Notes Finals Crim

Section 1. Article 266-A (1)(d) of Act No.
3815, otherwise known as "The Revised Penal Code,"

as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997," is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
"Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:
"1) By a person who shall have carnal knowledge of another person under any of the following
circumstances:
"x x x"
d) When the offended party is under sixteen (16) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present: Provided, That there shall be no
criminal liability on the part of a person having carnal knowledge of another person under
sixteen (16) years of age when the age difference between the parties is not more than three (3)
years, and the sexual act in question is proven to be consensual, non-abusive, and
non-exploitative: Provided, further, That if the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age, this
exception shall not apply.
"As used in this Act, non-abusive shall mean the absence of undue influence, intimidation,
fraudulent machinations, coercion, threat, physical, sexual, psychological, or mental injury or
maltreatment, either with intention or through neglect, during the conduct of sexual activities
with the child victim.ℒαwρhi৷ On the other hand, non-exploitative shall mean there is no actual
or attempted act or acts of unfairly taking advantage of the child's position of vulnerability,
differential power, or trust during the conduct of sexual activities."
Section 2. Articles 337 and 338 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as "The Revised Penal Code"
are hereby amended to read as follows:
"Article 337. Qualified seduction. - The seduction of a minor, sixteen and over but under
eighteen years of age, committed by any person in public authority, priest, home-servant,
domestic, g uardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the
education or custody of the minor seduced, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
"The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon any person who shall seduce his
sister or descendant, whether or not she be a virgin or over eighteen years of age.
"Under the provisions of this Chapter, seduction is committed when the offender have carnal
knowledge of any of the persons and under the circumstances described therein."
"Article 338. Simple seduction. - The seduction of a minor, sixteen and over but under eighteen
years of age, committed by means of deceit, shall be punished by arresto mayor."
William S. Disipulo vs. People, GR 252898, August 31, 2022 (counts of rape,
Lucena/Aaron, SI & Assault)
Facts:
A man who introduced himself as Struck went to the restaurant owned by the mother of the
victim AAA252898 at around 9pm. He noticed her and told her mother that she could be a
model in a TV commercial or an artist and mentioned his talent and fees, showing them videos
and mentioning that he knew one Tita Vecky, a purported talent manager of a popular actress.
Assuring them of no ill motive towards the victim and that he was gay and convincing the family
through skype for him and AAA25298 to meet at the LRT station to prepare for an audition and
do a video tape recording (VTR). The next day at around 9pm, the two met at the station and
told her they will be going to Halina Hotel with several artists, the latter agreed as she was
assured by Disipulo that he was gay and has no ill motive, but upon arriving, after he had took a
shower, the victim averred that he suddenly grabbed her in which she claimed to have resisted
but was threatened by Disipulo that he would hurt her. She then tried to deter him by telling him
she was having a menstrual period but instead pulled off her pants and underwear and inserted
his penis into her vagina. AAA252898 then locked herself inside the restroom and was about to
put her clothes on when she got pulled by Disipulo and took her underwear off and pushed her
back to the bed, inserting his fingers into her vagina and made her insert his penis into her
mouth as well while he take a video of it. The victim was threatened by Dispulo that he would
release the video if she told anyone about what had happened. She was left disoriented and
traumatized and could not eat nor sleep to which she had then told her mother about her
harrowing ordeal.
The incident was reported to the police station and Disipulo was later arrested but denied the
charges maintaining that it was consensual and that he was asked by her to teach her how to
be sexually attractive and on how to please her boyfriend, insisting as well that he was not into
women and was gay. The RTC held that prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the element of the crimes of rape by sexual assault and rape by sexual intercourse in
convicting Disipulo. The CA affirmed in its decision, thus this appeal.
Issue:
whether accused-appellant is guilty of one count of rape by sexual intercourse and one count of
rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC.
Held:
Yes and no. Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, otherwise known as The
Anti-Rape Law of 1997, provides:
ARTICLE 266-A. Rape. When and How Committed - Rape is committed

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Under paragraph 2 of article 266-A, the elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault
must be established beyond reasonable doubt as follows: (1) the offender commits an act of
sexual assault (a) by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or (b) by
inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; (2) the act of
sexual assault is accomplished (a) by using force and intimidation; (b) when the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or ( c) by means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority; or ( d) when the woman is under 12 years of age or demented
In the present case, all enumerated elements of the offenses charged against
accused-appellant were proven beyond reasonable doubt and was able to be narrated in detail
by AAA252898. Accused-appelant does not deny that he had carnal knowledge of the victim but
maintains that she freely and voluntarily went with him to have sex. He further contends that
force, threat or intimidation and fraudelent machination are mutually exclusive modes of
committing rape through sexual intercourse and that they cannot co-exist but was held incorrect
by the court. It held that the existence of one of the four circumstances mentioned in Par. !,
taken with the presence of the other elements of the offense, is sufficient to justify a conviction.
Thus, when force, threat, or intimidation is employed by the offender, it is not necessary that the
victim was deprived of reason or unconscious, or that the offense was committed with
fraudulent Machination.
The straightforward, consistent and reliable testimony of the victim as well belies the claim of
Disipulo, as aptly determined by the lower court that, through deceit, the accused-appellant
induced the victim by making her and her family believe that he is a gay talent manager
assisting several talents in doing commercials and modelling stints to gain their trust. And that
the victim voluntarily went with him to the Hotel under the impression that he will shoot her VTR
and train her, similar to what he claimed to do for his other talents. He however abused her trust
and took advantage of her gullibility to molest her.
The court cited the case of People v. Layoso, in which it held that: It is not necessary that the
victim should have resisted unto death or sustained physical injuries in the hands of the rapist. It
is enough if the intercourse takes place against her will or if she yields because of genuine
apprehension of harm to her if she did not do so. Indeed, the law does not impose upon a rape
victim the burden of proving resistance
Thus, in the present case, the perceived lack of resistance should not be taken against the
victim and that her initially going with Disipulo voluntarily does not give rise to the conclusion
that she consented to their sexual encounter.the initial deceit which was eventually
accompanied with force, threat, and intimidation when he coerced her to submit to his lustful
desire, and the victim’s failure to shout and resist cannot be construed as willful submission.
The court further reiterated that hymenal injury has never been an element of rape, for an
individual might still be raped without such resulting injury. Highlighting the case of People v.
Orilla to which it held that: absence of fresh lacerations in Remilyn's hymen does not prove that
appellant did not rape her. A freshly broken hymen is not an element of rape and healed
lacerations do not negate rape.In addition, a medical examination and a medical certificate are
merely corroborative and are not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case.
The credible disclosure of a minor that the accused raped her is the most important proof of the
sexual abuse.
The conduct of the victim (in which she managed to go to school but was not able to finish as
she was traumatized and distressed and cannot eat nor sleep) supports her claim that what
transpired between her and Disipulo was against her will. Even if it were true that the victim was
liberated and open-minded does not disprove the commission of rape and such qualities do not
give accused-appelant to commit sexual acts against the victim’s will. The court also points that
the attempt of the defense to discredit the testimony by portraying her as an individual of
loose morals is irrelevant and does not deserve any consideration. As provided in section 6 that
SECTION 6. Rape shield. - In prosecutions for rape, evidence ofcomplainant's past sexual
conduct, opinion thereof or his/her reputationshall not be admitted unless, and only to the extent
that the court finds, that such evidence is material and relevant to the case.
Disipulo’s claim of being gay and not into girl likewise deserves scant consideration as his
sexual orientation does not make it physically impossible to commit the acts complained against
him. Noticeably, in his direct examination that he even admitted to being attracted to women still.
Further, the purported inconsistencies between the Salaysay and the testimony of AAA252898
in open court are not substantial enough to impair the veracity of the prosecution's evidence
against the accused-appellant.. Hence, between the Salaysay of AAA252898 and her testimony,
this Court accords greater weight to the latter.
As to the penalties, the court noted that CA committed an error in convicting Disipulo of only one
count of rape by sexual assault. They stressed that the peculiar circumstances present in the
case warrant the conviction of disipulo for two separate offenses of rape by sexual assault. As it
cannot be denied that separate acts were committed successively, each with separate criminal
intent. While the acts all constitute sexual assault, accused-appellant has distinct and separate
motivations for the bestial and wrongful acts he committed.. These acts maybe
compartmentalized into two parts: first, the insertion of his finger into the
vagina of AAA252898; and second, the act of forcing his penis
into AAA252898's mouth. It cannot nonetheless be considered a continuation of the first act of
sexual act. The substantial differences in the modes of committing the acts
constituting sexual assault, coupled with the distinct criminal motivations of
accused-appellant in the performance of each act, led the court to conclude that it did not arise
from the same criminal impulse. As such, two counts of rape by sexual assault is imsposed and
That one count of rape by sexual intercourse was properly convicted by the ca for
only one act of penile penetration.
in People v. Aaron, this Court found that the three penile "penetrations occurred during one
continuing act of rape in which the appellant was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent"
and that he merely intended "to change positions.
in People v. Lucena, this Court convicted accused-appellant of three counts of rape by sexual
intercourse due to the fact that three penetrations occurred successively at an interval of
approximately five minutes. In Lucena, this Court found that the accused was not motivated by a
single criminal impulse
The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein
the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his
strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that
when the [appellant] decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon
[AAA], he was not motivated by a single impulse[,] but rather by several criminal intent.
_________________________
SALAZAR CASE
Facts:
According to AAA. she attended a fiesta at around 1pm on Febraury 23, 2013 and was drinking
a soda when Salazar approached her and invited her to go with him to meet his brother Jimmy
who was also the boyfriend of the victim, upon arrival at the house of Salazar, He forced AAA to
go inside and closed the door while poking her waist with a four (4) inch long and one (1) inch
thick metal. AAA pleaded him to stop but was told to be quiet and punched her in the abdomen
when she tried to stop him from removing her clothes. Thereafter, he had successfully removed
the shorts and underwear of the victim and repeatedly inserted his penis into her vagina.
AAA testified that she was not able to fight back as he was strong and that there was a pair of
scissors lying around thus she feared for her life. Upon getting home, AAA told her uncle and
mother what had happened and filed a blotter against Salazar which caused his arrest. AAA
was only fifteen years old at the time of the incident.
Salazar denied the accusation narrating that he was with his wife cooking when he was asked
by AAA to accompany him to Gilbert's house as planned by them and Jimmy and later left and
went home when his brother arrived. he then went to Becky’s house alone at 3pm and had
drinking spree ‘til 5pm with his relatives. his neighbor Emilia testified of seeing Salazar at the
front of their house at around 3pm without company and saw him drinking till 4pm. Cabarles
testified as well that he had a drinking spree with the accused-appellant from 8am to 2pm along
with Jimmy but not with AAA.
The RTC found Salazar guilty of the crim of rape penalized under 266(1) in relation to par of
266 (b) as all the elements therein are present. they further held that the testimony only offered
bare denial as it was not supported by evidence, and that the witnesses do not coincide with
Salazar’s testimony.
The CA affirmed the conviction, and held that lack of resistance is not tantamount to
voluntariness or consent, more so when victim was intimidated into submission. Hence failure to
cry for help does not negate rape. CA further stressed that lack of fresh hymenal laceration
does not detract from the commission of rape as hymenal injury is not an element of rape; thus,
absence of it will not negate rape, nor does the the presence of spermatozoa required. what
rape requires is carnal knwoledge, not ejaculation.
Issue:
Wether accused appellant is guilty fo rape
Held:
Yes. The element of rape by sexual intercourse under art. 266-A par 1 of the RPC are the ff: (1)
the offender is a man (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) such act was
accomplished by using force, threat, or intimidation.
In rape by force, threat, or intimidation, the prosecution must establish that there is no consent
or voluntariness on the part of the victim, and that the accused employed force, threat, or
intimidation to consummate the crime.
The accused-appellant questions the elements of force, threat and intimidation as he contends
that there was no resistance on the part of AAA, but the court find the argument untenable, The
testimony of AAA reveals that she was forced, threatened, and intimidated, rendering her
subservient to accused-appellant's control. The alleged absence of resistance is belied by the
fact that accused-appellant had to punch AAA in the abdomen for him to be able to remove her
clothes. Fearing for her life, accused-appellant was able to have carnal knowledge with AAA
against her will. Her failure to call for help is not because she consented to the sexual
intercourse, but because she was paralyzed by terror. Although the pair of scissors was not
pointed at her, accused-appellant's actions leading to the incident already created fear in the
mind of AAA
They reiterated that there is force and intimidation as long as the actions of the accused are
sufficient to consummate the bestial desires and purpose of the malefactor against the victim.
Intimidation must be considered as well in light of the victim's perception and judgment. It is
enough that it produces fear in the victim's mind, therefore, it is subjective.
In cases where the accused used a knife to threaten the victim, the Court held that it strongly
suggests force, or at least intimidation, which is clearly adequate to bring the victim to
submission. When this kind of intimidation exists where the victim is cowed into submission,
thereby rendering resistance futile, it is unreasonable to expect her to resist. such intimidation is
enough to render the victim incapable of offering any resistance because of fear for her life. In
any event, neither presence and use of a deadly weapon nor physical violence are essential to
find force or intimidation as it depends on the circumstances as well as the size, age, strength
and relation of the parties. Citing the case of Salazar y Rapis also which states that intimidation
is present when a victim is threatened with a knife during sexual intercourse. and that force and
violence need not necessarily be employed as intimidation is sufficient enough.
The court further gave scant consideration to the contention of the accused appellant attempting
to discredit the testimony of AAA. particularly the finding that there is no fresh laceration,
physical mark of assualt and spermatozoa as the absence of fresh hymenal laceraion does not
disprove rape as held in the case of People vs. ZZZ, thus: Mere touching no matter how slight of
the labia or lips of the female organ by the male genital, even w/out rupture of the hymen is
suffecient to consummate rape. Its absence does not disprove sexual abuse, especially when
the victim is a young girl. stressing that even an intact hymen will not negate the commission
and that proof of physical injuries is not an element of rape. Moreover. the absence of
Spermatozoa is not a defense since overriding consideration in rape cases is not the emission
of the semen but the unlawful penetration of the female genetalia by the male organ. Thus its
absence as well does not disprove rape as the basic element of rape is carnal knoedge, not
spermatozoa.
The foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim’s testimony and not the
findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not
indispensible in a prosecution for rape; the victim’s testimony alone, if credible is sufficent to
convict. In this case, the court found the testimony of AAA to be credible, candid, straightforward
and consistent on material points and absent any irregularity.
Denial is generally viewed upon with disfavor, like alibi, denial is an inherently weak and easily
fabricated defense. It is a self-serving negative evidence that cannot be given greater weight
than the stronger and more trustworthy affirmative testimony of a credible witness . . . Besides,
no woman would cry rape, allow an examination of her private parts, subject herself (and even
her entire family) to humiliation, go through the rigors of public trial, and taint her good name if
her claim were not true. Thus, For an alibi to prosper, it must be proved that the accused was in
another place during the commission of the crime, rendering it physically impossible for the
accused to be at the scene of the crime. Further, an alibi must be corroborated by a
disinterested witness.
Here, accused-appellant's defense is unsubstantiated. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
Roxas and Cabarles' claims are different from that of accused-appellants. Other defense
witnesses' testimonies do not coincide with his alibi and is contrary to his story. Moreover,
accused-appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime
scene at the time it was committed. Fatal to his alibi, he admitted that he was with AAA at that
time and that they were near the vicinity. Thus, between accused-appellant's unsubstantiated
alibi and AAA's positive and credible testimony, the latter must prevail.
CASE of Jumawan (Rape of husband)
Facts:
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the
accused-appellant, have carnal knowledge with the private complainant on October 16, and 17
without the latter’s will.
That on or about October 16, while the two are lying in their matrimonial bed, accused-appellant
asserts his desire to which she politely declined, reiterating that she was not feeling well.
However, the accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning to which KKK resisted by
holding on to her panties but was forcefully pulled and torn down by her husband. KKK stayed
defiant by refusing to bend her legs and wrestled her husband away but he held her hands and
succeeded in penetrating her. KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting as he was
carrying out his carnal desires.
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. The defense, on the other
hand, spun a different tale, claiming that on those dates, he was in Bukidnon which was
corroborated by the spouses’ driver. He asserts that KKK merely fabricated the rape as a
revenge for taking over the control and management of their businesses and that she wanted to
cover up her extra marital affairs. RTC found him guilty, giving greater weight and credence to
the straightforward testimonies of the prosecution and was affirmed by CA in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether Accused-appellant is guilty of marital rape
HELD:
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has
sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital
consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal to that he accords himself and cannot
be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a
sexual act without her full and free consent. While It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates
the spouses to love one another, this rule sanctions affection that is mutual, not the kind which is
unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known;
(b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse.
The single definition
for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed
in wedlock and
those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their
husband and those
raped by any other man alike.
Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or
intimidation, fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is incapable of giving free and
voluntary consent because
he/she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12
years of age or is
demented.
Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her
through force and
intimidation both of which were established beyond moral certainty by the prosecution through
the pertinent
testimony of KKK.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on
October 16, 1998 cannot
be stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse that ensued. No
consent can be deduced
from such act of KKK because at that juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse
was about to take
place.
The court did not give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit
him to convey that she was resisting his sexual onslaught as Resistance is not an element of
rape and the law does not impose upon the victim the burden to prove resistance much more
requires her to raise a specific kind thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-appellant
to recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual congress.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just
enough to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be
sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind or is of such a degree as to
impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into
submission
It must also be stressed that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is
usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they failed to
report the rape incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges.
Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults does not necessarily impair their
credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained. At that time, KKK and her daughters were not
aware that a husband forcing his wife to submit to sexual intercourse is considered rape. In fact,
KKK only found out that she could sue his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin
Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the separate charges for grave
threats and physical injuries against the accused-appellant. Thus, Unfamiliarity with or lack of
knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and public scrutiny that could have
befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of police authorities or even the neighbors
been sought, are acceptable explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the subject rape
incidents.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Decision of CA is affirmed.
____________________________________
People vs. XXX, GR 257276, February 28, 2022 (Guiding principles

