University of Groningen

The search for self-awareness

Middel, Kim Peronne

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Middel, K. P. (2018). The search for self-awareness: The road to national identity on Iceland, sæc. xiii-xx.
[Thesis fully internal (DIV), University of Groningen]. University of Groningen.

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Chapter 1 Alexanders saga. The universal validity of thought.1

Oc ef þu Alexander lifir sva sem Aristotiles hefir kent þer. þa man þitt nafn vppi meðan heimrenn
stendr
Alexanders saga

This chapter is the first in a series of four which will investigate the use of
contemporary thought in Icelandic texts written between the Middle Ages and the
twenty-first century in order to map the development of Icelandic self-awareness
during that period. The first text chosen for investigation is the Alexanders saga,
the saga about model king par excellence Alexander the Great: a text about ideal
kingship translated during a time of political turbulence on Iceland. Iceland found
itself on the brink of losing its independence to the Norwegian Crown, and in this
setting foreign ideas on kingship were presented to an Icelandic audience, in the
Icelandic language and in an Icelandic literary mold: a saga. With the translation of
the saga’s source, Walter of Châtillon’s Alexandreis, the connection between Iceland
and the outside world that was mentioned in the Introduction took place in an
extraordinary political-historical context. This occurrence is likely to have
necessitated modifications to the ideas on kingship in the original text, in which
case the saga would show input coming from the Icelandic environment in which it
came into being. For this reason, Alexanders saga2 offers the best starting point to
look for signs of Icelandic identity, and as such it calls for closer inspection.3
The Alexandreis was translated towards the end of the pre-colonial era on
Iceland, which lasted from its settlement in the ninth century until 1264 AD, in a
situation of political instability and during a shift in power to Norwegian rule. 4

1 This chapter has been published as Kim P. Middel, ‘Alexanders saga. Classical ethics in
Iceland´s Alexander epic’, Viator 45-1 (2014), 121-148.
2 Abbreviated as AS. The text edition used is Finnur Jónsson (ed.), Alexanders saga: Islandsk

oversættelse ved Brandr Jónsson (biskop til Hólar 1263-1264), Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1925,
not Andrea de Leeuw van Weenen’s (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2009), as
Jónsson’s is the most recent critical edition. For Alexandreis the edition used is Marvin L.
Colker (ed.), Galteri de Castellione Alexandreis (Thesaurus Mundi 17), Padua: Antenore, 1978.
3 Some might argue that Heimskringla, for its subject matter and author, would be just as

suitable. However, due to the fact that Heimskringla was composed earlier than AS and has
no direct link to a foreign counterpart from the mediaeval mainstream (outside of
Scandinavia), in my opinion it offers fewer possibilities to research any impact of the
immediate presence of an outside world on the Icelandic self.
4 The date of translation is usually fixed between 1260 and 1262, based on the fact that

bishop Brandr Jónsson is mentioned as the author in some of the later MSS, which I will
discuss later on. Considering the date of the oldest extant MS (AM 519a 4o, ±1280) and
following the textual analysis of MS AM 665 XX by Helgason, dating the saga around this
time seems appropriate. See Jón Helgason (ed.), Alexanders saga. The Arna-Magnaean
manuscript 519a, 4o, Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1966, xxvii, note 1.
21
Since the organisation of governance on Iceland in the tenth century, Iceland had
been in effect an oligarchy of chieftains who ruled in district and national
assemblies.5 Thus the balance in the country’s social-political structure was
maintained by a relatively small number of people chosen by and representing
farmers.6 This situation of relative stability lasted until the beginning of the
thirteenth century, by which time some of the governing families had been able to
consolidate power by unifying chieftanries.
What followed was an era known as the Sturlungaöld (1220-1262/1264),
during which internal warfare between the chieftains on Iceland reduced or
annihilated the power of some and consolidated that of others. By this time, the
Norwegian Crown had started to work its way into power on Iceland. In this it was
helped by Icelandic chieftains who had become members of the Norwegian court
and possibly saw chances of expanding their own influence by becoming
representatives of the king on Iceland.7 Given the situation of increasing turmoil,
some chieftains sought help from the Norwegian Crown, which made it easier for
the Norwegian king to expand his influence and tie people to himself. 8 By the
second half of the 1250s, tax obligations to the Norwegian crown were accepted by
part of the country, and by 1262, enough pressure had been put upon the
Icelanders for them to submit and swear allegiance to the Crown. 9 As of 1264,
Iceland was a dependency of Norway, and after the Kalmar Union in 1397, it
became a dependency of Denmark, which it would officially remain until 1944.
Another factor that, by the end of this era, is likely to have contributed to
the increasing instability in Iceland’s social-political structure, and ultimately to its
disintegration, was the start of the so-called Little Ice Age in 1258, a period of time
during which the average temperature dropped by approximately 4 degrees. 10 The
consequences of this climate change for agriculture and life on Iceland were
significant.

5 According to Icelandic sources, there were 39 chieftains who ruled three to a district,
though it is unsure whether this was indeed the case, as Karlsson points out. See Gunnar
Karlsson, The history of Iceland, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000, 72-73.
6 See Einar Ólafur Sveinsson, The age of the Sturlungs. Icelandic civilization in the thirteenth

century (Islandica 36), Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966 (19531), 8-9. This construct is
not quite unlike the social-political structure of ancient Rome with its patrones and
clientele; see Introduction, note 12.
7 Sveinsson, The age of the Sturlungs, 12.
8 The first significant step in this direction was in 1220, with chieftain Snorri Sturluson´s

offer to talk other Icelandic chieftains into submitting to the Crown; see Karlsson, History,
80.
9 Gunnar Karlsson, Iceland´s 1100 years. The History of a Marginal Society, London: Hurst

and Company, 2000, 85.

10 The Little Ice Age is commonly accepted to have commenced in 1258 due to the effects

of a volcanic eruption in the tropics (most likely Indonesia), and the effects of the climate
change on Iceland right after that date have been noticed in archeological finds. See Zach
Zorich, ‘Letter from Iceland: Surviving the Little Ice Age’, Archaeology 65-5 (2012):
http://archive.archaeology.org/1209/letter/iceland_hjalmarvik_irminger_east_greenland_
current.html (accessed January 5th, 2018).
22
 It is because of this historical-political backdrop that modifications of the
Alexandreis – a text about ideal kingship produced in a time of political transition –
may be expected. Furthermore, this type of text is likely to have required
adaptation as well in order to accommodate the understanding of an audience that
may have been familiar with king’s sagas, but not necessarily with a text featuring
a king straight from the mediaeval literary and ideological mainstream with
classical roots. The question is whether the translator was able to handle and pass
on the ideas that lie at the root of the Alexandreis successfully. The goal of this
study is to discern signs of adaptation for an Icelandic audience, the method
chosen is an analysis of the line of thought that underlies Alexander’s kingship in
Alexanders saga by examining ideas on kingship in the Alexandreis, in connection
with its source, Quintus Curtius Rufus’ Historiæ Alexandri magni,11 and by
comparing both texts.
First of all, the function of Aristotle’s speech about good kingship in the
Alexandreis will be defined both as a means of providing an update to the ethics
passed on from its source, the Historiæ Alexandri magni, and as a means of
assessing Alexander’s actions in the narrative. I will demonstrate that Walter of
Châtillon wrote the speech by Aristotle about good kingship in order to disconnect
Alexander’s qualities from their classical frame of reference and to provide a new
one. By describing Alexander’s virtues in general terms, Walter was able to update
the image of Alexander as a king for his own time. Furthermore, I will show that
the speech functions as a tropological program by which Alexander’s behaviour is
assessed in the narrative that follows the speech. I will propose that the program
in general, and Walter’s addition, in particular, of reverentia sapientiæ to the
spectrum of royal virtues enabled the update of the king’s image that apparently
was regarded necessary for understanding by Walter’s 12th-century audience.
The analysis of thought in the Alexandreis is followed by a close comparison
with its counterpart in the Alexanders saga. I will argue that the translator has
ascribed the speech the same key role Walter did in constructing the king’s image. I
endeavour to show that the Icelandic Alexander was assessed by the same
standard of ethics as his 12th-century Latin counterpart, and demonstrate the craft
with which the translator managed to keep the original line of thought intact
whilst effecting his own update. I will propose that both in the Alexandreis and the
Alexanders saga, Alexander’s downfall is not a gradual process: it is announced in
three steps. My last conclusion will be that the line of thought underlying all three
Alexanders – Curtius’, Walter’s and the Icelandic author’s – has universal validity.
This chapter closes with some thoughts on the visibility, or lack thereof, of the
cultural-historical environment in which the saga was composed in the king’s
image, and on the direction in which this points. With this study I hope to provide a

11Abbreviated as HAM; the text edition used is Carlo M. Lucarini (ed.), Q. Curtius Rufus
Historiæ, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009.
23
valid starting point for further research of signs of Icelandic self-awareness, in
thought.

THE CLASSICAL CONNECTION

In his Historiæ Alexandri magni, Quintus Curtius Rufus (sc i-ii)12 states that
Alexander would have conquered his superbia, had he been able to maintain his
temperance to the end of his life.13 It is precisely this popular topos of superbia or
pride that determines Alexander’s downfall in both Curtius’ text and the
Alexandreis. Curtius chose it as a key feature of the latter of the two main themes
constituting Alexander’s character, as identified by Baynham: the first being
whether Alexander was able to remain worthy of his fortune, and the second being
how this influenced the process of his moral demise.14 He had Alexander’s superbia
manifest itself in his unnatural pursuit of world domination and recognition as
Jupiter’s son;15 the relation between his virtues and vices determined the workings
of fate, and as superbia, the most serious of vices, got the upper hand, Alexander’s
downfall was the logical result. I say logical, because superbia in antiquity has an
ethical connotation that implies doing the wrong thing, i.e. acting against the
natural order of things. Being the gravest of human offenses, it can only lead to
self-destruction.16 Curtius leant on this specifically stoic notion of virtus/gloria and
scelus/superbia in Lucan’s Bellum Civile as deciding factors in defining a hero.17
Walter of Châtillon (±1135-1203) duly followed. Adapting Curtius’ Historiæ
is likely to have been facilitated by the fact that the text is of a historiographic

12 Not much is known about Curtius Rufus, and the dating of his Historiæ Alexandri magni
(sc i-ii) is based on language, style and references to other authors. See Elizabeth
Baynham, Alexander the Great. The unique history of Quintus Curtius, Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1998, 58; Gabriele John, Johannes Sibelis, and Heinrich Weismann,
Curtius Rufus’ Alexandergeschichte (Klassiker der Geschichtschreibung), Stuttgart: Phaidon,
1987, ix.
13 HAM III, xii-18,19 (Lucarini 33): ‘Equidem hac continentia animi si ad ultimum vitæ

perseverare potuisset, feliciorem fuisse crederem (…). Si<c> vicisset profecto superbiam
atque iram (…).’
14 See Baynham, Alexander the Great, 165.
15 HAM IV, vii-8 (Lucarini 64): ‘Sed ingens cupido animum stimulabat adeundi Iovem,

quem generis sui auctorem haud contentus mortali fastigio aut credebat esse aut credi
volebat.’
16 Alexandreis IX 3-4: ‘Ille deorum emulus in terris.’
17 See Andreas Glock, ‘Alexander Gallicus? Die Alexandreis Walters von Châtillon als Fall

impliziter antik-mittelalterlicher Dependenz und Selbstkonstituierung’, in Jan Cölln,

Susanna Friede, and Hartmut Wulfram (eds.), Alexanderdichtungen im Mittelalter.
Kulturelle Selbstbestimmung im Kontext literarischer Beziehungen, Göttingen: Wallstein,
2000, 280-81; Hartmut Wulfram, ‘Explizite Selbstkonstituierung’, above 228; Baynham,
Alexander the Great, 165-169; Henriette Harich, Alexander epicus. Studien zur Alexandreis
Walters von Châtillon(Dissertationen der Karl-Franzens Universität 72), Graz: Technische
Universität, 1986, 222; Vanessa Gorman, ‘Lucan’s epic Artisteia and the hero of the Bellum
Civile’, The Classical Journal 96-3 (2001), 263-264.
24
nature, with the supposed intention of providing empirical evidence, which was
common for classical Alexander texts in the Latin tradition.18 Its historiographic
character produced a text that was suitable for adaptation by later authors, of
whom Walter is the most representative.19 Not only was the Alexandreis (±1178-
1182) influenced by the narrative in the Historiæ, Walter also adopted the ethics
underlying the construction of Alexander’s persona. As a secretary to Henry of
France (1121-1175), archbishop of Reims, and later on as a notary at the court of
Henry’s successor William of Champagne (1135–1202), to whom the Alexandreis
was dedicated, Walter was bound to have been familiar with concepts of power
and court. He let the balance between Alexander’s virtues and superbia play the
same key function in shaping Alexander as Curtius did.20 The big question is how a
12th-century author was able to achieve this in a way that simultaneously provided
an update for his own time.

