abolition of serfdom brought into being a
vast proletariat of freedmen poor in manual skill and capital, and
poorer still in resource. Both these classes, bewildered by the
unaccustomed conditions rudely thrust upon them, rushed to the Jew
for loans as naturally as the moth rushes to the candle, and, like the
moth, they suffered in the act. The Jew had no cause to treat either
borrower with lenience; but, as might have been expected, the
peasant was by far the greater sufferer of the two. He was less
prepared for the struggle. For centuries he had lived under a
restraint which, while stunting his manhood, conferred upon him
some of the privileges, as well as more than all the punishments, of
childhood. If the leading strings deprived the peasant of the freedom
to act, they also deprived him of the freedom to ruin himself. These
strings were suddenly removed. The peasant, still an infant in mind,
was invested with all the responsibilities of an adult. The very
qualities which had enabled him to bear his servitude now proved his
unfitness for liberty. His utter lack of initiative, of enterprise, of self-
reliance, and of self-restraint, and his abject submissiveness to the
decrees of fate—all characteristic of the serf—are well summarised
in the one word nitchevo, the commonest and most comprehensive
expression in the mujik’s vocabulary. It means “no matter,” and
corresponds exactly to the malesh of the Egyptian fellah—another
peasantry sunk in ignorance and fatalistic resignation, as the results
of centuries of serfdom.
In addition to these defects the Russian peasant is a
constitutional procrastinator. He never does to-day what he thinks he
can by hook or by crook put off till to-morrow. Two of the most
precious boons of his newly-acquired liberty, in his eyes, were the
license it allowed him to postpone his work as long as he liked and to
drink as much as he liked. Under the old system “the proprietor
thrashed his serfs if they were drunk too often, and he kept their
pockets so empty, and the price of the vodki, of which he was the
monopolist, so high, that they had comparatively little opportunity of
gratifying their passion for liquor. This was very well while it lasted,
but now that the control is withdrawn the reaction is all the
169
greater.” This is an ample answer to the charge brought against
the Jew as the promoter of intemperance.
As to the charge of collusion with Government officials, it can
easily be met. Both culprits, of course, deserve punishment. But it is
scarcely fair that the one should be only fined, dismissed, or
imprisoned, and the other slaughtered or starved with the rest of his
nation. With regard to “boycotting” outsiders and playing into each
other’s hands, is it not natural that people belonging to a sect which
their neighbours scorn should assist their fellow-sufferers in
preference to their persecutors? There is no stronger bond between
man and man than the bond of a common stigma.
The charges of immoral pursuits and habits of depravity may, or
may not, be exaggerated. But, even admitting that the Jew is all that
his Russian enemy considers him to be, a sufficient answer to the
invectives of the latter is supplied by the old saying: “Every country
has the Jews it deserves.” Without having recourse to the obvious
retort—which in the case of the Russian peasant would be
particularly apposite—that, if there was no demand for the facilities
for immorality supplied by the Jew, the Jew would not think it worth
his while to supply them, we may urge the self-evident truth, that
legal disabilities, by barring the way to an honest and honourable
career, drive their victims to the exercise of the lowest and meanest
of callings. The struggle for existence under such banausic
conditions degenerates into a savage warfare in which there is no
room for scruple or shame. The outcast has no reputation to lose.
And, the more unprincipled the contest becomes, the greater grows
the necessity for oppression, in countries where statesmanship has
not yet discovered less rude remedies. It is a vicious circle from
which there appears to be no escape.