in rape cases; qualified)
FACTS:
At around 7pm, AAA was at their house when her uncle who lived with them summoned her
inside his room and committed rape by inserting his penis inside her vagina and directing her to
suck his penis, threatening her to comply or she will be killed.
It was on the same night when BBB saw the accused appellant through his window when she
was calling AAA for help to grill fish, kissing her daughter and that her daughter was holding the
accused-appellant’s penis, running her fingers on it. AAA informed her that she was being
sexually abused by the uncle, threatening to kill her if she does not comply to which BBB
informed to her husband and immediately filed a report. The medicial examination discovers
that there was an abrasion on the labia majora and an old healed incomplete hymenal
laceration at the 11:0)o’clock position. Accused-appellant denies having raped AAA, RTC
convicted him of Qualified rape and is affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Wether the CA erred in convicting accused-appellant of Qualified Rape
HELD:
No. In the review of rape cases, The court continue to be guided by the following principles: (1)
an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(2) in view of the nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the
complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution stands
or falls on its own
merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Thus, in a
prosecution for rape,
the complainant's credibility becomes the single most important issue
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the courts
a quo that the elements of Statutory Rape were duly established. AAA's straightforward and
positive testimony that accused appellant raped her was corroborated by BBB's testimony.
When considered together with the medico-legal certificate indicating an abrasion on her labia
majora and AAA's birth certificate proving that she was seven years old at the time of the
incident, the prosecution's evidence is sufficient for conviction. It is settled that the crime of rape
is deemed consummated even when the man's penis merely enters or comes into contact to the
labia or lips of the female organ.
Moreover, AAA's testimony is clear, candid, consistent in its material points, and unshaken
during cross examination. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are
inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability, but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she
testified is not true. Thus, accused-appellant's defense of denial cannot overcome the
categorical testimony of the victim. A denial, which necessarily constitutes self-serving negative
evidence, cannot prevail over the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.
However, contrary to the finding of the CA, The court held that the special qualifying
circumstance of relationship was sufficiently alleged in the Information. the instant case
contained a statement that
"the accused being the uncle of victim because accused is the brother of the victim's father."
Hence, accused appellant can be properly convicted of Qualified Rape.
CA Decision affirmed with modification
People vs. Rommel M. Dela Cruz, GR 252226, February 16, 2022 (Rape by SI vs. Sec 5b)
FACTS:
RTC found him guilty of two (2) counts of Sexual Abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, and is affirmed in toto by the CA.
ISSUE:
whether the CA erred in affirming accused-appellant's conviction of Sexual Abuse under Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in both Criminal Cases
HELD:
The RTC and the CA were correct in their assessment of the testimonies of AAA and her
mother. However, there is a need to fix the error in
the nomenclature of accused-appellant's crime. Accused-appellant should be held criminally
liable for two (2)
counts of Rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised
Penal Code.
Sexual Abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 has the following elements: (1) the
accused commits the
act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child whether male or female, is below 18 years of
age.2 Under the
circumstances, AAA cannot be deemed to be a child "exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse;" hence, the
second element is patently lacking in the case. Instead, the prosecution's evidence clearly
established the elements
under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353. Thus:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
The circumstance applicable in the case is paragraph 1(a). The fact of carnal knowledge was
established
through AAA's positive identification of accused-appellant as her abuser, testifying that
accused-appellant
undressed her, positioned himself on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina on two
separate dates.
In People v. Ejercito,
the Court held that the Anti-Rape Law or RA 8353, amending the RPC, should be uniformly
applied in rape cases against minors. Accordingly, "penal laws are crafted by legislature to
punish certain acts, and when two (2) penal laws may both theoretically apply to the same case,
then the law which is more special in nature,
regardless of the time of enactment, should prevail.
Further explained in People vs. Tulagan: assuming that both violation are mistakenly alleged in
the same information or wrongfully designate the crime in the information, “the accused should
still be prosecuted pursuant to the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, which is the more
recent and special penal legislation that is not only consistent, but also strengthens the policies
of R.A. No. 7610. Indeed, while R.A. No. 7610 is a special law specifically enacted to provide
special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their development, We hold that it is contrary to
the legislative intent of the same law if the lesser penalty (reclusion temporal medium to
reclusion perpetua) under Section 5(b) thereof would be imposed against the perpetrator of
sexual intercourse with a child 12 years of age or below 18. "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997." R.A.
No. 8353, provides a "stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse," as it
imposes a more severe penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B of the RPC.
As for the affirmative defense of “sweetheart theory”, the court held it as "an admission of carnal
knowledge of the victim," and consequently, the Court "places on the accused the burden of
proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence." Moreover, the defense cannot just
present testimonial evidence in support of the theory. Independent proof like tokens, mementos,
and photographs are required. Unfortunately for accused-appellant, he presented no
such evidence to substantiate his claim. And even assuming that they indeed have a
relationship, accused-appellant cannot just
force AAA to have sex against her will. Thus, In the case, accused-appellant may properly be
convicted of Rape without violating his due process rights and the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusations against him as It is very clear from the allegations in the
Informations that they constitute criminal charges for Rape under paragraph 1, Article 266-A, in
relation to
Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353.
Wherefore, CA’s decision is affirmed with modification.

People vs. Marlon P. Conti, GR 260704, February 27, 2023 (Statutory rape by SI and
SA-inre RA 7610)
FACTS:
BBB and Marlon are common law spouses who lived together in the house of Marlon’s mother
and slept in the same room along with her daughter AAA.
On November 13, 2013, BBB witnessed Marlon inserting his finger on the vagina of AAA after
he had gone through the bathroom outside their house, BBB who was alarmed when she saw
that Marlon inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina hit Marlon’s back but was knocked unconscious
when MArlon punched her in the abdomen.
BBB regained consciousness and reported it to MArlon’s uncle who then convinced her to go to
her grandfather CCC. hCCC then accompanied her the following day to file a complaint against
MArlon.
Marlon denies the charges alleging that he was not home at the time of the incident and was at
a warehouse where he was employed, which was corroborated by his workmate Faustino. RTA
culed in favor of the prosecution finding MArlong guilty of violation of RA 9262 and Statutory
Rape under 266-A 1(d) in relation to 266B of the RPC which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Did the CA commit any reversible error in affirming Marlon's conviction for Statutory Rape?
HELD:
The CA did not commit any reversible error in affirming Marlon's conviction for Statutory Rape
under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the RPC. However, considering that the prosecution was also able
to
establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that Marlon, before having carnal knowledge of
AAA, also inserted his finger into the latter's vagina, he must likewise be convicted of Sexual
Assault under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC inrelation to Section 5(b) of RA 761028 or the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act.
In order to sustain a conviction for Statutory Rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the RPC, the
following elements
must concur: (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (2) the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim, regardless of whether there was force, threat, or intimidation or grave
abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual
intercourse.
The Court concurs with the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the prosecution was
able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the foregoing elements. It is undisputed that AAA
was under 12 years old when Marlon had sexual intercourse with her on
November 13, 2013. Marlon's defenses of denial and alibi do not persuade. The corroborated
testimony of BBB and the medical findings of Dr. Simangan, prevails over Marlon's denial and
unsubstantiated allegations
The Court finds that Marlon also committed the crime of Sexual Assault under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610, which is committed when: (1)
the victim is a child, male or female, under12 years of age; and (2) the offender inserts any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of the victim.
It can be gleaned from the testimony of AAA and BBB that Marlon first inserted his finger in the
vagina of AAA, before inserting his penis. This was also alleged in the Information. In People v.
Agoncillo, which held that it is possible to convict an offender for Rape under Article 266-A(1) (d)
and Rape under Article 266-A(2) for one incident provided that these crimes are properly
alleged in the informations.
In People v. Chingh (Chingh), the Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for Statutory
Rape and Rape by Sexual Assault even though only one Information was filed against him.
In this case, the Information sufficiently alleged that Marlon inserted his finger into AAA's vagina
and had sexual intercourse with her. Clearly, the Information charged Marlon with two crimes.
Consequently, since Armando failed to file a motion to quash the Information, he can be
convicted with two counts of rape.
However, instead of Rape by Sexual Assault, the proper nomenclature of the crime committed
by Marlon is Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, in relation to Section
5(b) of RA 7610.
Considering the development of the crime of sexual assault from a mere "crime against chastity"
in the form of acts of lasciviousness to a "crime against persons" akin to rape, We hold that if
the acts constituting sexual assault are committed against a victim under 12 years of age or is
demented, the nomenclature of the offense
should now be "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610" and no longer Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC in relation
to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610," because sexual assault as a form of acts of lasciviousness is
no longer covered by Article 336 but by Article 266-A (2) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No.
8353.
Nevertheless, the imposable penalty is still reclusion temporal in its medium period, and not
prision mayor.
(Rape by SI vs. Sec 5b; Tulagan)

FACTS:
The accused appellant was charged with 1 count of rape under 266-A(1) and 2 counts of child
abuse under RA 7610 in RTC, and is affirmed by CA. The victim was a member of Wenceslao
Christian Fellowship where the accused-appellant was serving as a pastor of the said religious
org. The first information happened around 10 in the evening of October 2004 when AAA was in
the kitchen of the pastoral house. The light was turned off by accused appellant, embraces her
and threatened to kill her, to which he then ordered her to lie down on a wooden bench and then
and there have carnal knowledge with AAA. The second time happened on October 2005 when
he offered AAA to bring her home but instead brought the latter to his hut and had sexual
intercourse with AAA. Months later on Feb 2006, another incident occurred when AAA and her
classmates were ordered by their teachers to get cartons from accused-appellant’s father. She
felt the need to went to the comfort room when the accused-appellant followed her and again
sexually abused AAA. The examination shows that there is healed laceration and sperm cells in
the vagina of AAA which was concluded to be a definitive evidence of sexual contact.
Succintly, the defense rests upon the sweetheart theory, contending that AAA is the girlfriend of
the accused and the act is consensual.
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
The first element is undisputed as the accused-appellant himself admitted that he had carnal
knowledge of AAA. In order to establish the element of force and intimidation, the prosecution
must prove: a) a complete absence of voluntariness on the part of the victim; and b) that the
accused actually employed force and intimidation upon the victim to achieve his end. In rape,
force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the
time of the commission of the crime. Proof of resistance is not necessary; the victim has no
burden
to prove that she did all within her power to resist the force and intimidation employed upon her.
It being enough that it is of such nature as to wield the victim to submit to the accused's desires.
Intimidation includes the moral kind such as the fear caused when threatened with a knife or
pistol, or whenwords employed are of such nature as would incite anxiety or distress leaving the
victim without any choice but to surrender.
AAA was merely 14 years old while the accused-appellant was about 34 years old. In
addition, the accused-appellant is a pastor of the religious organization of which AAA and her
family are members– the accused-appellant being more than double the age of AAA, taken
together with his position by virtue of which he wields moral ascendancy and influence over
AAA, it is an inevitable conclusion that the element of intimidation is present
sweetheart theory is not credible when it is based on the testimony of the accused as the same
is self serving. for it to be credible, it should be substantiated by evidence of romantic
relationship such as love letters, momento, etc. which is glaringly lacking in the case. Even
assuming that there is indeed relationship does not indicate consent as love affair does not
justify rape.
wtih regards to the two child abuse conviction, in the absence of force and intimidation, sexual
intercourse with a minor even if done with consent is still punishable under said law.
Before an accused can be held criminally liable under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the
following requisites must be present: 1) offender is a man; 2) he indulges in sexual intercourse
with a female exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse, who is 12 years old or below 18 or
above 18 under special circumstances; and 3) coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group is employed against the child.
In the landmark case of People v. Tulagan, the Court explained that in rape involving a minor
who is under 12 years old or is demented consent is immaterial as the law presumes the
victim's incapacity to discern good and evil;
[c]onsent of the child is material and may even be a defense in criminal cases involving violation
of
Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18, or
above 18 under special circumstances. Such consent may be implied from the failure to prove
that the said victim engaged in sexual intercourse either "due to money, profit or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group.
Simply, sexual intercourse with a victim who is under 12 years of age or is demented is always
statutory rape and the accused-appellant will be prosecuted under paragraph 19(d), Article
266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. Meanwhile, if the victim is 12 years old or
less than 18 and is deemed to be a child "exploited to prostitution and other sexual abuse"
because she agreed to the sexual intercourse "for money, profit or any other consideration or
due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group," the crime could not be Rape
under RPC as there is consent. Rather, the offender should be penalized under Section 5(b),
R.A. No. 7610. However, when the victim consented to the sexual intercourse, and no
consideration, coercion or influence is involved, no crime is committed; except where "force,
threat, or intimidation" as an element of rape is substituted by "moral ascendancy or moral
authority" and in instances which fall as qualified seduction under Article 337 or simple
seduction under Article 338 of the RPC
Partly granted.
Anti-Child Abuse Law (RA No. 7610, as amended)

Definition of Terms [Sec. 3]
Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse [Sec. 5, as amended by RA 11648]
Attempt to Commit Child Prostitution [Sec. 6)
Child Trafficking [Sec. 7, as amended by RA 11648]
Attempt to Commit Child Trafficking [Sec. 8]
Obscene Publication and Indecent Shows [Sec. 9, as amended by RA 11648]
Employment of Children [Sec. 12, as amended by RA 9231]
Melvin Balon Encinares vs. People, GR 252267, January 11, 2021 (Sec 5b vs. Art 336)
FACTS:
Violation of Sec 10(a) of RA 7610 known as “ Special Protection of Children against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.”
Accused-appellant is the vice president of a hs general pta and offered help with t-shirts and
other items of CAT which victim AAA, 16 yrs of age is a commander of. The victim and accused
appellant became textmates and petitioner would send AAA cellphone load and even offered
ATM, GSIS, and SSS pensions.
It was evening of December when petitioner invited AAA to a drinking spree in his house, and
do then and there put AAA’s penis into his mouth and played with it for 10 mins. AAA resisted
but failed since he was too drunk. Consequently charging petitioner with violation of Sec. 10 (a)
of Ra 7610.
ISSUE:
Whether sec 10(a) is the correct conviction.
HELD:
The pertinent provisions of Sections 5 (b) and 10 (a) of RA 7610 respectively state:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim
is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period[.
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered
by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
SEC 5(b) 7610 specifically applies in cases of sexual abuse

committed against children which includes
lascivious conduct.
Sec 10(a) punishes other forms of child abuse not