ALEXANDER GUALTERIENSIS

There are several theories as to how Walter effected what could be called a
disantiquation of Curtius’ Alexander, whilst preserving the two main themes of
Alexander remaining worthy of his fortune, and how this effected his fall. 21 It is
clear that Walter had to disconnect Alexander’s characteristics from their classical
framework – in the void that consequently ensued, he would effect a situation in
which he could let Alexander’s virtues and vices coincide with mediaeval-Christian
concepts of royal virtue or lack thereof.
First off, he dehistorified places and events,22 and in addition, he
dehistorified Alexander as a king. The solution he chose was to have no-one less
than Aristotle present, as a tropological program, the mediaeval king’s virtues that
he wanted to ascribe to Alexander in Book I.23 This accounts for the fact that in the
consequent narrative, Walter had no need to shed extensive light on Alexander’s
characteristics beyond a stereotypical description in sententiæ:24 his character was

18 As opposed to the Greek tradition and its derivatives, which present events without
claiming historicity, and the romanticising vernacular tradition such as the Roman
d’Alexandre.
19 See Baynham, Alexander the Great, 30-32; George Cary, The medieval Alexander,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967 (19561) 17; Roger T. Pritchard, Walter of
Châtillon. The Alexandreis, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986, 6.
20 See Glock, ‘Alexander gallicus?’, 281.
21 Cary sees Alexander’s relationship to fortune as that of – Christian – man to divine will,

and observes an allegorical, impartial Fortuna; see Cary, The medieval Alexander, 202
(note 19). Harich observes that Fortuna feeds Alexander’s greed, but is not the overall
cause of his demise, and Alexander’s superbia lies in his aiming for world dominion; see
Harich, Alexander epicus, 222 and 231.
22 See Glock, ‘Alexander gallicus?’, 285.
23 Alexandreis I, 82-183.
24 See Harich, Alexander epicus, 242.

25
simply tested by the program. Testing Alexander’s actions by the program offers a
plausible explanation as to why his character does not undergo any development
throughout the narrative, or why his actions were judged generally and not by the
situation in which they occurred.
Because of the tropological angle, there is cause for calling the Alexandreis
the poetic equivalent of a king’s mirror,25 and this is supported by the narrative’s
framework: the philosopher instructing the king.26 This was unprecedented in
Alexander literature and it is a reference to the 12th-century notion of the rex
sapiens and of political success being linked to intellectual development.27 It is also
reflected in Walter’s addition of reverentia sapientis to the scala of Alexander’s
virtues and puts him in line with contemporary moralists who used Alexander’s
relation to Aristotle as an example for mediaeval kings.28
Walter begins by presenting the four worldly virtues for kings – virtus,
temperantia, iustitia, and sapientia – directly or indirectly in Aristotle’s speech,
setting the pace for the rest of the narrative.29 The specific derivatives of these
virtues that he uses to characterise Alexander throughout the Alexandreis – the
positives virtus militaris, clementia, pietas/liberalitas, gloria and reverentia
sapientis on the one hand, the negative cupido habendi on the other – signify both
sides of the balance between virtue and vice; other characteristics identified are
subordinate to these.30 The positives are comprised by reverentia sapientis, as
Alexander pays heed to Aristotle, and fill in gloria; the only negative fills in
superbia. Given this premise, it would follow that predominant characteristics in
the narrative on either side of the balance decide Alexander’s status of being a rex
utilis or inutilis respectively31 – the moment cupido habendi gets the upper hand, an
abrupt change from utilis to inutilis would be the logical consequence after a check

25 Maura K. Lafferty, Walter of Châtillon’s Alexandreis. Epic and the problem of historical
understanding, Turnhout: Brepols, 1998, 66.
26 There are several arguments for and against this interpretation of Aristotle’s speech.

Harich sees a contemporary guideline for Christian rulers; see Henriette Harich, ‘Parce
humili, facilis oranti frange superbum. Aristoteles in der Alexandreis Walters von
Châtillon’, Grazer Beiträge 12/13 (1985-1986), 147-69. Kratz on the other hand considers
them to be portrayed as outdated, pagan ideas from Antiquity; see Dennis M. Kratz,
Mocking epic. Waltharius, Alexandreis and the problem of christian heroism, Madrid:
Ediciones Jose Porru a Turanzas, 1980, 80-87. Lafferty states that in the 12th century,
Aristotle is the master of the argument, not of ethics, and that he is brought forward to
investigate the relationship betwee power and learning; see Lafferty, Walter of Châtillon’s
Alexandreis, 100.
27 For the notion of the rex sapiens that was in vogue in the twelfth century, see Wilhelm

Berges, Die Fürstenspiegel des hohen und späten Mittelalters (Monumenta Germaniae
Historica 2), Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1952 (19381) 67; Bernard Guenée, States and rulers in
later medieval Europe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985, 71.
28 See Cary, The medieval Alexander, 105-106.
29 Directly: virtus I, 115-163; temperantia I, 164-174; iustitia I, 105-114; 175-183;

indirectly sapientia: (I, 82-9).

30 They are a.o. pudor, continentia libidinum, paupertas, reverentia recti and ira.
31 See Ármann Jakobsson, Í leit að konungi. Konungsmynd íslenskra konungasagna,

Reykjavík: Háskólaútgáfan, 1998, 191.

26
with Aristotle’s program.
The first of the specific virtues, virtus militaris, takes up one third of
Aristotle’s speech.32 The ideal is that of a king who goes to war, is the first to
deliver an attack, sets an example for his men, and gives guidance to and confers
with his commanding officers.33 Alexander meets these requirements all the way
up until the last book of the Alexandreis. It is not surprising that virtue in combat
takes a predominant position in the program, as Alexander’s military enterprises
set the framework for the story and thereby for the elaboration of the other
characteristics,34 the most prominent one being clementia.
In his military actions, the king is first and foremost required by the
program to show clemency to those who deserve it, and deal appropriately with
those who do not.35 The program presents clementia in connection with ira, or to
be precise, with the positive ira refrenata.36. The importance of displaying
clementia to the deserving is reiterated in the narrative by an allegorical
representation in book four,37 and the objective is clear: it keeps the reign intact.38
When called for, ira is legitimate, as it is the appropriate response to superbia
towards the king,39 and refraining from actions prompted by ira is even better,
because it makes the king’s clementia shine all the more: it is a beneficium allowing
the king to claim the moral high ground.40 This positive ira is also the incentive for
Alexander’s first military action,41 whose success is determined by clementia. It has
justifiably been concluded that clementia is the most significant trait of
Alexander,42 but it is important to recognise that the stereotype clementia – ira
refrenata plays an essential role in this.

32 Alexandreis I, 115-143.
33 Alexandreis II, 433: ‘hostibus expositus ante omnia signa suorum cornipedem uexans
(…) choruscat (…) armipotens Macedo.’
34 Conquest was also one of the two main features of Alexander in mediaeval exemplary

literature, the other being munificence; see Barbara Sargent-Baur, ‘Alexander and the
Conte du Graal’, Arthurian Literature 14 (1996), 4.
35 Alexandreis I, 115: ‘Parce humili, facilis oranti frange superbum.’
36 ira refrenata is discussed later in the program; I, 181: ‘Vindictam differ donec

pertranseat ira.’ It is named explicitly in Alexander’s clementia towards Porus: IX, 319,
‘Ergo refrenata mutati pectoris ira…’
37 Alexandreis IV, 420-421: ‘Assidet hiis stabilitque deæ Clementia regnum, sola docens

miseris misereri et parcere victis’. Darius praying to the gods that his realm be handed
over to clemens victor Alexander, if he himself is not to maintain it, in IV, 62 is for the same
reason: ‘primum, queso, michi regnum stabilite meisque. Quod michi si tolli iam prefinistis
(…) regnum Asiæ me post hic tam pius hostis habeto, tam clemens victor.’ It is implicit that
Alexander’s clemency will ensure stability.
38 Alexandreis I, 342: ‘Instabile regnum est, quod non clementia firmat.’
39 ira as a negative appears in those passages where it is no longer refrenata; e.g. the

deaths at the hands of Alexander of Kallisthenes, Hermelaos and Kleitos, who were not
superbi: IX, 7-8, ‘etenim testatur eorum finis amicicias regum non esse perhennes.’
40 E.g. IV, 84-85: ‘...quanto clementior hoste hostis es.’
41 Alexandreis I, 30-32: ‘…Darium dare iura Pelasgis gentibus imperiique iugo patris arua

prementem audit et indignans his uocibus exprimit iram…’

42 Along with cupido gloriæ; Harich, Alexander epicus, 211 and 242; Kratz, Mocking Epic, 88.

27
 As much as clementia is about doing the right thing to those conquered,
pietas and liberalitas are about doing the right thing to those equal in rank43 and to
the king’s armed forces, respectively. As far as pietas goes, the program is clear: the
king has to be deferential.44 In Alexander’s case, pietas is specified in the narrative
by his display of decency and modesty towards others; that is, those of similar
rank.45 For instance, he treats Darius’ relatives with pudor and pudicitia, protects
them and shows them deference.46 Walter underlines the relevance of pietas, as
displayed by the protection of pudor, at the same level as clementia: he has Darius
proclaim Alexander both as a dutiful enemy and a clement victor in one breath. His
deference is an officium where his clemency is a beneficium; they both show that
shows he knows his place.
The third kind of appropriate behaviour towards others, liberalitas (and
consequently paupertas), is introduced at the beginning of book one, in the light of
Alexander’s military enterprises.47 It is Aristotle who tells Alexander to endow his
troops lavishly; if not materially, then at least with love and riches of the mind, a
beneficium from a commanding officer to his men.48 According to the program,
generosity and personal economy are crucial to virtus militaris: without a reward
no soldiers and no campaigns; no wall will protect a miserly leader.49 Alexander’s
generosity was heralded by Curtius for the same reason50 and had become
proverbial in the High Middle Ages.51
Interestingly, Walter extends liberalitas and paupertas beyond Alexander’s
men in two instances, as acts of pietas and clementia respectively: he has Alexander
refuse to sell Darius’ mother and daughters, and lets him apply his own kind of
Marshall Plan by making many donations to the temple of Jerusalem, after
conquering the city peacefully, and make a lasting gift of peace to its citizens.52 In
showing generosity, Alexander acts out the theory of the sequence ira – clementia

43 Or higher in rank; pietas has the ethical connotation of doing the right thing to higher
powers.
44 Alexandreis I, 178: ‘Nec desit pietas pudor et reverentia recti.’
45 In contrast, where Walter discusses Alexander’s pietas when it concerns equals, he

condemns Alexander’s men attacking a group of defenseless women in book III, 225 and
onward.
46 Alexandreis III, 234: ‘Maiestate tamen salua saluoque pudore...’
47 Alexandreis I, 1-2: ‘Gesta ducis Macedum totum digesta per orbem, quam large dispersit

opes...’ I agree with Cary and Harich that this is no indication for further prominence
throughout the narrative, although this is opposed by Sargent-Baur. See Cary, The
medieval Alexander, 212; Harich, Alexander epicus, 217; Sargent-Baur, ‘Alexander and the
Conte du Graal’, 13.
48 Alexandreis I, 146-154.
49 Alexandreis I, 163: ‘Non murus non arma ducem tutantur auarum.’
50 See for instance HAM III, i-1, 3: ‘Inter hæc Alexander, ad conducendum (…) militem

Cleandro cum pecunia misso...’

51 See Cary, The medieval Alexander, 209.
52 Alexandreis IV, 135-137: ‘At nunc securus sub paupertatis amictu regnat Alexander.