Accordingly, the undisciplined fury of the populace in 1881 was
supplemented by a systematic and carefully reasoned-out
persecution on the part of the Government. Instead of endeavouring
to raise the Russian masses to a level of mental and moral strength
sufficiently high to enable them to compete with the Jew, the Czar’s
ministers devoted their ingenuity to the invention of new means for
lowering the Jew to the level of the Russian masses. The disabilities
of the hated race were increased. Jewish property in the open
country was confiscated, and the owners were driven into ghettos. It
was enacted that henceforth no Jew should be allowed to live in a
village or to acquire property therein. The whole of the Russian
Empire was, with reference to the Jews, divided into three distinct
sections. The bulk of the race were confined to the fifteen provinces
known as the “Pale of Jewish Settlement.” Those Jews who
belonged to a merchants’ guild of the first class for ten years,
University graduates, and skilled artisans were permitted to move
freely and to settle in any part of European Russia they chose,
except the departments of Moscow and Taurien, in which no Jewish
workman was allowed to reside. The third section comprised Siberia,
and that was closed to all Jews, except convicts. The result of these
enactments was that the few towns within the “pale” were
overcrowded with Jewish residents, herded together and forced to
carry on a fierce competition for existence with each other. At the
same time, laws were passed rendering the admittance of Jewish
youths to the high schools and Universities prohibitive, and the Jews
were forbidden to act as State or municipal officers, or teachers, or
to practise at the bar without a special license from the Minister of
Justice. These and many other measures of restriction were adopted
with the ostensible object of saving the Russian peasant from the
clutches of the Jewish harpy. The joint effect of persecution and
legislation on the Jews was misery. But these crimes proved the
reverse of beneficial to the very peasants on whose behalf they were
avowedly committed. In every village and township the departure of
the Jewish traders and artisans was immediately marked by a rise in
the prices of commodities, and was soon followed by commercial
and industrial stagnation.
That regard for the moral and material welfare of the people,
however, was not the sole, or the principal, motive of the Russian
Government’s policy is unwittingly confessed by the fair patriot
already quoted. Referring to the prohibition of the Jews from keeping
public houses, she says: “That our objection is solely to the anti-
national Jews, not the Jews who become Russians in all but their
origin, is proved by the decision of the Commission in favour of
allowing the Karaite Jews to sell drink as freely as any other of their
Russian fellow-subjects. It is only the Talmudist Jews who are
170
forbidden that privilege.” It is hard for the ordinary man to see
how belief in the Bible justifies a pursuit which is otherwise
condemned as injurious to body and soul, or in what mysterious way
the Talmud affects the quality of liquor. The ordinary man will find it
easier to draw from these facts the inference that the Government’s
real end was the suppression of the Jew, the suppression of the
drink-selling Jew being only a means to that end.
In the attitude of the Russian people towards the Jews at the
present moment we recognise all the features made familiar by the
history of the Jewish nation in the past. Social nonconformity and
aloofness led to anti-Judaism in antiquity. To this motive of
persecution the advent of Christianity added religious rancour, and
the Middle Ages economic rivalry. The nineteenth century was
destined to strengthen the texture of hatred by the addition of a new
strand—Nationalism. All these causes, as we have seen, combined
to make the Jew an object of detestation variously disguised. In
ancient Rome we found impatience of dissent justifying itself by the
pretext of regard for public morality; in Catholic and Protestant
Europe cruelty and cupidity hallowed by the cloak of religious zeal; in
modern Europe we see narrow-minded intolerance and jealousy
trying to ennoble themselves by the title of patriotism. Each age has
inherited the passions of the past and has increased the sad
inheritance by the addition of new prejudices. In Russia modern
culture spreads a little way over the face of mediaevalism, as the
waters of a river at its mouth spread over the surface of the ocean,
modifying its colour without affecting its depths. Consequently the
Jew is still persecuted for his heresy, as well as for his usury,
exclusiveness, and foreign extraction.
Russian officials and English apologists of Russian anti-
Semitism will not admit that the persecution of the Russian Jews is
religious, though acknowledging that religion, too, plays its part.
They claim that it is essentially economical and social, “and that the
main cause has always been the unhappy relation of a wandering
and parasitic race, retaining its tribal exclusiveness, to the races
171
among which it sojourns, and on the produce of which it feeds.”
This view is natural in a modern spectator of the West; but it is not
quite correct, as it implies modern and Western conditions and
sentiments in a country which only in a small measure is modern and
Western. The late Mr. Lecky wrote: “The Russian persecution stands
in some degree apart from other forms of the anti-Semitic movement
on account of its unparalleled magnitude and ferocity.” It also stands
apart, to the same degree, on account of its origin. Jew-hatred in
Russia is a thoroughly genuine survival. In Western Europe it is
largely an artificial revival. The Russian Jews have never been
emancipated from servitude, because the Russian Christians, with
few exceptions, have never been emancipated from ignorance and
bigotry. In other words, the modern term anti-Semitism, with all its
quasi-scientific connotation, can hardly be applied to the Russian
variety of the epidemic. But, be the causes what they may, the result
is the same. To the slaughtered Jew, it is a matter of comparative
indifference whether he is slain as a parasite or for the love of Christ.