covered by particualr provisions of RA 7610
The offense will not fall within the purview of Sec 10 (a) if the same is specifically penalized
by a particular provision, such as sec 5(b).
The term “lascivious conduct” was given specific definition in the IRRA of 7610 as "the
intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of
any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person”.
Thus, The proper conviction of accused appellant is under Sec 5 (b) of RA 7610
People vs. Reggie D. Briones, GR 240217, June 22, 2020 (Tulagan Ruling)
FACTS:
RTC found Reggie Brioness y Duran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under
Art. 266- A (1) of RPC, which was affirmed by CA.
On July 19, 2006, FFF, a 12 yr old girl, was alonw in their house when Briones, who was their
neighbor and whom she considers “kuya” arrived to watch television. He asked FFF upon
arriving to increase the volume of the TV as he closed the front door. He then embraced FFF
and had sexual intercourse with her to which he then threatened to kill her if she discloses what
have happened. The sexual encounters were repeated * more times, and only then when she
missed her monthly period and was revealed to be pregnant had her parents learned about her
ordeal.
Briones on his part denies the accusation, insisting they were sweethearts, presenting love
letters written by FFF and was corroborated by his cousin Mary Ann, who testified that it was
consensual and that she once saw them go into the bedroom of Briones for about 30 mins.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Prefatorily, The court began by addressing Briones' criticism of the trial court's decision insofar
as the apparent confusion between rape under the RPC and under R.A. No. 7610 is concerned.
In People v. Tulagan,13 the Court ruled that "force, threat or intimidation" is the element of rape
under Article 266-A(1)(a)14 of the RPC, while "due to coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group" is the operative phrase for a child to be deemed "exploited in prostitution or
other sexual abuse," which is the element of sexual abuse under Section 5(b)15 of R.A. No.
7610. In the event where the elements of both violations of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 and of
Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the RPC are mistakenly alleged in the same Information and
proven during the trial in a case where the victim who is 12 years old or under 18 did not
consent to the sexual intercourse, Tulagan directs that the accused should still be prosecuted
and penalized pursuant to the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, which is the more recent
and special penal legislation that is not only consistent, but also strengthens the policies of R.A.
No. 7610.
Time and again, the Court has held that in rape, the "sweetheart" defense must be proven by
compelling evidence: first, that the accused and the victim were lovers; and, second, that she
consented to the alleged sexual relations. The second is as important as the first, because this
Court has held often enough that love is not a license for lust. Thus, Briones can offer love
letters to prove that FFF was his lover, but the fact that they were sweethearts does not
necessarily establish FFF's consent to the sexual act.
Mary Ann's testimony can barely save his plight as well. First of all, she categorically stated that
she did not know what happened therein. Yet, as the CA ruled, agreeing to enter one's room is
far from consenting to any sexual act that may have happened therein.
It must be borne in mind that FFF was only twelve (12) years old when Briones, nineteen (19),
raped her. It is a settled rule that the force contemplated by law in the commission of rape is
relative, depending on the age, size, or strength of the parties. It is not necessary that the force
and intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great and of such character as could not be
resisted; it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the
purpose which the accused had in mind.
Lina Talocod vs. People, GR 250671, October 7, 2020, (Sec 10a; Invectives-intent)
FACTS:
It was on November 5,2011 when AAA berated his playmates for throwing sand and gravel on
the road bothering passing motorists. Upset by AAA’s reprimand, one of the children reported
the incident to her mother (herein petitioner) who immediately confronted AAA about his
behavior, pointing a finger at the latter and furiously shouting” Huwag mong pansinin yan. At
putang ina yan. Mga walang kwenta yan. Mana-mana lang yan!". Upset AAA relayed the
incident to his mother BBB who then alleged that AAA was traumatized of the harsh uttered
words and expletives resulting to AAA no longer going out to play with other children and
suffered nightmares.
The defense claimed that what she actually uttered were “ wag mo na patulan yan walang
kwenta makipag-away," and that the same were addressed to EEE, not to AAA.
RTC convicted her in violation of Sec 10 (a) 7610 and was affirmed by the CA
HELD:
Notably, case law qualifies that for one to be held criminally liable for the commission of acts of
Child Abuse under Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, "the prosecution [must] prove a specific
intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of the child; otherwise, the accused
cannot be convicted [for the said offense.
the Court emphasized that "when the infliction of physical injuries against a minor is done at the
spur of the moment, it is imperative (or the prosecution to prove a specific intent to debase,
degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of the child x x x." "Debasement is defined as the act of
reducing the value, quality, or purity of something; degradation, on the other hand, is a
lessening of a person's or thing's character or quality; while demean means to lower in status,
condition, reputation, or character." "[Such] intention x x x can be inferred from the manner in
which [the offender] committed the act complained of[,]" as when the offender's use of force
against the child was calculated, violent, excessive, or done without any provocation
T]he Court finds that the act of petitioner in the case of Escalano in shouting invectives against
private complainants does not constitute child abuse under the foregoing provisions of R.A. No.
7610 Petitioner had no intention to debase the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child. It was
rather an act carelessly done out of anger. The circumstances surrounding the incident proved
that petitioner's act of uttering invectives against the minors AAA, BBB, and CCC was done in
the heat of anger.
Verily, based on the foregoing narration, there appears no indication that petitioner deliberately
intended to shame or humiliate AAA's dignity in front of his playmates. On the contrary, it is
rather apparent that petitioner merely voiced the alleged utterances as offhand remarks out of
parental concern for her child. Hence, in view of the absence of a specific intent to debase,
degrade, or demean the victim's intrinsic worth and dignity in this case, the Court finds that
petitioner cannot be held criminally liable for committing acts of Child Abuse under Section 10
(a), Article VI of RA 7610.
Allan A. De Vera vs. People, GR 246231, January 20, 2021 (Masturbate – Sec 5b to Sec
10a)
FACTS:
AAA, 16 yrs old were sitting on the couch while taking a diagnostic exam on the coffee table
inside the mini libraary of the Filipino Dept. when Petitioner, who was standing approximately
less than a meter away to the left of AAA and was facing a bookshelf was seen by AAA to be
masturbating his penis. RTC found him liable under Sec 5(b) of RA 7610 but was modified by
CA into Sec 10 (a) as they held that act of masturbating is considered another act of abuse,
prejudicial to the devt of the child.
ISSUE:
Whether Sec 10 (a) is the right conviction
HELD:
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, namely: (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty,
(c) child exploitation, and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child s
development. Simply put, Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 punishes any other acts of child abuse
not covered under other provisions of the same law.
In relation thereto, Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610 defmes child abuse as:
Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any
of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
Taking into account the special circumstances surrounding the case at bench, the act of
masturbating in the presence of the minor is considered a lascivious conduct and constitutes
psychological abuse on the minor victim. The act of masturbation then falls within the scope of
R.A. No. 7610 and not the RPC.
In the case at bench, the Information alleged sufficiently all the elements constituting the crime
of other forms of child abuse penalized under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, namely: (a) the
minority of the victim; and, (b) the acts constituting physical or psychological abuse committed
by petitioner against the victim petitioner fondled his penis and masturbated in the presence of
the victim thereby prejudicing her psychological and physical development and further debasing,
degrading and demeaning her intrinsic worth and dignity.
as for the insistence of petitioner to be convicted instead of unjust vexation is without merit.
masturbating is not just an act to vex the minor victim, but such was done intentionally to excite
crude sexual desire on account of the minor victim.
The feeling of being violated and the anxiety suffered by the minor student upon witnessing a
school employee masturbating in her presence inside the school campus undoubtedly tarnished
her purity, quality, character, and dignity.
Jaime A. Capueta vs. People, GR 240145, September 14, 2020 (Groping – Sec. 10a to Sec
5b)
FACTS:
Crime of Acts of lasciviousness under article 336 in relation to sec 5(b) of RA. 7610
AAA were playing bahay-bahayan at the foot of the stairs, house owned by accused’s sister
when the said accused came down from the second floor and lifted AAA’s skirt, touched her
right thigh and vagine, and left. Accusations was denied by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whther the conviction is correct.
HELD:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who
Concomitantly, pursuant to Section 5(b) of RA 7610, when the victim is under 12 years of age,
the perpetrator shall be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC for lascivious conduct, which
requires the presence of the following elements for its commission: (a) the offender commits any
act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) the lascivious act is done under any of the following
circumstances: (i) by using force or intimidation; (ii) when the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of
age; and (c) the offended party is another person of either sex.
In this case, the body of the Information charging petitioner contains an averment of the acts
committed which unmistakably describes acts punishable under Section 5(b), Article III of RA
7610. The Information evidently recites the ultimate facts and circumstances constituting the
offense for which petitioner was found guilty of. The Information, in fact, specifically alleges that
petitioner committed acts of child abuse. Hence, petitioner cannot be said to have not been
apprised of the nature and cause of accusation against him. The absence of the phrase
"exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse" or even the specific mention of
"coercion" or "influence" is not a bar for the Court to uphold the finding of guilt against an
accused for violation of RA 7610
People vs. VVV, GR 230222, June 22, 2020 (Tulagan ruling)
FACTS:
at around 9pm on june 10,2010, AAA was attending the wake of her grandmother when her
father, herein accused-appellant, told AAA to massage him to which she obliged, she was then
told to lie down and then and there inserted his forefinger into her vagina and have had carnal
knowledge with AAA. He threatened to maul and kick her if she told what have happened,
holding a balisong throughout the molestation.
ISSUE:
HELD:
In the landmark case of People v. Tulagan (Tulagan),26 the Court pronounced that if the victim
is 12 years old or above but under 18 years old, or at least 18 years old under special
circumstances, "the nomenclature of the crime should be 'Lascivious Conduct under Section
5(b) of RA 7610' with the iniposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua, but it should not make any reference to the RPC." The crime shall be called
"Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC" with the imposable penalty of
prision mayor only when the victim of the sexual assault is 18 years old or above and not
demented.27
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610,28 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children
against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the [victim] is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim
is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period[.]
Accused-appellant's act of inserting his penis into AAA's vagina through force and intimidation
constitutes Rape through carnal knowledge under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A of the RPC.
Moreover, accused-appellant's acts of intentionally holding AAA's vagina and inserting into it his
right forefinger plainly constitute sexual abuse and lascivious conduct as defined in the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610, known as the "Rules and Regulations on the
Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases," which pertinently provide:
(g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children;
Black's Law Dictionary defines "coercion" as "compulsion; force; duress" while "[undue]
influence" is defined as "persuasion carried to the point of overpowering the will." On the other
hand, "force" refers to "constraining power, compulsion; strength directed to an end" while
jurisprudence defines "intimidation" as "unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear." As
can be gleaned, the terms are used almost synonymously. It is then of no moment that the
terminologies employed by RA 7610 and by the Information are different.
Based on the facts of the case, it is undeniable that AAA was subjected to sexual abuse under
the above definitions. She is a child who, due to the coercion or influence of accused-appellant,
was subjected to the latter's lascivious conduct. It also bears stressing that accused-appellant is
the father of AAA; as such, he has moral ascendancy over AAA, his minor daughter. Where
rape is committed by a relative, such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse,
moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of "force and intimidation" as an essential
element of rape
In sum, the Court holds accused-appellant guilty of both Rape under paragraph 1(a), Article
266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC and Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610.
Rodan A. Bangayan vs. People, GR 235610, September 16, 2021 (Consent as a defense)
FACTS:
on January 5, 2012, AAA's brother, BBB, upon arriving home from the farm, saw Bangayan
laying on top of AAA. Bangayan and AAA were both naked from the waist down. Dr. Villar
testified, confirming that AAA admitted to him that she had sexual intercourse with Bangayan on
several occasions even prior to january 5th. Bangayan argued that he had proven, by clear and
convincing evidence, that he is in a relationship with AAA and that the act complained of was
consensual. The two bore a second child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not consent is a valid defense.
HELD:
Section 5. (a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1)
Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2)
Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements
or other similar means;
(3)
Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as prostitute;
(4)
Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5)
Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage
such child in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3,
for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, that the penalty for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period
The following requisites must concur: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female is below eighteen (18) years of
age. (punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in
prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation
where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or
influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct)
"sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion
of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
It is settled that a victim under 12 years old or is demented "does not and cannot have a will of
her own on account of her tender years or dementia; thus, a child or a demented person's
consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil.
Where the age of the child is close to the threshold age of 12 years old, as in the case of AAA
who was only 12 years and one month old at the time of the incident, evidence must be strictly
scrutinized to determine the presence of sexual consent. The emotional maturity and
predisposition of a juvenile, whose age is close to the threshold age of 12, may significantly
differ from a child aged between 15-18 who may be expected to be more mature and to act with
consciousness of the consequences of sexual intercourse.
In explicitly stating that children deemed to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse
under Section 5 of R.A. 7610, refer to those who engage in sexual intercourse with a child "for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group,"[53] it is apparent that the intendment of the law is to consider the condition
and capacity of the child to give consent.
Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 qualifies that when the victim of the sexual abuse is under 12 years of
age, the perpetrator shall be prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code. This means that,
regardless of the presence of any of the circumstances enumerated and consent of victim under
12 years of age
If the victim who is 12 years old or less than 18 and is deemed to be a child "exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse" because she agreed to indulge in sexual intercourse "for
money, profit or any other consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group," then the crime could not be rape under the RPC, because this no longer falls under
the concept of statutory rape, and there was consent. That is why the offender will now be
penalized under Section 5(b), R.A. No. 7610, and not under Article 335 of the RPC. But if the
said victim does not give her consent to sexual intercourse in the sense that the sexual
intercourse was committed through force, threat or intimidation, the crime Is rape under
paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC.
However, if the same victim gave her consent to the sexual intercourse, and no money, profit,
consideration, coercion or influence is involved, then there is no crime committed, except in
those cases where "force, threat or intimidation" as an element of rape is substituted by "moral
ascendancy or moral authority," like in the cases of incestuous rape, and unless it is punished
under the RPC as qualified seduction under Article 337 or simple seduction under Article 338.
Ireneo M. Magno vs. People, GR258682, January 16, 2023 (Touching private parts – Sec.
10a to Sec 5b)
FACTS:
Tapped in her private parts by a man at night at the plaza. found guilty of (2) COUNTS OF other
acts of child abuse in violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610
ISSUE:
HELD:
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610 define lascivious conduct as:
The intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus[,] or mouth, of
any person, whether of the san1e or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
In People v. Ladra,47 this Court said that squeezing the private part of a child suggests that the
same acts constitute intentional touching, to wit:
After a careful evaluation, the Court finds that the mere fact of "squeezing" the private part of a
child — a young girl 12 years of age — could not have signified any other intention but one
having lewd or indecent design. It must not be forgotten that several years prior,
accused-appellant had raped AAA in the same house, for which act he was appropriately
convicted. Indeed, the law indicates that the mere touching — more so, "squeezing," in this
case, which strongly suggests that the act was intentional — of AAA's genitalia clearly
constitutes lascivious conduct. It could not have been done merely to annoy or vex her, as
opined by the courts a quo. That AAA was fully clothed at that time, which led the courts a quo
to believe that accused-appellant could not have intended to lie with her, is inconsequential.
"'Lewd' is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous. It signifies that form of
immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS 266-A(2)
2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be
"Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610." Pursuant to the second proviso in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
LASCIVIOUS CONDUCT 5(B)

3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12) but below
eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18) years old or older but is unable to fully
take care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition,
the crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610," and the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua.
Prohibition of Child Marriage Law (RA 11596)

Unlawful Acts [Sec. 4]
Public Crimes [Sec. 5]
Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (RA No. 9208, as amended by RA 10364)
Acts of Trafficking in Persons [Sec. 4, RA 11862]

Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons [Sec. 5, RA 11862]
Qualified Trafficking in Persons [Sec. 6, RA 11862]
People vs. Susan R. Sayo and Alfredo S. Roxas, GR 227704, April 10, 2019 (sec. 5)
Facts:
Plaza girls under the control and supervision of SAYO as commercial sex workers. AAA (15)
BBB (16) CCC (16)
Oplan Sagip Angel proceeded and three agents were designated as poseur-customers in Pasig
Plaza where they were approached by Sayo. After negotiation, they proceeded to the house of
Alfredo Roxas.
HELD:
Death of Sayo extinguishes criminal liability.
The courts a quo committed serious error in convicting Roxas for Qualified Trafficking of
Persons and Trafficking in Persons as the offenses proscribed under Section 5 of RA 9208, the
Court affirms with modification Roxas' conviction and holds that he is guilty of one count of
violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9208 for Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons and not
Trafficking in Persons, qualified or otherwise.
Based on the evidence adduced during trial, the prosecution was able to establish that Alfredo
Roxas owned a house/apartment; that said house/apartment had a room; that the room was
offered for lease for every paying customer of the complainants; that accused Roxas, in
consideration of the sum of One Hundred (100) pesos, would allow the complainants and her
(sic) customers to use the room and engage in sex therein; that Roxas had knowledge of the
fact that the complainants engaged in sex for a fee as he cleaned the room after the
complainant and her customer finished using it; that, moreover, he sold condoms to
complainant's male customers before using the room. All of these acts promoted trafficking in
persons as defined under Section 5 of [RA 9208].
As can be gleaned from the above amendment, only violations of Section 4 on Trafficking in
Persons can be qualified. Section 5 on Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons, being separate
and distinct offenses, cannot be qualified as the law does not expressly provide therefor. The
clarificatory amendment, being beneficial to the accused, must be applied in his favor.
Fernando B. Arambulo vs. People, GR 241834, July 24, 2019 (use of minor in robbery)
Facts:
Essentially, the prosecution alleged that petitioner and his minor son, Dominique Dimple
Arambulo9 (Dominique), invited the latter's three (3) schoolmates who were also minors, namely
AAA, BBB, and CCC, 10 to their house sometime in 2011. It was then revealed that the purpose
of the meeting was to discuss petitioner's plans to commit robberies with the help of AAA, BBB,
and CCC. Upon learning about this, CCC expressed his desire to leave but petitioner got angry
and punched him; thus, he was forced to join the group. AAA, BBB, and CCC then similarly
testified that not only was petitioner the mastermind of the series of robberies they subsequently
committed against various people, but he was also the driver of their getaway tricycle
Held:
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical,
to commit any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including
those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship,
for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
Relatedly, Section 3 (d) of RA 9208 in its original form defines the term "forced labor and
slavery" as "the extraction of work or services from any person by means of enticement,
violence, intimidation or threat, use of force or coercion, including deprivation of freedom, abuse
of authority or moral ascendancy, debt-bondage or deception
The prosecution had clearly established the existence of the elements of violation of Section 4
(a) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (c)34 of RA 9208 in its original form, as evinced by the
following: (a) petitioner, through his minor son, Dominique, recruited three (3) other minors AAA,
BBB, and CCC; (b) Petitioner was able to do so by taking advantage of their vulnerability as
minors, particularly through enticement, violence, and use of force and coercion; and (c)
petitioner recruited them for the purpose of engaging them to perform illicit work/services, i.e.,
commit a series of robberies.
People vs. Jackie Maycabalong and Dave Pasilan, GR 215324, Dec. 5, 2019 (prostitution)
Region 7 received a report from an informant that there was trafficking of women for purposes
of sexual exploitation in Barangay Capitol, Cebu City, Acting on the tip they conducted a
surveillance operation to identify the persons involved in the illegal activities.
The entrapment operation, accused-appellants arrived at a lodging house along Colon Street to
inform DDD that they had customers who needed women. While accused-appellant Pasilan was
convincing DDD to go with them, accused-appellant Maycabalong went upstairs to fetch her
live-in partner, AAA, a friend of DDD. Later, accused-appellant Maycabalong, together with DDD
and AAA, boarded a cab wherein accused-appellant Pasilan was waiting. they proceeded
towards Mango Avenue to search for two more girls, whom they found along 22nd Street, and
whose names were later learned by DDD as CCC and BBB. The four girls were rescued and
brought by the DSWD team to the DSWD center.
Held:
The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its definition under Section 3 (a) of
(1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or
without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders."
(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another"; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs."
The Court, therefore, affirms the trial court's and the Court of Appeals' conviction of
accused-appellants in violation of R.A. No. 9208, Section 4(a) and (e), as qualified by Section
6(c) and punished under Section 10(c).
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of
seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse, thus, justifying the award
of moral damages. Exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is aggravated, as in this
case.
In People v. Rodriguez,18 the Court held that the trafficked victim's testimony that she had been
sexually exploited was "material to the cause of the prosecution." Here, AAA's testimony was
corroborated by the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the entrapment operation.
People vs. Ranie D.G. Estonilo, Gr 248694, October 14, 2020, (qualified trafficking of
minor, no client)
Facts:
Estonilo approached AAA,8 then 12 years old, in an effort to convince the latter to "mamakla" in
exchange for money. For this purpose, Estonilo even introduced him to a "client" who offered
P2,000.00 for AAA's sexual services, but AAA refused. However, Estoni1o was persistent with
his recruiting efforts, and this culminated in the evening of March 6, 2010. On that night, AAA
was on his way home with his friend, BBB, then 11 years old, when Estonilo called their
attention. Estonilo persistently coerced AAA to have sex with BBB at a nearby vacant lot in
exchange for P300.00 so that they will learn how to perform sexual acts. The children acceded
and had sexual contact with each other, the ordeal occured twice and cause AAA to contract an
infection.
RTC found him guilty of two (2) counts of Qualified Trafficking in Persons but CA modified the
ruling and found him guilty of Section 5 (a), paragraph (5), Article III of RA 7610.
Held:
SECTION 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered as qualified

trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child; xxx
In this case, the courts a quo found that the prosecution, through the testimonies of both AAA
and BBB, was able to establish that Estonilo had indeed befriended the two (2) minors in order
to recruit them and thereafter, pimp them to his clients. For this purpose, he was able to take
advantage of AAA and BBB's minority and coerce them into committing sexual acts with one
another, under the pretext that they needed to learn how to perform such acts with fellow males
so that they can earn monetary consideration for the same. Hence, the Court finds no reason to
overturn the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, as there was no showing that they
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case.
It bears pointing out that the RTC was in the best position to assess and determine the
credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties.27 As such, Estonilo's criminal liability for
the aforesaid acts must stand.
the CA erred in opining that no trafficking existed, As aptly pointed out by Associate Justice
Ramon Paul L. Hernando, neither the presence of the trafficker's clients, nor their intercourse
with the victim/s, is required to support a finding of trafficking. As held in People v. Aguirre the
presence of the trafficker's clients is not an element of the crime of recruitment or transportation
of victims under Sections 3 (a) and 4 (a) of RA 9208. In the same vein, the law does not require
that the victims be transported to or be found in a brothel or a prostitution den for such crime of
recruitment or transportation to be committed. In fact, it has been held that the act of sexual
intercourse need not have been consummated for recruitment to be said to have taken place. It
is sufficient that the accused has lured, enticed[,] or engaged its victims or transported them for
the established purpose of exploitation, which includes prostitution, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, and the removal or sale of organs. In this case, the prosecution has satisfactorily
established accused-appellants' recruitment and transportation of private complainants for
purposes of prostitution and sexual exploitation.
Thus, the fact that neither AAA nor BBB had sexual contact with any of Estonilo's clients will
not affect the latter's criminal liability for Qualified Trafficking in Persons. To be sure, the
gravamen of the crime of trafficking is "the act of recruiting or using, with or without consent, a
fellow human being for [inter alia,] sexual exploitation"32 - which, as already discussed, was
established to have been committed by Estonilo.
Wilbert D. Brozoto vs. People, GR 233420, Apil 21, 2021 (trafficking and Sec 5a RA 7610)
Facts:
AAA, who was then 14 years old, had a misunderstanding with her mother and ran away from
home. On November 27, 2011, AAA met petitioner through a common friend named Mary
Joy.19 During that encounter, petitioner asked AAA if she would be willing to engage in sexual
intercourse for money.20 With Mary Joy's persuasion, AAA agreed since she needed money
and had no one else to depend on but herself.21 Petitioner then instructed AAA to tell her future
clients that she is already 18 years old. On December 4, 2011, AAA's mother finally found
her.35 In the evening of that same day, she told her mother everything she had gone through.
RTC convicted petitioner of child trafficking under Sections 3(a) and 4(a), in relation to Section
10(a), of RA. 9208 and child abuse penalized under Sections 3 and 5 par. a(1), Article VI of R.A.
7610. CA affirmed the conviction
Held:
Section 6 of R.A. 9208 provides that the crime is qualified when, inter alia, the trafficked person
is a child.62 The law defines a child as "a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who
is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition.
RA 9208: amended by R.A. No. 10364
Act: recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining,

harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or
across national borders
Means: threat, force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person
Purpose: exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs
"Trafficking in persons is a deplorable crime."67 "The gravamen of the crime of trafficking is 'the
act of recruiting or using, with or without consent, a fellow human being for [inter alia,] sexual
exploitation.
Petitioner is guilty under Section 5(a) of R.A. 7610 for acting as a procurer of a child
prostitute.
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. ï¿½ Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
"Section 5(a) of R.A. 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution
wherein the child is abused primarily for profit."87 In People v. Dulay,88 the Court enumerated
the elements of Section 5(a) of R.A. 7610 as follows:
1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;
2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and
4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