Regum me glorior esse, non mercatorem’; I, 552-554: ‘...multo ditavit munere templum.
(…) indulto Marte beatæ urbis perpetuo donavit munere cives.’
28
in practice, and in doing so the importance of clemency for virtus militaris and the
success of Alexander’s military operations are stressed once again. It is safe to
conclude that pietas and liberalitas, next to being virtues of their own that take the
back seat to clementia and virtus militaris,53 do have an essential, channelling
function for the latter two: Alexander’s generosity and deference help embody his
clemency, and thereby his military success. The triad clementia – pietas - liberalitas
completes the package of appropriate behaviour.
All these virtues lead to gloria, the reward of good behaviour according to
the program. Alexander’s name is to live on forever if he abides by Aristotle’s
guidelines.54 In the narrative, Alexander shows that he is fully aware of glory being
the consequence of the merits of one’s life.55 It becomes the motive for his military
campaigns, the underlying reason of his virtues – he is in it only for the glory – and
the cause of his biggest flaw, cupido habendi.56 In other words, gloria is connected
to the way in which Alexander fills in his role as an exemplary king in two ways, as
the motive and as the reward for his behaviour.
Now this double connection between virtue and glory reflects something I
mentioned earlier on, the classical-stoic idea of man’s relation to the divine, or
doing what is appropriate within the natural order of things. If one behaves
appropriately, i.e. perform the officium of virtue, one receives the beneficium of
glory from the higher powers. And there we have it: as soon as Alexander’s cupido
habendi gets the better of him and his superbia puts him outside the natural order
of things, the interaction of virtue and glory must cease to exist and the motive
gloria turns into gloria vana.57 A parallel between Alexander’s superbia and his

53 Cary, The medieval Alexander, 212: ‘Gautier is too occupied (…) to pay more attention to
his liberality than merely to recognise it in passing.’ Harich, Alexander epicus, 217: ‘Fest
steht aber, daß diese beiden virtutes im Charakterbild Alexanders vor anderen (wie die
clementia und virtus militaris) wohl ein wenig zurückstehen.’
54 Alexandreis I, 182-183: ‘Si sic vixeris, eternum extendes in secula nomen.’
55 Alexandreis VII, 358: ‘Si vitæ meritis gloria respondet famæ.’
56 The consequences of lack of virtus militaris, for instance, is a rex inglorius: II, 208-210

‘...spoliis ululabit ademptis hostica barbaries, at rex inglorius exul nudus in hostili sine
laude iacebit harena.’ Furthermore, Alexander concedes that glory suffices as his only
reward: II, 484-485, ‘Prelia non spolium mecum discernite. Cedant premia preda meis,
michi gloria sufficit una.’ And finally, his reaction to Aristotle’s speech is one that indicates
his greed for power: I, 190, ‘Germinat intus amor belli regnique libido.’
57 Cicero and Seneca, who are the pre-eminent spokesmen for the idea, consider

Alexander’s gloria as a motive to be gloria vana or propria gloria from the very beginning,
a thought embraced by John of Salisbury putting forward Alexanders as a classical-pagan
antitype for Christ. The editions used are Michael Winterbottom (ed.), Marci Tulli Ciceronis
De officiis, Oxford: Clarendon, 1994; François Préchac and Manfred Rosenbach (eds.),
Lucius Annæus Seneca, philosophische Geschriften 5: De clementia. De beneficiis = Über die
Milde, über die Wohltaten, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989; Ioannis
Sarisberiensis Policraticus, ed. Clement C.J. Webb (Oxford 1909). Cicero, De officiis I, 90-
xxvi (Winterbottom 37): ‘Philippum quidem Macedonum regem rebus gestis et gloria
superatum a filio, facilitate et humanitate video superiorem esse (…). Itaque alter semper
magnus, alter sæpe turpissimus.’ Seneca, De beneficiis II, xvi (Préchac and Rosenbach 170):
‘Non quæro, inquit, quid te accipere deceat, sed quid me dare. (…) Animosa vox videtur et
29
being a non-Christian seems far-fetched to me;58 I would argue that it is more
important to recognise that the concept of gloria could function both at a classical
level and at a contemporary level, and that the moment cupido habendi comes into
the picture is the moment the balance between virtue and gloria is disturbed.
The next question is not if, but when this happens. One option might be in
book eight, in the speech of the Scythian leaders.59 There we see an abrupt shift of
attention from virtue to vice, though there does not seem to be an immediate
cause: Alexander’s campaign against the Scythians stemmed from his regular ira
and he consequently treated them clemently.60 Yet the Scythians lay several
charges that indicate greed and lack of self-control at his feet,61 although earlier in
book eight Alexander is still portrayed as the guardian of temperantia.62 A clue as
to why they do this might be found in the fact that Alexander had stopped acting in
accordance with the program on one account: he was not facilis oranti to the plea
of the Scythians before subduing them, but this lack of response is not uncommon
in mediaeval literature.63
The second warning against immoderateness is given by the Indian king
Porus in book nine,64 but still there is no sign of Alexander’s virtue being in danger:
his ira turns into ira refrenata after hearing the king’s plea, and he treats Porus
with clementia as well.65 The final warning is dealt further on in book nine by
Alexander’s own men, when they ask him to desist of further enterprises.66 It is

[cum] regia, cum sit stultissima!’ John of Salisbury, Policraticus, 722 C (Webb 247):
‘Multorum (…) fuit opinio (…) Alexander et Aristoteles a numinibus esse progenitos, eo
quod in omnibus propriam quærebant gloriam’; ibid. 722 D (Webb 16-20): ‘Non et verus
Dei Filius, Deus homo, propriam non quærebat gloriam in omnibus quæ gloriose fiunt ab
eo, sed Patris.’
58 Christine Ratkowitsch, ‘Troja-Jerusalem-Babylon-Rom. Allgemeingültiges und Zeitkritik

in der Alexandreis Walters von Châtillon’, Poetica 28 (1996), 100; Jan Cölln, ‘Der Heide als
Vorbild für christliche Weltherrschaft’, in Jan Cölln, Susanna Friede, and Hartmut Wulfram
(eds.), Alexanderdichtungen im Mittelalter. Kulturelle Selbstbestimmung im Kontext
literarischer Beziehungen, Göttingen: Wallstein, 2000, 94.
59 Alexandreis VIII, 375-476.
60 Alexandreis Cap.viii. libri, 8: ‘...monitus non flectunt principis iram.’; VIII, 506-508, ‘Non

magis arma ducis homines movere suoque subiecere iugo quam quod clementer agebat
cum victis.’
61 Alexandreis VIII, 375-376, ‘Cupido si corpus haberis par animo...’; VIII, 425-426, ‘...ad

pecudes nostras extendis auaras instabilisque manus’; VIII, 428-429, ‘Quid tibi diviciis
opus est, que semper avaro esuriem pariunt?’; VIII, 431, ‘Sicque famem sacies, defectum
copia nutrit.’
62 This is when he orders the richess of his spoiled troops to be burned in order to start the

next campaign, a memorable act because it is one of temperantia that goes against the
common liberalitas towards his men; Alexandreis VIII, 52-54.
63 Alexandreis VIII, 477-478: ‘Sic ait, at Macedo nichilominus agmine facta arma Scitis

inferre parat.’ See also Cary, The medieval Alexander, 173.

64 Alexandreis IX, 315: ‘Proinde tui cursus frenum moderare.’ The entire speech is to be

found at Alexandreis IX, 298-316.

65 Alexandreis IX, 319-320: ‘Ergo refrenata mutati pectoris ira, contra spem procerum

curauit prodigus egrum...’

66 Alexandreis IX, 514-543.

30
here that Alexander openly displays superbia for the first time: his glory exceeds
the frontiers of time,67 he endeavours to see a different Nature.68 This, not the
Scythians’ speech, is the moment when the balance of virtue and gloria is disturbed
permanently. Alexander’s virtues become irrelevant due to the unnatural desire
that constitutes his superbia, he himself becomes a rex unutilis. The consequence is
an inglorious death in book ten, leaving his men stranded and unprovided for in a
strange country and leaving his realm without a successor.69
There is no gradual process of moral demise leading to Alexander’s death.
However, Walter did use the three speeches as a tricolon crescens to announce the
– inevitable – end. We find a cue to this in the aforementioned fact that according
to the program, Alexander should have been – but was not – facilis oranti to those
before him in all three instances.70 The fact that the Scythians and Porus are strong
opponents who, in accordance with the stoic principle, live in harmony with natura
or the natural order of things, adds weight to their words to Alexander, who is
about to start doing the opposite.71 Their mentioning of fortuna, the classical-stoic
equivalent of natura in accordance with which man is supposed to live, forshadows
Alexander’s superbia: it embodies the divine boundary which they will not, but
Alexander will cross.72 The fact that it is Alexander’s own men delivering the last
speech stresses the gravity of his mistake in not paying heed. superbia takes over,
Alexander loses control over his fate, and it is a natural consequence that fate –
read nature itself – turns against him.73
So where is the last virtue on the list, reverentia sapientis, in all of this? As

67 Alexandreis IX, 555: ‘Excedit eui mea gloria metas.’

68 Alexandreis IX, 569-570: ‘Antipodum penetrare sinus aliamque uidere Naturam
accelero.’
69 Alexandreis IX, 517-519: ‘(…) Tua si tibi uilis ut nunc est uel cara minus, preciosa tuorum

sit saltim tibi, Magne, salus.’ Alexander runs the risk of neglecting his duty to look after his
people, a known problem for kings in the twelfth century; see Lafferty, Walter of
Châtillon’s Alexandreis, 93-97.
70 The king is to confer with those of virtue and high moral standard, regardless of their

rank; see Alexandreis I, 85 and I, 92-95: ‘Consultor procerum seruos contempne bilingues
et nequam (…). Non (…) prohibet rationis calculus, ut non exaltare uelis siquos insignit
honestas, quos morum sublimat apex licet ampla facultas et patriæ desit et gloria
sanguinis alti.’ I, 85 can be read in two ways, depending on whether procerum is
considered attributive to consultor or servos. The translations by Streckenbach
(Heidelberg 1990) and Townsend (Philadelphia 1996) choose the latter option, but
considering the caesura after procerum and the unlikely notion that a king would ask
advice from servants, the former option seems more plausible to me. Also, the phrase
construction is in line with that of I, 15: facilis oranti frange superbum.
71 About the Scythians, see VIII, 366-367: ‘...contentique cibis quos dat natura, beatam

ambitione sacra nolunt corrumpere uitam.’ About Porus, see IX, 317-318: ‘...fortunæ
turbine regem infractum uictumque animum uictoris habentem.’
72 Alexandreis VIII, 453-455, ‘...dum celeris Fortunæ munera nondum accusas, impone

modum felicibus armis, ne rota forte tuos evertat versa labores.’ IX, 315-316, ‘Caduca sunt
bona fortunæ stabilisque ignara favoris.’
73 Alexandreis X, 6-7: ‘Interea memori recolens Natura dolore principis obprobium mundo

commune sibique…’
31
mentioned before, deference of the wise, i.e. Aristotle, enabled Alexander’s acting
out of the other virtues. The program implicitly refers to reverentia sapientis in two
ways: by its form – guidelines for good conduct set by a philosopher74 – and by
emphasising the importance of consilium.75 Explicit mention is made in book three,
where Alexander professes not to be able to kill a wise man, Zoroas, since he is
useful to the world.76 Walter’s addition of reverentia sapientis to the range of
virtues, as well as this passage, were a novelty. One explanation offered is that the
mediaeval poet was seeking recognition and reward from his employer, idealising
antiquity where learning was stimulated by those in power,77 but although this is a
plausible explanation, it does not answer the question how this virtue fits the same
ethical bill that determines Alexander’s other virtues. In my opinion the crux lies in
the word sapiens, a charged term: it is charged because its classical-stoic
connotation is that of a person who has acquired consciousness of his position
within nature and therefore the ability to act appropriately. It is also charged
because the notion of the rex sapiens, as we saw before, was highly current in
Walter’s day.
The Scythians can serve as an example: their knowledge of the interaction
between man and natura/fortuna gives them the consciousness of the cyclical
nature of fate that underlies wisdom, a classical line of thought also functional with
twelfth-century authors; in other words, they are wise.78 This, the fact that they are
sapientes, puts the weight of their speech in a new light: part of Alexander’s
superbia lies in lack of reverentia sapientis and could have been prevented. To put it
bluntly, this virtue comprises the entire program. Walter may not have called
Alexander wise explicitly, but his earlier behaviour showed insight in nature and
therefore wisdom: he listened to the wise, did the right thing by other people, and
was therefore a rex sapiens, one that is useful to the world. Such wisdom stands in
sharp contrast to the Scythians’ comparison of Alexander to an unwise man, should
he choose to stop behaving in accordance with nature.79 The dice have been cast
for the trajectory that Alexander is to follow: sapiens will become stultus.
So there we have it: spurred on by reverentia sapientis and leading to gloria,
the entire network of virtue and vice that constructs the king’s image and
determines the run of the narrative is based on ethics that were both valid at a
classical-stoic and at a mediaeval-Christian level. Furthermore, Walter preserved