The student also must be very extraordinarily constituted who can
derive any consolation from the fact that the principles of toleration
made dear to us by the experience and the sacrifices of two
thousand years, are violated in so outrageous a manner not from
religious, but from “economical and social” motives.
But, though the source of Russian antipathy to the Jew may be a
matter of dispute, there is no question as to the sincerity and the
depth of the feeling. An authority on the Jewish Question, writing in
1882, expressed the opinion that the disasters of that and the
previous year were inevitable, and that, “unless the Jews are
removed from the countries in which they have taken place, we may
172
certainly anticipate their recurrence upon a much larger scale.”
This anticipation was justified by subsequent events. In 1891 and
1892 new anti-Jewish riots, encouraged by the authorities, were
followed by fresh restrictive enactments.
Many Jews who had contrived to settle in towns outside the
“pale” were driven back into it, and others within the “pale” were
forced to quit the villages and townships in which they had dwelt for
years and, leaving their property and business connections, to take
up their abode in the over-crowded larger towns. The persecution
reached its climax in the winter of 1891–92, when thousands of men,
women and little children were heartlessly expelled from Moscow, at
a time of the year when even soldiers are not suffered to drill in the
open air on account of the cold. These and other measures of
unbearable harshness drove, as it was intended that they should,
about a quarter of a million of Jews out of the Empire; and then the
nations of the West, alarmed by the influx of the destitute refugees,
raised a bitter outcry against the barbarity of the Czar.
The Czar, however, in the words of one of his own servants and
apologists, “remained deaf to protests of the Lord Mayor of London,
for example,” and declared that “he will leave unheeded any and all
such foreign remonstrances demanding a change in methods which
have been deliberately adopted.” In fact, all the measures of
repression and restriction which ignorant foreigners misrepresented
as “the barbarous expulsion of the Jews from Russia” had for their
virtuous object to prevent collision between the Jews and the
peasants, to relieve the latter from what they could not be persuaded
was not a Jewish tyranny, and, in one word, to secure good order
173
and to maintain stability in the community. It is interesting to hear
the Russian version of the matter. Unfortunately a euphemism does
not constitute a refutation.
In 1896 the Jewish Question was re-opened, and the Jews, as
well as other sufferers, ventured to hope for an improvement of their
lot from Nicholas II.’s reputed zeal for reform. Much also was
expected from “the generous and sympathetic instincts of the young
Empress.” But these expectations were not realised, and at the
174
present hour the country in which the race is most numerous is
also the country in which it suffers most grievously. The treatment of
the Jews in Russia can be summed up in one sentence: deliberate
starvation of body and soul. The Jew, as has been seen, is loathed
not only as a non-Slav and non-Orthodox, but also as a parasite who
exhausts the organism on which he lives. Isolation, it is held, by
forcing him to feed upon himself, will kill him. The Jews are,
therefore, only allowed to reside in certain specified quarters of
certain towns in certain districts, and are forbidden to move from
place to place without special permission or such a special form of
passport as is granted to prostitutes. Overcrowding produces
poverty, disease, and all the filthy degradation of ghetto life. A faint
conception of what such life means may be formed from a recent
petition to the Russian Committee of Ministers signed by many
thousands of Russian Jews: “Not less than 20 per cent. of the entire
population of the Jewish Pale of Settlement,” say the petitioners, “are
reduced to such a condition of wretchedness that they have to be
supported from charitable sources. In great Jewish communities like
those of Vilna, Berditcheff, and Odessa, the number of the Jewish
poor amounts to as much as 25 to 33 per cent. Co-extensive with
this widespread poverty there is in all the Jewish communities an
enormous labouring and artisan proletariat that knows not to-day
wherewith it may exist on the morrow. The simple weapon which the
labourer and artisan possesses in his relations with his employer—
the power of leaving his work and seeking better conditions of
employment elsewhere—has become impossible of use on account
of the limitation of freedom of movement and the prohibition of
residence elsewhere than in the few towns of the Pale of Settlement.