In People v. Larin,90 the Court defined when a child is deemed exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group
AAA's declarations established that petitioner exploited her in prostitution when he procured a
customer to engage in sexual intercourse with her for a fee, from which pay he also benefited.
People vs. XXX, GR 248815, March 23, 2022, (Qualified trafficking of minor; consent)
AAA, who was then only 14 years old, went with her friend, BBB, to meet with the latter's
"textmates."12 Upon arriving at the hotel, BBB introduced AAA to accused-appellant and an
unidentified man. Afterwards, the two men booked two separate rooms and all four of them
proceeded to go upstairs, one of the accused after being seperated with her in a room have
carnal knowledge with her. This later on happened again a few more times as BBB would
always find a way to persuade her to go back to the hotel with her.
It even resulted in other minors being brought to the hotel.
RTC and CA both found him guilty of Qualified Trafficking in Persons, punished under Section
4 (e), in relation to Section 6 (a), Republic Act No. 9208 and of the crime of Rape, punished
under Article 266-A(1)
Held:
Applying the foregoing law and jurisprudence in the case at bar, the RTC and the CA correctly
convicted accused-appellant of Qualified Trafficking in Persons. It was sufficiently proved that all
the elements of the crime are present. Through the straightforward and credible testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, particularly AAA's, it was established that: 1) accused-appellant
recruited or hired AAA by instructing her and BBB to bring other minor females at the hotel and
introducing them to different customers on separate occasions; (2) accused-appellant took
advantage of AAA's vulnerability as a minor child and as someone who was in need of money;
and (3) the purpose of such acts was for AAA and the other minor females to engage in sexual
intercourse or to render sexual services to several men in exchange for money. Additionally, it is
an undisputed fact that AAA was only 14 years old during the time when the incident occurred.
Thus, this Court finds that the CA committed no reversible error when it affirmed the RTC's
finding that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons.
Furthermore, the prosecution sufficiently established that accused-appellant had carnal

knowledge of AAA on September 8, 2011, through force and intimidation by pulling her and
pinning her down, and inserting his penis into her vagina, against her will and without her
consent.
Lenida T. Maestrado vs. People, GR 253629, September 28, 2023 (Attempted – fictitious
adoption)
Facts:
The police conducted the investigation pursuant to information received indicating that AAA's
birth certificate appeared to be spurious, since the birth mother and father indicated in the child's
birth certificate were both Caucasian while the child appears to be of Filipino descent.
The police officers spoke to Alvarez and asked whether she was the midwife who attended
AAA's birth. admitted that Locker merely approached her and asked for assistance in registering
AAA's birth to which she agreed. Alvarez informed the police that AAA was in the custody of
petitioner, the stepmother of Stone, who in turn was Locker's friend. Petitioner claimed that
Locker left AAA in her custody because Locker could not bring the child outside of the country
since the child's documents were still being processed.
The police thereafter filed complaints for violation of RA 9208, as amended by RA 10364,
against petitioner, Alvarez, Locker and Stone. As for petitioner, she was charged for acting in
conspiracy with the other accused by taking custody over AAA in Locker's absence and failing
to inform the (DSWD) or any other government agency that she had custody of AAA despite the
fact that she was not the child's mother. (attempted trafficking in persons by rtc affirmed by CA)
Held:
Section 4-A of RA 9208, as amended by RA 10364, defines Attempted Trafficking in Persons:43
SEC. 4-A. Attempted Trafficking in Persons. — Where there are acts to initiate the commission
of a trafficking offense but the offender failed to or did not execute all the elements of the crime,
by accident or by reason of some cause other than voluntary desistance, such overt acts shall
be deemed as an attempt to commit an act of trafficking in persons. As such, an attempt to
commit any of the offenses enumerated in Section 4 of this Act shall constitute attempted
trafficking in persons.
The provision further provides that in cases where the victim is a child, the following acts shall
also be deemed Attempted Trafficking in Persons:
(a) Facilitating the travel of a child who travels alone to a foreign country or territory without valid
reason therefor and without the required clearance or permit from the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, or a written permit or justification from the child's parent or legal
guardian;
(b) Executing, for a consideration, an affidavit of consent or a written consent for adoption;
(c) Recruiting a woman to bear a child for the purpose of selling the child;
(d) Simulating a birth for the purpose of selling the child; and
(e) Soliciting a child and acquiring the custody thereof through any means from among
hospitals, clinics, nurseries, daycare centers, refugee or evacuation centers, and low income
families, for the purpose of selling the child.
Here, petitioner and the other accused were charged of conspiring, confederating, and mutually
helping one another in committing the crime of Attempted Trafficking in Persons under Section
4-A, paragraphs (d) and (e) of RA 9208, as amended by RA 10364.45
To secure a conviction for Attempted Trafficking in Persons under Section 4-A, paragraph (d),
the prosecution must establish the following elements:
(i) the victim is a child; and
(ii) the simulation of bi1ih was for the purpose of selling the child.4
As for Attempted Trafficking in Persons under Section 4-A, paragraph (e), the prosecution must
prove the following elements:
(i) the victim is a child; and
(ii) the child is solicited and custody over him/her is acquired through any means from among
hospitals, clinics, nurseries, daycare centers, refugee or evacuation centers, and low-income
families for the purpose of selling the child.
As to the presence of the elements for violation of Section 4-A, paragraph (e) on acquiring
custody of a child for the purpose of selling him/her, first, it was established above that AAA is a
child. Second, the prosecution witness SPO4 Salubre positively identified petitioner in open
court as the person in custody of AAA when the police authorities rescued her (sic) and that she
was part of a collective effort to allow Locker to bring AAA, the baby she bought from BBB, to
the United States of America.
Alvarez, while denying participation of the payment of consideration, declared that the
enumerated persons conspired in one way or another to bring AAA to the United States of
America. Thus, the evidence on record and the testimonies of the witnesses reveal that the act
of Alvarez and petitioner, together with Locker and Stone, were part of a collective effort to
enable Locker to illegally bring AAA, the baby she bought from BBB, to the United States of
America.
People vs.BBB and XXX, GR 252507, April 18, 2022 (marriage to 14 yrs old;
qualified-mother)
Facts:
When Ronda read AAA's counseling form, she found out that she was only 14 years old and her
partner was 56 years old. AAA is Catholic while her partner, XXX, is Muslim. After inquiring
about her marriage, specifically the age gap, AAA broke down in tears. Ronda learned that
AAA's own mother deceived her into marrying XXX. Appellant told AAA that they would just get
something in Quiapo, but after entering the Golden Mosque, AAA was already married to XXX.
AAA disclosed further of the sexual abuses by reason of her mother’s instruction.
RTC find accused BBB guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Section 4
(c) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) Qualified trafficking in persons of R.A. No. 9208, as
amended by R.A. 10364. Affirmed by CA
Held:
SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. – It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical,
to commit any of the following acts:
(c) To offer or contract marriage, real or simulated, for the purpose of acquiring, buying, offering,
selling, or trading them to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor
or slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage.
"SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – Violations of Section 4 of this Act shall be

considered as qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
xxxx
(d) When the offender is a spouse, an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who
exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public
officer or employee. (emphasis supplied)
Verily, under Section 4(c) of RA 9208, as amended, the prosecution must establish that: (1) the
offender offered or contracted marriage, real or simulated; and (2) the purpose is to acquire,
buy, offer, sell or trade them to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor or slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage. Section 6 (a) and (d) further provides
that violation of Section 4 shall be considered qualified when: (1) the trafficked person is a child;
and (2) the offender is a spouse, an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who
exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public
officer or employee.
These elements are all present here.
Furthermore, Records show that appellant and XXX acted in concert in attaining a common
design and purpose, i.e., to deceive AAA into marrying XXX for the purpose of sexually
exploiting her. Notably, appellant told AAA that she needed to marry XXX so she could travel
with him to Kuwait and get his inheritance once he dies.
Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act (RA No. 9262)

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed
by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or
her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex
object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual
parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or
forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife
and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the
abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat
of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or

emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of
a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody
and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner
objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or
properties.
(b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to
the physical and psychological or emotional distress.
(c) "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and
behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative
abuse.
(d) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act committed by a person who, knowingly and without
lawful justification follows the woman or her child or places the woman or her child under
surveillance directly or indirectly or a combination thereof.
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis
during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between
two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.
(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a
common child.
(g) "Safe place or shelter" refers to any home or institution maintained or managed by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or by any other agency or voluntary
organization accredited by the DSWD for the purposes of this Act or any other suitable place the
resident of which is willing temporarily to receive the victim.
(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but are incapable of
taking care of themselves as defined under Republic Act No. 7610. As used in this Act, it
includes the biological children of the victim and other children under her care
Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children [Sec. 5]
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his
family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due
her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity or controlling the victim's own mon4ey or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or
common money, or properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her
actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity
which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation
directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that
alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This
shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against
her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the
woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.
Protection Orders [Secs. 8-16] !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense [Sec. 26]
SECTION 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. – Victim-survivors who are found by
the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil
liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of
self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman
syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert
psychiatrists/ psychologists.
Jaime J. Araza vs. People, GR 247429, September 8, 2020 (Infidelity)
Facts:
AAA learned about the affair of his husband Araza and a certain woman named Tessei Fabillar
due to a text message she received and had confirmed it when she went to Zamboanga to see
for herself. She filed a complaint at the PNP and they executed an agreement for
Araza(husband) and Fabillar to never see each other again. They lived together for a short while
before he again left. AAA then sought the help of the NBI and learned that he had returned to
his mistress,
She would receive text messages from the mistress telling Araza is sick and in need of money
and that she’d kill her husband resulting in depression and anxiousness on part of AAA for her
husband’s condition.
An expert witness Dr. Lindain testified that base on AAA’s assessment report, the symptoms of
AAA’s depression and difficulty sleeping are secondary to relational distress with Araza.
RTC ruled in favor of AAA and was affirmed by CA in which they concluded that R.A. No. 9262
does not criminalize acts such as the marital infidelity per se, but the psychological violence
causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife.
ISSUE:
v c cvcHELD:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:

xxx
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions, causing or likely to cause mental or
emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity.
In Dimamling v. People, the elements of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 are
enumerated:
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the
offender has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common
child. As for the
woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the
family abode;
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar acts or omissions.
In this case, the Court finds that the Information contains the recital of facts necessary to
constitute the crime charged. It clearly stated that: (1) The offended party AAA, is the wife of
offender Araza; (2) AAA sustained emotional anguish and mental suffering; and (3) such
anguish and suffering is inflicted by Araza when he had an extramarital affair with Fabillar and
had three illegitimate children with her.
Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No.

9262.24 Equally essential is the element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are
personal to the complainant. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained
by the offended party. The law does not require proof that the victim became
psychologically ill due to the psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather, the law only
requires emotional anguish and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or
mental suffering, jurisprudence only requires that the testimony of the victim to be presented in
court, as such experiences are personal to this party.
Marital infidelity, which is a form of psychological violence, is the proximate cause of AAA's
emotional anguish and mental suffering, to the point that even her health condition was
adversely affected.
CA AFFIRMED
Christian Pantonial Acharon People, GR 224946, November 9, 2021 (psychological abuse)
FACTS:
The couple, AAA and Christian borrowed the amount of P85,000.00 with 3% monthly interest
from
their godmother, Emelina So. agreeing that Christian, who left to work at Pizza Hut in Brunei,
would send money in the amount of Php9,633.00 per month in payment of their loan. He
however, did not send money on a regular basis but was only able to send an amount of
Php71,500.00, leaving the balance in the amount of Php13,500.00. According to Christian, his
rented place in Brunei was razed by fire and met a vehicular accident which required him to
spend [a significant] sum of money. He confirmed that [medical expenses are included in his
Employment Contract in Brunei]
(Exhibit "I"). but had paid for his medicines because it would take [a] long period of time to
process and claim it to their office. For a year, he estimated that he spent about $1,000.00 for
medical expenses only. RTC held him guilty which was then affirmed by CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court correctly convicted Christian of causing psychological or emotional
anguish when he allegedly failed to: (1) financially support AAA; and (2) keep the
communication lines open with the latter.
HELD:
No. The Court stresses that Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 uses the phrase "denial of financial
support" in defining the criminal act. The word "denial" is defined as "refusal to satisfy a request
or desire" or "the act of not allowing someone to do or have something." The foregoing
definitions connote willfulness, or an active exertion of effort so that one would not be able to
have or do something. The act punished by Section 5(i) is, therefore, dolo in nature - there must
be a concurrence between intent, freedom, and intelligence, in order to consummate the crime.
The Court deems it proper to clarify that Sections 5(i) and 5(e) of R.A. 9262 are mala in se, not
mala prohibita, even though R.A. 9262 is a special penal law. The acts punished therein are
inherently wrong or depraved(nature of the act), and the language used under the said penal
law requires a mental element. Being a crime mala in se, there must thus be a concurrence of
both actus reus and mens rea to constitute the crime. " Actus reus pertains to the external or
overt acts or omissions included in a crime's definition while mens rea refers to the accused's
guilty state of mind or criminal intent accompanying the actus reus."
It is not enough, therefore, for the woman to experience mental or emotional anguish, or for her
partner to deny financial support that is legally due her. In order for criminal liability to arise
under Section 5(i), there must, therefore, be evidence on record that the accused willfully or
consciously withheld financial support legally due the woman for the purpose of inflicting mental
or emotional anguish upon her. In other words, the actus reus of the offense under Section 5(i)
is the willful denial of financial support, while the mens rea is the intention to inflict mental or
emotional anguish upon the woman. Both must thus exist and be proven in court before a
person may be convicted of violating Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262.
The elements of a violation of Section 5(i), insofar as it deals with denial of financial support, are
therefore:
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has
a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or
living within or without the family abode;
(3) The offender willfully refuses to give or consciously denies the woman and/or her child or
children financial support that is legally due her and/or her child or children; and
(4) The offender denied the woman and/or her child or children the financial support for the
purpose of causing the woman and/or her child or children mental or emotional anguish.
Court finds that Christian is not guilty of violating Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 for the failure of the
prosecution to establish the third and fourth elements of the crime. The Court finds him
innocent, for there is undenied evidence that Christian tried, as he successfully did for a time, to
provide financial support. While Christian eventually failed to continue providing financial
support, this, however, is not enough to support a conviction. As there was no intention on his
part to cause the victim mental or emotional anguish, or public ridicule or humiliation by denying
financial support.
Neither could Christian be held guilty of violating Section 5(e)
The language of Section 5(e) above is clear: the denial of financial support, to be punishable,
must have the "purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's x x x movement or
conduct." To be sure, Section 5(e) uses the word "deprive" which, like the use of the word
"denial" in Section 5(i), connotes willfulness and intention.
In fine, and to reiterate, for deprivation of financial support to rise to a level that would make a
person criminally, there must be allegation and proof that it was made with the intent to control
or restrict the woman's and/or her child's or her children's actions.
The elements therefore:
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has
a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or
living within or without the family abode;
(3) The offender either (a) deprived or (b) threatened to deprive the woman or her children of
financial support legally due her or her family, or (c) deliberately provided the woman's children
insufficient financial support;
(4) The offender committed any or all of the acts under the third element for the purpose of
controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct.
Applying the foregoing to this case, the Court holds that Christian is also not guilty of violating
Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262 due to the absence of the third and fourth elements. There is no proof
that he deliberately refused to give support in order to control the behavior or actions of AAA.
Neither was there any allegation or proof that he prevented AAA from seeking gainful
employment or pursuing economic opportunities.
Abandons Melgar and REyes holding a person charged w 5e maybe charged w 5i, neither can
the 2 be construed as to mean that mere failure or inability to provide support is sufficient for a
conviction.
It is necessary to allege and prove the existence of the facts that qualify the act of denial or
deprivation of financial support from one in which mere civil liability may arise to one where a
person may be criminally liable. - without malice or evil intention - , courts cannot send
individuals to jail because of their mere inability. Wherefore, DEcision of CA is reversed and set
aside and the accused Christian is Acquitted.
ACTUS REUS MENS REA

5i
(Psychological V) Willful denial of financial Intention to inflict mental or
support. emotional anguish upon the
woman. (Psychological V)
5e Willful Deprivation of financial Intention to Control or