74 One could argue this is reflected in book one: I, 81, ‘atque hec dicentem vigili bibit aure
magistrum.’
75 See also note 70.
76 Alexandreis III, 176-178, ‘Numquam mea dextera sudet vel rubeat gladius cerebro tam

multa scienti. Utilis es mundo. Quis te impulit error ad amnes tendere velle Stigos, ubi
nulla scientia floret?’
77 Harich, Alexander epicus, 218
78 Lafferty, Walter of Châtillon’s Alexandreis, 162. This would also account for the passage

about Zoroas, because he knew what nature had in store for him.
79 Alexandreis VIII, 394-395, ‘Stultus qui fructum cum suspicit arboris, altum non vult

metiri.’ Walter uses the terms stultus/stultitia and superbus/superbia within the same
semantic scope, as did Seneca; see note 57.
32
both main themes that were subject to these ethics and that were therefore
universally usable: Alexander remains worthy of his fortune, as long as he abides
by the program, and the moment he stops doing so is the moment he determines
his own fall. Alexander’s relation to classical fortuna is no different than it is to
Christian divina providentia,80 and it is Alexander, not fortuna itself, who’s in
control of events. His superbia goes beyond a mere pursuit of world domination:81
the latter cannot cause Alexander’s downfall, if there is no ethical connotation of
his failing to do the right thing. The Scythians gave the kick-off for this at the end of
their speech,82 book ten takes away any doubt about the matter: Alexander should
have been content with mortal honour,83 as opposed to the gloria vana he ended
up pursuing. Things cannot be more clear: Alexander’s superbia disrupted the
natural order of things, the relation between man and the divine, and it is as
comprehensive and negative a vice in the Alexandreis as it is in the Historiæ.
Aristotle’s program of virtues in general, and the addition of reverentia
sapientis in particular, play a key role in updating the Alexander’s image as a king
and leader for a twelfth-century audience. The program created a contemporary
framework for Alexander’s characteristics; it enabled Walter to emphasise relevant
and recognisable features for his audience and leave out less relevant ones.84 In
doing so, Walter intercepted any problems with the aforementioned
‘disantiquation’ of Alexander. The actual adaptation – or rather update, as the
ethics covering the king’s characteristics in both texts were so closely related – of
Alexander’s image was consequently achieved by testing these characteristics by
the program. The testing was then used as an instrument to confirm the current
value of the program’s tropological tenor: the superficial elaboration of
Alexander’s characteristics is the consequence of their being subject to the
program. The addition of the program and reverentia sapientis bear testimony to
the trouble Walter went through in order to keep the universal validity of the
ethics underlying his king’s image intact, as well as to provide an update. Or in a
nutshell: he made sure Alexander was as much a classical-stoic as a mediaeval-
Christian king.

ALEXANDER ISLANDICUS

The immense popularity of the Alexandreis reached Iceland and the rest of the
Occident relatively quickly, and less than a century after it had been written, it was

80 Baynham, Alexander the Great, 118; Cary, The medieval Alexander, 81 (note 19).
81 Harich, Alexander epicus, 222.
82 Alexandreis VIII, 462-463: ‘Si similis nobis homo, te debes reminisci semper id esse quod

es. Stultum est horum meminisse ex quibus ipse tui es oblitus.’

83 Alexandreis X, 351: ‘Sed si mortali contentus honore fuisset..’
84 For instance, audacia and temeritas are given considerable attention by Curtius; see

Baynham, Alexander the Great, 118 and onward.

33
adapted into the prose Alexanders saga (± 1260).85 The date immediately raises
questions. First of all, as the last in the series of the so-called Icelandic
Antikenromane,86 it is affiliated in form with the tradition of the Icelanders’ and
kings’ sagas, but forms no direct part of it due to the non-Icelandic matter.
Secondly, it deals with a highly popular subject in the mediaeval West – Alexander
and ideal kingship – at the periphery of the environment that had worked out the
matter at hand. And thirdly, it is the last work to appear in its era, the Sturlungaöld,
on the eve of the collapse of the original Icelandic social-political structure.87 As
mentioned in the introduction, over forty years had passed during which some
chieftains were able to increase their power and wealth, resulting in strife and
battle and ultimately the take-over of power by the Norwegian crown. A work
about ideal kingship in such a context of political instability, the saga raises
expectations of adaptation for the local audience,88 especially where it concerns
the image of the king; Alexanders saga found itself at a literary and cultural, not to
mention a historic crossroads. For all these reasons, and in my opinion not least
because the saga does not concern Nordic matter,89 it may not be surprising that it

85 See note 4. For a general discussion of research concerning the dating of Alexanders
saga, see David Ashurst and Francesco Vitti, ‘Alexander literature in Scandinavia’, in
Zachary David Zuwiyya (ed.), Alexander literature in the Middle Ages (Brill's companions to
the Christian tradition 29), Leiden: Brill, 2011, 315-322; Kirsten Wolf, ‘Gyðinga saga,
Alexanders saga and bishop Brandr Jónsson’, Scandinavian Studies 60-3 (1988), 371-72.
86 For the four other Antikenromane and their dating, see Stefanie Würth, Der

‘Antikenroman’ in der isländischen Literatur des Mittelalters (Beiträge zur nordischen

Philologie 26), Basel en Frankfurt: Helbing und Lichtenhain, 1998, 35-118.
87 I hesitate to use the term ‘republic’ or ‘commonwealth’ to signify Iceland’s social-

political structure between 874 and 1262-1264. The term ‘commonwealth’ or

‘allsherjarríki’ used is a 19th-century invention to designate the mediaeval Icelandic state
(see Chapter 4); the term ‘republic’ or ‘res publica’ is an 18th-century invention by bishop
Finnur Jónsson used for the same purpose (see Chapter 3). Also, Finnur´s ‘republic’ only
initially was related to the neutral res publica described by Arngrímur Jónsson in
Crymogæa (1609), who neither used it specifically to denote the mediaeval Icelandic state
nor used it in analogy of Jean Bodin´s description of the Roman republic, as Jensson claims
(see Chapter 2). See also Gottskálk Þór Jensson, ‘The Latin of the North. Arngrímur
Jónsson’s Crymogæa (1609) and the discovery of Icelandic as a classical language’,
Renæssanceforum 5 (2008), 22: http://www.renaessanceforum.dk/5_2008/gj.pdf
(accessed January 5th, 2018).
88 There has been mention of the fact that the tenor of the saga might have been changed,

but without regarding the manner in which this happened; see Stefanie Würth,
‘Alexanders saga: literarische und kulturelle Adaptation einer lateinischen Vorlage’, in
Susanne Kramarz-Bein (ed.), Hansische Literaturbeziehungen. Das Beispiel der Þíðreks saga
(Ergänzungsbände zum Reallexikon der Germanischen Altertumskunde 14), Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter, 1996, 309-311.
89 One, if not the main, of the three features that make the Icelanders’ sagas unique is the

Icelandic subject matter, as Hallberg and Clover have pointed out; for the kings’ sagas, we
might add, this would be Nordic matter. This might account for the fact that the main
academic focus in saga literature has been on Icelanders’ sagas, and to a lesser extent on
kings’ sagas, as Andersson observed; it would also explain why other saga genres have
received little notion. See Theodore M. Andersson, ‘King's sagas’, in Carol J. Clover and
John Lindow (eds.), Old Norse-Icelandic Literature. A Critical Guide (Islandica 45), Toronto:
34
has received little attention so far.
Two of the extant manuscripts in the younger edition of AS mention
Brandur Jónsson (± 1205/1212-1264) as the saga’s translator;90 the introduction
and colophon of a manuscript of the Gyðinga saga state that he translated both GS
and AS at the request of Norwegian king Magnús Hákonarson.91 Brandur belonged
to the clan of the Svínfellingar, one of the most powerful clans on Iceland, and was
bishop of Skálholt, abbot of Þykkvabær and bishop of Hólar between 1238 and
1264.92 According to Hákonar saga Hákonarson, Brandur was staying at the
Norwegian court in 1262, and since king Magnús and his father king Hákon were
known for their literary patronage, the information seems plausible.93 However,
the research done by Hallberg, Sveinsson, Widding and Wolf has offered
arguments both in favor of and against the validity of the statement in GS,94 and as
to whether Brandur was commissioned for both works, the statement itself is
ambiguous.95 The most recent conclusion is that there are no convincing

University of Toronto Press, 2005 (19851) 198; Carol J. Clover, ‘Icelandic family sagas
(Íslendingasögur)’, in Clover and Lindow (eds.), Old Norse-Icelandic Literature, 239; Peter
Hallberg, The Icelandic saga (transl. Paul Schach), Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1962, 1.
90 Jónsson, Alexanders saga, 155: ‘Brandr byskup Ionsson er sneri þessi sogu or latinu ok

inorrænu.’ - ‘Bishop Brandur Jónsson, who translated this story from Latin into Norse.’The
mss. are AM 226 fol. and Stockholm 24.
91 See Kirsten Wolf (ed.), Gyðinga saga (Stofnun Árna Magnússonar á Íslandi rit 42),

Reykjavík: Stofnun Árna Magnússonar, 1995, 3: ‘Alexandr hinn riki ok hinn mikli kongr. þa
er hann hafði sigrat ok undir sik lagt allar þiodir iheiminum sem fyrr var ritat’; ibid. 219:
‘Enn or latínu ok í norrænu sneri brandr prestr ions son. er siðan var byskup at holum. ok
sua alexandro magno. eptir bodi virduligs herra. herra Magnusar kongs. sonar hakonar
kongs gamla.’ The ms. is AM 226 fol.
92 For extensive information about Brandur Jónsson, see Finnur Jónsson, Den Oldnorske og

Oldislandske Litteraturs Historie 2, Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gads Forlag, 1923, 861-62; Jan de
Vries, Altnordische Literaturgeschichte (Grundriss der germanischen Philologie 16), Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter, 1967 (1941-19421), 194-96; Wolf, Gyðinga saga, lxxxiii-lxxxvii; Tryggvi
Þórhallsson, ‘Brandur Jónsson biskup á Hólum’, Skírnir 97 (1923), 1-22.
93 Marina Mundt (ed.), Hákonar saga Hákonarson etter Sth. 8 fol., AM 325 VIII,4 o og AM

304,4o, (Norrøne tekster 2), Oslo: Forlagsentralen 1977) 192: ‘þa kom af íslandi branddur
aboti ionsson (…) brandur aboti var med konginum vm iolin ok voro konganner alluel til
hans.’ For literary patronage by the Norwegian crown and for connections between
prominent Icelanders during the age of the Sturlungs and the Norwegian crown in general,
and Brandur Jónsson’s in particular, see Fridrik Paasche and Anne Holtsmark, Noregs og
Islands litteratur inntil utgangen av middelalderen (Norsk litteraturhistorie 1), Oslo:
Aschehoug, 1957 (19241), 484; Sveinsson, The age of the Sturlungs, 12-23.
94 Widding and Hallberg argue against, Sveinsson and Wolf argue in favour; see Einar Ó.

Sveinsson, ‘Athugasemdir um Alexanders sögu og Gyðinga sögu’, Skírnir 135 (1961), 237-
247; Kirsten Wolf, ‘Gyðinga saga, Alexanders saga’, 372-399; Peter Hallberg, ‘Några
språkdrag i Alexanders saga og Gyðinga saga med en utblick på Stjórn’, in Einar G.
Petursson and Jonas Kristjansson (eds.), Sjötíu ritgerðir helgaðar Jakobi Benediktssyni 20.
júlí 1977 vol. 1 (Stofnun Árna Magnússonar á Íslandi rit 12), Reykjavík: Stofnun Árna
Magnússonar, 1977, 234-250; Ole Widding, ‘Það finnur hver sem um er hugað’, Skírnir 134
(1960), 61-73.
95 See the second quote in note 91; the punctuation in the text allows for two readings.