If they do not wish to die of hunger or go begging Jewish workmen
must submit unreservedly to the conditions prescribed by the
manufacturers. The Jewish capitalists, too, are seriously injured by
the burdensome effect of the special regulations which have, owing
to the restraints of the May laws, taken from them every freedom of
action, and deprived them of the power of disposing of their products
175
in markets outside the Pale of Settlement....”
In addition, the Jews are confined to the most ignoble
occupations. They are excluded from the High Schools and the
Universities of the Christians, and are forbidden to keep secular
schools of their own. The only teaching accessible to the ordinary
Russian Jew is Rabbinical teaching. The centre of this education is
the Talmudical School of Walosin, known among the Jews as the
“Tree of Life College,” founded in 1803 by a disciple of Elijah Wilna,
a famous Hebrew scholar, and maintained by contributions collected
from all parts of the Russian “pale.” The institution provides spiritual
and bodily food—both very primitive in quality and meagre in
quantity—to some four hundred hungry students who spend three-
fourths of their time poring over the records of the past, and the other
fourth is denouncing a present of which they know nothing.
Ignorance fosters fanaticism, and the authority of the Synagogue
which, under different circumstances, might have been used as an
instrument of conciliation, is turned into a source of bitterness. The
seed of discord between Jew and Gentile, sown by oppression, is
nursed by the benighted Rabbis, who regard thirst for secular
knowledge as more sinful than thirst for alcohol; and the poisonous
plant is assisted in its growth by the young Jews who, having
contrived to obtain abroad an education denied to them at home,
intensify the just animosity of their people against the Christian
oppressors. The ill-feeling is invigorated further still by the Jewish
recruits who, on the expiration of their term of service, return to their
families exasperated by the hardships and the insults which they
have experienced in the ranks, for the Hebrew soldier in the Russian
army is treated exactly as the Christian recruit is treated in the
Turkish Gendarmerie. In both cases, not only is promotion out of the
176
question, but the infidels are the victims of unmeasured invective,
malice, and injury at the hands of their colleagues and superiors.
They are, as a race, considered unclean and unfriendly. They form a
small minority. They are powerless to protect themselves, and the
officers will not take them under their protection. The less deserved
the insult, the more anxious will the victim be to recover his self-
esteem by revenge. Is it, then, to be wondered at that the Russian
Jews are distinguished among their fellow-slaves for their eager
participation in any insurrectionary movement that offers the faintest
hope of relief and revenge? To turn a population which, by instinct
and interest alike, is the most conservative and peaceful in the world
into a people of anarchists is, indeed, the highest triumph hitherto
achieved by Russian statesmanship.
The hatred towards the Jew is shared by the Russian’s enemy,
the Pole, and for similar reasons—economic preponderance and
excessive addiction to usury and the trade in liquor. In 1863 the
revolutionary Government of Poland endeavoured to enlist the
sympathies of the Jews in the struggle against the common
oppressor by conceding to them civic equality. The experiment was
crowned with brilliant success. Justice turned the Jews of Poland
into Polish patriots. But the reconciliation did not outlive the
revolution. After that short spell of liberty the ancient prejudice
revived, and now, though legally the Jews of Poland are still Polish
citizens, the Catholics of Poland, encouraged by their Orthodox
tyrants of Russia, vie with them in their fierce contempt for the race
which stood their common fatherland in so good stead in the hour of
its need. How intense this feeling is, may be seen from the following
account by an English eye-witness:
“To the Jew in Warsaw is meted out a wealth of disfavour and
contempt that is hardly pleasant to witness. The British stranger,
however, who normally lives far from any personal contact with these
huge Jewish populations, is not altogether in a position to pass
judgment on this deeply-seated anti-Semitic rancour. It pervades all
classes of Polish society, and finds expression in a variety of ways.
The youth who obligingly performs my minor marketing for me, in
return for a tolerant attitude on my part on the subject of small
change, was interested in the fate of an egg which I had pronounced
to have passed the age limit of culinary usefulness.
“‘Don’t throw it away,’ he begged; ‘give it to me.’
“‘What do you want it for?’
177
“‘Oh, it will do to throw at a Jew.’”
One exception to the mutual antipathy which divides the Jew of
Poland from his Gentile fellow-countryman is offered by the upper

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