(Control of conduct and support. restrict the woman’s
agency) conduct( dependence)
(Economic Abuse)
XXX vs. People, GR255877, March 29, 2023 (failure to give support; psychological abuse)
FACTS:
XXX works as a seaferer
The case revolves around the married couple AAA and XXX, who works as a seaferer. AAA
testified that her husband XXX intially remitted part of his monthly salary but stopped after a few
months. They last spoke to each other sometime in 2004 but had fallen out of communication
everseince for the next 13 years which caused her extreme pain and humiliation. XXX on the
other hand testified that he was only forced to marry AAA and initially sends remittances to her
but had to request his employer to stop making the remittances in 2004 because his parents
became sick with cancer. He did not inform AAA about the remittances as he was traumatized
from their frequent fights.
RTC find him guilty for violation of Sec 5i due to his denial of financial support to AAA and was
affirmed by the CA.
Thus, this appeal.
ISSUE:
whether or not XXX is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5(i) of
R.A. No. 9262.
HELD: CHECK THE PREVIOUS CASE
It bears emphasis that Section 5 (i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are
inflicted on victims who are women and children." In prosecutions under Section 5 (i), therefore,
[p]sychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator" with denial of financial
support as the weapon of choice. In other words, to be punishable by Section 5 (i) of R.A. 9262,
it must ultimately be proven that the accused had the intent of inflicting mental or emotional
anguish upon the woman, thereby inflicting psychological violence upon her, with the willful
denial of financial support being the means selected by the accused to accomplish said
purpose.
This Court also notes that his failure to provide financial support was not because he wanted to
inflict mental and emotional anguish on AAA. but to help his father who was at the time in the
hospital because of cancer. AAA did not even in fact try to reach out. If she was indeed at the
time in need of financial support, she would have at least exerted efforts to obtain it. The fact
that she did not do anything casts serious doubt on her claim that she needed it.
Further, there can be no presumption for the need for support based on the circumstances of
this case as they have no children to rear and support, nor do they have conjugal house to
maintain. They had no standing obligations to pay off, thus XXX cannot be considered in bad
faith for presuming that AAA did not need him for support.
AAA's intentions in immediately filing this criminal case before even making any attempts to
obtain financial support is dubious. The obligation is not a one-way street for the husband to
support his wife. The wife has the identical obligation to provide support to her husband.
The Decision is Reversed and Set Aside and Petitioner is Acquitted.
XXX vs. People, GR250219, March 1, 2023 (Abandonment; psychological abuse)
FACTS:
AAA was in Singapore working to held sustain their family when she had learned that her
husband, petitioner is in a romantic relationship with another woman, CCC, who is also
pregnant with the petitioner’s child. The paramour would ocaasionally send messages to AAA
just to spite her and learned that petitioner brought CCC to their hometown, prompting her to
return to Philippines.
Upon learning that her husband and CCC cohabited, AAA sought the help of DSWD in getting
her daughter from her mother-in-law. BBB( AAA’s daughter) who at the time was only 9 years
old took a stand in the court, crying while narrating his father’s infidelity.
ISSUE:
Whether the
conviction of violation of RA 9262 of inflicting Psychological violence under sec 5i is correct.
HELD:
Yes. The Court in Reyes v. People, elucidated that conviction under Sec. 5(i) of RA 9262
requires proof of the indispensable elements of (1) psychological violence as the means
employed by the perpetrator consisting of any acts enumerated in Sec. 5(i) or similar acts, and
(2) the mental or emotional suffering or damage sustained by the offended party. It has been
further stressed that "the law does not require proof that the victim become psychologically ill
due to the psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional
anguish and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering,
jurisprudence only requires that [the victim testify in court and narrate such experiences].
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional
anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the
perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained
by the offended party.
RA 9262 defines violence against women and their children as any act or a series of
acts which result in or is likely to result in psychological harm or suffering. Marital infidelity is one
of the forms of psychological violence. The prosecution in this case was able to satisfactorily
establish petitioner's marital infidelity, his cohabitation with CCC who even bore him a child, and
his abandonment of AAA. BBB's psychological trauma was evident when she wept in open court
upon being asked to narrate the petitioner's infidelity.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and decision of CA is AFFIRMED.
Hazing Regulation Act (RA No. 8049), as amended by RA 11053
Dandy Dungo vs People, GR 209464, July 01, 2015 (APO – Up LosBanos)
Omar Villarba vs. CA and People, GR 227777, June 15, 2020 (Order of Kalantiao – CPU Ilo-ilo
City)
Carlos Paulo I. Bartolome and Joel A. Bandalan vs. People, GR 227951, June 28, 2021 (Tau
Gamma; Lyceum Cavite)
Arts. 267-292
People vs. Ustadz Ibrahim Ali, et.al., GR 222965, December 6, 2017 (Kidnapping;
elements; days immaterial)
Facts:
19 years old Oliz, together with her employer named Antonio Yu Lim Bo and the latter's wife and
daughter, on board a Blue Nissan Vehicle then driven by one Rene Igno who was ordered by
the herein accused to stop said vehicle somewhere at the vicinity of EAAB at Sta. Maria Road,
and thereafter through intimidation, commandeered and drove said vehicle with all its occupants
aboard towards San Roque and finally to the area of Pitogo beach with the clear intention on the
part of the accused to extort ransom money from said victim or other person; victim Christia Oliz
alighted from the vehicle and was able to run away and with the timely assistance of some
residents thereat as well as the arrival of the police authorities, prompted all the accused to
escape except accused Ustadz Ibrahim Ali y Kalim who was arrested thus briefly depriving the
liberty of said victim against her will; furthermore, the commission of said crime has been
attended by the aggravating circumstance of NIGHT TIME AND USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE.
Found by RTC guilty as principal of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
defined and penalized under Article 267, paragraphs 2, affirmed by CA.
Held:
In order for the accused to be guilty of serious illegal detention, the following elements must
concur: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he or she kidnaps or detains another, or in any
manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal;
and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained
or threats to kill the victim are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female,
or a public officer.
In other words, deprivation of liberty is qualified to serious illegal detention if at least one of the
following circumstances exists: (a) detention lasts for more than three (3) days; (b) accused
simulated public authority; (c) victim suffers serious physical injuries or is threatened to be killed;
or (d) the victim is a minor, female or public officer.
The CA was correct in ruling that the period of detention became immaterial in view of the
victim's circumstances. If, during the deprivation of liberty, any of the circumstances under
Article 267(4) of the RPC occurs, i.e, the victim was a female, the crime of serious illegal
detention is consummated.
The essence of serious illegal detention is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled
with the indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect such deprivationï¿½it is enough that
the victim is restrained from going home.
[inconsistencies on immaterial details do not negate the probative value]
People vs. Edilberto Norada, GR 218958, December 13, 2017 (No detention; homicide)
Facts:
Three men on board a Suzuki multi cab rented and spent some time at Room 106 of the
apartelle. PI Gotas inspected the room and saw bloodstains scattered inside and on its wall. He
was informed that one of the occupants of the room was Edilberto Norada y Harder (Norada).
Rosalina testified that appellant was a friend of her son. Appellant frequently visited their house
since the victim finances the former's fruit buying and selling business.
The testimony of the accused summarized that Accused Edilberto Norada declared that he and
Agustin Seva for sometime, have been hatching to organize a kidnap for ransom group in
Bacolod City. They then met villanueva who is friends with Pacil, who has a canadian friend
named Ray Truck, prompting the three, Augustian, Villanueeva and Norada in planning to
kidnap Truck.
Accused appellants revealed of renting a car, thus villanueva would then bring Pacil with Truck
with him to execute their kidnap plan. The latter however did not appear, resulting in the three to
kidnap Pacial instead, to where one of the accused had hit him with a wood upon resisting to be
tied.
RTC found the three guilty of complex crime of Attempted Kidnapping with Murder. (CA
affirmed)
Held:
The crime of kidnapping was not satisfactorily established

Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659. The crime has the following elements:
(1) the accused is a private individual;

(2) the accused kidnaps or detains another or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts tor more than three days;
(b) it is committed by simulating public authority:
(c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats
to kill him are made or;
(d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official.9
"The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled
with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but
also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time."
Courts should not indulge in speculation no matter how strong the guilt of the accused. Hence
since the offense of kidnapping was not sufficiently established, the trial court erred in holding
appellant liable for attempted kidnapping.
Treachery did not attend the killing, "Treachery cannot be presumed [for] the circumstances
surrounding the [killing] must he proved as indubitably as the crime itself."15 Treachery is
present ''when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make."16 "To constitute treachery, two conditions must concur: (1) the employment of means,
methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender's safety from any defense or
retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and (2) the offender's deliberate or
conscious choice of the means, method or manner of execution."
Conspiracy was established among the accused. These acts of appellant during and after the
killing indubitably show that he acted in concert for a joint purpose and a community of interest
with his co-accused in killing the victim. Thus applying the basic principle in conspiracy that "the
act of one is the act of all," appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator and regardless of his
participation, is liable as co-principal.
No abuse of superior strength as well, thus, Considering that none of the circumstances alleged
in the information, i.e., treachery and abuse of superior strength was proven during the trial, the
same cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder. Appellant can only be held liable for
homicide. Under Article 249 homicide of RPC.
People vs. Felipe Mirandilla, GR 186417, July 27, 2011 (Kidnapping with rape)
Facts:
39-day ordeal, it was eve of the fiesta in Barangay San Francisco, Legazpi City. At the plaza,
when AAA went out the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store, when while making her
way back, accused point thrust a knife at her, joined by other 4 man, one with a gun, and
boarded a tricycle to which he drove the victim in Rawis and have had carnal knowledge with
her (1 sexual assault), moving her from place to place (raped 27 times) until she succeedingly
escaped.
accused Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., (Mirandilla) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape; four counts of rape; and, one count of rape through sexual
assault.
Held:
guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with rape.
Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659,70 states that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is
raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
This provision gives rise to a special complex crime. As the Court explained in People v.
Larrañaga,71 this arises where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component
offenses.
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime
of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape.73 This is because
these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659
punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the
seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the
present case, there is only one crime committed – the special complex crime of kidnapping with
rape.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not have
taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible abduction
with rape. In People v. Garcia,74 we explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and
the woman was raped several times, the crimes committed is one complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was only necessary for the first
rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate count of rape.
People vs. Rogelio S. Mendoza, et.al., GR 233088, January 16, 2023 (Kidnapping for
ransom; “Choa”)
Facts:
Mendoza revealed that he and his co-accused were members of a group called "W aray-W aray
Kidnap for Ransom," which was responsible for the kidnapping of Carrie Choa (Carrie). The
members discussed the plan to kidnap Carrie(victim), , Carrie was asked to gave them the
name and contact number of her sister, Gliceree L. Continting (Gliceree). They told her that they
would demand PHP lMillion to PHP 2Million for ransom money. Victim was confined in the nipa
hut for four days and was released after.
Held:
In prosecuting a case involving the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, the following elements
must be established:
(a)intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his/her liberty;
(b) actual deprivation of the victim of his/her liberty; and
( c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.
In the instant case, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all
the elements.
First, accused-appellants' intent to deprive Carrie of her liberty was evident from the moment
she was forcibly taken at gunpoint.
Second, the victim herself categorically narrated how she was brought to Angono, Rizal and
detained in a nipa hut for four days.
Third, it was established that the purpose of kidnapping Carrie was to extort money from her.
People vs. Tyrone R. Dela Cruz and Sandy Viñesa, GR 248456, August 16, 2022 (two
counts Kidnapping for ransom; “Spouses Huang”)
Facts:
Elisa and her brother in law were kidnapped. She alleged that she was released by the
kidnappers in order to raise the ransom money for Jason's liberty. In the presence of the police
authorities, Elisa negotiated a deal with the kidnappers with the ransom money. After the
ransom had been paid, Jason was then released by the kidnappers.
The police authorities made a search as to the ownership of the white Honda Civic vehicle who
turned out to be Dela Cruz and was positively affirmed by the two victims to be one of the
kidnappers.
Held:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected
to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
For an accused to be convicted of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, the prosecution must
prove that: (a) the accused was a private person; (b) he kidnapped or detained, or in any other
manner, deprived another of his or her liberty; (c) the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and
(d) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.
2 counts of kidnapping for ransom
Pascasio Duropan, et.al. vs. People, GR 230825, June 10 2020 (Unlawful arrest)
Facts:
Duropan and Coloma were Barangay Kagawad and Barangay Tanod, respectively, of Lincod,
Maribojoc, Bohol.
Doubting Pacis' claim, Duropan and Coloma pushed Pacis and his companions on board two
(2) paddle boats. Pacis then protested and inquired whether Duropan and Coloma can arrest
them without a warrant. Despite their objections, Pacis' group was brought to the Police Station
of Maribojoc, Bohol
Upon investigation, Pacis and his companions were released. The Maribojoc Chief of Police
determined that the barangay officials had no legal basis to arrest Pacis.
Held:
ARTICLE 269. Unlawful Arrest. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, in any case other than those authorized by law,
or without reasonable ground therefor, shall arrest or detain another for the purpose of
delivering him to the proper authorities.
The crime of unlawful arrest punishes an offender's act of arresting or detaining another to
deliver him or her to the proper authorities, when the arrest or detention is not authorized, or
that there is no reasonable ground to arrest or detain the other.
As worded, any person may be indicted for the crime of unlawful arrest. This was affirmed in
People v. Malasugui,56 where this Court considered whether a public officer may be held liable
under this crime.
Failure to judicially charge within the prescribed period renders the public officer effecting the
arrest liable for the crime of delay in the delivery of detained persons under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. Further, if the warrantless arrest was without any legal ground, the
arresting officers become liable for arbitrary detention under Article 124.
However, if the arresting officers are not among those whose official duty gives them
the authority to arrest, they become liable for illegal detention under Article 267 or 268.
If the arrest is for the purpose of delivering the person arrested to the proper
authorities, but it is done without any reasonable ground or any of the circumstances
for a valid warrantless arrest, the arresting persons become liable for unlawful arrest
under Article 269.
A public officer whose official duty does not involve the authority to arrest is deemed a private
individual and may be liable for illegal detention. Illegal detention, defined under Articles 26761
and 26862 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes "any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him [or her] of his [or her] liberty[.]
In Osorio v. Navera, SSgt. Osorio was charged with kidnapping, a crime punishable under
Article 267 as the offense he committed was not service-connected.
Further, kidnapping is not part of the functions of a soldier. Even if a public officer has the legal
duty to detain a person, the public officer must be able to show the existence of legal grounds
for the detention. Without these legal grounds, the public officer is deemed to have acted in a
private capacity and is considered a "private individual." The public officer becomes liable for
kidnapping and serious illegal detention punishable by reclusion perpetua, not with arbitrary
detention punished with significantly lower penalties.
"in abducting and taking away the victim, [the accused] did so neither in furtherance of official
function nor in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in fine, in relation to their office,
but in purely private capacity, that they [committed the crime]."
to prosecute accused of the crime of unlawful arrest successfully, the following elements must
be proved:
(1) that the offender arrests or detains another person;
(2) that the arrest or detention is to deliver the person to the proper authorities; and
(3) that the arrest or detention is not authorized by law or that there is no reasonable ground to.
jurisprudence instructs that there need not be an actual restraint for curtailment of liberty to be
characterized as an "arrest."
Sanchez v. Demetriou explained what may be deemed an arrest:
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal
declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other and an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.
While deemed as persons in authority and agents of persons in authority, respectively, the
barangay kagawad and barangay tanod are not the public officers whose official duty is to arrest
or detain persons contemplated within the purview of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
"Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally
infirm." Both elements that justify an in flagrante delicto arrest were absent in this case.
First, Pacis was merely cutting nipa leaves when petitioners came across him. This act by itself
is not a crime.
Second, the group displayed no signs of suspicious behavior. The only overt act they saw Pacis
and his companions do was harvesting nipa leaves from a plantation in plain view and in broad
daylight.
People vs. Aida Marquez, GR 181440, April 13, 2011 (Failure to return a minor)
Facts:
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor
as defined and penalized under Article 270 by RTC, affirmed by CA
On September 6, 1998, after a trip to a beach in Laguna, Marquez allegedly borrowed Merano’s
then three-month old daughter Justine Bernadette C. Merano (Justine) to buy her some clothes,
milk and food, to which she agreed. When Marquez failed to return Justine in the afternoon as
promised, Merano went to her employers’ house to ask them for Marquez’s address. However,
Merano said that her employers just assured her that Justine will be returned to her soon.
On February 11, 1999, Marquez allegedly called Merano up again to tell her to pick up her
daughter at Modesto Castillo’s (Castillo) house in Tiaong, Quezon. To which she learned that
Marquez sold Justine to the family and that they gave Marquez Sixty Thousand Pesos
(₱60,000.00), showing a photocopy of the handwritten "Kasunduan" Merano then learned from
Castillo that in an effort to legalize the adoption of Justine, the Castillos turned over custody of
Justine to the Reception and Study Center for Children of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
Marquez’ version contends that it was Merano who offered Justine for adoption.
Held:
Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody of a minor person, shall
deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.
This crime has two essential elements:
1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and
2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians.
what is actually being punished is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to
restore the minor to his parents or guardians.27 As the penalty for such an offense is so severe,
the Court further explained what "deliberate" as used in Article 270 means:
Indeed, the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply
something more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or
intentionally and maliciously wrong.28 (Emphasis ours.)
It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with the custody of Justine. it
is undeniable that in both versions, Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take
custody of Justine. It does not matter, for the first element to be present, how long said custody
lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez was the one entrusted with the custody of the minor
Justine. Thus, the first element of the crime is satisfied.
As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6, 1998, the custody of
Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez. Whether this lasted for months or only for a
couple of days, the fact remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual
custody of Justine. Marquez’s deliberate failure to return Justine, a minor at that time, when
demanded to do so by the latter’s mother, shows that the second element is likewise
undoubtedly present in this case.
Joseph Anthony Alejandro, et.al., vs. Atty. Jose Bernas, GR 179243, September 7, 2011
(Grave Coercion)
Facts:
Petitioner alejandro is the lessee-purchaser of condominium unit No. 2402, in Pasig City under
the Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase with the lessor-seller Oakridge Properties, Inc.
(OPI). Alejandro sub-leased the Unit to the other 3 petitioners. However, a defect in the
air-conditioning unit prompted petitioners to suspend payments until the problem is fixed by the
management. Instead of addressing the defect, OPI instituted an action for ejectment before
MTC against Alejandro for latter’s failure to pay rentals. METC ruled in favor of Alejandro.
Though, after being directed by RTC to remove padlock, they padlocked the unit again and cut
off the electricity and water as well as telephone facilities.
Petitioner then filed complaint for Grave coercion against the employers of OPI who found them
probably guilty of unjust vexation, elevated to DOJ and CA (no avail)
For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be present:
1. that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong;
2. that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats or intimidation; and
3. that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other
words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
It was never alleged that the acts were effected by violence, threat or intimidation.
There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded
fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property
of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. 44 Material violence is not
indispensable for there to be intimidation. Intense fear produced in the mind of the victim which
restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is sufficient.
It was not alleged that the security guards committed anything to intimidate petitioners, nor was
it alleged that the guards were not customarily stationed there and that they produced fear on
the part of petitioners.
-To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person
shall be borne in mind.
In Sy v. Secretary of Justice, the respondents therein, together with several men armed with
hammers, ropes, axes, crowbars and other tools arrived at the complainants’ residence and
ordered them to vacate the building because they were going to demolish it. Intimidated by
respondents and their demolition team, complainants were prevented from peacefully
occupying their residence and were compelled to leave against their will.
The Court thus found that there was prima facie showing that complainants were intimidated
and that there was probable cause for the crime of grave coercion.
People vs. Pedro Consulta, GR 179462, February 12, 2009 (Robbery vs. grave Coercion)
Facts:
Nelia (complainant) along with other two female, boarded a tricycle on heir way to Pembo,
Makati City. Apellant, along with his brother blocked the tricycle and under their threats, driver
alighted and left. Appellants shouted invectives towards Nelia and thereafter grabbed her
necklace worth 3,500 pesos.
Trial court found him guilty of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons defined and penalized under
Article 294, paragraph No. 5, in relation to Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code, and is
affirmed by CA.
Held:
Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. – Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any
personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilt of robbery.
The elements of robbery are thus:

1) there is a taking of personal property;
2) the personal property belongs to another;
3) the taking is with animus lucrand(intent to gain)i; and
4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon things.
Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the overt
acts of the offender. It may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to
another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator.
The Court finds that under the above-mentioned circumstances surrounding the incidental
encounter of the parties, the taking of Nelia’s necklace does not indicate presence of intent to
gain on appellant’s part. Absent intent to gain on the part of appellant, robbery does not lie
against him.
Grave coercion, like robbery, has violence for one of its elements. Thus Article 286 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
"Art. 286. Grave coercions. – The penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding six
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without authority of law, shall, by
means of violence, threats or intimidation, prevent another from doing something not prohibited
by law or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.
"The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to robbery and the other to
coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the accused. Was the purpose with intent to gain to
take the property of another by use of force or intimidation? Then, conviction for robbery.
Was the purpose, without authority of law but still believing himself the owner or the creditor, to
compel another to do something against his will and to seize property? Then, conviction for
coercion under Article 497 of the Penal Code.
The Court finds that by appellant’s employment of threats, intimidation and violence consisting
of, inter alia, uttering of invectives, driving away of the tricycle driver, and kicking of the tricycle,
Nelia was prevented from proceeding to her destination.
Pedrito M. “Willy” Garma vs. People, GR 248317, March 16, 2022, (Grave Threat – actus reus;
mens rea)
Anti-Wiretapping Act (RA No. 4200)
Gaanan vs. IAC, GR L-69809, October 16, 1986 (Wiretapping-phone extension)
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and
accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between
one person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also
undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear
the caller's message with the use of an extension telephone line.
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons
such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in
order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted
advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be
punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of
similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or
arrangements.
There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of
a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
Felipe Navarro vs. C.A., GR 121087, August 26, 1999 (conversation must be private)
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained
or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications.29
Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is
not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by
the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversations; (2) that the tape
played in the court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the
persons such are claimed to belong.30 In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally
made the voice recording;31 that the tape played in the court was the one he recorded;32 and
that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan.33 A sufficient foundation was
thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry
against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner
Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
Arts. 293-310 – Robbery and Theft
Aristotel Valenzuela vs. People, GR 160188, June 21 2007 (nature of theft)
Fernando R. Pante vs. People, GR 218969, January 18, 2021 (lost and found)
People vs. Ronald V. Palema, et.al., GR 228000, July 10, 2019 ( Leonen, Art. 294)
Gemma Jacinto vs. People, GR 162540, July 13 2009 (impossible crime of qualified theft)
Theft by Employees and Laborers (PD 133)
Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Materials Pilferage Act (RA 7832)

US vs. Ignacio Carlos, GR 6295, Sept 1, 1911 (Electricity may be stolen; corporeal)
Anti-Carnapping Law (RA No. 6539 as amended by RA 10883)
People vs. Bustinera, GR No. 148233, 08 June 2004 (Felonious taking of taxi, animus
lucrandi)
Facts:
The said accused being then employed as one [of] the taxi Drivers of Elias S. Cipriano, and as
such has free access to the taxi he being driven, did then and there, without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, take, and carry away a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi with Plate No.
PWH-266.
Held:
Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified,
with respect to certain vehicles,27 by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as
"AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING."
Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed
by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the
property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen
consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken
from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.36
On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines "carnapping" as
"the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things." The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to
another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to
gain
Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of unlawful
taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same.
In the 2000 case of People v. Tan where the accused took a Mitsubishi Gallant and in the later
case of People v. Lobitania which involved the taking of a Yamaha motorized tricycle, this Court
held that the unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping law and
not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.
It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of
motor vehicles, it excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys,
street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on
public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers and
tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes. By implication,
the theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered by Article 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended and the provisions on robbery, respectively
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the
owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things;
it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he
has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
While the nature of appellant’s possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was hired as a
taxi driver and was entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its owner, which is
contrary to company practice and against the owner’s consent transformed the character of the
possession into an unlawful one. Appellant himself admits that he was aware that his
possession of the taxi was no longer with Cipriano’s consent as the latter was already
demanding its return.
The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in
any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed.Thus, the mere
use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.
Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the taking was "temporary" and for a
"joy ride", the Court sustains as the better view57 that which holds that when a person, either
with the object of going to a certain place, or learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride,
takes possession of a vehicle belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he is
guilty of theft because by taking possession of the personal property belonging to another and
using it, his intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom utility, satisfaction, enjoyment
and pleasure. Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites in his work Groizard who holds that the use of a
thing constitutes gain and Cuello Calon who calls it "hurt de uso.
People vs. Jeffrey F. Macaranas, GR 226846, June 21, 2017 (Carnapping with Homicide)
Facts:
Frank Karim Lanagaman, along with girlfriend Kathlyn Cervantes, boarding Frank’s motorcycle,
a green Honda wave 125, registered under a name of Jacqueline LAngaman. When they were
about to leave, 3 men approached them, with one of them helding Frank by the neck and
shooting him, causing Frank to fall down. The same man pointed the gun to Kathlyn and
demanded for her cellphone to which she gave and was thereafter hit in her head and acted
unconscious. One of the men took Frank’s motorcycle, while the third man searched the body of
Frank for any valuables.
RTC found accused appellants guilty of carnapping and was affirmed by the CA.
Held:
Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act: (1)
the penalty of life imprisonment was changed to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape,
and (3) the change of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." This third amendment clarifies the
law's intent to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis
paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons. Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution
has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim,
and more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping
and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof."
In People v. Bariquit, the accused-appellants were charged with, tried, and convicted for the
crime of robbery with homicide.
Under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, treachery is applicable only to crimes against
persons. Accordingly, inasmuch as robbery with homicide is a crime against property and not
against persons, treachery cannot be validly considered in the present case.
So, essentially, carnapping is the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle and it becomes
qualified or aggravated when, in the course of the commission or on the occasion of the
carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant is killed or raped.
As we have ruled in People v. Mejia:

The killing or the rape merely qualifies the crime of carnapping x x x and no distinction must be
made between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other which is committed "in the
course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof makes no difference insofar as the penalty is
concerned.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. The act of one is the act of all. It is present when one
concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt act leading
to the crime committed.
Anti-Highway Robbery Law (PD No. 532)

People vs. Glenford Samoy, et.al., GR 193672, January 18, 2012 (Robbery with homicide vs.
Highway robbery)
Facts:
Complainants left Tuguegarao city riding a small Isuzu Elf truck with Johnny on the wheel to
buy pigs. When the group reached the boundary of Allacapan, Cagayan, three armed men,
which included accused Glenford Samoy and Leodigario Israel, flagged them down. One
carried an M16 armalite rifle, the second a .45 caliber pistol, and the third a .38 caliber pistol.
The accused ordered those on the truck to alight and hand over their money. Melencio, who was
in charge of buying the hogs for their employer, immediately handed over the P60,000.00 he
had with him.
The accused then ordered their captives to get their things from the truck and go up the
mountain. When they hesitated, one of the accused fired his gun. The accused fired three
warning shots to stop those who where running away. When the latter did not heed the shots,
the accused fired directly at them. Melancio who was severely wounded was pronounced dead
on arrival.
The RTC found both Samoy and Israel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide, affirmed by CA
Held:
The RTC and the CA were likewise correct in finding accused Israel guilty only of robbery with
homicide, not of robbery on the highway as defined in P.D. 532. Conviction for the latter crime
requires proof that several accused organized themselves for the purpose of committing robbery
indiscriminately, preying upon innocent and defenseless people on the highway. Here, the
prosecution proved only one act of robbery.
Anti-Cattle Rustling Law (PD No. 533)
Canta vs. People; GR No. 140937, 28 February 2001 (Elements of cattle rustling)
Facts:
Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda Monter a cow, subject of the case, at 5
o'clock in the afternoon of March 13, 1986, Agapay took the cow to graze in the mountain of
Pilipogan in Barangay Candatag. However, when he came back for it, the cow was gone and
found hoof prints which led to the house of Filomeno Vallejos. He was told that petitioner
Exuperancio Canta had taken the animal.
Narciso Gabriel reported the matter to the police. Petitioner admitted taking the cow but
claimed that it was his and that it was lost on December 3, 1985. He presented two certificates
of ownership, one dated March 17, 1986 and another dated February 27, 1985, to support his
claim.
Narciso presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986, signed by the municipal
treasurer, in which the cow was described as two years old and female. On the reverse side of
the certificate is the drawing of a cow.
Held:
The crime is committed if the following elements concur:

(1) a large cattle is taken;
(2) it belongs to another;
(3) the taking is done without the consent of the owner;
(4) the taking is done by any means, methods or scheme;
(5) the taking is with or without intent to gain; and
(6) the taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against person or force
upon things
These requisites are present in this case. First, there is no question that the cow belongs to
Narciso Gabriel. Petitioner's only defense is that in taking the animal he acted in good faith and
in the honest belief that it was the cow which he had lost. Second, petitioner, without the
consent of the owner, took the cow from the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, despite
the fact that he knew all along that the latter was holding the animal for the owner, Narciso.
Third, petitioner falsified his Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle by asking Telen to antedate
it prior to the taking to make it appear that he owned the cow in question. Fourth, petitioner
adopted "means, methods, or schemes" to deprive Narciso of his possession of his cow, thus
manifesting his intent to gain. Fifth, no violence or intimidation against persons or force upon
things attended the commission of the crime.
Indeed, the evidence shows that the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle which petitioner
presented to prove his ownership was falsified.
The trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of violation of §2(c) of P. D. No. 533, otherwise
known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.
The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, all
laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this Decree
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Ariel Lopez vs. People, GR 212186, June 29, 2016 (Theft of carabao)
Art. 315 – Swindling or Estafa as amended by P.D. 1689
Ma Gracia Hao and Danny Hao vs. People, GR 183345, September 17, 2014 (syndicated)
In the case at hand, the question before us relates to the judicial determination of probable
cause. In order to properly resolve if the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s issuance of the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners, it is necessary to scrutinize the crime of estafa,
whether committed as a simple offense or through a syndicate.
The crime of swindling or estafa is covered by Articles 315-316 of the RPC. In these provisions,
the different modes by which estafa may be committed, as well as the corresponding penalties
for each are outlined. One of these modes is estafaby means of deceit. Article 315(2)(a) of the
RPC defines how this particular crime is perpetrated:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior toor
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business orimaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.
Under this provision, estafa has the following elements: 1) the existence of a false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; 2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; 3) the reliance by
the offended party on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, which induced him
to part withhis money or property; and 4) as a result, the offended party suffered damage.31
These cited factual circumstances show the elements of estafaby means of deceit. The
petitioners inducedDy to invest in State Resources promising higher returns. But unknown to Dy,
what occurred was merely a ruse to secure his money to be used in Danny’s construction and
realty business. The petitioners’ deceit became more blatant when they admitted in their petition
that as early as August 1995, State Resources had already been dissolved.37 This admission
strengthens the conclusion that the petitioners misrepresented facts regarding themselves and
State Resources in order to persuade Dy to part with his money for investment with an
inexistent corporation.
These circumstances all serve as indicators of the petitioners’ deceit. "Deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives or is
intended to deceive another, so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury."38
Thus, had it not been for the petitioners’ false representations and promises, Dy would not have
placed his money in State Resources, to his damage. These allegations cannot but lead us to
the conclusion that probable cause existed as basis to arrest the petitioners for the crime of
estafa by means of deceit.
We now address the issue of whether estafain this case was committed through a syndicate.
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689,39 there is syndicated estafaif the following elements are
present: 1) estafaor other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC
was committed; 2) the estafaor swindling was committed by a syndicate of five or more
persons; and 3) the fraud resulted inthe misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers
associations or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public
Not an estafa through syndicate as it is not done to other people.
People vs. Ronilee F. Cababuena, GR 233089, June 29, 2020 (estafa and illegal recruitment)
Conchita Dela Cruz, et.al. vs. Peolple, GR 236807, January 12, 2021 (Estafa through
falsification)
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing

estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of public, official, or commercial document. In other words,
the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official, or
commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the
commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the
public, official, or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.85
(Emphasis supplied.)
The elements of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the RPC are the following:
1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;
2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
Estafa was committed through the falsification of public documents, under Article 171 paragraph
4 of the RPC, by the accused public officers/employees taking advantage of their official
positions and making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. As held by the
Sandiganbayan:
First. There were false pretenses, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means in that it was made to
appear, through the use of the falsified documents, that the DPWH service vehicles in question
underwent emergency repairs that required purchases of spare parts, and that reimbursements
were due to accused Martinez;
Second. The false pretenses, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means, in the form of falsification of
documents, were employed prior to the commission of the fraud; that is to deceive the
government in paying the claims for the fictitious emergency repairs/purchases of spare parts;
Third. The government was induced to pay the claims relying on the false pretenses, fraudulent
acts or fraudulent means employed;
-and-
Fourth. The government suffered damages in the total amount of P5,166,539.00, the sum total
of the false claims paid.87 (Emphasis in the original.)
Clearly, the falsification of the DVs and supporting documents was a necessary means to
commit estafa. Without making it appear that there were emergency repairs and/or purchases of
spare parts, the accused would not have been able to obtain P5,166,539.00 in reimbursements
from the DPWH.
As to petitioners' guilt for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, such has also been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 provides:
SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
x x x x127
The elements of the above violation are:
(a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
(b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (c) his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.128
The elements are present in this case. As held by the Sandiganbayan:
First. Accused Arias, Borje, Castillo, Favorito, Quarto and San Jose are undoubtedly public
officers discharging administrative or official functions.
Second. All the aforementioned accused, in conspiracy with one another and with accused Dela
Cruz, acted with evident bad faith in falsifying official documents to deceive the DPWH into
paying the claims for the fictitious emergency repairs/purchases of spare parts in the name of
deceased accused Martinez.
Illegal Recruitment (RA 8042)
People vs. Marissa Bayker, G.R. No. 170192, February 10, 2016 (estafa and recruitment)
Illegal recruitment is committed by a person who: (a) undertakes any recruitment

activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article
34 and Article 38 of the Labor Code; and (b) does not have a license or authority to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.23 It is committed in large
scale when it is committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.24
The CA properly affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant by the RTC for illegal
recruitment committed in large scale because she had committed acts of recruitment
against at least three persons (namely: Canizares, Dahab, and Miparanum) despite her
not having been duly licensed or authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) for that purpose.
The conviction of the accused-appellant for illegal recruitment committed in large scale
did not preclude her personal liability for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code on the ground of subjecting her to double jeopardy. The elements of estafa
as charged are, namely: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or
by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party, or a third party suffered damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.29 In contrast, the crime of illegal
recruitment committed in large scale, as indicated earlier, requires different elements.
Double jeopardy could not result from prosecuting and convicting the accused-appellant
for both crimes considering that they were entirely distinct from each other not only
from their being punished under different statutes but also from their elements being
different.
The active representation by the accused-appellant of having the capacity to deploy