35
arguments to reject a common translator for both works. It is certainly not
impossible that this was Brandur Jónsson, but with the current state of research,
which is based on the statement in AM 226 fol. and on the consequent comparison
of AS and GS, no other direct or indirect evidence of his involvement and of a royal
commission is found. Nevertheless, considering the subject matter, the saga’s
placement in time, the provenance of extant manuscripts and the saga’s reception
into the twentieth century, the general consensus remains that both translator and
audience were Icelandic.96 What is important to keep in mind is that there are at
least four circumstances supporting this thesis that will have contributed to the
realisation of the Alexanders saga on Iceland: the development of Icelandic lay
culture in the thirteenth century, a tradition of one hundred years of literature
written in the vernacular, the existence of a literary form of Iceland’s own that
could be released on foreign material, and a tradition of writing about – be it
Norwegian – kings.97 These must have enabled, or at least facilitated, the
adaptation of the Alexandreis.
And then the poetic epic was transformed into a prose saga. The translator
made general emendations to the narrative, such as explanatory additions and cuts
in superfluous information, where he saw fit or where differences in language
structure compelled him to do so, and kept generic observations and moralistic
comments that come close to sententiæ by Walter intact whilst stating the source;98
meanwhile, he followed the main thread of the narrative closely, which reflected
the linear modus dicendi of the sagas and which enabled him to cast the epic in the
mold of a saga.99 Changes considered necessary for the understanding of the ideas
in the Alexandreis – the summit of mediaeval kingship – fall into a different
category, one of statements containing essentially different information.100 If the
translator gave Aristotle’s program and its elaboration in the narrative the same
key function as Walter, any such changes are to be found there. The opening of
Aristotle’s speech immediately raises expectations of significant change: where

96 Würth for one observes that the translator seemingly did not expect extensive linguistic
and geographic knowledge from his audience, and therefore finds the intended audience
more likely to have been Icelandic. See Würth, ‘Alexanders saga: literarische und kulturelle
Adaptation’, 313.
97 For these developments, see Andersson, ‘King's sagas’, 197-238; Clover, ‘Icelandic family

sagas (Íslendingasögur)’, 239-315; Hallberg, The Icelandic saga, 35-70 and 142-147; Kurt
Schier, Sagaliteratur, Stuttgart: Metzler, 1970, 1-9; Würth, Der ‘Antikenroman’, 187 and
onward.; Gabrielle Turville-Petre, Origins of Icelandic literature, Oxford: Clarendon, 1953,
142-253.
98 Alexandreis II, 533-535: ‘(…) proch gloria fallax imperii, proch quanta patent ludibria

sortis humanæ!’ – AS II, p. 37 (521-523): ‘Vm þann atburð ræðir sva meistare Galterus. Ho
ho. bleckileg er þessa heíms hamingia oc opt syniz þat hvessv vollt hon er.’
99 For an extensive inventory of general emendations in style and narrative content, see

Würth, Der ‘Antikenroman’, 107-117.

100 Kees de Graaf, Jacques Tersteeg, and Marie-Christine van der Sman, Alexander de Grote

in de Spiegel historiael. Een onderzoek naar de vertaaltechniek van Jacob van Maerlant
(Tekst en tijd 6), Nijmegen: Alfa, 1983, 102; Wolf, ‘Gyðinga saga, Alexanders saga’, 382;
Würth, Der ‘Antikenroman’, 107-108.
36
Walter’s Aristotle advised Alexander to become a man and take up arms, the saga’s
Aristotle tells him to adorn himself with wisdom.101 The former points in the
direction of virtus militaris, the latter rather in that of reverentia sapientis.
Subsequently though, the program shows hardly any differences with the original:
the four worldly royal virtues are treated in the same order, albeit shortened for
narrative economy or extended for purposes of clarification as mentioned above. It
is not until the end that we encounter two more possibly significant differences:
that justice needs to be accompanied by clemency,102 and that Alexander will have
to consult writings regularly.103 These three changes provide an entrance for
examining the consequences of the program for the narrative and the specific
derivatives of Alexander’s characteristics.
The treatment of the first specific virtue, virtus militaris, takes up an equal
amount of space in the program in the saga as it does in the original, and the ideal
is the same: the king needs to be a battle initiator, a commanding officer and an
example to his men.104 The Icelandic Alexander proves that he is up to the test.105
The framework for the action is set and the guidelines for what should follow
military action are clear: clementia to the deserving, ira to the undeserving.106 The
translator recognises the legitimacy of ira – reiði as a response to superbia –
drambsemi and adopts the connection of clementia to the positive ira refrenata in
the program,107 to emphasise Alexander’s refraining from anger and showing
clemency to those conquered instead both indirectly108 and directly,109 in the
broadest sense of the word and in a manner known in Icelandic literature, namely
by using Alexander’s facial expression to express his state of mind,110 in the

101 Alexandreis I , 82 : ‘Indue mente uirum, Macedo puer, arma capesce’ versus AS I, p. 4 (l.
14-15): ‘þa pryddu þic fyrst með raðspekinne. en tak siðan til vapna þinna eptir fyst þinne.’
102 Alexandreis I, 178: ‘nec desit pietas, pudor et reverentia recti…’ versus AS I, p. 7 (l. 16-

18): ‘Eigi scal þo rettløtit eitt saman. þviat þar við scal tempra miscunnena.’
103 Alexandreis I, 179: ‘diuinos rimare apices’ versus AS I, p. 7 (l. 18): ‘optlega scalltu

ranzaka ritnengar.’
104 AS I, pp. 5-6 (l. 12-30, l. 1-11).
105 Alexandreis II, 433: ‘hostibus expositus ante omnia signa suorum cornipedem uexans

(…) choruscat (…) armipotens Macedo.’ – AS II, pp. 33-34 (l. 32-3): ‘Framme firir ollom
merkiom var einn ungr maðr a heste þeim er Bucifal heitir ecki dęlligr bleyðimonnom
undir brún at lita. þat var sialfr Alexander macedo.’
106 Alexandreis I, 115: ‘Parce humili, facilis oranti frange superbum.’ – AS I, p. 5 (l. 12-15):

‘Þat røð ec þer segir Aristoteles. at þu ser miukr oc linr litillatum. auðsottr oc goðr bæna
þurptugom. en harðr oc úeirinn drambsaumom.’
107 Alexandreis I, 181: ‘Vindictam differ donec pertranseat ira.’ – AS I, p. 7 (l. 22-23):

‘refsingina scalltu eigi fyr lata fram koma. helldr en af þer gengr reiðen.’
108 Alexandreis IX, 319: ‘Ergo refrenata mutati pectoris ira....’ – AS IX, p. 138 (l. 23): ‘nu gerir

Alexander í mote þvi er flestir etloðo...’

109 Alexandreis IV, 84-85: ‘...quanto clementior hoste hostis es.’ – AS IV, p. 59 (l. 4-6): ‘Bleikt

andlit oc ryggleg augo syna þat at þu ert miklo milldare uvinr. en hermanna natura se til.’
110 This is a common occurrence in the Icelanders’ sagas: the expression of the human face

provides information on the condition of the subject’s mind; see Kirsten Wolf, ‘Somatic
semiotics. Emotion and the human face in the sagas and þættir of Icelanders’, Traditio 69
(2016), 125-145.
37
narrative.
The translator seems to have struggled a little with keeping allegorical
Clementia in book four separate from the king’s everyday clementia in the
narrative: her importance within the realm of the goddess Victoria is moved to that
of kings.111 Nevertheless, he does try to hang on to the allegory by giving Clementia
the active role of showing compassion to many, instead of just teaching others to
do so. Some of the narrative economy in the remainder of the passage, and possibly
elsewhere, plus the fact that the translator does not put this digression clearly in
connection with the main thread of the story, may be due to a slight inability to
handle the classical allegory that for the course of the narrative he could not omit.
Still, the translator is on top of all that Walter has offered in the sequence ira –
clementia. Moreover, he is critical. A good example is the one instance where ira
appears as a negative, as an uncalled-for response of Alexander’s that was not
prompted by any act of superbia.112 Not only is Walter mentioned as the source of
information, the translator also observes the fact that Walter did not clarify under
which circumstances Alexander killed the three men.113 It is a returning
observation by the translator: that Walter is merely testing Alexander’s actions by
the program, not by the situation.114
This does not change the fact that the objective and importance of clemency
over anger are unaltered and equally essential: clemency is a beneficium that keeps
the reign intact,115 and the narrative repeats this message faithfully.116 We can
safely say that clementia remains Alexander’s most significant trait; so far, there is
no visible influence of changes in the program. But what about doing the right
thing to the other two target groups, those equal in rank and Alexander’s troops?
pietas manifests itself integrally by Alexander’s showing pudor and pudicitia in his

111 Alexandreis IV, 420-421: ‘Assidet hiis stabilitque deæ Clementia regnum sola docens
miseris misereri et parcere uictis.’ – AS IV, p. 69 (l. 20-22): ‘Clementia er oc íþeira samsęte
er mioc remmer riki konunganna. þviat hon er goð af griðum oc miscunnar morgom.’
112 See note 39.
113 Alexandreis IX, 7-8 ‘et enim testatur eorum finis amicicias regum non esse perhennes.’ –

AS IX, p. 129 (l. 31-34): ‘Iþeire ferð gerez þat til tiðenda at vinir konungsens lataz nockorir
oc af hans volldom eptir þvi sem meistare Galterus visar til. en eigi kveðr hann scyrt á með
hveriom atburðum þat varð…’
114 In other words, the translator lets it transpire that Alexander's violent actions cannot

be judged properly unless more were known about their context. See Kim P. Middel,
Alexanders saga. Bewerking of bevestiging. MA thesis, University of Groningen 2006, 37.
115 Alexandreis I, 342: ‘Instabile regnum est, quod non clementia firmat.’ – AS I, p. 13 (l. 10-

12): ‘Hugsa sva fyrir þer at ustaðoct verðr þat riki er litla miscunn hefir með ser.’
116 Alexandreis IV, 62: ‘primum, queso, michi regnum stabilite meisque. Quod michi si tolli

iam prefinistis (…) regnum Asiæ me post hic tam pius hostis habeto, tam clemens victor.’ –
AS IV, p. 58 (l. 5-6): ‘þess bið ec yðr fyrst at þer gevet mer at hallda rike mino. oc þeim
ollom er mer þiona. En ef (…) ec skyla lata rike mitt (…) þa vil ec þess biðia at sva milldr
vvinr oc miskunsamr sigrvegare take rike eptir mec sem Alexander er.’ Alexander’s being a
miskunsamr sigrvegare holds the same implication of maintaining stability in the realm,
even though the first part of Darius’ prayer – ‘at þer gevet mer at hallda mine riko’ – is
slightly different than in the Alexandreis.
38
treatment of Darius’ relatives,117 and the translator dutifully quotes Walter as the
source of the moralistic comment on the matter.118 It does not matter that he does
not call Alexander a pius euersor in this passage:119 the fact that Alexander knows
how to show deference to those who are equal to him is implicit in the context of
the passage, in his mourning over Darius’ wife as if she were a family member.120
Moreover, Alexander’s deference – milldr uvinr – is regarded once more at the
same level as his clemency – miskunsamr sigrvegare – by Darius a little later on,
and on top of this, in showing courtesy – yvirlęti – to his relatives, Darius
recognises Alexander’s deference – millde – to himself as an officium, due to be
followed by the beneficium of clementia in keeping his realm intact.121
There is no apparent difference between the function of pudor and pudicitia
as acts of pietas in the narrative between the saga and the Alexandreis, and the
translator also recognises the connection between officium/yvirlęti and
pietas/millde. Why then does the program speak of miscunn, which is used
elsewhere in the sense of clementia, instead of millde – pietas, when discussing
pudor and pudicitia?122 On closer inspection, it seems that the translator had some
issues with translating pudor as a positive: it appears once as reinlíf and is
described periphrastically elsewhere.123 Using miscunn as a common denominator
for pudor and pudicitia seems to be a slight practical flaw in an otherwise solid
translation of their significance.
The third act of doing the right thing by others, liberalitas, does not appear
at the opening of the saga as it does in the Alexandreis,124 simply because the epic
proemium was replaced by a saga prologue. It does appear integrally in the
program,125 together with Aristotle’s advice of offering mental remuneration for

117 Alexandreis III, 234-236: ‘Maiestate tamen salvoque pudore...’ – AS III, p. 45 (l. 13, 17-
19): ‘Sva var mikil milldi konungs at hann var þannog til moðor Daríj sem hann monde til
sinnar moðor...’
118 Alexandreis IV, 21-22: ‘...custodem se esse pudoris maluit et formæ, neutrumque sibi

temerare gloria maior erat quam si uiolaret utrumque.’ – AS IV, p. 56 (l. 15-18): ‘...þviat
hann kaus helldr at vera gezlo maðr fegrðar hennar oc reinlives. oc þat var honom meire
dyrð segir M. Galterus at spilla hvarigo. helldr en saurga hvartveggia.’
119 Alexandreis IV, 12: ‘pius euersor.’ – AS IV, p. 56: absent.
120 Alexandreis IV, 11-13: ‘Non secus indoluit (…) quam si cecidisse peremptas nuncius

afferret una cum matre soreres.’ – AS IV, p. 56 (l. 5-7): ‘Alexander konungr verðr sva ryggr
við liflát hennar. sem hann monde verða mega þott honom vere sagt drap moðor sinnar og
systra.’
121 See note 115.
122 See note 102.
123 reinlíf: AS IV, p. 56 (l. 16); periphrases: AS III, p. 45 (l. 13): ‘En eptir þvi sem byriar

konungligre tign...’ and AS IV, p. 58 (l. 33): ‘þu helldr oc sva sømilega…’ There is no
apparent trouble with handling pudor wherever it is a negative, with scomm, scamfylli,
scammaz and svívirðen; see a.o. AS II, p. 30 (l. 17), AS V, p. 78 (l. 31), AS VI, p. 93 (l. 2), and
AS III, p. 51 (l. 30).
124 See note 47.
125 Alexandreis I, 146: ‘...plue donatiua maniplis.’ – AS I, p. 6 (l. 14-15): ‘...oc gefa atvér hendr

ridderonom...’
39
lack of material reward126 and the warning that without generosity, there can be
no military prowess.127 Also, in those instances where liberalitas, and paupertas at
that, appear as an act of deference or clemency towards others than his own men,
namely Darius’ family128 and the citizens of Jerusalem,129 the translator follows
Walter suit. From the beneficium of generosity, as a practical result of ira refrenata
– clementia, in making the people of Jerusalem a donation to their temple, it is a
small step to the beneficium of clemency in making them a ‘lasting gift’, which the
translator specifies as peace and mutual good understanding for the duration of his
reign.
Displaying liberalitas once more underlines the importance of clementia for
the success of Alexander’s military campaigns: in the end, it commits each party to
observe proper behaviour – yfirlęte – and thereby vouches for stability in the
realm. The same can be said of pietas: not as prominently present as clementia and
virtus militaris, it still fulfils its channelling function for either. Concluding, the triad
clementia – pietas - liberalitas for appropriate behaviour remains completely
intact: any apparent differences can be explained from the context or concern a
concrete explanation of Walter’s words. Given this conclusion, it must follow that
the triad of virtues towards others is a glorious one, and indeed the consequence is
glory. Gloria follows the same route as it does in the Alexandreis: it remains the
motive of Alexander’s military campaigns as well as the cause of his cupido
habendi,130 it is the consequence of a virtuous life in the broadest sense spurred on
by reverentia sapientis,131 and Alexander himself appreciates what Aristotle has

126 Alexandreis I, 152-154: ‘At si forte animo res non respondeat alto, copia si desit (…),
non minuatur amor, non desit copia mentis.’ – AS I, p, 6 (l. 19-20): ‘Enn ef gullit er onægra
til en vilinn at gefa. þa lattu þo eigi astina minka þott fættiz giafarnar.’
127 Alexandreis I, 163: ‘Non murus non arma ducem tutantur auarum.’ – AS I, p. 6 (l. 25-26):

‘En smalatum hofðingia tiar hvarke ramligt vige ne mikill vapnabunaðr.’

128 Alexandreis IV, 135-137: ‘At nunc securus sub paupertatis amictu regnat Alexander.

Regem me glorior esse, non mercatorem.’ – AS IV, p. 60 (l. 28-29): ‘En nu reðr Alexander
londom með fatøki sitt uruggr oc frials fire fiarens ahyggio. Vel likar mer at ec sia konungr
en eigi kaupmaðr.’
129 Alexandreis I, 552-554: ‘...multo ditavit munere templum. (…) indulto Marte beatæ urbis

perpetuo donavit munere cives.’ – AS I, p. 18 (l. 19-21): ‘…offrar til templum domini
margar storar gersima (…). hann heitr oc Gyðingom sem hann efnde. at þeir scylldo ę ifriðe
vera oc goðo yfirlęti meðan hans riki støðe.’
130 See note 56; Alexandreis II, 484-485: ‘Prelia non spolium mecum discernite. Cedant

premia preda meis, michi gloria sufficit una.’ – AS II, pp. 35-36 (l. 30-32, 1): ‘Bardagans vil
ec luttakare vera með yðr. en herfangsens eigi. þvi scoloð þér með yðr scipta. At fullo vinnz
mer agetið eitt saman. fiarens ann ec yðr en mer fregðarennar.’ Alexandreis I, 190:
‘Germinat intus amor belli regnique libido.’ – AS I, p. 8 (l. 2-3): ‘Nu girniz hann engis
annars. æn ryðia ser til rikis með odde oc eggio.’
131 Alexandreis I, 182-183, ‘Si sic vixeris, eternum extendes in secula nomen.’ – AS I, p. 7

(l.24-26): ‘oc ef þu (…) lifir sva sem Aristoteles hefir kennt þer. þa man þitt nafn uppi
meðan heimrenn stendr.’
40
told him on the subject.132 The double connection between virtue and glory, with
glory being both motive and reward, is maintained. The practical consequence of
Alexander’s virtues in the narrative may be hegemony, but it is not, as Ashurst
argues, the objective;133 furthermore, on the level of ideas the objective is to keep
the reign, being the natural order of things, stable. At this point, we may wonder
whether the translator could do anything else but adopt the situation that
Alexander’s self-destruction becomes a fact, as soon as the balance between virtue
and glory ceases to exist due to a greed for things unattainable to man causing
gloria to become gloria vana, but let us see if he took the same view to Alexander’s
course of action in getting there.
In the first part of the tricolon crescens that leads up to Alexander’s fall in
the Alexandreis, the speech of the Scythians,134 there are no apparent differences:
the Scythians are the first to accuse Alexander of being greedy, 135 but he treats
them clemently all the same.136 There is some of the usual narrative economy
concerning moralistic summaries by Walter, but that is it.137 His lack of response to
their plea has been kept intact:138 there was no need for a critical explanation of
Alexander’s behaviour, because it was prompted by ira and followed by clementia,
and as said before, this lack of response was common in literature. The second part
of the tricolon, the speech of king Porus,139 shows the same message as in the
Alexandreis,140 and Alexander reacts correspondingly with showing the ill king

132 Alexandreis VII, 358: ‘Si vitæ meritis gloria respondet…’ – AS VII, p. 111 (l. 20-23): ‘verðr
eptir þvi sem maklect er. at þu hever til verkat Darius k. ílifi þino. man þín fregð fara um
allan heim. oc eigi man þitt agete fyrnaz mega.’
133 For the theory of hegemony as an objective, see David Ashurst, The ethics of empire in

the saga of Alexander the Great, Reykjavík: Háskólaútgáfan, 2009, 132.

134 AS VIII, pp. 126-128.
135 Alexandreis VIII, 375-376: ‘Cupido si corpus haberis par animo...’ – AS VIII, p. 126 (l. 12-

13): ‘Verir þu konungr þvi hove mikill at licams vexte. sem agirni þín er mikil amarga
vega...’ Alexandreis VIII, 425-426: ‘...ad pecudes nostras extendis auaras instabilisque
manus.’ – AS VIII, p. 127 (l. 14-15): ‘er þér þickir eigi scomm íat seilaz til busmala vars...’
Alexandreis VIII, 429-431: ‘quanto tibi parasti, tanto plura petis et habendis acrius ardes.’ –
AS VIII, p. 127 (l. 15-17): ‘þat megom ver helzt af scilia mikilleic ágirne þinnar. at þér myne
scorta þickia ę þvi meira sem fleira ber undir þec.’
136 Alexandreis VIII, 506-508, ‘Non magis arma ducis homines movere suoque subiecere

iugo quam quod clementer agebat cum victis.’ – AS VIII, p. 129 (l. 16-19): ‘þat hellt þo mest
til er flestir voru fusir at gevaz ívalld Alexandri. at hann var miclo milldare en aðrir
hofðengiar aullom þeim er til hans krupu.’
137 Alexandreis VIII, 428-429, ‘Quid tibi diviciis opus est, que semper avaro esuriem

pariunt?’ – AS VIII, p. 127: absent. Alexandreis VIII, 429-431: ‘Sicque famem sacies,
defectum copia nutrit.’ – AS VIII, p. 127: absent.
138 Alexandreis VIII, 477-478: ‘Sic ait, at Macedo nichilominus agmine facta arma Scitis

inferre parat.’ – AS VIII, pp. 128-129 (l. 33, 1-2): ‘En Alexander konungr bregðr ecke ętlan
sinne at helldr fyrir orð hans.’
139 AS IX, p. 138, rr 2-19.
140 Alexandreis IX, 315: ‘Proinde tui cursus frenum moderare.’ – AS IX, p. 138 (l. 17-18):

‘Ger sva vel Alexander. still hedan af framgangi thinom.’

41
clemency after suppressing his own anger upon hearing Porus’ speech.141 Within
the tricolon crescens of warnings, this is the last instance where Alexander displays
appropriate behaviour, and the translator’s explicit statement that Alexander
shows Porus grið, which is absent in the Alexandreis, sheds extra light on this fact.
As expected, the final warning comes from Alexander’s men,142 and Alexander
openly admits to them that he is not going to pay heed to their words and that his
desire lies beyond his human realm.143 His superbia and his instantly becoming a
useless king because of it are evident; gloria becomes gloria vana, and allegoric
Nature, over whose boundaries Porus144 and his officers145 had warned him not to
step, duly initiates the course to his inevitable death.146 The tricolon crescens is
completed in accordance with the original: there is no graduality in Alexander’s
downfall in the saga.
It is clear: Alexander should have listened. The translator makes the reason
why as clear as Walter does: the weight of those delivering the three speeches is
evident. Or is it? In the case of Porus and Alexander’s officers, it is,147 but in the