Miparanum abroad despite not having the authority or license to do so from the POEA
constituted deceit as the first element of estafa. Her representation induced the victim
to part with his money, resulting in damage that is the second element of the estafa.
Considering that the damage resulted from the deceit, the CA's affirmance of her guilt
for estafa as charged was in order.
Mildred Coching Liwanag vs. People, GR 232245, March 2, 2022 (Estafa and Illegal
Recruitment)
Held:
It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately of Illegal Recruitment
under RA 8042 or the Labor Code, and Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC.[48] Case
law holds that the same pieces of evidence that establish liability for Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale confirm culpability for Estafa.[49]
Estafa is defined under Article 315 of the RPC, which provides:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.
The elements of Estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation.[50]
All the aforesaid elements are present in this case. The prosecution sufficiently established that
accused-appellant defrauded the four private complainants by making them believe that she has
the capacity to deploy them to Japan as factory workers, even if she did not have the authority
or license for the purpose. Because of accused-appellant's promises to deploy them to Japan,
the victims willingly parted with their money as processing and placement fees to the
accused-appellant. Consequently, all the victims suffered damages in the amount of P40,500.00
each as the promised employment abroad never materialized, and the said money they parted
with were never recovered.
People vs. Perlita Castro Urquico, GR 238910, July 20, 2022 (Estafa and Illegal Recruitment)
Article 13(6) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as "any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advert1smg for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not."
Illegal recruitment, on the other hand is defined under Article 38 of the Labor Code as follows:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment.
(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of
this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal
and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Department of Labor and Employment or any
law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with A1ticle 39
hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
Illegal recruitment, as defined under Article 38 of the Labor Code, encompasses recruitment
activities for both local and overseas employment. However, illegal recruitment under this
article is limited to recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority.67 Thus, under the Labor Code, to constitute Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale,
three elements must concur:
1. The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined under Art. 13 (b) or any prohibited
practice enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code.
2. He did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers.
3. He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
Bouncing Checks Law (BP No. 22)
Socorro and Marie Paz Ongkingco vs. People (receipt of written notice of dishonor;
presumption)
Ariel Lim vs. People, GR 190834, November 26, 2014 (payment beyond 5 days)
Facts:
petitioner issued Bank of Commerce Check Nos. 0013813 and 0013814, dated June 30, 1998
and July 15, 1998, respectively, payable to CASH, in the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) for each check. It was Castor who ordered the delivery of printing
materials and used petitioner's checks to pay for the same. Claiming that the printing materials
were delivered too late, Castor instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment" order for the two
checks. Thus, the checks were dishonored by the bank because of said order and during trial,
when the bank officer was presented on the witness stand, he admitted that said checks were
drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). Private complainant Magna B. Badiee sent two demand
letters to petitioner, dated My 20, 1998 and July 23, 1998 and, subsequently, private
complainant filed a complaint against petitioner before the Office of the Prosecutor. After the
lapse of more than one month from receipt of the demand letters, and after receiving the
subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner issued a replacement check dated
September 8, 1998 in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). Private
complainant Magna B. Badiee was able to encash said replacement check.
Nevertheless, on March 19, 1999, or six (6) months after petitioner had paid the amount of the
bounced checks, two Informations were filed against him
RTX Found him liable for violation of BP 22 and is affirmed by the CA in toto.
Held:
the check was issued by the petitioner merely as a campaign contribution to Castor's candidacy.
As found by the trial court, it was Castor who instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment"
order for the two checks because the campaign materials, for which the checks were used as
payment, were not delivered on time. Petitioner relied on Castor's word and complied with his
instructions, as it was Castor who was supposed to take delivery of said materials. Verily, it is
easy to see how petitioner made the mistake of readily complying with the instruction to stop
payment since he believed Castor's word that there is no longer any valid reason to pay
complainant as delivery was not made as agreed upon. Nevertheless, two months after
receiving the demand letter from private complainant and just several days after receiving the
subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, accused issued a replacement check which was
successfully encashed by private complainant.
While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the
issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we
should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is consistent
with the purpose of and reason for the law.
In the more recent case of Tan v. Philippine Commercial International Bank, the Court
enumerated the elements for violation of B.P. Big. 22 being "(1) The accused makes, draws or
issues a check to apply to account or for value; (2) The accused knows at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank
to stop payment.
To facilitate proving the second element, the law created a prima facie presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit, which is established when it is shown that the
drawer of the check was notified of its dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to
fully pay the amount of the check or make arrangements for its full payment. If the check,
however, is made good or the drawer pays the value of the check within the five-day period,
then the presumption is rebutted. Evidently, one of the essential elements of the violation is no
longer present and the drawer may no longer be indicted for B.P. Blg. 22. Said payment within
the period prescribed by the law is a complete defense.
- Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check during the
five-day grace period would exculpate the accused from criminal liability
The fact that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check
after having received the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have
forestalled the filing of the Information in court. In effect, the payment of the checks
before the filing of the informations has already attained the purpose of the law
It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced check after the
information has been filed in court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused
from possible conviction for violation of B.P. Big. 22. Since from the commencement of the
criminal proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused
had every intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded
check, then there is no equitable and compelling reason to preclude his prosecution.
Furthermore, this case should be well differentiated from cases where the accused is charged
with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, In said case of estafa,
damage and deceit are the essential elements of the offense, and the check is merely the
accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value of the dishonored check will
not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability of the crime but
not the criminal liability.
Access Device Regulation Act (RA No. 8484) as amended by RA 11449
Anthony De Silva Cruz vs. People, GR 210266, June 7, 2017 (J. Leonen; Possession and use)
The possession and use of a counterfeit credit card is considered access device
fraud and is punishable by law. To successfully sustain a conviction for possession
and use of a counterfeit access device, the prosecution must present not only the
access device but also any evidence that proves that the access device is
counterfeit.
Cruz allegedly tried to purchase two (2) bottles of Calvin Klein perfume worth US$96.00 from
Duty Free Philippines Fiesta Mall. around 8:00 p.m., Cruz allegedly tried to purchase a pair of
Ferragamo shoes worth US$363.00. Ana Margarita Lim (Lim), facilitated the sales transaction.
Cruz paid for the purchase using a Citibank Visa credit card bearing the name "Gerry Santos,"
with credit card number 4539 7207 8677 7008. When Lim asked for Cruz's Duty Free shopping
card, Cruz presented a shopping card with the name of "Rodolfo Garcia." Lim asked for another
identification card, and Cruz gave her a driver's license bearing the name "Gerry Santos
Lim called Citibank after she noticed that the last 4 digits were not properly embossed and
Ctiibank informed Lim the credit card was counterfeit.
Held:
Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998, defines
an access device as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial number, personal identification number,
or other telecommunications service, equipment, or instrumental identifier, or other means of
account access that can be used to obtain money, good, services, or any other thing of value or
to initiate a transfer of funds (other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument).55
Since a credit card is "any card, plate, coupon book, or other credit device existing for the
purpose of obtaining money, goods, property, labor or services or anything of value on credit,"56
it is considered an access device.
Section 9(a) and (e) make the possession and use of a counterfeit access device as "access
device fraud" that is punishable by law:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 9. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts shall constitute access device fraud and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a)
producing, using, trafficking in one or more counterfeit access devices;
(e)
possessing one or more counterfeit access devices or access devices fraudulently applied for
Art. 320 – Arson
PD No. 1613 (Law on Arson)
People vs. Alamada Macabando, GR 188708, July 31, 2013 (Destructive v. simple arson)
Held:
In sum, Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.
contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not
included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.22 This law punishes
simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of
perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political, and national security implications than destructive arson
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these
elements have been proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the appellant set
fire to his own house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were
established during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which stated that
damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been intentional.
The act affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the
appellant’s act does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and
viciousness when compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The
established evidence only showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the
conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity
or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal
Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand,
acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of
perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple
Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security
implications than Destructive Arson.
People vs. Aubrey Enriquez Soria, GR 248372, August 27, 2020 (Arson with homicide;
Qualified arson)
Umandak, one of the neighbors of the Parcons, informed the latter that he recovered a travel
bag from a woman who jumped over the fence, and whom he suspected of having stolen it. The
woman was also carrying a shoulder bag. the police arrested the appellant, and was brought
before Parcon for identification. At the precinct, Parcon identified the items recovered from
appellant which included a gray shoulder bag, a pouch, a wallet, ladies' things and two (2)
cellular phones. Parcon recognized the two cellular phones to be his, while the shoulder bag
belonged to Cornelia.
Held:
What the evidence on record tells us is this - accused-appellant, who had just been hired the
day before the incident, had stolen the cellular phones of her employer Parcon, Jr., as well as
the belongings of her coworker, the deceased Cornelia Tagalog. To cover her tracks, she burned
her employment papers at Parcon, Jr.'s home office, which fire turned into a conflagration that
burned the entire Parcon house down and resulted in the death of Cornelia Tagalog. That
accused-appellant had in her possession the two cellular phones of Parcon, Jr. and the personal
effects of Cornelia Tagalog places her at the scene of the crime.
Art. 327 – Malicious Mischief
Robert Taguinod vs. People, GR 185833, October 12, 2011 (Elements)
about to queue at the corner to pay the parking fees, the respective vehicles were edging each
other. The CRV was ahead of the queue, but the Vitara tried to overtake, which resulted the
touching of their side view mirrors. The side view mirror of the Vitara was pushed
backward and naturally, the side view mirror of the CRV was pushed forward. This
prompted the private complainant's wife and daughter, namely, Susan and Mary
Ann, respectively, to alight from the CRV and confront the petitioner. Petitioner
appeared hostile and so petitioner instructed his family to return to the car.
Petitioner accelerated backward as if to hit them. When the CRV was at the upward
ramp leading to the exit, the Vitara bumped the CRV’s rear portion and pushed the
CRV until it hit the stainless steel railing located at the exit portion of the ramp.
the CRV sustained damage at the back bumper spare tires and the front bumper,
the repair of which amounted to P57,464.66. The insurance company shouldered
the said amount, but the private complainant paid P18,191.66 as his participation.
On the other hand, the Vitara sustained damage on the right side of its bumper.
Found guilty of Malicious Mischief under Article 3929 of the MeTC and affirmed by the
RTC. partly granted by CA
Held:
What really governs this particular case is that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under
Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;
(2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction;
(3) That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of damaging
it.
In finding that all the above elements are present, the MeTC rightly ruled that:
The following were not disputed: that there was a collision between the side view mirrors of the
two (2) vehicles; that immediately thereafter, the wife and the daughter of the complainant
alighted from the CRV and confronted the accused; and, the complainant, in view of the hostile
attitude of the accused, summoned his wife and daughter to enter the CRV and while they were
in the process of doing so, the accused moved and accelerated his Vitara backward as if to hit
them. the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the petitioner was clearly deliberate as
indicated by the evidence on record and the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does
not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the
CRV, the petitioner was just giving vent to his anger and hate as a result of a heated encounter
between him and the private complainant.
Mario Valeroso vs. People, GR 149718, September, 29, 2003 (act of hate)
Facts:
Petitioner put up a “no trespassing, PNB property” in the said lot but was nevertheless built on
with a nipa hut by Castillo, believing it was owned by her grandparents. Petitioner tore down the
said hut.
MTC rendered a decision, charging him of malicious mischief which was affirmed by rtc and ca.
Held:
The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code
are:
1. That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;
2. That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction;
3. That the act of damaging another’s property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it.
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, all the foregoing elements are present in this case. First,
he admits that he deliberately demolished the nipa hut of Mrs. Castillo. Second, the demolition
does not constitute arson or any other crime involving destruction. Third, as correctly found by
the CA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner was appointed caretaker of the subject lot on August 21, 1996. Upon the other hand,
private complainant constructed her hut thereon only in April 1997. Such being the case,
petitioner was not justified in summarily and extrajudicially demolishing private complainant’s
structure. As it is, petitioner proceeded not so much to safeguard the lot as it is to give vent to
his anger and disgust over Castillo’s disregard of the "no trespassing" sign he placed thereon.
Indeed, his act of summarily demolishing the house smacks of his pleasure in causing damage
to it
Neither can she invoke Justifying circumstances of fullfillment of duty or in the lawful exercise of
a right or office as the petitioner deliberately demolished the property of Mrs. Castillo without
any lawful authority. Thus, while the first requisite is present, the second is unavailing. The
petitioner was not acting in the fulfillment of his duty when he took the law into his own hands
and summarily demolished Mrs. Castillo’s hut.
Art. 333-346
Meynardo Beltran vs. People and Judge Tuazon GR 137567, June 20, 2000 (Nullity of
marriage; concubinage)
FACTS:
After 24 years of marriage, petitioner Meynardo Beltran filed a petition for nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. his wife Charmaine E. Felix answered in her petition that
it was the petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named
Milagros Salting, a criminal case was then filed for the petitioner for concubinage.
Petitioner filed a motion to defer proceeding but was denied by Judge Cervantes, he then filed a
petition for certiorari in RTC Makati, questioning previous denied motions and praying for
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction but was denied motion as well. thus the instant petition
for review.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners contention is correct.
HELD:
contention is untenable.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova, the fact where assuming that the first
marriage was null and void would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. So long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contacts a second marriage or in this case cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy/concubinage.
People vs. Hon. Ilarde, Cecile Santibanez and Avelino Javellana, GR L-58595, October 10,
1983 (adultery; private complaint necessary)
In the case at bar, the desire of the offended party, Efraim Santibañez, to bring his wife and her
alleged paramour to justice is only too evident. Such determination of purpose on his part is
amply demonstrated in the dispatch by which he filed his complaint with the police
[annex "A", supra]; the strong and unequivocal statement contained in the affidavit filed with the
Fiscal's Office that "I am formally charging my wife Cecile Sorianosos and Atty. Bob Javellana of
the crime of adultery and would request that this affidavit be considered as a formal complaint
against them"
[Annex "B", supra]; his filing of a complaint for legal separation against Cecile Santibañez with
the local Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court; and finally, in disinheriting his wife in his Last
Will and Testament dated January 10, 1981.
Undoubtedly, the complaint-affidavit filed by Santibañez contains all the elements of a valid
complaint, as "it states the names of the defendants, the designation of the offense by the
statute, the acts or omission complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party, the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed.
People vs. Sandy L. Domingo, GR 225743, June 7, 2017 (Forcible abduction absorbed in
rape)
Facts:
On January 24 2004, at around 8pm, private complainant, a saleslady in a public market in

rosario cavite was waiting for her cousin to fetch him when appellant, who worked at a fish stall
in the market approached the victim and asked if he could accompany her home. When the two
boarded the tricycle, the appellant poked the victim with a knife and stopped at a place not
familiar with her. Arriving at an unfamiliar house, appellant and aaa entered into a room, forcibly
undressed the victim while poking her with a knife and have had carnal knowledge with her.
Appellant invokes sweetheart theory.
Issue:
Held:
CA affirmed with the conviction of accused for forcible abduction with rape.
There is no complex crime of forcible abduction with rape if the primary objective of the accused
is to commit rape.
Under Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of forcible abduction are: (1) the
taking of a woman against her will; and (2) with lewd designs. The crime of forcible abduction
with rape is a complex crime that occurs when the abductor has carnal knowledge of the
abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when
the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under
12 years of age or is demented.
Although the elements of forcible abduction obtained, the appellant should be convicted only of
rape. His forcible abduction of AAA was absorbed by the rape considering that his real objective
in abducting her was to commit the rape. Where the main objective of the culprit for the
abduction of the victim of rape was to have carnal knowledge of her, he could be convicted only
of rape.
Art. 347-352; as amended by RA 10655
Marietta D. Zamoranos vs. People and Samson Pacasum, Sr., GR 193902, June 1, 2011
(Muslim divorce; bigamy)
Facts:
Zamoranos was a roman catholic who converted to islam and weded Jesus de guzman in islami
rites and subsequnlty wed in civl rigghts. The two then obtained a divorce by talaq after a year
and was confirmed by the Sharia Circuit District court. Zamoranos married anew with Samson
Pacasum in both islamic and civil rights but de facto seperated in 1998.
Pacasum filed cases against Zamoranos for annulment of marriage and declaration of marriage
alleging that she was previously married to De Guzman under civil rites and thus her marriage
with him is void and filed a charge of Bigamy
Issue:
Whether zamoranos is guilty of bigamy
Held:
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is
complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in
accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage
rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial one.
But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two
situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both
parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of
the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the male party is a Muslim
and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos’ divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an

Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari’a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was
valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989.
Atilano Nollora Jr vs. People, GR 191425, Sept 7, 2011 (Preferential application; bigamy)
Held:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following
essential requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after
the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a marriage
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this
Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code
of the Philippines] shall apply." Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the
claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his
professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
Luisito G. Pulido vs. People, G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021 (Effect of dissolution under
Art. 35-36)
16 yrs old married her teacher who was then 22 yrs old in a civil ceremony. Pulido then admitted
to be having an affair with Baleda whom he eventually married, indicating that Pulido’s civil
status is single.
Arcon file Bigamy, though Pulido in his defense insisted that their marriage was null and void for
lack of valid marriage liciense while his marriage with Baleda is null and void as well for lack of
marriage ceremony.
RTC found him guilty of Bigamy and Acquitted baleda which was affirmed by the CA.
Held:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines and penalizes Bigamy, viz.:
Art. 349. Bigamy. - The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
Judicial declaration of the absolute nullity of a prior void ab initio marriage secured prior to
remarriage is required before a prior void ab initio marriage may be considered a valid defense
in the prosecution of bigamy. For resolution of this Court is the subsequent judicial declaration of
the absolute nullity of Pulido's first marriage with Arcon which he presented as a defense in the
criminal prosecution for bigamy against him.
After a careful scrutiny of the records and rigorous reexamination of the applicable law and
jurisprudence, we find that there is enough basis to abandon our earlier pronouncement and
now hold that a void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy even
without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity.
To summarize and for future guidance, the parties are not required to obtain a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of a void ab initio first and subsequent marriages in order to raise
it as a defense in a bigamy case. The same rule now applies to all marriages celebrated under
the Civil Code and the Family Code. Article 40 of the Family Code did not amend Article 349 of
the RPC, and thus, did not deny the accused the right to collaterally attack the validity of a void
ab initio marriage in the criminal prosecution for bigamy.
However, if the first marriage is merely voidable, the accused cannot interpose an annulment
decree as a defense in the criminal prosecution for bigamy since the voidable first marriage is
considered valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted. The crime of
bigamy, therefore, is consummated when the second marriage was celebrated during the
subsistence of the voidable first marriage. The same rule applies if the second marriage is
merely considered as voidable.
To our mind, it is time to abandon the earlier precedents and adopt a more liberal view that a
void ab initio marriage can be used as a defense in bigamy even without a separate judicial
declaration of absolute nullity. The accused may present testimonial or documentary evidence
such as the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or subsequent void ab initio
marriages in the criminal prosecution for bigamy. The said view is more in accord with the
retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage, the purpose of and legislative intent behind Article
40 of the Family Code, and the rule on statutory construction of penal laws. Therefore, the
absence of a "prior valid marriage" and the subsequent judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
his first marriage, Pulido is hereby acquitted from the crime of Bigamy charged against him.
Art. 353-364
Leo A. Lastimosa vs. People, GR 233577, December 5, 2022 (Identifiable victim –

“Doling”)
According to the prosecution, Lastimosa had been a constant and vocal critic of then Governor
Gwendolyn Garcia (Garcia), which resulted in the filing of several other libel cases against him.
The prosecution asserts that the article "Si Doling Kawatan" was about Garcia, and that
Lastimosa wrote the same to tarnish her reputation as governor, "and as a Cebuana woman,
mother and grandmother.’
Held:
In this case, there is reasonable doubt in one of the elements, namely, the element that the
person allegedly defamed must be identifiable in the subject writing.
Libel is defined as a "public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead."23 "For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: a) it
must be defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim must
be identifiable." Absent any one of these elements precludes(fails) the commission of the crime
of libel.
the Court finds that the imputation in the article "Si Doling Kawatan" is indeed defamatory.
According to jurisprudence, "[i]n determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used
are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that
they were used and understood in another sense." Here, the character "Doling" was described
in the article as "abrasive," "cruel," "arrogant," and worst, "a thief." There is thus no doubt that
the subject article was defamatory.
the Court similarly finds that malice was present as the law presumes malice because of the
defamatory nature of the imputation. While it is true that criticisms against public officials or
public figures are considered privileged — and thus malice is not presumed — according to
jurisprudence, the said exception does not apply where the comment or criticism was about, or
extends to the private life of the public figure.
“Acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties will not
constitute libel. But, Any attack upon the private character of the public officer on
matters which are not related to the discharge of their official functions may constitute
libel.”
Although the gist of an action for defamation is an injury to reputation, the focus of a defamation
action is upon the allegedly defamatory statement itself and its predictable effect upon third
persons
:Action cannot be brought by a third person. (not actionable)
If no one is identified, there can be no libel because no one's reputation has been injured
IMPORTANT: Where the person subject of the defamatory words was not named, a libel suit
may only prosper "if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains
matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the
article may know the plaintiff was intended, or if he is pointed out by extraneous circumstances
so that persons knowing him could and did understand that he was the person referred to."
1- Identification through intrinsic reference