141 Alexandreis IX, 319-320: ‘Ergo refrenata mutati pectoris ira, contra spem procerum
curauit prodigus egrum...’ – AS IX, p. 138 (l. 22-24): ‘oc nv gerir Alexander í mote þvi er
flestir etloðo. oc gefr Poro grið. lętr alla stund a leggia at lęcna hann.’
142 AS IX, p. 143 (l. 3-18).
143 Alexandreis IX, 555, 569-570: ‘Excedit eui mea gloria metas. (…) Antipodum penetrare

sinus aliamque uidere Naturam accelero.’ – AS IX, p. 143 (l. 30-31) and IX, p. 144 (l. 8-10):
‘Undir þvi þycke mer at fręgðen fare eigi ímolld með mer. (…) at íannan heim scal heria þa
er ec hefi þennan undir mer lagt allan. oc langar mec til at ver megem sia naturu þess
heimsens.’
144 Alexandreis VIII, 453-455: ‘...dum celeris Fortunæ munera nondum accusas impone

modum felicibus armis, ne rota forte tuos euertat uersa labores.’ – AS VIII, p. 128 (l. 9-13):
‘fer nu þa sva ínyt þér hamingionnar hollostu. at þu gerir enda nockorn áufriðenom. takir
hvilld eptir langt erveðe. fęrir þic sialfr íhóf fyr en hon late vellta hvelet undir þer.’
145 Interestingly enough, the translator does not mention hamingia as such, but refers to

her with hon, ‘she’: the context that she cannot be stable is sufficient indication that it
concerns fortuna. See Alexandreis IX, 315-316: ‘Caduca sunt bona fortunæ stabilisque
ignara fauoris.’ AS IX, p. 138 (l. 18-19): ‘hugsa sva at hann er valltr vinr. þviat hon kann eigi
staðug at vera.’
146 Alexandreis X, 6-7: ‘Interea memori recolens Natura dolore principis obprobium mundo

commune sibique…’ – AS X, p. 144 (l. 21-25): ‘…at natturan minniz áþat er henne þiccir
Alexander hava svivirt sec og heimenn þer hann let at hann vęre of þrongr oc oflitill einom
herra ivir at vera. Oc þvi at hann etlaðe at rannsaka þa lute er hon vill leynda vera lata.’
147 As to Porus, see Alexandreis IX, 317-318: ‘...fortunæ turbine regem infractum uictumque

animum uictoris habentem.’ – AS IX, p. 138 (l. 20-22): ‘...er sa maðr er með aullo var
yfirkominn hefir ecki scekiz íhugenom. oc svarar sva diarflega.’ The importance of
listening to others (in this case Alexander’s own men), be they lower in rank, has been
dealt with in the program: Alexandreis I, 85 and I, 92-95: ‘Consultor procerum seruos et
nequam (…). Non (…) prohibet rationis calculus, ut non exaltare velis siquos insignit
honestas, quos morum sublimat apex licet ampla facultas et patriæ desit et gloria
sanguinis alti.’ – AS I, p. 4 (l.18-20): ‘Þat vil ec þer fyrst raða at þu ser raðuandr, at þu hafir
iafnan ena beztu men við þina raða gerð. (…) Eigi let ec þic þo at auka þeira manna
nafnbætir þot sma bornir se. er haverscliga siðo oc sømiligan manndom hafa fram at leGia
mote ætt oc peningum.’
42
case of the Scythians, the translator slightly throws us for a loop.148 Why is the
message that explains the weight of the Scythians’ words, the fact that they know
their place in the natural order of things, absent? It is not an omission out of
narrative economy; what’s more, since it concerns a general observation of Walter,
one would expect integral reproduction. One possible explanation might be that
the positive image of the Scythians in parts of the classical and mediaeval
Alexander tradition149 has a negative counterpart in other parts of that same
tradition, among others in the French Alexander literature.150 There is no way of
knowing if this is the cause of the hiatus, but the translator does seem to have tried
to fill up the gap in the passage leading up to the speech. He kept the speech and its
scope intact, so he had to find another means of pointing out the speech’s
significance and he picks one from his own, if not historical, then at least literary
environment: he has the Scythians follow a common protocol in Icelandic
literature for addressing a king.151 They send a delegation to the king, the eldest of
whose members communicates the message of their people to Alexander. This
protocol – first, að fara á fund; next, að koma fyrir konung, and last, að bera fram
ęrindi152 – is found elsewhere in the saga in the addressing of king Darius by
Narbazones153 and the audience of Darius’ messengers with Alexander,154 and
elsewhere in the Antikensagas as well.155 The appropriate response of the king is to

148 Alexandreis VIII, 366-367: ‘...contentique cibis quos dat natura, beatam ambitione sacra
nolunt corrumpere uitam.’ – AS VIII, pp. 126-128: absent.
149 For a bibliography of all that has been published on this matter, see Lafferty, Walter of

Châtillon’s Alexandreis, 158-160, there note 49 and note 51.

150 Cathérine Gaullier-Bougassas, Les romans d’Alexandre. Aux frontières de l’épique et du

romanesque, Paris: Champion, 1998, 163; Martin Gosman, La légende d’Alexandre le Grand
dans la littérature française du 12e siècle. Une réécriture permanente (Faux Titre: études de
langue et littérature française publiées 133), Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997, 173.
151 AS VIII, p.126 (l. 8-12): ‘þeir voro sendir áfund hans af lanz folkino. oc siðan er þeir hafa

nát mali konungs. þa ber sa fram ęrende þeira er ellztr var. oc hefr sva mal sitt þa er hann
hafðe horft aðr nockora stund a konungenn.’
152 I.e. to go and talk (to the king), to appear before the king and to convey a message.
153 AS VI, p. 96 (l. 2-4): ‘Oc þviat þeir sa nv at flest allt lið Darij var vfust at fylgia honom við

þat er iamnan toc þungt at falla. þá neyta þeir sva þeirar gulo at Narbazones gengr áfund
konungsens. oc er hann kemr fyrir hann. melir hann a þa leið…’
154 AS IV, p. 58 (l. 18-26): ‘…at hann sendir nv .x. riddara hofðengia til fundar við

Alexandrum konung (…). Sendi menn Darii konungs fara nu með slicom boðom (…) oc
þegar er þeir koma fyrir Alexandrum konung þá ber sa þeira fram orenden er ellztr var oc
bezt talaðr…’
155 For Trójumanna saga, see Jonna Louis-Jensen (ed.), Trójumanna Saga (Editiones

Arnamagnæana series A, vol. 8), Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1968, 11-12 (l. 24,16): ‘Nu berr
Iason vpp eyrindi sin fyrir konung og segir at hann er sendr eptir reyfinu…’; 25-26 (l. 21-
22, 15): ‘Hann for þegar honum gaf byr ok fann Pelei ok sagðiz vera sendr af Priamus
konungi at leita vm sættir við þa Girki…’; 70-72 (l. 24, 25, 28): ‘en er Girkir vorv við land
komnir sendi Agamemnon Diomedem ok Vlixem a fvnd Priamvs ok beidi at Elenv skylldi
lavsa lata.’ For Breta Sögur, see Jón Helgason (ed.), Hauksbók. The Arna-Magnæan
manuscripts 371 4to, 544 4to and 675 4to (Manuscripta Islandica 5), Copenhagen:
Munksgaard, 1960, 53r: ‘enn er þeir spvrðv krancleik Aurelii þa geck framan ein irskr
maðr fyrir konunga ok spvrði hvat þeir villdi gefazt at hann reði Aurelii bana’; 55r: ‘En til
43
listen and consult with his advisors, as he does after the address by Darius’
messengers. This construction allowed the translator to fit the passage in the same
framework as Walter had done and maintain its validity for its audience,
whichever view of the Scythians it took: Alexander fails to react appropriately to
their speech by not listening and attacking them. More so, not only does the
translator state that Alexander suffered losses among his men, but also that the
Scythians resisted him fiercely.156 The message again is clear: Alexander should
have listened and he paid for the consequences of not doing so; the narrative can
continue as it does in the Alexandreis.
And none of this would have happened, had Alexander observed reverentia
sapientis all along. The two implicit references in the program are the same: the
manual for good conduct drawn up by a philosopher on the one hand, and
stressing the importance of conferring with others on the other hand.157 In the
consequent narrative, the translator follows the path laid out by Walter in using
the example of Zoroas, whose wisdom makes him of use to the world.158 Also,
despite the lack of epithet of the Scythians as sapientes, the gist of their speech in
the saga, that indicates wisdom in recognising the interaction between man and
natura/fortuna, remains standing. The translator may not mention the
counterparts sapiens and stultus explicitly,159 he does emphasise sapientia by
having the Scythians point out explicitly that its essence lies in living secundum
naturam:160 the translator has represented the change from virtus to superbia
literally in Alexander’s failing to acknowledge true wisdom. It could be argued that
here, as opposed to failing to show reverentia sapientis in the cases of Porus and his
army officers, Alexander is failing to display a general reverentia sapientiæ. That
having been said, the objective is the same: it heralds a failure to observe the entire
program, hence the trajectory from wise to unwise and from rex utilis to rex

tiðindi vrðv at einne stoirv veizlv Artus at þar komu sendimenn af Rom með brefi þat er
sva sagði…’ For Gyðinga saga, see Wolf, Gyðinga saga, 96 (B 6, 10-11): ‘hann giorir sendi
men til demetrii konvngs (…). Demetrivs konungr sendir nv bref imóð sendingv simoni
með þessvm orþvm…’
156 Alexandreis VIII, 480-481: ‘…et tandem, sed non sine cede suorum, imperio Macedum

Scitiam seruire coegit…’ – AS VIII, p.129 (l. 7-8): ‘oc þo feck hann aðr mikit manntion. þviat
viða var hart við honum numeð.’
157 See note 70 and note 147.
158 Alexandreis III, 176-178: ‘Numquam mea dextera sudet vel rubeat gladius cerebro tam

multa scienti. Utilis es mundo. Quis te impulit error ad amnes tendere velle Stigos, ubi
nulla scientia floret?’ – AS III, p. 43 (l. 15-18): ‘oc alldregi scal min hond. eða mitt sverð
saurgaz isva marg vitrom heila. Ertu harðla nytsamlegr heiminom. Eða hver villa eggiar
þec at vilia sva rapa til helvitis þar sem engi vizka ma þrivaz.’
159 This may be accounted for by narrative economy, since it is one of Walter’s sententia-

like summaries: Alexandreis VIII, 394-395: ‘Stultus qui fructum cum suspicit arboris, altum
non uult metiri.’ – AS VII, p. 126: absent.
160 Alexandreis VIII, 414-415: ‘Igitur si quid quesiueris ultra, excedunt tua uota modum

finemque beati.’ AS VIII, p. 127: ‘Enn ef þu konungr gengr nockor framan. þa gengr þu yvir
þat marc. er natturan hefir sett þér oc oðrom er alla gerer at sonno sęla. þa er hennar raðe
vilia fylgia.’
44
inutilis.
It is this discrepancy between the specific deference for the wise in the
passage about the Scythians in the Alexandreis, and the more general deference for
wisdom in the same passage in the Alexanders saga, that in my opinion accounts
for the difference in the opening of the program with pryddu þic fyrst með
raðspekinne, ‘adorn thyself with wisdom.’ Prominently and more generally than in
the Alexandreis, the translator has brought forward the virtue that comprises due
observance of the entire program – reverentia sapientiæ – and the reason for
Alexander’s fall. The opening of the program with raðspeki also offers the pleasant
extra of solving possible trouble which the audience might have in understanding
of the passage about the Scythians. The translator shows his true craft in using
sapientia for this purpose, for it was a concept familiar to his environment: it is the
most important royal virtue in the kings’ sagas of the thirteenth century. 161 The
discrepancy with the Alexandreis has no further impact on the narrative:
Alexander’s lack of reverence, whether for wise men in particular or wisdom in
general, is equally responsible for his superbia/stultitia162 and the ethic
connotation of his superbia disrupting the natural order of things remains intact
with the same kick-off performed by the Scythians163 and the same finishing touch
in book ten.164 Alexander’s fortuna is still in his own hand, not in that of divine will
as Ashurst, and Cary before him, concluded,165 and the translator shows that he
knows it: fortuna in the Alexandreis and hamingia in the saga function at the exact
same level.166
This leaves us with one last question. Of the three possibly significant

161 See Jakobsson, Í leit að konungi, 210.

162 See note 79; the translator uses both concepts as Walter did, within the same semantic
scope.
163 Alexandreis VIII, 462-463: ‘Si similis nobis homo, te debes reminisci semper id esse

quod es. Stultum est horum meminisse ex quibus ipse tui es oblitus.’ AS VIII, p. 128 (l. 20-
23): ‘Enn ef þu ert maðr sem ver. þa gleym alldregi þvi hvat þu ert. þviat vvitrlect er at hafa
sva fasthugenn a auðro at maðr mune eigi hverr hann er.’
164 Alexandreis X, 351: ‘Sed si mortali contentus honore fuisset...’ – AS X , p. 152 (l. 20-23):

‘ef hann hefðe eigi sét ofsionum yvir mannligu eðli.’

165 See Ashurst, The ethics of empire, 100. Concerning the relation between man and divine

will in the Alexandreis, see Cary, The medieval Alexander, 81.

166 It has been argued that the translator leaves out Walter’s references to the enevitability

of fate for the fact that hamingia supposedly has a different meaning than fortuna. See
Einar Ó. Sveinsson, ‘Alexandreis et la saga d’Alexandre’, in Maurice Gravier (ed.),
Rencontres et courants franco-scandinaves. Actes du 7e congrès international d’histoire des
littératures scandinaves (Bibliothèque nordique 4), Paris: Minard, 1972, 30; Würth, Der
‘Antikenroman’, 111-112. The passages that Würth mentions to support this theory,
though, concern a concrete fatum, and the translator does translate fatum explicitly, with
gæfa, or implicitly: e.g. Alexandreis I, 443: ‘tanta est fiducia fati…’ versus AS I, p. 15 (l. 1-2):
‘oc sua treystiz hann nu sinni gefu…’ and Alexandreis VI, 516: ‘fati decreta secutus…’ versus
AS VI, p. 99 (l. 23): ‘en þviat þess var afauðet…’ The thought that the translator erased the
clear distinction between fortuna and fatum by using hamingia for both concepts holds no
ground, since the instances mentioned are precisely those where fortuna and fatum are
interchangeable. See Würth, Der ‘Antikenroman’, 112, note 489.
45
changes to the program, the one about miscunn has turned out not to be significant,
and the one about raðspeki has significance in that it provides a minor update and
intercepts a possible problem for the understanding of the saga’s audience, whilst
preserving the line of thought. What remains to be looked at is the third apparent
change, Aristotle’s statement that Alexander is to consult writings regularly. 167 It
seems a drastic transition from Walter’s ‘exploring the heavenly heights’, one that
has lost its ethical connotation. Or has it? Several glosses in Alexandreis
manuscripts interpret the exploration of divinos apices not only as striving for the
summit of virtue, but also as consulting writings that teach us.168 I am tempted to
say that what they teach is wisdom, as one of the glosses speaks of divinas
scripturas, and the translator confirms this suspicion by calling the reading of
writings a condition for becoming a learned – hence wise – man.169 The phrase að
verða margvitr connects the message to reverentia sapientiæ, which comprises the
program of striving for the summit of virtue, and the circle of ethics is closed once
more.
Only the change in the opening of the program is really a change, albeit a
minor one. Where Walter effected an update to the king’s image with the program
of virtues and the addition of reverentia sapientis, the Icelandic translator adopted
the program and moved the focus to reverentia sapientiæ in order to provide a
further update, without any concessions to the line of thought at hand and without
consequences for the understanding of the narrative. In fact, the translator went
out of his way to intercept anything that could cause a misunderstanding of the
ideas presented. This suggests that the argument that the intended audience had
had a limited education in Latin170 may not be considered too general: the
translator’s successful efforts to keep the king’s image and its underlying ideas
intact implies an intended audience that was at least familiar with the ideas
presented, most likely through acquaintance with other Latin material rooted in
the mainstream of mediaeval-Christian thought.171 It implies an audience that
would not first and foremost perceive literal truth in, for instance, Alexander’s
world domination, as Ashurst argues,172 but take it for the literary-psychological
concept that it is, used to smooth the road to his downfall. An actual retouch of the
king’s image at an ideological level was clearly not considered necessary: the line
of thought from the Historiæ through the Alexandreis to the Alexanders saga is a
continuous one, for it is universally valid. The trouble through which the translator

167 See note 103.

168 See Colker, Galteri de Castellione Alexandreis, 309: ‘divinos rimare apices – id est inquire
diuinas scripturas...’; ibid. 362: ‘apices – id est uirtutes que homines extollunt et eleuant.
Vel apices id est litteras diuinas quia nos instruunt.’
169 AS I, p. 7 (l.18-19): ‘ef þú villt margvitr verða.’
170 Würth, Der ‘Antikenroman’, 117.
171 Laymen’s knowledge of Latin and Latin writings was common in the Sturlung Age; see

Einar Ó. Sveinsson, ‘Läs- och skrivkunnighet på Island under fristatstiden’, Scripta

Islandica. Isländska sällskapets årsbok 7 (1956), 11-16.
172 Ashurst, The ethics of empire, 50.

46
went to warrant the universality of Alexander’s image and accomplish an update
shows him to be a worthy successor to Walter: Alexander remains the same and
not the same.

ALEXANDER UNIVERSALIS

I have endeavoured to demonstrate how the classical-stoic line of thought that was
handed down by Curtius to Walter of Châtillon, and hence to the translator of the
Alexanders saga, is the same across the board in constructing the image of king
Alexander at an ideological level, and how some existing views on the matter might
need reviewing. I have pointed out that it is relevant to realise that the ideas
underlying these ethics in all three texts function both in pre-Christian antiquity
and in the Christian Middle Ages: the ethics of the relation between man and
fortuna, of doing the right thing, could be used because they had universal validity.
The current study has demonstrated that both mediaeval authors took on the task
of preserving these ideas and providing an update for their time and audience, and
that Aristotle’s speech as a program of virtuous behaviour was instrumental in
achieving this goal. As this study has shown, both authors were familiar with the
ideas at hand, that were firmly rooted in the mainstream of mediaeval thought
about good kingship, and both aimed at an audience likewise acquainted with
these ideas and/or able to handle them.
This brings us back to the aforementioned cultural-historical crossroads at
which the saga is situated. With the era of disintegration of the Icelandic state
coming to an end and Icelandic society balancing on a cultural-historical-political
fissure, the point in time at which the Alexandreis was translated seemed to have
offered the ideal spawning ground for the development of notions of the Icelandic
self within the world changing around it, from an aristocracy with free retainers
into a dependency of ‘royal subjects’, as Sveinsson put it.173 The Alexanders saga
with its concepts of power seemed to have provided the ideal stage for venting
such notions: the ideal place for finding signs of self-awareness in the handling of
mainstream thought in a time of great transition. But it turns out that it was not, at
least not on the level of ideas. I have demonstrated that the Icelandic translator
went to great lengths to make sure the scope of the ethics presented were
maintained. His only significant change to the program was a minor concession – if
that – to his intended audience in order to help effect the update and eliminate the
risk of misunderstandings further on in the narrative. If anything is to be said
about influences from the cultural-historical environment on the adaptation of the
Alexandreis in this respect, we are left empty-handed: this research has shown that
from an ideological point of view, there is no sign whatsoever of the
aforementioned cultural-historical crossroads, at which the Alexanders saga was

173 Sveinsson, The age of the Sturlungs, 8-23.

47
written, influencing the king’s image. In other words, it can be concluded that there
is no specifically Icelandic Alexander, and other contemporary Icelandic texts
about kings (or Nordic, for that matter) give little hope that they contain a different
picture.174 Influences from the cultural-historical environment might very well be
found in areas other than that of ideas (the description of Alexander’s facial
countenance to express his state of mind is another likely instance of such
influences), but these examples bear no relevance for the ideas that underlie the
king’s image.175
In conclusion, the translator obviously felt no need to deviate from the
mainstream of thought in an era of turbulence seemingly suitable to do otherwise.
Moreover, the saga was received and reproduced on Iceland into the twentieth
century.176 No one less than Nobel Prize winning author Halldór Kiljan Laxness
clarified his decision to edit the Alexanders saga in a way that may account for the
general popularity of the saga. He stated that the saga is a highlight in the
development of the Icelandic language, an instance where Icelandic meets Latin as
its equal, and the successful combination of southern sources and northern
form.177 He added that Icelanders of all times may learn more than one thing about
how to handle foreign matter, and that Norwegian claims to the origin of the text
are to be refuted, because an Icelandic author’s name is mentioned. 178 Alexanders
saga clearly was and is regarded as a part of the Icelandic cultural heritage; not
primarily for its ideas, but mostly for the beauty of its language, its alleged author
and its cultural-literary qualities.
Be this as it may, the popularity of the saga implies that there was also a
general understanding, if not appreciation, of the saga’s line of thought throughout
the centuries. Why, then, has there been so little academic attention for Alexanders
saga and the other Antikensagas until recently, as I pointed out before? It cannot
just have been because of their non-Icelandic subject matter. My conclusion is that

174 Jakobsson describes the same line of thought concerning e.g. clementia-milldi and
raðspeki in the kings’ sagas; see Jakobsson, Í leit að konungi, 314-315. Bagge’s study of the
Norwegian king’s mirror, the Konungs Skuggsjá, results in a similar picture concerning
wisdom as the king’s main virtue; see Sverre Bagge, The political thought of the King’s
Mirror, Odense: Odense University Press, 1987, 88-90.
175 See also note 110; examples would be a.o. royal etiquette, court and state-structure. For

instance: Alexandreis I, 209-211: ‘Hic igitur Macedo, ne iura retunderet urbis (…) sacrum
diadema uerendo suscipiens capiti sceptro radiavit eburno.’ – AS I, p. 9 (l. 5-6) ‘...eptir
venio fyre konunga tekr Alexander her með korono konungs nafnn.’ Alexandreis VI, 407-
408: ‘donec (…) iusto tibi regi restituat regnum.’ – AS VI, p. 96 (l. 21-23): ‘en siðan takir þu
tign þina með friðenom oc konunglict valld (…) þat er enge ma annar at retto eignaz
meðan þu ert alive.’ Alexandreis I, 212: ‘Stat procerum medius.’ – AS I, p. 9 (l. 6-7) ‘Her
hafði konungr stefnt fiolmennt þing.’
176 Handwritten copies were produced well into the nineteenth century; see Würth, Der

‘Antikenroman’, 102.
177 See Halldór Kiljan Laxness, Alexandreis það er Alexanders saga mikla eftir hinu forna

kvæði meistara Philippi Galteri Castellionæi, sem Brandur Jónsson ábóti sneri á danska
tungu, það er íslenzku, á þrettándu öld, Reykjavík: Heimskringla, 1945, 5.
178 One has to bear in mind that there are few sagas that mention an author and a patron.

48
researching the ideas presented in these texts, the reception and handling of
foreign thought, might show that Icelandic authors and readers actually stood in
the middle of the abovementioned mainstream of mediaeval-Christian thought and
continued to appreciate it. Such a discovery would be detrimental to the common
notion of Iceland’s unique historical, cultural and literary position at the periphery
of the Occident. The findings of my study concerning the universal validity of
thought in the image of Alexander confirm this conclusion. What’s more, the
realisation that Icelandic authors and readers were, to say the least, quite at home
with these mainstream ideas at a moment as crucial as the end of the age of the
Sturlungs makes one wonder when, or if, in the course of history they abandoned
following the mainstream of ideas in literature uncritically and started either to
profess their own or to use such ideas to profile themselves. It is for this reason, as
paradoxical as it may seem, that Alexanders saga offers an unparalleled starting
point from which the development of Icelandic self-awareness on the level of ideas
is to be detected. What with the text being an Icelandic adaptation of the
Alexandreis, the self-awareness that may be detected would be one of language, of
the unconscious, popular kind, which corresponds with the ways in which popular
Icelandic self-awareness manifested itself in the Middle Ages.179 There are no signs
of a public self-awareness to be discovered, however, and because of this lack of
public self-awareness at such a pivotal moment in Icelandic history, it remains to
be determined when such could and would emerge after the upcoming change of
circumstances.180 After all, what lay ahead of them were nearly seven centuries of
colonial occupation, a given that raises questions as to how any kind of Icelandic
self-awareness was to develop and could be reflected in writing – a premise that
calls for further study.

179See Introduction, 12.

180 This popular self-awareness of the linguistic kind is also detected in the mediaeval
Icelandic Grammatical Treatises. Those in my opinion are not suitable to serve as a
starting point in detecting the development of public self-awareness on Iceland, because
they lack the use of contemporary ideas as seen in AS that could point towards the
presence of public self-awareness.

Sources used for research, but not specifically referenced, are Wim Aerts and Martin
Gosman (eds.), Exemplum et similitudo: Alexander the Great and other heroes as points of
reference in medieval literature (Mediaevalia Groningana 8), Groningen: Forsten, 1988;
William Millor and Christopher Brooke (eds.), The letters of John of Salisbury. Vol II: The
later letters (1163-1180), Oxford: Clarendon, 1979; Ernst Kantorowicz, The king’s two
bodies, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997 (19571); Henry A. Myers, Medieval
kingship, Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1982; Sigurður Nordal, ‘Úr Alexanders sögu’, in Sigurður
Nordal, Guðrún Pálína Helgadóttir, and Jón Jóhannesson (eds.), Sýnisbók. Reykjavík:
Bokaverzlun Sigfusar Eymundssonar, 1953: 207-210; Gerhard Streckenbach, Otto Klinger,
and Walter Berschin (eds.), Walter von Châtillon. Alexandreis: das Lied von Alexander dem
Großen (Sammlung Weltliteratur, Reihe: Mittellateinische Literatur), Heidelberg: Lambert
Schneider, 1990; Stefanie Würth, Isländische Antikensagas. Saga von den Trojanern, Saga
von den britischen Königen, Saga von Alexander dem Großen, München: Eugen Diederichs,
1996.
49
50