2- through description
3- extrinsic evidence
Raffy T. Tulfo vs. People, GR 187113, Jan 11, 2021 (J. Leonen; elements; publisher’s
liability; malice in law)
Facts:
These consolidated criminal cases originated from 14 Informations for libel filed against the
writer, publisher, and managing editor of the Abante Tonite column, "Shoot to Kill," which
covered stories on the alleged anomalous dealings of Atty. Carlos "Ding" So (Atty. So) of the
Bureau of Customs. At issue are the Revised Penal Code provisions on libel vis-ŕ-vis the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press and statements involving public officers in the
exercise of their official functions.
Abante Tonite columnist Raffy T. Tulfo (Tulfo) filed a partial Petition for Review,2 docketed as
G.R. No. 187113, assailing a portion of the Court of Appeals' Amended Decision3 That affirmed
his conviction for six of 14 counts of libel. Abante Tonite publisher Allen A. Macasaet (Macasaet)
and managing editor Nicolas V. Quijano (Quijano) also filed a partial Petition for Review,4
docketed as G.R. No. 187230, assailing the same Decision.
Issue:
First, whether or not petitioner Raffy T. Tulfo is liable for libel under Article 353 in relation to
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code;
Second, whether or not the published articles can be considered privileged communication
under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code;
Held:
ART. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the
following cases:
SEC. 9. A private communication made by any person to another, in good faith, in the
performance of any duty, whether legal, moral, or social, solely with the fair and reasonable
purpose of protecting the interests of the person making the communication or the interests of the
person to whom the communication is made, is a privileged communication, and the person
making the same shall not be guilty of libel nor be within the provisions of this Act.
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral,
or social duty; and
SEC. 7. No reporter, editor or proprietor of any newspaper is liable to any prosecution for a fair
and true report of any judicial, legislative, or other public official proceedings, or of any statement,
speech, argument, or debate in the course of the same, except upon proof of malice in making
such report, which shall not be implied from the mere fact of publication.
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in
the exercise of their functions.
SEC. 4. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the court, and if
it appears to the court that the matter charged as libelous is true and was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; otherwise lie shall be convicted; but
to establish this defense, not only must the truth of the matter so charged be proven, but also that
it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. ART. 361. Proof of the truth. - In every
criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that
the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and
for justifiable ends, the defendant shall be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be
admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against Government employees with
respect to facts related to the discharge of their duties.
Insulting words are not actionable as libel per se, and a consequent personal embarrassment
does not mean this is automatically equivalent to defamation. The court must still be satisfied
that, from the entirety of the impugned writing, it is defamatory.
Malice exists when the prosecution proves that the author made the defamatory statement
knowing it was false, or even if true, there is no showing of good intention and justifiable
motive.99 It "implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm"100 and exists when "the
offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely
to injure the reputation of the person defamed
The requisite of malice has evolved, there being a distinction between libel cases involving
private persons and those involving public officers and public figures. Thus, whether the
complainant is a private or public person is a factor that must be considered
As an exception to the presumption that every defamatory imputation is malicious, privileged

communication has two kinds: absolute and qualified. The distinction between these two was
discussed in Orfanel v. People,114 where this Court decreed:
[A] privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or conditionally privileged. A

communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if its author has
acted in bad faith. This class includes statements made by members of Congress in the
discharge of their functions, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the
issues, and the answers are responsive or pertinent to the questions propounded to said
witnesses. Upon the other hand, conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those
which, although containing defamatory imputations, would not be actionable unless made with
malice or bad faith. It has, moreover, been held that there is malice when the defamer has been
prompted by ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the
reputation of the person defamed.
this Court reiterated the actual malice test and discussed Article 361 on the defense of truth:
even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct,
unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice –
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan, which this Court
has cited with approval in several of its own decisions. This is the rule of "actual malice."
Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity
alone does not prove actual malice.
From these, it can be deduced that the impugned articles fall within the purview of
qualified privileged communications. These columns relate to Atty. So's exercise of his
official functions. His alleged actuations refer to matters of public interest which the
citizenry ought to know. As an official of the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So is subject to a
closer scrutiny by members of the media, who act as sentinels of the public.
The "reckless disregard" In Flor v. People, decreed that the existence of reckless disregard
cannot be based on "whether a reasonably prudent [person] would have published, or would
have investigated before publishing." Instead, it depends on whether sufficient evidence has
been adduced "to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as
to the truth of [their] publication."
Here, petitioner Tulfo's testimony on cross-examination does not show that the allegations were
false, or that they were made with reckless disregard of ascertaining whether the statements
were false or not. His testimony that no administrative case was filed against Atty. So does not
mean that the statements in the articles were false.
That petitioner Tulfo has never bothered obtaining Atty. So's side of the story, as respondent
insists,cannot amount to malice. While substantiatiating facts does play an important role in
reporting standands, a reporter may rely on a lone source's information, even if such information
only shows one side of the story, for as long as the reporter "does not entertain a 'high degree of
awareness of [its] probable falsity.'"
Michael C. Guy vs. Raffy Tulfo et.al, GR 213023, April 10, 2019 (J. Leonen; Libel of private
person)
Facts:
Written by Raffy T. Tulfo (Tulfo), the article reported that a certain Michael C. Guy (Guy), who
was then being investigated by the Revenue Integrity Protection Service of the Department of
Finance for tax fraud, went to former Department of Finance Secretary Juanita Amatong
(Secretary Amatong)'s house to ask for help.7 Secretary Amatong then purportedly called the
head of the Revenue Integrity Protection Service and directed that all the documents that the
Revenue Integrity Protection Service had obtained on Guy's case be surrendered to her.
RTC and CA found him guilty of libel under 353
Held:
Here, respondents published the libelous article without verifying the truth of the allegations
against petitioner. As the Court of Appeals found, the Revenue Integrity Protection Service only
investigates officials of the Department of Finance and its attached agencies who are accused
of corruption. Petitioner, on the other hand, is no government official and, therefore, beyond the
Revenue Integrity Protection Service's jurisdiction. It only goes to show that respondents did not
verify the information on which the article was based.
Jeffrey Torreda vs. People, GR 165960, February 8, 2007 (Grave slander vs. Libel)
Torreda and his four co-employees reported to Senior Vice-President Hisao Tanaka that,
Teresita Sepulveda had ordered them to prepare petty cash vouchers in their names and that
the sums covered by the vouchers were received by Sepulveda for her own personal use.
Consequently, Sepulveda was barred from approving petty cash vouchers with an amount
beyond ₱1,000.00. She was also required to make monthly reports of petty cash vouchers to
the Senior Vice-President. Thus, restrictions were imposed on Sepulveda’s authority to approve
petty cash vouchers.
Sepulveda opened Torreda’s personal computer and read his Lotus Notes mail and other
personal files, specifically the report he had sent to Tanaka about her. She reprimanded Torreda
and told him that he should not send mails to Tanaka without her approval.
Torreda reported the incident via electronic mail (e-mail) to Tanaka13 on the same day.
complained that Sepulveda had no right to open the computer because it was his, telling Tanaka
that Sepulveda used to open the employees’ computers; hence, she could no longer be trusted
On November 15, 2002, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.48 The NLRC
ratiocinated that the complainant committed the infraction of accusing his immediate superior of
stealing ₱200.00 and calling her a robber (through an e-mail message), without any evidence at
all, and forwarding copies to the other officers of the company. The NLRC declared that this
infraction constitutes serious misconduct, a just cause for dismissal under Article 282(a) of the
Labor Code, as amended.
Held:
Petitioner maliciously and publicly imputed on Sepulveda the crime of robbery of ₱200.00. As
gleaned from his Complaint dated September 7, 1999 which he filed with the General
Administration, he knew that it was Delos Santos who opened his drawer and not Sepulveda.
Thus, by his own admission, petitioner was well aware that the robbery charge against
Sepulveda was a concoction, a mere fabrication with the sole purpose of retaliating against
Sepulveda’s previous acts.
The records show that Sepulveda was impelled to forcibly open petitioner’s drawer. She needed
to retrieve the benefits applications of retirees and incumbent employees of
respondent-corporation, which petitioner had failed to process for payment before his leave. The
claimants sought to have their claims approved and released with dispatch. Before opening
petitioner’s drawer, Sepulveda saw to it that she had Kobayashi’s approval. Delos Santos
opened the drawer of petitioner in the presence of his co-employees in the Financial Section.
Thereafter, the claims were processed and payments were effected. Thus, Sepulveda acted in
good faith.79
Petitioner admitted that his charge of robbery/theft against Sepulveda was baseless, but
claimed that he fabricated the charge because of his exasperation and anger at Sepulveda’s
repeated acts of opening his drawer without prior permission while he was on leave, not only on
September 7, 1998 but also on September 10 and 11, 1998; he also pointed out that Sepulveda
looked into his personal files in his computer. In fine, by falsely ascribing a crime to Sepulveda,
petitioner was merely retaliating against perceived misdeeds she had committed against him.
However, the manner resorted to by petitioner of redressing the wrong committed by Sepulveda
is a criminal act. As the adage goes, the end cannot justify the means used by petitioner.
Medelarnaldo B. Belen vs. People, GR 211120, February 13, 2017 (Publication, privileged
communication)
Noel Villanueva vs. People and Yolanda Castro, GR 160351, April 10, 2006 (oral and
slander by deed)
Facts:
Grave Oral Defamation punishable under Art. 358, and Slander by Deed punishable under Art.
359
Held:
Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The term oral
defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and
defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or
means of livelihood
There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The gravity of the oral
defamation depends not only (1) upon the expressions used, but also (2) on the personal
relations of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances surrounding the
case.
In our previous rulings, we held that the social standing and position of the offended party are
also taken into account and thus, it was held that the slander was grave, because the offended
party had held previously the Office of Congressman, Governor, and Senator and was then a
candidate for Vice-President, for which no amount of sophistry would take the statement out of
the compass of grave oral defamation. However, we have, likewise, ruled in the past that
uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the
offended party constitutes only a light felony
In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society

against the use of intemperate language particularly because the offended party was a
Vice-Mayor. However, we cannot keep a blind eye to the fact that such scathing words were
uttered by him in the heat of anger triggered by the fact, as found by the Court of Appeals, that
complainant refused, without valid justification to approve the monetization of accrued leave
credits of petitioner.
In Reyes v. People [137 Phil. 112, 120 (1969)], we ruled that the expression "putang ina mo" is a
common enough utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather
to express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates one’s
expression of profanity. Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of resentment and not
necessarily to insult the latter.
Following the same principle as enunciated in our foregoing discussion of the first issue, we find
petitioner guilty only of slight slander by deed in Criminal Case No. 140-94 inasmuch as we find
complainant’s unjust refusal to sign petitioner’s application for monetization and her act of
throwing a coke bottle at him constituted a perceived provocation that triggered the "poking of
finger" incident
Slander by deed is a crime against honor, which is committed by performing any act, which
casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person. The elements are (1) that the
offender performs any act not included in any other crime against honor, (2) that such act is
performed in the presence of other person or persons, and (3) that such act casts dishonor,
discredit or contempt upon the offended party. Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes
slander by deed of a serious nature or not, depends on the social standing of the offended party,
the circumstances under which the act was committed, the occasion, etc. It is libel committed by
actions rather than words. The most common examples are slapping someone or spitting on
his/her face in front of the public market, in full view of a crowd, thus casting dishonor, discredit,
and contempt upon the person of another.
- Dirty finger of “Fuck you” sign is similar to expression putanginamo which is held not be
libelous in the case of reyes vs. people.
Enrique G.De Leon vs. People and SPO3 Leonardo, GR 212623, January 11, 2016 (Grave
vs. slight slander)
Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. It is
defined as "the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood."35 The elements of oral defamation
are: (1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, status or circumstances; (2) made orally; (3) publicly; (4) and maliciously; (5)
directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead; (6) which tends to cause dishonour,
discredit or contempt of the person defamed. Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It
becomes grave when it is of a serious and insulting nature.
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the

possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to
blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the
words used in the statement must be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their
plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading
them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.36|It must be
stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and
mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or
spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for
special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it
actionable by itself
Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends not only upon the
sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon the special circumstances of
the case, like the social standing or the advanced age of the offended party.38 "The gravity
depends upon: (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal relations of the accused and the
offended party; and (3) the special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship
between the offended party and the offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the
offender at the time. In particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger,
with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony.
To reiterate, their altercation and De Leon's subsequent defamation were not in connection with
SPO3 Leonardo's public duties. Taking into account the circumstances of the incident, calling
him "walanghiya" and "mangongotong na pulis" was evidently geared towards his reputation as
a private individual of the community. Thus, the defamation committed by De Leon, while only
slight in character, must not go unpunished.
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (RA 10175)
Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr.et.al. v. Secretary of DOJ, GR 203335, et.al, 18 February 2014
(cybercrime; double jeopardy)
Facts:
consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
Held:
VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial
communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time; and
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block
access to suspected Computer Data.
1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to
the original author of the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who
simply receive the post and react to it; and
2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as
VA L I D and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section
4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section

4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section
4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on
Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.1âwphi1
Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of
Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and
Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act
10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription
against double jeopardy; as well as
2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section
4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009
also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Quasi-Offenses (Art. 365)
Criminal negligence (Simple and Reckless)
Francisco Morales vs. People, GR 240337, January 4, 2022 (Art. 365)
Facts:
herein accused, driver of Mitsubishi Delica Van, bump a isuzu jeepney, with 3 passengers
sustaining serious physical injuries, The said jeepney was traversing the road of Sto. Rosario
Street, Angeles City on their way to Angeles City Market and were on the right lane, while the
accused was on the opposite lane when suddenly, petitioner overtook the vehicle in front of him
causing to occupy the lane of Jeepney, Rico tried to avoid collission to no avail since petitioner
was driving in a fast speed. The decisision of the mtcc was affirmed by both courts
Issue:
Whether conviation shall be uphold.
Held:
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) punishes the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and
"negligence." It defines reckless imprudence as voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to
do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his/her
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
regarding persons, time, and place.
Reckless imprudence is not merely a way of committing a crime. We noted that: (1) the object of
punishment in quasi-crimes is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, while in intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; (2)
the legislature intended to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses otherwise they would have
been subsumed under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent; and (3) the penalty
structure for quasi-crimes differ from intentional crimes in that the criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual wilful crime but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of
crimes.[36] Thus, the correct way of alleging quasi-crimes is to state that their commission
resulted in damage, either to person or property, such as reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide or simple imprudence causing damage to property
First approach (art 48) deals with complex crimes, allows single
prosecution of multiple felnoies (light
felonies excluded) will serve only the
maximum penalty for the most serious
crime. It is a procedural tool for the benefit
of the accu
forbids its application sanctions a single prosecution for all the

effects of the quasi-crime collectively
alleged in one charge, regardless of their
number and severity; should proceed
from a single charge regardless of the
number or severity of the consequences
art 48 not applicable to quasi crimes (complexing of a single quasi crime is forbidden)
incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes
Thus, it appears that in De los Santos, reckless imprudence is not treated as a crime
itself. Rather, it is regarded as a way of committing a crime. There, We stated that "[s]ince
Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the
definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions punishable by law" committed
either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa)."[42] "Crimes through negligence"
pertain to the offenses committed under Article 365.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the
amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should
be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for
the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, for both the injuries and
the damage committed were caused by one single act of the defendant and constitute
what may be called a complex crime of physical injuries and damage to property. It is
clear that the fine fixed by law in this case is beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal
court and within that of the court of first instance. - Simply put, if the imprudent or
negligent act covered by Article 365 results to both damage to property and persons, a
fine shall be imposed for the former and an additional penalty based on the penalty
scheme of Article 365 shall be meted for the latter. The information cannot also be split
into two
Venancio M. Sevilla vs. People, GR 194390, August 13, 2014 (Art. 365)
Facts:
Herein accused Venancio was charged with flasification of public document under article 171(4),
he is amember of sangguniang panlungsod, elected as councilor, who made a false statement
in a narration of facts in his CS form 212 by putting a “no” answer to a question wether he has
any pending criminal case to which he did. The defense claimed it as his staff who prepared the
PDS
Issue:
whether Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of falsification of public document through
reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against him in the Information was for the
intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.
Held:
foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a
modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separate
crimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or property.
the Information charged him with the intentional felony of falsification of public document under
Article 171(4) of the RPC while the prosecution was able to prove reckless imprudence resulting
to falsification of public documents.
To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that is
necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the
greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification
of public documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful act of
falsification of public documents.
What is penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the acts of dangerous recklessness
and lack of care or foresight although such mental attitude might have produced several effects
or consequences
Reynaldo V. Valencia vs. People, GR 235573, November 9, 2020 (Reckless imprudence)
Facts:
It was 4:30 in the morning when accused Valencia, a jeepney driver, was driving a passenger
jeepney. traversing Sagumayon Bridge when the jeepney suddenly shook and the passengers
at the back of the jeepney, namely Reymer Añonuevo (Añonuevo) and Richard Nicerio (Nicerio),
heard a loud thud, as if the jeep hit something solid.
The jeepney stopped, and when the two passengers looked out towards the road, they saw a
person lying face down. They informed Valencia that he hit a man; but instead of helping,
Valencia backed the jeepney up, continued driving, and told his passengers that he would tell
the police about the incident.
Another witness testified hearing the loud thud and someone inside a jeepney shouting “may
nabagnga” Valencia denied he allegations, as well as the alleged offer to settle the case
contented by Moises (victim’s son)
CA affirmed rtc convicting Valencia of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
Issue:
Whether accused is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
Held:
A careful review of the records convinces this Court that an exception to the general rule exists
in this case, particularly the first exception, or "[w]hen the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures."
As punished in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence:

[C]onsists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place
(1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is
voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless
imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
The prosecution was able to prove that Jaquilmo died on the bridge, but it failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner's imprudence in driving the jeepney was the proximate
cause of his death. No one testified as to the manner by which petitioner was driving before he
supposedly hit Jaquilmo, or of personally witnessing the jeepney hit Jaquilmo. Thus, failing to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the reckless imprudence, the hereby accused is therefore
acquitted.

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Section 1. Article 266-A (1)(d) of Act No.

3815, otherwise known as "The Revised Penal Code,"

"Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:

ARTICLE 266-A. Rape. When and How Committed - Rape is committed

Wether accused appellant is guilty fo rape

CASE of Jumawan (Rape of husband)

Whether Accused-appellant is guilty of marital rape

At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.

People vs. XXX, GR 257276, February 28, 2022 (Guiding principles

Wether the CA erred in convicting accused-appellant of Qualified Rape

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —

Wherefore, CA’s decision is affirmed with modification.

(Rape by SI vs. Sec 5b; Tulagan)

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

Anti-Child Abuse Law (RA No. 7610, as amended)

Whether sec 10(a) is the correct conviction.

SEC 5(b) 7610 specifically applies in cases of sexual abuse

Sec 10(a) punishes other forms of child abuse not

Whther the conviction is correct.

People vs. VVV, GR 230222, June 22, 2020 (Tulagan ruling)

Whether or not consent is a valid defense.

ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS 266-A(2)

LASCIVIOUS CONDUCT 5(B)

Prohibition of Child Marriage Law (RA 11596)

Definition of Terms [Sec. 3]

Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (RA No. 9208, as amended by RA 10364)

Acts of Trafficking in Persons [Sec. 4, RA 11862]

Death of Sayo extinguishes criminal liability.

SECTION 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered as qualified

(a) When the trafficked person is a child; xxx

RA 9208: amended by R.A. No. 10364

Act: recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining,

1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;

a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and

4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

It even resulted in other minors being brought to the hotel.

Furthermore, the prosecution sufficiently established that accused-appellant had carnal

Section 4-A of RA 9208, as amended by RA 10364, defines Attempted Trafficking in Persons:43

(i) the victim is a child; and

(i) the victim is a child; and

"SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – Violations of Section 4 of this Act shall be

(a) When the trafficked person is a child;

These elements are all present here.

Definition of Terms [Sec. 3]

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or

3. destroying household property;

Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children [Sec. 5]

(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

Protection Orders [Secs. 8-16] !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense [Sec. 26]

Jaime J. Araza vs. People, GR 247429, September 8, 2020 (Infidelity)

Section 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:

Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No.

Christian Pantonial Acharon People, GR 224946, November 9, 2021 (psychological abuse)

Neither could Christian be held guilty of violating Section 5(e)

ACTUS REUS MENS REA

5e Willful Deprivation of financial Intention to Control or

XXX works as a seaferer